COMMENTARIES 


ON 


THE   MODERN    LAW 


OF 


MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS 


INCLUDING 


PUBLIC  CORPORATIONS  AND  POLITICAL  AND 

GOVERNMENTAL  CORPORATIONS 

OF  EVERY  CLASS 


BY 

JOHN  W.  SMITH,  LL  D., 

OF  THE  CHICAGO  BAR 

Author  of  "  Receiverships,"  "  Equitable  Remedies  of  Creditors  ' 


BEING  A  REVISED,  RE-WRITTEN  AND  ENLARGED  EDITION 
OF  BEACH  ON  PUBLIC  CORPORATIONS 


IN    TWO  VOLUMES 

VOL.  I 


INDIANAPOLIS 

THE  BOWEN-MERRILL  COMPANY 

1903 


Copyright  1903 

BY 

THE  BOWEN-MERRILL  COMPANY 
T 

1903 


THE    HOLLENBECK    PRESS 
INDIANAPOLIS 


PREFACE  TO  THE 
MODERN  LAW  OF  MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS. 


The  changing  conditions  of  the  past  ten  years  have  brought  about 
an  extensive  development  of  the  Law  of  Municipal  Corporations. 

These  changes  are  so  numerous  and  are  of  such  importance  that 
this  new  edition  is  practically  a  new  treatise.  Some  of  the  chapters 
are  greatly  enlarged,  many  of  them  are  entirely  rewritten  and  a  num- 
ber of  entirely  new  chapters  have  been  added  to  treat  phases  of  the 
subject  which  have  developed  since  the  publication  of  Beach  on  Pub- 
lic Corporations. 

The  cases  decided  during  these  last  ten  years  have  been  carefully 
examined,  and  especial  care  has  been  taken  to  cite  them  accurately. 

The  author  has  endeavored  to  make  this  a  complete  and  up-to-date 
treatment  of  the  subject  of  Municipal  Corporations. 

Chicago,  January  1,  1903.  '  John  W.  Smith. 


(iii) 


^ri.^.O,QQ 


PREFACE  TO 
BEACH  ON  PUBLIC  CORPORATIONS. 


In  these  volumes  I  have  attempted  to  consider  all  the  law  of  public 
corporations,  including  municipal  corporations,  and  governmental  or 
political  corporations  of  every  class.  The  scope  of  the  work  is,  there- 
fore, somewhat  wider  than  that  of  any  other  with  which  I  am  ac- 
quainted. I  have  proposed  to  myself  the  task  of  making  a  treatise 
wiiich  shall  cover  the  entire  field  of  public  company  law  in  all  its  de- 
tails, using  the  term  "public  companies"  in  its  widest  modern  sense, 
and  I  have  studiously  undertaken  in  the  volumes  in  hand  not  to  omit 
the  law,  as  declared  in  the  decided  cases  or  defined  by  statute,  of 
any  sort  of  a  public  corporation. 

This  work,  therefore,  and  my  "Private  Corporations"  (Chicago, 
1891)  complement  each  other,  and,  taken  together,  are  intended  to 
constitute  a  complete  treatise,  in  four  uniform  volumes,  on  Company 
Law  in  all  its  phases,  from  the  federal  government  at  the  one  extreme 
— wliich,  in  this  country  at  least,  is  the  first  of  public  corporations 
(United  States  v.  Maurice,  2  Brock.  96,  109  (per  Marshall,  C.  J.)  ; 
Ableman  v.  Booth,  21  How.  506),  possessing  defined  and  limited  cor- 
porate powers,  with  the  capacity  to  contract  and  be  contracted  with, 
to  sue  in  its  corporate  name  ("The  Government  of  the  United  States," 
Cohens  v.  Virginia,  6  Wheat.  261)  and  to  be  sued  by  consent,  and 
which,  having  been  duly  created  as  a  corporation  by  the  people  of  the 
several  original  states,  acquired  a  true  corporate  entity,  and  went  into 
operation,  or  commenced  the  transaction  of  its  business,  on  Wednes- 
day, March  4,  1789  (Owings  v.  Speed,  5  Wheat.  420) — to  the  most 
insignificant  joint-stock  association  or  local  incorporation,  at  the 
other  extreme.     Within  this  wide  range  should  seem  to  be  included 

(v) 


VI  PREFACE. 

every  sort  of  an  association  among  men  which  passes  for  a  corporation 
or  a  company,  aside  from  partnerships  on  the  one  hand,  and  political 
sovereignties  on  the  other. 

The  subject  of  Public  or  Municipal  Corporations,  as  compared 
with  that  of  Private  Corporations,  is,  both  in  this  country  and  in 
England,  largely  statutory,  and  the  intelligent  reader  will,  therefore, 
perhaps  not  be  surprised  at  the  space  given  in  the  text  to  the  con- 
sideration of  many  local  statutes  and  ordinances.  Sometimes  these 
statutes  are  types  of  classes  of  statutes  found  in  many  states,  but  per- 
haps more  frequently  are  distinct  and  sui  generis^  and  must,  there- 
fore, in  a  treatise  designed  to  be  general,  be  separately  considered. 

In  collecting  and  arranging  the  matter  for  so  large  and  compre- 
hensive a  work  as  this,  I  have,  of  necessity  and  as  of  course,  relied 
very  much  upon  the  intelligent  and  faithful  labor  of  several  young 
men  in  my  office  upon  whose  assistance  I  have  come  very  much  to 
depend  in  work  of  this  character,  and  without  which,  in  view  of  my 
other  engagements,  it  would  have  been  altogether  impossible  for  me 
to  prepare  the  work  in  its  present  shape. 

I  trust  that  what  has  been  here  collected,  collated  and  digested 
upon  this  important  title  may  be  accorded  the  same  generous  and 
indulgent  reception  which  my  other  works  have  had  at  the  hands  of 
my  professional  brethren. 

New  Yorl',  February  i,  IS 93.  Charles  F.  Beach,  Jr. 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS. 


VOLUME  I. 


CHAPTER   L 

INTRODUCTORY — HISTORICAL   VIEW. 

Section  Page 

1.  The  genus  corporation  defined 1 

2.  Species  of  corporations -3 

3.  Public  corporations,  quasi-public  corporations  and  private  cor- 

porations      4 

4.  Subdivisions  of  public  corporations 6 

5.  Municipal  and  public  quasi-corporations  defined 7 

6.  Subdivisions  of  strictly  public  corporations 7 

7.  Definition  of  the  municipal  corporation 9 

8.  Definition  of  the  public  quasi-corporation 11 

9.  Examples  of  municipal  and  public  quasi-corporations 12 

10.  Counties    13 

11.  The  New  England  towns 14 

12.  The  same  subject  continued 16 

13.  The  state 17 

14.  Long  Island  towns 18 

15.  The  development  of  the  municipal  corporation — (a)    In  general  19 

16.  (b)  Greece  and  Rome 20 

17.  (c)   Italy  and  France — The  mediteval  cities 21 

18.  Conclusion    22 


CHAPTER  II. 

OF   THE   CREATION   OF   THE    CORPORATION. 

19.  The  Teutonic  town 26 

20.  The  old  English  town 27 

21.  The  same  subject  continued 28 

22.  Guilds   30 

23.  The  English  boroughs 31 

(vii) 


VIU  TABLE   OP   CONTENTS VOL.    I. 

Section  Page 

24.  The  same  subject  continued 33 

25.  Creation  of  modern  English  municipal  corporations 34 

26.  Municipal  corporations  created  by  charter  from  the  crown 35 

27.  Municipal  corporations  created  by  act  of  parliament 36 

28.  Municipal  corporations  at  common  law  and  by  prescription  in 

England     37 

29.  Municipal  corporation  by  implication  in  England 38 

30.  The  Municipal  Corporations  Reform  Act  of  1835 39 

31.  The  Municipal  Corporations  Act  of  1882 40 

32.  The  American  town — Local  self-government 42 

33.  The  power  to  create  municipal  corporations  in  the  United  States 

— Where  vested — (a)    In  the  state 44 

34.  (b)   In  the  federal  government 45 

35.  Municipal   corporations   created   by   the    federal    government — 

(a)    Territories 46 

36.  (b)   The  District  of  Columbia 47 

37.  Municipal  corporations  by  prescription  in  the  United  States 48 

38.  The  same  subject  continued — Instances  of  incorporation  by  pre- 

scription in  the  United  States 49 

39.  Municipal  corporations  by  implication  in  the  United  States 49 

40.  The    same    subject    continued 50 

41.  Creation  of  municipal  corporations  in  the  United  States — (a)  In 

general    51 

42.  (b)   By    special    charter 52 

43.  (c)   By  general  municipal  incorporating  acts 53 

44.  Constitutional   limitations   of   legislative   power   to   create   mu- 

nicipal   corporations 53 

45.  Construction   of   such    constitutional    limitations — (a)    Corpora- 

tions  "for   municipal   purposes"   and   "bodies  politic   or   cor- 
porate"      54 

46.  (b)   "Corporate  powers" 55 

47.  Miscellaneous  instances  of  such  constitutional  limitations 56 

48.  Incorporation  by  courts   56 

49.  The   same    subject   continued 58 

50.  Classes  of  cities  under  general  incorporating  acts 59 

51.  The  corporate  limits — Territory  of  the  corporation 59 

52.  Acceptance  of  charters  by  corporators  not  necessary 61 

53.  The    same    subject   continued 61 

54.  Substantial  compliance  with  incorporating  acts  necessary 62 

55.  Instances  of  irregularities  in  incorporation 63 

56.  Notice   of   incorporation 64 

57.  Validity  of  incorporation — How  tested 64 

58.  The  same  subject  continued 65 

59.  Existence  not  questioned   collaterally 65 

60.  The  charter  of  a  municipal  corporation  is  a  law 66 

61.  The    American    township 67 

62.  Local  self-government  a  delegation  of  legislative  power 68 

63.  The   same   subject   continued 68 

64.  Corporations  de   facto 69 

65.  Effect  of  incorporation 70 


TABLE   OF    CONTEIS'TS VOL.    I.  IX 


CHAPTER  III. 

THE    CHARTER. 

Section  Page 

66.  Early  charters   72 

67.  Political  element  in  charters 73 

68.  Charters  at  the  present  day 74 

69.  Municipal  charters  not  within  the  rule  of  the  Dartmouth  College 

case    75 

70.  The  present  English  statutes 76 

71.  The  municipal  corporation  acts  and  the  royal  prerogative 77 

72.  Contents    of    charter 78 

73.  Prominent  features  of  special  charters 79 

74.  What  charters  can  not  confer 80 

75.  Wherein  the  constitutional  limitation  consists 81 

76.  Acceptance — When    necessary 82 

77.  The  same  subject  continued 83 

78.  Compulsory   acceptance   84 

79.  Charters,   how  proved 85 

80.  Proof  of  fact  of  incorporation 86 

81.  Proof  of  corporate   existence 87 

82.  General   rules  of  construction   of   charters 87 

83.  Can  charters  be  modified 89 

84.  How  far  the  state  can  enforce 'performance  of  local  duties 90 

85.  Change   in   municipal   boundaries 91 

86.  Effect  of  amendments  of  charter  on  city  ordinances 91 

87.  Reorganization  under  general  law — Effect  of 92 

88.  Reorganization  must  be  strictly  according  to  statute 93 

89.  The    same    subject   continued 93 

90.  Effect  of  adoption  of  a  new  constitution 94 

91.  How  far  special  legislation  is  permissible 94 

92.  Written   constitutions — Operation   of 95 

93.  Power  to  make  by-laws — How  limited 97 

94.  Conflict  of  by-laws  and  general  acts 97 

95.  The  ordinance,  when  passed,  must  be  reasonable 99 

96.  Reasonableness — How  determined  100 


CHAPTER  IV. 

AMENDMENT,    REPEAL   AND    FORFEITURE   OF    CHARTER. 

97.  The  power  of  the  state  to  amend,  repeal  or  modify  the  charters 

of  municipal   corporations 102 

98.  The  charter  of  a  municipal  corporation  not  within  the  rule  of 

the    Dartmouth    College    case 104 

99.  Construction   of   repealing  and   amendatory   acts — (a)    General 

principles    105 


X  TABLE    OF    CONTENTS — VOL,    I. 

Section  Page 

100.  (b)  Statutes  in  pari  materia  construed  together — Repeal  by  im- 

plication           106 

101.  Municipal  charter  not  repealed  by  subsequent  general  law  unless 

intent  to  repeal  is  clear 107 

102.  The  same  subject  continued 108 

103.  Instances  of  repeal  of  charter  by  general  acts 108 

104.  Repeal  and  amendment  of  charter  by  subsequent  amendment  of 

state    constitution 109 

105.  Repeal  of  general  laws  by  enactment  of  municipal  charter 110 

106.  Repeal  of  general  laws  by  municipal  ordinance Ill 

107.  The  same  subject  continued Ill 

108.  Construction  of  amendatory  and  repealing  acts  made  applicable 

only  to  cities  of  a  certain  class 112 

109.  Effect  of  legislation  upon  the  charter  of  a  city  organized  under 

special  law,  and  not  by  its  acceptance  thereof  subject  to  the 
general    law 113 

110.  Miscellaneous  instances  of  effective  repealing  and  amendatory 

acts    114 

111.  The  same  subject  continued 115 

112.  What  is  an  amendment  or  repeal  of  a  municipal  charter? 116 

113.  Repeal— Effect  of 117 

114.  Acceptance  of  amendment 117 

115.  Manner  of  acceptance 118 

116.  Constitutional    limitations   on    power   of   legislature   to   amend 

or  repeal  municipal  charters — (a)   In  general 118 

117.  (b)    Special  legislation 119 

118.  (c)    Vested  .  rights — Impairment    of    obligation    of    contracts — 

Recognition   by   constitution 120 

119.  (d)   Title  of  amendatory  or  repealing  acts 121 

120.  The    same   subject   continued 121 

121.  Forfeiture  of  charter  in  England 122 

122.  The   same   subject   continued 123 

123.  Instances  of  forfeiture  of  charter  under  English  law 123 

124.  The  charter  of  a  municipal  corporation  in  the  United   States 

can  not  be  forfeited  by  judicial  action 124 

125.  The  same  subject  continued 124 


CHAPTER  V. 

MEMBERSHIP    AND    CITIZENSHIP PERSONAL    LIABILITY    OF    MEMBERS 

OF    THE    CORPORATION. 

126.  Definitions — Membership — Citizenship    126 

127.  Qualifications   for   membership   in   English   municipal   corpora- 

tions       127 

128.  The  same  subject  continued 128 

129.  Qualifications  for  membership  in  American  municipal  corpora- 

tions       128 


TABLE   OF    CONTENTS — VOL.    I.  XI 

Section  Page 

130.  Citizenship    in    England 129 

131.  The  same  subject  continued 130 

132.  Citizenship  in  the  United  States 131 

133.  Natural  citizens  131 

134.  The  same  subject  continued 132 

135.  Naturalized  citizens   132 

136.  The  same  subject  continued 133 

137.  Right  of  naturalized  citizens  to  hold  and  receive  lands 134 

138.  The  status  of  Chinese  before  the  law 135 

139.  The  status  of  American  Indians  before  the  law. . . .' 135 

140.  Privileges  and  immunities  of  citizens 136 

141.  The    same    subject   continued 137 

142.  Rights  of  citizens 139 

143.  The  same  subject  continued 140 

144.  Personal  liability  of  members  of  the  corporation 140 

145.  The  same  subject  continued — Russell  v.  The  Men  of  Devon 141 

146.  Personal   liability  of  members  of  public   quasi-corporations  in 

New   England 142 

147.  The  same  subject  continued 143 

148.  Beardsley  v.  Smith — (a)   The  reason  for  the  New  England  doc- 

trine of  personal  liability  of  members 143 

149.  (b)    The  doctrine  in  England 144 

150.  (c)  The  doctrine  in  Massachusetts  and  Maine 145 

151.  (d)    The  doctrine  in  Connecticut 146 

152.  Limitations   upon   the   personal   liability   of   members   of   New 

England   public   quasi-corporations 148 


CHAPTER  VI. 

OFFICERS   AND   AGENTS. 

153.  Legislative  power  to  create  officers  and  agents 150 

154.  Legislative  control  over  officers  and  agents 151 

155.  Who   are   officers? 151 

156.  Conduct  of  elections — Construction  of  election  statutes 152 

157.  Miscellaneous  instances  of  the  construction  of  election  statutes.  J53 

158.  Validity  of  election — General  principles 155 

159.  The  same  subject  continued — Illustrations 155 

160.  English  rule  as  to  majority 157 

161.  Election  by  ballot 158 

162.  Election  by  city  council 159 

163.  Election  by  definite  bodies  generally — Majority  and  plurality..  160 

164.  The  same  subject  continued — Quorum  majority 161 

165.  Informal   ballot    163 

166.  Tenure  of  office 163 

167.  Tenure  of  office  where  city  passes  from  one  class  to  another.  . .  .  165 

168.  Power  to  hold  over — English  and  American  rules 166 

169.  The  same  subject  continued 167 


Xll  TABLE    OF    CONTENTS VOL.    I. 

Section  Page 

170.  Appointment   of   officers 168 

171.  Validity  of  appointment 170 

172.  Appointment  by  de  facto  officers 171 

173.  Compensation  of  officers — In  general 171 

174.  The  same  subject  continued — Failure  of  corporate  funds 174 

175.  The  same  subject  continued — Illustrations 176 

176.  Miscellaneous    instances 177 

177.  Extra  compensation   178 

178.  Compensation  of  attorneys 181 

179.  The  same  subject  continued 182 

180.  Compensation — Power  of  legislature  to  control 183 

181.  Compensation  in  case  of  removal 184 

182.  Qualifications  for  office-holding 185 

183.  Official   oath 186 

184.  The  same  subject  continued 187 

185.  Duties  of  officers 187 

186.  Powers  of   mayor 188 

187.  The  same  subject  continued — Statutory  provisions 190 

188.  The  same  subject  continued — Miscellaneous  powers 191 

189.  Miscellaneous  instances  of  powers  of  municipal  officers 192 

190.  De  facto  officers — General  statement 194 

191.  The  same  subject  continued — Color  of  title 195 

192.  Incumbent  of  an  unconstitutional  office 196 

193.  Possession  of  office  by  de  facto  officer 197 

194.  Rights  and  liabilities  of  de  facto  officers 197 

195.  Resignation  by  acceptance  of  incompatible  office 198 

196.  Acceptance  and  withdrawal  of  resignation 199 

197.  Removal  of  officers  and  agents — How   effected 200 

198.  Causes  for  removal — English  and  American  rules 202 

199.  Preferring  of  charges 203 

200.  Power  of  corporation  to  remove  officers  and  agents 204 

201.  The  same  subject  continued 205 

202.  Notice  of  proceeding  to  remove 206 

203.  The   same   subject   continued 207 

204.  By   whom    discharged 208 

205.  All  persons  charged  with  notice  of  duties  and  powers  of  munici- 

pal agents    210 

206.  Liability  of  officers  to  the  corporation 210 

207.  Instances  of  fraudulent  acts  of  municipal  agents 211 

208.  Liability  of  corporation  to  officers 212 

209.  Indictment  of  municipal  officers 213 


CHAPTER  VII. 

PERSONAL   LIABILITY    OP    OFFICERS   AND   AGENTS. 

210.  Liability  on  contracts — Presumption  against  liability 215 

211.  The  same  subject  continued — Negotiable  instruments 216 

212.  The  same  subject  continued — Excess  of  authority,  fraud,  etc..   217 


TABLE    OF    CONTENTS — VOL.    I.  Xlll 

Section  Page 

213.  Exemption  from  liability  for  legislative  acts 218 

214.  The  foregoing  rule  qualified — Breach  of  trust 219 

215.  Liability  of  judicial  officers  considered 220 

216.  Quasi-judicial  officers — Corrupt  motive 221 

217.  Liability  of  ministerial  officers 222 

218.  The  same  subject  continued 223 

219.  No  personal  liability  for  strictly  public  acts 224 

220.  Default  of   subordinates 225 

221.  Ejection  of  member  of  council  by  order  of  mayor 226 

222.  Negligence  of  recorder  of  deeds 228 

223.  The  same  subject  continued 229 

224.  Liability  of  assessor  of  taxes 229 


CHAPTER   VIIL 

THE   LIABILITY  OF  THE  CORPORATION   FOR  THE  ACTS  OF   ITS  OFFICERS 

AND   AGENTS, 

225.  Introductory    232 

226.  Liability  ex  contractu — Requirements  for  valid  contracts 232 

227.  Contracts  within  scope  of  powers  of  corporation 233 

228.  The    same    subject   continued 234 

229.  The  doctrine  of  ultra  vires  applied  with  greater  strictness  to 

public  than  to  private  corporations 235 

230.  The  reason  for  the  rule 235 

231.  Municipal  bonds  void  when  ultra  vires 236 

232.  The    same    subject   continued 236 

233.  Ultra  vires — How  modified   by  estoppel 237 

234.  The  same  subject  continued — Hitchcock  v.  Galveston 237 

235.  Irregularity  in  exercise  of  power 239 

236.  Ultra  vires — How  modified  by  the  doctrine  of  implied  contract — 

General    principles 239 

237.  The  same  subject  continued 240 

238.  Illustrations  of  the  doctrine  of  implied  contracts 241 

239.  The  same  subject  continued 242 

240.  Liability  of  the  corporation  to  repay  taxes  illegally  collected..  242 

241.  The  same  subject  continued — Restrictions 243 

242.  Illegality  of  assessment 244 

243.  Actual  receipt  of  taxes  by  the  corporation 244 

244.  Compulsory  payment  of  taxes 245 

245.  The  same  subject  continued 246 

246.  Illustrations  of  the  rule 246 

247.  The  same  subject  continued 247 

248.  The  doctrine  of  the  federal  supreme  court  considered 248 

249.  The  same  subject  continued 249 

250.  Contracts  within  the  scope  of  powers  of  officer  or  agent 249 

251.  The  same  subject  continued — Clark  v.  Des  Moines 250 

252.  All  persons  contracting  with  strictly  public  corporations  charged 

with  knowledge  of  scope  of  powers  of  officer  or  agent 252 


SIV  TABLE    OF    CONTENTS VOL.    I. 

Section  Page 

253.  The  same  subject  continued 253 

254.  Liability  of  corporation  for  act  of  its  officers  or  agents  in  viola- 

tion of  law 254 

255.  The  same  subject  continued 255 

256.  Effect  of  representation  of  officer  or  agent  as  to  authority 255 

257.  The  same  subject  continued 256 

258.  Ratification  of  contracts 257 

259.  The  same  subject  continued 257 

260.  Ratification  by  authorized  officers  necessary 258 

261.  Manner  of  ratification 259 

262.  Manner  of  execution  of  contracts  by  officers  and  agents 259 

263.  The  same  subject  continued 260 

264.  Contracts  by  ordinance  or  resolution 261 

265.  Signature   of   contract 262 

266.  The  same  subject  continued 262 

267.  Liability  ex  delicto — (a)    In  general 263 

268.  (b)    Discretionary  and  legislative  acts 263 

269.  (c)   The  same  subject  continued 264 

270.  (d)   Ministerial    acts 265 

271.  (e)   Public  as  contradistinguished  from  private  duties 265 

272.  The  rule  applied  to  public  quasi-corporations 266 

273.  Conclusion.    267 


CHAPTER   IX. 

PUBLIC   BOARDS. 

274.  Corporate  assemblies  of  the  old  English  corporations 269 

275.  The  same  subject  continued — Notice  at  common  law 270 

276.  The  same  subject  continued — Presence  of  the  mayor 271 

277.  Regular  or  stated  meetings — Time  for  holding 272 

278.  Adjournments    273 

279.  Special  meetings   274 

280.  Adjourned  meetings  274 

281.  Notice  of  special  meetings 275 

282.  The  same  subject  continued — Specification  of  object  of  meeting.  277 

283.  Adjourned  meetings — Time  for  holding 278 

284.  Corporation  represented  by  governing  boards 279 

285.  The  same  subject  continued — Meeting  essential  to  official  action.  279 

286.  The  same  subject  continued — Delegation  of  powers 281 

287.  The  same  subject  continued 283 

288.  Delegation  of  powers — A  Pennsylvania  case 283 

289.  The  same  subject  continued — The  rule  limited 284 

290.  Constitution  of  council 286 

291.  The  same  subject  continued 286 

292.  Conflicting  councils — Kerr  v.   Trego 287 

293.  Acts  of  de  facto  councils 288 

294.  Quorum  of  definite  body 289 


TABLE    or    CONTENTS VOL.    I.  XV 

Section  Page 

295.  The  same  subject  continued 291 

296.  The  same  subject  continued — An  exception  to  the  rule 291 

297.  The  same  subject  continued — Special  charter  provisions 292 

298.  Quorums  and  majorities  further  considered — The  rule  in  Eng- 

land      292 

299.  The  same  subject  continued — Decisions  in  the  United  States. . . .  293 

300.  Further  application  of  majority  principle 294 

301.  Execution  of  authority  vested  in  two  persons 295 

302.  Presiding    officer 295 

303.  The  same  subject  continued 297 

304.  Commitment  for  contempt — Whitcomb's  case 298 

305.  Ayes  and  nays 299 

306.  Parliamentary  law    300 

307.  Reconsideration  and  rescission — General  power 301 

308.  The  same  subject  continued 301 

309.  Power  to  reconsider  and  rescind  qualified 302 

310.  The  same  subject  continued 303 

311.  Reconsideration   distinguished    from   appeal 304 

312.  Joint  assemblies  of  definite  bodies — Constitution  and   proceed- 

ings      305 

313.  Record   of  meetings 305 


CHAPTER   X. 

OFFICIAL  BONDS. 

314.  Official  bonds— Definition   308 

315.  What  officers  must  give  bonds 308 

316.  Form   and    requisites   of   bond 309 

317.  Effect  of  signing  official  bonds  in  blank 309 

318.  The    same   subject   continued 310 

319.  Construction  of  courts  on  bonds  improperly  approved 310 

320.  Defective  bonds  valid  as  common-law  obligations 311 

321.  The   same   subject   continued 312 

322.  Time  when  an  official  bond  takes  effect 312 

323.  Effect  of  not  filing  bonds  within  the  time  prescribed  by  statute. .  313 

324.  The  same  subject  continued 313 

325.  Liability  of  sureties  on  a  treasurer's  bond 314 

326.  The  same  subject  continued 315 

327.  Mingling  of  and  defalcation  out  of  two  funds 316 

328.  Liability  of  sureties  as  affected  by  subsequent  legislation 317 

329.  Liability   of   surety  when   subsequent  legislation   imposes  new 

duties  of  the  same  general  character 317 

330.  The    same    subject   continued 318 

331.  Liability  of  officer  on  his  bond  where  the  loss  is  occasioned  by 

the  act  of  God  or  the  public  enemy 319 

332.  The  same  subject  continued 320 

333.  Duty  of  obligee  to  notify  sureties  of  increased  risk,  etc 320 


XVI  TABLE    OF    CONTENTS — VOL.    I. 

Section  Page 

334.  Liability   of   sureties   on   successive    bonds — (a)    Wtiere    differ- 

ent sureties  are  given  on  each  bond 321 

335.  The  same  subject  continued 322 

336.  (b)   Where  funds  received  by  the  officer  during  his  first  term 

remain  in  his  hands  during  liis  second  term 322 

337.  (c)   "When  the  sureties  of  the  first  term  are  liable  for  money 

converted  or  collected  by  the  officer  during  his  second  term.  .   323 

338.  (d)  When  an  officer  before  entering  on  his  second  term  makes 

a  report  to  or  settlement  with  the  proper  authorities 323 

339.  The    same    subject    continued 324 

340.  (e)  Where  the  officer  applies  money  received  in  his  second  term 

to  pay  deficiencies  in  his  first  term 325 

341.  (f)   Where  the  bond  is  given  for  a  term  of  office  or  a  certain 

period  of  time 326 

342.  Laches  or  negligence  of  other  officers  or  principal 326 

343.  Liability  of  sureties  where  additional  bonds  are  given 327 

344.  Liability  of  surety  where  the  official  occupies  two  or  more  offices  327 

345.  Liability  of  surety  for  unofficial  acts  of  officer 328 

346.  The  same  subject  continued 329 

347.  Liability  of  sureties  for  acts  done  under  color  of  office 329 

348.  The    same    subject   continued — Lammon    v.    Feusier — The    doc- 

trine of  the  federal  supreme  court 330 

349.  The  same  subject  continued 330 

350.  The  same  subject  continued — The  doctrine  of  the  state  courts..  331 

351.  The  same  subject  continued 332 

352.  Illustrations  of  the  doctrine 333 

353.  Distinction  between  judicial  and  ministerial  duties 333 

354.  Illustrations    of    the    doctrine 334 

355.  The  same  subject  continued 335 


CHAPTER  XI. 


MEETINGS    AND    ELECTIONS. 

356.  Town  meeting  in  New  England  and  elsewhere 338 

357.  Right  to  meeting — Mandamus  to  enforce 339 

358.  Application  for  and  authority  to  call  a  meeting 340 

359.  Secondary  authority  to  call  a  meeting 341 

360.  General  purpose  of  a  warning 341 

361.  Designation  of  time  and  place  of  meeting 342 

362.  General  and   formal   requisites  of  a  warrant 343 

363.  The  same  subject  continued 344 

364.  Service    of    warrant 345 

365.  Time   of   service    346 

366.  Return  of  service 347 

367.  Notice  of  annual  meetings 348 

368.  The  same  subject  continued 349 

369.  Time   of  meeting 349 


TABLE    OF    CONTENTS — VOL.    I.  XVll 

Section  Page 

370.  Place    of   meeting 350 

371.  Organization  of  meeting — Tlie  moderator 350 

372.  The  same  subject  continued — Cleric  and  clerk  pro  tempore 351 

373.  Adjournments   of   meetings  352 

374.  The  same  subject  continued 353 

375.  The  power  of  adjournment  limited 354 

376.  Adjourned   meetings   354 

377.  Reconsideration    and    rescission — The   general    rule 355 

378.  The   same   subject  continued — Illustrations 356 

379.  The  same  subject  continued — The   rule  qualified 357 

380.  Ratification  of  doings  of  invalid  meetings 358 

381.  Parliamentary   law   in   town   meetings 359 

382.  The  same  subject  continued — Illustrations 359 

383.  Validity  of  votes  as  determined  by  the  warrant — Illustrations..   360 

384.  The  same  subject  continued 361 

385.  Invalidity   of   votes — Illustrations   362 

386.  The  same  subject  continued 363 

387.  Votes  at  town  meeting — General  rules  of  construction 364 

388.  Record  of  proceedings 364 

389.  Parol  evidence  of  proceedings 365 

390.  Doings  of  meetings  not  legally  called 366 

391.  Presumptions  in   favor   of   ancient  meetings 367 

392.  Notice  of  election 368 

393.  Qualification  of  voters — Power  to  prescribe 369 

394.  Registration    acts 370 

395.  Place   of   election 371 

396.  The  same  subject  continued 372 

397.  Popular    elections — Plurality    373 

398.  The  same  subject  continued — Majorities,  etc 374 

399.  Voting   by    ballot 374 

400.  The  same  subject  continued 375 

401.  The  Australian  ballot  and  cumulative  voting 376 

402.  Absolute  accuracy  not  required  in  a  ballot 377 

403.  Votes    for    ineligible    candidates 378 

404.  Putting  up  offices  at  auction — Tax  collector 379 

405.  City  council  as  judge  of  election  and  qualification  of  its  mem- 

bers       380 

406.  Canvass  and  return  and  contest  of  elections 380 


CHAPTER  XII. 

CONSOLIDATION   AND   REORGANIZATION. 

407.  How   effected 382 

408.  Power   of   legislature   383 

409.  Constitutionality  of  laws  for  annexation 383 

410.  Delegation   of   legislative   power 384 

1  Smith — ii 


XVlll  TABLE    OF    CONTENTS — VOL.    I. 

Section  Page 

411.  Illinois  decisions   385 

412.  Maryland  decisions  386 

413.  Michigan  decisions   387 

414.  Missouri   and   Tennessee   decisions 387 

415.  Ruling  as  to  Baltimore  City 388 

416.  Rule  as  declared  in  Washington 389 

417.  Powers  of  cities  under  the  laws 389 

418.  The  same  subject  continued 390 

419.  What  may  be  annexed — General  rule 391 

420.  The  same  subject  continued — Construction   of   statutes 392 

421.  The  same  subject  continued 392 

422.  Right  of  taxation  as  to  annexed  lands 393 

423.  Taxation    for   antecedent    indebtedness 394 

424.  Remedy    of   taxpayer  395 

425.  Effect  of  consolidation    395 

426.  The  same  subject  continued 396 

427.  Annexation    proceedings — Notice 396 

428.  Mode   of  voting 397 

429.  Jurisdiction  and  procedure   398 

430.  The  same  subject  continued 399 

431.  Reasonableness   of   annexation 400 

432.  Validity  of  annexation    400 

433.  Procedure  to  test  validity 401 

434.  The  same  subject  continued 402 

435.  Special  acts  as  to  reorganization 403 

436.  Nebraska    act 403 

437.  Effect   of    reorganization    404 

438.  The  same  subject  continued 405 

439.  The  same  subject  continued — Decisions  in  California  and  Ten- 

nessee       405 

440.  Validity  of  reorganization — Special  cases 406 

441.  Invalid    reorganization    407 

442.  Property  rights  passing  to  new  corporation 408 

443.  For  what  the  reorganized  corporation  becomes  liable 409 

444.  Further  scope  of  the  foregoing  doctrine 410 

445.  What  are   such   liabilities 410 

446.  Remedy  of  creditors  of  the  old  corporation 411 


CHAPTER  XIII. 

PARTITION    AND   DISSOLUTION, 
(a)   Partition. 

447.  Partition — General    rule 415 

448.  Validity    of    partition 416 

449.  Rules  as  to  division  of  counties  and  towns 417 

450.  Procedure  for  division  not  applicable  in  vacating  a  town 418 


TABLE    OF    CONTENTS — VOL.    I.  XIX 

Section  Page 

451.  Indiana   rules 419 

452.  Michigan  rules  420 

453.  Rules  as  to  severing  territory 421 

454.  Pennsylvania    rule    421 

455.  Constitutionality — Wisconsin   422 

456.  Rulings  as  to  constitution  of  Wisconsin  on  division  of  counties.  423 

457.  The  same  subject  continued — Uniformity  of  system  of  govern- 

ment       424 

458.  Title   of   act 425 

459.  Florida  decisions  on  constitutionality  of  acts 426 

460.  Kansas  decisions   427 

461.  How  partition  affects  officers  427 

462.  Where  unorganized   territory   has  been  attached  to   a   county.. 429 

463.  Settlement  of   inhabitants 430 

464.  Territory  severed  from  an  old  to  form  a  new  corporation  is  a 

part  of  the  old  until  the  new  is  fully  organized 431 

465.  Some   Wisconsin   acts   construed 431 

466.  Provisions  of  act  as  to  county  sites 432 

467.  Apportionment  of  liabilities 433 

468.  Rules  as  to  property  and  liabilities 434 

469.  The  same  subject  continued 435 

470.  A  Wisconsin  case  on  property  rights 436 

471.  Rules  as  to  apportionment  of  liabilities  and  remedies 437 

472.  Rules  in  North  Carolina  as  to  settlement  between  new  and  old 

counties    438 

473.  Rules  for  adjustment  of  liabilities 439 

474.  Liabilities  which  fall  upon  the  portion  severed 440 

475.  Defenses  to  claims  growing  out  of  partition 441 

476.  Enforcement  of  obligations  of  old  and  new 443 

477.  Miscellaneous   444 

(b)   Dissolution. 

478.  Dissolution — How  effected  in  general 445 

479.  The  same  subject  continued 446 

480.  Surrender  of  charter 447 

481.  The  same  subject  continued 448 

482.  Florida  decisions  on  constitutionality  of  acts  to  dissolve 449 

483.  Vacated  towns    450 

484.  This  was  no  dissolution 451 

485.  Effect  of  dissolution  as  to  liabilities  and  funds  in  hand 451 

486.  Effect  of  dissolution  upon  liabilities 452 

487.  What  does  not  affect  liabilities  and  remedies 454 

488.  Repealing  charters    455 

489.  The  same  subject  continued 456 

490.  Receiver   for  a  city 457 

491.  The  same  subject  continued 458 

492.  Where  such  a  receiver  was  appointed 459 


X2  TABLE    OF    CONTENTS — VOL.    I. 


CHAPTER  XIV. 

ORDINANCES   AND   BY-LAWS. 

Section  Page 

493.  Introducton    462 

494.  By-laws,   ordinances  and   resolutions 462 

495.  Distinction  between  ordinance  and  resolution 463 

496.  The  same  subject  continued — Illustrations 464 

497.  The  province   of   ordinances 465 

498.  Power  to  make. ordinances 466 

499.  The  same  subject  continued 467 

500.  By  whom  the  power  is  to  be  exercised 469 

501.  Validity    generally    469 

502.  Validity  in  respect  of  form — (a)   Meeting  of  council 470 

503.  (b)   The  same  subject  continued 471 

504.  (c)   Quorum  and  votes 472 

505.  ( d )   The  same  subject  continued 474 

506.  (e)    Mode   of   enactment 476 

507.  (f )   The  same  subject  continued 478 

508.  (g)   The  signing  of  the  ordinance 479 

509.  (h)   The  same  subject  continued 480 

510.  The  veto  power 481 

511.  (i)   Publication  of  the  ordinance — When  mandatory 482 

512.  (j)   The  same  subject  continued — When  directory 483 

513.  (k)   The    same    subject   continued — Amendments   and    re-enact- 

ments   484 

514.  (1)   Manner    of   publication 485 

515.  (m)   The    same    subject   continued , 486 

516.  (n)   Time  and  proof  of  publication 487 

517.  (o)   Title  of  the  ordinance 488 

518.  (p)   Record  of  the  ordinance 490 

519.  Validity  in  respect  of  matter — (a)    Constitutionality 491 

520.  (b)   The  same  subject  continued 492 

521.  (c)   Consistency  with   statute  and   charter 493 

522.  (d)   The  same  subject  continued 494 

523.  (e)   Consistency  with  general  penal  law 495 

524.  ( f )   The  same  subject  continued 497 

525.  (g)   Reasonableness  of  the  ordinance 499 

526.  (h)   The  same  subject  continued — Illustrations 502 

527.  (i)   The  same  subject  continued — Reasonableness  a  question  of 

law    505 

528.  (j)   Vagueness  of  the  ordinance 506 

529.  (k)   Ordinances  void  for  want  of  notice 507 

530.  (1)   Ordinance  granting  arbitrary  power 508 

531.  (m)   Ordinance  delegating  power 509 

532.  (n)   Ordinances  which  are  contracts 510 

533.  (o)   Ordinances  as  to  improvements — Valid 511 

534.  (p)   Ordinances  as  to  improvements — Invalid 512 

535.  (q)   Miscellaneous  ordinances — Valid  and  invalid 513 


TABLE    OF    CONTENTS — VOL.    I.  XXi 

Section  Page 

536.  (r)  Jurisdictional  matters  in  relation  to  ordinances 514 

537.  (s)   Curative    ordinances 514 

538.  (t)   Scope,  force,  effect,  etc.,  of  ordinances 515 

539.  Motives  of  council  not  to  be  impeached 516 

540.  Construction    of    ordinances 516 

541.  The  same  subject  continued — Miscellaneous 518 

542.  Ordinances  void  in  part 519 

543.  Amendment  and  repeal — By  subsequent  ordinance 520 

544.  Repeal  by  act  of  the  legislature 522 

545.  Repeals  by  implication 523 

546.  Power  to  impose  penalties 526 

547.  Mode  of  enforcement  of  ordinances — By  a  purely  civil  action.  . .   527 

548.  Jurisdiction  of  proceedings 529 

549.  Imprisonment  in  default  of  payment  of  fine 529 

550.  Imprisonment  as  a  penalty 531 

551.  Forfeitures   531 

552.  The  same  subject  continued 533 

553.  Cumulative  fines  and  fines  for  continuous  and  repeated  offenses.   534 

554.  Enforcement  by  complaint — Nature  of  the  proceedings 535 

555.  The  complaint — General  requisites 536 

556.  The   same   subject   continued — Pleading 537 

557.  Pleading   further   considered ' 538 

558.  Proof  of  ordinances 539 

559.  Right  to  trial  by  jury 541 

560.  The  same  subject  continued 542 

561.  Certiorari  and  habeas  corpus 543 


CHAPTER  XV. 

EXPRESS    CORPOEATE  POWERS. 

562.  Powers  of  a  municipal  corporation  generally 546 

563.  Delegation  of  powers 547 

564.  Delegation  of  power  by  the  municipality 549 

565.  Power  which  may  be  delegated 551 

566.  The  same  subject  continued 551 

567.  Exercise   of    powers 552 

568.  Mode  of  exercise 553 

569.  Proceedings  not  reviewable 554 

570.  The  same  subject  continued 555 

571.  Constitutionality  of  acts  granting  powers 556 

572.  The  same  subject  continued 557 

573.  Validity  of  acts  granting  powers 558 

574.  Power  to  "trade"  should  not  be  granted 558 

575.  Power  of  towns  as  to  villages  within  them 560 

576.  Power  as  to  issue  of  commercial  paper 561 

577.  As   to   trusts 563 

578.  Purchase  at  tax  sales 564 


rxu  table  of  contexts — vol.  i. 

Section  Page 

579.  Granting  exclusive   franchises 565 

580.  The  same  subject  continued 567 

581.  Contracts   not  exclusive 568 

582.  Improvements  generally 569 

583.  Costs  of  improvements 570 

584.  Gas  and  water  supply 571 

585.  Natural  gas  companies 573 

586.  Establishment  of  electric  plant 574 

587.  Public    property 576 

588.  The  same  subject  continued 577 

589.  Parks    ^ 578 

590.  Wharves    579 

591.  The  same  subject  continued 579 

592.  Markets    580 

593.  The  same  subject  continued 581 

594.  Streets    generally 582 

595.  Construction  of  statutory  provisions 583 

596.  Protection  of  streets 584 

597.  Obstructions  in  streets 585 

598.  Use  of  streets  by  street-railways 585 

599.  Telegraph  and  telephone  poles  in  streets — Removal 586 

600.  Vacation   of   streets 586 

601.  Grading  of  streets 587 

602.  Allowing  the  use  of  streets  by  railroads 588 

603.  The  same  subject  continued 588 

604.  Regulations  as  to  railroads  using  streets 589 

605.  The  same  subject  continued 590 

606.  Crossings   of    railways 591 

607.  Miscellaneous  matters  relating  to  streets 592 

608.  Sewers    593 

609.  Fire-limits— Public   health 594 

610.  Directions   as   to   buildings 595 

611.  Police    power 596 

612.  The  same  subject  continued 597 

613.  Regulation  of  liquor  traffic 599 

614.  To  promote  health 600 

615.  General  welfare,  etc 601 

616.  To   license 602 

617.  Occupations    602 

618.  The  same  subject  continued 603 

619.  Public  offenses 606 

620.  The  same  subject  continued 606 

621.  Nuisances    607 

622.  Holidays,    etc 608 

623.  Power  to  purchase,  lease  and  convey  real  estate 608 

624.  Power  to  subscribe  for  stock 609 

625.  Power  over  watercourses 610 

626.  Power  to  aid  private  charities 610 

627.  Miscellaneous   611 


TABLE    OF    CONTENTS — VOL.    I.  XXlll 


CHAPTER  XVI. 

ULTRA   VIRES. 

Section  Page 

628.  General  statement  of  the  rule 613 

629.  Purchase  of  land  for  use  of  a  railroad 615 

630.  Illustrations  of  the  general   rule 616 

631.  Grant  of  power  to  regulate  highways  construed 617 

632.  Contracts  for  exclusive  privileges  in  highways 618 

633.  Strictly  official  duties  not  to  be  confided  to  non-official  persons. .   619 

634.  Police  ordinances — Wooden   buildings 619 

635.  The  same  subject  continued — Railroad  crossings 620 

636.  The  same  subject  continued — Markets,  etc 622 

637.  Donations    622 

638.  The   same    subject   continued 623 

639.  Subscribing  to  stock  of  railroads 624 

640.  City  council  as  judge  of  elections 625 

641.  Governing  authorities  of  school  districts 626 

642.  The  same  subject  continued 627 

643.  Purchase  of  real  estate  for  school  purposes — Texas  ruling 628 

644.  Condemnation  of  land  outside  of  territorial  limits 628 

645.  Diversion  of  lands  dedicated  to  public  uses 629 

646.  Sale  of  real  estate — Prescribed  mode  controls 630 

647.  Appropriations  for  highways  and  school-buildings 631 

648.  Power  to  purchase  realty  does  not  authorize  giving  notes 632 

649.  Work  on  public  buildings,  etc 633 

650.  Issuing  of  bonds 634 

651.  The  same  subject  continued — Municipal  aid 635 

652.  The  same  subject  continued — Public  improvements 636 

653.  Contracts  abrogating  control  of  streets 637 

654.  General  legislation — Offers  of  rewards 638 

655.  Contracts  for  water  supply 639 

656.  The  same  subject  continued 639 

657.  Contracts  for  lighting  streets 640 

658.  Grant  of  exclusive  privileges 641 

659.  Curative   legislation 642 

660.  Ratification    643 

661.  Estoppel    644 

662.  Purchasers  of  bonds  are  bound  to  take  notice 646 

663.  Corporations  may  contest  ultra-vires  contracts 646 

664.  Liability  upon  ultra-vires  contracts 647 

665.  The  same  subject  continued 648 

666.  Ultra  vires,  when  not  a  defense  to  actions  by  the  corporation . .   649 

667.  Taxpayers'    resistance 650 

668.  Taxpayers'    suits 651 

669.  The  same  subject  continued 652 

670.  Suits  to  restrain  the  enforcement  of  contracts. 653 

671.  Injunction  the  proper  remedy 654 

672.  The   same   subject   continued 655 


XXIV  TABLE    OF    CONTENTS VOL.    I. 

CHAPTER    XVII. 

IMPLIED  POWERS    AND   EMINENT    DOMAIN. 

(a)   Implied  Poweks. 

Section  Page 

673.  General  statement  of  the  rule 658 

674.  Compromise  of  claims 659 

675.  The  same  subject  continued — Application  of  the  rule  in  Iowa. . .  659 

676.  The  dissenting  opinion  in  the  Iowa  case 660 

677.  Compromise  of  ultra-vires  claims 661 

678.  Submission  to  arbitration 662 

679.  Employment   of   attorneys 663 

680.  Power  to  hold  property  in  trust 664 

681.  Acquisition  of  property  for  other  than  municipal  purposes 665 

682.  The    same    subject    continued — Discretion    in    erecting    public 

buildings    665 

683.  Power  to  indemnify  officers 666 

684.  The  same  subject  continued 667 

685.  Offers  of  rewards 669 

686.  The  same  subject  continued — The  power  generally  denied 669 

687.  The  same  subject  continued — The  foregoing  rule  qualified 670 

688.  Expenditures  in  obtaining  or  opposing  legislation 671 

(b)   Eminent  Domain. 

689.  Nature  and  definition 672 

690.  The  same  subject  continued — Constitutional  limitations 673 

691.  What  property  may  be  taken 674 

692.  Quantity  of   estate 675 

693.  What  constitutes  a  taking 676 

694.  The  same  subject  continued — The  leading  case 676 

695.  The  same  subject  continued — Constitutional  amendments 678 

696.  Property  already  appropriated  to  public  use 678 

697.  The  same  subject  continued 679 

698.  Change  of  grade 680 

699.  Change  of  use — Additional  use 681 

700.  The   same  subject  continued — Electric  railways 682 

701.  Grant  of  power  to  municipal  corporations 684 

702.  Public   use    and   necessity    of    appropriation,    by    whom    deter- 

mined      685 

703.  Legislative    declaration    conclusive 686 

704.  Public  use  as  respects  municipalities — Parks  and  streets 687 

705.  The   same  subject  continued — Water,  gas,  etc 688 

706.  The  same  subject  continued — Cemeteries,  sewers,  etc 689 

707.  The  same  subject  continued — Leasing  for  public  use 690 

708.  The  same  subject   continued — Ornamental   purposes 691 

709.  Notice  of  proceeding — Necessity  for 692 

710.  Parties  entitled  to  notice 693 


TABLE    OF    CONTENTS — VOL.    I.  XXV 

Section  Page 

711.  Service   of   notice 693 

712.  Treaty  with    the   owner 694 

713.  The  application  or  petition 695 

714.  The    tribunal 697 

715.  Right  to   jury   trial 698 

716.  Right  to  abandon  proceedings 699 

717.  Damages  upon  discontinuance  of  proceedings 700 

718.  Compensation    701 

719.  Elements   in   estimating   compensation 702 

720.  The  same  subject  continued 703 

721.  Benefits    704 

722.  Payment    705 

723.  Review  of  proceedings — Certiorari 706 

724.  The  same  subject  continued — Appeal 707 


CHAPTER  XVIII. 

MUNICIPAL    CONTRACTS. 

725.  Municipal    contracts — General 709 

726.  Contracts — By  whom  made 709 

727.  What  is  municipal  contract 712 

728.  Implied   contracts 713 

729.  Ratification    of   contracts 714 

730.  Rescission  of  contracts 716 

731.  Modification  or  alteration  of  contracts 717 

732.  Acceptance  of  work  under  contract 718 

733.  Performance   of   contract 719 

734.  Waiver   of   performance 720 

735.  Breach   of   contract — Remedy 721 

736.  Payments  on   contract 721 

737.  Validity   of   contracts — General 723 

738.  Contracts  which  have  been  held  valid 725 

739.  Invalidity  of  contracts 728 

740.  Construction  of  contracts 736 

741.  Extras     738 

742.  Exclusive  franchises  and  privileges 739 

743.  Contracts  ultra  vires 740 

744.  Liability  of  municipality  on  contracts 741 

745.  Estoppel    745 

746.  Letting  of  municipal  contracts 747 


CHAPTER  XIX. 

LEGISLATIVE    CONTROL. 

747.  Legislative  control  subject  to  limitations 755 

748.  Powers  that  the  state  can  not  relinquish 756 

749.  Impairment  of  legislative  grants 757 


XXVI  TABLE    OF    CASES VOL.    I. 

Section  Page 

750.  The  same  subject  continued 758 

751.  Remission   of   forfeitures 758 

752.  Property  held  for  public  Uses 759 

753.  Tenui'e  of  office  of  municipal  officers 760 

754.  Agencies  of  municipal  administration 760 

755.  Diversion  of  funds 761 

756.  The  same  subject  continued — Public  interest  paramount  to  pri- 

vate   right 762 

757.  Application  of  revenues 762 

758.  The  same  subject  continued 763 

759.  Impairment  of  obligations  to  individuals 763 

760.  The  same  subject  continued 764 

761.  Impairment  of  remedies  against  the  corporation 765 

762.  The  same  subject  continued — Control  of  taxing  power  limited..  765 

763.  Vacating  assessments  of  damages 766 

764.  The  rule  summarized 767 


CHAPTER  XX. 

TORTS    AXD   CRIMES. 

765.  Torts  by  the  sovereign  power 770 

766.  The  state  not  liable  for  officers'  torts — No  respondeat  superior. .   771 

767.  Suits  against  United  States — Court  of  claims 772 

768.  Suits  against  New  York — Board  of  claims 773 

769.  Counties,  etc.,  as  divisions  of  the  state 774 

770.  The  same  subject  continued 775 

771.  Non-liability  of  New  England  towns 776 

772.  Liability  of  New  York  towns 777 

773.  Liability  of  towns,  etc.,  as  to  special  duties 778 

774.  Non-liability  of  school  districts  and  drainage  districts 779 

775.  Non-liability  for  separate  boards  and  bodies 780 

776.  Non-liability  for  torts  of  independent  officers 781 

777.  The  same  subject  continued — Who  are  independent  officers 782 

778.  The  same  subject  continued — Applied  in  New  York  City,  etc.  .  .  .    783 

779.  Liability  of  municipal  corporations  in  tort — General  principles.    784 

780.  Liability  in  performance  of  public  or  governmental  functions.  .   785 

781.  Duties  which  are  mandatory  and  discretionary 786 

782.  Duties  legislative  or  judicial 787 

783.  Liability  for  torts  of  public  officers 787 

784.  Liability  for  torts  of  officers  not  public 788 

785.  Liability   in  making  improvements,  etc 789 

786.  Torts  in  diverting  watercourses,  surface  water,  etc 790 

787.  Respondeat  superior  not  applicable  to  public  officers 791 

788.  Negligence  as  an  element  of  tort 793 

789.  Liability  for  collision  of  vessels 795 

790.  Torts  of  independent  contractor 795 

791.  Miscellaneous  matters  in  relation  to  torts 796 


TABLE    OF    COXTENTS — VOL.    II,  XXvii 

Section  Page 

792.  Non-liability    for    firemen 797 

793.  Non-liability  for  police 798 

794.  Liability  for  acts  of  mobs 799 

795.  Private  interests  must  yield  to  public 800 

796.  The  same  subject  continued — Destroying  buildings  to  check  fire.  802 

797.  Non-liability  for  negligence  in  public  service 802 

798.  Liability  in  matters  of  arrest 804 

799.  Non-liability  as  to  jails 804 

800.  Non-liability  as  to  hospitals 806 

801.  Non-liability  as  to  fireworks 807 

802.  Liability  as  to  city  wells  and  water 808 

803.  Non-liability  to  trespassers 809 

804.  Liability  for  nuisances 810 

805.  Municipal  liability  in  general 812 

806.  Chartered    cities,    etc.,    distinguished    from    counties,    etc. — The 

conflict    812 

807.  Municipal  liability  in  exercise  of  private  powers 814 

808.  Liability  commensurate  with  duty 816 

809.  Municipal  liability  as  to  water  front 817 

810.  Liability  for  fright  of  horses 817 

811.  Municipal  liability  for  acts  of  officers  and  agents 818 

812.  Not  liable  for  ultra-vires  acts  of  officers 819 

813.  Non-liability  in  the  exercise  of  discretionary  powers 819 

814.  The  same  subject  continued — New  York  and  Georgia  rule 821 

815.  The  same  subject  continued — Drainage 821 

816.  Non-liability  for  errors  of  judgment 822 

817.  Liability   for  trespass 823 

818.  Liability  for  waste 825 

819.  Liability  after  notice — Implied  notice 826 

820.  The  same  subject  continued — Statutory  notice 827 

821.  The  same  subject  continued — New  York  decisions 829 

822.  Impeaching  municipal  legislative  acts  for  fraud 829 

823.  Indictment   for  torts 830 

824.  Not  indictable  for  felony 832 


VOLUME  II. 


CHAPTER  XXI. 

FISCAL   MANAGEMENT, 
(a)   Power  to  Incur  Indebtedness. 

825.  Manner  of  contracting 834 

826.  Construction  of  statutory  provisions 835 

827.  Borrowing  money    837 

828.  The    same    subject   continued 838 

829.  Employment  of  attorneys 840 


XXVlll  TABLE    OF    CONTENTS — VOL.    II. 

Section  Page 

830.  Contracts  for  construction  of  county  buildings 840 

831.  Support  of  the  poor 841 

832.  Taxation  for  scliool  purposes 843 

833.  Tlie  same  subject  continued 844 

834.  The  same  subject  continued — Validity  of  resolutions 845 

835.  Levy   of   taxes 846 

836.  Contracts  for  water  supply  and  lighting 847 

837.  School  boards  and  directors 848 

838.  Erection   of    school-houses 849 

.    839.  School  district  boards — Contracts  for  building 851 

839a.  Contracts   with    teachers 852 

840.  Authority  of  county  treasurer,  etc 853 

841.  Authority  of  officers  in  particular  instances 854 

842.  The  same  subject  continued 855 

843.  Powers  of  a  trustee  of  a  school  township 856 

844.  Town   selectmen,   etc 857 

845.  The  same  subject  continued 858 

846.  Township    boards 859 

847.  The  same  subject  continued — Michigan  decisions 860 

848.  Town  trustees — Indiana  decisions 861 

849.  The   same    subject   continued 862 

850.  Directors  of  schools — Illinois  decisions 864 

851.  Town   supervisors — Illinois  and  Minnesota   decisions 865 

852.  Power  of  towns  and  town  officers  in  Maine 866 

853.  Powers  of  towns  in  Massachusetts 866 

854.  Michigan    decisions 867 

855.  Selectmen  in  New  Hampshire 868 

856.  Towns  and  town  officers  in  New  York 869 

857.  Vermont    decisions ' 870 

858.  Debts  which  are  valid 871 

859.  Debts  which   are   invalid 872 

860.  Miscellaneous  matters  pertaining  to  municipal  debts 872 

(b)   Limitation  of  Indebtedness. 

861.  Limitation  on  power  to  create  municipal  indebtedness 873 

862.  Indebtedness  depending  on  popular  vote 874 

863.  Indebtedness  limited  by  a  per  cent,  of  valuation 875 

864.  Preliminary  provisions  for  a  sinking  fund 875 

865.  Aggregate   indebtedness — How  determined 875 

866.  Evasion  of  constitutional   limitations 880 

867.  Indebtedness  in  excess  of  limit  not  a  defense,  when 882 

868.  Construction  of  constitutional  provisions 882 

869.  Rulings  of  the  United  States  supreme  court 884 

870.  Rulings  in   California 885 

871.  Rulings   in   Colorado 886 

872.  Rulings    in    Illinois 887 

873.  Rulings  in    Indiana 889 

874.  Rulings  under  the  Iowa  constitution 890 

875.  The  same  subject  continued 891 


TABLE    OF    CONTENTS — VOL.    II.  Xxix 

Section  Page 

876.  Rulings  under  the  Oregon  and  "Washington  constitutions 891 

877.  Rulings  under  Texas  laws 892 

878.  Rulings  in  West  Virginia 893 

879.  Special  statutory  provisions 893 

880.  The  same  subject  continued 894 

881.  Indebtedness  for  water  and  lights 895 

882.  Effect  of  exceeding  the  limit 896 

883.  Remedy  of  taxpayers  against  increase  of  debt 897 


CHAPTER  XXII. 

MUNICIPAL   FUNDS. 

(a)   Care  and  Disbursement  of  Funds. 

885.  Funds  appropriated  to  specific   uses 900 

886.  Custodians   of   funds 901 

887.  The    same    subject  continued 903 

888.  Compensation   of   treasurers 904 

889.  The  same  subject  continued 905 

890.  Settlements  with   treasurers 906 

891.  Actions  to  recover  county  funds. 907 

892.  Actions  on  treasurer's  bonds 908 

893.  Public    depositories 909 

894.  Examination  of  county,  officers'  accounts 910 

895.  Liability  of  custodians  of  funds 911 

896.  Liabilities  on  bonds  of  custodians  of  school  funds 912 

897.  Investment  of  school   funds 913 

898.  Loan  of  school  funds 913 

899.  Liability  of  officers  and  agents  of  towns 914 

900.  Miscellaneous  expenditures 915 

(b)  Appropriations. 

901.  Appropriations  out  of  special  funds 916 

902.  Appropriations  anticipating  revenue 917 

903.  Special   funds 918 

904.  The  same  subject  continued — Construction  of  statutes 918 

905.  Statutory  provisions  further  considered 919 

906.  Appropriations   for   schools 920 

907.  The  same  subject  continued 922 

908.  Budget    923 

909.  Annual    appropriations 924 

910.  Appropriation  of  taxes  to  sinking  fund 924 

911.  Validity  of  appropriations 925 

912.  Appropriations  held  to  be  void 926 


XXX  TABLE    OF    CONTENTS VOL.    II. 

(c)   UxLAWFUL  Expenditures. 

Section  Page 

913.  The  New  York  statute  providing  for  investigation 926 

(d)   Claims. 

914.  Presentation  of  claims  for  allowance 928 

915.  Notice — Sufficiency,   etc 929 

916.  Notices  which  have  been  held  sufficient  or  insufficient 929 

917.  Statute  applies  to  claims  for  tort 930 

918.  Decision  based  upon  notice  not  final 930 

919.  Miscellaneous  matters  concerning  presentation 931 

920.  Interest  on   claims 931 

921.  Compromise   of    claims 932 

922.  Presentation  of  claims  continued 932 

923.  The  same  subject  continued 933 

924.  The  same  subject  continued — Verification  of  claim 935 

925.  Presentation  of  claims  for  injuries 935 

926.  Presentation  as  a  condition  precedent  to  right  of  action 937 

927.  Allowance   of  claims 938 

928.  The  same  subject  continued — Procedure 939 

929.  The  same  subject  continued — Adjudication  by  the  board 940 

930.  Conclusiveness  of  adjudication 941 

931.  Proceedings  after  disallowance  of  claim 942 

932.  Malfeasance  in  over-allowance 943 

933.  Proper  and  improper  charges  against  a  county 943 

934.  The  same  subject  continued 944 

935.  Apportionment  of  indebtedness  upon  division  of  a  county 945 

936.  Claims  of  contractors  for  extra  work 946 

937.  Claims  for  services  to  indigent  persons 947 

938.  Proceedings  to  enforce  payment  of  judgments 948 

939.  Mandamus  to  county  officers 949 

(e)  Warrants. 

940.  Character  of  warrants  as  evidences  of  indebtedness 950 

941.  How  drawn     953 

942.  Mandamus  to  compel  the  signing  of  a  warrant 954 

943.  How  payable — From  what  fund 955 

944.  Duty  of  officers  in  drawing  warrants 956 

945.  Validity  of  warrants 957 

946.  Actions  upon  warrants 958 

947.  Mandamus  to  compel  payment  of  warrants 960 

948.  Defenses  to  actions  on  warrants 961 

949.  Notes  of  counties 963 

950.  Notes  of  towns 964 

951.  Township    orders 965 

952.  The  same  subject  continued 966 

953.  School  board  orders 967 

954.  School    warrants 968 


TABLE    OF    COXTEXTS — VOL.    II.  XXXI 


CHAPTER  XXIII. 

BONDS   AXD   COUPOXS. 

Section  Page 

955.  Implied  power  to  issue  bonds 971 

956.  The  doctrine' of  the  supreme  court  of  the  United  States 973 

957.  The    same    subject   continued — Brenham   v.    German-American 

Bank    974 

958.  Same   continued — State   decisions 975 

959.  Agency   in    issuing 977 

960.  The  corporation  must  have  a  legal  existence 977 

961.  No  right  of  action  on  void  bonds 978 

962.  Constitutional  limitations — Public  purpose 978 

963.  Aid   to   manufacturing  enterprises 980 

964.  Internal    improvements 981 

965.  Municipal   aid  to  railroads — Express  legislative  authority  es- 

sential       981 

966.  Railway  aid  bonds — Legislature  may  authorize 982 

967.  The   same  subject  continued — Negotiable  bonds 984 

968.  Conditions    precedent 984 

969.  Bonds — Constitutional    requirements 985 

970.  The  same  subject  continued — Assent  of  taxpayers 986 

971.  The  same  subject  continued — Election 987 

972.  Conduct  of  election  continued 989 

973.  Conditional    subscriptions 990 

974.  The  same  subject  continued 991 

975.  Ratification    992 

976.  The  same  subject  continued 994 

977.  Effect  of  consolidation  of  companies  on  authority  to  subscribe.   994 

978.  Effect  of  constitutional  prohibitions 995 

979.  The  same  subject  continued 996 

980.  Recitals  in   municipal    bonds 997 

981.  Negotiability    of   bonds 1012 

982.  Signature   to   bonds 1013 

983.  Sealing    1014 

984.  Date— Ante-dating    1015 

985.  To  whom  payable  1015 

986.  Place  of  payment 1016 

987.  Time  of  maturity 1016 

988.  Delivery    1017 

989.  Quality  of  municipal  bonds  as  commercial  paper 1018 

990.  Coupons    1019 

991.  Payment  of   coupons 1019 

992.  Interest  upon  interest 1020 

993.  Refunding,  substituted  and  renewal  bonds 1020 

994.  The  same  subject  continued 1022 

995.  Estoppel  by  matter  in  pais 1022 

996.  Estoppel  to  set  up  overissue  in  violation  of  statute 1023 

997.  Overissue  in  violation  of  the  constitution — No  estoppel  by  re- 

citals     1024 


XXXll  TABLE    OF    CONTENTS — VOL.    II. 

Section  Page 

998.  The  same  subject  continued — The  rule  qualified 1024 

999.  Bona  fide  holders 1025 

1000.  The  same  subject  continued 1026 

1001.  Defenses  available  against  bona  fide  holders 1027 

1002.  The   same    subject  continued 1028 

1003.  Validity  of  bonds 1028 

1004.  Invalidity  of  bonds 1029 

1005.  Sale  of  bonds 1030 

1006.  Miscellaneous    1033 


CHAPTER  XXIV. 

CHARITIES  AND   CORRECTIGlSr. 

1007.  General  rules  governing  directors  of  poor,  etc 1034 

1008.  Rulings  in  Massachusetts  as  to  overseers  of  the  poor 1036 

1009.  Rulings  in  Maine  and  New  York 1036 

1010.  Contracts  by  governing  boards  for  the  support  of  the  poor 1037 

1011.  Discretionary  powers  of  governing  boards 1039 

1012.  Medical  treatment  for  the  poor 1040 

1013.  The  same  subject  continued 1041 

1014.  Settlement  of  paupers — Generally 1041 

1015.  The  same  subject  continued 1042 

1016.  The  same  subject  continued — Illegitimate  children 1043 

1017.  Massachusetts  decisions  on  settlement  of  soldiers  mustered  out 

of    service 1044 

1018.  Settlement  of  married  women 1045 

1019.  Settlement  acquired  by  residence  and  payment  of  taxes 1046 

1020.  The  same  subject  continued 1047 

1021.  Constitutionality  of  laws  for  the  removal  of  paupers 1048 

1022.  Rulings  on  removal   of  paupers 1049 

1023.  Notice  in  cases  for  removal  of  paupers 1050 

1024.  Notice  of  charge  by  one  town  to  another 1051 

1025.  "What  corporations  are  liable  for  support  of  paupers 1052 

1026.  No  implied  liability 1053 

1027.  Special    liabilities 1054 

1028.  Various  rulings  as  to  the  poor 1054 

1029.  Support  of  patient  at  state  lunatic  asylum — Persons  "in  need 

of  immediate   relief" 1055 

1030.  The  same  subject  continued 1056 

1031.  Support  of  insane  poor  further  considered 1057 

1032.  Aid  to  children 1058 

1033.  Liability  of  corporations  to  those  furnishing  support  to  pau- 

pers    1058 

1034.  The   same   subject   continued 1059 

1035.  Duty  to   furnish  immediate   relief 1060 

1036.  Proceedings  to  compel  relative  to  support  paupers 1061 

1037.  Liability  of  a  pauper  for  his  support 1062 

1038.  Municipality  can  not  recover  for  voluntary  aid 1062 


TABLE    OP    CONTENTS — VOL.    II.  XXxiii 

Section  Page 

1039.  Actions  for  support  of  paupers 1063 

1040.  The  same  subject  continued 1065 

1041.  Statutes  prohibiting  bringing  paupers  from  other  states 1066 

1042.  Liability  to  paupers  for  negligence  of  employes 1068 

1043.  Support   of  the  insane 1068 

1044.  The  same  subject  continued 1069 

1045.  Soldiers'   homes 1070 

1046.  Reformatories     1070 

1047.  Liability  of  counties  for  the  care  of  prisoners 1072 

1048.  Care  of  prisoners  continued 1073 

1049.  Hiring  of  convicts 1073 

1050.  Liability  for  personal  injuries  to  prisoners 1074 

1051.  The  same  subject  continued 1075 


CHAPTER    XXV. 

PUBLIC    HEALTH — BOARDS   OF   HEALTH   AND   QUARANTINE. 

1052.  Municipal  regulations  for  the  promotion  of  public  health 1078 

1053.  Power   of   the    state    legislature 1078 

1054.  Declaring  nuisances  is  not  an  exercise  of  judicial  functions. . .  .1079 

1055.  Extent  of  authority  illustrated 1079 

1056.  The  same  subject  continued 1080 

1057.  Regulation  of  occupations 1080 

1058.  Powers  conferred  on  boards  of  health  not  exclusive 1081 

1059.  Power  to  control  manufactures 1082 

1060.  Limitations  of  police  power  over  occupations 1082 

1061.  Establishment   of    sanitary    districts 1083 

1062.  The  same  subject  continued 1083 

1063.  Reasonableness  of  ordinances 1084 

1064.  Regulating  removal  of  garbage 1085 

1065.  Regulating  burials  and  burial  permits 1086 

1066.  Boards  of  health  generally 1087 

1067.  Powers  of  town  trustees  in  Iowa  as  boards  of  health 1087 

1068.  Power  of  boards  of  health  as  to  employment  of  physicians 1088 

1069.  Owner  of   property   condemned   as   a   nuisance   entitled   to   a 

hearing   1088 

1070.  The  same  subject  continued 1089 

1071.  Conclusiveness  of  determination  by  board  of  health 1090 

1072.  Power  of  board  of  health  as  a  corporation — New  Jersey  deci- 

sions     1091 

1073.  The  same  subject  continued 1091 

1074.  Injunction  upon  application  of  hoard  of  health  in  New  Jersey.  .1092 

1075.  Abatement  of  nuisances  under  general   authority  to  promote 

health     1093 

1076.  Power  to  forbid  the  exercise  of  an  offensive  trade 1093 

1077.  Actions  by  town  boards  of  health  to  suppress  nuisances  by  in- 

junction     1094 

1  Smith — iii 


XXXIV  TABLE    OF    CONTENTS — VOL.    II. 

Section  Page 

1078.  Expenditures  by  boards  of  health,  to  what  municipal  corpora- 

tion   chargeable 1095 

1079.  No  corporate  liability  for  torts  of  health  officers 1096 

1080.  The  same  subject  continued 1096 

1081.  Personal  liability  of   members  of  board   of   health   for  negli- 

gence     1097 

1082.  The  same  subject  continued , 1098 

1083.  Quarantine   regulations  generally 1098 

1084.  Extent  of  power   of  municipal   authorities 1099 

1085.  Liability  of  owner  of  vessel  for  quarantine  expenses 1100 

1086.  Power  and  duty  of  boards  of  health  under  Florida  quarantine 

laws   1100 

1087.  Charge  against  vessels   in   quarantine 1101 

1088.  A  limitation  upon  quarantine  regulations 1101 


CHAPTER  XXVI. 

SUPPRESSION   OP   NUISANCES. 

1089.  Nuisance    defined 1103 

1090.  Not  protected   by   constitution 1104 

1091.  What  are  nuisances 1105 

1092.  Prescriptive  right  to  maintain  a  nuisance 1106 

1093.  City  can  not  create  or  maintain  a  nuisance 1106 

1094.  Abatement  of   1107 

1095.  Public  nuisance   1107 

1096.  Private  nuisance    1108 

1097.  Legalized  nuisance   1108 

1098.  License  of  nuisance 1110 

1099.  Damages   1111 

1100.  Liability  for  public  and  private  acts 1113 

1101.  Nature   of  the   power  of  public   authorities  to   suppress   nui- 

sances     ■. .1113 

1102.  The  same  subject  continued — A  police  power 1114 

1103.  Abatement  of  nuisances  by  destruction  of  property 1114 

1104.  The  same  subject  continued — Constitutional  limitation 1115 

1105.  Discretion    of    municipal    bodies    in    regulating    and    abating 

nuisances    1116 

1106.  The  power  of  municipal  corporations  as  to  declaring  what  is  a 

nuisance   Ill  6 

1107.  The  extent  of  the  power  to  abate  nuisances 1117 

1108.  Abatement  of  decayed  and  noisome  tenement  houses 1118 

1109.  Removal    of    occupants — Express   authority    or    extraordinary 

peril     1118 

1110.  Power  to  define  nuisances  not  absolute 1119 

1111.  The    same    subject   continued 1119 

1112.  Limitation  of  power  to  define  nuisances  further  illustrated.  .1120 

1113.  Municipality   confined   to   mode  prescribed   in   the   charter   or 

statute    1121 


TABLE    OF    CONTENTS — VOL.    IL  XXXV 

Section  Page 

1114.  The  same  subject  continued 1121 

1115.  Abatement  of  structures  endangering  public  safety 1122 

1116.  Person  charged  with  maintaining  a  nuisance  entitled  to  notice 

or  hearing 1122 

1117.  Construction  of  statutes  requiring  notice  to  owners  to  remove 

nuisances 1123 

1118.  Proceedings  in  equity  for  abatement  of  nuisances — New  Jersey 

decisions    1124 

1119.  The  same  subject  continued — Minnesota  decisions 1125 

1120.  The  same  subject  continued — The  rule  in  other  states 1126 


CHAPTER  XXVII. 

PUBLIC    IMPROVEMENTS. 

1121.  Public  improvements  generally 1129 

1122.  Necessity   for  public  improvements 1129 

1123.  Cost  of  improvement 1131 

1124.  Necessary  funds  a  prerequisite 1132 

1125.  Passage   of   ordinance 1132 

1126.  Petition   for  improvement 1133 

1127.  Statutory  requirements  strictly  construed 1138 

1128.  Conclusiveness  of  determination  of  council 1138 

1129.  Including  several  streets  in  one  improvement 1139 

1130.  Notice   of  proposed   improvements 1140 

1131.  Consent  of  owners  to  improvements 1141 

1132.  What  must  be  specified  in  an  ordinance 1142 

1133.  Ordinance  as  a  basis  of  improvements 1143 

(a)  Necessity  of  ordinance 1144 

(b)  Sufficiency    of —    1144 

(c)  Validity  of—    1146 

( d )  Reasonableness  of —   1148 

(e)  Recitals  in—    1149 

(f )  Curative  acts   1149 

1134.  Formality  and  irregularity  in  proceedings 1149 

1135.  Improvement  of   streets 1150 

1136.  Grade  of   streets 1151 

1137.  Resolution  as  a  basis  of  improvements 1152 

1138.  Agreements  to  repair  streets 1155 

1139.  Railroad  bridge  across  a  street  not  a  local  improvement 1155 

1140.  Rule  as  to  repaving,  etc.,  in  Pennsylvania 1156 

1141.  Opening  and  widening  streets 1156 

1142.  Reconstruction  of  streets  and  sidewalks — Second  assessment.  .1157 

1143.  Paving  streets    1157 

1144.  Paving  and    repairing  distinguished 1158 

1145.  Repairs  of  streets,   etc 1159 

1146.  Lawful   improvements 1160 


XXXVl  TABLE    OF    CONTENTS — VOL.    II, 

Section  Page 

1147.  Curative  legislation    1160 

1148.  Supervisors  of   a  county  ordering  improvements  in  a   town.  1160 

1149.  Sidewalks    1161 

1150.  Contracts  in  restraint  of  right  to  control  or  improve  streets.  .1162 

1151.  Discretion  of  municipal  authorities 1162 

1152.  The  same  subject  continued 1163 

1153.  Streets  with  railways  intersecting  them 1163 

1154.  Local   assessments    1164 

1155.  Local  improvement  defined 1165 

1156.  Legality  of  assessments  for  local  improvements 1166 

1157.  Special  taxation  in  Illinois 1167 

1158.  Constitutionality  of   assessments   for   sidewalks 1167 

1159.  Fee  in  land  condemned  a  part  of  the  cost  of  an  improvement.  .1168 

1160.  Highways     1169 

1161.  Opening    highways 1170 

1162.  Repairing   highways 1170 

1163.  Bridges     1171 

1164.  Construction   of  bridges 1171 

1165.  Sewers    1173 

1166.  Construction  of  sewers 1175 

1167.  The  same  subject  continued 1175 

1168.  Contracts  for  construction  of  sewers 1175 

1169.  Power  as  to  drains  and  sewers  discretionary 1176 

1170.  Local  assessments  for  drains  and  sewers 1177 

1171.  Drainage   continued    1178 

1172.  Liability  of  the  corporation 1179 

1173.  The  same  subject  continued — Rights  in  percolating  water 1180 

1174.  Massachusetts  decisions  as  to  assessment  for  sewers 1181 

1175.  Use  of  street  for  private  drain 1182 

1176.  Improvements  by   street-railway  companies 1182 

1177.  The  same  subject  continued 1183 

1178.  Street-railway  company  bound  to  repair 1183 

1179.  Lighting  of  streets 1184 

1180.  Contracts — Construction   of 1185 

1181.  The  same  subject  continued — Advertisements  for  bids,  etc 1187 

1182.  Conditions  precedent  to  recover  by  contractor,  etc 1188 

1183.  Indiana  decisions  as  to  letting  contracts 1189 

1184.  Effect  of  assignment  of  a  contract 1192 

1185.  When  a  contract  is  complete 1193 

1186.  Letting  contract  after  returning  bids., 1193 

1187.  Discretion  of  municipal  authorities 1194 

1188.  Approval   of   contract  by   council — Rejection 1195 

1189.  Repaying  of  street 1195 

1190.  Title  to  street  essential  to  jurisdiction 1195 

1191.  Opening  and  improving  streets  in  one  proceeding 1196 

1192.  Description  of  work  in  resolution 1197 

1193.  Conclusiveness  of  assessor's  or  other  oflficial's  action 1197 

1194.  Assessment  for  paving  streets  and  constructing  sidewalks 1198 

1195.  When  cost  of  repairing  can  not  be  charged  to  abutters 1198 

1196.  Power  of  assessment  illustrated  and  limited 1199 


TABLE    OF    CONTENTS — VOL.    II.  XXXvii 

Section  Page 

1197.  The   same   subject   continued 1200 

1198.  Collateral  attack  of  assessments 1201 

1199.  Suit  to   restrain   assessment 1202 

1200.  Actions   to    vacate    assessments 1202 

1201.  Allegations  necessary 1203 

1202.  Evidence — Proof   required    1204 

1202a.  Actions  to  recover  money  paid  upon  illegal  assessments 1205 

1203.  Power  to  assess  abutting  owners 1205 

1204.  The   same   subject   continued 1206 

1205.  Rule  in  Texas  as  to  homestead 1206 

1206.  Liability  of  the  corporation  for  negligence 1207 

1207.  The    same    subject   continued 1208 

1208.  Damages  for   improper  construction 1208 

1209.  The  same  subject  continued — Constitutional  provisions .1209 

1210.  Damages  from  defective   streets. .  .• 1210 

1211.  Measure   of   damages 1210 

1212.  Offset  against  damages 1211 

1213.  Unauthorized  modification  of  contract 1212 

1214.  Rights   of  abutters 1213 

1215.  Interest  of  abutters  in  streets 1214 

1216.  Liability  of  corporation  for  consequential  injuries 1215 

1217.  Flowage  of  surface  water  from  streets 1216 

1218.  The    same    subject   continued 1217 

1219.  Flowage  of  water  by  construction  of  a  levee 1218 

1220.  Damages  for  change  of  grade 1218 

1221.  The  same  subject  continued — Connecticut  rule 1221 

1222.  The    same    subject    continued — "Damage"   clause    in    constitu- 

tions     1222 

1223.  The  same  subject  continued — Measure  of  damages 1222 

1224.  Damages  by  change  of  grade  further  considered 1222 

1225.  The  same  subject  continued — Common-law  action 1223 

1226.  Estoppel  of   landowner 1224 

1227.  Actions  by  abutters — Pleading,  etc 1225 

1228.  Questions  for  the  jury 1226 


CHAPTER  XXVIII. 

LOCAL   OR    SPECIAL   ASSESSMENTS. 

1228a.  Special  assessments  defined — Nature  of 1230 

1229.  Express  legislative  authority  requisite 1232 

1230.  A    continuing    power 1233 

1231.  Purposes  for  assessment  illustrated 1233 

1232.  Decision  of  council  conclusive 1235 

1233.  Preliminary  steps  to  valid  assessment 1235 

(a)  The    ordinance 1236 

(b)  Petition  for  improvement 1236 

(c)  Notice   of    improvement 1236 


sxxviu        -  table  of  contexts vol.  ii. 

Section  Page 

( d )  What  record  must  show 1237 

(e)  Cost  of  improvement 1240 

(f )  Drawings  and  specifications 1240 

(g)  Compliance  with  preliminaries 1240 

1234.  Notice  of  improvement 1240 

1235.  Hearing  of  property  owners 1242 

1236.  What  property  assessable 1243 

(a)  Property  enumerated  in  statute 1243 

(b)  Must   be   abutting  property 1243 

(c)  Must  be  on  property  benefited 1243 

(d)  Unplatted  or  unsubdivided  property 1244 

(e)  Public  property  not  subject 1244 

(f)  Abutting  property  for  lateral  improvements 1245 

(g)  Property  at  termination  of  street 1245 

(h)   Part  of  undivided  tract  may  be 1245 

(i)   Property   on    extended   street 1246 

(j)   Title   not   involved 1246 

(k)   Improvements  on  two  streets  not  assessable  on  one 1246 

1237.  Exempt  property  liable  to  special  assessments 1246 

1238.  Assessments  against  elevated   street  railways 1248 

1239.  Assessments  against  railroad  right  of  way 1248 

1240.  Assessment   districts    1252 

1241.  Same   subject  continued 1253 

1242.  Prescribed  formalities  must  be  strictly  followed 1254 

1243.  Same   subject  continued 1255 

1244.  Ordinance  or  resolution 1256 

1245.  Petition     1257 

1246.  Same  subject  continued 1258 

1247.  Description  of  improvements  and  property 1259 

1248.  Delegation  of  matters  of   detail 1261 

1249.  Personal   liability   of   landowner 1261 

1250.  Recovery  of  money  paid  on  illegal  assessments 1263 

1251.  Same   subject  continued 1264 

1252.  Same  subject  continued — "Coercion  in  law" 1265 

1253.  Apportionment   of    assessment 1266 

(a)  Assessment  only  to  extent  of  benefits 1266 

(b)  Excess  over  benefits  to  be  paid  by  city 1266 

(c)  Where  costs  in  some  blocks  greater  than  in  others 1266 

(d)  Equality  must  be  basis  of  assessment 1267 

(e)  Frontage   rule    1267 

(f)  Apportionment  by  superficial  area 1270 

(g)  Rule  in  absence  of  statutory  mode 1271 

(h)   Apportionment  between  city  and  property  owners 1271 

(i)  Both  sides  of  street  must  be  assessed 1272 

( j)   City  can  not  subdivide  property,  etc 1272 

1254.  Report  of  commissioners — When  conclusive 1273 

1255.  Objections   to   special   assessment 1274 

(a)  Necessity    of    filing 1274 

(b)  When  objections  are  to  be  made 1274 

(c)  Sufficiency   of   objections 1274 


TABLE    OF    CONTENTS — VOL,    II,  XXxix 

Section  Page 

(d)  When  objection  sustained 1276 

(e)  When  objection  not  sustained 1276 

(f)  Failure  to  appeal 1276 

(g)  Waiver  of  defect  in  notice 1276 

1256.  Confirmation  of  assessment 1277 

(a)  Want  of  notice 1277 

(b)  Jurisdiction   to   confirm 1277 

(c)  Evidence  on  hearing  of  confirmation 1277 

(d)  Judgments — May    be    separate 1277 

(e)  Collateral    attack   of 1278 

1257.  Appeal  from  judgment  confirming — Certiorari 1278 

(a)  Limitation    of   time     1278 

(b)  Effect  of  appeal 1279 

(c)  Presumption   on    appeal 1279 

(d)  What  considered  on  appeal 1279 

1258.  Remedy   of   property    owner 1280 

(a)  By  appeal    1280 

(b)  Remedy   in   equity 1280 

(c)  Remedy  by  statute 1281 

(d)  Remedy  may  be  lost 1282 

(e)  Tender— Jury   trial    1282 

1259.  Defenses  when  available  and  when  not  available 1282 

1260.  Assessments  enjoined,  when 1284 

1261.  Estoppel    1285 

1262.  Reassessment — When   made   1286 

1263.  Injunction   against  illegal  assessments 1287 

1264.  Evidence  in  matters  of  special  assessment 1289 

(a)  In  application   for  judgment 1289 

(b)  Presumptions   1289 

(c)  Burden  of  proof 1289 

(d)  Certificate   of  clerk 1290 

1265.  General  principles  as  to  validity  of  assessments 1290 

1266.  Special   assessments  held  valid 1293 

1267.  Special  assessments  held  invalid 1295 

1268.  Curative    acts 1298 

1269.  Benefits— What  are — How  determined 1299 

(a)  What  are   benefits 1299 

(b)  Method   of  ascertaining 1299 

(c)  Assessment  not  to  exceed  benefit. .' 1299 

(d)  Review  of  benefits  by  courts 1300 

1270.  Abutting  owner  and  property — Liability 1300 

1271.  Legislative  power  with  reference  to  assessments 1301 

1272.  Collateral  attack  of  assessment 1303 

1273.  Lien  of  special   assessment 1304 

1274.  Recovery  of  money  paid  on  illegal  assessments 1304 

1275.  Liability  of  city  in  special  assessments 1305 

1276.  Miscellaneous  matters  relating  to  special  assessment 1307 

(a)  Repaving  and  repairs 1307 

(b)  Sale  in  special  assessments 1307 

(c)  Double    taxation 1307 


xl  TABLE    OF    CONTEXTS — VOL.    II. 

Section  Page 

(d)  Deposit  of  bonds  by  contractor 1308 

(e)  Stay  of  improvement — Effect  of 1308 

(f)  Payment — By  cotenant — By  city 1308 

(g)  Repeal  of  ordinance — Effect  of 1308 

(h)   What  are  public  improvements 1308 

(i)  Liability  of  city  in 1308 

(j)   Liability  of  abutter 1309 

(k)   Personal  judgment  not  proper 1309 

(1)  Reducing  assessment 1309 


CHAPTER  XXIX. 

STREETS,    ALLEYS,    WHARVES,    ETC.  ' 

1277.  Street   defined 1313 

1278.  Alley  defined 1313 

1279.  Sidewalk  defined 1314 

1280.  Methods  of  acquiring  lands  for  streets  and  alleys 1314 

1281.  Dedication  must  be  accepted 1315 

1282.  Care  of  streets,  alleys,  etc 1315 

1283.  Power  to  vacate  streets 1317 

1284.  Vacation  is  discretionary 1320 

1285.  Abandonment  of  streets 1321 

1286.  Discretion  in  improving  unused  streets 1321 

1287.  Use  of  streets  for  private  purposes 1322 

1288.  Powers  not  to  be  surrendered 1323 

1289.  Liability  of  municipality  for  defective  streets 1323 

1290.  Negligence  of  municipality  in  regard  to 1324 

(a)  Ditches  in  street 1324 

(b)  Holes  in  street 1324 

(c)  Injury  at  other  than  street  crossing 1325 

(d)  Liability  for  others  and  oflficers 1325 

(e)  Not  relieved  by  delegation  of  work 1325 

(f)  Negligence  generally 1325 

(g)  Negligence  is  a  question  of  fact  for  jury 1326 

1291.  Contributory  negligence , 1326 

1292.  Knowledge  of  defects— Effect  of 1327 

1293.  Illustrations  of  contributory  negligence 1328 

1294.  What  is  not  contributory  negligence — Illustrations 1329 

1295.  Contributory  negligence  a  question  for  the  jury 1331 

1296.  Negligence  must  be  proximate  cause  of  injury 1331 

1297.  Notice  of  defective  condition  of  street  or  sidewalk 1333 

1298.  Notice  may  be   constructive 1333 

1299.  To  whom  notice  should  be  given 1334 

1300.  When  notice  is  not  required 1335 

1301.  Notice  required  by  statute  or  charter 1336 

1302.  Notice  inferred  from  lapse  of  time 1336 

1303.  Time  sufficient  to  impute  notice  for  the  jury 1337 


TABLE    OF    CONTENTS — VOL.    II.  xli 

Section  Page 

1304.  Sidewalks   1337 

(a)  Sidewalk  defined 1337 

(b)  Control  over  and  liability  in  regard  to 1338 

(c)  Presumption  as  to  condition  of  sidewalk 1338 

(d)  Duty  to  erect  barriers  and  signals 1338 

(e)  Liability  for  defective  sidewalks 1338 

(f )  Miscellaneous  illustrations  of  liability 1339 

(g)  Liability  of  owner  for  failure  to  repair 1340 

(h)   Liability  of  city  for  failure  to  repair 1340 

(i)   Michigan  rule  of  liability  for  failure  to  repair 1341 

(j)   Liability  for  accumulations  of  snow  and  ice 1342 

1305.  Right  of  municipality  to  indemnity 1344 

1306.  Power  of  park  board  over  streets 1345 

1307.  Extent  of  municipal  control 1346 

1308.  Franchise  in  the  use  of  streets 1347 

1309.  The  use  of  streets  and  alleys 1347 

(a)  Power  of  legislature  over 1347 

(b)  Nature  of  public  interest  in 1347 

(c)  Use  by  gas  company 1348 

(d)  Use  by  telephone  company 1349 

(e)  Use  by  railroad  company 1349 

(f)  Use  by  street  railway  company 1350 

(g)  The  right  of  railways  to  use  of  streets  limited 1353 

(h)   Regulating  speed  of  cars 1355 

(i)   Regulating  trains  at  crossings 1357 

1310.  Obstructions  in   streets 1358 

(a)  Care  of  streets  in  regard  to  obstructions 1358 

(b)  Presumption  as  to  streets 1359 

(c)  Notice  of   obstruction 1359 

(d)  Negligence  in  regard  to  obstructions 1361 

(e)  Who  placed  the  obstruction  not  material 1362 

(f )  Exemption  from  liability  by  charter 1362 

(g)  Nature  and  character  of  obstructions 1362 

(h)   Removal  of  obstructions 1365 

( i )   Notice   of  injury — Statutory 1365 

(j)   Obstructions  sometimes  allowable 1367 

1311.  Removal  of  shade  trees 1368 

1312.  Surface    water 1369 

1313.  Awnings  1370 

1314.  Control   of  wharves 1370 

1315.  Limit  upon  liability  in  control  of  docks 1372 

1316.  Reconstruction  and  repair  of  sidewalks,  streets,  etc 1373 

(a)  Reconstruction     1373 

(b)  Repair  and  results  of  failure 1373 

(c)  Degree  of  care  required 1374 

1317.  Sewers    1376 

1318.  Establishing  grade  of  streets 1378 


Xlii  TABLE    OP    CONTENTS — VOL.    II. 


CHAPTER  XXX. 

POLICE   POWERS. 

Section  Page 

1319.  Nature  of  the  police  power 1381 

1320.  Exercise  of  police  powers  by  municipal  corporations 1383 

1321.  Delegation  of  police  power 1383 

1322.  Scope  of  municipal  legislation  for  police  regulation 1384 

1323.  Limitations  on  exercise  of  police  power 1384 

1324.  Power  to  regulate 1385 

1325.  Power  to  prohibit , 1386 

1326.  Regulation  is  not  prohibition 1387 

1327.  License    1387 

(a)  Scavengers   1387 

(b)  Barbers 1387 

(c)  Milk    dealers 1388 

(d)  Removal   of  kitchen    refuse 1388 

(e)  Public    scales 1388 

(f )  Sale  of  meats  and  provisions 1388 

1328.  Privilege    tax 1389 

1329.  Regulation  of  telegraph  and  telephone  lines  in  streets 1389 

1330.  Regulation  of  dangerous  business 1390 

1331.  Regulation   of  buildings — Building  permits,   etc 1390 

1332.  Regulating  the   removal  of  dead   animals 1392 

1333.  Regulating  the  removal  of  garbage 1392 

1334.  Regulation  of  fire  escapes 1393 

1335.  Regulating  livery  stables 1393 

1336.  Abatement  of  nuisances 1394 

1337.  Property  destroyed  by  a  mob 1394 

1338.  Hawkers  and  pedlers 1395 

1339.  Hackmen,  draymen,  etc 1396 

1340.  Auctioneers   1397 

1341.  Book  canvassers — Interstate  commerce 1399 

1342.  Intoxicating  liquors 1399 

1343.  Hackstands  and  hotel  runners 1401 

1344.  Regulation   of  markets 1402 

1345.  Disorderly    houses 1403 

1346.  Discrimination  against  non-residents 1404 

1347.  Ordinances  relating  to  licenses 1404 

1348.  Miscellaneous    1406 


CHAPTER  XXXI. 

MUNICIPAL   COURTS   AND   RECORDS. 

(a)   Municipal  Courts. 

1349.  Introductory    1408 

1350.  The  same  subject  continued — Scope  of  subject 1409 

1351.  Creation — Abolition — Increase  of  power 1409 


TABLE   OF    CONTENTS — VOL.    II.  xliii 

Section  Page 

1352.  The  same  subject  continued 1410 

1353.  Jurisdiction — Criminal,  civil  and  special 1411 

1354.  The  same  subject  continued 1412 

1355.  Summary    powers 1413 

1356.  The  same  subject  continued 1414 

1357.  The  same  subject  continued — Felonies  and  misdemeanors 1415 

1358.  Jurisdictional    limitation 1415 

1359.  The  same  subject  continued — Constitutional  limitations 1416 

1360.  Qualifications  of  officers — Judges  and  jurors 1417 

1361.  Appeals   1418 

1362.  Method  of  procedure 1419 

1363.  The  same  subject  continued 1420 

(b)   Municipal  Records. 

1364.  Recording  of   ordinances 1421 

1365.  Evidential    character — Originals    1421 

1366.  The  same  subject  continued — Copies 1422 

1367.  Proof  of  records— By  originals 1423 

1368.  The  same  subject  continued — By  certified  copies 1424 

1369.  Parol  evidence   1425 

1370.  The  same  subject  continued 1426 

1371.  Amendments   1426 

1372.  The  same  subject  continued 1427 

1373.  Right  of  abstract  makers  to  take  transcripts  of  public  records.  1428 

1374.  The  same  subject  continued 1428 

1375.  Remedial   rights 1429 


CHAPTER  XXXII. 

FIEEMEN   AND   POLICEMEN. 

1375a.  Organization  of  fire  department 1431 

1376.  Liability  of  corporation  for  removal  of  firemen 1432 

1377.  Certiorari   to   review  dismissal  of  firemen 1432 

1378.  Policemen  unknown   to  the   common   law 1433 

1379.  Qualification   of  officers — Non-partizan   boards 1434 

1380.  Police  fund— Legislative  control  of 1434 

1381.  Suspension  pending  trial  on  charges  of  misconduct 1435 

1382.  The  tribunal  to  hear  charges 1436 

1383.  The    hearing 1437 

1384.  Counsel  and   witnesses 1437 

1385.  Examining  the  accused  as  a  witness 1438 

1386.  Neglect  and  absence   from   duty 1439 

1387.  Violating  regulations   1440 

1388.  Evidence  of   intoxication 1441 

1389.  Conduct  unbecoming  an  officer 1442 

1390.  The  same  subject  continued 1443 


xliv 


TABLE   OP    CONTENTS — VOL.   II. 


Section  Page 

1391.  Severity  of  punishment 1443 

1392.  Review  of  proceedings  by  certiorari 1444 

1393.  Recovery  of  salary  after  restoration  upon  certiorari 1445 

1394.  City    marshals 1446 


CHAPTEE  XXXIII. 

:WATER   AND   LIGHTS. 

1395.  Power  of  municipality  as  to  water  supply 1447 

1396.  Contracts   for  water   supply 1448 

1397.  Limitations   upon    power   to    contract 1449 

1398.  Contracts  further   illustrated 1450 

1399.  The  same  subject  continued — Monopolies 1451 

1400.  Construction   of   contracts 1452 

1401.  The  same  subject  continued 1452 

1402.  No  exclusive  right 1453 

1403.  Rent  of  hydrants 1454 

1404.  Water-works  companies  under  New  Jersey  statutes 1454 

1405.  Infringement  of  riparian  rights 1455 

1406.  The  right  to  waters  of  a  stream 1456 

1407.  Connecting   pipes 1458 

1408.  Liability  of  water-works  companies 1459 

1409.  The  same  subject  continued 1459 

1410.  Water-rates   1460 

1411.  The   same   subject  continued 1460 

1412.  Collection  of  water-rents 1461 

1413.  Power  of  municipality  to  contract  for  lights 1462 

1414.  The  same  subject  continued 1463 

1415.  Authorized    contracts  illustrated 1464 

1416.  Unauthorized  contracts 1465 

1417.  Contract  for  gas  lighting  construed 1465 

1418.  The  same  subject  continued 1466 

1419.  Construction  of  statutory  and  charter  provisions 1467 

1420.  The  same  subject  continued 1467 


CHAPTER  XXXIV. 


PUBLIC    EDUCATION. 


1421.  Introductory    1469 

1422.  Constitutional  provisions  and  state  statutes 1470 

1423.  Legal  status  of  school   system 1471 

1424.  State  board   and   superintendent  of  education 1471 

1425.  County   superintendents    1472 

1426.  Change  of  boundaries  of  school  districts 1473 

1427.  Presumption  of  legal  organization  of  district 1474 


TABLE   OP    CONTENTS — VOL.    II.  xlv 

Section  Page 

1428.  District   school   boards 1475 

1429.  Meetings  of  district  school  boards 1477 

1430.  Prescribing  text-books — Rescission  of  resolution 1478 

1431.  Power  of  board  of  school  trustees  to  contract 1479 

1432.  Power  to  require  parents  to  sign  and  return  teacher's  report.  .1480 

1433.  Fiduciary   capacity 1481 

1434.  Limitation  of  power 1482 

1435.  Personal  liability  of  directors 1483 

1436.  Meetings  of  district  electors — Elections 1484 

1437.  Term  of  school  officer — Holding  over 1486 

1438.  School    fund 1487 

1439.  The  same  subject  continued — Mandamus  to  state  comptroller.  .1487 

1440.  School  taxes   1489 

1441.  School  lands  1489 

1442.  School    bonds 1490 

1443.  School-teacher — Appointment — Contract — Removal    1490 

1444.  Pupils    1492 

1445.  Race    question    in    schools 1493 

1446.  Bible  in  schools 1494 

1447.  Actions  and  defenses 1495 


CHAPTER  XXXV. 

TAXATION. 

1448.  Taxation  defined   1497 

1449.  Distinction  between  "tax"  and  "assessment" 1498 

1450.  Situs  of  taxable  property 1499 

1451.  Subjects  of  taxation 1502 

1452.  Property  subject  to  taxation 1504 

1453.  Constitutional  restrictions  1505 

1454.  Implied  power  of  taxation 1506 

1455.  License  fees  and  taxes  on  business 1507 

1456.  The  same  subject  continued — The  power  strictly  construed 1509 

1457.  Local  taxation  of  transportation  companies 1509 

1458.  Banks    1510 

1459.  Water  companies 1511 

1460.  Gas  companies   1512 

1461.  Miscellaneous  corporations 1512 

1462.  Apportionment  by  benefits 1513 

1463.  Agricultural  lands 1514 

1464.  Taxation  after  changing  the  corporate  limits 1516 

1465.  Effect  of  change  of  corporate  limits 1518 

1466.  Equality  and   uniformity 1519 

1467.  Taxation  to  pay  debts 1521 

1468.  Limitation  of  state  control 1523 

1469.  Other  limitations  of   taxing  power 1524 

1470.  Effect  of  annulling  the  municipal  charter 1525 


xlvi  TABLE   OF    CONTENTS — VOL,    II. 

Section  Page 

1471.  Mandamus    1526 

1472.  When   mandamus  is  improper 1528 

1473.  Proceedings  in  equity 1529 

1474.  Execution   1529 

1475.  Implied  obligations  to  levy  tax 1530 

1476.  Legislative  control    1531 

1477.  Taxing  powers  1532 

1478.  Implied   powers   1534 

1479.  Charter    limitations 1534 

1480.  Taxation  to  aid  private  enterprises 1535 

1481.  Discrimination    against   non-residents 1537 

1482.  State  control 1537 

1483.  Execution  of  charter  powers 1538 

1484.  Voting  the  tax 1539 

1485.  Purposes  for  which  the  tax  may  be  levied 1542 

1486.  Proceedings  to  collect 1543 

1487.  Application  of  taxes 1543 

1488.  Lien  of  taxes 1544 

1489.  Exemptions    1544 

1490.  Exemptions  further  considered — Whiting  v.  West  Point 1546 

1491.  Validity  of  taxes 1548 

1492.  Invalidity  of  taxes 1549 

1493.  Recovery  of  tax  illegally  paid 1550 

1494.  Miscellaneous   1553 


CHAPTER  XXXVI. 

HIGHWAYS. 

1495.  Highways   defined— Different  kinds 1556 

1496.  Modes  of  creating  highways 1557 

1497.  Dedication  of  highways — Nature  and  requisites 1559 

1498.  Dedication    continued — Evidence    and    presumptions 1560 

1499.  Conditional  or  qualified  dedication — Revocation 1561 

1500.  Acceptance    of    highway — Nature    of 1562 

1501.  Dedication  by  state — By  cities 1563 

1502.  Dedication    continued 1563 

1503.  Acquiring  streets  by  prescription 1564 

1504.  Same  subject  continued — Prescription  in  various  states 1566 

1505.  Appropriating  lands  for  highways — Damages 1568 

1506.  Laying  out  highways 1568 

1507.  Property  exempt  from 1569 

1508.  Private  owners'  rights 1570 

1509.  Proceedings  to  establish  highways — Parties — Notice 1571 

1510.  Petition — Jurisdictional    facts 1572 

1511.  Abandonment  of  highway  by  non-user 1573 

1512.  Discontinuing  or  vacating  highways 1574 

1513.  Bridges — Part  of  highway,  etc 1575 


TABLE    OF    COXTEXTS — VOL.    II,  xlvii 

Section  Page 

1514.  Bridges  over  navigable  rivers  and  waters 1575 

1515.  Bridges  between  states — Between   counties 1576 

1516.  County  bridges 1577 

1517.  City    bridges 1578 

1518.  Bridges  in  towns,  townships  and  boroughs 1579 

1519.  General  duty  to  repair  bridges 1580 

1520.  Abutting  owners'  rights  and  easements 1581 

1521.  Liability  for  defective  construction 1583 

1522.  Defective  highway  plan — Liability  for 1584 

1523.  Same   subject  continued 1585 

1524.  Duty  to  keep  streets  reasonably  safe 1586 

1525.  Primary  municipal  duty  to  repair — Abutting  owners'  liability.  1587 

1526.  Municipal  and  abutting  owners — Statutory  liability 1588 

1527.  Limited  liability  for  acts,  etc.,  of  independent  contractor 1590 

1528.  Municipal  duty  of  supervision  over  others 1591 

1529.  General  municipal  liability  for  neglect  of  streets 1592 

1530.  Municipal  liability  in  Michigan 1592 

1531.  Same  subject  continued — Rule  in  other  states 1594 

1532.  Liability  for  ways  which  public  is  invited  to  use 1596 

1533.  Municipal   recourse   against   third   persons 1598 

1534.  Liability  when  defects  concur  with  other  causes 1599 

1535.  Plaintiff's  concurring  act  in  cases  of  danger  and  exigency 1601 

1536.  Limited  liability  in  grading  streets 1602 

1537.  Liability  in  respect  to  latent  defects 1603 

1538.  Municipal  liability  for  snow  and  ice 1604 

1539.  Same   subject  continued — Notice 1607 

1540.  Obstructions— Liability    for 1608 

1541.  Obstructions  for  private  convenience 1609 

1542.  Liability  for  structures  over  the  street 1611 

1543.  Municipal  liability  for  fright  of  horses 1612 

1544.  Notice  of  defect  in  highway 1614 

1545.  Notice  when  a  question  for  the  jury 1616 

1546.  When  notice  is  not  necessary 1618 

1547.  To  whom  notice  may  be  given 1620 

1548.  Notice   of  injury 1621 

1548a.  The  same   subject  continued — Requisites  of  notice 1322 

1549.  Illustrations  of  sufficient  notice 1623 

1550.  Pleading  of  notice — Evidence  of 1624 

1551.  Evidence  in  personal  injury  cases 1626 

1552.  Instructions   to   jury 1628 

1553.  Exercise  of  care  by  person  injured 1631 

1553a.  Duty  to  look   and   listen 1635 

1554.  Pedestrians'  duty  to  use  crossings  and  sidewalks 1637 

1555.  Infirm  persons — Duty  of  caution 1639 

1556.  Violation  of  ordinance,  etc.,  as  contributory  negligence 1641 


.xlviii  TABLE    OF    CONTENTS VOL.    II. 


CHAPTER   XXXVII. 

MANDAMUS   AND    QUO    WARRANTO. 

(a)    Mandamus. 

Section  Page 

1557.  Mandamus — General    1644 

1558.  Mandamus  where  discretion  may  be  exercised 1645 

1559.  Reinstatement  of  officer — Canvass  of  election 1647 

1560.  Premature   application — Laches 1647 

1561.  Control    of    official    discretion 1648 

1562.  Same  subject  continued 1649 

1563.  Same  subject  continued — Board  of  assessment 1650 

1564.  Same  subject  continued — Improvement  of  highways 1650 

1565.  Same  subject  continued — Rebuilding  bridge 1651 

1565a.  Petition   for  mandamus 1651 

1566.  Relator's  right 1652 

1567.  Instances  illustrating  use  of  mandamus 1653 

1568.  Private  parties  as  relators 1654 

1569.  Acts  in  excess  of  officer's  powers 1656 

1570.  Michigan   decisions — Control   of  discretion 1656 

1571.  Restoration   to   office 1657 

1572.  To  restore  removed  officials 1658 

1573.  To  obtain  possession  of  office 1659 

1574.  To  compel  performance  of  judicial  functions 1659 

1575.  To  compel  payment  of  judgment 1660 

1576.  To  compel  audit  of  claims 1661 

1577.  Payment  of  claims  and  warrants 1662 

1578.  For  payment  of  claims 1663 

1579.  To  compel  payment  of  claims  continued 1664 

1580.  To  compel  public  boards  to  reverse  their  decisions 1665 

1581.  To  compel  subordinate  officials  to  recognize  board 1665 

1582.  Removal  of  obstructions  in  streets 1666 

1583.  Same  subject  continued — Control  of  discretion 1667 

1584.  To  appoint  school  trustees 1669 

1585.  Apportionment,  etc.,  of  school  moneys 1669 

1586.  To  restore  school  funds 1670 

1587.  To  compel  signing  of  teacher's  warrant 1670 

1588.  To  dissolve  injunction  against  city 1671 

1589.  To  compel  approval  of  official  bond 1672 

1590.  To  compel  execution  of  tax  deed 1673 

1591.  To  compel  approval  of  contract 1673 

1592.  To  a  county  treasurer  to  refund  taxes 1674 

1593.  Abatement  of  public  nuisance — Canvass  of  election — To  police 

commissioners  to  enforce  law 1674 

1594.  Obstructions  in  streets — Contract  for  improvement 1675 

1595.  Title  to  office  and  custody  of  records 1676 

1596.  License    to    sell    liquors 1677 

1597.  Hearing  of   complaint : 1677 


TABLE   OF    CONTENTS — VOL.    II.  xlix 

Section  Page 

1598.  By  taxpayer  to  compel  investment  of  funds 1678 

1599.  To  levy  tax  to  pay  judgment — Previous  demand 1679 

1600.  Peremptory   and   alternative 1680 

1601.  Practice— Parties 1681 

1602.  Parties    further  considered 1681 

1603.  Pleading 1682 

1604.  Enforcement  of  public  duties 1683 

1605.  When  mandamus  will  lie — General 1684 

1606.  When  mandamus  will  not  lie — General 1686 

(b)    Quo  Warranto. 

1607.  Scope  of  proceeding — Title  to  office — Policeman 1688 

1608.  Validity  of   incorporation — Evidence 1688 

1609.  Against  municipal  officers  under  void  organization 1689 

1610.  Usurpation  of  franchise  by  city — Parties 1689 

1611.  Common  council  as  judge  of  election 1690 

1612.  Mandamus  and  quo  warranto  distinguished 1690 

1613.  Florida  decisions  on  quo  warranto — Council  as  judges  of  elec- 

tions    1691 

1614.  Practice  in  Massachusetts — Contest  of  elections 1692 

1615.  Quo  warranto  against  municipal  corporation 1693 

1616.  Jurisdiction  of  court 1693 

1617.  Election  contests — Rules  in  Colorado 1694 

1618.  Title  to  office— Practice  in  Michigan 1695 


CHAPTER  XXXVIIL 

INJUNCTION    AND    CERTIORARI. 

(a)  Injunction. 

1619.  Equitable  jurisdiction  in  municipal  affairs 1696 

1620.  Rights  and  remedies  of  abutting  owners 1697 

1621.  Restraining  power  of  equity  in  municipal  affairs 1700 

1622.  Injunction  in  matters  of  special  assessment 1701 

1623.  To  restrain  the  enforcement  of  an  ordinance 1702 

1624.  To  restrain  the  passage  of  an  ordinance 1703 

1625.  Restraining  the  execution  of  contracts 1704 

1626.  Restraining  the  collection  of  assessments 1704 

1627.  Restraining  the  vacation  or  grading  of  streets 1705 

1628.  Restraint  of  railroads  in  streets 1705 

1629.  When   injunction   sustained — Illustrations 1706 

1630.  When  injunction  not  sustained — Illustrations 1708 

(b)  Certiorari. 

1631.  Jurisdiction    in 1711 

1632.  Miscellaneous    1713 

1  Smith — iv 


TABLE   OF    CONTEXTS — VOL.    II. 


CHAPTER    XXXIX. 

taxpayers'  actions. 
Section  Page 

1633.  Introductory    1714 

1634.  Remedies  for  illegal  taxation — In  general 1716 

1635.  Injunctions  against  taxes 1717 

1636.  Requisites  for  injunction 1719 

1637.  No  injunction  against  irregular  taxes 1720 

1638.  Void    taxes 1721 

1639.  Injunctions  against  municipal  taxation 1721 

1640.  Taxes  on  personal  property 1722 

1641.  Taxes  on  real  property 1722 

1642.  Certiorari    1723 

1643.  Recoveries  by  taxpayers  of  taxes  paid 1725 

1644.  Actions  against  officers 1726 

1645.  Misappropriations    '.  1727 

1646.  Injunction   further  illustrated 1729 

1647.  The  same  subject  continued 1730 

1647a.  Suits  by  taxpayers  generally 1731 


CHAPTER  XL. 


actions  by  and  against  public  corporations. 

1648.  Capacity  to  sue  and  be  sued — Whether  a  county  is  subject  to 

suit    1733 

1649.  The  same  subject  continued 1735 

1650.  Service  of   process 1737 

1651.  Corporate  name  in  suits 1738 

1652.  Authority  to  bind  town  by  appearance 1738 

1653.  Pleading  in  suits  upon  bonds 1740 

1654.  Bill  of  interpleader  by  public  officer 1741 

1655.  Writ  of  prohibition  in  behalf  of  a  town — Office  of  the  writ.  . .  .1742 

1656.  Execution   against   municipal    corporation 1743 

1657.  Garnishment  of  municipal  corporations 1744 

1658.  Presentation  of  claims — Charter  provisions  construed 1746 

1659.  Action  by  contractor — Remedy  by  tax-bill  when  not  exclusive.  .1747 

1660.  Corporate  liability  to  qui  tarn  action  for  penalties 1748 

1661.  Statutory   liability   for   injuries  to   sheep   by  dogs — Filing  of 

statement    1748 

1662.  The  same  subject  continued — Massachusetts  decisions 1750 

1663.  Liability  for  acts  of  officers  in  killing  dogs  running  at  large. .  .1751 

1664.  Suits  by  the  municipality 1752 

1665.  Suits  against  the  municipality — Defenses 1752 

1666.  Damages,   measure   of 1753 

1667.  Recovery  of  money  wrongfully  paid 1754 


TABLE   OF    CONTENTS — VOL.    II.  '        ,  H 

Section  •                                   Page 

1668.  Limitations   against   suits 1754 

1669.  Miscellaneous    1755 

1670.  Application  of  estoppel  in  municipal  affairs 1756 

1671.  When  estoppel  applies  to  municipality 1756 

1672.  When  estoppel  does  not  apply  to  municipality 1758 

1673.  Estoppel  of  persons  and  corporations 1759 


CHAPTER  XLI. 

MUNICIPAL   DEPARTMENTS. 

1674.  Creation   of   departments 1761 

1675.  Board  of  health 1761 

1676.  Board   of   education 1763 

1677.  Board  of  police — Department  of  police 1764 

1678.  Fire   department 1767 

1678a.  Department   of   parks 1769 


CHAPTER  XLII. 

DAMAGES    IN    MUNICIPAL   MATTERS. 

1679.  Elements  of   damages 1771 

1680.  The  measure  of  damages 1773 

1681.  Damages  to  adjoining  owners 1774 

1682.  Damages  from  change  of  grade 1776 

1683.  Damages  in  case  of  independent  contractor 1778 

1684.  Damages  where  city  fails  to  assess 1779 

1685.  Damages  in  miscellaneous  matters 1780 


CHAPTER    XLIII 


PLEADING.- 

1686.  Necessary    allegations 1783 

1687.  Unnecessary   allegations 1785 

1688.  Sufficiency  of  allegations 1785 

1689.  Insufficiency   of  allegations 17S7 

1690.  The  declaration,  complaint,  or  petition 1788 

1691.  Bill  in  chancery — Allegations  of 1791 

1692.  Variance  between  allegations  and  proof 1792 

1693.  Instructions   to    jury 1793 


lii  TABLE    OF    CONTENTS VOL.    II. 


CHAPTER  XLIV. 

evidence. 
Section  Page 

1694.  Admissibility   of  evidence 1795 

1695.  Sufficiency  of  evidence 1799 

1696.  Burden  of  proof 1800 

1697.  Questions  of  fact  are  for  the  jury 1801 

1698.  Contributory   negligence — Evidence    of 1803 

1699.  Record  of  council— Proof  of 1804 

1700.  Presumptions    1805 

1701.  Miscellaneous    1805 


CHAPTER    XLV. 

FRANCHISES. 

1702.  Power  to  grant  franchises — Limited 1807 

1703.  Franchise  may  be  a  contract 1808 

1704.  Franchises  with  reference  to  streets 1808 

1705.  Grant  of  exclusive  franchises 1809 

1706.  Validity  of  franchise 1810 

1707.  Franchises  subject  to  police  power 1811 

1708.  Revocation,   forfeiture  and   surrender 1811 

1709.  Acceptance  of  franchise — Conditions 1813 

1710.  Franchises  to  street  railways 1813 

1711.  Miscellaneous   1814 

CHAPTER    XLVI. 

CIVIL    SERVICE   AND   VETERANS   ACTS, 
(a)    Civil  Service  Acts. 

1712.  The  scope  and  purpose  of  civil  service  laws 1816 

1713.  Civil  service  laws — When  introduced — New  York  statute 1817 

1714.  To   whom   applicable 1819 

1715.  Civil  service  rules  and  regulations 1820 

1716.  Appointments — Meaning  of ,  etc 1821 

1717.  Removal,  reasons  for 1822 

1718.  Reinstatement    1823 

1719.  Miscellaneous    provisions 1824 

1720.  Constitutionality  of  civil  service  laws 1825 

(b)    Veterans  Acts. 

1721.  Scope  and  purpose  of  acts 1826 

1722.  Removal   and   discharge 1828 

1723.  Applies  to  subordinates  only 1829 

1724.  Hearing    1829 

1725.  Miscellaneous   1830 


TABLE  OF  CASES. 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Vol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.'] 


Aaron  v.  Broilles,  64  Tex.  316, 
Abbett   V.   Board   &c.,    114    Ind. 


1097 
61, 

9,   1076 
Abbott  V.  City  of  Mobile,   119  Ala. 

595,  1336 

V.  Mills.  3  Vt.  521,  1559 

Abel  V.  City  of  Minneapolis,  08  Minn. 

89,  1774,  1776 

Abell    V.    Prairie    Civil    Tp.    &c.,    4 

Ind.  App.  599,  1750 

Abells  V.  City  of  Syracuse,  40  N.  Y. 

S.  233  739 

Abendro~th  V.  Manhattan  E.  Co.,  122 

N.  Y.  Ij  1581 

Aberdeen  v.  Blackmar,  6  Hill  324,  1599 
Aberuathy  v.  Phifer,  84  N.  C.  711,  941 
Abram  v.  State,  28  S.  W.  818,  499 

Abrams  v.  Carlisle,  18  S.  C.  242,  334 
Ackerman  v.  Huff,  71  Tex.  317,  694 

Ackley  School  Dist.  v.  Hall,   113  U. 

S.  135,  1000,  1018 

Adams  v.   Brenan,   177  111.   194, 

734,  1699,  1701.  1764 
V.  Chicago  R.  Co.,  39  Minn.  286, 

1214,  1582 
V.  City  of  Beloit,  105  Wis.  363,  1554 
V.  City  of  Modesto,  131  Cal.  501,  928 
V.  City  of  Oshkosh,  71  Wis.  49, 

829,   1609,   1619 
V.  City  of  Salina,  58  Kan.  246,     800 
V.  City  of  Shelbyville,  154  Ind. 
467, 

1150,  1243,  1266.  1302,  1304,  1707 
V.  Crowell,  40  Vt.  31,  366 

V.  Fisher,  23  Tex.  651,  1206 

V.  Green.  74  Mo.  App.  125,  1301 

V.  Hyde,  27  Vt.  221,  1540 

V.    Inhabitants    &c.,    147    Mass. 
440,  1586.    1606,    1616 

V.  Logan  Co.,  11  111.  336,  757 

V.  Mack,  3  N.  H.  493,         1421,  1422 
V.    Mayor   &c.,    2    Head   363, 

1508,  1521 
V.  Memphis  &c.  R.  Co.,  2  Coldw. 
645,  977 

V.  Ohio  Falls  Car  Co.,  131  Ind. 
375,  585,  1322 

V.  Paige,  7  Pick.  542,  211 

V.   Pratt.   109   Mass.  59,  365 

V.  President  &c.,  1  Greenl.  361, 

7,  142,  148,  342,  776,  965 
V.    Richardson,    43    N.    H.    212, 

221,   335 
V.  Saratoga  &c.  R.  Co.,  11  Barb. 
(N.  Y.)  414,  453,  1565 

V.  Stanyon,  24  N.  H.  405,       348,  367 
V.  State,  82  111.  132.  864,  1483 

V.  State,  65  N.  H.  188,  1484 

V.  Tator.  42  Hun  384,  197 

V.  Thomas.  11  Ky.  L.  701,  1492 

.V.  Tyler.  121  Mass.  380,  1745 

Adams   Co.   v.   City   of  Quincy,   130 

III.  566,  511,  1145,  1245 

Adamson  v.  Nassau  Electric  R.  Co., 
33   N.   Y.    S.    732,   89   Hun   261, 

1811,  1349 


Adcock   V.  City  of  Chicago,   160   111. 

611,  1237,  1278 

Addis  V.  City  of  Pittsburgh,  85  Pa. 

St.  379.  260 

Addison  v.  Saulnier,  19  Cal.  82,         1508 

Addy  V.  City  of  Janesville,  70  Wis. 

401,  1180 

Addyston    Pipe    &c.    Co.    v.    City    of 

Corry,  197  Pa.  St.  41,  741,  874 

Adkins  v.  Brewer.  3  Cow.  206,  335 

V.     Quest,     79     Mo.     App.     36, 

1259,  1260 

Adleman  v.   Pierce,  55  Pac.  658,        -751 

Adley    v.    Reeves,    2    Man.    &    S.    53, 

528,   531 

Adrian     Water-works     v.     City     of 

Adrian.  64  Mich.  584.  1453 

Adsell    V.    Inhabitants    &c.,    3    Gray 

526.  362 

Adsit  V.  Brady,  4  Hill  630,  222,  224 

^^Ltna  L.  Ins.  Co.  v.  City  of  Burrton, 

75   Fed.   962,  609 

V.  Mabbett,  18  Wis.  698.  321 

Aitna   Mills  v.   Inhabitants  &c.,   126 

Mass.  422,  695 

Affeld  V.  City  of  Detroit,  112  Mich. 

560,  916 

Agawam   Nat'l   Bank   v.    Inhabitants 

&c..  128  Mass.  503,  233,  237 

Agnew  V.  City  of  Corunna,  55  Mich. 

428.  820.   1613 

V.  Beall,  124  111.  312,     194,  659,  662 

Agricultural   Branch  R.  Co.  v.  Win- 
chester,  13   Allen   29,  994 

Ahern  v.  Steele,  115  N.  Y.  203.  1095 

Ah  You,  In  re,  82  Cal.  339,       1415,  1417 

Ah   You,   In  re.   88  Cal.  99,  1404 

Aiken  Co.  v.  Murray,  35  S.  C.  508,     915 

Aikman    v.    School    Dist.,    27    Kan. 

129,  1485 

Aitcheson     v.     Huebner,     90     Mich. 

643,  1673 

Akers  v.  Mayor  &c.,  35  N.  Y.  S.  1099. 

1326,    1335 

Akin  v.  Akin,  78  Ga.  24,  786 

Akron  v.  Chamberlain  Co.,  34  Ohio 

St.  328,  1776 

Alabama  &c.  R.   Co.  v.  Citv  of  Bes- 
semer. 113  Ala.  668.  605 
V.   Kidd,   29   Ala.   221,                      4,   6 

Alamango    v.    Albany    Co.,    25    Hun 

551.  805 

Albany  v.  Abbott,  61  N.  H.   157,         869 
V.  Cunliff,  2  N.  Y.  165,  253 

V.  Savannah  &c.  R.  Co.,  71  Ga. 
158,  1503 

Albany  &c.  Bank  v.  City  of  Albany, 

92  N.  Y.  363.  240,  257,  715 

Albany   &c.    Mining   Co.   v.    Auditor- 
General,   37    Mich.   391.      1288.   1717 

Albany   &c.    R.    Co.    v.    Brownell,    24 

N.   Y.  345,  680 

Albee  v.  Ward,  8  Mass.  79.  335 

Alberger  v.  Mayor  &c.,  64  Md.  1, 

1194,  1242 


(liii) 


liv 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Yol.  I,  pp.  1-S32;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.'\ 


Albers'    retition,    In    re,    113    Mich. 

640,  1318 

Albrecht    v.    City    of    St.    Paul,    47 

Minn.  531,  1202 

Albrittin  v.  Mayor  &c.,  60  Ala.  486, 

85,  86,  265,  1324,  1614,  1616 
Albro    V.    City    of    Fall    River,    175 

Mass.  590,  1782 

Albuquerque  v.  Zeiger,  5  N.  M.  674,    1256 
Alcorn  v.   Hamer,   38   Miss.  652, 

61,  83,  1270 

V.    Philadelphia,    112    Pa.    St. 

494,  1233 

Alden  v.  Alameda  Co.,  43  Cal.  270,     1527 

V.  City  of  Minneapolis,  24  Minn. 

254,  680,  1215 

V.  City  of  Springfield,  121  Mass. 

27,  1291 

V.   Roundsville,  7  Met.  218,  1485 

Alderman    v.     School    Directors,    91 

111.  179,  1691 

Alderson    v.    Commissioners,    31    W. 

Va.  633,  381 

Alderton  v.   Binder,  81  Mich.  133,     1655 
Aldrich  v.  Collins,  3  S.  D.  154,  631 

Aldridge  v.  Tuscumbia  R.  Co.,  2  St. 

&  P.  199,  685 

Aleppo  School  District's  Appeal,  96 

Pa.  St.  76,  1474 

Alesandi'o   Irr.    Dist.   v.    Savings  &c. 

Co.,  88  Fed.  928,  1030 

Alexander  v.  Bennett,  60  N.  Y.  204,    1410 

V.  City  of  Big  Rapids,  76  Mich. 

282,  1586 

V.   City  of  Milwaukee,   16  Wis. 

264,  1216,  1222 

V.   City  of  Vicksburg,   68   Miss. 

564.  797 

V.  Johnson,  144  Ind.  82,  1700 

V.  Oneida  Co..  76  Wis.  56,  966 

V.  People,  7  Colo.  155,  374,  556 

V.    Town   Council   &c.,   54    Miss. 

659,  1392 

V.  Town  of  New  Castle,  115  Ind. 

51,  228 

Alexander  Ave.,  In  re,   17  N.  Y.   S. 

933,  1249.  1251 

Alexandria  v.  Fairfax,  95  TJ.  S.  774.  1737 
Alexandria    Coal    Co.    v.    Swann,    5 

How.  83.  662 

Alexandria  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Alexandria 

&c.  R.  Co.,  75  Va.  780,  684 

Alford  V.   City  of  Dallas,  35   S.   W. 

816.  1286 

V.  Jones,  71  Tex.  519,  430 

Alger  V.  City  of  Lowell,  3  Allen  402, 

1597,   1641 

V.  Curry,  40  Vt.  437,  344.  361 

V.    Inhabitants    &c.,    119    Mass. 

77,  1727 

Allaire  v.    Hartshorne,   21   N.   J.   L. 

665,  1019 

Allee  V.  Reece,  39  Fed.  341,  220,  334 

Alleghany    City,    Appeal    of,    41    Pa. 

St.  60,  1544 

Alleghany  City  v.  McClurkin,  14  Pa. 

St.  81,  239,  649 

V.    People's   Nat'l    Gas   &c.    Co., 

172  Pa.   St.  632,  1347 

Allegheny  City  v.  Western  &c.  R.  Co., 

138  Pa.  St.  375.  1251 

Allegheny  Co.  v.  Gibson,  90  Pa.   St. 

397.  799,  800,  1394 

v.  Watt.  3  Pa.  St.  462,  1073 

Allen  V.   Archer,  49  Maine  346, 

.347,  364,  1727 

V.  Baltimore  &c.  R.  Co.,  114  U. 

S.  311,  1717 

V.  Borough  of  Du  Bois,  181  Pa. 

St.  184,  1331 

V.  City  of  Burlington,  45  Vt.  202, 

343,  344,  363,  871,  1551 


Allen  V.  City  of  Chippewa  Falls,  52 

Wis.  430,  1216 

V.  Citv  of  Davenport,  107  Iowa 
90,      490,    540,    725,    735,    879,    881, 
1030,   1151,   1231,   1298,   1300,   1301, 
1376,  1701 
V.    City    of    Galveston,    51    Tex. 
302,  260,  1206,  1254 

V.  City  of  Portland,  35  Or.  420, 

720,  1134,  1135,  1259,  1284 
V.  Commonwealth.  83  Va.  94,  223 
V.  Cook,  21  R.  I.  525,  1344,  1361 

V.   Dallas   &c.    R.    Co.,   3    Woods 
316.  1027 

V.  District  Tp.,  70  Iowa  434,       1473 
V.    Drew,    44    Vt.    174. 

1148,   1234,   1268 
V.  Gray,  11  Conn.  95,  536 

V.  Hostetter,  16  Ind.  15,  420 

V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  60  Maine  124, 

559,  979.  153S 
V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  19  Pick.  485, 

576,  867 
V.   Intendant  &c.,   89   Ala.    641, 

855,   856 
V.   Jones.   47   Ind.   438,  684 

V.  Louisiana,  103  U.  S.  80,  986 

V.  Mavor  &c.,  53  N.  J.  L.  522,     1582 
V.  Metcalf,  17  Pick.  208,  1483 

v.  People.  84  111.  502,  115 

V.  State.  61  Ind.  268,  327 

V.  Watts,  88  Ala.  497,  967 

Allentown  v.  Henry,  73  Pa.  St.  404, 

1232,    1235 

Allentown  School  Dist.  v.  Derr,  115 

Pa.  St.  439,  1017 

Alley  V.  Board  &c.,  76  111.  101,  990 

V.    City    of    Lebanon,    146    Ind. 
125.  1280 

V.    Inhabitants    &c.,    53    Maine 
446,  1542 

Alline    v.    Le    Mars    City,    71    Iowa 

654,  1637 

Allison    V.    Louisville   &c.    R.    Co.,    9 

Bush  247,  651 

Allman    v.    District    of    Columbia,    3 

App.  D.  C.  8,  1243 

Allwood  V.  Cowen,  111  111.  481,  1699 

Almand   v.    Atlanta   &c.   R.    Co.,    108 

Ga.  417,  71,  586 

Almy  V.  Coggeshall,  19  R.  I.  549,       1777 

Altgelt   V.    City   of   San   Antonio,    17 

S.  W.  75,  1451,  1512 

Altman  v.  City  of  Dubuque,  111  Iowa 

105,  481.  1151 

Alton  V.  Mulledy,  21  111.  76,  210 

Altvater  v.  Mayor  &c..  31  Md.  462.     264 

Alves'  Ex'r  v.  Town  of  Henderson,  16 

B.  Mon.  131.  629 

Alvis  V.  Whitney,  43  Ind.  83,  1519 

Alvord  V.  City  of  Syracuse,  58  N.  Y. 

S.   854.  1273.    1281 

V.   City  of  Syracuse,   163   N.   Y. 
158,  1285,   1303 

V.  Syracuse  &c.  Bank,  98  N.  Y. 
599,  1023 

Amador    Co.    v.    Kennedy,    70    Cal. 

458.  602 

Amberson   Ave.,    In    re,    179    Pa.    St. 

634,  1299 

Ambrose  v.  State,  6  Ind.  351,  607 

American    File    Co.    v.    Garrett,    110 

U.  S.  288,  1031 

American    Ins.    Co.    v.    Stratton,    59 

Iowa  696,  216,  217 

American  &c.   Ins.   Co.  v.   Fyler,   60 

Conn.  448,  1488 

American  Print  Works  v.  Lawrence, 

21   N.   J.   L.   248,  673.   1114 

American  Salt  Co.  v.   Heidenheimer, 

80  Tex.  344.  1028,  1029 

American  &c.  Tel.  Co.  v.  Hess,   125 

N.  Y.  641,  1390,  1581 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


Iv 


[References  are  to  Pages. 


Vol.  I,  pp.  1-S32;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.-] 


American  Tnion  Kx    Co    y.  City  of 
St.  Joseph.  6(5  Mo    t..i>,„      ^nwi 
Amery  v.  City  of  Keokuk,    '^^^owa^^^^ 

AmeJ'v.'  City  of  San  Francisco    76  ^^^ 

V.    I.ake    Superior    &c.    CO.,    -J-  ^^^ 
Minn.  241,  .,         p 

Amesbury  v.   Howditch  &c.  Ins.  Co., 
ft   f^nv   ^OG 

Amesbury  &c.'co.  v.  Inhabitants  &<•-     .^ 

Ame^^^MUr^i^c,    .4    How.  J64.^^;^ 

V.  Mayor  &c.,  14  Ohio  St.  472,    1535 

Amherst  v.  HoHis.  9  N    H    107  104- 

Amos  V.   City   of   Fond  du   Lac,  ^o^^^^ 

Amy'v.'Du'£ue98IT.S470,  1020 

\.  Selma.  77  Ala.  l^S.^^^,  452,  453 

V.  Smith.  1  Litt    326  '  Ig 

AndeUrTn^r^i  ^^f,^"'    {^ 

^°^T1?ak^er.^&'Yld'l3r  ''''^     ^69 

V.     Bitzer,     20     Ky.     L.  ^1||0.  ^^89 

V.  Caldwell,  91  Ind.  451  698 

V.  City  Council  &c.,  58  N.  J.  L.   ^„^ 

1^  CMty  of  Bath.  42  Maine  346  1332 
v.    City    of    Detroit,    124    Mich.^^^^ 

v^City  of  Mayfield.  93  Ky  230.  928 
V.   Cit'y  of  Wellington.   4.^  Kan.  ^^^ 

V.  Equitable  Gas  Light  Co.,  12 

Daly  462.        .    .  i.   TnH 

v^  Kerns  Draining  Co.,   l^^Ind.^^^^ 

V.  Mayor  &c..  8  Houst.  516  1180 

V.  Mayor  &c.,  2  Penn  28,  1362,  1364 
V.  Meeker  Co..  46  Mi?°-  237  15  <o 
V.  Orient  &c.  Co.  88  Iowa  o.9,  881 
V.  Pemberton.  89  Mo.  61,  1571 

V.    Prairie    School    Tp.,    1    I^^^-^^go 

na^ita  Anna  Tp..  116  U^^S.^^^^ 
V.  Tuberville,  6  Coldw.   150,  685 

Anderson  Co.  v.  Houston  &c.  R.  Co., 

50   Tgj.     028,  lUUl 

Anderson    Co     Comg    v^  Jea^l.  ^113 

^-   *•         '  1007,  1023,  1757 

Anderton  v.   City  of  Milwaukee,   82 

^^Mc    "^TQ  oat,  o.3» 

Andes  v.-  Ely.'  158  U.  S.  312,  1004 

Andover  v.  Grafton,  7  N.  H.  29|.  ^^   ^^^ 

Andress    v.     Board     &c.,     19     Mich.^^^^ 

Andrfw 'v.  Settle.  6  Ohio  Dec    160,    1286 

Andrews.  Ex  parte    18  Cal.  678  10<J 

Andrews  V.  Kstes    11  Maine  267  217 

V.    Inhabitants    &c.,    110    Mass. 

21^  3.^.5,    doo 

V.  Insurance  Co.,  37  Maine  2^56.  ^^^ 

V.  King.  77  Maine  224^         '  1436 

V.  People.  15S  111.  477  ^^.^^^ 

V.  Portland.  79  Maine  484,    lji2.  213 
V    Pratt.  44  Cal.  309.  1<8,  615 

v:  School  Dist.,  37  Minn.  96.  ^^  ^^^^ 

V.  United  States.  2  Story  202,^  175 
Angel   V.    Town   of    Spring   City,    06 

S    W    191  ""* 

Answer  of  Justices.  122  Mass  600.  1420 
Anthony  v.   Inhabitants  &c.,   1   Met. 

284  -ioi,  oiJ- 


Anthony  v.  Jasper  ^o.^lOl^.];-  S^/^O^^-o,,, 

V.  State,  29  Ala.  27.  538 

V.   Village  of  Glen   Falls,  38   N. 
Y    S    536.  I.i44 

V.' Williams,  47  Ind.  565,  1191 

Antonio  v.  Mehaffy,  96  U.  S.  312        1006 
Apgar  V.   Hay  ward,    110   ^.   Y.   22^,  ^^^ 

Apple  V.  Board  &c..  127  Ind    553     'l580 
Appleby  V.   Mayor  &c..^^l^5   |U,w.^rr.   ^^^ 

Arbegust    v.    City    of    Louisville,    2 

Bush  271.  ^  ^        .J,-"     '  H^l 

Arberry  v.  Beavers,  6  Tex.  457,  224 

Arbuckle-Ryan  Co.  v.  City  ot  Grand 

Ledge,   122  Mich.   491.  ^^  ^^^^^  ^^^^ 

Archer  v.  Hart    5  Fla.  234  Sr2 

V    Noble.  3   Greenl.   418.       330,   c},5- 

Ardey    v.    City    of    Dallas,    13    Tex. 

Civ.    App.    442,  1286,    129o 

Arey  v.  City  of  Newton,   148  Mass.^^^^ 

Ars'en'ti  v.  City  of  San  Francisco.  16 

Pal    255  239,  240,  241,  260,  618, 

cal.  255,        g5Sy'638;649,  653,  1306 

Argo  V.  Barthand,  80  Ind.  63  1201 

Alius  V.  Village  of  Sturgis,  86  Mich.^^^^ 

Argus    Co.    V.    Mayor   &c.,    55   N.    Y. 

495 
Arimond  v.  Green  Bay  &c.  Canal  Co.. 

31  Wis.  316,  ,„     .   ,  1-1** 

Arkadel^phia    v.    Windham,    49  ^Ark.^^^^ 

Arkadelphia  Lumber  Co.  v.  Arkadel- 

phia,   56  Ark.  370,  46;j.   1424 

Arkansas    Val.    ^'^S;     Co.    v.     Belden 

Mining  Co..   12  <    l^.   S.  3i9.  iiyi 

Arlington  v.  Merricke,  2  Saund   411^  32b 

Armington   v.   Town   of   Barnett,    lo 
Vt.  745,  .    „,     ,f 

Armstrong  v.    Board  &c.,   4   Blackf. 

on8  '"' 

;  Brown.  20  Ky.  L.  1766,  513,  612 
V.  Citv  of  Topeka.  36  Kan.  4.32,  401 
V.    Ogden    City,    12    Utah^^476,^^^^ 

V.    School    Dist.,    19    Mo.    App. 
462  i4J- 

V.    School    Dist.,    28    Mo.    App. 
IfiQ  1491 

V.  Tama  Co.,  34  Iowa  309,  1064 

V.  Town  of  Ackley,  71  lo^l^J^'igog 
V.  Truitt.  53  Ark.  287,  944,  945 

V.    Village   of   Ft.    Edward,    159 
N.  Y.  315.  ,,    „      ^'-^ 

Armstrong    Co.    v.    Bnnton,    47    Pa. 

St    367  yoi> 

Arnold'  v.    'Blaker,    L.    R.    6    Q.    B. 

433  lODJ- 

V.  City  of  Cambridge,  106  Mass.^^^^ 

pity  of  Ft.  Dodge,  ni^lowa^;'^^ 

v."city   of   St.    Louis,    152    Mo.^^^^ 

v^Holbrook.  L.  R.  8  Q.  B.  96.  1561 
V.   Hudson   River  R.   Co.,   55   N. 

Y    661                                             6(4.  b7b 

V.'  Mayor  &c.,  21  R.  I._,  15,     717,  737 

V.  Mayor  &c..  4  Man.  &  G.  860.  261 

V.  Styles,  2  Blackf.  391.  420 

V.  Village  of  Decatur,  29  Mich.  ^^^ 

Arnoult  v.  City  of  New  Orleans,  11 

La.  An.  54,        .      ,     ,         .^  ^    '^^^ 
Arthur  v.  City  of  Charleston,  46  ^.^^^^ 

Artz^v^'  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.,  34  Iowa 

153,  '^°'^ 


Ivi 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Vol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol  II,  pp.  833-1830.-\ 


Asbell    V.    Mayor   &c.,    80    Ga.    503, 

28*,  14a7 
Ash  V.  City  of  Independence,  79  Mo. 

Add    70  '"*■* 

V    People,  11  Mich.  347,     1403,  1508 
Ashby  V.   White,   2   Ld.   Raym.   938 ; 

s.  c.  1  Salk.  19,  221,  222,  225 

Asher  v.  Texas,  128  U.  S.  129,  1399 

Ashley  v.   Board  &c.,   16  U.   S.  App. 

6.56:   s.  c.   60   Fed.  55;  8  C.   C. 

A.  455,  66,  69,  70,  1002.  1^01|^. 

.    ?9f'*y«^^«^^«™79?fmtl217 
V.    Town   of   Calliope,    71    Iowa 
466,  ,         58 

Ashman    v.    Pulaski    Co.,    73    Fed. 

907  1006 

Ashton  V.  City  of  Newton,  134  Mass. 

507  1598 

V.  City  of  Rochester,  14  N.  Y. 
S    855  *^^ 

Ashueiot  Nat'l  Bank  v.  Lyon  Co.,  81 

Fed    127,  87» 

V.   School   Dist..  41   Fed.  514,     1490 

Ashueiot  R.  Co.  v.  Elliott,  57  N.  H. 

397  102U 

Askew  V.  Hale  Co.,  54  Ala.  639, 

7,  9,   13,   14,  434,   441,  774 

Askin  V.  London  &c.,  1  Up.  Can.  Q-   ^^^ 

B.  292,  174 
Askins   v.    Commonwealth,    1    Duv. 

275,  457 

Aspinwall    v.    Board    &e..    22    How. 

364,     103,  625,  982.  996,  997,  1524 

Astor,  In  re,  53  N.  Y.  617,  1234 

Astor  V.  Hoyt,  5  Wend.  603,  693 

V.  Mayor  &c.,  62  N.  Y.  567,  294 

V.   Miller,  2  Paige  68,  1571 

Atchison  v.   Bartholow,  4  Kan.   124, 

54,  55 

Atchison  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Board  &c.,  25 

Kan.  261.  9?1 

V.   Commissioners,  17  Kan.  29,     992 
V.  Missouri  &c.  R.  Co.,  31  Kan. 
660,  1353 

V.   Peterson,    5   Kan.   App.    103, 

1249,  1303 
V.  Wilhelm,  33  Kan.  206,  1535 

Athearn  v.  Independent  Dist.  &c.,  82 

Iowa  686.  281 

Atkins  V.  Phillips,  26  Fla.  281,  476 

V.    Town    of    Randolph,    31    Vt. 
226,  1538 

Atkinson  v.  Bowman,  42  Hun  404,       19 
V.     Goodrich     Transp.     Co.,     60 
Wis.   141,  499 

V.  Marietta  &c.  R.  Co.,  15  Ohio 
St.   21,  54 

V.  Wvkoff.  58  Mo.  App.  86,  1317 

Atlantic  &c.  Tel.  Co.  v.  Chicago  &c. 

K.  Co.,  6  Biss.  158,  681 

Atlantic  City  &c.  Co.  v.  Atlantic  City 

&c.  Co.,   15  Atl.   581,  561 

Atlantic  City  Water-works  Co.  v. 
Atlantic  City,  39  N.  J.  Eq. 
367,  1448 

V.    Atlantic   City,    48    N.    J.    L. 
378,  1465 

V.  Consumers'  Water  Co.,  44  N. 
J.  Eq.  427,  1455 

V.   Read,  50  N.  J.   L.   665, 

233,  1449,  1450 

Atlas  Bank  v.  Brownell,  9  R.  I.  168,    321 

Attaway  v.  Mayor  &c.,  68  Ga.  704.     1075 

Attorney-General  v.  Barstow,  4  Wis. 

567.  381 

V.   Board  &c.,  64  Mich.   607, 

381,  433,  1665 
V.  Boards  &c..  120  Mich.  357,  1086 
V.  Brown.  1  Wis.  513,  106.  150 

V.   Cahill.   169   Mass.    18,  209 

V.  Cain,  84  Mich.  223,  1688 


Attorney-General   v.   Chicago  &c.   R. 

Co.,  35  Wis.  425,  54 

V.    City    of    Boston,    123    Mass. 
460,  124,  651 

V.   City  of  Cambridge,   16  Gray 
247,  1177 

V.   City  of  Eau   Claire,   37   Wis. 
400,  559,  610,  666 

V.    City    of    Salem,    103    Mass. 
138,  124 

V.    Common    Council    &c.,    112 
Mich.   145,  209 

V.  Connors,  27  Fla.  329,  1446 

V.  Corporation  of  Shrewsbury,  6 
Beav.   220,  123,  446 

V.  Crocker,   138  Mass.   214, 

195,  351,  352,  365 
V.  Ely.  4  Wis.  420,  152.  377 

V.  Fitzpatrick.  2  Wis.  542,  436 

V.  Heishon.  18  N.  J.  Eq.  410.     1105 
V.  Lombard  &c.  R.  Co.,  10  Phila. 
352.  586 

V.  Manderson.  12  Jur.  383,  325 

V.  Marston,  66  N.   II.  485.  185 

V.  Mayor  &c..  1  Bligh  312,  651 

V.    Mayor    &c..    2    Mylne    &    Cr. 
406.  667 

V.  McCabe,  172  Mass.  147.  1763 

V.  Metropolitan  R.  Co.,  125  Mass. 
515.  591,  682 

V.  Pingree.  120  Mich.  550,  609 

V.  Railroad  Companies,  35  Wis. 
425.  106 

V.  Rice.  64  Mich.  385.  62,  415 

V.   Shepard,  62  N.   H.  383. 

117.  118,  162,  294 
V.  Simonds.  Ill  Mass.  256, 

273    353    355 
V.  Stevens.  1  Saxt.  Ch."369,        '  634 
V.    Town    of    Dover,    62    N.    J. 
L.  138,  70 

V.   Utica  Ins.   Co.,  2  Johns.  Ch. 
371,  296 

V.  Varnum,  167  Mass.  477,  171 

V.  Williams,  174  Mass.  476,         1782 
V.  Wilson.  1  Craig  &  Ph.  1.  651 

Attorney-General's    Opinions, 

448.   538.   869.   870 

Atwater  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  6  Conn. 

223,  142,  341,  965 

v.  Trustees  &c.,   124  N.   Y.  602, 

801    8*^3 

Atwell    V.    Zeluflf,    26    Mich.    118, 

1552,  1725 

Atwood  V.   Austin.   16  Johns.   180,       278 
V.  I'artree.  56  Conn.  80.  1675 

V.  Town  of  Lincoln,  44  Vt.  332.    363 

Auburn  &c.  Plank  Road  Co.  v.  Doug- 
lass. 9  N.  Y.  444.  568 

Auchenbach   v.    Seibert,   120   Pa.    St. 

159,  156 

Auditor-General    v.     Board    &c.,    89 

Mich.  552,  418 

V.    Lake  George  &c.   R.   Co.,   82 
Mich.   426,  192 

Auditors    v.    Benoit,    20    Mich.    176, 

197,   213 

Auer  V.    City   of   Dubuque,   65    Iowa 

650,  1239 

Augusta  Bank  v.  City  of  Augusta,  49 

Maine  507,  983 

Augusta  City  Council  v.  Hudson,  88 

Ga.  599,  1579 

Augusta  Factory  v.  City  Council  &c., 

83  Ga.  734,  623 

Augusta  &c.   R.   Co.   v.   City  Council 

&c..  100  Ga.  701,  586 

Aulanier  v.  Governor,  1  Tex.  653. 

196,    1508 

Auld  V.  Walton,  12  La.  An.  129,         370 

Aurora  City  v.  West.  7  Wall.  82.       1020 

Aurora  Water  Co.  v.  City  of  Aurora, 

129  Mo.  540,  490 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


Ivii 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Toi.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-1830. '\ 


Austin  V.  Allen,  6  Wis.  134,         343,  096 
V.  Colgate,  27  S.  W.  896,  1337 

V.    District    Tp.    &c.,    51     Iowa 
102,  807 

V.    Inhabitants    &c.,    57    Maine 
304,  344,  363 

V.  Murray,  16  Pick.  121, 

100,   505,   508,   1086,   1087 

Austrian  v.  Guy,  21  Fed.  500,  49 

Avant  V.  Plvnn.  2  S.  I).  153,  593 

Avery  v.   Slack,   19   Wend.   50,  193 

V.  Stewart,  1  Cush.  496,         362,  364 

V.    Township    Board,    73    Mich. 

622,  965,  966 

Axt  V.  Jackson  School  Tp.,  90  Ind. 

101,  210 

Ayer  v.   City  of  Norwich,   39   Conn. 

376,  1612 

V.  Lawrence,  59  N.  Y.  192,     651,  825 
Ayeridge    v.    Commissioners,    60    Ga. 

404,  106,  122 

Ayers  v.  Hatch,  175  Mass.  489,    203,  1830 
Ayres    v.    Pennsylvania    R.    Co.,    52 

N.  J.  L.  405,  1561 

V.   Village  of  Hammondsport,   7 

N.  Y.  S.  174,  1607 


B 


Baader  v.  Town  of  Cullman,  115  Ala. 

539,  120 

Baar  v.  Klrby,  118  Mich.  392,  463 

Babbage  v.  Powers,  130  N.  Y.  281,     1349 

Babbitt    v.    Selectmen   &c.,    3    Cush. 

530,  668 

V.  State,  10  Kan.  9,  339 

Babcock   v.   Beaver   Creek,   64   IMich. 

601,  1551,   1552 

V.    City    of    Buffalo,    56    N.    Y. 
268,  1093,    1110 

V.  City  of  Helena,  34  Ark.  499,     88 
V.   Gififord,   29  Ilun   186,  224 

V.   Hanselman,   56   Mich.   27,        1695 
V.     Scranton     Traction     Co.,     1 
Lack.  Leg.   N.  223,  463 

V.    Town    of    Granville,    44    Vt. 
325,  1551,  1723 

V.  Welsh,   71  Cal.  400,  1574 

Babington  v.   Parish  of  St.   Charles, 

27   La.   An.   321,  651 

Babson  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  101  Mass. 

93,  1601 

Bachelder  v.  Epping,  28  N.  H.  354,     868 

Bachelor  v.  New  Hampton,  60  N.  H. 

207,  697,  1572 

Back  V.   Carpenter,  29  Kan.  349,  49 

Backhaus    v.    People,    87    111.    App. 

173,  525 

Backman   v.   Charlestown,   42   N.   H. 

125,  257 

Backus  v.  Lebanon,  11  N.  H.  19, 

637,   698,   1323 

Bacon  v.  Bacon,  3  Cro.  Car.  601,  130 

V.  City  of  Antigo,  103  Wis.   10,    930 
V.    City    of    Tacoma,    19    Wash. 
674,  1662 

V.     Mayor    &c.,     86     Ga.    301, 

1145,  1208 
V.   Mayor  &c..    105   Ga.    62, 

1129.  1235.  1294,  1300 
V.  Robertson.  18  How.  480,  445,  446 
V.  Texas,  163  TT.  S.  207.  1808 

Badger  v.   Citv  of  New  Orleans,   49 

^La.   An.   804,  926 

Badkins  v.   Robinson,   53  Ga.   613.     1403 

Bagg    V.    City    of    Detroit,    5    Mich. 

336,  1234 

Bagwell    V.    Town   of   Lawrenceville, 

94  Ga.   654,  600 

Bailey  v.  Buell,  59  Barb.   158,  1551 

V.  City  of  Cambridge,  174  Mass. 
188,  1344 


Bailey  v.   City   of  Centerville,   108 

Iowa  20,  1796 

V.  Fulton  Co.,  Ill  Ga.  313,  792 

V.    Inhabitants  &c.,   126  Mass. 
416,  688 

V.  Lawrence  Co.,  2  S.  Dak.  533, 

1652 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  3  Hill  531, 
4,    6,    222,    437,    459,    7(!2,    779,    783, 
809.   811,   1113,   1546 
V.   State,  30  Neb.  855,  540,  1422 

V.  Winn,  101  Mo.  649,  1412 

Bally    V.    Commonwealth    (Pa.),    10 

Atl.   764,  903 

V.  Commonwealth,  20  W.   N.  C. 
(Pa.)   221,  1035 

Bainbridge  v.  Downie,  6  Mass.  253,     216 

Baird  v.  Daly.  08  N.  Y.  547,  1627 

v.  Todd,  27  Neb.  782,  884 

Baker  v.  Board,  40  Iowa  226,  556 

v.  Chambles,  4  Greene  428,  217 

V.  City  of  Boston,  12  Pick.  184, 

823,    1093,    1112,    1121 
V.    City   of   Cincinnati,    11    Ohio 
St.  534,  1508,  1521 

V.    City    of   Grand    Rapids,    111 
Mich.  447,        1329,  1336,  1339,  1377 
V.  City  of  Lexington,  21  Ky.  L. 
809,  518,   520,   527 

V.    City   of   Portland,    58    Maine 
199,  1641 

V.  City  of  Seattle,  2  Wash.  576, 

892,  916 
V.  City  of  Utica.  19  N.  Y.  326,     175 
V.  City  of  Washington,  7  D.  C. 
134,  690 

V.    Cushman,    127    Mass.    105, 

301,  302 
V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  13  Maine  74, 

668,  866 
V.  Johnson,  41  Maine  15,  960 

V.   Panola   Co.,   30   Tex.   86,  1551 

V.  Preston,  1  Gilm.  235.  211,  324 
V.  Schofleld,  58  Ga.  182,  491,  1425 
V.  Shephard,  24  N.  H.  208,  346,  361 
V.  Tobin,  40  Ind.  310.  1191 

V.  Town  of  Normal.  81  111.  108,  519 
V.  Village  of  Maguon,  9  111.  App. 
155  541 

Balch   v!   City  of  Utica,    5   N.  Y.   S. 

513,  1393,  1394,  1755 

V.    County    Com'rs,    103    Mass. 

106,  689 

Balcom,  In  re,  58  N.  Y.  S.  1097, 

1825,  1830 

Balcombe  v.  Northrup,  9  Minn.  172,  217 

Baldwin  v.  Carter,  15  Johns.  496,  278 
v.  City  Council,  53  Ala.  437,  1533 
v.  City  of  Bangor,  36  Maine  518,  684 
V.  City  of  Chicago.  68  111.  418,  542 
V.  City  of  Elizabeth,  42  N.  J. 
Eq.  11,  564 

V.    City   of   Oswego,    1    Abb.    Ct. 
App.   Dec.   62,  722 

V.   City  of   Springfield,   141   Mo. 
205.  1373 

V.  Franks,  120  U.  S.  678,  140 

V.  Green,  10  Mo.  410,  97,  468,  494 
V.   Marshall,   2   Humph.   116,  228 

V.  Mayor  &c.,  42  Barb.  549,  1522 
V.   Murphy,   82   111.   485,  523 

V.    Nickerson,    3    Wyo.    208,  1486 

V.  Smith,  82  111.  162,  522 

V.   Town  of  North  Branford.  32 
Conn.  49,  343,  345,  363,  364 

V.   Tucker,    16   Fla.   258.  1722 

Bales  V.  Pidgeon,  129  Ind.  548,  1566 

Balfe  V.  Lammers.  109  Ind.  347,       1288 

Ball  V.  Fagg,  67  Mo.  481,  169,  540,  1425 
V.  Town  of  Woodbine,  61   Iowa 
83,  808 

Ballard  v.  Davis,  31  Miss.  525,  294,  1485 
V.  Gay,  108  N.  C.  544,  1419 


Iviii 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Vol.  I.  pp.  1-S32;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.1 


Ballard  v.   Tomlinson.   L.   R.   29  Ch. 

1).  115,  809 

Ballerino  v.  Mason.  83  Cal.  447,  230 

Ballinger  v.  New  York  &c.  R.  Co.,  23 

N.  Y.  42,  823 

Baltimore  &c.  Co.  v.  Nesbit,  10  How. 

395,  VOO 

Baltimore  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  City  of  Sey- 
mour, 154  Ind.  17.  1806 
V.  Fifth  Baptist  Church,  137  U. 
S.  568.  1111 
V.  North.  103  Ind.  486,  679 
Baltimore    Trust    &c.    Co.    v.    Mayor 

&c.,   64   Fed.   153,  510,   522 

Baltimore   Tpk.   Co.,    In  re,   5   Binn. 

481,  1540 

Bamber    v.    City    of    Rochester,    63 

How.   rr.  103.  1097 

Bambrick  v.  Campbell,  37  Mo.  App. 

460,  479 

Bancroft  v.   City  of  Cambridge,   126 

Mass.  438,  689 

V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  18  Pick.  566, 

667,  668 
Bangor   &c.    R.    Co.    v.    McComb,    60 

Maine  290.  701 

V.  Smith,  47  Maine  34,  1813 

Bangor  Savings  Bank  v.  City  of  Still- 
water. 46  Fed.  899.  840,  974 
V.    City    of    Stillwater,    49    Fed. 
721,  963 
Bank    &c.     See    also,    President    &c ; 

Name  of  Bank. 
Bank  &c.   v.   Brainerd   School  Dist., 

49  Minn.   106,  780 

V.  Bridges,  30  N.  J.  L.  112,  115 

V.  Brown,  26  N.  Y.  467. 

58.  83.  520.  1539 
V.    City    of    Louisville,    88    Fed. 
398,  1740,   1757 

V.  City  of  New  Orleans,  12  La. 
An.  421,  245 

V.    City    of    Port   Townsend,    16 
Wash. "450,  1753 

V.  Earl.  38  U.  S.  519,  1807 

V.  Farrar,  1  La.  An.  49,  523 

V.   Mavor  &c..   Dud.   130,   1510,   1511 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  43  N.  Y.  184. 

242.  246,  1205,  1551.  1725,  1727 
V.  Mavor  &c.,  7  Ohio  354.  973,  977 
V.   Patterson,   7  Cranch  29D, 

240,    257,   260,    262 
V.   Peel,   11   Ark.   750.  378 

V.    Planters'    Bank,    9    Wheat. 
907,  4,  6,  7 

V.    Town   Council   &c.,    10   Rich. 
L.  104,  1511 

V.  Town  of  Stateville,  84  N.  C. 
169.  257,   644 

V.    Village   of   Rome,    18    N.    Y. 
38.  983 

V.   Wray,  4  Strob.  87,  217 

Bankhead  v.   Brown,   25   Iowa  540, 

685,  687,  688 
Barber  v.   City  of  Chicago,   152   111. 

37,  1146,  1245 

V.  City  of  East  Dallas,  83  Tex. 
147,  410 

V.    City   of    Roxbury,    93    Mass. 
318,  1612 

Barber  Asphalt  Pav.  Co.  v.  City  of 

Denver,  72  Fed.  336,  1305.  1306 

V.   City  of  Harrisburg,   62   Fed. 
565,  1309 

V.   City  of  Harrisburg,   64   Fed. 
283,  1305 

V.  Citv  of  New  Orleans,  43  La. 
An.  464,  918 

V.  Gogreve,  41  La.  An.  251, 

1257,  1268 
V.  Hezel,  155  Mo.  391,  511,  1307 

V.   Hezel,  76  Mo.  App.  135,  726 

V.  Hunt,  100  Mo.  22,  479 


Barber  Asphalt  Pav.  Co.  v.  Lampton, 

70  Mo.  App.   286.  1259 

v.  Ullman.  137  Mo.  543, 

524,    725,    1146.    1155,    1282 
V.  Watt,  51  La.  An.  1345, 

1240,   1269,   1290,   1310 

Barber   Surgeons   v.    Pelson,   2   Lev. 

252,  85 

Barbier  v.   Connolly,   113  U.   S.   27, 

492,  509 

Barbour    v.    City    of    Ellsworth,    67 

Maine  294.  820 

V.    Inhabitants    &c.,    51    Maine 

608,  364 

Barbour    Co.    v.    Brunson,    36    Ala. 

362,  774 

V.  Horn,  48  Ala.  649.  774 

Barce    v.    City    of    Shenandoah,    106 

Iowa    426.  1329,    1802 

Barclav  v.  City  of  Boston,  167  Mass. 

596,  931 

V.    City    of    Boston,    173    Mass. 
310.  1753 

V.  Howell's  Lessees,  6  Peters  498. 

675  1559 

Bard  v.  Poole,  12  N.  Y.  495,     '  1576 

Barden  v.  City  of  Portage,  79  Wis. 

126.  1218 

Bardick  v.  Dillon.  7  Okl.  535,     1700,  1704 

Bardsley  v.  Sternberg,  17  Wash.  243, 

173,  711,  951,  958 

Bargate  v.   Shortridge,  5  II.  L.   Cas. 

297,  1001.  1016 

Barhite  v.   Home  Tel.   Co..  63  N.   Y. 

S.  659,  1349,  1787,  1788,  1809 

Barhyte  v.   Shepherd,  35   N.   Y.  238, 

16.50,  1727 

Barker  v.  Board  &c.,  45  Kan.  681, 

1169.  1225,  1569 
V.  City  of  Omaha,  16  Neb.  269,  1288 
v.    Hovey,   26   Pac.   585. 

1169,  1225.  1569 
V.  People,  3  Cow.  686,  185,  369 

v.  Smith.  10  S.  C.  226,  523 

V.   Southern  Const.   Co.,   20  Ky. 
L.   796,        186.   711.   753,   1267,   1290 
V.  State,  18  Ohio  514,  1516 

V.  Torrey,  69  Tex.  7,  1489 

V.   Town  of  Oswegatchie,   10   N. 
Y.   S.   834,  858,   1172 

V.  Town  of  Oswegatchie,   16  N. 
Y.  S.  727,  554 

Barklev   v.    Levee   Com'rs,    93    U.    S. 

258.  1529 

Barksdale  v.  City  of  Laurens,  58  S. 

C.  413,  790 

Barling  v.  West,  29  Wis.  307,       467,  499 

Barlow  v.  City  of  Tacoma,  12  Wash. 

32,  1241 

V.  Waters.  16  Ky.  L.  426,  1373 

Barnard  v.  Campau,  29  Mich.   162,     228 
V.    Campbell.    55    N.    Y.    456,  991 

V.  Knox  Co..  105  Mo.  382,  883 

Barnert   v.    Mayor   &c.,   48    N.    J.   L. 

39.5.  289,  472,  473 

Barnes  v.  Barnes,  6  Vt.  388. 

86.  87,   1475 
v.  Brookman.  107  111.  317,  311 

V.  Chapin,  4  Allen  444.  1613 

V.    Common    Council,    89    Ala. 
602.  1425 

V.  District  of  Columbia.  91  U.  S. 
540,       8,  46,  48.  103.  265.  782.  783, 
788.  813.  1207,  1317.  1592 
V.  Dyer.  56  Vt.  469,  1261,  1297,  1498 
V.   Marshall  Co.,  56   Iowa   20. 

1674.  1723.  1726 
V.   Town  of  Bakersfleld,   57   Vt. 
375.  178 

V.  Town  of  Lacon,  84  111.  461, 

43,   982.   1531 
V.    Town    of    Marcus,    96    Iowa 
675,  1327,  1339,  1802 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


lix 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Vol.  I,  pp.  1~S32;  Vol.  II,  pp.  S.33-18S0.'] 


Barnett,  Ex  parte,  51   Ark.  215,  1074 

Barnett  v.  Contra  Costa  Co.,  67  Cal. 

77,  788 

V.  Dennison,  145  U.   S.   135, 

1000,  1757 
V.  President  &c.,  28  III.  62, 

482,   11.32 

Barney  v.   Dewey,   13   John.s.   224.      15U9 

Barney  Dumping  Boat  Co.  v.  Mayor 

&c.,    40    Fed.    50,  784,    788 

Barnum  v.  Oilman.  27  Minn.  466,  378 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  62  Md.  275,  563,  664 
V.  Okolona,  148  U.  S.  393, 

1033,   1757 

Barnum    &c.    Iron    Works    v.    Speed, 

59  Mich.  272,  1672 

Baron   v.    Krebs,    41    Kan.    338,  1256 

Barr    v.    City    of    Kansas    City,    105 

Mo.  550,  1598,  1618,  1636 

V.  City  of  Omaha,  42  Neb.  341,  1211 
V.  City  of  Philadelphia,  191  Pa. 
St.   438,  874,    882,   916 

V.  Denniston,  19  N.  H.  170,  651 

V.  Mayor  &c.,  58  N.  J.  L.  255,       470 
V.  Stevens,  1  Bibb  292,  708 

V.  Village  of  Auburn,  89  111.  362, 

477,   540,   1424 
V.  Village  of  Bainbridge,   59   N. 
Y.  S.  132,  1337,  1364 

Barrett  v.  Black,  56  Maine  498,  810 

V.  City  of  Cambridge,  10  Allen 
48,  1725 

V.  Crane,  16  Vt.  246,  341 

V.  Falls  City  &c.   Stone  Co.,  21 
Ky.  L.  669, 

1240,  1275,  1373,  1799,  1805 
V.  Ocean  City,  62  N.  J.  L.  588,  751 
V.  Savor.  12  N.  Y.   S.  170,  1486 

V.   School  Dist.,  37  N.   W.  445,  1480 
V.    Schuyler  Co.   Court,   44   Mo. 
197,  992 

Barron  v.  Mayor  &c.,  7  Peters  243,     673 

Barrow  v.  Davis,  46  Mo.  394,  1288,  1722 

Barrows   v.    City    of   Sycamore,    150 

111.  588,  1111,  1112,  1347,  1348,  1703 

Barry  v.  City  of  New  York,  56  N.  Y. 

S.  1049,  737 

V.  Goad.  89  Cal.  215.  852 

V.  Lowell.  8  Allen  127.  1216 

V.  Terkildsen,  72  Cal.  254,  1636 

Bartemeyer  v.   Iowa.   18  Wall.   129,     137 

Barter  v.  Commonwealth,  3  1*.  &  W. 

253,  298.  526,  528,  529,  1410 

Barthet  v.  City  of  New  Orleans.  24 

Fed.    563,  503,    605 

Bartholomew  v.  Town  of  Harwinton, 

33   Conn.   408,  859 

Bartle  v.  City  of  Des  Moines,  38  Iowa 

414,  891 

Bartlett  v.   Board   of  Education,   59 

111.  364,  310 

V.    Crozier,    15   Johns.    250,  222 

v.  Crozier,   17  Johns.  439,  1591 

V.  Governor,  2  Bibb  586.  318 

V.  Ilooksett,  48  N.  H.  18,  1612 

V.  King.   12  Mass.  537.  523 

V.    Kinsley,   15   Conn.   327, 

352,  361,  1485 
V.  Town  of  Clarksburg.  45  W.  Va. 
393.  785,  808,  1394 

V.  Tucker,  104  Mass.  336,  217 

Barton    v.    City    of    Pittsburgh,    4 

Brews.   373,  540,    1257,    1421 

V.    City   of   Syracuse,    36    N.    Y. 
54,  812,  821,  1159,  1208 

V.    Incorporation    &c.    of    Gads- 
den. 69  Ala.  495,  521 
V.   Sweptson.   44  Ark.   437,  210 

Barton  Co.  v.  Walser.  47  Mo.  189,         14 

Bartram    v.    City   of   Bridgeport,    55 

Conn.  122.  1261 

Bass  V.  Fontleroy,  11  Tex.  698,  757 

V.  Mavor  &c..  30  Ga.   845,  992 

V.  State,  34  La.  An.  494,  673 


Bassett  v.  City  of  St.  Joseph,  53  Mo. 

290,  1580,    1750 

v.   Den,  17  N.  J.   L.   432,        186,  187 
V.  Fish,  12  Hun  209,  222 

v.  Fish,  75  X.  Y.  303,  1632 

V.   I'orter,   4  Cush.   487, 

48,   86,   87,   1475 
Bassford,   In   re,   50  N.   Y.   509,  1253 

Bass  Foundry  &c.  v.  Board  &c.,  115 

Ind.    234,  841,   943 

Bastrop  Co.  v.  Hearn,  70  Tex.  563,  905 
Katchelder  v.  Kpping,  28  N.  H.  354,  672 
Bateman    v.    Mathes,    54    N.    J.    L. 

536,  1045 

V.  Mid  Wales  R.  Co.,  L.  R.  1  C. 
P.  499,  971 

Bates  V.  Bassett,  60  Vt.  530,     666,  871 
V.  City  of  Houston,  14  Tex.  Civ. 
App.  287,  792 

V.    City    of    St.    Louis,    153    Mo. 
18.  180 

V.  Gregory,  22  Pac.  683,  1736 

V.    Inhabitants    &c.,    151    Mass. 
174,  1377,    1775 

V.   Mayor,   46  Ala.   158, 

1500,   1508,   1510 
V.   Overseers  &c.,   14   Gray   163, 

339,   1429 

V.  Porter,  74  Cal.  224,  900 

V.    Village    of    Rutland,    62    Vt. 

178,  782,  827 

Bates  Co.  v.  Winters,  97  U.  S.  83,  1027 

Batesville  Institute  v.  Kaufifman,  18 

Wall.  151,  459 

Bath  Co.  V.  Amy,  13  Wall.  244,  1528 
Bathurst  v.  Course,  3  La.  An.  260,  1427 
Battle    V.    Corporation    &c.,    9    Ala. 

243,  1502 

Battles  V.  Laudenslager,  84  Pa.   St. 

446,  1027 

Bauer  v.  City  of  Rochester,  35  N.  Y. 

St.  959,  1609 

Baum  V.  Whatcom  Co.,  19  Wash.  626,  754 
Bauman  v.  City  of  Detroit,  58  Mich. 

444,  264 

V.   Ross,  167  U.   S.   548. 

1273.   1302,   1778 
Baumgartner  v.  Hastv,  100  Ind.  575,     11, 
490,  594,  647,  1110,  1115.  1391,  1394 
Baustian  v.  Young,   152  Mo.  317. 

1340,   1800 
Baxter  v.   City  of  Seattle,  3   Wash. 

352,  595 

V.  State.  9  Wis.  38,  1488 

V.  Thomas.  4  Okla.  605,  492 

V.    Winoonski   Turnpike   Co.,   22 
Vt.    114,  9,    148,    777 

Bayard  v.  Klinge,  16  Minn.  249, 

374,  1539 
Bay  Co.  v.  Brock.  44  Mich.  45,  1672 

V.   Bullock.   51   Mich.  544,      387,  420 
Bayland  v.   Mayor  &c.,   1   Sandf.  27, 

251,  647 
Bayley  v.  Taber,  5  Mass.  286,  1017 

Bayliss  v.  Pearson,  15  Iowa  279,  216 

Baysinger  v.  People,  115  III.  419,  213 
Beach    v.    City    of    Elmira,    58    Hun 

600,  1180 

V.  Leahy,  11  Kan.  23,  12,  56 

v.    People,    157    ill.    659,      512,    1277 

Beades  v.  Board  &c..  122  Mich.  366,  1506 

Beal  V.  Ray.  17  Ind.  554.  308 

Bealafeld  v.  Borough  of  Verona,  188 

Pa.  St.  627,  1378 

Beall  V.  Athens  Tp.,  81  Mich.  536. 

1593,  1600,  1613 

V.  Mill  Co.,  45  Ga.  28,  1814 

Beals  V.  Board  &c..  28  Cal.  449.  436 

V.  Board  &c..  35  Cal.  624.     763,  1522 

V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  174  Mass.  1, 

1281,    1299 

V.  James.  173  Mass.  501.  1241 

Beaman  v.  Board  &c.,  42  Miss.  237,     974 


Ix 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Vol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Yol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.] 


Bean  v.  Board  &c.,  51  Iowa  53,  934 

V.  City  of  Middlesboro,  57  S.  W. 
478.  792 

V.    Inhabitants  &c.,   23   Maine 
117,  662 

V.   People,  7  Colo.  200,  1429 

V.  Tliompson,  19  N.  H.  290,  348 

V.  Town  of  Concord,  48  Vt.  30,  829 

Bear   v.    Commissioners   &c.,    124   N. 

C.  204.  1686 

Bearce  v.  Fossett,  34  Maine  575, 

347,  366 

Beard  v.  City  of  Brooklyn.  31  Barb. 

142,  722,   1306,  1748 

V.  City  of  Decatur,  64  Tex.  7,       177 

V.  City  of  Hopkinsville,  95  Ky. 

239,  877,  880,  881 

Bearden  v.  City  of  Madison,  73  Ga. 

184,  466 

Beardsley    v.    City    of    Hartford,    50 

Conn.   529,  1221 

V.  Smith.  16  Conn.  368, 

142,   143,   148,  342,  965,  1526 
Beaser  v.  City  of  Ashland,  89   Wis. 

28,  1702 

Beaslev  v.   Town  of  Beckley,  28  W. 

Va.   81,  543,   1724 

V.  United  States,  21  Ct.  CI.  225,  772 
Beaston    v.    Farmers'    Bank    &c.,    12 

Peters  102,  3 

Beattv  V.  City  of  St.  Joseph,  57  Mo. 

App.  251,  789 

Beatty  Co.  v.   Sibley  Co.,  32  Minn. 

470.  904 

Beauchamp    v.    Board    &c.,    45    111. 

274,  1701 

Beaumont  v.  City  of  Wilkesbarre,  142 

Pa.   St.   108,        113.   4'.)0.   1268,   1421 
Beaver  v.  State,  124  Ind.  324,  909 

Beaver  Co.  v.  Armstrong,  44  Pa.  St. 

63,  1019 

Beaver  Creek  v.  Hastings,  52  Mich. 

528,  276 

Beavers  v.  Trimmer,  25  N.  J.  L.  97,  1095 
Beazley  v.  Kennedy,  52  S.  W.  791,  750 
Beck  V.  Carter,  68  N.  Y.  283,  810 

V.  City  of  Buffalo,  63  N.  Y.  S. 

499,  1242,  1328 

V.   Hanscom,  29  N.  H.  213,  305 

Becker   v.    Baltimore   &c.   R.   Co.,   17 

Ind.   App.   324,  1261,   1294,   1298 

V.   City  of  Henderson,   100  Ky. 

450,  305 

V.   City  of  Washington.   94   Mo. 

375.       477,  481.  506.  539.  540.  1146 

V.  Keokuk  Water-woi-ks,  79  Iowa 

419,  1368,    1459,    1542 

Beekman  v.   Mayor  &c.,  41  N.  Y.   S. 

900,  1334 

Beck  St.,  In  re.  44  N.  Y.  S.  1087,  1754 
Beckwith  v.  Whalen,  70  N.  Y.  430,  1573 
Bedell  v.  Long  Island  R.  Co.,  44  N. 

Y    367,  1109 

v.'  Village  of  Sea  Cliff,  46  N.  Y. 

S.  226,  791 

Bedford  v.  Hannibal  &c.  R.  Co.,  46 

Mo.  456,  1109 

Beebe    v.    City    of    Little    Rock,    68 

Ark.   39,  648.   741,    1321 

Beecher  v.  City  of  Detroit,  92  Mich. 

268,  587,    1255 

V.   Clay   Co.,   52  Iowa  140. 

1.550,   1727. 

Beechwood  Ave.  &c..  In  re,  194  Pa. 

St.  80,  1275,  1307 

Beeder  v.  Village  of  Little  Falls,  100 

X.  Y.  343.  1597 

Beekman  v.   Frost,  18  Johns.  544,       228 
V.  Saratoga  &c.  R.  Co.,  3  Paige 
45,  673.  685,  698 

V.  Third  Ave.  R.  Co.,  153  N.  Y. 
144,  586,  1351 


Beer  Co.  v.  Massachusetts,  97  U.  S. 

32,  80,  1082 

Beers  v.  Arkansas,  20  How.  527,  770 

V.  Botsford,  3  Day  159.  142 

V.  Pinney,  12  Wend.  309,  1599 

Beesman   v.    City   of   Peoria,    16   111. 

484,  1418 

Beeson  v.   City  of  Chicago,  75  Fed. 

880,  1351,   1698 

Behrensmeyer  v.  Kreitz,  135  111.  591,  377 

Beikman's  Case,  11  Abb.  Pr.  164,       1133 

Belling    v.    City    of    Evansville,    144 

Ind.  644,  600 

Belcher  v.  Farrar,  8  Allen  325. 

1089,  1094 

Belcher  Sugar  Refining  Co.  v.  St. 
Louis  Grain  Elevator  Co.,  82 
Mo.   121,  1354 

Belfast  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Inhabitants  &c., 

60  Maine  568,  344,  361,  988 

V.    Inhabitants    &c.,    62    Maine 

148,  304,  355,  356 

Belisle  v.  Clark,  49  Ala.  98,  217 

Belknap  v.  City  of  Louisville,  99  Ky. 

474,  874 

V.    Reinhart,   2   Wend.   375,  215 

Bell  V.  Borough  of  Waynesboro,  195 

Pa.   St.  299,  872,   1032 

V.    City    of    Boston,    101    Mass. 
506,  1157 

V.   City  of  Platteville,   71   Wis. 
139,  666 

V.   City  of  Rochester,   33   N.   Y. 
St.  739,  1095 

V.  Mayor  &c.,  79  Ga.  152,  990 

V.  Mayor  &e.,  105  N.  Y.  139,  1530 

V.  McKinnev,  63  Miss.  187,  221 

V.    Mobile   &c.    R.    Co.,    4   Wall. 
598  983 

v."  Nashville  Bank,  Peck  269,  45 

V.   Ohio  &c.   R.  Co.,  25  Pa.   St. 
161,  629 

Bell  Co.  V.  Alexander,  22  Tex.  350, 

564,  664 

Bellinger  v.  New  York  &c.  R.  Co.,  23 

N.  Y.  42.  1603 

Bellows  V.   Courter,  53  Hun  631,        1064 
V.  President  &c.,  2  Mason  31,       1806 

Belo  V.  Commissioners,  76  N.  C.  489, 

985,  1023 

Beloit  V.  Morgan.  7  Wall.  619,  1023 

Belt   V.    Prince   George  &c.   Abstract 

Co.,  73  Md.  289,  1428,  1429 

Bemis  v.  Leonard,  118  Mass.  502,       346 

Benedict  v.  Goit,  3  Barb.  459,  682 

Benjamin  v.   Webster,   100  Ind.   15,   1539 

Bennet  v.  United  States,  2  Wash.  T. 

179,  1737 

V.  Wheeler.  15  Gray  486,  335 

Bennett  v.  Burch,  1  Denio  141,  341 

V.    City    of    Buffalo,    17    N.    Y. 
383,  1261,  1533 

V.    City    of    Marion,    102    Iowa 
425,  1754 

V.    City    of    New    Bedford,    110 
Mass.  433,  301 

V.  People,  30  111.  389,  1400 

V.  State,  58  Miss.  556,  314 

V.   Whitney.  94  X.   Y.  302.   222,  224 

Benoist  v.  City  of  St.  Louis,  19  Mo. 

179,  387,   1513,   1535 

V.  Inhabitants  &c..  8  Mo.  250,       958 

Bensley  v.  Mountain  Lake  Water  Co., 

13   Cal.   300.  700 

Benson  v.  Mayor  &c.,  9  Iloust.  359,  1369 
V.  Mavor  &c.,   10  Barb.   223,  757 

V.   Mayor  &c..  24  Barb.   248,  763 

V.   Monroe,   7   Cush.   125.        246,   248 
V.  Village  of  Waukesha,  74  Wis. 
31,  1322 

Benton  v.  City  of  Elizabeth,  61  N.  J. 

L.  411,  693,  1390 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


Ixi 


[References  are  to  Pages.    Vol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.1 


Benton  v.  City  of  Milwaukee,  50  Wis. 

368,  1254 

V.  Hamilton,  110  Ind.  294,  637 

V.   Taylor,  46  Ala.   388,      1712,   1723 

V.  Trustees  &c.,  140  Mass.  13,       806 
Bepler  v.  City  of  Cincinnati,  23  Wk. 

L.  Bui.  221).  1263 

Bergen  v.  Clarkson,  1  Halst.  428, 

277,  532 
Berghoflfen  v.  City  of  New  York,  64 

N.  Y.  S.  1082,  752 

Bergman  v.  St.  Louis  &c.  R.  Co.,  88 

Mo.  678,  489 

V.  St.  Paul  &c.  R.  Co.,  21  Minn. 

533,  700,  701 

Berka  v.  Woodward,   125  Cal.   119,     611 
Berket  v.  City  of  Peoria,  185  111.  369, 

1272,  1275 
Berks  St.,  In  re,  12  W.  N.  C.  10,  1251 
Berlin  v.  Gorham,  34  N.  H.  266, 

61.  69,  81,  83,  90,  103,  404 
Berlin    Iron    Bridge    Co.    v.    City    of 

San  Antonio.  62  Fed.  882,     730,  735 

V.  City  of  San  Antonio,  50  S.  W. 

408,  915,  1308 

V.  City  of  San  Antonio,  92  Tex. 

388.     717,  872,  1021,  1785.  1790 

V.  Wagner,  57  Hun  346,  10  N. 

Y.  S.  840,  1173, 1580 

Bernard  v.  City  of  Hoboken,  27  N.  J. 

L.  413,  184 

V.  Torrance,  5  Gill  &  J.  383,       216 
Bernards  Tp.  v.  Morrison,  133  U.  S. 

523,  634,  1004,  1011 

V.  Stebbins,  109  U.  S.  341,  1014 

Berrenberg   v.    City    of    Boston,    137 

Mass.  231,  1626 

Berrien  Co.  Treasurer  v.  Bunbury,  45 

Mich.  79,  192 

Berry  v.  Commonwealth,  12  Ky.  L. 

462,  908 

V.  McComb  City,  69  Miss.  882,  1560 
Berry   Horn  &c.   Co.   v.    Scruggs  &c. 

Co.,   62   Mo.   App.   93,  1348 

Bertholf  v.  O'Reilly,  74  N.  Y.  509,     770 
Bertonmeau    v.    Directors    &c.,    3 

Woods  177,  1494 

Berwind    v.    Galveston   &c.    Ins.    Co., 

20  Tex.   Civ.   App.   426,  719,  743 

Bessinger  v.  Dickerson,  20  Iowa  260, 

322,  324,  328 
Best  V.  Allen,  30  111.  30,  1111 

Betham  v.  City  of  Philadelphia,  196 

Pa.  St.  302,  787 

Bethune   v.    Hughes,    28    Ga.    560, 

100,  1403 
Betts  V.  Bagley,  12  Pick.  572,  341 

V.  Village  of  Gloversville,  8  N. 

Y.  795,  1584 

Bevans   v.   United    States,    13    Wall. 

56,  319 

Bevard  v.  Hoffman,   18  Md.  479,  221 

Bibel  V.  People,  67   111.   172,  282,  547 

Bickerdike   v.    City   of   Chicago.    185 

111.    280,  511,    512,    1173,    1174, 

1252,  1279 
Bickerstaff,  In  re.  70  Cal.  35,  1401,  1405 
Bickford  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  173  Mass. 

552,  1780 

Bicknell    v.    Widner    School    Tp.,    73 

Ind.  501,  862 

Riddle  v.  Willard.  10  Ind.  62,  200 

Bidelman  v.  State,  110  N.  Y.  232.     1579 
Bldwell  V.  City  of  Pittsburgh,  85  Pa. 

St.  412.  802 

V.  Town  of  Murray,  40  Hun  (N. 

T.)  190,  1591 

Bieling  v.  City  of  Brooklyn,   120  N. 

Y.   98.  788,   1612 

Bienville   Water  &c.    Co.   v.    City   of 

Mobile,  95  Fed.  539,  740 

Bigelow  V.  Bridge,  8  Mass.  275,  326 


Bigelow  V.  City  of  Chicago,  90  111.  49, 

1252,  1268,  1272 
V.  Hillman,  37  Maine  52, 

301,  521,  987 
V.    Inhabitants    &c.,    3    Pick. 
267,  1613 

V.  Inhabitants  &c..  14  Gray  541, 

148.  778,  780,  803,  807,  1076 
V.   Inhabitants  &c.,  25  N.   J.   L. 
297,  1232,  1425 

V.    West   Wis.    R.    Co.,    27    Wis. 
478,  517 

V.  Wilson,  1  Pick.  485,  346 

Biggs    V.     Huntington,    32    W.    Va. 

55,  1638 

V.  McBride,  17  Or.  640,  150 

Bigler  v.  Mayor,  5  Abb.  N.  C.  51,       894 

Bill    V.    City    of    Denver,    29    Fed. 

344.  1306 

V.  Dow,  56  Vt.  562,  357 

Billings  V.  City  of  Chicago,  167  111. 

337,  1248,  1272 

V.  City  of  Worcester,  102  Mass. 
329.  1586,    1600 

V.  Kneen,  57  Vt.  428,  1041 

V.   Lafiferty,  31   111.   318,  221 

Bills  V.  City  of  Goshen,  117  Ind.  221, 

463.  481,  485,  503,  506,  605,  1405 

Kinde  v.  Klinge,  30  Mo.  App.  285,     1492 

Binell   V.   City   of   Kankakee,   64    111. 

249,  977 

Bingaman  v.  City  of  Pittsburgh,  147 

Pa.  St.  353,  1258 

Binghamton  Opera  House  Co.  v.  City 

of  Binghamton,  156  N.  Y.  651,     1759 

Rinsse  v.  Wood.  37  N.  Y.  526.  1599 

Bird  V.  Mayor  &c.,  33  Hun  396,  193 

V.  Merrick,  L.  &  R.  115.  369 

V.    Perkins.   33   Mich.   463,  64 

V.  Wasco  Co..  3  Or.  282.  183 

Birdsall  v.  Clark,  73  N.  Y.  73, 

282,  285,  468,  547,  552,  572 

Birdseye  v.  Village  of  Clyde,  61  Ohio 

St.  27,  1759 

Birge  v.  Berlin  Iron  Bridge  Co.,   16 

N.  Y.  S.  596.  361 

V.  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.,  65  Iowa 
440.  693 

V.  Gardner,  19  Conn.  507,  794 

Birket    v.    City    of    Peoria,    185    111. 

369,  1272 

Birmingham  v.  Rumsey,  63  Ala.  252,  1529 

Birmingham  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Birmington 

&c.  R.  Co.,  79  Ala.  465,       568,  1184 
V.  Reg.,  6  Ry.  Cas.  625,  699 

Bish  V.  Johnson,  21  Ind.  299,  994 

Bishop  V.  Brainerd,  28  Conn.  289,       994 
V.   Cone.   3  N.   H.   513,  367,   1427 

V.   Fahay.   15  Gray  61,  1751 

V.  Lucy,  21  Tex.  Civ.  App.  326,      223 
V.  Marks,  15  La.  An.  147, 

1270,  1520 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  7  Ga.  200,  1385 

V.  Moorman,  98  Ind.  1,  655 

V.    Schneider,    46    Mo.    472,  229 

V.  Williamson,  11  Maine  495,  225 

Bissell   V.   City   of   Jeffersonville.   24 

How.    287,  285.    1001 

V.  City  of  Kankakee,  64  111.  249, 

624,  980,   1524,   1525 
V.  Davidson,  65  Conn.  183,  1762 

V.  New  York  &c.  R.  Co.,  23  N.  Y. 
61,  1559 

V.  Saxton,  66  N.  Y.  55,  324 

V.  Saxton,  77  N.  Y.  191.  322 

V.  Spring  Valley  Tp.,  110  U.  S. 
162.  863,   1014 

Bittenhaus  v.  Johnston,  92  Wis.  588, 

1386 

Bittinger  v.  Bell,  65  Ind.  445,  987 

Bitzer    v.    Leverton,    9    Kan.    App. 

76,  585 


Ixii 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Vol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-18S0.'i 


Bitzer  v.   O'Bryan,  21  Ky.   L.   1307, 

1787,  1806 
Black  V.  Brinkley,  54  Ark.  372.  403 

V.   City  of  Columbia,   19    S.   C. 
412,  264 

V.  Cohen,  52  Ga.  621,  992 

V.    Commissioners   &c.,    8    Neb. 
440.  940 

V.  Common  Council  &c.,  119  Mich. 
571,  710.  744,  915 

V.   Cornell,  30  Mo.   App.   641, 

627,  848,  1480 
V.  Mayor  &c..  50  Md.  235,       699,  701 
Blackburn  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  9  Pick. 

97,  362 

Blackett  v.  Blizzard,  9  B.  &  C.  851,  473 
Blackman  v.  Lehman,  63  Ala.  547,  1018 
Blackmore  v.  Vestry  &c.,  L.  R.  9  Q. 

B.  D.  451,  812 

Blackstone  v.  White.  41  Pa.  St.  330,  86 
Blackwell  v.  Hill,  76  Mo.  App.  46.  1369 
Bladen    v.    Philadelphia,    60    Pa.    St. 

464,  253 

Blain  v.  Bailey,  25  Ind.  165.  106 

Blair  v.    City  of   Charleston,   43   W. 

Va.  62,  1299.  1774,  1777,  1778 

V.  City  of  Waco,  75  Fed.  800,         550 
V.   Cuming  Co.,    Ill   U.    S.    363, 

980.  981,  1014 
V.  Forehand.  100  Mass.  136,  1751 
V.  Hanna.  87  Ind.  298,  1571 

V.  Luniug.  76  Cal.  134,  1259 

V.  People,  181  111.  460,  297 

V.  Ridgelv,  41  Mo.  63,  369 

V.  West  Point,  2  McCrary  459,  51 
Blake  V.   City  of  Dubuque,   13   Iowa 

66,  705 

V.  City  of  Lowell,  143  Mass.  296, 

1586,  1621 
V.  City  of  Pontiac,  49  111.  App. 
543.  789 

V.  Ferris,  5  N.  Y.  48,  1368 

V.    Inhabitants   &c.,    68   Maine 
365,  1587 

V.  Johnson.  1  N.  H.  91,  1727 

V.  Mayor  &c..  53  Ga.  172,  1730 

V.   Orford,   64   N.   H.   299.     345,   632 
V.  People,  109  111.  504,  1691 

V.  Portsmouth  &c.  R.  Co.,  39  N. 
H.  435.  410 

Blakely  v.  Bennecke,  59  Mo.  198,  218 

V.  City  of  Trov.  18  Hun  167,  1615 
Blakelv  Tp.  v.  Devine.  36  Minn.  53,  1126 
Blakemore  v.  Dolan.  50  Ind.  194,  521 
Blakie  v.  Staples.  13  Grant  67.  651 

Blanchard  v.  Bissell,  11  Ohio  St.  96, 

384.   392.   393,   463,   480.   1132.   1517 
V.  City  of  Kansas,  16  Fed.  444,  1209 
V.    Inhabitants    &c.,    102    Mass. 
343,  262 

Blanchford  v.  Dow.  82  Maine  557,  1727 
Blanden  v.  City  of  Fort  Dodge,   102 

Iowa  441.  1777,  1778 

Blank  v.  Kearney,  59  N.  Y.  S.  645, 

1152,  1185 
V.  Kearnv.  61  N.  Y.  S.  79,  728 

Blanton    v.    Board    &c.,    101    N.    C. 

532.  1021 

Blashfield  v.   Empire  State  &c.   Co., 

18  N.  Y.  S.  250,  1581 

Blatchley   v.   Moser,   15   Wend.   215, 

496,  1085 

Bledsoe  v.  Gary,  95  Ala.  70. 

1409,  1411,  1412 

Blessing    v.    City    of    Galveston,    42 

Tex.   641,  104,   446 

Bleu  V.  Bear  River  Co.,  20  Cal.  602. 

714,  992 

Blight  V.  Rochester,  7  Wheat.  535.       132 

Bliss    V.    City   of   Chicago,    156    111. 

564.  1277 

V.  Hosmer,  15  Ohio  44,  674 


Bliss  V.   Inhabitants  &c.,   145  Mass. 

91,  1595 

Blize  V.  Castlio,  8  Mo.  App.  290,  708 

Block  V.  Commissioners  &c.,  99  U.  S. 

686,  1000,  1018 

V.  President  &c.,  36  111.  301, 

488.  540,  1424 

Blodgett  V.   City  of  Boston,  8  Allen 

(Mass.)    237,  1595 

V.   Holbrook,  39  Vt.  336, 

361,  364,  1540 

Bloodgood  V.  Mohawk  &c.  R.  Co.,  18 

Wend.  9,  705 

Bloom  V.  City  of  Xenia,  32  Ohio  St. 

461,  1182 

Bloomer  v.    Stolley,   5   McLean  158, 

67,  520 

Bloomfield  v.  Charter  Oak  Bank,  121 

U.    S.    121.      15.   342,    344,   348,    358, 
366,  867,  858,  964.  1022,  1522,  1526 

Bloomfield  &c.  Co.  v.  Richardson,  68 

Barb.   437,  689 

Bloomington   v.   Chicago  &c.   R.   Co., 

134   HI.  451,  1248 

Bloomington  Cemetery  Assn.  v.  Peo- 
ple, 139  111.  16,  1160,  1245 

Blomington  School  Tp.  v.  National 
School  Furnishing  Co.,  107  Ind. 
43.  210,  857,  862 

Bloor  V.  Town  of  Delafield,  69  Wis. 

273,  1614 

Blount  V.  City  of  Janesville,  31  Wis. 

648,  558 

Blue  V.  Beach,  155  Ind.  121,  1762 

Blush  V.  Town  of  Colchester,  39  Vt. 

193,  342,  344,  363 

Bly  V.  City  of  Haverhill,   110  Mass. 

520,  1613 

V.   Village  of  Whitehall,   120  N. 

Y.   506.  1632,   1638 

Blythe  v.  Tompkins.  2  Abb.  Pr.  468.     385 

Board  &c.  See  also.  Name  of  Coun- 
ty ;  County  Com'rs ;  Commis- 
sioners. 

Board  &c.  v.  Aetna  Life  Ins.  Co..  90 

Fed.   222.  838,   952,   1011,   1757 

V.  Arnold.  112  111.  11.  1491,  1701 
V.  Arrighi,  54  Miss.  668,  648 

V.  Aspinwall.  24  How.  376,  1527 

V.   Auditor,    27   Mich.    165,  1712 

V.    Bacon,    96    Ind.    31,  1625 

V.  Bailey,  122  Ind.  46, 

1575,    1577,    1578 
V.  Baker,  24  111.  App.  231,  1483 

V.  Baker.  34  111.  App.  620,  914,  1488 
V.  Barnett.  107  111.  507.  681 

V.  Beckwith.  10  Kan.  608,  675 

V.  Bird.  31  Cal.  66.  313 

V.  Blodgett.  155  111.  441.  973 

V.  Board  &c.,  15  Colo.  320,  439 

V.  Board  &c.,  32  Ind.  234,  419,  1519 
V.  Board  &c.,  128  Ind.  295,  1577 

V.  Board  &c.,  26  Kan.  181.  427,  1519 
V.  Board  &c.,  74  Mich.  721,  444 

V.  Board  &c.,  124  Mich.  491,  106 

V.  Board  &c.,  58  Miss.  619,  1517 

V.  Board  &c.,  62  Miss.  325.  441 

V.  Board  &c..  63  N.  J.  L.  371,  1785 
V.  Board  &c.,  46  N.  Y.  St.  376,  1073 
V.  Board  &c..  30  W.  Va.  424,  1474 
V.  Bond,  3  Colo.  411,  1745 

V.  Boswell,  4  Ind.  App.  133, 

805,  1076 
V.  Bowen.  4  Lans.  24.  662 

V.  Boynton.  30  Ind.  359.  841,  1040 
V.  Bradford.  72  Ind.  455.  670 

V.  Brawner.  100  Ky.  166  201 

V.  Brown.  89  Ind.  48. 

1575.    1577.    1579,    1625 
V.  Brown.  4   Ind.   App.  288,  1060 

V.   Brown,   33   La.   An.   383.  826 

V.  Brush.  77  111.  59.  281.  1539 

V.  Burkey,  1  Ind.  App.  565.  1057 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


Ixiii 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Vol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol  II,  pp.  838-1830.1 


Board  &c.  v.  Rurtis.  lOS  N.  Y.  130,  1737 
V.  Byrne,  (!7  Iiid.  Ul,  841 

V.  Capital  Gas  &c.  Co.,  16  Ky.  L. 
780,  726 

V.  Carter,   2  Kan.   115,  1538 

V.  Casey,  98  N.  Y.  St.  251,  10!»5 

V.  Catlett.  86  Va.   158.  941 

V.   Chissom.   7   Iiid.   688,  535 

V.  Chit  wood,  8  Ind.  504,  1480 

V.  Cluircliil],   21    Va.   528,  1680 

V.  Cincinnati  Steam  Heating  Co., 
128   Ind.  240.  841 

V.    City    of    Kingston,    50    Ilun 
435,  1066 

V.  City  of  Lincoln,  81   111.   156, 

1084,   1756 
V.    City    of    Springfield,    63    111. 
€6,  '  762,  1084 

V.  Clark,  92  N.  Y.  391,  178,  318 

V.  ColHuliury.  1  Mich.  355,  311,  312 
V.  Cole,  2   Ind.   App.  475,  611 

V.  Common  Council  &c.,  128  Cal. 
369,  1550 

V.  Cowan,  60  Miss.  876,  1522,  1531 
V.  Cox,  6  Ind.  403, 

251,  410,  445,  647 
V.  Crotty,  9  Colo.  318,  1672 

V.  Cutter,  3  Colo.  349,  1552 

V.  Darrow,  13  Colo.  460,  208,  380 
T.  Davies,  1  Wash.  290,  108,  109,  403 
V.  Dav,  19  Ind.  450,  959,  960,  971 
V.  Deprez,  87  Ind.  509,  1579 

V.  Dombke,  94  Ind.  72,  1580 

V.  Edwards,  76  111.  544,  1743 

V.  Emmerson,  95  Ind.  579,  1625 

V.  Fahlor,  114  Ind.  176,  947 

V.   Parwell.   25   111.    181,  973 

V.  Fonda,  77  N.  Y.  350, 

311,  322,  1014 
V.  FuUen,  111  Ind.  410,  947,  1233 
V.  Fullen,  118  Ind.  158,  947 

V.  Gantt,  73  Md.  521,  845,  1669 
V.  Giron,  46  La.  An.  1364,  499,  541 
V.  Gorrell.  20  Gratt.  484,  684 

V.  Hall,  47  Wis.  208,  291' 

V.  Harrodsburg  Educational  Dist., 
9  Ky.  L.  605.  921 

V.  Hayden,  13  Colo.  App.  36, 

787,  1688 
V.  Henzler,  41  Atl.  228, 

477,  539,  540,  1762 
V.  Hicks,  2  Ind.  527,  1660 

V.  Hildebrand.  1  Ind.  555.  1063 

V.  Hill,  115  Ind.  316,  632,  889,  947 
V.  Hill,   122  Ind.  215,  841 

V.  Hinchman,  31  Kan.  729,  715 

V.  Hogan.  39  Kan.  606,  695,  1572 
V.  Holman,  34  Ind.  256,  841,  1035 
V.   Hon.  87   Ind.   356,  841,   1040 

V.  Howard,  27  C.  C.  A.  531,  1757 
V.  Hubbard,  45  111.  139,  1013 

V.  Huflf.  91  Ind.  333.  1567 

V.   Inhabitants  &c.,   18  Ohio  St. 
221,  629 

V.  Jenks.  65  111.  275.  1287 

V.   Jennings,   104   Ind.   108, 

188,  841 
V.  Jewell,  44  Minn.  427,  319,  912 
V.  Johnson,  21  Fla.  578,  961 

V.  Johnson,  124  Ind.  145, 

207,  1473,  1672 
V.  Johnson,  127  Ind.  238,  178,  945 
V.  Judice,  39  La.  An.  896,  326 

V.  Kimberlin.  108  Ind.  449,  1736 

V.  Leavitt.  4  N.  M.  37,  108,   109 

V.  Les:g.  98  Ind.  523.  1577,  1579 
V.  Legg.   110  Ind.  479,  1575 

V.  Leggett,  115  Ind.  544,  943 

V.  Lomax,  5  Ind.  App.  567, 

841,  842,  1040 
V.  Markle,  46  Ind.  96,  521 

V.  Mason  &c.  Co.,  100  Ky.  48,  120 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  57  N.  J.  L.  452,      715 


Board    &c.    v.    McClintock,    51    Ind. 

325,  17.30 

V.   JIcLeod.  34  Kan.  306,  1035 

V.  McManus.  54  Ark.  446,  1662 

V.  McNamar,  10  Neb.  276,  981 

V.  Mighels.  7  Ohio  St.  109, 

7,  13,  82,  803,  813,  1076,  1734 
V.   Miguos,  32   La.   An.   923,  1509 

V.  Minor,  23  Ohio  St.  211,  1495 

V.   Misenheimer.   78   111.   22,  1483 

V.   Moore.   17   Minn.  412.  780 

V.  Morrison,  22  Miss.  178,  1714 

V.  Motherwell  Iron  &c.  Co.,  123 
Ind.   3(!4.  841 

V.  Muhlenbacker,  18  Kan.  129,  696 
V.  Murray,  99  Ky.  422,  1145 

V.  National  Life  Ins.  Co.,  90  Fed. 
228,  712,  999,  1005,  1011,  1021 

V.   Neidenberger,  78  III.  58,  1530 

V.  Newlin,  132  Ind.  27,         946,  947 
V.  New  York  Horse  Manure  Co., 
47  N.  J.  Eq.  1,  1125 

V.  Norman,  51  La.  An.  786,  515 

V.  O'Connor,  86  Ind.  531.  1191,  1530 
V.  Osburn,  4  Ind.  App.  590, 

842,  943,  1035,  1040 
V.  rashley,  19  S.  C.  315,  1537 

V.  Patterson,  56  111.  Ill,  629 

V.  I'ayne,  123  N.  C.  435,  984 

V.  People,  13  Colo.  App.  553, 

203,  204 
V.  People,  36  111.  299,  1538 

V.  I'eople,  65  III.  360,  152 

V.  I'eople,  110  111.  511,  1084,  1514 
V.   People,  24  111.  App.  410,  1665 

V.   People,  38  111.  App.  239,  1655 

V.  I'eople,  78  111.  App.  586,  1687 

V.  Pierce,  6  N.  Mex.  324,  452 

V.  Piatt,  79  Fed.  567,  879 

V.  Quick,  99  N.  Y.  138.  178 

V.  Kevnolds,  49  111.   186,  1041 

V.  Risley,  40  Mo.  356,  579 

V.  Ristine,  124  Ind.  242,  1063 

V.  Ritter,  90  Ind.  362,  841,  1040 

V.  Roehr,  23  111.  App.  629,  628,  1486 
V.  Rogers,  55  Ind.  297,  664 

V.  Ross,  46  Ind.  404,  663 

V.   Schmoke,  51  Ind.  416,  1063 

V.  School  Dist,  56  Ark.  354,  1247 
V.  School  Dist..  81  Wis.  548,  1487 
V.  Seaton,  90  Ind.  158,  841,  1040 
V.  Sherwood,  27  U.  S.  App.  458, 

952,  1758 
V.  Shields,  62  Mo.  247, 

55.  65,  66,  69,  70,  1001 
V.  Shields,  130  Ind.  6.  1038,  1039 
V.   Silvers,  22   Ind.  491,  465,  947 

V.   Spltler,   13   Ind.   235,  419 

V.  Springfield.  68  111.  66,  240 

V.  State,  61   Ind.  379,  1672 

V.  State,  86  Ind.  8,  1525 

V.  State,  115  Ind.  64,  997 

V.  State.  122  Ind.  333.  1490 

V.  State.  42  N.  J.  L.  263,  1577 

V.  State,  45  Ohio  St.  555,  1493 

V.  Stone.  22  Kv.  L.  25,  502,  1554 

V.   Strader.   18" N.  J.  L.  108, 

814,  832 
V.  Sutliff,  97  Fed.  270,  998,  1031 
V.  Tate,   10  Neb.   193,  664 

V.  Tavlor,  123  Ind.  148,  663,  840 
V.  Taylor,  99  N.  C.  201,  1232 

V.   Templer,-  34   Ind.   322.  909 

V.  Templeton,   116  Ind.  369.  179 

V.    Texas    &c.    R.    Co.,    46    Tex. 
316,  562 

V.  Thomas,  12  Kv.  L.  832,  1487 

V.  Thompson,  106  Ind.  534,  1579 
V.  Tinnon.  26  Kan.  1.  1494 

V.  Tower.  28  Minn.  45.  319 

V.  Union  Bank  &c..  96  Fed.  293. 

993  998 
V.  Valentine,  32  N.  Y.  St.  919,  '1095 


Ixiv 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  Pages.  Vol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.1 


Board  &c.  v.  Walbridge,  38  Wis.  179,  991 
V.    Ward,    69    Tnd.    441,  G63,    670 

V.  Watson,  5  Bush  660,  1507 

V.  Webb,  47  Kan.  104.  8.")5 

V.   Weeks,   130  Ind.   162,       854,  855 
V.   Welder,   64   111.   427,  1701 

V.  Wertz,  112  Ind.  268,  932 

V.  Wood.  126  Ind.  168,  909 

V.  Woods,  77  Mo.  197,  576 

Boardman    v.    Board   &c.,   85    N.    Y. 

359.  1723 

V.  Halliday,  10  Paige  223,  197 

Boardman    Tp.    v.    Flagg,    70    Mich. 

372  860 

Bobbett  V.  State,  10  Kan.  9,  1655 

Bock  V.  City  of  New  York,  64  N.  Y. 

777,  179,  180 

Bodge  V.   Philadelphia,   167   Pa.   St. 

492  784 

Bodwic  V.  Fennell,  1  Wils.  233,  528 

Boehm  v.  Mayor  &c.,  61  Md.  259, 

1086,  1388 

Boehme  v.  City  of  Monroe,  106  Mich. 

401,  470 

Bogart  V.  Green,  8  Mo.  115,  329 

V.  Lamotte  Tp.,  79  Mich.   294, 

233,  235,  634,  635 

Bogert  V.  City  of  Elizabeth,  27  N.  J. 

Eq.  568,  1297 

V.  City  of  Indianapolis,  13  Ind. 
134,  1086 

V.    Jackson   Circuit   Judge,    118 
Mich.  457,  1704 

V.  Trustees,  43  N.  J.  L.  358, 

340,  343 

Bohen  v.  City  of  Waseca,  32  Minn. 

176,  265,   1612 

Bohler  v.   Schneider,   49   Ga.   195, 

1508,  1521 
Bohlman    v.    Railway    Co.,    40    Wis. 

157,  187 

Bohm  V.  Metropolitan  El.  R.  Co.,  129 

N.  Y.   576,  1581 

Bohmv  V.  State,  21  Tex.  App.  597,     494 
Bolan'd    v.    City   of   Kansas,    32    Mo. 

App.  S,  1634 

Bolger  V.  Foss,  65  Cal.  250,  1574 

Bolles  V.  Brimfleld,  120  U.  S.  759, 

642,  992,  993,   1033 
Bolton  V.  Gilleran,  105  Cal.  244. 

510,   1702 

V.   Village  of  New  Rochelle,  32 

N.  Y.  S.  442,  811 

Bonaparte  v.   Camden  &c.  R.  Co.,   1 

Bald.  205,  4,  6 

Bond   V.   City   of  Kenosha,   17   Wis. 

284,  558 

V.  Hiestarid,  20  La.  An.  139,         106 
Bonestell  v.  Mayor,  22  N.  Y.  162, 

638,   1212 
Bonnell  v.  Allen,  53  Ind.   130,  656 

V.  Nuckolls  Co.,  28  Neb.  90,  884 

V.  Nuckolls  Co.,  32  Neb.  189,         884 
Bonner  v.  McPhail,  31  Barb.  100,       1415 

V.  State.  7  Ga.  473,  1691 

Bonsall    v.    IMayor   &c.,    19    Ohio    St. 

418.  1198,  1262 

Boodv  V.  Fnited  States,  1  Woodb.  & 

M.  150,  318 

Book  V.   Enrle,  87  Mo.   246,  638.   883 

Booker  v.  Young,  12  Gratt.  303,  162 

Boom  V.  City  of  LTtica.  2  Barb.  104, 

251,  253,  647,  1106 
Boom  Co.  V.  Patterson,  98  U.  S.  403, 

.591,   694,    1168,    1222 
Boone  v.  People.  4  III.  App.  231.  1483 

Boone    Co.    v.    Armstrong,    23    Neb. 

764.  933 

V.  Jones.  54  Iowa  699,  211,  310.  324 

V.   Keck.   31   Ark.  387.  1745 

Booth  V.  Hillsborough  Co.,  45  N.  H. 

1.39,  1067 


Booth  V.  Town  of  Carthage,  67  111. 

102.  523,  524 

V.  Town  of  Woodbury,  32  Conn. 

118,  859 

Boothbay  v.  Giles,  68  Maine  160,  311 

Boots  V.  Washburn,  79  N.  Y.  207,  1173 
Bordages  v.  Fliggins,  1  Tex.  Civ.  App. 

43,  1206,  1207 

Bordeaux  v.   Meridan  Land  &c.   Co., 

67  Miss.  304,  843,   1489 

Bore  V.  Bush.  6  Mart.  N.  S.  1.  335 

Boring  V.  Williams,  17  Ala.  510,  1415 
Bork  V.   City  of   Buffalo,    127   N.   Y. 

64,  894 

V.    City   of   Buffalo,   2   N.   Y.    S. 

559,  1288 

Borough  of  Avoca  v.  Pittston  &c.  R. 

Co.,  7  Kulp  470,  1347 

Borough  of  Bathurst  v.  MacPherson, 

L.   R.  4  App.  Cas.  256,  812,  831 

Borough   of   Belzhoover   v.    Heirs   of 

Belzhoover,  173  Pa.  St.  213,  1252 
Borough   of   Bethlehem   v.    Haus,   26 

W.  N.  C.  348.  1177 

Borough  of  Blooming  Valley,  56  Pa. 

St.  66,  1517 

Borough  of  Chartiers'  Appeal,  8  Atl. 

181,  1220 

Borough  of  Dunmore's  Appeal,  52  Pa. 

St.  374,  1522 

Borough  of  Freemansburg  v.  Rogers, 

8  Atl.  872,  1214 

Borough   of   Freeport   v.    Marks,    59 

Pa.  St.  253.  218,  516,  992 

Borough  of  Greensburg  v.  Laird,  138 

Pa.  St.  533.  1195 

V.  Young,  53  Pa.  St.  280,  1198 

Borough  of  Harrisburg  v.  Crangle,  3 

W.  &  S.  460,  693 

Borough  of  Lansdowne  v.  Springfield 

Water  Co.,  7  Del.  Co.  R.  506,  1388 
Borough  of  Little  Meadows,   35   Pa. 

St.  335,  1517 

Borough    of   Manchester   v.    Reserve 

Tp.,  4  Pa.  St.  35,  1474 

Borough  of  Mauch  Chunk  v.  Shortz, 

61    Pa.   St.   319,  1234 

Borough  of  Milford  v.  Milford  Water 

Co.,  134  Pa.  St.  610,  1450 

Borough  of  Millerstown  v.  Bell,  123 

Pa.   St.  151,  1396 

Borough  of  Mt.  Pleasant  v.  Balti- 
more   &c.    R.    Co.,    138    Pa.    St. 

565,  1249 

Borough  of  New  York  v.  Forscht,  23 

Pa.  St.  391,  669 

Borough    of    Norristown   v.    Fitzpat- 

rick.  94  Pa.  St.  121.       798,  799,  808 

V.    Norristown   &c.    R.    Co.,    148 

Pa.  St.  87,  1182 

Borough  of  Port   Royal  v.   Graham, 

84  Pa.  St.  426,  958 

Borough    of    Sayre    v.    Phillips,    148 

Pa.    St.    482.  502 

Borough   of   Shamokin   v.    Shamokin 

&c.  R.  Co..  196  Pa.  St.  166,  1814 
Borough   of   St.    Peter  v.    Bauer,    19 

Minn.   327.  1411 

Borough    of    Susquehanna    Depot    v. 

Simmons,  112  Pa.  St.  384,  1182 

Borough  of  Warren  v.  Lewis,  16  Pa. 

Co.  R.  176.  599 

Borough  of  West  Chester  v.  Town  of 

Apple.  35  Pa.  St.  2S4,  1615 

Boss  V.  Hewett,  15  Wis.  285,  1018 

V.  Litton.  5  Car.  &  P.  407,  1637 

Boston  Belting  Co.  v.  City  of  Bos- 
ton. 149  Mass.  44.  1180 
Boston  Elec.  Co.  v.  City  of  Cam- 
bridge. 163  Mass.  64,  739 
Boston  &c.  Glass  Co.  v.  City  of  Bos- 
ton, 4  Met.  181,                              1551 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


Ixv 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Yol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.} 


Boston  &r.  R.  Co.  v.  City  of  Boston, 

140  Mass.  87,  15.57 

V.  FoKsom.  4G  N.  H.  64,  70G 

V.   Lowoll  &c.  U.  Co.,  124  Mass. 
:U',S.  679 

Boston  Rolling:  Mills  v.  City  of  Cam- 
bridge.   117    Mass.   30(5,        817,   1112 

Boston    &c.    Society    v.    Mayor,    116 

Mass.    181,  1247 

Boston   Tpk.    (^o.    V.    Town   of   Pom- 
fret,  20  Conn.  590,  1427 

Bostwick  V.   Barlow.   14  Ilun  177,       224 
V.  Van  Voorhis,  91  N.  Y.  353,       321 

Bothey  v.  City  of  Seattle,  17  Wash. 

263,  1328 

Boucher  v.  City  of  New  Haven,  40 

Conn.   456,  1591,   1592,   1619 

Bonldin  v.  Mayor  &c.,  15  Md.  18,       1255 

Boulton  V.  Crowther,  2  B.  &  C.  703,  801 

Bound   V.    Wisconsin   &c.    R.    Co..    -iZ 

Wis.  543,  623.  651,  997,  1738 

Bounds  V.  Kirven,  63  Tex.   159,  678 

Bourget   v.   City   of   Cambridge,    156 

Mass.  398,  1595 

Bourland  v.  Peoria  Co.,  16  111.  538,     1780 

Bourn  v.  Hart,  93  Cal.  321,  926 

Bourne  v.  State.  35  Neb.  1,  1481 

Bouton  V.  Board  &c.,  84  111.  384,         619 
V.    City   of   Brooklyn,    15    Barb. 
375,  1204,  1723 

Bow  V.  Allenstown,  34  N.  II.  351, 

48,  49,  50,  87,  1475 

Bowditch  V.  Boston.  101  U.  S.  16,       802 
V.  Superintendent  &c.,  168  Mass. 
239,  1240.   1281,  1712 

Bowdoinham  v.  Richmond,  6  Greenl. 

112,  1538 

Bowen  v.  Mayor  &c.,  79  Ga.  709,  988 

V.  Morris,  2  Taunt.  374,  262 

V.  Newell,  16  R.  I.  238,  1546 

V.  Peate.  L.  R.  1  Q.  B.  D.  321,     745 
V.   State,   108  N.   Y.   166,  18 

Bower  v.  Peate.  1  Q.  B.  D.  321,         1779 

Bowers  v.  County  Com'rs,  8  Ohio  St. 

285,  384 

V.   Fleming.   67   Ind.   541,  328 

Bowler  v.  Perrin,  47  Mich.  154,  187 

Bowlin  V.   Furman.  28  Mo.  427,  629 

Bowman  v.  City  of  Colfax,  17  Wash. 

344,  1779 

V.  City  of  Omaha,  59  Neb.  84,  1338 
V.  Ross,  167  U.  S.  549,  1230 

V.  Tripp.  14  R.  I.  242,  1621 

V.    Venice   &c.    R.    Co.,    102    HI. 
459,  693,   695 

Boyce  v.  Auditor  General,  90  Mich. 

314,  859,  860 

Boyd  V.  Alabama,  94  IT.  S.  645,         1082 
V.  Chambers,  78  Ky.  140. 

90,  103.  760,  1410 
V.   City  of   Milwaukee,   92   Wis. 
456,  1185,   1186 

V.  Insurance  Patrol  &c.,  113  Pa. 
St.   269,  8,   9 

V.    Mill    Creek    School    Tp.,    114 
Ind.  210,  857,  861,  1482 

V.  State,  88  Ala.  169,  1493 

V.    Town   of   Readsboro,    52    Vt. 
522  829 

Boyden  v.  Brookline.  8  Vt.  284,  177 

V.  United  States.  13  Wall.  17.       319 

Boye  V.  City  of  Albert  Lea,  74  Minu. 

230,  788,  793 

V.  Girardey,  28  La.  An.  717, 

1508,   1521 

Boyle  V.    Borough   of   Hazelton,    171 

Pa.  St.  167,  1362 

V.    City    of    Brooklyn,    71    N. 
Y.  1.  1257 

V.  City  of  New  Orleans,  23  Fed. 
843.  651 

V.   City  of  Saginaw,   124   Mich. 
348,  1796 

1  Smith — v 


Boynton  v.  People,  155  111.  66,  1278 

V.   People,  ^^,<)  III.  553,  1283 

Boyt  V.   Dougherty  Co..   79  Ga.  211,     990 

Bozarth  v.  McGillicuddy,  19  Ind.  App. 

26,  749 

Brabham  v.  Board  &c..  54  Miss.  363,        9 

Brackenridge  v.  Fitchburg,  145  Mass. 

160,  1639 

Brackett  v.  Blake,  7  Met.  335,  1191 

ISraden  v.  McNutt,  114  Ind.  214, 

1477,  1489 

Bradford  v.  City  of  Chicago,  25  111. 

411,  244 

V.  City  of  Pontine,  165  III.  612, 

550,  1142.   1144,  1241.  1282 
V.  City  &c.  of  San  Francisco,  112 
Cal.  537,  729,   1700 

V.  Mayor  &c.,  92  Ala.  349.  1.581 

Bradish  v.  Lucken,  38  Minn.  186,       1722 
V.  Tucker,  16  Fla.  258,  1722 

Bradley  v.  Amis,  2  Havw.  399,  1111 

V.   City  of  Eau  Claire,   56  Wis. 
168,  942 

V.    City   of   Frankfort,    99    Ind. 
417,  697 

V.  City  of  Rochester,  7  N.  Y.  S. 
237,  1395,   1405 

V.    Fall    Brook    I.    D.,    68    Fed. 
948,  1242 

V.  Fisher,  13  Wall.  335,  220 

V.   Franklin   Co.,   65   Mo.  638,       992 
V.  Love.  76  Iowa  397.  920 

V.  McAtee,  7  Bush  667,  1234 

V.    Town    of    Richmond,    6    Vt. 
121.  1745 

V.  Village  of  W.  Duluth,  45  Minn. 
4.  1157 

Bradshaw  v.  City  of  Omaha,  1  Neb. 

16,  104,  393,   1517 

V.   Rogers,   20  Johns.   103,  674 

Bradstreet  v.  Supervisors,  13  Wend. 

546,  134 

Bradwell  v.  State.  16  Wall.  130.  137,  140 

Brad.y,  Petition  of.  85  N.  Y.  268,       1253 

Brady  v.  City  of  Bayonne,  57  N.  J.  L. 

379,  463,  727 

v.  City  of  Lowell,  3  Cush.   124, 

776,  1594 
V.  City  of  Lowell,  4  Cush.  310,  814 
V.  Howe.  50  Miss.  607,  171 

V.  King,  53  Cal.  44.  1255 

V.  Mayor  &c.,  20  N.  Y.  312. 
235.  251,  257,  28©,  644,  645,  647,  715 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  1  Barb.  584.  6G2 

V.    Northwestern    Ins.    Co..    11 
Mich.    425,  1121,    1391 

V.  Rogers,   63  Mo.  App.  222,        1136 
V.  Weeks,  3  Barb.   157,  1114 

Braidy  v.  Theritt,   17   Kan.   468,  197 

Braley  v.  Dickinson,  48  Vt.  599, 

347,  1485 

Bramah    v.    Roberts,    3    Bing.    N.    C. 

963,  971 

Bramlett  v.   City  of  Laurens,   58   S. 

C.  89,  1778 

Bramwell  v.  Guheen,  2  Idaho  1069,     363 

Branch    v.    Commonwealth,    2    Call 

510.  333 

V.    Town   of   Marengo,   43    Iowa 
600,  1510 

Brand  v.  City  of  San  Antonio,  37  S. 

W.  340,  550,  743 

Brandirff  v.   Harrison  Co.,   50   Iowa 

164,  652 

Brandon,  Ex  parte,  49  Ark.  143,         1074 

Brandt  v.  City  of  Milwaukee,  69  Wis. 

386,  1319 

Braney  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  167  Mass. 

16,  739 

Branham  v.  Mayor  &c.,  24  Cal.  585, 

629,  646 

Brannon  v.  County  Court,  33  W.  Va. 

789,  893 


Ixvi 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Vol.  I,  pp.  1-S32;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.'] 


Brattleboro  Sav.  Bank  v.  Board  &c., 

98  Fed.  524,  1003, 1033 

Brauer  v.   City  of  Portland,  35  Or. 

471,  1769 

Braun  v'.  Sauerwein,  10  Wall.  218,       455 

V  State,  40  Tex.  Cr.  App.  236,  1407 
Bravin  v.  City  of  Tombstone,  56  Pac. 

719  1687 

Bray    v.'   Town    of    Wallingford,    20 

Conn.  416.  148    1745 

Brayton   v.   City  of  Fall   River,   113 

"Mass.    218,  817,    830,    lti5 

Breaiix  v.  Parish  of  Iberville,  23  La. 

An.  232,  636 

Breckenridge,   In  re,   160  N.  Y-   12^'-.ooa 

1828,   looU 

Breed  v.  Conley,  14  Iowa  269,  229 

Breen  v.  Morris  &c.  R.  Co.,  I  Beas. 

165,  1015 

Breese  v.  Poole,  16  111.  App.  551,  700 
BreggnsUa  v.    Borough  of  Vineland, 

53"N.  J.  L.  168,  606 

Brehm  v.  Mayor  &c.,  104  N.  Y.  186,  1746 

V  Mayor"  &c.,  39  Hun  533,  1265 
Breicbbiel    v.    Powles,    39    N.    Y.    St. 

856,  1055 

Breil   v.   City  of  Buffalo,   144  N.   ^-^^^ 

163,  „  1336 

V.   City  of  Buffalo,   35  N.  Y.   S. 

3.^9.  1336 

Brenan  v.  People,  176  111.  620, 

52,    1823,    1824,    1825 
Brenham  v.  fierman-American  Bank, 

144  U.  S.  173.  ^^,„ 

561,   839,  972,   975,   1013 

Brennan^v.  City  of  Buffalo,  le^^N-^g^, 

V.  City  of  St.  Louis,  92  Mo.  482, 

1580,  1627,   1790 

V.  City  of  Weatherford,  53  Tex. 

330,  395 

Bress  v.  Louviere.  37  La.  An.  736,  1490 
Brevoort  v.  City  of  Detroit,  24  Mich. 

322,  •  1266 

Brewer  v.  Bowman.  9  Oa.  37,  687 

V.  City  of  Springfield,  97  Mass. 

152,  1722 

V.  Watson.  71  Ala.  299,  1429 

Brewer  Brick  Co.  v.  Inhabitants  &c., 

62  Maine  62. 

979,  980,  1503,  1542,  1545 
Brewis  v.  City  of  Duluth,  3  McCrary 

Brewster  v.  City  of  Hornellsville,  54 
.  N.  Y.  S.  915,  931 

V.  City  of  Peru,  180  111.  124, 

1144,  1379 

V.  City  of  Syracuse,  19  N.  Y. 

116.  1261 

V.   Hyde,  7  N.  H.  206.  341,  34.5 

Brickill  v.  Mavor  &c.,  7  F'ed.  479,  779 
Bricklavers  v.  Plasterers,  Palm.  396,  467 
Brick  Presby.   Church  v.  Mayor  &c., 

5  Conn.  538,  1086 

Bridge  v.   Wyckoff,   67   N.   Y.   130. 

1561,  1574 
Bridge  Co.  v.  City  of  Frankfort,  18 

B.   Mon.  41,  649 

V.  United  States,  105  U.  S.  470,  1576 
Bridgeford   v.   City  of  Tuscumbia,   4 

Woods  611,  1425 

V.   City  of  Tuscumbia,   16  Fed. 

910,  1029 

Bridgeport  v.  Housatonic  R.  Co.,  15 

Conn.  475,  210 

Bridgeport  Ins.  Co.  v.  Wilson,  34  N. 

Y.    27.^.  1599 

Bridges  v.  Mavor  &c.,  33  Ga.  113,     1501 

V.  Shallcross,  6  W.  Va.  562,  150 

Briegel  v.   Citv  of  Philadelphia,  135 

Pa.  St.  451,  1180 

Briel  v.   City  of  Buffalo,   156  N.  Y. 

699,  1300 


Brientnall    v.    City   of   Philadelphia, 

103  Pa.  St.  156,  .593 

Brieswick  v.  Mayor  &c.,  51  Ga.  639,  530 

Briggs  V.  Borden.  71  Mich.  87, 

362,  626,  652,  1486,  1496 
V.  Borough  of  West  Newton,  164 
Pa.  St.  341,  1331 

V.  Coleman,  51  Ala.  360,  222 

V.   Murdock,  13  Pick.   305, 

343.   346,   347,   348 
V.  Wardwell,  10  Mass.  356,  335 

V.  Whipple.  6  Vt.  95,  668 

Brigham  v.   Edmunds,   7   Gray  359,     823 

Bright  V.  McCullough,  27  Ind.  223, 

426,  1508 
V.   Supervisors.   18  Johns.   242,     178 

Brightman    v.     Inhabitants    &c.,    65 

Maine  426,  800,  1394 

V.    Kerner,   22   Wis.   54,      1247,    1513 

Brill  Co.  V.  City  of  Philadelphia,  167 

Pa.   St.  1.  1208 

Brimmer  v.  Boston.  102  Mass.  19,       637 

Brinckerhoffi  v.  Board  &c.,  6  Abb.  Pr. 

428,  1744 

Brink   v.   Borough  of   Dunmore,    174 

Pa.  St.  395,  824 

Brinkmeyer   v.    Evansville,   29   Ind. 

187,  8,  225,  774,  786 

Briscoe   v.   Bank.   11    Peters  257,  18 

Bristol  V.  Bristol  &c.  W.  W.  Co.,  19 

R.  I.  413,  1760 

V.  Johnson,  34  Mich.   123,  1721 

V.  New  Chester,  3  N.  H.  524, 

61,  83,  434,   1519 

Bristol  &c.  Co.  v.  City  of  Bristol,  97 

Va.   304.  595,   1706 

Britton  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  107  Mass. 

347,  1595 

V.  Platte  City,  2  Dill.  1.  847 

Brizzolari  v.   State,  37  Ark.  364,  607 

Broad  v.  City  of  Paris,  66  Tex.  119, 

316,  324 

Broadbelt  v.  Loew,  44  N.  Y.  S.  159.  1363 

Broadfoot  v.  City  of  Fayetteville,  124 

N.  C.  478,  117 

Broadwav  Baptist  Church  v.  McAtee, 

8   Biish   508,  1262 

Broberg   v.    City   of   Des   Moines,   63 

Iowa  523,  1621 

Brockman  v.  City  of  Creston,  79  Iowa 

587.  98,  577,  624,  652,  653 

Brodhead   v.   City  of  Milwaukee.    19 

Wis.   624,  548,   980 

Brodie  v.  McCabe,  33  Ark.  690,  1523 

Brodnax  v.  Groom,  64  N.  C.  244,        1388 

Brokaw  v.   City  of  Terre  Haute,  97 

Ind.  451,  699 

V.    Commissioners    &c.,    130    111. 
482,  1644,  1668 

Brome  v.  Cuming  Co.,  31  Neb.  362.     664 

Bronson  v.  Borough  of  Wallingford, 

54  Conn.  513,  1207 

V.   Oberlin,  41   Ohio  St.  476,  557 

V.  Town  of  Washington,  57  Conn. 
346.  1741,  1748 

V.  Woolsey,  17  Johns.  46,  216 

Brook  V.  Horton,  68  Cal.  554,  1317 

Brook  Ave.,   In  re,  40  N.  Y.   S.  949, 

1273.  1774 

Brooklyn  v.  Insurance  Co.,  99  U.  S. 

362,  1026 

Brooklyn  Park  Com'rs  v.  Armstrong, 
45  N.  Y.  234, 

629.   675,   685.   759,  760 

Brooklyn  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Brooklyn  &c. 

R.'Co.,  32  Barb.  358,  97,  468 

Brooklyn   Street,   In  re,   118   Pa.   St. 

640.  1560 

Brooklyn  Trust  Co.  v.   Town  of  He- 
bron,  51    Conn.   22,        346.   359,   365 

Brooks  V.  Fischer,  79  Cal.  173, 

56,   63,  91 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


Ixvii 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Vol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol  II,  pp.  833-1830.'] 


Brooks  V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  100  Mass. 

271.  101!),  177!) 

V.  Mansian,  80  Mich.  57G.  1390,  1404 
V.  Mitchell,  9  U.  &  W.   15.  1018 

V.    I'ollv    Co..    52    Iowa    400,  1515 

V.  ItifliiiK.  40  Ind.  15.  1214 

V.  Shelton,  47  Miss.  243,  1717 

Broom's  Case.   152  Mass.   1.  1412 

IJrophv  V.  Citv  of  Perth  Amboy,  44 

N.  J.  L.  217,  536 

V.   Hyatt,   10  Colo.   223, 

170,  300,   1085 
V.  Landman.  28  Ohio  St.  542,     1254 
Brothers  v.  Commissioners,  70  N.  C. 

720.  883 

Broughton    v.    Manchester    Water 

Works,  3  Barn.  &  Aid.  1.  971 

V.  Pensacola.  93  V.  S.  200, 

92.   405,   409.   410,  454 

Brouwer  v.  Appleby,  1  Sandf.  158,         83 

Brown's  Case.   152  Mass.   1,  1412 

Brown  v.  Austin,  1  Mass.  208,  210 

V.  Beattv,  34  Miss.  227,         073,  700 

V.  Board  &c.,  103  Cal.  531,  741 

V.  Board  &c.,  124  Cal.  274, 

1317,   1712 
V.  Board  &c.,  22  Ky.  L.  483.  874 

V.  Board  &c..  49  Ohio  St.  578.  1070 
V.  Bon  Homme  Co.,  1  S.  D.  210, 

635    992 
V.  Carl,  111  Iowa  008.  144!) 

V.  City  of  Atchison,  39  Kan.  37, 

240.  743 
V.   City  of  Cape  Girardeau,   90 
Mo.  377,  1541 

V.  City  of  Chicago,  110  111.  186,  1399 
V.  City  of  Denver.  3  Colo.  109.  1253 
V.    City   of   Grand    Rapids,    83 
Mich.  101.  802.  1200 

V.    City    of   Houston,    48    S.    W. 
760.  752 

V.  City  of  Lowell.  8  Met.  172,       680 
V.   City   of   Saginaw,    107    Mich. 
643.  1235 

V.    Commissioners   &c.,   38   Kan. 
436.  381 

V.  County  Com'rs.  18  Neb.  355.  1577 
V.    County    Com'rs,    21    Pa.    St. 
37,  523 

V.    County    Com'rs,    2    McCrary 
469,  836 

V.  Crego.  32  Iowa  498.  1528 

V.  Duplessis.  14  La.  An.  842,  591 

V.    Finlev.   3   McArthur  77,  1745 

V.  Gates,  15  W.  Va.  131,  11,  1529 
V.  Green,  46  How.   Pr.  302,  1001 

V.   Hicks,   1   Ark.   232,  1423 

V.  Hines.  10  Ind.  App.  1,  1314 

V.  Hummel.  6  Pa.  St.  80,  5 

V.   Illius.  27  Conn.  84.  809 

V.  Ingalls  Tp.,  81  Fed.  485, 

988,  989.  998,  1029 
V.    Inhabitants    &c.,    05    Maine 
402,  1096 

V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  79  Maine  305, 

353.  357,  362,  854 
V.    Inhabitants   &c.,    155   Mass. 
587.  860 

V.    Insurance    Co.,    3    La.    An. 
177.  447 

V.  .lerome.   102   111.  371,  1412 

V.  Lunt,  37  Maine  423,  195 

V.  Mayor  &c.,  57  Mo.  156,  1580 

V.  Mayor  &c.,  63  N.  Y.  239.  259,  644 
V.  Mosely.  11  Sm.  &  M.  354,  331 
V.   Powell,  25  Pa.  St.  229,  1571 

V.    Rome    &c.    R.    Co.,    86    Ala. 
206.  696 

V.  Ruse.  69  Tex.  589.  955 

V.  Russell.  166  Mass.  14,  1827 

V.  School  Dist..  64  N.  H.  303,  631 
V.  Smith.  24  Barb.  419.  1727 

T.  Spofford,  95  U.  S.  474,  1032 


Brown  V.   Spragne,  5  Denio  545,  1757 

V.  State,  82  Ga.  224,  1677 

V.  Town  of  Canton.  4  Lans.  409,  870 
V.   Town   of  Guyaudotte,   34   W. 
Va.  299,  1394 

V.  Town  of  Jacobs,  77  Wis.  27, 

959,   966,   968.    1495 
V.    Town    of    Louisburg,    126    N. 
C.  701.  1325 

V.  Town  of  Southbury,  63  Conn. 
212,  1623 

V.  Winterport,  79  Maine  305, 

257,   302,   360 
V.  Witham,  51  Maine  29,  347 

Browne  v.   Turner,   170   Mass.   9.        1310 

Brownell  v.  Palmer,  22  Conn.  107, 

355,  367 
V.  Town  of  Greenwich,  114  N.  Y. 
518,  1017 

Browning  v.  Board.  44  Ind.  11,  1577 

V.  City  of  Chicago,  155  III.  314, 

1145,  1243,  1277 
V.    City    of    Springfield,    17    111. 
143,  267 

Brownlee  v.  Board  &c.,  81   Ind.  186,  857 

Brownsville  Com'rs  v.  Loague,  129  U. 

S.  493,  1525 

Brownville    v.    Cook,    4    Neb.    101, 

607,   1420 

Bruceville    Coal    Co.    v.    People,    147 

111.  06.  734 

Bruck  V.  Broesigks.  18  Iowa  393,         565 
v.  Collier.  56  Mo.   160,  1373 

Bruecker  v.  Village  of  Port  Chester, 

101  N.  Y.  240.  1205,  1264,  1551 

Bruggerman  v.  True,  25  Minn.  123,     698 

Bruker    v.    Town    of    Covington.    69 

Ind.  33.  1329,  1639 

Brumby  v.  Harris.  107  Ga.  257,  1298 

Brunner  v.  Downs,   17  N.  Y.   S.   633,  595 

Brunott  v.  McKee.  6  W.  &  S.  513.  332 

Brunswick  v.  McKean,  4  Maine  508.     306 

Brunswick  Gaslight  Co.  v.  Brunswick 

Village  Corp.,  92  Maine  493.       1173 

Brush  V.  City  of  Carbondale,  78  111. 

74,  591,  1322 

V.   Inhabitants  &c.,   64   N.   J.   L. 
365,  1143 

Brush  Electric  &c.  Co.  v.  City  Coun- 
cil &c..  114  Ala.  433.     713,  739,  931 
V.  Lefevre.  93  Tex.  304,  1791 

Brusso  v.  City  of  Buffalo.  90  N.   Y. 

679,  1590,   1618,   1631,   1637 

Bryan   v.    Cattell,    15    Iowa    538. 

183.    1445 
V.     City    of    Lincoln,     50    Neb. 
620.  988 

V.  United  States,   1  Black  140,     322 
V.  Wear,  4  Mo.  100,  1424 

Bryant  v.  City  of  St.  Paul.  33  Minn. 

289,  774.  780,  1096 

V.    Inhabitants   &c.,    86    Maine 
450,  784 

V.  Bobbins.  70  Wis.  258.  1178 

V.  Town  of  Randolph,  133  N.  Y. 
70,  778 

V.  Town  of  Randolph,  14  N.  Y.  S. 
844.  811,  816 

V.   Woods.   11  Lea  327.  312 

Brydon  v.  Campbell,   40  Md.   331,        228 

Bryson  v.  Johnson  Co.,   100  Mo.  76, 

887,  1171 

Buchanan  v.  Borough  of  Beaver,  171 

Pa.  St.  567,  1698 

v.    City    of    Duluth,    40    Minn. 
402.  1179 

v.  Curtis.  25  Wis.  99.  1559 

v.  Litchfield.  102  U.  S.  278. 
636,  877,  880,  884,  1000.  1001,  1003, 
1005,  1007.  1009 
V.  School  Dist.,  25  Mo.  App.  85, 

618,  627 


Ixviii 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Vol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol  II,  pp.  833-1830.'] 


Buck  V.  City  of  Eureka,  124  Cal.  61, 

184,  713,  878 

V.    City    of    Lockport,    6    Lans. 

251.  1527 

V.  Colbath,  3  Wall.  334,  330 

Buckinghouse  v.  Gregg,  19  Ind.  401,  420 
Buckley  v.   Briggs.   30  Mo.   452,  260 

V.  City  of  Kansas  City,  156  Mo. 

10,  1359 

V.  City  of  Tacoma,  9  Wash.  253, 

1155,  1185 

V.  Drake,  41  Hun  384,  706 

Buckman  v.  Landers,  111  Cal.  347,     1279 
Bucknall  v.  Storey,  36  Cal.  67. 

1232,   1723 

V.  Story,  46  Cal.  589,  246,  248 

Buckner,  Ex  parte,  9  Ark.  73.  1724 

Buckner  v.  Gordon,  81  Ky.  665, 

90,  103,  370 

V.  Trustees  &c.,  1  A.  K.  Marsh. 

9.  629 

Buckton    V.    People,    12    Colo.    App. 

86,  298 

Bucroft  V.  City  of  Council  Bluffs,  63 

Iowa  646,  648.   1301,   1305,   1306 

Buell  V.  Ball,  20  Iowa  282, 

516.  830,  1515,  1517 

V.  Buckingham,  16  Iowa  284,         472 

V.  State,  45  Ark.  336,  1403 

Buffalo,   In  re,  78  N.  Y.  362,  1421 

Buffalo  Cement  Co.   v.   McNaughton, 

156  N.  Y.  702.  754 

Buffalo  &c.  Cemetery  v.  City  of  Buf- 
falo, 46  N.  Y.  503, 

1198,  1246,  1247,  1512,  1545 
Buffalo  &c.   Co.   V.   City  of  Buffalo, 

58   N.   Y.   639,  818 

V.  Knight  Templar  &c.  Assn.,  17 

Colo.  30.  1422 

Buffalo  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  City  of  Buffalo, 

5  Hill  209,  658,   1356 

V.   Dudley.   14  N.   Y.  336,  994 

V.  Falconer,  103  U.  S.  821,  996 

Bufifett  V.  Troy  &c.  R.  Co.,  40  N.  Y. 

168,  233 

Buffham  v.  City  of  Racine,  26  Wis. 

449,  1745 

Buford  V.  State,  72  Tex.  182, 

115,   124,  402,  407,  446 
Bull  V.  Bull,  43  Conn.  455,  1488 

V.    City   of   Quincy,    9    111.    App. 

127,  -  1548 

V.  Conroe,   13  Wis.  233,  558 

V.  Read,  13  Graft.  78,  58,  61 

Bullitt  V.  Clement,  16  B.  Mon.  193,     221 

V.  Selvage,  20  Ky.  L.  599. 

1130,  1267,  1298 
Bullitt    Co.    V.    Washer,    130    U.    S. 

142,  284 

Bullock  V.  Curry,  2  Met.  171,     1536,  1539 

V.  Geomble.  45  111.  218,  533 

V.  Mayor  &c.,  99  N.  Y.  654, 

1587,   1631 

V.    Town   of  Durham,    19   N.    Y. 

S.  635,  1581 

Bulow  V.   City  Council,   1   N.  &  Mc. 

527,  1511 

Bump  V.  Smith.  11  N.  H.  48.  1473 

Bunch  V.  Town  of  Edenton,  90  N.  C. 

431.  1329,  1633 

Bundv  V.   Town   of  Wolcott,   59   Vt. 

665,  1552 

Bunn  V.  People.  45  111.  397,  177 

Bunting  v.  Willis.  27  Graft.  144,  200 

Burch  V.  Hardwicke,  30  Graft.  24. 

798.  1432 
Burchell    v.    Mayor   &c.,   9    N.    Y.    S. 

196.  1265 

Burchfleld  v.   City  of  New   Orleans, 

42  La.  An.   235,  233,  235,  710 

Burden  v.  Stein.  27  Ala.  104,  688 

Burdett  v.  Allen,  35  W.  Va.  347,  608 

Burdick  v.  Uichmund,  16  R.  I.  502,     937 


Burditt  V.  Swenson,  17  Tex.  489,       1387 
Burford  v.  City  of  Grand  Rapids,  53 

Mich.  98,  264 

Burger  v.   Philadelphia,   196  Pa.   St. 

41,  1361 

Burgess  v.  Citizens'  Pass.  R.  Co.,  148 

Pa.  St.  87,  468 

V.   Pue,  2   Gill  11,  58,   1532 

V.  Pue,  2  Gill  254.  275 

V.  Seligman,  107  U.  S.  20,  1033 

Burhans  v.  Village  of  Norwood  Park, 

138  111.  147.  1174 

Burk  V.  Ayers.   19  Hun  17,  689 

V.  Collins.  51  Ga.  391,  1428 

V.    Galveston   Co.,   76   Tex.   267, 

1490,  1495 

V.  State.  5  Lea  349,  93,  408 

Burke,   Matter  of,  62   N.   Y.   224, 

1233    1234 

V.  Jeffries.  20  Iowa  145,      "     '     '53 

V.  Supervisors,  7  W.  Va.  371,       381 

V.    United    States,    21    Ct.    CI. 

317,  772 

Burleigh    v.    Town   of   Rochester,    5 

Fed.  667,  1014,  1018 

Burleson    v.    City    of    Reading,    110 

Mich.   512.  1333 

Burley  v.   Bethune.  1   Marsh.  220,       221 
Burlington  v.  Dennison,  42  N.  J.  L. 

165,  284 

Burlington  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Clay  Co.,  13 

Neb.   367,  1535 

v.  Spearman,  12  Iowa  112, 

384,    1251,   1517 
Burlington  Tp.  v.  Beasley,  94  U.   S. 

310,  981 

Burlington  Water  Co.  v.  Woodward, 

49  Iowa  58,  877,  891 

Burlington  Water  Works  Co.  v.  City 

of    Burlington,    43    Kan.    725, 

572,  1454 
Burmeister,  In  re,  76  N.  Y.  174, 

1233,  1234 
Burnett,  Ex  parte,  30  Ala.  461. 

1118,  1415 
Burnett  v.  City  of  Boston,  173  Mass. 

173,  1130 

v.  Mayor  &c.,  12  Cal.  76,  1253,  1258 

V.  Mayor  &c..  55  N.  Y.  S.  893,       1377 
Burnham  v.   Brown,  23  Maine  400,   1018 

V.  City  of  Chicago.  24  111.  496,     1195 

V.  City  of  Fond  du  Lac,  15  Wis. 

193,  1745 

V.   City  of  Milwaukee,   69   Wis. 

379,  1741 

Burns   v.    Bender,   36   Mich.    195,  861 

V.  Clarion  Co.,  62  Pa.  St.  422,     1522 

V.  Mayor  «&c.,  2  Kan.  454, 

47,  982,  1535 

V.  Norton,  59  Hun  616,  221 

V.  Town  of  Le  Grange,  17  Tex. 

415,  1414 

Burnside,  Ex  parte.  6  S.  W.  276,       1677 

V.    Lincoln   Co.    Court,   86    Ky. 

423,  1677 

Burr   V.    Charlton    Co.,    2    McCrary 

603,  992 

V.  City  of  Atlanta,  64  Ga.  225, 

1395.   1537 

V.    City    of   Carbondale,    76    111. 

455,  845,   1004 

V.    Inhabitants    &c.,    121    Mass. 

241.  680 

V.   Town  of  Newcastle,   49   Ind. 

322.  1378 

Burrill    v.    City    of    Boston,    2    Cliff. 

590,  647,  715 

Burroughs  v.  Lowder.  8  Mass.  373,     311 
Burrows.  In  re,  55  Ark.  275,  1074 

Burt  V.  Brigham,  117  Mass.  307.         701 

V.    City    of    Boston,    122    Mass. 

223,  1505 


TABLE  OF   CASES. 


Ixix 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Vol.  J,  pp.  1-832;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.] 

Byers  v.  Commonwealth,  42  Pa.  St. 

89,  541,  141S 

nyler  v.  Aslier.  47  III.  101.  "  .•'.TO 

Byles  V.  Golden  Tp.,  52  Mich.  612,       868 
Byi-am  v.  City  of  Detroit,  50  Mich. 

56.  128S 

V.  Foley.  17  Tnd.  App.  629,  12S1 

Ryrd,  Kx  parte.  84  Ala.  17,  1402 

Byrne  v.   Drain,   127  Cal.   66."?,  1285 

Byrnes  v.  City  of  Cohoes,   67   N.   Y. 

204.  790,  811,   1217 
V.    City    of    St.    Paul,    78    Minn. 

205.  ,  184 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  64  N.  J.  L.  210,       507 

Byrum  v.  Peterson,  34  Neb.  237,       1654 


Burt  V.  Winona  &c.  R.  Co.,  31  Minn. 

372,  197,  289 
Burton  v.  Burton,  1  Keves  359,  132 

V.   Fnlton.   49   Pa.   St.   151.  222 

V.  Inhabitants  &c..  34  Vt.  345,  871 
V.  Town  of  Koshkonong,  4  Fed. 

373,  ^  764 
V.   Tuite.   78   Mich.   363,  1428 

Burwoll  V.  Board  &c..  03  N.  C.  73,  676 
Busbee   v.   Commissioners,   93    N.    C. 

143.  1230,    1499 

Busenbark  v.  Clements,  22  Ind.  App. 

557,  1149,   1246.   1282,   1782 

Bush  V.  Board  &c.,  42  N.  Y.  S.  417,     872 

V.  Coler.  53  N.  Y.  S.  679,  932,  1757 

V.  Giesy,  16  Or.  355,  961 

V.  Lisle,  89  Ky.  393.  1373 

V.  Seabury,  8  Johns.  418, 

100,  580,  1402 

V.  State.  100  Wis.  549,  157 

V.  Wolfe.  55  Ark.   124,  949 

Bushel  V.  Commonwealth  Ins.  Co.,  15 

S.  &  R.   173.  4.  5 

Bushnel  v.  Whitlock.  77  Iowa  285,  1087 
Buskirk  v.  Strickland.  47  Mich.  389,  676 
Busse  V.  Town  of  Central  Covington, 

19  Ky.  L.  157,  1314 

Bussey  v.  Gilmore,  3  Maine  191,  1542 
Butcher  v.  City  of  Camden,  29  N.  J. 

Eq.  478,  201 

Butchers'    Assn.    v.    City   of   Boston, 

139  Mass.  290.  1557 

Butchers'  Union  &c.  Co.  v.  Crescent 

City  &c.   Co.,   Ill   U.    S.    746, 

1403,  1811 

Butler,  Appeal  of,  73  Pa.   St.  448, 

1389,  1507 

Butler  V.  Board  &c.,  46  Iowa  326, 

1674,  1726 
V.  Board  &c.,  15  Kan.  178.  182,  743 
V.  City  of  Charleston,  7  Gray  12, 

253.    280,    663.   1212 
V.   City  of  Milwaukee,   15   Wis. 
493,  668 

V.   City  of  Muscatine,   11   Iowa 
433,  1515 

V.   City  of  Passaic,  44  N.  J.  L. 

171.  1091 
V.  Dunham,  27  111.  473,  983,  1023 
V.  Kent,  19  Johns.  223,  225 
V.  McLean  Co.,  32  111.  App.  397,  671 
V.  Nevin,  88  III.  575.  1255 
V.   Pennsylvania,    10   How.   402, 

81.  183,  756 
V.  Regents  &c.,  32  Wis.  1241,       177 
V.   Sullivan  Co..   108  Mo.   630.       855 
V.  ITnited   States,  21  Wall.    (88 
U.  S.)   272.  310,  312 

V.  Village  of  Edgewater,  53  Hun 
633,  1180 

V.  Worcester.  112  Mass.  541,       1178 

Butte  Co.  V.  Bovdstun.  68  Cal.  189,  556 
V.   Morgan,   76  Cal.   1.  328,   906 

Butterfield  v.   Inhabitants  &c.,  6  Al- 
len 187,  253 
V.  Klaber,  52  How.  Pr.  255,         1104 

Butterfoss   v.    State,    40   N.   J.    Eq. 

325,  1125 

Button    v.    City   of   Port    Worth.    78 

Tex.  227.  316,  317 

Buttrick  v.   City  of  Lowell,   1  Allen 

172.  798.   1076,   1433 
Butz  V.  Cavanagh,   137  Mo.   503, 

1112,  1790 
V.    City   of   Muscatine.    8    Wall. 

575.  89.    453.    764,    1531,    1535 

V.  Kerr,  123  III.  659.  1084 

Butzman   v.    Whitbeck.    42   Ohio    St. 

223.  1509 

Buxton  V.  Chesterfield,  60  N.  H.  357,  1053 
Byerly  v.  City  of  Anamosa,  79  Iowa 

204,  1632 


Cabot  V.  Kingman,  166  Mass.  403, 

1211,  1775,  1779 

Cadwallader  v.  Durham,  46  N.  J.  L. 

53,  1056 

Caffrey,  In  re,  65  N.  Y.  S.  470,  1782 

Cagwin  v.  Town  of  Hancock,  84  N. 

Y.  532,  1010 

Cahill,    In   re,   110   Pa.    St.    167, 

1410,  1411 

Cahoon  v.  Coe,  52  N.  H.  518,  346 

Cain    V.    City    of    Omaha,    42    Neb. 

120,  1291 

V.   City  of   Syracuse,   95   N.    Y. 
83,  263,  821 

V.  Commissioners,  86  N.  C.  8,       1269 
V.  Warner,  60  N.  Y.  S.  769.  1766 

Cairo  v.  Zane,  149  U.  S.  122,  1007.  1757 

Cairo   &c.   R.    Co.   v.   Sparta.   77    111. 

505.  43,  985,  1017,  1531 

V.   Turner,  31   Ark.   494,        673,   706 

Calaway    Co.    v.    Foster,    93    U.    S. 

567,  995 

Calder    v.    Police    Jury,    44    La.    An. 

173.  1170 

Caldwell  v.  City  of  Alton,  33  111.  417, 

502,  1402,  1403 
V.  Cornell,  21  Ky.  L.  812,  1806 

V.   Harrison,   11   Ala.   755.  295 

V.  Justices,  4  Jones  Eq.  323, 

43,  1532 
V.  Rupert.  10  Bush  179,  1232 

V.  State,  55  Ala.  133.  530 

Caldwell  Co.  v.  Harbert,  68  Tex.  321, 

854.   1491.   1495,    1522 

Calhoun,  Ex  parte,  87  Ga.  359,  1426 

Calhoun  v.  Little.  106  Ga.  336,  513 

V.  Millard.  121  N.  Y.  69,  1004 

California    v.    Railroad    Co.,    127    U. 

S.    1.  45,   46.    1807 

California    Imp.    Co.    v.    Moran.    128 

Cal.  373.  1276.  1291.  1298,  1543 

v.  Reynolds,  123  Cal.  88, 

749,   1141.   1786.   1800 

California  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Board  &c..  18 

Cal.  671,  990,  1724 

Calking  v.  Baldwin.  4  Wend.  667.         706 

Calkins  v.  City  of  Hartford,  33  Conn. 

57.  1618 

V.  City  of  Springfield,  167  Mass. 

'         68  133X 

Call  v.'chadbourne,  46  Maine  206, 

58,   61,   83 

Callaghan  v.  Town  of  Alexandria.  52 

La.   An.   1013,  490,   989 

Callahan    v.    City    of    Boston,    175 

Mass.  201,  1756 

V.   Inhabitants  &c.,  30  N.  J.   L. 
160.  814 

V.  Mayor,  66  N.  Y.  656,  1412 

Callan  v.   Wilson.   127  U.   S.   540. 

543,   1413 

Callanan  v.  Oilman,   107  N.  Y.   360, 

1582,  1609.  1610 

Callaway    Co.    v.    Foster,    93    U.    S. 

567,  1001 


Ixx 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Vol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.'i 


Callen  v.   City  of  Junction   City,   43 

Kan.  627,  384 

Callender  v.  Marsh,  1  Pick.  418, 

680,  801 

Canister   v.    Kochersperger,    168    111. 

334,  1283 

Calwell   V.  City  of  Boone,   51   Iowa 

687,  263,   798,   1076 

Cambridge   v.    Railroad   Com'rs,    156 

Mass.  161,  1578 

Cameron  v.  School  Dist.,  42  Vt.  507,  366 

Camp    V.    City    of    Minneapolis,    33 

Minn.  461.  396 

V.  State,  27  Ala.  53,  1400 

Campau  v.  City  of  Detroit,  106  Mich. 

414,  TIS 

V.   Langlev,  39  Mich.  451,  533,  1085 

Campbell,  Ex  parte,  74  Cal.  20,  1399 

V.  City  Council  &c..  53  Ala.  527,    799 
V.    Cit'v   of   Cincinnati,   49   Ohio 
St.  463,  478.  1133 

V.  City  of  Kenosha,  5  Wall.  194, 

643,  992 
V.  Cobb,  2  Sneed  18,  323 

V.  Dwiggins,  83  Ind.  473,  692 

V.  Evans.  45  N.  Y.  356,  1085 

V.  Kennpdv.  34  Iowa  494,  1370 

V.  Morris,  "3  Har.  &  McH.  535, 

V.  Seaman,  63  N.  Y.  568,  1104,  'lll9 

V.  Thompson,  16  Me.  117,  536 

Campbell  Co.  v.  Knoxville  &c.  R.  Co., 

6  Coldw.  598,  982,  984 

Campton    v.    Zabriskie,    101    U.    S. 

601,  1716 

Canal  Co.  v.  Commissioners  &c.,  26 

La.  An.  740,  675 

V.  Garritv,  115  111.  155,  588 

Canal  St.,  In  re,  12  N.  Y.  406,  1419 

Canal  St.,  In  re,  11  Wend.  154,  1297 

Canal    Trustees   v.    City   of   Chicago, 

12  111.  403,  1246 

Canepa  v.  Mayor  &c.,  92  Ala.  358,  1391 
Canfield  v.  Bavfleld  Co..  74  Wis.  60,  593 
Cannifif  v.  Mayor  &c.,  4  E.  D.  Smith 

430,  187 

Cannon  v.  City  of  St.  Joseph,  67  Mo. 

App.  367,  791 

V.  New  Orleans,  20  Wall.  577, 

579,  1101,  1537 

Canosia  Tp.  v.  Grand  Lake  Tp.,  80 

Minn.  357,  411 

Canova  v.  State,  18  Fla.  512, 

433,  434,   442,  444,  955 

Canterbury  v.    City   of  Boston,   141 

Ma.ss.  215,  1622 

Canto.  Ex  parte.  21  Tex.  App.  61.     1402 

Cantrell  v.  Clark  Co..  47  Ark.  239,  1052 

Cantwell  V.  City  of  Appleton,  71  Wis. 

463,  1620,   1636 

Canyonville   &c.    Road   Co.    v.    Doug- 
lass Co.,  5  Or.  280.  708 

Cape  Girardeau  Co.  Court  v.  Hill,  118 

U.   S.  68,  106 

Cape  Girardeau  &c.  Road  v.  Dennis, 

67  Mo.  438,  686 

V.  Renfroe,  58  Mo.  265,  682 

Cape  May  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  City  of  Cape 

Mav.  35  N.  J.  Eq.  419,  522 

Capen  v.  Foster.  12  Pick.  485,  370 

Capital  Bank  v.  School  Dist.,  1  N.  D. 

479.  851,  968 

V.  School  Dist.,  6  Dak.  248,         1486 

Capital  City  Gaslight  Co.  v.  Charter 

Oak  Ins.  Co.,  51  Iowa  31,  1512 

Capital  Gas  Co.  v.  Young,  109  Cal. 

140,  732 

Capital   Printing  Co.  v.  City  of  Ra- 
leigh. 126  N.  C.  516.  1801 
V.  Hoey,  124  N.  C.  767,  1687 

Capman  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  76  Maine 

427,  1622 


Card  V.  City  of  Ellsworth,  65  Maine 

547,  1613 

Cardwell  v.  American  Bridge  Co.,  113 

U.  S.  205,  157G 

Carey  v.  Board  of  Police  &c.,  53  N. 

J.  L.  311,  143& 

V.  City  of  Ann  Arbor,  124  Mich. 
134,  1364 

V.    City    of    Duluth,    38    Minn. 
218,  411 

V.  City  of  East  Saginaw,  79  Mich. 
7*-i  118!^ 

V.  'state,  34  Ind.  105,  331,  333 

Carhart    v.    Auburn    G.    L.    Co.,    22 

Barb.  297,  1108 

Carland    v.    Commissioners    &c.,    5 

Mont.    579,  288 

Carle   v.    City   of   De   Soto,    156   Mo. 

443,  1797,  1799 

Carleton  v.  Franconia  &c.  Steel  Co., 

99  Mass.  216,  810 

V.    Inhabitants    &c.,    88    Maine 
293,  1336 

V.   Inhabitants,  102  Mass.  348,  1552 
V.  People,  10  Mich.  250, 

66.  69,  70,  195,  197,  289,  296 
V.  Rugg.  149  Mass.  550.  1107 

Carlin  v.  Cavender,  56  Mo.  286,  1259 

Carling   v.    Mayor   &c.,    64   N.    J.    L. 

223,  1713 

Carlisle  v.  Wilson,  110  Ga.  860,  1365 

Carll  V.  Village  of  Northport,  42  N. 

Y.  S.  576,  1777 

Carlton  v.   Newman,  77  Maine  408,  1531 
V.  Reddington.  21  N.  H.  291,        1095 

Carlyle  Water  &c.  Co.  v.  City  of  Car- 

lyle,  31   111.  App.  325.  639,  889 

Carmack  v.  Commonwealth,  5  Binn. 

184,  329,  332 

Carman  v.  Steubenville  R.  Co.,  4  Ohio 

St.  399,  745 

Carmichael  v.  City  of  Texarkana.  94 

Fed.  561,  1106.  1109 

Carney  v.   Village  of  Marseilles.  136 

III.  401,  1324,  1524.   1580,  1795 

Carpenter  v.  Aldrich,  3  Met.  58,         1740 
V.  City  of  Cohoes,  81  N.  Y.  21, 

1579    1597 
V.  City  of  New  York,  60  N.  Y. 
S.  633,  1781 

V.   City  of  New  York,  64  N.   Y. 
S.  839,  1212 

V.   City  of  St.   Paul,   23   Minn. 
232,  1139 

V.  Gwvnn.  35  Barb.  395,  1559 

V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  51  Mo.  483.  1001 
V.  People.  8  Colo.   116.   90,  103,  114 

Carr  v.  Ashland.  62  N.  H.  665.  828 

V.   City   of  Easton,   142   Pa.   St. 
139.  1632 

V.  City  of  St.  Louis,  9  Mo.  191, 

97,  468.  494 
V.  McCampbell.  61  Ind.  97.  1429 

V.  Northern  Liberties,  35  Pa.  St. 
324,  204.  820,  830 

V.   State.   103   Ind.   548,       697,   1573 
V.  United  States.  98  U.  S.  433,     770 

Carrico  v.  People,  123  111.  198,  1473,  1485 

Carrier  v.  Town  of  Shawangunk,  10 

Fed.  220,  1001 

Carrington  v.   City  of  St.   Louis,  89 

Mo.  208,  1802 

Carroll  v.  City  of  St.  Louis,  12  Mo. 

444,  181,  663 

V.  Langan,  63  Hun  380,  1413 

V.  Mayor.  12  Ala.  173,  1724 

V.  Siebeuthaler.  37  Cal.  193.  213 

V.  Wall.  35  Kan.  36,     296,  297,  475 
Carroll  Co.  v.  Smith,  111  V.  S.  556. 

374.  1008.  102G 
Carrollton  &c.   ISIfg.   Co.   v.   City  of 

Carrollton.  20  Ky.  L.  818.  707 

Carron  v.  Martin,  26  N.  J.  L.  594,     1257 


TABLE  OF   CASES. 


Ixxi 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Vol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.^ 


CaiTothers  v.   Board  &c.,  IG  W.  Va. 

r.iiT.  1717.  1719 

Carskaddon   v.   City  of  South   Bend, 

141  Ind.  59G,  713 

Carson  v.  City  of  Hartford,  48  Conn. 

CS.  700,  701 

V.  Mavor  &c..  94  Ga.  017,  G04 

V.  Mcl'lietridge.  15  Ind.  327,  368 

Carstesen  v.   Town  of  Stratford,   67 

Conn.  428,  793,  797,  1328 

Carswell  v.  Mayor  &c.,  2  Marv.  3(i0, 

13.59,   1362 
Carter  v.  City  of  Augusta,  84  Maine 

418,  1053 

V.  Citv  of  Portland,  4  Or.  339,     652 

V.  ClaVlv,  89   Ind.  238,  682 

V.  Dow,  16  Wis.  298.  1521,   1751 

V.   McFarland.  75   Iowa  196,  274 

V.   Ottawa.  24   Fed.  546.  1026 

V.  Town  of  Monticello,  68  Iowa 

178.  1618,  1620 

Carter  Co.  v.  Sinton.  120  U.  S.  517,     441 
Carthage   v.    Frederick,    122    N.    Y. 

268.  1382 

Cartlian  v.  Lang.  69  Iowa  384,  652 

Cartright  V.  Belmont,  58  Wis.  370,     1597 
Cartwright  v.   Board  of   Health  &c.,  • 

56  N.  Y.  S.  731,  1406 

Carvin  v.  City  of  St.  Louis,  151  Mo. 

334,  1361 

Cary  v.  City  of  Ottawa.  8  Fed.  199,  1001 

V.  City  of  Pekin,  88   111.   154, 

1515,  1516 

V.  Mayor  &c..  49  N.  J.  L.  110,  1397 
Cascade  Co.  v.  City  of  Gt.  Falls,  18 

Mont.   537.  1315 

Cascaden   v.    City   of   Waterloo.    106 

Iowa   673.  291,   522,   1707 

Case  V.  Blood,  71   Iowa  632,  1487 

-V.  Favier.  12  Minn.  89.  571 

V.  .Johnson,  91   Ind.  477.  1201 

V.  Mayor  &c..  30  Ala.  538.  85.  537 
Casinello,  Ex  parte,  62  Cal.  538,  1081 
Caskev    v.    City   of    Greensburg,    78 

Ind.  233.  313 

Cason  V.  City  of  Lebanon,   153  Ind. 

567,  724.  731,  736.  1151,  1710,  1792 
Caspary  v.  City  of  Portland,  19  Or. 

496,  819 

Cass  V.  Bellows,  31  N.  H.  501,  1422,  1427 

V.  Dillon,  2  Ohio  St.  607, 

106.  607,  763,  995 

V.  People,  166  111.  126, 

511,  512,  1144,  1261 
Cass  Co.  V.  Gillett,  100  U.  S.  585. 

995,   996,   1026 

V.  Green,  66  Mo.  498,  1026 

V.  Johnston,  95  U.  S.  360, 

373.  374.  473.  1001 
Cass  Farm  Co.  v.  Citv  of  Detroit.  124 

Mich.  433,  721.  748.  1174,  1506 

Cassadv  v.  City  of  Covington,  12  Ky. 

L.  980,  1157 

Cassedv  v.  Town  of  Stockbridge,  21 

Vt.  391.  1641 

Cassidy  v.  City  of  Bangor,  61  Maine 

434,  275,  301 

Cassin  v.  Zavalla  Co.,  70  Tex.  419.     275 
Caswell  V.  City  of  Mashalltown,  101 

Iowa  598.  179 

Cate  V.  Martin,  69  N.  H.  610,       155,  1787 
Cathcart  v.   Comstock,  56  Wis.  590, 

424,  432 
Catron  v.  Lafayette  Co.,  106  Mo.  659, 

896,  1001,  1740 
Cavan  v.  City  of  Brooklyn,  5  N.  Y.  S. 

758,  1746 

Cavanagh    v.    Board   &c.,    59   N.    Y. 

412,  1766 

V.    City  of  Boston,    139   Mass. 

426.  823 

Cavanaugh  v.  Smith.  84  Ind.  380,       1572 
Caviel  v.  Coleman,  72  Tex.  550,  1491 

Cavis  V.  Robertson,  9  N.  H.  524,  367 


Cawley  v.  People,  95  111.  249,       211,  313 
Cedar  Hapids  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Cowan,  77 

Iowa  535,  1674 

Cemetery  Ass'n  v.  Meninger,  14  Kan. 

312,  571 

Center  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Black,  32  Ind. 

468,  1720 

Center  St.,  In  re,  115  Pa.  St.  247, 

1200,  1261.  1262 
Central  Bridge  Co.  v.  City  of  Lowell, 

15  Gray  106,  279.  471,  674 

Central    City    Horse   R.    Co.    v.    Fort 

Clark  Horse  R.  Co.,  81  111.  523,    674 
Central   Crosstown   R.   Co.   v.   Metro- 
politan  St.   R.   Co.,  44  N.   Y.   S. 

752,  1351 

Central   Irr.   Dist.   v.   De   Lappe,   79 

Cal.  351,  1421 

Central  R.  Co.  v.  State,  32  N.  J.  L. 

220,  591 

Central  W.  &  W.  Co.  v.  City  of  Corpus 

Christi.  23  Tex.  Civ.  App.  390,       735 
Cerf  V.  Pfleging.  94  Cal.  131.  1560 

Chadbourn  v.  Town  of  Newcastle,  48 

N.  H.  196,  1394 

Chaddock  v.  Day,  75  Mich.  527, 

1403,  1508 
Chadwick  v.   McCausland,   47   Maine 

342,  1561 

Chafee  v.   City  of  Aiken,  57  S.   C. 

607,  1321 

Chaffee  v.  Middlesex  R.  Co.,  146  Mass. 

224,  335.  1019 

Chaffee  Co.  v.  Potter,  142  U.  S.  335, 

998.  1003,  1005,  1009,  1011,  1024 
Chafin    V.    Waukesha    Co.,    62    Wis. 

463,  536,   542 

Chahoou  v.  Commonwealth,  21  Graft. 

822,  1411 

Chakin   v.    School   Dist.,    30    N.    H. 

25,  1485 

Chalk  v.  White,  4  Wash.  156,  1645 

Chains  V.  Atchison  &c.  R.  Co.,  16  Kan. 

117,  685 

V.   Parker,   11  Kan.  394,  1252 

Challiss  V.  Board  &c..  15  Kan.  49,     1717 
Chamberlain  v.   Bell,   7  Cal.   292,  228 

V.    City    of    Cleveland,    34    Ohio 

St.  551,  1231.  1256 

V.    City   of    Evansville,    77    Ind. 

542,  500,  523 

V.  City  of  Litchfield,  56  111.  App. 

652.  599 

V.  Elizabethport  Steam  Cordage 

Co.,  41  N.  J.  Eq.  43,  684 

V.  Enfield,  43  N.  H.  356, 

1105,  1112.  1613 

V.  Inhabitants  &c..  13  Maine  466, 

350,   352,   354,   358,   1428 

V.  Taylor,  36  Hun  24,  1166,  1550 

Chamberlain  of  London  v.  Compton, 

7   I).   &  R.   597.  100,   500 

Chamberlin    v.    Gleason,    163    N.    Y. 

214,  1241 

V.  Morgan,  68  Pa.  St.  168,  689 

Chambers  v.   City  of  St.   Joseph,  33 

Mo.  App.  536,  1747 

V.  City  of  St.  Louis,  29  Mo.  543, 

563,  665 

V.  Furry.   1  Yeates  167,  681 

v.  King  &c.  Bridge  Co.,  16  Kan. 

270,  1737 

v.  Lewis.  9  Iowa  583.  706 

V.  Saterlee.  40  Cal.  497. 

673    78S    1234 

V.  Territory,  3  Wash.  T.  280.  '  1663 
Chambers  Co.  v.  Clews,  21  Wall.  317. 

985,  1000.  1002 
Champaign  City  v.  Patterson,  50  111. 

61,  1596 

Champlin  v.  Village  of  Penn  Yan.  34 

Hun  33,  1612 

Chandler  v.  Bradish,  23  Vt.  416. 

168,  340,  361 


Ixxii 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[.References  are  to  Pages.   Vol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.'] 


Chandler  v.  City  of  Boston,  112  Mass. 

200,  384,  1517 

V.  Hanna,  73  Ala.  390,  556 

V.  Teople,  161  111.  41.  1241 

V.  Railroad  Commissioners,  141 
Mass.  208,  1743 

V.  Reynolds,  19  Kan.  249,     427,  1519 

Chapin  v.  School  Dlst.,  30  N.  H.  25, 

345,  346 
V.  School  Dist.,  35  N.  H.  445,       664 

Chaplain  v.  Brown,  15  R.  I.  579,         1214 

Chaplin  v.   Hill.  24  Vt.  528,  644 

Chapman  v.  Commonwealth,  25  Gratt. 

721,  325 

V.  Clark,  49  Mich.  305,  187 

V.    County    Com'rs,    79    Maine 
267,  287 

V.  Douglass  Co.,  107  U.  S.  348, 

240,   242,   632 
V.   Ferguson,   1   Bart.   El.  Cas. 
267,  377 

V.  Gates,  54  N.  Y.  132,  705 

V.  Milton.  31  W.  Va.  384, 

1596,  1620 
V.   Oshkosh  &c.  R.   Co.,  33   Wis. 
629.  701 

V.  Swan,  65  Barb.  210, 

1563,   1567,   1568 

Charles  v.  City  of  Marion,  98  Fed. 

166.  1284 

V.   Finchley  Local  Board,  52  L. 
J.  Ch.  554,  809 

V.  Haskins,  11  Iowa  329,  332 

V.  Mayor  &c..  27  N.  J.  L.  203.         294 

Charles    River    Bridge    v.    Warren 

Bridge,  11  Pet.  420.  758,  1323 

Charleston  v.  Oliver,  16  S.  C.  47, 

528.  1389.  1507,  1509 

Charlotte    &c.    Co.    v.    Gow,    59    Ga. 

685.  821 

Charnock  v.  District  Tp.  &c.,  51  Iowa 

70,  1530 

Chartiers  Tp.  v.  Phillips,  122  Pa.  St. 

14.5,  1332,  1600 

Chase  v.  Chase,  95  N.  Y.  373.  1205 

V.   City  of  Cleveland,  44  Ohio 
St.   505,  1344 

V.  City  of  Lowell,  7  Gray  33.         163 
V.  City  of  Oshkosh,  81  Wis.  313, 

582.  1322.  1369 
V.    City   of   Portland.    86    Maine 
367.  1211.  1219 

V.  City  of  Worcester,  108  Mass. 
60,  1182 

V.   City  Treasurer  &c..   122  Cal. 
540.  1152.  1280,  1284,  1285 

V.  Middleton,  123  Mich.  647.         779 
V.  President  &c.,  19  Pick.  564, 

142.  342,  965,  1526 
V.  Saratoga  Co..  33  Barb.  603,  1661 
V.   Stephenson.   71    III.   383,  1494 

V.  Town  of  Rutlant].  47  Vt.  393,  697 

Chatterton  V.  Parrott,  46  Mich.  432,  1570 

Chawk  V.  Beviile,  21  Ky.  L.  1769.     1275 

Cheaney  v.   Hooser,  9  B.  Mon.  330, 

69,   384.   393,    1515.    1516,    1517 

Cheatham  v.  Shearon,  1  Swan  213,  1105 
v.  United  States.  92  U.  S.  85.       1718 

Cheeney  v.    Inhabitants  &c..   60   Mo. 

53.  233,  647,  960 

Cheetham  v.  Ilampson.  4  T.  R.  318,  1095 

Che'ezen  v.  State.  2  Ind.  149,  524 

Chegaray  v.  Jenkins,  5  N.  Y.  376,         229 

Chelmsford    Co.    v.    Demarest,    7 

Gray  1,  326 

Chemung  Bank  v.  Supervisors,  5  De- 

nio  517.  253 

Chenery  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  16  Gray 

125,  1750 

Cherokee  &c.  Co.  v.  Justices  &c.,  28 

Ga.  121,  1511 

Cherokees  v.  Georgia,  5  Peters  1,         136 


Cherry  v.  Board  &c.,  52  N.  J.  L. 

544,  1156 

V.   City  of  Rock   Hill,   48   S.   C. 
553  1777 

V.   Fewell,  26  S.  E.  498,  1777 

Chesapeake   &c.    Canal   Co.   v.    Balti- 
more &c.  R.  Co.,  4  Gill  &  J.  1,       123 

Chesapeake  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Bradford,  6 

W.  Va.  220.  699 

V.  Hoard.  16  W.  Va.  270,  106 

Chesapeake  &c.  Tel.  Co.  v.  Mayor  &c., 

89   Md.   689.        715,   727,   1349,   1704 

Cheshire  Prov.  Inst.  v.  Stone,  52  N. 

II.  365.  1055 
Chess  V.  Manown,  3  Watts  219.  681 
Chesshire  v.  People,  116  111.  493,  1689 
Chester  v.  Black,  132  Pa.  St.  568,  1252 
Chester  Co.  v.   Barber,   97   Pa.   St. 

455.  663 

V.  Brower,  117  Pa.  St.  647,  678 

Chester  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Commissioners, 

72   N.   C.   486,  374,   985 

Chestnutwood  v.    Hood,   68   111.   132, 

1533,  1701 
Chicago  V.  Babcock.  143  HI.  358,         1635 

V.  C.  &  W.  Ind.  R.  Co.,  105  111. 

73,  1757 

V.  Robbins,  2  Black  418, 

8,  1345,  1599 

V.  Sheldon,  9  Wall.  50. 

510.  764,   1183 

V.  Shober  &c.  Co.,  6  Bradw.  560,  210 

V.  Taylor,  125  U.  S.  161.  678 

Chicago  Board  of  Trade  v.  People,  91 

III.  80.  1812 
Chicago  Dock  &c.  Co.  v.  Garrity,  115 

111.  155,  88 

Chicago  League  Ball  Club  v.  City  of 

Chicago.  77  111.  App.  124.  1385 

Chicago  Packing  Co.  v.  City  of  Chi- 
cago. 88  III.  221,  496,  604 

Chicago    Pub.    Stock    Exch.    v.    Mc- 

Claughry.   148   III.  372,  1697 

Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Ayers.  106  111.   . 
511.  1219 

V.    Baldridge,    177    111.   229,  1554 

v.  Board  &c..  49  Kan.  399.  991 

V.    Chicago   Citv   R.   Co.,   62   HI. 
App.    502.  1348 

V.  City  of  Chicago,  91  HI.  573,  1248 
V.  City  of  Chicago,  140  III.  309, 

591.  1249 
V.  City  of  Chicago,  148  HI.  141. 

059.  1236 
V.  Citv  of  Chicago.  172  HI.  66.  465 
V.  City  of  Chicago.  174  HI.  439, 

465.  525.  1151.  1152.  1379 
V.  City  of  Chicago,  178  HI.  429. 

1132.  1147.  1154 
V.  City  of  Chicago,  184  III.  154, 

504,   512,   1798 
V.    City   of   Chicago,    166    U.    S. 
226.  1774 

V.    City    of   Council    Bluffs,    109 
Iowa  425.  481,  591 

V.   City  of  Joliet,   79   III.   25. 

1117,  1349 
V.  City  of  Joliet.  153  HI.  649, 

1249.   12.50,    1251.   1300.    1308 
V.    City   of   Milwaukee.    89    Wis. 
506.  1249,  1250,  1251 

V.   City   of  Milwaukee,   97   Wis. 
418.  1379 

V.  City  of  Ottawa,  148  111.  397,  1697 
V.  Citv  of  Qnincv,  136  III.  489.  1700 
V.  City  of  Quincy,  136  111.  563, 

1249.  1355 
V.  City  of  Quincy,   139  III.   355. 

1156,  1162 
V.  City  of  Quinrv.  158  HI.  64.  1240 
v.  Cole.  75  111.  591.  1720 

v.    Commissioners  &c.,   38    Kan. 
597,  996 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 


Ixxiii 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Vol.  I,  pp.  1-S32;  Vol.  II,  pp.  83S-18S0.'] 


Chicago  &f.  R.  Co.  V.  Dunbar,  95  111. 

571.  1S12 

V.   lOngle,  Tfi  III.  ?.17,  540,  14-j:{ 

V.  Foil.  22  III.  aS.S.  1711 

V.    First     Methodist     Episcopal 
Church  &c.,  102  Fed.  85,  lOG 

V.  Francis,  70  III.  23cS.  1G02 

V.    (Jcncral    Electric   R.    Co.,    74 
III.  App.  405,  1351 

V.  Ilaggarty.  07  111.  113,  1350 

V.  Hall,  90  111.  42,  1002 

V.  Ilaller,  82  III.  208,  1002 

V.  nines,  82  111.  App.  488,  488 

V.  Hock,  118  111.  587.  691) 

V.   Iowa,  94   IT.   S.  155.  6,  574 

V.  .Tacobs.  110  111.  414,  701,  702 

V.  .Tones,  149  111.  301,  548 

V.  Lake,  130  111.  42,  1812 

V.    Langlade   Co.,    56    Wis.    614, 

196,  425,  432 
V.  Loeb,   118  111.  203,  1602,  1603 

V.  Maher,  91  111.  312.  1602 

V.  Makepeace,  44  Kan.  676,  991 

V.  MeOinnis,  79  III.  209,  1706 

V.  Minnesota  &c.  R.  Co.,  14  Fed. 
525.  521 

V.  Moffltt,  75  111.  524,  592 

T.  People,  73  111.  541,  1812 

y.  People,  91  111.  251,  1349 

V.  People,  104  111.  256,  1277 

V.  People,  120  III.  104.  1249,  1250 
V.  People,  79  111.  App.  529.  515,  590 
V.  Phillips,  111  Iowa  377, 

1284,  1285.  1295.  1299 
T.    Pinckney,    74   111.    277, 

983,  988.  996 
V.  Quaintance.  58  111.  389,  1109 

V.  Siders,  88  111:  320.  1288,  1717 

V.   Smith,  62  111.  268,  983 

T.  South  Park  Com'rs,  11  111.  App. 
562,  1249 

T.  Stein,  75  111.  41,  1603 

V.  Sutton.  130  Ind.  405,  1569 

v.    Town    of    Kentwood,    49    La. 
An.   931,  66 

V.   Town   of   Lake,   71    111.   333, 

684,  685 
V.  Town  of  Oconto.  50  Wis.  189,  415 
V.  Village  of  Klmhurst.   165  111. 

148.      1248.   1249,  1300,  1303,  1308 
V.   West   Chicago   Park  Commis- 
sioners. 151    111.  204.  1349 
V.  Wiltse,  116  111.  449,  591 
V.  Winters,  65  111.  App.  435.         540 
Chickering  v.  Robinson.  3  Cush.  543.    334 
Chicora  v.  Crews,  6  S.  C.  (N.  S.)  243,   45 
Chicot    Co.    V.    Kruse,    47    Ark.    80, 

1525,  1646 
Chidsey  v.  Town  of  Canton,  17  Conn. 

475,  777 

Child  V.  Chappell.  9  N.  Y.  246,  1564 

V.   City  of   Boston,   4   Allen   41, 

821,  1585 
V.  Colburn,  54  N.  H.  71, 

344.  359.  361,  363 
V.  Hudson's  Bay  Co.,  2  P.  Wms. 
207,  526 

Childrey  v.   Rady,  77  Va.  518.  313 

Childs  V.  Nelson.  69  Wis.  125.    1106.  1322 
V.  Village  of  West  Troy,  23  Hun 
68,  1625 

Chilton  V.  Town  of  Gratton,  82  Fed. 

873,  1011 

Chiniquy  v.  People,  78  111.  570,  991 

Chinn  v.  Trustees.  32  Ohio  St.  236.    12S8 
Chin  Van,  Ex  parte,  60  Cal.  78,  1406 

Chirae  v.  Chirac,  2  Wheat.  259,  132 

Chisholm   v.   City  of  Montgomery,   2 

Woods  584,  838 

V.  Georgia.  2  Dall.  419.      17,  45,  770 
Chittenden  v.    City  of  Lansing,   120 

Mich.  539,  714 


Chittenden  v.  Wurster,  152  N.  Y.  345, 

1699.   1820,   1826 

V.  Wurster,   153   N.   Y.   064,  1824 

Choato  V.   City  of  Buffalo,  57   N.  Y. 

S.  383,  609 

V.   Inhabitants  &c.,  13  Gray  92, 

1047,    1048 
Chope    V.    City    of    Eureka,    78    Cal. 

588,  788 

Chopin    V.    City    of    Worcester,    124 

Mass.   464.  1178 

Chosen  Freeholders  &c.  v.  State,  24  N. 

.1.  L.  718,  61,  274,  276 

Choteau  v.  Rowse,  50  Mo.  65,  222 

Chouteau  v.  City  of  Roxbury,  7  Gray 

374,  258 

Chrisman  v.  Bruce,  1  Duv.  63,  221 

Christensen,    In    re,    43    Fed.    243,      1400 

V.    City    of    Fremont,    45    Neb. 

160,  573 

Christian  v.   City  of  St.   Louis,   127 

Mo.   109,  1098 

Christian  Church  v.  Johnson,  53  Ind. 

273,  260 

Christian    Co.    v.    Rockwell,    25    111. 

App.  20,  1040 

Christman  v.   Phillips,   58   Hun  282, 

842.    1039 
Christopher  v.    Van   Liew,   57    Barb. 

17,  335 
Christy    v.    Commissioners    &c.,    41 

Ohio  St.  711.  664 

V.  Newton,  CO  Barb.  332,  1573 

V.  Whitmore.  67  Iowa  60,  1087 

Chumasero  v.  Gilbert,  20  111.  39,  378 

Church  V.  City  of  Detroit,  64  Mich. 

571,  1341,    1593 

V.  I'eople,  174  111.  366. 

1147,  1283,  1291,  1292 

V.  People,  179  111.  205. 

1146,  1147,  1153.  1293 

V.  President  &c..  Ill  Mich.  298.  1326 
Churchman   v.   City  of  Indianapolis, 

110  Ind.   259.  240.   1255 

Chytraus  v.  City  of  Chicago,  160  111. 

18,  1148 
Cicero  Lumber  Co.  v.  Town  of  Cicero. 

176    111.    9,      508,    1202,    1316,    1318 
1346,  1347.  1348.  1703.  1709 

Cicero  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  City  of  Chicago, 

176  111.  501,  1248 

Cihak  V.  Klekr.  17  111.  App.  124.       1564 

Cincinnati   v.    Buckingham,   10   Ohio 

257,  534 

V.  Kasselman,  23  Wk.  Law  Bui. 
392.  1234 

V.  Morgan,  3  Wall.  275,  1001 

V.   Penny,  21  Ohio  St.  499,  1181 

Cincinnati  &c.  Assurance  Co.  v.  Rosen- 
thal,  55    111.   85,  137,    254 

Cincinnati  Gas  Light  &c.  Co.  v.  Avon- 
dale,  43  Ohio  St.  257,  602 

Cincinnati  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Commission- 
ers &c..  1  Ohio  St.  77,  703,  983 
V.  Incorporated  Village  of  Cum- 
minsville.  14  Ohio  St.  523,    590,  682 

Citizens'  Gas  &c.  Co.  v.  Town  of  El- 
wood,  114  Ind.  332, 

466.  560.  569,  614 

Citizens'  &c.   Ins.  Co.  v.   Sortwell.  8 

Allen  217,  273,  291 

Citizens'  Loan  Ass'n  v.  Lyon,  29  N. 

J.  Eq.  110,  651 

Citizens'  R.  Co.  v.  Ford.  93  Tex.  110.  518 
V.  .Tones,  34  Fed.  579,       1184,  1351 

Citizens'  Sav.  &c.  Ass'n  v.  Perry  Co., 

156  IT.  S.  692,  1000,  1002,  1757 

Citizens'    &c.    R.    Co.   v.    Ballard.    22 

Ind.  App.   151,  1327,   1359 

V.   City  of  Memphis,   53   Fed. 

715,     •  510 

City — See  also.   Common   Council ; 
Mayor ;   Name  of  City. 


Ixxiv 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Yol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Yol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.-] 


City  V.  Lamson,  9  Wall.  477,       643,  959 
City   &c.   V.   Alexander,   23   Mo.    483,  ^^^ 

City    Bank    v.    Bogel,    51    Tex^g^f^'ign 

City  Council  &c.,  Ex  parte,  64  Ala. 

463  lo6z 

V.  Ashley  Phosphate  Co.,  38  SC. 
541,    527,  537,  1415,  1420,  1423,  1425 
V.  Belser,  53  Ala.  379,  543 

V.  Birdsong,  126  Ala.  632, 

1276,  1282,  1290,  1506 
V.    Capital   City   Water   Co.,   92 
Ala.  361,  f§9 

V.  Chur,  2  Bailey  164,  537 

V.  Dawson  Water-works  Co.,  106 
Ga.   696,  742,   745,   874 

V.    Dunbar,    50    Ga.    387, 

1232,  1499,  1501 
V.  Dunn,  1  McC.  L.  333,  540,  1423 
V.  Hudson,  94  Ga.  135,  790 

V.  Hutchinson,  13  Ala.  573,  1093 

V.  King.  4  McCord  487,  1412,  1418 
V.  Lombard,  99  Ga.  282,  790 

V.  Marks,  50  Ga.  612,  704 

V.  Milwaukee  &c.  R.  Co.,  7  Wis. 
484,  „^      odl 

V.   Montgomery  &c.   R.   Co.,   31 
Ala    76  64o 

V.  Murphey,  79  Ga.  101,  1200,  1232 
V.  National  Bank,  47  Ga.  562,  1503 
V.   Owens.   Ill    Ga.   464.  2b5 

V.   Parker,  114  Ala.  n8.     ^^^^    ^^^^ 

V.  Pepper,  1  Rich.  l^-^H^^^^,^  ^^^, 

V.    Port    Royal   &c.    R.    Co.,    74 
Ga.  658,  586 

V.  Saver,  65  Ala.  564,  171  ( 

V.  Sciirameck.  96  Ga.  426,  1211 

V.   Seeba.  4  Strobh.  L.  319,  537 

y.   State,  38  Ala.  162,  1533 

V.  Sweeny.  44  Ga.  463,  201 

V.  Townsend,  84  Ala.  478, 

678,  1225,  1226,  1227 
V.  Walton,  37  Ga.  620,  1503,  1533 
V.   Walton,   77   Ga.   517,  564 

V.  Wentworth  St.  Baptist  Church, 
4  Strob.  306,  520.  522,  594,  1086 

V.  Youmans,  85  Ga.  708.  371 

City  Imp.  Co.  v.  Broderick,  125  Cal. 

'  139,  752 

City    Item   &c.    Co.   v.   City   of   New 

Orleans,  51  La.  An.  713,    1549,  1732 
City   of   Albany   v.    McNamara,    117 

N.  Y.  168,  1062 

City  of  Albia  v.  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co., 

102  Iowa  624,  1164 

City  of  Alleghany  v.  Western  &c.  R. 

Co.,  92  Pa.  St.  100,  1250 

City  of  Allentown  v.  Adams,  8  Atl. 

430,  „^1-^1 

City  of  Alton  v.  ^tna  Ins.  Co.,  82 

111.   45.  1542 

V.  111.  Transp.  Co.,  12  111.  38,  629 
y.  Kirsch.  68  111.  261,  536,  537 

V.  Madison  Co.,  21  111.  115,  638 

V.    Middleton's    Heirs,    158    111. 
540  1145,    1146 

V.  Mulledy,  21  111.  76.     260.  285,  465 
City  of  Altoona  v.  Bowman,  171  Pa. 

St.   307,  477 

V.  Lotz,  114  Pa.  St.  2.38.  1632 

City  of  Ana  v.  Boren,  77   111.   App. 

408,  1795 

City  of  Anderson  v.  Bain,  120  Ind. 

054  1776 

V.  Kast,  117  Ind.   126,  264,  820 

V.  O'Conner,  98  Ind.  168,  1079 

Citv   of   Antonio   v.    Antonio    St.    R. 

Co.,  22  Tex.  Civ.  Apn.   148.  932 

City    of    Argentine    v.    Atchison    &c. 

R.  Co.,  55  Kan.  730,  727 


City  of  Argentine  v.  State,  46  Kan. 

430.  1160 

City   of   Ashland   y.    Chicago   &c.    R. 

Co.,  105  Wis.  398,  586 

V.  Wheeler,  88  Wis.   607,  510 

City     of     Atchison     v.     Acheson,     9 

'  Kan.  App.  33,  1326,  1331,  1333,  1348 

V.   Butcher,  3  Kan.   104,  982 

V.  Challiss,  9  Kan.  603,  1585 

V.  King,  9  Kan.  550.  488 

V.   Price.   45   Kan.   296,  1234 

V.  Twine,  9  Kan.  350,  1394 

City  of  Atlanta  v.  Champe,  66  Ga. 

659.  1614 

V.  First  Presbyterian  Church,  86 
Ga.  730,  1247 

V.  Gabbett,  93  Ga.  266,  1260 

V.   Gates   City   Gaslight   Co.,    71 
Ga.  106,  1467,  1813 

V.  Green,  67  Ga.  386,  678 

v.  Hamlein,  96  Ga.  381,  1296 

v.   Holiday,  96  Ga.   546,  1369 

v.  Ilunnicutt,  95  Ga.  138,  1211 

V.  Milam,  95  Ga.  135,  1341 

City  of  Atlantic  City  v.  GrofC,  64  N. 

J.  L.  527,  1315 

City   of   Auburn   v.    Paul,    84   Maine 

212,  1177 

City  of  Augusta  v.   Hafers,   61    Ga. 

48,  161T 

V.  North,  57  Maine  392,     458,   1532 
City  of  Aurora  v.   Colshire,   55   Ind. 

484,  1596 

V.  Pox,  78  Ind.  1,  1255,  1425 

V.  Hillman,  90  111.  61, 

1618,  1620.  1634,   1641 
V.  McGannon,  138  Mo.  38, 

1506,    1507 
V.  Reed.  57  111.  29,  680 

V.  Scott,  185  111.  539,  1801 

V.  Scott,  82  111.  App.  616,  1796 

V.  West,  22  Ind.  88, 

982.  990,  1010,   1027 
V.   West,   22   Ind.   503,  982.   1010 

City   of   Austin   v.    Austin   Cemetery 

Ass'n,  87  Tex.  330.  599,  1703 

V.   Austin  City  Cemetery  Ass'n, 
28  S.  W.  1023,  506 

V.   Austin   Gas-light  &c.   Co.,   69 
Tex.   180,  1512,   1520,   1547 

V.  Colgate,  27  S.  W.  896,  1360 

V.  Johns,  62  Tex.  179,  182 

V.  Ritz,  72  Tex.  391. 

1618,  1628,  1629 
V.  Walton,  68  Tex.  507,  182,  538 

City    of    Ballard    v.    Thompson,    21 

Wash.    669,  326 

City  of  Bangor  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  71 

Maine  535.  1063 

City   of   Bedford   v.    Neal,    143    Ind. 

425  1327,  1639 

V.   Woody,   23   Ind.   App.   401, 

1789,    1792,   1793 
City  of  Belleville  v.  Citizens'  Horse 

R.  Co.,  152  111.  171.  520.  1812 

City  of  Belton  v.  Sterling,  50  S.  W. 

10'>7  712,  742 

v.  Turner,  27  S.  W.  831,     1339.  1376 
City    of    Belvidere    v.    Crichton,    81 

111.   App.   595,  1337 

City  of  Bethany  v.  Howard,  149  Mo. 

504,  1752 

City  of  Big  Rapids  v.  Combstock,  65 

Mich.  78.  1106 

City  of  Binsrhamton   v.    Binghamton 

&c.  R.  Co.,  61   Hun  479,  1183 

City  of  Blair  v.  Santry,  21  Neb.  247,    901 

City  of  Bloomington  v.   Bay,  42  111. 

^503  1355,  1596 

v.  Brokaw.  77  HI.  194,       1530 

v.  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co..  134  111. 

451.        1155,  1149,  1235.  12.50 

1253,  1300 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


Ixxv 


[References  are  to  Pages.    Vol.  I,  pp.  1-S32;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.] 


City  of  Bloomington   v.   Costello,   05 

111.    App.    4{»7,  1107,    1775 

V.  Daiikwardr,  73  Iowa  170,  1403 
V.  Latham,  141.'  111.  4(!1.',  1149,  l:Jll 
V.  rollock.  141   111.  34(!. 

405.   1151.   llill,   IL'19,   1222,   1223 
V.   Keeves,   177   111.   161, 

1134,   1147,   1279 
V.  Smith.  123  Ind.  41,  1012 

V.   Wahl,   40   111.  4S9,  100,   1403 

V.    Wil.soii.    14    Ind.   App.   470,        825 

Citv  of  Hhitrion   v.   McAfee,   23   Ind. 

App.  112,  1339 

City  of   Bolden   v.   Fowler,   11    Colo. 

300,  1177 

City  of  Bonham  v.  Taylor,  81   Tex. 

59,  041,  918 

City  of  Booneville  v.  Ormrod,  20  Mo. 

193,  1571 

City  of  Boston  v.  Baldwin,  139  Mass. 

315,  1417 

V.  Boston  &c.  R.  Co.,  170  Mass. 
95.  1271 

V.  Coon,  175  Mass.  283,  1752 

V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  4  Cash.  538,  1422 
V.  Richardson,   13  Allen  140,  586 

V.  Shaffer.  9  Pick.  415,  1404 

V.   Shaw,   1   Met.   130,  500,  505 

V.  Simmons.  150  Mass.  461,    211,  219 

City  of  Boulder  v.  Niles,  9  Colo.  415, 

205,  1594,  1605,  1029 

City  of  Bowling  Green  v.  Carson,  10 

Bush  64.  100,   1402 

City  of  Bradford  v.  Fox,  171  Pa.  St. 

343  1286 

City  of 'Brazil   v.    McBride,   69    Ind. 

244.  174,   201 

City  of  Brenham  v.  Brenham  Water 

Co.,  67  Tex.  542,    567,  640,  041,  1451 

City  of  Bridgeport  v.  Ilousatonic  R. 
Co.,   15  t'onn.  475, 

233.  645.  763,  982.  983,  992 
V.  New  York  &c.  R.  Co..  30  Conn. 
255.  592,   1240,   1250 

City  of  Brockton  v.  Cross,  138  Mass. 

297.  940 

City  of  Broken  Bow  v.  Broken  Bow 

Water-works  Co.,  57  Neb.  548,      731 

City  of  Brooklyn  v.  Breslin.  57  N.  Y. 

591,        408,  500,  505,  547,  552,  1405 
V.    Brooklyn   &c.    R.    Co.,    47    N. 
Y.  475.  1345,  1598 

V.  Cleves,  1  Hill  &  D.  231,  528 

V.  Furey,  30  N.  Y.   S.  349, 

590,  599,  611 
V.  Nassau  &c.  R.  Co.,  61  N.  Y.  S. 
33.  1386 

City  of  Brownville  v.  Cook,  4  Neb. 

101.  536 

City  of  Bryan  v.  Page,  51  Tex.  532, 

240.  260,  464.  044,  003 

City  of  Buffalo,    In   re,   18   N.   Y.    S. 

771.  1415 

V.  Chadeayne,  134  N.  Y.  103,       595 
V.  Collins  Baking  Co.,  57  N.  Y. 
S.  347.  503 

V.  Schliefer,  25  Hun  275.  530 

City   of   Burlington   v.    Bumgardner, 

42   Iowa  073,  1509,   1532 

V.    Burlington    &c.    R.    Co.,    41 
Iowa  134,  1532 

V.    Burlington    &c.    R.    Co.,    49 
Iowa  144,  510,  522 

V.  Dankwardt,  73  Iowa  170, 

021.    1402 
V.    Dennison,    42    N.    J.    L.    105, 

464,  1091 
V.  Gilbert,  31  Iowa  356, 

050,  1224,  1259 
V.   Kellar,   18  Iowa  59, 

97,  468,  530,  531 

>Tt7a    RSI  119    I 


V.  Lawrence,  42  Iowa  681, 


112 


City   of   Burlington    v.    Putnam    Ins. 

Co.,   31    Iowa    1(12,  465,    1507 

V.  Quick,  47  Iowa  222.  1262 

V.  Stock  well,  5  Kan.  App.  569,    1110 

City    of    Butte    v.    Cohen,    9    Mont. 

435,  315 

City  of  Cadillac  v.  Woonsocket  Inst., 

7  C.  C.  A.  574,  1002,  1013,  1757 

City  of  Cairo  v.  Adams  Kxp.  Co.,  54 

111.   App.   87,  003 

V.   Allen,  3  III.  App.  398,  1530 

V.   Bross,    101    111.   475,  581 

V.  Coleman,  53  111.  App.  680, 

550,   604 

City  of  Caldwell  v.  Prunelle,  57  Kan. 

511,  792 

City   of   Camden   v.   Allen,    26   N.   .1. 

L.  398,  458,  530 

City  of  Canton  v.   Nist,   9  Ohio   St. 

439,  97,  468,  494 

V.  Wagner,  54  Ohio  St.  329,       1141 

City   of   Cape   Girardeau   v.   Fougen, 

30   Mo.    App.    551.  464 

V.  Rilev,  52  Mo.  424,  485 

V.  Riley,  72  Mo.  220,  494,  500 

City  of  Cape  May  v.  Cape  May  &c. 

R.  Co.,  60  N.  J.  L.  224,       507.  1365 

V.    Cape    May    Transp.    Co.,    64 

N.   J.   L.   80,  1388,    1548.    1784 

City  of  Carlinville  v.    McClure,    156 

111.  492,  1144,   1151 

City   of  Carlyle  v.   Clinton   Co.,    140 

111.  512,  854.   1235 

City   of   Carlysle   v.    Carlvsle   Water 

&c.  Co.,  52  111.  App.  577.  733 

City  of  Carrollton  v.   Bazzette,   159 

111.   284,  502,  503 

V.  Clark,  21  111.  App.  74,  296 

City  of  Carthage  v.  Badgley,  73  Mo. 

App.  123,  1780,  1788,  1792 

City  of  Cassville  v.  Jimerson,  75  Mo. 

App.  420,  528 

City  of  Cedar  Rapids  v.  Bechtel,  110 

Iowa  196,  876 

City  of  Centerville  v.  Miller,  57  Iowa 

50,  526 

City  of  Central  v.  Sears,  2  Colo.  588, 

177,  404,  465 

City  of  Champaign  v.  Forrester,  29 

111.  App.  117,  1177 

V.  Harmon,  98  HI.  491,  565 

V.  Jones,  132  111.  304,  1609 

City  of  Chariton  v.  Barber,  54  Iowa 

360.  606 

V.   Holliday,   60  Iowa  391,  297 

City  of  Charleston  v.  Cadle,  166  111. 

487.  1296,  1310 

V.  Reed,  27  W.  Va.  681,        594,  1392 

City  of  Charlestown  v.  Commission- 
ers,  109  Mass.  270.      700.  707.   1724 

City    of   Charlotte    v.    Shepard,    120 

N.   C.   411.  1549 

V.  Shepard.  122  N.  C.  602,  986 

City  of  Cherokee  v.  Fox,  34  Kan.  16, 

536,  1395 

City  of  Chester  v.  Black,  132  Pa.  St. 

568.  593,    1160 

V.    Eyre,    181    Pa.    St.    642, 

515.  1147,  1246 
V.  Pennell,  169  Pa.  St.  300,         1298 
V.    Wabash   &c.    R.   Co.,    182   111. 
382.  586 

City  of  Chicago  v.  Baer,  41  111.  306, 

1248,  1266 
V.  Baker.  OS  Fed.  830,        1779.  1798 
V.  Baptist  Theological  Union,  115 
111.   245,  1498 

V.   Barbian,   SO  111.  482,  705 

V.  Bartel.  100  111.  61.  i:{95 

V.  Brophv.  79  111.  277.  1(!20 

V.   Burcky.   158   111.   103,  1318 

V.  Colby,  20  111.   614,  1246 


Ixxvi 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


IReferences  are  to  Pages.   Vol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.'] 


City   of  Chicago  v.   Collins,   175   111. 

445.  134S,  1697,  1600,  1702 

V.  Dalle.  115  111.  386,  826,  1614 

V.  Duffy,  179  111.  447,  737 

V.  Edwards,  58  111.  252,  205 

V.  English,  180  111.  476,  1798,  1806 
V.   English,   80   111.   App.   163, 

1033,  1804 
V.  Evans,   24  111.  52.  1703 

V.  Ferris  Wheel  Co.,  60  111.  App. 
384,  1703 

V.    Fidelity    Bank,    11    111.    App. 
165,  1725,  1726 

V.  Fitzgerald,  75  111.  App.  174,  1327 
V.  Frazer.  (10   111.  Anp.  404.  712 

V.  Gage,  95  III.  593,  211,  309,  313 
V.  Gallagher,  44  111.  295,  1584 

V.  Galpiii,  183  111.  399,  714,  881 

V.  Haslev,  25  111.  485,  1530,  1743 
V.  Hav.  75  111.  530,  1612 

V.  Jackson,  88  111.  App.  130. 

1772,    1774 
V.  Johnson,  53  111.  91,  1620 

V.  Keefe.   114  111.  222,  1595 

V.  Kohlhof.  64  111.  App.  349,  1316 
V.  Laflin,  49  III.  172,  1093,  1110 

V.  Langlass,  66  111.  361,  1584 

V.    Larned,   34    111.    203, 

1168,   1268,   1514 
V.  Law,  144  III.  569,  1165 

V,    Manhattan   Cement   Co.,    178 
111.   372,  1394,   1395 

V.  McCarthy.  75  111.  602,  1615 

T.  McCoy,  136  111.  344,  486 

V.   McDonald,   176   111.   404, 

878,  880,  881 
V.  McDonald,  57  111.  App.  250,  1316 
V.  McLean,  133  111.  148,  1636 

V.  Xetcher,  1S3  111.  104,  492,  13S7 
V.  Nichols,  177  111.  97, 

1129,  1130,  1699,   1700 
V.  People,  56  111.  327. 

931,  1306,  1780 
V.  Powers,  42  III.  169,  1578,  1617 
V.  Quimby.  38   111.   274,  535 

V.  Richardson,  75  111.  App.  198,  1802 
V.  Roth,  26  111.  456,  1757 

V.  Rumpff,  45  111.  90,  568,  614,  642 
V.  Sawyer.  160  111.  290,  1314,  1758 
V.  Seben,  165  111.  371,  787 

V.  Seben,  62  111.  App.  248,  1377 

V.   Sexton,   115  111.  230,  1757 

V.    Shober   &c.    Co.,    6    111.    App. 
560,  926 

V.  Stratton.   162  111.  494, 

548,  549,  551,   ]105,   1393,  1394 
V.  Stratton,  58  111.  App.  539,  505 

V.  Trotter,  136  111.  430. 

500.  508,  605 
V.  Turner,  80  111.   419,  789 

V.    Union    Bldg.    Ass'n,    102    III. 
379.  678,  1703 

V.    Union   Stock   Yards   Co.,   164 
111.  224.  1349 

V.  Weir,  165  111.  582,  739 

V.    Williams,    182    111.    135, 

711,   916,   1753 
V.    Williams,    80    111.    App.    33, 

732,  916 
V.  Wright,  32  111.  192,  1254,  1533 
V.  Wright.  69  111.  318.  571,  1697 

City  of  Chillicothe  v.  Brown,  38  Mo. 

App.  609,  603,  1402 

City  of  Cincinnati  v.  Bryson,  15  Ohio 

625,  1232,  1397 

V.    Buckingham.    10    Ohio    257. 

532,  1402 
V.  Cameron,  33  Ohio  St.  336.  547 

V.    Guckenberger,    60    Ohio    St. 
353,  733,  872 

V.  Gwynne.  10  Ohio  ]92.  530,  1412 
V.  Janes,  55  Ohio  St.  180,  1705 

V.  Penny,  21  Ohio  St.  499,  10o2 


City  of  Cincinnati  v.  Seasongood,  46 

Ohio  St.   296,  1256 

V.  Sherike.  47  Ohio  St.  217,  1138 

V.  Stone,  5  Ohio  St.  38,  1779 

City  of  Circleville  v.  Sohn,  59  Ohio  St. 
285,  1338,   1359 

City  of  Cleburne  v.  Brown,  73  Tex. 

443,  640 

V.  Gulf  &c.  R.  Co.,  66  Tex.  457,    578 

City   of   Cleveland    v.    Cleveland   &c. 

R.   Co.,   93   Fed.   113,  592,   1321 

V.  King,  132  U.  S.  295,  817 

v.   State  Bank  &c.,   16  Ohio   St. 
236  233 

V.  Wick,  18  Ohio  St.  303.  1234 

City  of  Clinton  v.  Cedar  Rapids  &c. 

R.  Co..  24  Iowa  455,  103 

V.  Phillips,  58  111.  102,  500 

v.  Walliker,  98  Iowa  655, 

879,  881,   1149 

City  of  Cohoes  v.   President  &c..   47 

N.  Y.  St.  612,  1558,  1561 

City    of    Coldwater    v.    Tucker,    36 

Mich.  474,  1174,  1536 

City  of  Columbus  v.  Hydraulic  Wool- 
len  Mills  Co.,   33   Ind.   435,  680 
v.  Ogletree,  96  Ga.  177,     1326,  1335 
V.   Storey,  35  Ind.  97,                    1255 
v.    Street    R.    Co.,    45    Ohio    St. 
98.                                                         1509 

City   of   Concordia   v.    Hagaman,    1 

Kan.  App.  35,  742 

City    of    Connersville    v.    Hydraulic 

Co.,  86  Ind.   184,  960 

V.  Merrill,  14  Ind.  App.  303,  1145 

City    of    Conyers    v.    Kirk,    78    Ga. 

480,  896,   1463 

City  of  Coolidge  v.  General  Hospital 

Soc.  &c.,  9  Kan.  App.  891,  998 

City  of  Corpus  Christi  v.  Central 
W.  &  W,  Co.,  8  Tex.  Civ.  App. 
94,  735 

City  of  Corsicana  v.  Tobin,  23  Tex. 

Civ.  App.  492,  1805 

City  of  Corvallis   v.    Carlile,    10   Or, 

139,  497 

City  of  Council  Bluffs  v.  Stewart,  51 

Iowa  385,  890 

City  of  Covington  v.  Arthur,  12  Ky. 

L.    163,  1514 

V.  Bovle,  6  Bush  204,  1267 

V.  Casey,  3  Bush  698,  1258 

V.    Commonwealth,     19    Ky.    L. 
105,  1504 

V.   Elliott,   21    Kv.   L.   895,  1783 

V.  Ludlow,  1  Met.  295. 

295,  1425,  1427 
V.  McKenna,  99  Kv.  508,  729 

V.  Powell.  2  Met.  i22r>.  1503,  1725 
V.    Southgate,    15    B.    Mon.    491, 

393.   1517 

Citv   of  Crawfordsville  v.    Bond,   96 

Ind.  236.  1179,  1619 

V.  Braden,   130  Ind.   149,  / 

552    575    576 

City  of  Cynthiana  v.   Board  &c.,   21 

Kv.  L.  731,  1.554,  1764 

City  of  Dallas  v.  Atkins,  32  S.   W. 

780.  1286 

V.    Beeman,    23    Tex.    Civ.    App. 
315.  411,  1780,  1781 

V.  Cooper,  34  S.  W.  321,  793 

v,    Ellison,    10    Tex,    Civ.    App. 
28.  1286 

V.   Emerson.   36  S.   W.  304,  1309 

V.   Jones.  93  Tex.   38, 

1330.  1340.  1359,  1793,  1801 
V.  Jones,  54  S.  W.  60R.  1796 

V.  Kahn.  9  Tex.  Civ.  App.  19,  1219 
V.  McAllister.  39  S.  W.  173,  1713 
V,    Meyers,    55    S.    W.    742. 

1361,    137.5,    1796 
V.  Leake,  34  S.  W.  338,  1211 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


l.wvii 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Vol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.] 


City  of  Dallas  v.  Webb,  '_'"J  Tex.  ("iv. 

App.   4S,  1325,   1S02,   1803 

V.  Western  Electric  Co.,  83  Tex. 
248,  1745 

City   of   Danville  v.    Danville   Water 

Co.,  ISO  111.  235,  573,  877,  92G,  931 
V.   :M(Adauis,   153   III.   216,  1140 

V.  iMilchell.  63  111.  App.  647,  1744 

City  of  Davenport  v.  Bird,  34  Iowa 

524.  535,   1420 

V.   Kelley,  7  Iowa  102,  1403 

V.   Peoria  &c.  Ins.  Co.,   17  Iowa 
276,  457,   1529 

V.   Stevenson,  34  Iowa  225,  264 

City  of  Davton  v.  Robert,  8  Ohio  C. 

C.   649,  1707 

V.   Taylor,   62  Ohio   St.   11, 

1335,  1804 

City  of  Decatur  v.   Stoops,  21  Ind. 

App.  397,  1330 

City   of   Delphi   v.    Bowen,    61    Ind. 

29,  1722 

V.  Evans,  36  Ind.  90,      299.  300,  464 
477,  1233,  1258.  1421,  1425,  1426 
V.    Lowery,    74    Ind.    520, 

1422,   1578,   1617 
v.  Startzman,  104  Ind.  343,  651 

City  of  Denison  v.  Foster,  28  S.  W. 

1052,  1756 

City  of  Denver  v.  Aaron,  6  Colo.  App. 

232,  1335,  1375 

V.   Bach,   26  Colo.  530,  502 

V.  Bayer,  7  Colo.  113,  1652 

V.  Baldasari,  61  Pac.  397,  1375 

V.  Beede.  25  Colo.  172,  1710 

V.  Brown,  11  Colo.  337,  1745 

V.  Capelli,  4  Colo.  25,  1208 

V.  Deane,  10  Colo.  375,  1621 

V.   Dunsmore,  7  Colo.  328,  1375 

V.  Girard,  21  Colo.  447, 

492,  652,  1319,  1758 
V.  Hickey,  9  Colo.  App.  137,  1346 
V.  Johnson,  8  Colo.  App.  384,  1333 
V.    Knowles,    17   Colo.   204, 

1230,  1268 
V.  Moewes,  15  Colo.  App.  28,  1374 
V.   IMullen,   7  Colo.  345,  1117 

V.  Rhodes,  9  Colo.  554,  1207,  1217 
V.  Saulcey,  5  Colo.  App.  420,  1333 
V.  Sherret,  88  Fed.  226,  1361 

V.  Williams,  12  Colo.  475.  1592 

City  of  Depere  v.  Hibbard,  104  Wis. 

666,  1339,   1804 

City   of  Des   Moines   v.    Chicago   &c. 

R.  Co..  41  Iowa  567,  522,  1510 

V.  Gilchrist,  67  Iowa  210,  1121,  1392 
V.  Layman,  21  Iowa  153,  698 

V.  Rice,  40  Iowa  638,  1802 

City  of  Detroit  v.  Beckman,  34  Mich. 

125,  1215,   1344,   1586 

V.  Blackeby,  21  Mich.  84, 

8,  9.  814,  1341,  1592 
V.  Board  &c..  108  Mich.  494,  573 
V.  Chaffee,  70  Mich.  80,  1.589 

V.   Corey,  9  Mich.   165,  1546 

v.   Daly,   68   Mich.   503,        587,   1253 
V.    Detroit   Citizens'   St.   R.   Co., 
64  Fed.  628,  1350 

V.  Detroit  City  R.  Co.,  37  Mich. 
558.  1352 

v.  Detroit  &c.  Plank  R.  Co.,  43 
Mich.    140,  595 

V.    Ft.    Wayne   &c.    R.    Co.,    90 
Mich.  646,  1355 

V.  Hosmer,  79  Mich.  384,  1464,  1672 
V.  Martin,  34  Mich.  170, 

245,  247,  1263,  1552 
V.  Putnam,  45  Mich.  263, 

814,    1341,    1593 
V.  Weber,  29  Mich.  24,  322 

City  of  Dubuque  v.   Chicago  &c.   R. 

Co.,  47  Iowa  196,  1534 


City  of  Duhu(]ne  v.  Illinois  Cent.  R. 

Co.,  39  Iowa  56,  1510 

v.  Northwestern  &c.  Ins.  Co.,  29 
Iowa  9.  1501,  1509,  1513 

V.   Rebman,  1   Iowa  444,    1414,  1418 

City  of   Dulutb   v.   Krupp,   46  Minn. 

435.  1395 

V.  Mallet,  43  Minn.  204,  590,  1357 
V.  ArcDonnell,  61  Minn.  288,       1754 

City  of  Dunkirk  v.  Wallace,  19  Ind. 

App.    298,  743 

City  of  Dunleith  v.  Reynolds,  53  111. 

45,  1499 

City   of   Duquoin    v.    Kelly,    176   111. 

218,  1554 

City    of    Durango    v.    Remsberg,    16 

Colo.  327,  1420 

City  of  East  Dallas  v.  State,  73  Tex. 

370.  391,  402 

City  of  East  St.  Louis  v.  Board  &c., 

6  111.  App.  130.  1528 

V.  Donahue,  77  111.  App.  574,     1327 
v.  I'^ast  St.  Louis  Gas-light  Co., 
98  111.  415,      639,  649,  848,  877,  889 
V.   Flannigan,   26   111.   App.   449, 

219,  848,  887 
V.  Flannigan,  34  111.  App.  596,  903 
V.  Flannigen,  36  111.  App.  50,  922 
v.  Maxwell,  99  111.  439,  106,  107 

V.  O'Flvnn,  119  111.  200,  1320 

V.   People,  124  111.  655,  893 

V.  Rhein.  139  111.  116,  896 

v.  St.  John,  47  111.  463,  684 

V.  Thomas,  11  111.  App.  283,  282 
V.  Trustees  &c.,  102  III.  489,  1509 
V.  Wehrung,  50  111.  28. 

281,   547,   1589 

City  of  Effingham  v.  Surrells,  77  111. 

App.  460,  1780 

City  of  Elgin  v.  Eaton,  83  111.  535, 

1224,    1885,   1602 
V.  Hoag.  25  111.  App.  650,  1177 

City  of  Elizabeth  v.  Force,  29  N.  J. 

Eq.   587,  •  1027 

v.   New  Jersey  R.  Co.,  53  N.  J. 

L.  491,  1566 

City  of  Elkhart  v.  Simonton,  71  Ind. 

7,  699 

V.   Wickwire,   121   Ind.  331. 

1201,    1288 

City  of  Elk  Point  v.  Vaughn.  1  Dak. 

118,  111,  495,  496.  1401 

City    of    Ellsworth    v.    Rossiter,    46 

Kan.  237,  177,  743 

City  of  Emporia  v.  Gilchrist,  37  Kan. 

532,  1161 

v.   Norton,   16  Kan.   236,  485 

V.   Schmidling,  33  Kan.  485, 

1625,  1627 
V.   Smith,  42  Kan.  433,  384,  393 

V.   Soden,   25   Kan.   588,  688 

V.  Volmer,  12  Kan.  622,  535 

V.  Wagoner,  6  Kan.  App.  659,       505 

City    of    Enterprise    v.    Fowler,    38 

Kan.  415,  935 

City  of  Erie,  Appeal  of,  91  Pa.  St. 

398,  883,  889 

V.  Caulkins,  85  Pa.  St.  247,         1779 
T.    Erie   Canal    Co.,    59    Pa.    St. 
174,  81 

V.   First  Universalist  Church, 
105  Pa.  St.  278,  1247 

v.  Knapp,  29  Pa.  St.  173,  1745 

V.  Magill.  101  Pa.  St.  616,  16.39 

V.    Phelps,   56   Kan.    135,  1334 

V.    Piece   of   Land   &c.,    175    Pa. 
St.   523.  1250 

City  of  Eufaula  v.   McNab,   67   Ala. 

588,  233 

City  of  Eureka  v.   Jackson,  8  Kan. 

App.  49,  520 

V.  Wilson,  15  Utah  53,  1363 


Ixxviii 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Vol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol  II,  pp.  833-1830.^ 


City  of  Evansville  v.  Decker,  84  Ind. 

325.  1177,  1179 

V.   Dennett,   161  U.   S.   434, 

1005,    1010 
V.  Frazer,  24  Ind.  App.  62S, 

1360,  1376 
V.  Hall.  14  Ind.  27,  1511 

V.   Martin,  41   Ind.   145,  503 

V.   Miller,   146   Ind.  613,  515 

V.  Page.   23   Ind.  525,  392 

V.  Pfisterer,  34  Ind.  36,  1723 

V.  State,  188  Ind.  426. 

1432,   1433.  1443,   1532 

City  of  Faribault  v.  Wilson,  34  Minn. 

254.  537 

City  of  Fairfield  v.  Hornick,  53   111. 

App.  558.  1333 

V.  Ratcliffe,  20  Iowa  396,  1232 

City  of  Fayette  v.  Shafroth,  25  Mo. 

445,  1412 

City    of    Fayetteville    v.    Carter,    52 

Ark.  301,  1405 

City  of  Fergus  Falls  v.  Fergus  Falls 

Hotel  Co.,  80  Minn.   165.  650 

City    of    Findlav    v.    Pendleton,    62 

Ohio  St.  80,  712,  729 

V.   Pertz,   66   Fed.   427.  714 

City  of  Flora  v.  Naney.  136  111.  45,    1743 
V.  Pruett.  81  111.  App.,  161.  1802 

City  of  Fort  Dodge  v.  Moore,  37  Iowa 

388.  1546 

City  of  Fort  Madison  v.  Moore,  109 

Iowa  476,  713,  754 

City  of  Fort   Scott  v.   Peck,   5  Kan. 

App.   593,  798,   794 

City  of  Fort  Wayne  v.  Breese,   123 

Ind.  581,  -1631 

V.  Codv.  43  Ind.  197.  1253 

V.  De  Witt,  47  Ind.  391,  1624,  1625 
V.  Lehr,  88  Ind.  62,  233,  1541 

v.   ShoafC,  106  Ind.  66. 

616.  1199.  1288 

City  of  Fort  Worth  v.  Crawford,  64 

Tex.   202,  264 

V.  Davis,  57  Tex.  225,  1255 

V.  Shero.  16  Tex.  Civ.  App.  487,  928 

City  of  Frankfort  v.  Aughe,  114  Ind. 

77,  497 

City  of  Freeport  v.  Isbell,  83  111.  440,  225 

City  of  Fulton  v.  Northern  111.  Coll., 

158  111.  333,  741 

City  of  Galena  v.  Amy,  5  Wall.  705,  1523 
V.  Corwith.  48  HI.  423,        977,   1021 

City  of  Galesburg  v.  Galesburg  Water 

Co..   34   Fed.   675.  746 

V.  Hawkinson,  75  111.  152,     91,  1519 
V.  Searles,  114  111.  217. 

1143,  1167,  1513 

City  of  Galveston  v.  Hemmis,  72  Tex. 

558,  16.39 

V.  Morton,  58  Tex.  409.  715 

V.  Posnainsky,  62  Tex.  118, 

8,  9,  11,  265,  266,  813 
V.  Sydnor.  39  Tex.  236.       1551 

City  of  Geneseo  v.  Geneseo  &c.  Co..  55 

Kan.   358,  609.   734,   735 

City  of  Geneva  v.   Geneva  Tel.   Co., 

62  N.  Y.  S.  172,  1390 

City  of  Gladstone  v.  Throop,  71  Fed. 

341,  1018 

City  of  Goshen  v.   Alford,   154   Ind. 

58,  1789,  1805 

V.  Croxton,  34  Ind.  239,  535 

V.   England,   119   Ind.   368,  1627 

V.  Kern,  63  Ind.  468.  537 

V.  Mvers.  119  Ind.  196,       1578.  1579 

City  of  Grand  Rapids  v.  Blakelv,  40 

Mich.  367,  245.  1716 

v.  Brandy,  105  Mich.  870,     604,  605 
v.  De  Vries,  123  Mich.  570, 

726,  1392 
V.  Grand  Rapids  Hydraulic  Co., 
66  Mich.  606,  1451,  1452 


City    of    Grand    Rapids    v.    Grand 

Rapids  &c.  R.  Co.,  33  N.  W.  15,  637 
V.  Hughes.  15  Mich.  54,  526 

v.  Loose,  92  Mich.  92,  1156 

y.  Newton,  111  Mich.  48,  501 

v.    Normaii,   110   Mich.   544,  524 

y.  Wyman.  46  Mich.  576,     1614,  1621 

City  of  Greeley  v.  Hamman,  12  Colo. 

94,  541,  542 

V.   Hamman,    17   Colo.   30, 

1421,   1422 

City  of  Green  Bay  v.  Brauns,  50  Wis. 

204,  300,   477 

City  of  Greensboro  v.  McGibbony,  93 

Ga.  672,  1362 

City   of   Greensburgh   v.    Corwin,    58 

Ind.  518,  535 

City  of  Greenville  v.  Greenville  Water 
Works  Co.,  125  Ala.  625, 

716,  724,  737 
v.  Kemis.  58  S.  C.  427,  1388 

City  of  Guthrie  v.  T.  W.  Harvey  Lum- 
ber Co..  9  Gkla.  464,  71 
y.  Wylie.  6  Okla.  61.                70,  733 

City   of    Hagerstown   y.    Witmer,   86 

Md.  293,  1105 

City   of   Hamilton   y.    Ashbrook,   62 

Ohio   St.   511,  612 

City  of  Hammond  v.  Evans,  23  Ind. 

App.  501.  951 

City   of   Hannibal    v.    Price,    29   Mo. 

App.   280.  1396 

V.  Richards,  82  Mo.  330,  1079 

City  of  Harrisburg  v.  McCormick,  129 

Pa.  St.  213.  593,  1160,  1252 

y.  Segelbaum,  151  Pa.  St.  172,  1195 
y.  Sheek.  104  Pa.  St.  53.  107 

v.  Shepler,  190  Pa.  St.  374, 

715,  726,  730,  872,  1132,  1273 

City  of  Hartford  v.   Graves,   8  Kan. 

App.   677.  1365 

y.    Hartford   Electric  L.   Co..   65 
Conn.   324,  724,   752 

v.  Talcott,  48  Conn.  525,  1588 

y.    West    Middle    District,    45 
Conn.  462,  1247 

City  of  Harvard  v.   Crouch,  47  Neb. 

133,  1211,  1380 

City  of  Helena  v.  Gray,  7  Mont.  486, 

506,  1401 
y.  Harvey.  6  Mont.  114,  696 

y.  Mills,  94  Fed.  916,  873 

V.  Turner,  36  Ark.  577,  650 

City    of    Henderson    v.    Clayton,    57 

S.  W.  1,  790 

v.  Lambert.  8  Bush  607,       387,  1513 
y.  White.  49  S.  W.  764,  1325 

City  of   Ilolvoke  v.    Hadley  &c.   Co., 

174  Mass.  424.  1752,  1798 

City  of  Honey  Grove  v.  Lamster,  50 

S.  W.  1053,  1785 

City  of  Hopkins  v.  Kansas  City  &c. 

Co.,  79  Mo.  98,  1683  ■ 

City  of  Houston  v.   Emery,   76  Tex. 

2S2.   321,  1738 

City  of  Humboldt  v.  McCoy,  23  Kan. 

249.  490 

City  of  Iluntingburg  v.  First.  22  Ind. 

App.  66,  1335,   1787,   1803 

City  of  Huntington  v.  Boyd,  25  Ind. 

App.  250,  1787,  1793 

y.  Breen,  77  Ind.  29.  1632 

v.  Burke,  12  Ind.  App.  133, 

1788,    1789 
V.  Cheesbro,  57  Ind.  74.  538 

V.  First,  22  Ind.  App.  66,  1317,  1330 
v.  Force.  152   Ind.  36S,  738 

V.  McClurg,  22   Ind.   App.  261, 

1330.  1339.  1793 
V.  Pease.  56  Ind.  305.  537,  538 

City  of  Huron  v.   Meyers,   13   S.   D. 

420,  220 


TABLE  OF  CASES. 


Ixxix 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Yol.  I, 

City  of  Huron  v.  S(M'ond  Ward  Sav. 
Bank,  SU  Fed.  i;";.!, 

loo...  1011.  l(o<.  I'-JO 

City  of  Independence  v.   ^^tes.^Q^-^^iooe 

^.^''Mo.'.re,   32  Mo.  392,         "     '     52G 

V  Tronvalle.   1.5  Kan.  70.  540.  ^1424 
City   of    Indianapolis   v.    Consumers 

^Gas  &c.  Co..   140  Ind.  10..  'jf 

V  Coolv.  99  Ind.  10.  ^  1G09 
v!  l-nuuelman.  lOS  Ind.  530  .9., 
V.  Gaston.  58  Ind.  224,       1580,  1639 

V  Holt.  155  Hid.  222,  l^'^  150b 
V.  Ilueiielc.  115  Ind._581,  496,  498 
V.  IlutlVr.  oO  Ind.  235.  11<9 
V.  Imberry,  17  Ind.  Uo.  ^^^^  ^^^5 
V.  Indianapolis  Gas  Light  &c-  Co., 
66  ind.  396,            103,  ^-^-o^^^'i^^^l 

V.   Kingsbury.   101   Ind.   200,  693 

V.  LaN\Ter.  38  Ind.  348.  lU^ 
V.    Mann.    144    Ind.    17o,         '14,    8.4 

V.  Man.sur.  15  Ind.  112.  i--^;* 

V.   McAvoy,   80   Ind.   oS(,  --ii 

V.  Miller.  27  Ind.  394.  lllo 

V.  Patterson,  112  Ind.  344  390 

V.  Ritzinger,  24  Ind^^App.^6o.  ^  ^^^^ 

V.   Scott,   72   Ind.    196,  1625 

V.  Vaien.  Ill  Ind.  240,  15o2 

City  of  Indianola  v.  Gulf  &c.  K.  L.o.,^^^^ 

v^  J^nes,^!!'  Iowa  282.  ^  299,  477 

City  of  Ida  v.   Sugg,  8   Kan.   App.^^^^ 

City  of  jaclison  v.  Newman,  59  Miss.       ^ 

City  oV  Jacksonville  v.  Akers,  11  l^^-^^f^^ 

v.''Allen.'^25  111.  App.  54,       200,1445 

V.  Hamill.  178  111.  235.       12 <  2    12.3 

V.    Jacksonville    R.    Co.,    67    111.  ^^^ 

f  "iedwitli,  26  Fla.  163,  580,  606 
V    L'Rngle.  20  Fla.  344.  426 

v.  Loan^65  111.  App    218,  1774 

V.   Smith.  78  Fed.  292,  ^„  ^^"> 

City  of  Janesville  v.  Carpenter,  77     ^^^ 

^''lla'rkoe,   18  Wis.  350,       106,   108 
V.  Milwaukee  &c.  R.  Co.,  7  Wis. 
404  539,  boo 

City  of  Jefferson  v.  Whipple,  76  Mo.^^^^ 

City    of'  Jeffersonville    ^-^,^1^%^^. -.741 
Ind.  App.  532.  1210,  1221,  1 .  41 

V.  Patterson,  26  Ind.  16  .,   l^-O 

City    of    Joliet    v.    Blower,    155    HI- 
414.  ^~ 

V.  Johnson,  177  111.  178, 

13.33.    1334,    1341,    1.93 
V.  Looney.  159  111    471,  1334 

V.  Verbv.  35  111.  58,   ^  ,^       ^       1596 

City  of  Joplin  V.  Lecke,  78  Mo.  App-^^^^ 

City  "of  Junction   City  v.   Blades,   1 

^    ^Kan.  App    85  I'Sf 

V.  Webb,  44  Kan.  71.  ->-"t 

City  of  Kalamazoo  v.  Kalamazoo  Heat 

&c.  Co..  124  Mich.  74.       ^513.  1813 
City^of^Kankakee  v.  Potter.^  1^19 ^Hl.^  ^^^ 

City  o"f  Kansas  v.  Baird,  98  ^l°-25e^'i568 
V.  Clark.  68  Mo,  588,  "     '521 

V.   Collins,   34   Kan.   434,  1395 

V.  Flanagan.  69  Mo.  22,  536 

V.  Hill.  80  Mo.  523,  698 

V.  Kansas  City  R.  Co.,  102  Mo.^^^^ 

?^  McAleer.  31  Mo.  App.  433,     1119 
V.  Payne,  71  Mo.  159,  1544 


pp.  1-S32;  Vol.  II,  pp.  S33-lS30.-\ 

City  of  Kansas  v.  Vindquost,  36  Mo. 

App.  584,  1389 

V.  White.  69  Mo.  20.  521 

V.  Zahner,  73  Mo.  App.  396. 

City  of  Kansas  City  v.  Gray  (Kan.), 

61  Pac.  746,  12S.> 

v.  Grubel.  57  Kan.  436,  519 

V.   Hanson,  60  Kan.  833, 

720,  725,  726 
V.  Hart,  60  Kan.  684,  1375 

V.  Kimball,  60  Kan.  224, 

1134,   1276 
V.  Marsh  Oil  Co.,  140  Mo.  458, 

89,  110,  1146 
V.  McDonald.  60   Kan.  481, 

503.  1326,  1331.  1.363,  1753,  1797 
V.  O'Connell.  99  Mo.  357,  1176,  1368 
V.   Orr.  62   Kan.  61.  1361,   1375 

V.   Stegmiller,   151  Mo.  189, 

100.  113.  117 
V.  Trotter.  9  Kan.  App.  222,         1235 
V.    Wyandotte   Gas   Co.,    9    Kan. 
App.  325.  647,  8.2 

City  of  Kearney  v.  Downing,  59  Neb. 

549,  882 

V.  Thoemason,   25   Neb.   147. 

1179,  1370 

City  of  Keokuk  v.  Independent  Dist., 

53   Iowa  352,  1588 

V.  Scroggs.  39  Iowa  447,  1121,  1392 

City  of  Kingston  v.  Terry,  53  N.  Y. 

S.  652.  1781 

City  of  Kinmundy  v.  Mayhan,  72  111. 

462.  282.   531,  547 

City  of  Knoxville  v.  Chicago  &c.   R. 

Co.,   83   Iowa  636.  526.   608 

City   of   Kokomo  v.   Boring,   24   Ind. 

App.  552.  1327 

V.  Mahan.  100  Ind.  242, 

1177,  1190,  1224,  1233.  1301 

City  of  La  Crosse  v.   Town  of  Mel- 
rose, 22  Wis.  459,  1623 

City  of  Laddonia  v.  Poor,  73  Mo.  App. 

465.  ,    ^       505 

City  of  Lafayette  v.  Asylum,  4  La. 

An    1  124. 

V.  Blood.  40  Ind.  62,  „„  1624 

V.  Cox,  5  Ind.  38,  §8,  982 

V.  Cummins.  3  La.  An.  673,  lo20 

V.  Fowler,  34  Ind.  140,  1233 

V.  James,  92  Ind.  240,  319 

V.  Jenners,  10  Ind.  70,  54 

V.  Nagle,  113  Ind.  425,  17.6 

V.  Shultz.  44  Ind.  97,  <05 

V.  State,  69  Ind.  218.  368 

V.  Timberlake.  88  Ind.  330, 

264.  774,  815.  820 
V.  Wortman.  107  Ind.  404,  1224 

City  of  Lamar  v.   Weidman,  57  Mo. 

App.   507.  502.   520 

City  of  Lampasas  v.  Talcott,  97  Fed. 

457,  9" 

City  of  Lansing  v.  Toolan,  37  Mich. 

jr^o  1.080 

vl  Van  Gorder,  24  Mich.  456,       1748 
City  of  Lake  View  v.  Tate,  130  111. 

247  1148,  13o( 

City  of  Laporte  v.  Gamewell  &c.  Co., 

146  Ind.  466,  „  ^        880 

City  of  Laredo  v.  Macdonell,  52  Tex. 

511  "44 

V.   Nalle.   65  Tex.   859,  1746 

City  of  Lawrence  v.  Davis,  8  Kan. 

App    ''^5  1339 

V.  Littel,'9  Kan.  App.  130. 

1790.  1793.  1801,  1804 
V.  Webster,  167  Mass.  513.  ^_^^^ 


City  of  Lead  v.  Klatt,  13  S.  D.  140.  ^^^ 


Ixxx 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Vol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.1 


City   of   Leadville   v.    Matthews,    10 

Colo.    125,  172 

City  of  Leavenworth  v.  Mills,  6  Kan. 

288,  741,  1306,  1748 

V.   Norton,    1   Kan.   432,  1535 

V.  K!ankin,  2  Kan.  355, 

233,  255,   646 
V.  Stille,  13  Kan.  539,  741 

City  of  Lebanon  v.  Twiford,  13  Ind. 

App.   384,  1370 

City   of   Lexington   v.    Aull,    30    Mo. 

480.  1513 

V.  Butler,  14  Wall.  282, 

959,  1000.  1001,  1016,  1018 
V.  Headley.  5  Bush  508, 

540,  1227,  1254,  1421,  1425 
V.  McQuillan,  9  Dana  513.  1271 

V.  Rennick,  20  Ky.  L.  1924,  174 

City  of  Lin-coln  v.   Pirner,   59   Neb. 

634,  1334,  1336,  1339 

V.  O'Brien,  56  Neb.  761,  930,  1338 
V.  Smith,  28  Neb.  762.  1598 

V.  Walker.  18  Neb.  244,  1330 

V.  Woodward,  19  Neb.  259,  1614 

City   of   Linneus  v.   Duskey,    19   Mo. 

App.   20,  607 

City  of  Litchfield  v.  Whitenack.  78 

111.  App.  364.  1107.  1112 

City  of  Littlefleld  v.  Anglim,  83  111. 

App.  65,  1803 

City  of  Little  Rock  v.  Board  &c..  42 

Ark.  152,  280,  1199 

V.  Katzenstein.  52  Ark.  107,  1253 
V.  Parish,  36  Ark.  166,  90,  103 

City  of  Logansport  v.  Blakemore,  17 

Ind.    318,  996 

V.  Crockett,  64  Ind.  319, 

300.  468,  477,  1425,  1427 
V.  Dick,  70  Ind.  65,  1590 

V.   Dykeman,   116   Ind.   15, 

299.  889,  1038,  1201 
V.  Humphrey,  84  Ind.  467,  260,  565 
V.  Justice,  74  Ind.  378,  1620 

V.  La  Rose,  09  Ind.  117,  1660 

V.  Legg,  20  Ind.  31.">,  291,  292,  1256 
V.  Pollard.  50  Ind.  151.  1224 

V.  Seybold.  59  Ind.  225,  395 

V.  Shirk.  88  Ind.  563,  675 

V.   Wright,   25   Ind.   512,   1180,   1208 

City  of  Los  Angeles  v.   Los  Angeles 

Water  Co.,   124   Cal.   368.   610.   1707 
V.    Southern   Pacific   R.    Co.,    67 
Cal.  433,  1510 

V.   Teed.   112   Cal.  319,  1021 

City  of  Louisville  v.  Bannon,  99  Ky. 

74,  1319 

V.  Cassady.  20  Ky.  L.  1348,         1800 
V.  City  of  Louisville  Rolling  Mill 
Co.,  3  Bush  416,  1776 

V.  Coleburne.  22  Ky.  L.  64,  1772 

V.    Commonwealth.    1    Duv.    295. 

572,    1529,   1546 
V.   Gosnell,   104   Ky.   201.  1292 

V.  Hegan,  20  Ky.  L.  1532,  1774,  1776 
V.  Henaing.  1  Bush  381,  1501,  1.503 
V.  Hyatt,  5  B.  Mon.  199,  1306 

V.  Kean,  18  B.  Mon.  9.  1681 

V.  Leatherman,  99  Ky.  213, 

1244,   1306 
V.  Louisville  Water  Co.,  20  Ky. 
L.    12.59,  1351 

V.  McOill.  21  Ky.  L.  718.  1754,  1793 
V.  McKegney,  7  Bush  651,  1424 

V.  Mehler,  21  Ky.  L.  62,  1308 

V.  Murphy,  86  Ky.  53,  663 

V.  O'Malley,  21  Ky.  L.  873. 

1753,  1754 
V.   Seibert,  21  Ky.  L.  328,  1754 

V.  Selvage,  21  Ky.  L.  349, 

512.  725,  1296,  1310 
V.  Shannahan,  22  Ky.  L.  163,         795 
V.    Western    Bank,    21    Kv.    L. 
1075,  512 


City  of  Louisville  v.  Wilson,  99  Ky 
City 


598,  173 

of   Lowell    V.    French,    6   Cush. 
223,  1262 

V.  Hadley,  8  Met.  180.  1198 

V.   Parker,   10  Met.   309,  329 

V.   Simpson,   10  Allen  88,  468 

V.   Wheelock,   11  Cush.  391, 

1254,   1424 

City  of  Ludlow  v.  Mackintosh,  21  Ky. 

L.  924,  1775 

V.  Trustees.  78  Ky.  357.     1249,  1253 

City  of  Lynchburg  v.  Norfolk  &c.  R. 

Co.,  80  Va.  237,  1508 

V.  Slaughter.  75  Va.  57,  1026 

City  of  Lynn  v.  City  of  Newburyport, 

5  Allen  545,  1049,  1052 

v.    County    Com'rs,    148    Mass. 
148,  1485 

City   of   Lyons   v.    Cooper,    39   Kan. 

324,  1401 

City  of  Madison  v.  Baker,  103  Ind. 

41.  1624 

V.  Korblv.  32  Ind.  74,  169,  200,  207 
V.  Smith,  83  Ind.  502,  1201 

V.   Whitney,  21   Ind.   261,  1511 

City  of  Mankato  v.  Arnold,  36  Minn. 

62,  1072,  1410 

V.  Fowler.  32  Minn.  364,  1398 

City    of    Marion    v.    Eppler,    5    Ohio 

St.   250,  1266 

V.  Robertson.  84  111.  App.  113,     596 

City  of  Marionville  v.  Henson,  65  Mo. 

App.    397,  1129,    1236.    1291 

City  of  Marshall  v.  Cleveland  &c.  R. 

Co..   80   111.   App.   531.  611,   932 

V.  Rainey,  78  Mo.  App.  416, 

751,    1236.    1279 

City  of   Marshalltown   v.    Blums,   58 

Iowa  184,  1537 

City  of  Maysville  v.  Shultz,  3  Dana 

10,  92 

City  of  McGregor  v.  Cook,  16  S.  W. 

936.  1743 

City  of  McKeesport  v.  Citizens'  &c.  R. 

Co.,   2   Pa.    Super.   Ct.    249,  1811 

V.  IMcKeesport  &c.  R.  Co.,  2  Pa. 
Super.  Ct.  242,  1384 

v.  Soles,  178  Pa.  St.  363,  1244 

City   of   McPherson   v.    Nichols,    48 

Kan.  430.  1423 

City  of  Memphis  v.  Adams,  9  Heisk. 

518,  181,  663 

V.  Bolton,  9  Heisk.  508, 

701,   702,   704 
V.  Brown,  20  Wall.  289, 

181,  741,  1305,  1306 
V.    Hernando   Ins.   Co.,   6   Baxt. 
527,  1531 

V.  Laski.  9  Heisk.  511,  1745 

V.  Memphis  Water  Co.,  5  Heisk. 
495,  456 

City  of  Michigan  City  v.  Leeds,  24 

Ind.  App.  271,  724 

City  of  Middlesboro  v.   Coal  &  Iron 

Bank,  22  Ky.  L.  380,  1544,  1554 

V.   New  South  Brewing  &c.  Co., 

56  S.   W.   427,  1548 

City  of  Miles  City  v.  Kern,  12  Mont. 

119.  538.  1419 

City  of  Milwaukee  v.  Milwaukee  Co., 

95  Wis.  424.  1504 

V.    Milwaukee  &c.   Co.,   7   Wis. 

85,  1171 

City  of  Mineral   Wells  v.   Darby,  51 

S.   W.  351.  563 

City  of  Mitchell  v.   Smith,   12  S.   D. 

241.  876.  1021 

Citv  of  Mobile  v.  Craft,  94  Ala.  156,  602 
V.  Louisville  &c.  R.  Co.,  124  Ala. 
132,  585 

City  of  Monett  v.  Beatty,  79  Mo.  App. 
315,  528 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


Ixxxi 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Vol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Yol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.'] 


City  of  Morrison  v.  Ilinkson,  87  III. 

587,  1111.  15,30,  1743 

City  of  Mt.  Carmel  v.  Blaokbnrn,  .5.3 

111.  App.  658,  1.328,  1.341 

V.   Shaw,   155  111.  37,  1319,   1369 

City  of  Mt.   Pleasant  v.   Breeze,   11 

Iowa  399,  606 

City    of    Mt.    Sterling   v.    Holly,    22 

Kv.   L.   358,  1407 

V.  Jephsou,  21  Ky.  L.  1028,         1777 

City  of  Mt.  Vernon  v.  Holbn,  22  Ind. 

App.  282,  1361,  1364,  1786,  1793 

V.  Hovey.  52  Ind.  563,  983 

City  of  Muscatine  v.  Chicago  &c.  R. 

Co.,  79  Iowa  645,  1251 

V.  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.,  88  Iowa 
291.  1245 

V.  Keokuk  &c.  Co..  45  Iowa  185,  246 
V.    Steck,   7   Iowa  505,        1418,   1420 

City   of    Napa  v.    Easterby,    76    Cal. 

222.  480,  482.  486,  489 

City  of  Nashville  v.  Smith,  86  Tenn. 

213.  1546 

City  of  Natchez  v.  Shields,  74  Miss. 

871.  1326 

City  of  Navasota  v.  Pearce,  46  Tex. 

525,  9 

City    of   Nevada  v.    Eddy,    123    Mo. 

546,  1251 

City  of   New   Albany  v.    Lines,   21 

Ind.  App.  380,  1377 

V.  McCulloch,  127  Ind.  500. 

889,   1324 
V.  Meekin,  3  Ind.  481, 

1499,  1500,  1502,  1550 
V.  Slider,  21  Ind.  App.  392, 

812,   1107 

City  of  Newark  v.  Funk,  15  Ohio  St. 

462,  1746 

V.  Stout,  52  N.  J.  L.  35.  164 

City  of  New  Bedford  v.  Inhabitants 

&c.,  9  Allen  207,  1036 

City  of  Newburyport  v.  Creedon,  148 

Mass.  158,  1069 

City  of  New  Haven  v.  Fairhaven  &c. 

R.  Co.,  38  Conn.  422,  1248 

V.  Sargent.  38  Conn.  50,  1109,   1378 

City   of    New    Kiowa   v.    Craven,    46 

Kan.  114,  806 

City  of  New  London  v.  Brainard.  22 

Conn.    552.  651,    668,    1730 

City  of  New  Orleans  v.  Abbagnats,  62 

Fed.  240,  800 

V.   Boudra,   14   La.   An.   303, 

85,  538 
V.  Brooks,  36  La.  An.  641,  274 

V.    Carondelet    &c.    Co.,    36    La. 
An.  396,  1545 

V.  Cazelar,  27  La.  An.   156, 

1513,  1516 
V.  Collins.  52  La.  An.  973.  106.  1383 
V.  Commercial  Bank,  10  La.  An. 
735,  1510 

V.  Costello,  14  La.  An.  37.  1413 

V.  Danneman,  51  La.  An.  1093,  1391 
V.  Elliott.  10  La.  An.  59,  1520 

V.  Fisher.  91   Fed.  574,  1755 

V.  Fourchv,  30  La.  An.  910.         1503 
V.  Grafflna.  52  La.  An.  1082,       1386 
V.    Home  Mut.   Ins.   Co.,   23   La. 
An.  61.  1530,  1744 

V.  Hoyle,  23  La.  An.  740.  104 

V.  Kaufman.  29  La.  An.  283,       1520 
V.  Kerr.  50  La.  An.  413.  786 

V.   Kientz.   52  La.   An.   950,  580 

V.  Louisiana  &c.  Co.,  31  La.  An. 
826,  1502 

V.  Lozes,  51  La.  An.  1172,  1406 

V.   Mechanics'  &c.  Bank,  15  La. 
An.  107,  1510 

V.  Michoud,  10  La.  An.  763.  393 

V.  Morris,  3  Woods  103,       581,  1529 

1  Smith — vi 


City  of  New  Orleans  v.  New  Orleans 

&c.  Co..  32  La.  An.  105,       1513,  1546 
V.    People's   Bank,   32    La.    An. 
82,  1503 

V.  St.  Louis  Church,  11  La.  An. 
244.  301 

V.   Ship  Windemere,  12  La.  An. 
84,  1100 

V.    Southern   Bank,    11   La.   An. 
41,  1510 

V.    Southern   Bank,   15   La.   An. 
89,  106 

V.   Stafford,  27   La.  An.  417, 

580,   1402,   1403 
V.  Staiger,  11  La.  An.  68,  1520 

V.  Steinhardt,  52  La.  An.  1043, 

1142,  1713,  1809 
V.   Turpin,    13   La.   An.    56,  1508 

V.  Warden  «&c.,  11  La.  An.  244, 

987,  1086 
V.  W^arner,   175  U.  S.   120,  952 

V.  Wire,  20  La.  An.  500,  1262 

City  of  Newport   v.   Commonwealth, 

21  Ky.  L.  42,  1815 

V.  Newport  &c.  Co.,  84  Ky.  166. 

636.  1466 
V.  Newport  &c.  Co.,  89  Ky.  454, 

571.  1466.  1467 
V.  Newport  &c.  Co.,  90  Ky.  193,  622 
V.   Phillips.  19  Ky.  L.  352,  716,  717 
V.  South  Covington  &c.  R.  Co., 
89  Ky.  29.  1509 

City  of  Newton  v.  Belger.  143  Mass. 

598,  508,  605,  621 

V.   Bergbower,  63   111.  App.   201,  518 

City  of  New  Whatcom  v.  Bellingtou 

Bay  Improv.  Co.,  16  Wash.  131,  1274 

City   of   New  York,   In  re,   61   N.   Y. 

S.  431,  1311 

V.  Brady,  30  N.  Y.  S.  1121,  1367 

V.  Brown,  57  N.  Y.  S.  742, 

1337,  1338 
V.  Dimick,  2  N.  Y.  S.  46.  1589 

City  of  Nokomis  v.    Salter,   61    111. 

App.  150.  1330 

City   of   Norfolk   v.    Young,    97    Va. 

728.  1166 

City  of  North  Platte  v.  North  Platte 
Water  Works  Co.,  56  Neb.  403, 

290,  730 

City  of  North  Vernon  v.  Voegler,  103 

Ind.  314,  1179 

City    of    Oakland    v.    Carpentier,    13 

Cal.   540.  281.   292.   547 

City  of  Oklahoma  City  v.   Myers,   4 

Okla.  686,  1339 

V.  Welsh,  3  Okla.  288,       1330,  1335 

City  of  Olney  v.  Harvey,  50  111.  453, 

92,  440,  1519,  1530 
V.   Wharf.   115   111.  519,  588,   678 

City  of  Olympia  v.   Mann,    1   Wash. 

389.  594.    1392 

City  of  Omaha  v.  Bowman,  52  Neb. 

293  1338 

V.  City  of  South  Omaha,  31  Neb. 
378,  62,  391 

V.  Croft.  60  Neb.  57,  824,  825 

V.   Flood,  57  Neb.   124, 

1107,  1772,  1774 
V.  Harmon,  58  Neb.  339,  513 

V.  Kountze,  25  Neb.  60.  1263 

V.  Kramer,  25  Neb.  489,   1211,   1222 
V.  Megeath.  46  Neb.  502,  1700 

V.  Olmstead,  5  Neb.  446,  1418 

V.   Richards,  49   Neb.    244. 

794,  1331,  1338 
V.  Williams,  52  Neh.  40,  1778 

City    of    Opdike    v.    Daniel,    59    Ala. 

211,  983 

City  of  'Ord  v.   Nash,   50  Neb.  335. 

1337,  1374 

City  of  Osage  City  v.   Larkins,  40 

Kan.  206,  1608 


Ixxxii 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


IReferences  are  to  Pages.   Vol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.'] 


City   of   Osborne   v.    Hamilton,    29 

Kan.  1,  1621 

City  of  Oshljosh  v.  Milwaukee  &c.  R. 

Co.,  74  Wis.  534,  1667 

V.    Sohwartz,   55   AVis.   483,   536,   542 

City  of  Oswego  v.  Canal   Co.,   6  N. 

Y.   257.  1374,   1559,   1563,   1567 

V.  Collins,  38  Hun  171,  1401 

City  of  Ottawa  v.  Black,  10  Kan.  App. 

339,  931,  1329,  1367,  179G 

V.  McCreery,  10  Kan.  App.  443,  1787 
V.  People,  48  111.  233,  1683 

V.   Spencer,  40  111.  121, 

1168,  1268,  1514 

City  of  Ottumwa  v.  Chinn,  75  Iowa 

405,  1126 

V.  Schaub,  52  Iowa  515, 

540,  1422,  1424 

V.  Zekind,  95  Iowa  622,         502,  503 
City  of  Ouray  v.  Corson,  14  Colo.  App. 

345,  600,  1763 

City  of   Owensboro  v.   Hickman,   90 

Ky.  629,  371 

V.  Sparks,  18  Ky.  L.  269, 

526,  527,  599 

City   of   Padueah   v.   Cully,    9   Bush 

323,  322 

City  of  Palestine  v.  Hassell,  15  Tex. 

Civ.  App.  519,  1336,  1337 

V.  West,  37  S.  W.  783,  201 

City  of  Parkersburg  v.  Tavener,  42 

W.  Va.  486,  1272,  1786 

City  of  Paterson  v.  Society  of  Manu- 
facturers, 24  N.  J.  L.  385,  1246 

City  o^f  Pawtucket  v.  Bray,  20  R.  I- 

City  of  Paxton  v.  Frew,  52  111.  App. 

393,  1335 

City   of   Pekin   v.    Brereton,    67    111. 

477  1385 

V.  McMahon,  154  111.  141,  794,  816 
V.  Reynolds.  31  111.  529,  931,  1016 
V.  Smelzel,  21  111.  464,  1400 

City    of    Pensacola    v.    Sullivan,    23 

Fla.  1,  1541 

City   of   Peoria   v.   Calhoun,   29   111. 

317,  500 

V.  Crawl,  28  111.  App.  154,  1180 

V.  Gerber,  68  III.  App.  255,  1332 

V.  Gugenheim,  61  IIJ.  App.  374, 

492,  502 
V.  Johnston.  56  111.  45,  401 

V.  Kidder.  26  111.  351,  1246 

City  of  Philadelphia  v.  Ball,  147  Pa. 

St.  243,  1256 

v.  Bowman,  175  Pa.  St.  91,  522 

V.  Dibeler,  147  Pa.  St.  261,  1156 
V.  Dickson,  38  Pa.  St.  247,  705 

V.  Duncan,  4  Phila.  145,  530 

V.  Dyer,  41  Pa.  St.  463,  705 

V.  Kvans.  139  Pa.  St.  483,  1158 

V.  Flanigan,  47  Pa.  St.  21,  638,  647 
V.  Gavagnin,  62  Fed.  617,  795,   1333 
V.  Germantown  Pass.  R.  Co.,  10 
Phila.   165.  687 

V.  Gilmartin,  71  Pa.  St.  146,  1112 
V.  Given,  60  Pa.  St.  136,  198,  1445 
V.   Gorges,   180  Pa.   St.  296,  1292 

V.  Greble.  38  Pa.  St.  339,  458,  1544 
v.  Madden,  8  Pa.  Dist.  R.  532,  547 
V.   Miller,  49   Pa.   St.  440,  1238 

V.  Nock.  12  Pa.  Super.  Ct.  44.     1307 
V.    Philadelphia   &c.    R.    Co.,    58 
Pa.    St.    253.  629,    1106 

Y.  Philadelphia  &c.   R.  Co.,  177 
Pa.  St.  292  1252 

V.  Presbyterian  Hospital,  143  Pa. 
St.  367,  1247 

V.  Rink   (Pa.),  2  Atl.  505.  1445 

V.   River  Front  R.  Co.,   137   Pa. 
St.   334,  1350 

V.  Rule,  93  Pa.  St.  15,  1271 


City  of  Philadelphia  v.  Smith,  23  W. 

N.  C.  242,  1614,  1616 

V.  Smith,  16  Atl.  493,  1637 

V.  Tryon,  35  Pa.  St.  401,     593,  1234 
V.   Union   Burial   Grounds,   178 
Pa.    St.    533,  1246,    1294 

V.  Wistar,  35  Pa.  St.  427,  593 

V.   Wright.   100   Pa.   St.   235,        1220 
V.  Yewdall,  190  Pa.  St.  412,         1272 

City  of  I'iqua  v.  Zimmerlin,  35  Ohio 

St.   507,  519 

City  of  Pittsburg,  Appeal  of,  118  Pa. 

458,  1503 

V.  Broderson,  10  Kan.  App.  430, 

1360,  1797 
V.    Epping    Carpenter    Co.,    194 
Pa.  St.  318,  1707 

V.   Grier,   22   Pa.   St.   54,   1112,   1113 
V.   Reynolds,  48  Kan.  360,  485 

City  of  Platteville  v.  Hooper,  63  Wis. 

385.  312,  315 

City  of  Plattsburg  v.   Riley,  42  Mo. 

App.  18.  395 

City   of    Plattsmouth   v.    Boeck,    32 

Neb.  297,  1209,  1211 

City  of  Pleasanton  v.  Rhine,  8  Kan. 

App.   452.  1333 

City  of  Plymouth  v.  Milner,  117  Ind. 

324,  1634 

V.   Schultheis,   135   Ind.   701,  508 

City  of  Pontiac  v.   Carter,  32  Mich. 

164,  225,  801,   1322 

V.  Talbot  Pav.  Co.,  94  Fed.  65. 

722,  741 

City  of  Port  Huron  v.  Chadwick,  52 

Mich.    320,  1214 

City  of  Portland  v.  City  of  Bangor, 

65  Maine  120,  1415 

V.  Portland  Water  Co.,  67  Maine 
135,  1502,  1512 

City  of  Poughkeepsie  v.  King,  57  N. 

Y.  S.  116,  527 

V.  Quintard,  136  N.  Y.  275,  875 

V.   Wiltsie.  36  Ilun   270,  179 

City  of  Providence  v.  Miller,  11  R.  I. 

272,  216,  262 

V.  Union  R.  Co.,  12  R.  I.  473, 

523,  524 

City  of  Pueblo  v.  Robinson,  12  Colo. 

593,  1205,  1267 

City  of  Putnam  v.  Langley,  133 

Mass.  204,  1666 

City   of  Quincy   v.    Ballance,   30   111. 

185,  535 

V.  Bull,  106  111.  337,  519.  522,  1812 
v.    Chicago    &c.    R.    Co.,    92    111. 
21,  464 

V.   Jones,   76   111.   231,        1355,    1776 
V.  O'Brien,  24   III.  App.  591,  607 

City  of  Raleigh  v.   Peace,   110  N.  C. 

32.  570,  1230,  1255.  1262,  1267.  1269 

City    of    Reading    v.    Keppleman,    61 

Pa.   St.   233.  90,   103 

V.  Savage,  120  Pa.  St.  198.  43 

City  of  Rensselaer,  64  N.  Y.  S.  704,  1652 

City   of    Richmond   v.   Crenshaw,    76 

Va.  936.  1717,  1728 

V.    Daniel,    14    Gratt.    385, 

1501,  1503 
V.  Dudley,  129  Ind.  112,  503,  685 
V.  Long,  17  Gratt.  375, 

806,  1075,  1096 
V.  McGirr,  78  Ind.  192,  837 

v.  Mulholland,  116  Ind.  173,         1635 
V.  Richmond  &c.  R.  Co.,  21  Gratt. 
604,         1247,  1513.  1533,  1545,  1548 
V.   Scott,   48   Ind.  568,  1520 

City  of  Roanoke  v.  Shull,  97  Va.  419, 

1793,  1798 

City   of   Rochester   v.    Bell    Tel.    Co.. 

64  N.  Y.  S.  804.  1390 

V.  Campbell,  123  N.  Y.  405. 

1345,  1587,  1598 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


Ix: 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Vol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.'] 


City  of  Rochester  v.  Close,  35  Ilun 

2(18.  1308 

V.  Krickson.  4fi  Barb.  92,  1125 

V.   Montgomery,   72   N.   Y.   05, 

1344,  1598 
V.  Town  of  Rush,  80  N.  Y.  302, 

572,  153G,  1546 
V.  Upman,  19  Minn.  108.  537,  1507 
V.   AA'est.   53   N.   Y.   S.   1101.  1386 

City  of  Rock  Falls  v.   WeUs,  59   111. 

App.   155.  1316 

City  of   Rock  ford  v.   Rannie,   77   III. 

App.  065.  1343 

Citv  of  Kock  Islaiifl  V.  Vanlandschoot, 

7S  III.  4S5.  1641 

City  of  Uockville  v.  Merchant,  60  Mo. 

App.  305.  520 

City  of  Roodhouse  v.  Christian,  53 

111.   App.    107.  1341 

V.  .lennings,  29  111.  App.  50,  611 

V.   Johnson.   57   111.   App.   73.  178 

City  of  Rosedale  v.  Goldiug.  55  Kan. 

107,  1315 

City  of   Rushville  v.    Rushville   Nat. 
Gas  Co.,   132  Ind.  57o, 

553.   569,   573,   574 

City   of    Sacramento   v.    Crocker,    16 

Cal.   lin,  1508 

V.   Fowle,  21   Wall.   119,  1737 

V.   Kirk,   7  Cal.  419,  996 

City  of  Saginaw  v.   Saginaw  Circuit 

Judge.  106  Mich.  32.  604 

V.    Swift    Electric    L.    Co.,    113 
Mich.  660,  504 

City   of   St.   Charles  v.    Eisner,    155 

Mo.  671.  1388 

V.  Hackman,  133  Mo.  634,  1752 

City   of    St.    Joseph   v.   Anthony.    30 

Mo.  537.  1131,  1533 

V.  Farrell.  106  Mo.  437,  1270 

V.  Hamilton,  43  Mo.  282,  699 

V.   Hannibal  &c.   R.  Co.,  39  Mo. 
476,  1513 

V.  Levin.  128  Mo.  588,  604 

V.  O'Donoghue.  31  Mo.  345.  1253 

V.   Owen,   110   Mo.  445,      1175,   1206 
V.  Vesper.  59  Mo.  App.  450.  499 

City   of   St.    Louis   v.   Alexander.    23 

Mo.   483,  485,   1010 

V.  Allen,  13  Mo.  400, 

104,  384,  1515,  1517 
V.  Allen.  53  Mo.  44,  1206 

V.  Arnot.  04  Mo.   275.  1462 

V.  Bell  Tel.  Co..  96  Mo.  623.         615 
V.  Bentz,  11  Mo.  61,     495,  496,  1085 
V.  Boatman's  Ins.  &c.  Co.,  47  Mo. 
150,  1507 

V.  Bofflnger.  19  Mo.  13.         466,  1099 
V.   Bowler,   94    Mo.   630,  1389 

V.  Brown,  155  Mo.  545. 

512.  1244,  1274 
V.  Bucher,  7  Mo.  App.  169,  1507 

V.  Caflferata,  24  Mo.  94, 

104.  495.  496,  601,  1085 
V.  Clemens,  36  Mo.  467,  1499 

V.  Clemens,  42  Mo.  69,  1192 

V.   Connecticut  L.   Ins.   Co.,   107 
Mo.  92,  1588 

V.  Davidson,  102  Mo.  140. 

235,  239,  255,  649 
V.  Dorr,  136  Mo.  370,  1391 

V.    Excelsior    Brewing    Co.,    96 
Mo.  677.  1252 

V.  Fitz,  53  Mo.  582.  538 

V.  Foster,  52  Mo.  513, 

299,  477,  485.  540,  1422 
V.  Coebel.  32  Mo.  295.  516 

V.  Green,  7  Mo.  App.  468,  1508,  1521 
V.  Grone,  46  IMo.  574,  1396 

V.  Gurno,  12  Mo.  414,  1602 

V.    Heitzebei'g    Packing   &c.    Co.. 
141  Mo.  375.  1394 

V.  Herthel,  88  Mo.  128,         517,  615 


City  of  St.   Louis  v.   Knox,   74  Mo. 

79.  538 

V.  Knox,  6  Mo.  App.  247,  502 

V.    Laclede   Gas   Light   Co.,    155 
Mo.  1,  746 

V.  Laughlin,  49  Mo.  5.59, 

615,  1508,  1509 
V.  McCoy,  18  Mo.  238,  1099 

V.  aieyrose  Lamp  Mfg.  Co.,  139 
Mo.  560,  1390 

V.  Oeters.  36  Mo.  456,         1234,  1253 
V.  Ranken.  96  jMo.  407,  1254 

V.  Roche,   128  Mo.  541,  541,  612 

V.  Russell,  9  Mo.  507, 

94,  104,  383,  1517 
V.  Russell.  116  Mo.  248,  1393 

V.  St.  Louis  R.  Co.,  89  Mo.  44,     539 
V.  St.  Louis  R.  Co.,  14  Mo.  App. 
221,  519 

V.  Schoenbusch,  95  Mo.  618, 

496,  601,  607 
V.  Spiegel,  75  Mo.  145,  1507 

V.   Stearn.  3   Mo.  App.   48,  1003 

V.  Sternberg,  4  Mo.  App.  453,     1508 
V.  Sternburg,  69  Mo.  289,  1520 

V.   Vert,  84  Mo.  204. 

481.   493,   536,   607 
V.  Weber,  44  Mo.  547. 

100.  502,  1084,  1403,  1406 
V.  Weitzel.  130  Mo.  600,         602,  605 
V.  Western  U.  Tel.  Co.,  63  Fed. 
68,  604,  729 

V.  Wiggin  Ferry  Co.,  40  Mo.  580. 

1499,  1502 
V.  Withaus.  90  Mo.  646.        274.  471 

City  of   St.    Paul   v.   Chicago  &c.    R. 

Co.,  63  Minn.  330,  566,  1350 

V.  Colter,  12  Minn.  41, 

500,  501,  1148 
V.  Gilflllan,  36  Minn.  298,  621,  1120 
V.  Laidler.  2  Minn.  100,  575,  1403 
V.  Seitz,  3  Minn.  297,  1590 

V.  Stoltz,  33  Minn.  233,  1389 

V.  Traeger,  25  Minn.  248,  1403 

City  of  Salem  v.  Eastern  R.  Co.,  98 
Mass.  431. 

1080.  1090.  1110,  1116,  1123,  1762 
V.  Maynes,  123  Mass.  272,  1121,  1122 

City   of  Salina  v.   Trosper,   27   Kan. 

544,  1641 

City  of  San  Antonio  v.  Berry,  92  Tex. 

319,  1549,  1786 

V.  Jones,  28  Tex.  19.  983 

V.   Lane.   32  Tex.   405,  983,   1018 

V.    Mackey,    14    Tex.    Civ.    App. 
210.  825 

V.    Mackey,   22   Tex.   Civ.   App. 
145,  793 

V.   Micklejohn,   89  Tex.   79,  463 

V.    Mullaly.    11    Tex.    Civ.    App. 
596.  1211 

V.  Peters.  40  S.  W.  827,  1304 

V.    San   Antonio    St.    R.    Co.,    15 
Tex.  Civ.  App.  1,  1811 

V.   Smith.  94  Tex.   266.  1708 

V.  Walker.  56  S.  W.  952,  1304 

V.  White.  57  S.  W.  8.58,  804 

City   of    San   Diego   v.    Granniss,    77 

Cal.   511,  404 

City  of  Sandwich  v.  Dolan,  133  111. 

177.  1634 

V.   Dolan.   141   111.  430,  1631 

City  of  San  Francisco  v.   Burr,   108 

Cal.  460,  1319 

v.  Canavan,  42  Cal.  541. 

90,  103,  629,  1537 
V.  Hazen,  5  Cal.  169,  202 

V.   Itsell,  80  Cal.  57.  630 

City  of  San  Jose  v.   Welch,   65  Cal. 

358,  328 

City  of  San  Luis  Obispo  v.  Fitzger- 
ald, 126  Cal.  270,  470 


Ixxxiv 


TABLE  OF  CASES. 


IReferences  are  to  Pages.   Vol.  I,  pp.  1-8.32;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.'] 


City  of  Santa  Barbara  v.   Sherman, 

61  Cal.  57,  535 

City  of  Santa  Cruz  v.  Santa  Cruz  R. 

Co.,  56  Cal.  143,  527 

v..Waite,  98  Fed.  387,       1021,  1031 

City  or  Santa  Rosa  v.  Coulter,  58  Cal. 

537,  1515 

City  of  Savannah  v.  Atlantic  &c.  R. 

Co.,  3   Woods  432,  1533 

V.   Hancock,   91   Mo.   54, 

685,  687,  1568 
V.  Kelly,  108  U.  S.  184,  982 

City  of  Scranton  v.  Barnes,  147  Pa. 

St.  461,  1256 

V.  Catterson,  94  Pa.  St.  202, 

1609,  1621 
V.  Gore,  124  Pa.   St.  595,  1637 

V.  Hill,  102  Pa.  St.  378,  1637 

V.  Hvde  Park  Gas  Co.,  102  Pa. 
St.  382,  959 

V.    Pennsylvania   Coal    Co.,    105 
Pa.  St.  445,  1199 

City  of  Seattle  v.  Baxter,  20  Wash. 

714,  1284 

V.  Pearson,  15  Wash.  575,  520 

V.   Smvth,  22  Wash.  327,  492 

V.   Yesler,   1   Wash.   Ter.   571. 

47.  1262 

City    of    Selma   v.    Mullen,    46    Ala. 

411,  260 

City  of   Seward  v.   Conroy,   33   Neb. 

430,  399 

City    of    Seymour   v.    Cummins,    119 

Ind.  148,  1179 

V.  Jeffersonvllle  &c.  R.  Co.,  126 
Ind.   466,  678 

City  of   Shawneetown   v.   Baker.   85 

HI.  503.  257,  662 

v.  Mason,  82  111.  337,  704 

City  of  Sherman  v.  Nairey,  77  Tex. 

291,  1581 

City  of  Shreveport  v.  Gregg,  28  La. 

An.  836,  1498 

V.  Levy.  26  La.  An.   671.  493 

v.  Prescott,  51  La.  An.   1895, 

1131,  1132,  1248 
V.  Robinson,  51  La.  An.  1314,  503 
V.  Roos,  35  La.  An.   1010.  526 

City  of  Sioux  City  v.  Weare,  59  Iowa 

95,  876 

City  of  Sioux  Palls  v.  Kirby,  6  S.  D. 

62,  596 

City  of  Solomon  v.  Hughes,  24  Kan. 

211.  540,  1421 

City  of  Somerset  v.  Smith,  20  Ky.  L. 

1488,  290,  729 

City   of   Somerville   v.    City   of   Bos- 
ton,  120  Mass.  574,  1045 

City    of    South    Bend    v.    Paxon,    67 

Ind.  228,  1625 

City  of  South  Omaha  v.  Cunningham, 

31  Neb.  316.  1210 

V.  Powell,  50  Neb.  798,  1374 

City  of  South   Pasadena  v.   Los  An- 
geles &c.   R.  Co.,   109  Cal.  315,      513 

City  of  South  St.  Paul  v.  Lamprecht, 

88  Fed.  449,        871,  986.   1012,   1029 

City  of   Spokane   Falls  v.   Brown,   3 

Wash.  84,  1254 

City  of  Springfield  v.  Baker,  56  Mo. 

App.  637,  1240 

V.   Burns,   51    111.   App.   595,  1341 

V.  Davis,  80  Mo.  App.  574,  1550 

V.  Dovle,  76  HI.  202,  1014 

V.  Edwards,  84  111.  385,       219,  881, 
895,   897,  917,   1699,   1730 
V.  Green,   120  111.  269, 

512,  1211,  1268,  1303 
V.  Harris.  107  Mass.  532,  1159 

V.  Le  Claire,  49  111.  476,  787,  1620 
V.  Mathus,  124  III.  88,  1146,  1259 
V.  Rosonmever.  52  111.  App.  301,  13'_'8 
V.    Sale,    127    HI.    359,        1234,    1259 


City   of    Springfield   v.    Schmook,    68 

Mo.  394,  704 

V.  Tomlinson,  79  111.  App.  399,  1364 
V.  Weaver,  137  Mo.  650, 

1144,  1146,  1157 

City  of  Spring  Valley  v.  Gavin,  182- 

111.  232,  1794,  1803.  1805 

City  of  Sterling  v.  Gait,  117  III.  11, 

512,    1142,    1143,    1259,    1268,    1272 
1273,   1300,   1303 
V.   Merrill,   124  111.   522, 

1334,   1614,   1629 

City  of  Stockton  v.  Creanor,  45  Cal. 

643,  282 

V.  Western  &c.  Ins.  Co.,  73  Cal. 
621,  114 

City  of  Streator  v.  Chrisman,  182  III. 

215,  13.34 

V.  Chrisman,  82  111.  App.  24,       1330 
V.  Hamilton,  61  HI.  App.  509,     1330 

City    of    Sumner    v.    Scaggs,    52    111. 

App.    551.  1326 

City  of  Superior  v.  Norton,  63  Fed. 

357,  729 

City  of  Syracuse  v.   Reed,   46   Kan. 

520,  903 

City    of    Tampa   v.    Mugge,    40    Pla. 

3*^6  1543 

vrsalomonson,  35  Fla.  446,    520,  551 

City  of  Taunton  v.   Inhabitants  &c., 

153   Mass.    192,  1047,   1057 

v.  Taylor,  116  Mass.  254, 

468,  552,  1094,  1125.  1126 

City    of   Terre    Haute    v.    Beach,    96 

Ind.  143,  1572 

V.  Evansville  &e.  R.  Co.,  149  Ind. 
147,  1782 

v.  Hudnut,  112  Ind.  542,     820,  1207 
y.  Mack,  139  Ind.  99.  1702 

v.  Turner.  36  Ind.  522.  680 

City  of  Terrell  v.  Dessaint,  71  Tex. 

770,  892 

City  of  Texarkana  v.  Leach,  66  Ark. 

40.  1317 

City    of    Toledo    v.    Board    &c.,    48 

Ohio  St.  43,  1247 

City   of  Topeka   v.    Cowee,    48    Kan. 

345,  1561,  1566 

V.    Gillett,   32    Kan.   431, 

113,   119,  401 
V.  Noble,  9  Kan.  App.   171, 

1794,  1801 
V.  Ravnor.  60  Kan.  860,  490,  1394 
V.    Sells,    48    Kan.    512.  1224 

City  of  Trov  v.  Atchison  &c.  R.  Co., 

11  Kan.  519.  540 

v.  Winters,  2  Hun  63,  594,  1392 

City  of  Tulare   v.   Hevren,    126  Cal. 

226,  1787 

City  of  Uvalde  v.  Spier,  91  Fed.  594, 

1012,  1029 

City   of    Valparaiso    v.    Gardner,    97 

Ind.  1,     11.  .568.  632.  647.  651,  848 

877,  880,  889,  897,  1038,  1465 

V.  Hagen.  153  Ind.  337,  1708 

City  of  Vicksburg  v.  Butler,  56  Miss. 

72,  1552 

v.    Hennessey,    54    Miss.    391. 

1586,  1633 
V.  Herman,  72  Miss.  211,  1219 

City  of  Vincennes  v.   Callender,   86 

Ind.  484.  1038 

V.   Citizens'   Gas  Light  Co.,   132 
Ind.  114,  568,  569 

City    of    Virginia    v.    Hall,    96    111. 

278.  1262 

v.  Plummer,  65  111.  App.  419.     1344 

City  of  Wabash  v.  Carver,   129  Ind. 

552,  1578.    1579 

City    of    Waco    v.    Chamberlain,    92 

'  Tex.  207,  748,  1153 

v.  Prather,  90  Tex.  80,  1144 

V.  Prather,  35  S.  W.  958,  1144 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


Ixxxv 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Vol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol.  II,  pp.  SSS-ISSO.] 


City  of  Wahoo  v.  Dickinson,  2^1  Neb. 

4-Jfi.  3S5 

V.  Keodcr,  27  Neb.  770,  1.3 

City  of  Walla  Walla  v.  Walla  Walla 
Water  Co.,  172  U.  S.  1. 

740,  876,  880,  881 
City  of  Waltliam  v.  Citv  of  Newbury- 

port.  ir.o  Mass.  50;),  1045 

City  of  Warsaw  v.  Duulap,  112  Ind. 

.'->T0.  I(il5 

City  of  Waterloo  v.  Union  Mill  Co., 

72   Iowa  437,  155J> 

City    of    Waterton    v.    Robinson,    69 

Wis.  230,  1737 

City   of  Water  Valley  v.   Davis,   73 

Miss.    521.  1752 

City    of    Wasahachie    v.    Brown,    67 

Tex.  519.  628,  883 

City  of  Waycross  v.  Youmans,  85  Ga. 

708,  199 

City  of  Wellston  v.  Morgan,  59  Ohio 

St.    147,  734 

City  of  Westport  v.  Kansas  City,  103 

Mo.   141,  116,  388 

V.  Mastin,  62  Mo.  App.  647, 

463,  550,   1295 
City    of   Wheeling   v.    Mayor    &c.,    1 

Hughes  90,  579 

City   of    Whitewrigbt   v.    Taylor,    23 

Tes.  Civ.  App.  486,  1376 

City  of  Wilkes  Barre  v.  Meyers,  113 

Pa.  St.  395.  1446 

City    of   WMlliamsport    v.    Beck,    128 

Pa.   St.   147,  1195 

V.    Commonwealth,    89    Pa.    St. 
48.  977 

City  of  Willow  Springs  v.  Withaupt, 

61  Mo.  App.  275.  515 

City  of  Wilmington  v.  Macks,  86  N. 

C.  88,  1.507 

V.  Yopp.  71  N.  C.  76,  1230 

City  of  W'inchester  v.   Redmond.  93 

Va.  711.  638,  741 

City  of  Winfield  v.   Peeden,  8  Kan. 

App.  671.  180,  790 

City  of  Winona  v.  Burke,  23  Minn. 

254,  537 

V.  School  Dist.,  40  Minn.  13, 

1473,  1474 
City  of  Worcester  v.  Inhabitants  &c., 

4  Allen  574,  1047 

V.  Keith.  5  Allen  17,  697 

City  of  Wyandotte  v.  Wood,  5  Kan. 

603,  54,  55 

V.  Zeitz,  21  Kan.  649.  646 

City  of  Yonkers  v.    Yonkers  R.   Co., 

64  N.  Y.  S.  955.  503,  1407 

City  of  Ysleta  v.  Babbitt,  8  Tex.  Civ. 

App.  432,  788.  789,  816 

City  of  Zanesville  v.  Richard,  5  Ohio 

St.  589,  1513,  1521,  1534 

City   R.   Co.   V.   Citizens'   St.   R.   Co., 
166  U.   S.   557, 

566,  1351.  1756.  1808,  1813 
City    &c.    R.    Co.    V.    Mayor   &c.,    77 

Ga.   7.S1.  594.   1358 

City  Sav.  Bank  v.  Huebner,  84  Mich. 

391,  910 

City    St.    Imp.    Co.    v.    Babcock,    123 

Cal.    205,  1131 

Civil   Service  Com'rs  v.   Kenyon,   86 

111.  App.  547.  1686 

Claflin   V.   City  of  Chicago,    178   III. 

.549,  11.53 

V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  4  Gray  502,    668 
V.   McDonough.  3.3  Mo.  412.  1263 

Claiborne   Co.   v.    Brooks.    Ill    U.    S. 

400,  562.  625.  637,  972,  974.  984 

Clapp  V.  Camp,  122  Mass.  481,  1779 

V.    City    of   Hartford,    35    Conn. 
66,  1239,  1270,  1271 

V.  Davis,  25  Iowa  315,  1745 


Clapper  v.  Town  of  Waterford,  131 

N.   Y.   382,  778 

(Maridge  v.  lOvelyn,  5  B.  &  Aid.  81,     378 
Clarissy  v.   Metropolitan  Fire  Dept., 

7  Abb.  Pr.  352,  1744 

Clark  V.  Barnard,  108  TI.  S.  436,  18 

v.   Board  &c.,  27   111.  305.  973 

V.  Board  &c.,  24  Iowa  266.  1494 

V.  Board  &c.,   126  Mass.  282,  378 

V.  Board  &c.,  9  Neb.  516.  653 

V.  Board  &c.,  107  N.  Y.  553,  853 

V.  City  of  Austin,  38  Minn.  487, 

828,    1590 
V.   City  of  Columbus,   23   Wkly. 
L.  Bui.  289,  837 

V.   City   of  Davenport,    14   Iowa 
494,  106,  846,  1232,  1535 

V.  City  of  Des  Moines,  19  Iowa 
199,     217,  234,  250,  252.  253,  638.  941 
952,  960,  977,  1232,   1368.  1459 
V.    City    of    Dunkirk,    75    N.    Y. 
612,  1197 

V.    City    of   Janesville,    10    Wis. 
119.  484,  837,  973 

V.  City  of  Portsmouth,  68  N.  H. 
263,  180 

V.  City  of  Richmond,  83  Va.  355, 

795     1595 
V.   City   of   Rochester,   24    Barb. 
446,  76:5,   983 

V.  City  of  South  Bend.  85  Ind. 
276,  575,   1121,   1391 

V.  City  of  Utica,  18  Barb.  451,    698 
V.  City  of  Worcester,  167  Mass. 
81,  1792 

V.    Commonwealth,    29    Pa.    St. 
129,  66,  69,  70,  197 

V.   Fry.  8   Ohio  St.  358,  745 

V.   Hannibal  &c.   R.   Co.,  36  Mo. 
202.  1108 

V.  Holdridge,  58  Barb.  61.  220 

V.     Inhabitants    &c.,    63    Maine 
393,  1613 

V.    Inhabitants    &c.,    128    Mass. 
567,  803,  807 

V.    Jeffersonville  &c.   R.    Co.,   44 
Ind.   248,  656 

V.  Le  Crete,  9  B.  &  C.  52,     100,  500 
V.   Lincoln   Co.,   1   Wash.   518,  9 

V.  Manchester.  62  N.  H.  577, 

795,   803,   804,   810.   815.   816,   827 
V.    Mayor    &c.,    12    Wheat.    40, 

261,  282 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  13  Barb.  32,  1093 

V.   McKenzie,   7   Bush  523,  381 

V.  Miller.  54  N.  Y.  528.  222 

V.  Mobile  School  Com'rs,  36  Ala. 
621,  1745 

V.  Montague,  1  Gray  446,  1740 

V.  Peckham.  10  R.  I.  35,  1112 

V.  People,  146  111.  348,  1278 

V.   Phelps,  4  Cow.  190.  335,  1570 

V.  Polk  Co.,  19  Iowa  248. 

252.  941  952  9.59 
V.  Robinson,  88  111  498,  '  "'  377 
V.  School  Directors,  78  111.  474,  864 
V.   School  District,  3  R.   I.   199, 

973,  977 
V.  Sheldon,  106  N.  Y.  104,  925,  1678 
V.   State,  109  Ind.   388.  1490 

V.   State.  142  N.  Y.  101,  175 

V.  Thompson,  37  Iowa  536,  12 

V.  Village  of  Dunkirk,  75  N.  Y. 
612.  1288 

V.   Village  of  Dunkirk,   12   Hun 
181.  1717 

V.    Village   of   North    Muskegon, 
88  Mich.  308.  17,38 

V.   Warden.   55   Maine  61,      347,   348 
V.   Worcester.   125   Mass.   226.        675 
Clark  Co.  v.   Hine.  49  Ark.  145.  1052 

Clarke   v.   City   of  Chicago,    185    111. 

354,  1153,  1277 


Ixxxvi 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


IReferences  are  to  Pages.   Yol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.'\ 


Clarke  v.  City  of  Rochester,  5  Abb. 

Pr.  107,  447 

V.  Butcher,  9  Cow.  674,  245,  248 
V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  81  Mo.  503,  576 
V.  Locke,  9  N.  Y.  S.  918,  1541 

V.  Lyon  Co.,  8  Nev.  181, 

181,  663,  714,  1736 
T.  Manchester.  56  N.  H.  502,  699 
V.  May,  2  Gray  410.  335 

V.  Rochester,  24  Barb.  446,  11 

V.  Rogers,  81   Ky.  43,  58,  61 

Clarksburg  Electric  Light  Co.  v. 
City  of  Clarksburg,  47  W.  Va. 
739,  1811 

Clason  V.  City  of  Milwaukee,  30  Wis. 

316,  499,  502,  506,  1406 

Classen  v.  Shaw,  5  Watts  468,  311 

Clay  V.  Nichols  Co.,  4  Bush  154,  982 

V.   Wright,   44  Vt.   538,  871 

Claybrook   v.    Board   &c.,    117    N.    C. 

450,  993 

V.   City  of  Owensboro,   23   Fed. 
634,  1494 

Clayburgh  v.  City  of  Chicago,  25  111. 

535,  1224 

Clay  Co.  V.  McAleer,  115  U.  S.  616, 

1525,  1662 
V.    Simonsen,    1   Dak.   403, 

319,  904,  908 
V.    Society   &c.,    104    U.    S.    579, 

998,  1006 

Clayton  v.  Harris,  7  Nev.  64,  369 

V.   McWilliam.s.   49  Miss.  311,       960 

Clearfield  v.  Ind.  School  Dist.,  79  Pa. 

St.  419,  1485 

Clear  Lake  &c.  v.  Lake  Co.,  45  Cal. 

90.  1394 

Clearwater  v.  Meredith,  1  Wall.  25,         5 

Cleary  v.  Eddy  Co.,  2  N.  Dak.  397,      1654 

Cleburne  Water  &c.  Co.  v.  City  of 
Cleburne,  13  Tex.  Civ.  App. 
141,  1752 

Clegg  V.  School  Dist.,  8  Neb.  178,  56 

Cleghorn    v.    Po^elthwaite,    43    111. 

428,  1720 

Cleland  v.   Porter,  74  111.  76,  372 

Clemence  v.  City  of  Auburn,  66  N.  Y. 

334,  812,  1584.  1587,  1603 

Clemens  v.  Mayor  &c.,   10  Md.  208,  1262 

Clement  v.  Burns,  43  N.   H.  609, 

696,    1572 
V.  City  of  Philadelphia,  137  Pa. 
St.   328,  1192 

v.    Everest.    29    Mich.    19,  66,    69 

Clementine  v.  State.  14  Mo.  112,       1105 

Clements   v.    Lee,    114    Ind.    397, 

1150,  1190 
v.  Village  of  West  Troy,  10  How. 
I'r.   199,  1559 

Clerk  V.  Tucket,  3  Lev.  281,         531,  532 

Cleveland  v.  Amy,  88  Mich.  374, 

1486,  1491 
V.  City  Council  &c.,  54  S.  C.  83, 

986,  999,   1033,   1709 
V.    City    of    Bangor,    87    Maine 
259,  1333 

V.   Grand  Trunk  R.   Co.,   42   Vt. 
449,  1109 

V.  Heisley,  41  Ohio  St.  670,  1518 

V.   King,   132   U.    S.    295, 

1591,  1594,  1609 
v.  State  Bank,  16  Ohio  St.  236,  210 
V.  Steward,  3  Ga.  283,  0 

V.   Tripp,    13   R.    I.    50. 

1239,   1242,   1268 

Cleveland  Cotton  Mills  v.  Commis- 
sioners &c.,  108  N.  C.  678,  835 

Cleveland  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  City  of  Cleve- 
land, 94  Fed.  385,  1707 
v.  Dunn,  63  111.  App.  531,  66 
V.  O'Brien,  24   Ind.   App.   547,      1200 
V.    Wynant,    114    Ind.    525, 

1613,    1614 


Clevenger  v.  Town  of  Rushville,   90 

Ind.   258,  537 

Clews  V.  Lee  Co.,  2  Woods  474,  1528 

Click  V.  Lamar  Co.,  79  Tex.  121,       1568 

Clifford  V.  Commissioners,  59  Maine 

262,  697 

Clifton  V.  Cook,  7  Ala.  114,  152 

V.  Wvnne,  80  N.  C.  145,  1528 

Clingman  v.   People,   183  III.  339,       1308 

Clinton  v.  Cedar  Rapids  &c.   R.  Co., 

24  Iowa  455,  90 

V.  City  of  Portland,  26  Or.  410, 

1141,  1260 
V.   Englebrecht,   13  Wall.  434,  47 

Clodfelter  v.  State,  86  N.  C.  51,     771,  773 

Cloherty,  In  re,  2  Wash.  137,  1410 

Close  V.  Glenwood  Cemetery,  107  U. 

S.  466,  104 

Cloud  V.   Town  of  Norwich,   57   Vt. 

448,  212 

Clough  V.  Hart,  8  Kan.  487,         181,  664 
V.  Holden,  115  Mo.  336,  586 

Cloughessey  v.  City  of  Waterbury,  51 

Conn.  405,  1624 

Cluggish    V.    Koons,    15    Ind.    App. 

599.  1286. 

Coal  Float  V.  City  of  Jeffersonville, 

112  Ind.  15,  500 

Coan   V.    City   of   Marlborough,    164 

Mass.   206,  789 

Coast    Co.    V.    Mayor   &c.,    56    N.    J. 

Bq.  615,  70,  1731 

Coast  Line  R.  Co.  v.   Mayor  &c.,  30 

Fed.   646,  510,    1183 

Coates  V.  Campbell,  37  Minn.  498,       980 

V.    Mayor   &c.,    7    Cow.    585,  528, 

611,  1079,   1086,   1105,   1114,  1119 

Coatesville   Gas   Co.   v.    Chester  Co., 

97  Pa.  St.  476,  1512 

Cobb   V.    City   of   Boston,    112   Mass. 

181.  701,  702 

V.    City   of   Portland,    55   Maine 
381.  799 

V.  Kingman,  15  Mass.  197,     90,  103 
V.  Lucas.  15  Pick.  1,  707 

V.  Ramsdell.  14  N.  Y.  S.  93,       1065 
V.    School   Dist.,   63  Vt.   647. 

853,  1491 

Coburn    v.    Bossert,    13    Ind.    App. 

359,  1705 

V.  Ellenwood,  4  N.  II.  99,  50 

Cochran  v.  McCleary,  22  Iowa  75, 

189.  286,  288,  296 
V.    Village    of    Park    Ridge,    138 
111.  295,  1146,   1174 

Cochrane   v.   Mayor  &c.,   81   Md.    54, 

599,   812 

Cocke  V.  Halsey,  16  Pet.  71,    70,  195,  197 

Cocker   v.    Du    Coteau    Landing   Co., 

16  Rap.   Jud.  Que.   S.   C.  72,  550 

Cockerel!   v.   Cholomeley,   1   Russ.  & 

Mvl.  418.  429,  1014 

Codman  v.  Winslow,  10  Mass.  146,     348 

Codner  v.   Bradford.   10  Wis.  443,     1596 

Coe  V.  Bearup,  14  Week.  Dig.  246,     1564 
V.  Caledonia  &c.  R.  Co.,  27  Minn. 
197.  990 

V.  Meriden,  45  Conn.  155,  115 

V.   Schultz,  47   Barb.  64.  1107 

V.    Smith,   24  Wend.  341,  10,50 

Coffey  V.    Edmonds,   58   Cal.   521,  158 

Coffeyville   &c.    Co.   v.    Citizens'   Gas 

&c.  Co.,  55  Kan.  173,  1347 

Coffin   V.   City  of   Portland,   43   Fed. 

411,  29» 

V.    Inhabitants   &e.,    162   Mass. 
192,  1317 

V.   Nantucket.   5  Cush.   269,  281 

V.  Richards,  59  I'ac.  562,  986 

V.   State.  7   Ind.   157,  183 

Coggeshall    V.    City    of    Des    Moines, 

78    Iowa   235,  837,    1188 

V.  Peltou,  7  Johns.  Ch.  292,  664 


TABLE    OP    CASES. 


Ixxxvii 


[References  are  to  Pages.    Vol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Yol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.1 


Coggswell     V.      Inhabitants     &c.,     4 

Cush.   307,  1597 

Cohen  V.  City  of  Alameda,   11*4  Cal. 

504,  115:5,    1506 

V.    Mayor   &c.,    11.3    N.    Y.    532, 

1110,  1111,  1112,  1609,  1610 
V.  St.  Louis  &c.  R.  Co.,  34  Kan. 
158,  701 

Coin  V.  Brown,  111  Mich.  657,  75 

Colburn  v.  Ellis,  5  Mass.  427,  198 

V.    Mayor  &c.,   17   Am.   L.   Reg. 
191,  562 

Colchester  v.  Seabor,  3  Burr.   1870,     445 
Colden  v.  Botts,  12  Wend.  234,  544 

V.  Thurbur,  2  Johns.  424,  1559 

Cole  V.    Black   River   Falls,   57   Wis. 

110.  196,   447 

V.    City    of    Newburyport,    129 
Mass.  594,  818 

V.    Citv    of    Shreveport,    41    La. 
An.  839,  719,  1306 

V.    City   of    St.    Louis,    132    Mo. 
633.  1219,   1380 

V.  Favorite,  69  111.  457,  1757 

V.    La    Grange,    113    U.    S.    1, 

559,    980 
V.   Laws.   108   N.   C.   185.  226 

V.    Medina,    27   Barb.    218,  2G3 

V.    People,    161    111.    16,  725 

V.   Skrainka,   105   Mo.  303,  1131 

V.  Trustees  &c.,  27  Barb.  218,  820 
Cole  Co.  V.  Schmidt,  10  S.  W.  888,  906 
Coleman,   In   re.  30  Hun  544,  1723 

V.  Board  &c.,  50  Cal.  493,  991 

V.  City  of  Fargo,  8  N.  D.  69,         930 
V.    Commonwealth,    25    Gratt. 
865.  1421,   1422 

V.   Ormond,   60  Ala.  328,  328 

V.  Pike  Co.,  83  Ala.  326,       906,  907 
V.  Second  Ave.  R.  Co.,  38  N.  Y. 
201.  637 

V.  State,  47  N.  Y.  St.  609,  773 

Coler    V.    Board    &c.,    89    Fed.    257, 

1633,  1700 
V.  Board  &c.,  6  N.  Mex.  88,  1014 
V.  Cleburne,  131  U.  S.   162, 

614.   1014,   1015 
Coles  V.  Madison  Co.,  1  111.  154, 

61,  83,   759 
V.  Trustees  &c.,  10  Wend.  659,     291 
Coles    Co.    V.    Allison,    23    111.    383, 

437,  1691 

Colin  V.  Board  &c.,  114  Cal.  404,  872 

Coll    V.    City    Board    &c.,    83    Mich. 

367,  •  1665 

Collander  v.  Marsh,  1  Pick.  418.  824 

College  Street,  In  re,  5  R.  I.  474,       1247 
Collensworth  v.   City  of  New  What- 
com, 16  Wash.  224.  796 
Collett    V.    Mayor   &c.,    64    N.    Y.    S. 

693,  1358,   1362,   1375,   1376 

Collier  v.  Hyatt,  110  Ga.  317,  1787 

Collingwood  v.  Pace,  1  Vent.  413,       130 
Collins   V.    City   of   Louisville,    2    B. 

Mon.  134.  1254 

V.  City  of  New  Albany,  59  Ind. 
396.  392 

V.   City  of  Waltham,   151   Mass. 
196.  1179 

V.  Holyoke.   146  Mass.  298.  285 

V.  Inhabitants  &c..  6  Cush.  396,  1618 
V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  172  Mass.  78, 

815,    816 

V.   King  Co.,   1    Wash.   416.  1052 

V.  McDaniel.  66  Ga.  203,  223 

V.  Russell,  107  Oa.  423,  201 

V.  Welch,  58  Iowa  72,  660,  661 

Collopy  V.  Cloherty,  18  Ky.  L.  1061,    290 

Colman  v.  Anderson,  10  Mass.  105,     343 

V.  Shattnck.  62  N.  Y.  348,  187 

Colorado  Pav.  Co.  v.  Murphy,  78  Fed. 

28.  1687,  1704 

Colter  V.  Casteel,  37  S.  W.  791,  754 


Colter  V.  Morgan,  12  B.  Mon.  278,         318 

Colton  V.  Ilanchett,  13  111.  615,  1701 

Columbia    v.     Harrison,    2    Treadw. 

Const.   213,  ,529 

v.  Hunt,  5  Rich.  550,  1232 

Columbia  Bridge  Co.  v.  Kline,  Bright. 

320,  564 

Columbia  R.   Co.  v.   Hawthorne,   144 

TJ.  S.  202,  1G27 

Columbia  Tp.  v.  Pipes,  122  Ind. 

239,  1749 

Columbus  &c.   R.   Co.   v.   Board  &c., 

05  Ind.  427,  1539 

Columbus  Water-works  Co.  v.  City  of 

Columbus,  48  Kan.  99,  74G 

Colville  v.  Judy,   73  Mo.  651,  696 

Colwell  V.  May's  Landing  Co.,  19  N. 

J.    Fq.   245,  517 

Comanche    Co.    v.    Lewis,    138    U.    S. 

198,  86,  974 

Comb  V.  Bell,  2  Minn.  295,  1165 

Comer  v.   Bankhead,   70  Ala.   493,        216 
V.    Folsom,    13    Minn.   219,  992 

Comesky  v.  Postal  Tel.  Cable  Co.,  41 

App.  Div.  245,  1773 

Commercial  Elec.  &c.  Co.  v.  City  of 

Tacoma,  20  Wash.  288,  789 

Commercial  Nat.  Bank  v.  City  of  lola, 

2  Dillon  353,  55,  980,  982 

V.  City  of  Portland,  24  Or.  188, 

741,    1306 

Commissioner  v.  Smith,  5  Tex.  471.     224 

Commissioners. — See     also,     Board  ; 
Name  of  county. 

Commissioners  &c..   In   re,   49   N.    J 

L.    488,  564 

Commissioners  &c..  Matter  of,  47  Hun 

302,  1248 

V.  Albany  Co.,  92  U.  S.  307,  103 

V.    Anderson,   20   Kan.    298,  212 

V.  Aspinwall,  21  How.  539,  1011 

V.  Auditor  &c.,  1  Ohio  St.  322,     434 
V.  Babcock,  5  Or.  472,  229 

V.  Baker,  44  Md.   1,  8 

V.  Bolles,  94  U.  S.  104, 

1001,  1002,  1006,  1007,  1022 
V.  Brewer,  9  Kan.  307,  182,  743 

V.   Bunker,   16   Kan.   498,        427,   434 
V.   Call.   123  N.   C.  308,  986,  999 

V.  Clark,  94  U.  S.  278, 

1002,  1014,  1017,  1031 
V.  Claw,  15  Johns.  537,  708 

V.   Commissioners  «&c.,   92   U.   S. 
307,  14,    434,    767,    1517,    1532 

V.   Commissioners  &c.,   79   N.   C. 
565,  434 

V.  Commissioners  &c.,  101  N.  C. 
520,  1043 

V.  Commissioners  &c.,  107  N.  C. 
291,  438,  439 

V.    Commissioners   &c.,    16    Ohio 
466,  436 

V.  Commissioners  &c.,  2  Ohio  St. 
508,  436 

V.   Covey,   74   Md.   262, 

509,  595,  1391,  1392 
V.  Directors  &c.,  7  Ohio  St.  65,  1063 
V.    Durham,   43    III.   86.  705 

V.   Frank,   1  Jones  L.  436,  539 

V.  Griffin,  134  111.  330,  1712 

V.  Harris,  7  Jones  L.  281,  507 

V.  Ilearne,  59  Ala.  371,  :!()0 

V.  Jackson,  165  111.  17,  879 

V.    January,    94    U.    S.    202. 

1001,  1006 
V.  Johnston,  71  N.  C.  398,  704 

V.  Keller,  6  Kan.  510, 

941,  952.  959,  960 
V.  Kent,  5  Neb.  227,  278 

V.  Leckey,  6  S.  &  R.  166.  295 

V.  McCombs,  19  Ohio  St.  320,       629 
V.   McDaniel,  7  Jones  L.   107,        196 


Ixxxviii 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


{References  are  to  Pages.   Vol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Yol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.'] 


Commissioners  &c.  v.  National  Land 

Co..  23  Kan.  106,  245 

V.  Nelson.  19  Kan.  234,  427 

V.  Newell,  80  111.  587,  977,  1532 

V.  Norris,  62  Ga.  538,  1725 

V.    Northern    Liberties   Gas   Co., 
12  Pa.  St.  318,       500,  502,  506,  508 
V.  Osborn,  4G  Ohio  St.  271,  938 

V.  Quinn.  136  III.  604.  1170 

V.  Ranney,   13   Ohio  St.  388,  938 

V.  Rather,  48  Ala.  433,  412 

V.    Rollins    &    Sons,    178    U.    S. 
255  998 

V.  Smuggs,  121  N.  C.  394,  986 

V.  Supervisors  &c..  27  111.  140,  1724 
V.  Thaver.  94  U.  S.  631,  990,  1001 
V.  Tomlinson.  9  Kan.  167,  1072 

V.    Village    of    East    Peoria,    75 
III.  App.   450.  610 

V.  Walker.  8  Kan.  431,  1263,  1552 
V.   Zimmerman,    101   Ky.   432. 

993.  1021 

Common  Council  &c.  v.  Board  &c.,  87 

Mich.    113,  1163 

V.    Huron    Copper   Min.    Co..    57 
Mich.  547.  628,  1536 

V.  State.  5  Ind.  334,  664 

Common    Schools   v.    Commissioners 

&c.,  20  Md.  449.  845 

Commonwealth,    Appeal    of,    9    Atl. 

524,  1320 

V.  Abrahams,  156  Mass.  57,  508,  578 
V.  Adams.  3  Bush  41,  308 

V.  Adams,   114  Mass.  323.  1642 

V.  Albur^er,   1   Whart.  469,  629 

V.    Alger,    7    Cush.    53, 

594,  1115,  1382 
V.  Allen,  70  Pa.   St.   465, 

380,    1690,    1694 
V.  Arrison,  15  S.  &  R.  127,  296 

V.  Athearn,  3  Mass.  285,  1429 

V.   Baldwin,   1   Watts  54,  1734 

V.  Bean.  14  Gray  52,  552 

V.   Bennett.   108  Mass.  30,  84 

V.  Blaisdell,  107  Mass.  234,  1106 
V.   Brennan.    150   Mass.   63.  428 

V.  Brooks,  109  Mass.  355,     509,  552 
V.  Central  Bridge  Corporation,  12 
Cush.    243,  1575 

V.  Chase,  6  Cush.  248,       1423,  1424 
V.    City    of    Boston,    16    Pick. 
442,  1557 

V.    City    of    Frankfort,    92    Ky. 
149.  588 

V.  City  of  Louisville,  20  Ky.  L. 
893,  1756 

V.  City  of  Pittsburg.  14  Pa.  St. 
177.  168,  285,  301 

V.  Clulev,  56  Pa.  St.  270,  378 

V.  Cochran,  5  Binn.  87,  1667 

V.  Comly,  3  Pa.  St.  372,  319 

V.  Commercial  Bank,  28  Pa.  St. 
383.  123,  296 

V.    Commissioners   &c.,    6    Binn. 
5,  1662 

V.   Commissioners  &c.,   16   Serg. 
&  R.  443.  1527 

V.    Commissioners  &c.,   9   Watts 
466.  295 

V.  Commissioners  &c.,  1  Whart. 
1,  1662 

V.  Commissioners  &c.,  32  Pa.  St. 
218,  990 

V.    Commissioners    &c.,    37    Pa. 
St.  277,  1016,  1522,  1527,  1530 

1534,  1667 
V.   Coolev.    10   Pick.   37.  ^■''H 

V.  Coombs.  2  Mass.  489.  634 

V.  Corcoran.  9  Knlp  507.  297 

V.   Council   &c.,   41    Pa.   St.   278. 

977.  983 
V.  County  Com'rs.  5  Rawle  75.  371 
V.  Cullen,  13  Pa.  St.  133,     447,  1813 


Commonwealth  v.  Curtis,  9  Allen  266, 

517,  539,  552,  597 
V.  Cutter,  156  Mass.  52, 

500.   507,   538,   597,   1419 
V.  Davis.  140  Mass.   485. 

484.  485.  500,  509,  602 
V.  Dean,  110  Mass.  357,  84 

V.   De   Camp,   177    Pa.    St.   112,      731 
V.  Delaware  Canal  Co.,  123  Pa. 
St.  594,  1521 

V.  Dow,   10  Met.  382,  517,  519 

V.  Downing.  6  Mass.  72,  707 

V.  Dugan.  12  Met.  233.  1433 

V.  Emminger,  74  Pa.  St.  479,  381 
V.  Emorv.  11  Cush.  406,  1418 

V.    Erie   &c.    R.   Co..    27    Pa.    St. 
339.  97.   468.  592,   1352 

V.  Fahey.  5  Cush.  408.  536,  1086 
V.  Fairfax,  4  Hen.  &  M.  208,  326 
V.  Fenton,  1.39  Mass.  195,  1395 

V.   Fowler,  10  Mass.  290,  1690 

V.  Gabhert.  5  Bush  438.  318 

V.  Genther,  17  S.  &  R.  135,  211 

V.  George.  148  Pa.  St.  463,  582 

V.    German    Society,    15    Pa.    St. 
251.  207 

V.   Goodrich.   13   Allen  546,  10S6 

V.  Hamilton  Mfg.  Co.,  120  Mass. 
383,  1811 

V.    Hankes,    123    Mass.    525. 

1418,  1420 
V.  Ilargest.  7  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  333,  305 
V.   Hastings,   9  Met.  259.  1433 

V.  Heffron.  102  Mass.  148.  1422 

V.   Holmes.   17   Mass.   336,  1106 

V.  Holmes,  25  Gratt.  771,  317,  319 
V.  Howard,  149  Pa.  St.  302,  281 

V.  Hublev,   172  Mass.  58,  1386 

V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  3  Mass.  406,  1739 
V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  1  Pick.  180,  684 
V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  2  Pick.  70,  290 
V.   Johnson,   2   Binney   275.  960 

V.   .lohnson.   6  Pa.   St.   136,  1734 

V.  Judges.  8  Pa.  St.  391.  58.  61 

V.  Justices  &c.,  2  Pick.  414.  1683 
V.  Kepner.  10  Phila.  510.  286,  296 
V.  King.  13  Mete.  115.  1105,  1587 
V.   Leech,   44   Pa.    St.   332. 

380.  556,   1690 
V.   Lennon,   172   Mass.   434,  1362 

V.  Lowell  Gas  Co.,  12  Allen  75. 

4.  1511,  1512 
V.  Marshall,  69  Pa.  St.  328,  1160 
V.  Matthews.  122  Mass.  60.  487 

V.  McCafCerty,  145  Mass.  384. 

483,  500,  552,  601 
V.  McClelland,  83  Ky.  686,  370 

V.  McCombs,  56  Pa.  St.  436. 

66.  69,  70.  197 
V.    McDonald,    16    Serg.    &    R. 
390.  1559 

V.    McGroartv.   6   Kulp   105.  84 

V.  McWilliams.  11  Pa.  St.  61.  983 
V.  Meeser.  44  Pa.  St.  341,  380,  1690 
V.    Mitchell,    82    Pa.    St.    343, 

1667,  1687 

V.  Mohn,  52  Pa.  St.  243,  1105 

V.  Moorehead.  118  Pa.  St.  344,  1106 
V.   Mulhall.   162  Mass.  496.  1348 

V.  New  York  &c.  R.  Co.,  138  Pa. 
St.   58.  1681 

V.  Odenweller,  156  Mass.  234, 

539,    1420 
V.   Page,   155   Mass.   227. 

597.  1397.  1402 
V.   Painter.   10   Pa   St.   214. 

58,  61,   82 
V.   Parks,  155  Mass.   531.  595 

V.  Patch.  97  Mass.  221. 

494.   502.   597.   1085.    1094 
V.  Pennsylvania  Benef.  Institute, 
2  S.  &  R.  141,  206 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


Ixxxix 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Vol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.'] 

Comstook  V.  Incorporated  Village  of 
Nelsonville,  61  Ohio  St.  2S8, 


Commonwealth  v.  Pennsylvania  Canal 

Co..  (56  ra.  St.  41.  674 

V.    People's   &c.    P.ank,    5    Allen 
4L'8,  1520 

V.  Perkins.  7  Pa.  St.  42.  1G67 

V.  Perkins,  43  Pa.  St.  400, 

983,  1520,  1.530 
V.  Peters.  3  Mass.  229,         695,  1572 
V.    Philadelphia,    132    Pa.    St. 
288.  1467 

V.  Pindar.  11  Met.  539.  1411 

V.   Plaisted,   148  Mass.  375, 

468,  493,  500.  551.  552,  1433.  1434 
V.   Proprietors  &c.,  2  Gray  339, 

831,  832 
V.  Quarter  Sessions.  8  Barr  391.  82 
V.  Reid,  175  Mass.  325,  1386 

V.  Rice.  9  Met.  253,  580,  1402 

V.  Roark,  8  Cush.  210,  1411 

V.  Robertson,  5  Cush.  438. 

500,  517,  1084 
V.   Rowe,   141   Mass.   79,  537 

V.  Roxburv.  9  Gray  451,  15 

V.   Roy.   140  Mass.   432,  506 

V.  Rush,   14  I'a.  St.  186,  629 

V.  Ryan,  5  Mass.  90,  1417 

V.    Schiibmehl,   3   Lack.    Leg.    N. 
186,  305 

V.  Select  &c.  Council.  34  Pa.  St. 
496,        971,    1523,    1526,    1528.    1530 
1535,   1667 
V.  Select  &c.  Council,  88  Pa.  St. 
66,  1527,  1529 

V.  Shaw,  7  Met.  52, 

347,  348,  851,  362 
V.   Shaw,   1   Pittsb.   492,  1415 

V.   Sheldon.  3   Mass.   188,  706 

V.  Smith.  132  :\Iass.  289.  308 

V.  Springfield  &c.  Co.,  10  Bush 
254,  990 

V.  Stark,  2  Cush.  556,  538 

V.  Steffee.  7  Bush  161,  500 

V.  Stockley.  12  Phila.  316,  1405 

V.  Stockton,  5  T.  B.  Mon.  192,     332 
V.  Stodder,  2  Cush.  502, 

467.  506,  519,  552,  1389,  1404 
V.  Sutherland,  3  S.  &  R.  145,  200 
T.   Tewksbury,   11   Met.   55,  594 

V.     Towanda    Water-Works,     15 
Atl.   440,  1688 

V.  Towles,  5  Leigh  743,  137 

V.   Union  &c.   Ins.   Co.,   5  Mass. 
230,  1693 

V.  Upton,   6  Gray  473,  1106 

V.  Went  worth.  145  Mass.  50, 

360,  362 
V.  West  Chester,  9  Pa.  Co.  Ct. 
542,  1666 

V.    Westfield    Borough,    11    Pa. 
Co.  Ct.  369,  1655 

V.    Wilkins,    121    Mass.    356. 

535,  1403 
V.  Williamson.  10  Phila.  490,  1494 
V.  Winthrop.  10  Mass.  177,  707 

V.  Woelper.  3   S.  &  R.   29,  185 

V.  Wolbert,  6  Binn.  292,  650 

V.  Woods,  44  Pa.  St.  113, 

593.   1243,   1253 
V.  Worcester,  3  Pick.  462, 

500,  505.  529.  536,  551 
V.  Wyman.  137  Pa.  St.  508, 

166,  287 
V.  Yost,  11  Pa.  Super.  Ct.  323.  1763 
V.  Young,  135  Mass.  526.       468,  552 

Company    &c.    v.    Atkinson,    6    East 

507.  326 

Compher  v.  People.  12  111.  290.  318 

Comstock  V.   City  of  Grand  Rapids, 

54   Mich.   G41,  802.    1200 

V.    City    of    Syracuse,    5    N.    Y. 
874,  895,  896 


720,   728,  745 
V.  School  Committee  &c.,  17  R. 

I.  827,  364 
Conboy  v.  Iowa  City,  2  Iowa  90. 

85.  491,  5.38,  1418 
Concord  v.  Burleigh,  67  N.  II.  106,    1110 
V.  Boscawen,  17  N.  II.  465. 

1536,  1542 
V.  Concord  Horse  R.  Co.,  65  N. 

II.  30,  282 
V.    Merrimack    Co.,    60    N.    H. 
521,                                                      1055 
V.  Robinson,  121  U.  S.  165, 

562,  625,  645.  981,  984 

Concord  R.  Co.  v.  Greeley,  17  N.  I-I. 

^       47,  685 

Condict   V.    Mayor   &c.,   46   N.    J.    L. 

^       157,  781,  1096 

Condran  v.  City  of  New  Orleans.  43 

La.  An.  1202,  710,  743 

Conery  v.  New  Orleans  Water-Works 

Co.,   142   U.    S.   79.  767,   768 

V.  New  Orleans  Water-Works  Co., 
39  La.  An.  770,  650 

V.  New  Orleans  Water-Works  Co., 
41  La.  An.  910.  572,  636 

Congreve  v.  Morgan,  18  N.  Y.  84,     1599 
V.   Morgan,   5  Duer  495,  745 

Conklin  v.  City  of  Elmira,  42  N.  Y. 

S.  518.  1342 

V.    City    of    Keokuk,    73    Iowa 
343,  1227 

V.   Thompson,   29   Barb.   218,  807 

Conklyn    v.    New    York    &c.    R.    Co., 

102   N.  Y.   107,  1603 

Conley  v.  Chedic.  6  Nev.  222,  1722 

V.    Supervisors    &c.,    2    W.    Va. 
416,  523 

Conlin   v.    Aldrich,   98   Mass.   557. 

1657,  1692 
V.  Board  &c..  99  Cal.  17.  926 

Connecticut  &c.   Ins.   Co.   v.   City   of    ' 
Chicago,   185   111.   148,  1295 

V.     Cleveland    &c.    R.    Co.,    41 
Barb.  9,  1014 

Connecticut  River  R.   Co.  v.  County 

Com'rs,    127   Mass.   50,  1743 

Connellsville  Borough  v.  Gilmore.  15 

W.  N.  C.  343,  1124 

Conner  v.  Beret.   1  Mo.   235.  7-59 

V.  Board  &c.,  57  Ind.  15,     841,  1040 
V.  Elliot.  IS  How.  591,  137 

V.   Mayor.   2  Sandf.  355,        199,   201 

Connett  v.  City  of  Chicago,  114  111. 

233,  1349 

Connolly  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  151  Mass. 

437,  .         641,  672 

Connor  v.  Mayor  &c.,  5  N.  Y.  285,         183 

Connors  v.  Carp  River  Iron  Co.,  54 

Mich.   168.  106 

Conover  v.  Devlin,  15  How.  Pr.  470,     197 

Conoway  v.  Ascherman,  94  Ind,  187,  696 

Conrad  v.   Stone,  78  Mich.  635,  161,  162 
V.  Trustees  &c..  16  N,  Y,  158, 

9.  782,  812.  821,  1587,  1591,  1592 

Conroe  v.  Bull,  7  Wis.  408,  1737 

Conservators  &c,  v.  Ash,  10  Barn.  & 

Cress.  349.  38 

Consolidated  &c.  Ass'n  v.  Avingo,  28 

La.  An.  552.  1027 

Consolidated  Traction  Co.  v.  East  Or- 
ange Tp.,  63  N.  J.  L.  669. 

592,  1791,  1814 

Construction  of  Sewer  &c..  In  re,  30 

Pittsb,  L.  J.  18,  1266 

Consumers'  Gas  &c.  Co.  v.  Congress 

Spring  Co..  15  N.  Y.  S.  624.         681 

Continental  &c.  Co.  v.  Riggen.  31  Or. 

336.  879 

Continental  Const.  Co.  v.  City  of  Al- 
toona,  92  Fed.  822,  551,  730 


sc 


TABLE  OF   CASES. 


IBeferences  are  to  Pages.  Vol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.'] 


Converse  v.   City  of  Fort  Scott,  92 

U.  S.  503,  991 

V.  McArthur,  19  Barb.  410,         1062 
V.  Porter,  45  N.  H.  385, 

352,  361,   1569 

Conway  v.  City  of  Beaumont,  61  Tex. 

10,  263 

V.  Russell,   151  Mass.  581,  222 

V.  St.  Louis,  9  Mo.  App.  488,  197 

v.  O'Brien,  11  Ind.  41i).  97,  468 

V.  President  &c.,  15  lud.  150, 

1252,    1500 

Cook  V.  Boston,  9  Allen  393,  243 

V.   City  of  Anamosa,   66  Iowa 
427,  776.  1620 

V.    City   of   Ansonia,    66   Conn. 
413,  1211 

V.    City    of    Beatrice,    32    Neb. 
80,  985 

V.  City  of  Charlestown,  98  Mass. 
80,  1613 

V.  City  of  Menasha,  103  Wis.  6.     932 
V.  Commissioners  &c.,  6  McLean 
612,  836 

V.  Crandall,  7  Utah  344,  1515 

V.  Harris,  61  N.  Y.  448,     1559,  1562 
V.  number,  11  C.  B.   (N.  S.)   33,  127 
V.   Inhabitants  &c.,   115   Mass. 
571,  1613 

V.  Luckett,  2  C.  B.  168,  128 

V.    Manufacturing   Co.,    1    Sneed 
698,  982 

V.  Mayor  &c.,  54  Ga.  468,     798,  1075 
V.  Pennsylvania,  97  U.   S.  566,  1395 
V.    Sanitary    Dist.    &c.,    177    111. 
599  524 

V.  Slocum,  27  Minn.  509,  1196,  1253 
V.   Sudden,  94  Cal.  443,  1560 

V.  Town  of  Barton,  63  Vt.  566.  1575 

Cook  Co.  V.  Chicago  Indust.   School, 

125  111.  540,  1495 

V.  Harms,  108  III.  l.".!.  1756 

V.  McCrea,  93   111.   230,  835 

Cooke  V.  School  Dist.,  12  Colo.   153, 

435,   1487 

Cook    Farm    Co.   v.    City   of   Detroit, 

124  Mich.  426,  1303 

Cool  V.  Crommet,   13  Maine  250, 

693,    1570 

Cooley  V.  Chosen  Freeholders  «S:c.,  27 

N.  J.  L.  415,  832 

Coolidge  V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  114  Mass. 

592,  10,  641,  671 

Coolman  v.  Fleming,  82  Ind.  117,         697 

Coombs  V.  County  Com'rs,  68  Maine 

484,  1321 

V.    Inhabitants   &c.,    38   Maine 
204,  1332 

V.  MacDonald,  48  Neb.  632,  740 

Coonley  v.  City  of  Albany,  132  N.  Y. 

145,  817,  830,   1557 

V.  City  of  Albany,  57  Hun  327, 

620,  1372 

Cooper  V.  City  of  Brooklyn,  42  N.  Y. 

S.  762,  550 

V.   District  of  Columbia,   Mac- 
Arth.  &  M.  250,  519 

V.  Lampeter  Tp.,  8  Watts  125, 

284    295 
V.  People,  41  Mich.  403,  '  536 

V.  Phibbs,  L.  R.  2  H.   L.  149,       249 
V.  Schultz.  32  How.  107.  1079 

V.   Sullivan  Co.,  65  Mo.  542,  990 

V.  Town  of  Delavan.  61   111.  96,  865 
v.  Village  of  Waterloo,  88  Wis. 
433,  1375 

Copcutt  V.  City  of  Yonkers,  59  Hun 

212,  1256 

Cope  V.   Collins,  37  Ark.  649.  ]528 

V.  Thames  Haven  Dock  &  R.  Co., 
3  Kxch.  841.  261 

Copeland  v.  Packard,  16  Pick.  217, 

687,  1739 


Copeland  v.  State,  126  Ind.  51,  1672 

Copes  V.  Mayor  &c.,  10  Rich.  L.  491,    992 

Copp  V.  Henniker,  55  N.  H.  179,  698 

Corbalis  v.  Newberry  Tp.,  132  Pa. 

St.  9,  816 

Corbett  v.  City  of  Troy,  6  N.  Y.  S. 

381,  1607 

Corbett  v.  Widber,  123  Cal,  154,         1553 

Corbin  v.  Cedar  Rapids  &c.   R.  Co., 

66  Iowa  73,  699 

V.    Philadelphia,    195    Pa.    St. 
461,  1801 

V.   Wisconsin  R.  Co.,   06  Iowa 
269,  1573 

Corcoran  v.  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.,  149 

111.  291,  170& 

V.  Village  of  Peekskill,  108  N.  Y. 
151,  1627 

Cotdell  V.  New  York  &c.  R.  Co.,  64 

N.  Y.  535,  1641 

V.  State,  22  Ind.  1,  524 

Cordiell  v.  Frizell,  1  Nev.  130,  168 

Corev  V.  Carter,  48  Ind.  327,  1763 

Corfield   v.    Coryell,    4    Wash,    C.    C. 

371,  137 

Corkle  v.  Maxwell,  3  Blatch.  413,         1725 

Corliss  V.  Corliss,  8  Vt.  373,  340 

Cormack  v.   Wolcott,  37   Kan.  391,     1429 

Cornell  v.  Barnes,  7  Hill  35,  309 

v.  People,  107  111.  372,  1538 

V.    Town    of    Guilford,    1    Denio 
510,  210,    251,    252,    253,    647 

Cornell  College  v.  Iowa  Co.,  32  Iowa 

520,  652 

Corning  v.  Gould.  16  Wend.  531,       1574 
V.  Greene,  23  Barb.  33,  58,  61 

Cornwell  v.  Metropolitan  &c.  Com'rs, 

10  Exch.  771,  1561 

Corporation    &c.    v.    Mayor    &c.,    5 

Cow.   538,  611 

Corporation  of  Amite  City  v.   Clem- 
ents, 24  La.  An.  27,  52(> 

Corporation  of  Bluflfton  v.  Mathews, 

92  Ind.  213,  1624 

V.  Studabaker,  106  Ind,  129,  861 

Corporation  of  Columbia  v.  Harrison, 

2  Treadw.  Const.  213,  528,  534 

V.  Hunt,  5  Rich.  L.  550,  1101 

Corporation   of   Easton  v.    Neff,   102 

Pa.  St.  474.  820 

Corporation  of  Gloucester  v.  Osborn, 

1   H.   L.   Cas.   272,  563 

Corporation  of  Knoxville  v.  Bird,  12 

Lea  121,  11-1,  1392 

Corporation  of  Marshall  v.  Snediker, 

25  Tex.  460,  1551 

Corporation  of  I'embroke  Tp.  v.  Can- 
ada &c.  R.  Co.,  3  Ont.  R.  503,     1349 

Correll  v.  City  of  Cedar  Rapids,  110 

Iowa  333,  1753,  1754 

Corrigan  v.  Gage,  68  Mo.  541. 

1149,  1406 

Cory  V.  Carter,  48  Ind.  327,  1494 

V.  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.,  100  Mo. 
282,  694 

V.   Somerset  Freeholders,  44  N. 
J.  L.  445,  259 

Cosgrove  v.  City  Council  &c.,  103  Ga. 

835,  1387 

Cosner  v.  City  of  Centerville,  90  Iowa 

33,  1802 

Costello  V.I  State,  lOS  Ala.  45,  585,  1364 
V.  Wyoming.  49  Ohio  St.  202.       557 

Coster  V.  Tidewater  Co.,  18  N.  J.  Eq. 

54,  685,  687 

Cotes  V.  City  of  Davenport,  9  Iowa 

227,  680 

Cothran   v.    City   of   Rome,    77   Ga. 


oSZ, 


839 


Cottnm    V.    Oregon    Citv.    98    Fed. 

570,  1767 

Cotter  v.  Doty,  5  Ohio  394,  532 


TABLE   OP    CASES, 


XCl 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Vol.  I,  pp.  1-8S2;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.] 


Cotterill   v.    Starkey,   8   Car.   &   P. 

G91.  1637 

Cotton  V.  Atkinson,  53  Ark.  98,  328 

V.    Commissioners   &c.,    6    Fla. 
610,  858,  983 

V.  Davies.  1  Str.  53,  157 

V.  Kllis.  7  Jones  L.  545,  183 

V.   Inhabitants  &c.,  47   N.   J.  L. 
401.  1741 

V.  Mississippi  &c.  Co.,  22  Minn. 
372.  45 

V.  Phillips.  56  N.  H.  220,     185,  198 

Coughlan  v.  City  of  Cambridge,  166 

Mass.   268.  790 

Cougot  V.  City  of  New  Orleans,  16  La. 

An.  21,  581 

Coulson  V.   City  of  Portland.   Deady 

481,  877,   880,   952 

Coulter  V.  Coulter,  81  Ind.  542.  1095 

V.    Robertson.    24    Miss.    278.  410 

Council    &c.    V.    Hardson,    88    Ga. 

599.  1333 

V.   People,  78  111.  382,  1668 

County — See   Board  ;    Commissioners  ; 
County  Com'rs  :  Name  of  County. 

County  Com'rs  v.  Baker,  44  Md.  1,       223 
V.  Burgess.  61  Md.  29.  1632 

V.   Chandler,  96  U.   S.  205,  981 

V.   County   Com'rs  &c.,   50   Md. 
245,  7,  13,  14 

V.  County  Com'rs,  1  Wyo.  Ter. 
140,  438 

V.    Diebold    State   &c.    Co.,    133 
U.  S.  473,  1191 

V.  Duckett,  20  Md.  468, 

218,  222,  1546 
V.  Duvall,  54  Md.  351.  226 

V.  Hunt,  5  Ohio  St.  488,  655 

V.  King.  13  Fla.  451. 

280.  427,  433.  443,   1528,   1529 
V.   Lineberger.   3   Mont.   231,  319 

V.  Melviu.  89  Md.  37,  1685 

V.  People.  11  111.  202,  1683 

V.  President  &c..  51  Md.  465.       393 
V.   State,  24  Fla.  263,  425,  426,  432 

County  Court  v.  Bareman,  34  W.  Va. 

362.  893 

V.  Griswold.  58  Mo.  175,  685 

V.  People,  58  111.  456,  624 

V.   Robinson.   27  Ark.   116,  1494 

Courser  v.  Powers,  34  Vt.  517,  187,  198 

Courtney  v.  Louisville,  12  Bush  419. 

983.    1515,   1517 

Covington  v.  City  of  East  St.  Louis, 

78  111.  548,     54,  106,  494,  845,  1517 
V.   Kentucky,   173   U.   S.  231. 

74.  90,  104.  120,  713 
V.  Rockingham.  93  N.  C.  134.     1717 

Covington    Co.    v.    Dunklin,    52    Ala. 

277.  1527 

Covington  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  City  of  Cov- 
ington. 9  Bush  127,  586 
V.  Ingles,  15  B.  Mon.  637,            1806 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  85  Ga.  367. 

233,  235,  589 

Cowart  V.  Foxworth.  67  Miss.  322, 

843,  1489 

Cowdin  V.  HufC.   10  Ind.  83.  183 

Cowdrey  v.  Town  of  Canadea,  16  Fed. 

532,  990 

Cowen  V.  Village  of  West  Troy,  43 

Barb.  48.  97.  468.   494.  644 

Cowie  V.   City  of   Seattle.   22  Wash. 

659.  1329.   1359.   1362,   1801 

Cowles  V.  Brittam,  2  Hawks  204,       1714 
V.  School  Dist..  23  Neb.  655.       1472 
Cowlev  V.   City  of  Spokane,  99  Fed. 

840.  1291 

V.    Town    of   Rushville,    60    Ind. 
327.  521 

Cox  V.  City  of  Chicago.  S3  111.  App. 

540,  1798 


Cox  V.  City  of  Des  Moines,  111  Iowa 

646,  1328 

V.  City  of  St.  Louis,  11  Mo.  431, 

85,  538 
V.  James,  .59  Barb.  144,  1564 

Coy  V.  City  Council.  17  Iowa  1, 

1526.  1527,  1530,  1680 
Coykendall  v.  Hood,  55  N.  Y.  S.  718, 

514,  1710 
Coyle  V.  Gray,  7  Houst.  44,  577 

Crabtree  v.  Gibson,  78  Ga.  230, 

1172,  1288 

Crafford  v.   Supervisors  &c.,  87   Va. 

110,  3 

Craft  V.  Loflnck,  34  Kan.  365,  427 

Crafts  V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  47  Maine 

141,  1744 

Craig  V.  Burnett.  32  Ala.  728,  1507 

V.  Charle.ston,  78  111.  372,  789 

V.    City   of   Charleston,    180    HI. 
154,  812 

V.   City  of  Philadelphia,  89  Pa. 
St.  265,  1254,  1271 

V.  City  of  Sedalia.  63  Mo.  417,  1580 
V.   City   of  Vicksburg,   31   Mass. 
216,  1012 

V.  First  Presbyterian  Church,  88 
Pa.   St.   42.  374 

V.   Rochester  &c.   R.   Co.,   39   N. 
Y.  404,  1582 

V.  Secrist.  54  Ind.  419,  664 

V.  Town  of  Andes,  93  N.  Y.  405,  987 

Cram    v.    City    of    Chicago,    139    111. 

265,  1173.  1174 

Cramer   v.    City   of   Burlington,    45 

Iowa   627,  1797 

V.    City  of   Charleston,    176   111. 
507,  511.   1289 

Crampton  v.  Zabriskie,  101  U.  S.  601, 

651,    653,    1698,    1728 

Crandall  v.  Amador  Co.,  20  Cal.  72,  1679 
V.  Nevada,  6  Wall.  35,  138 

V.  State.  10  Conn.  339,  137 

Crane   v.    City   of   Fond   du   Lac,    16 

Wis.   196,  13,   1527,  1530 

V.    City    of    Janesville,    20    Wis. 
321,  1254 

v.  School  Dist.,  61  Mich.  299,       852 
V.  Siloam  Springs,  67  Ark.  30, 

481,   1309,    1378,   1449 

Cranston  v.  Augusta,  61   Ga.  5T2,       544 

Craw  V.  City  of  Tolono.  96   III.  255, 

1143.   1262.   1268.   1300,    1303 

Crawford     v.     Bradford,     23     Fla. 

404.  1721 

V.  Dunbar,  52  Cal.  36,  185,  378 

V.  Meredith.  6  Ga.  552,  310 

V.  Town  of  Rutland.  52  Vt.  412,  1573 
V.   Village  of  Delaware,   7   Ohio 
St.  459,  824 

V.   Wilson,  4  Barb.   504,  1475 

Crawford   Co.    v.    Iowa   Co.,    2    Pin. 

368.  424 

Crawfordsville   Music   Hall   Ass'n  v. 

Clements.  12  Mo.  App.  464,         1286 

Crawn  v.  Commonwealth.  84  Va.  282,  315 

Crawshaw  v.  City  of  Roxbury,  7  Gray 

374.  669,  715 

Craycraft  v.    Selvage,   10   Bush   696, 

210.    646 

Creager  v.   Wright   School   Dist.,   62 

Mich.   101,  1480 

Crebs   v.    City   of   Lebanon.    98   Fed. 

549,  403.  716.  882.  1752 

Creed  v.  Hartmann,  29  N.  Y.  591. 

212,  745 

Cregier  v.  Mayor  &c.,  11  Daly  171,       178 

Creighton  v.  Board  &c.,  42  Cal.  446. 

763,  1522 
v.  Commonwealth,  83  Ky.  142,  313 
V.  Manson.  27  Cal.  613.  480 

V.   Piper.    14   Ind.    182.  185 

V.  Scott,  14  Ohio  St.  438,  1262 


xeu 


TABLE   OP    CASES. 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Vol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.'] 


Crepps  V.  Burden.  Cowp.  640,  535 

Crescent  City  G.  L.  Co.  v.  New  Or- 
leans G.  L.  Co.,  27  La.  An.  138.  1808 
Crescent   Tp.    v.   Anderson,   114   Pa. 

St.  643,  1633 

Creston  Water  Works  Co.  v.  City  of 

Creston.  101  Iowa  687,  720,  876 

Crist    V.    Brownsville    Tp.,    10    Ind. 

461,  295 

Crites  v.  City  of  New  Richmond,  98 

W^is.  55,  1803 

Crittenden  v.  Terrill.  2  Llead  588,  329 
Crittenden   Co.    v.    Shanks,    88    Ky. 

475,  916 

Crocker  v.  McGregor,  76  Maine  282,  1614 
Crockett  v.  City  of  Boston,  5  Cush. 

182,  687,  1159 

Crofut  V.  City  of  Danbury,  65  Conn. 

294,  638 

Croll  V.  Village  of  Franklin,  40  Ohio 

St.   340,  523 

Cromartie  v.   Commissioners  &c.,  87 

N.  C.  134,  1528 

Crommett  v.  Pearson,  18  Maine  344, 

294,   866 

Cromwell  v.  Sac  Co.,  96  U.  S.  51, 

1000,  ,1018,    1020,    1026,    1027 
Cronan  v.  Municipality  &c.,  5  La.  An. 

537,  1305 

Cronin  v.  Patrick  Co.,  89  Fed.  79,       999 

V.  People,  82  N.  Y.  318.       611,  1402 

V.  Stoddard,  97  N.  Y.  271, 

197,  311,  313 
Cronlv   V.    City   of   Tucson,    56    Pac. 

876,  988 

Crook  V.  People,  106  111.  237.  90,  103 
Cropper  v.  City  of  Mexico,  62  Mo. 

App.   385,  1335 

Crosby  v.  Hanover.  36  N.  H.  404.  1323 
Cross  V.  Cherry.  122  Pa.  St.  417,         561 

V.  City  of  Kansas,  90  Mo.  13.       1224 

V.  Hecker,  75  Md.   574.     1413.   1417 

V.  Mayor  &c.,  18  N.  J.  Eq.  305, 

259.  464.  465,  1106.   1254,   1288 

V.  School  Directors,  24  111.  App. 

191,  1482 

Crossett  v.  City  of  Janesville,  28  Wis. 

420,  680 

Crouse,  Ex  parte,  4  Whart.  9.  1071 

Crow  v.  Board  &c..   IIS   Ind.  51,  1038 

V.  Oxford.  119  V.  S.  215,  645 

Crowder   v.    Town   of    Sullivan,    128 

Ind.  486,  568.  877,  889,  1038 

Crowell  V.  Crispin,  4  Daly  100.  215 

V.   Sonoma  Co.,  25   Cal.  313. 

788,  814 

Crowly  V.  Copely.  2  La.  An.  329.  1270 
Crewmen  v.  Wellsville  Water  Co.,  3 

N.  Y.  S.  177,  1456 

Crudup  V.   Ramsey.  54  Ark.   168,  9.58 

Cruger  v.  Dougherty,  43  N.  Y.  107,  1533 

V.  Hudson  River  R.  Co.,  12  N.  Y. 

190.  698 

Cruickshank  v.  City  of  Chicago,  181 

111.  415,  512 

Cruikshanks  v.   City   Council,   1   Mc- 

Cord  360.  1714 

Crume  v.  Wilson,  104  Ind.  583,  699 

Cudd  V,  Calvert,  54  S.  C.  457.  610 

Cudden  v.  Eastwick,  1  Salk.  143.  9 

Culbertson    v.    City    of    Fulton.    127 

111.  30.  877.  880.  883,  888,  923 

v.  Coleman.  47  Wis.  193.  558 

Cullen    v.    Town    of    Carthago,    103 

Ind.   196.  663,   664,   861 

Culver  V.  Armstrong.  77  Mich.  194.  1496 

V.  Citv  of  Streator.  130  111.  238.  799 

V.  People.  161  111.  SO,  1289 

V.  Third  Nat.  Bank.  64  III.  528.  524 


Culverson   v.    City   of  Maryville,   67 

Mo.  App.  343.  1328 

Cuming  v.  City  of  Grand  Rapids,  46 

Mich.  150,  1253 

Cumins  v.  Lawrence  Co.,  1  S.  Dak. 

158,  1024 

Cumming  v.  Mayor  &c.,  R.  M.  Charlt. 

26,  1500,  1508 

V.  Mayor  &c.,  11  Paige  596, 

175,  741,  1306 
V.  United  States,  22  Ct.  CI.  344,  772 

Cummings  v.  Brown,  43  N.  Y.  514,     332 
V.  City  of  St.  Louis,  90  Mo.  259, 

577,  629,  1698 
V.  Clark,  15  Vt.  653,  198 

V.    Huse   &c.    Ice    Co.,    156   Mo. 
28,  1373 

V.  Peters,  56 "Cal.  593,  688 

V.   Village  of   New   Rochelle,   56 
N.  Y.   S.   701.  1326,   1330 

V.    West    Chicago    Park    Com'rs. 
181  111.  136,  1136,  1149,  1236 

Cummins  v.  City  of  Seymour,  79  Ind. 

491,  647.   1177,   1179.   1776 

V.    Des    Moines   &c.    R.    Co.,.   63 

Iowa  397.  701 

V.    District    Tp.    &c.,    42    Fed. 

644,  1024 

V.    National    Bank,    101    U.    S. 

153,  1288 

Cunningham  v.  Bucklin,  8  Cow.  178,  335 
V.  Campbell,  33  Ga.  625,  697 

V.    City    of    Cleveland.    98    Fed. 
657,  728,  740,  744,  882 

V.  Citv  of  Denver,  23  Colo.  18,  1333 
V.  Citv  of  Griffin,  107  Ga.  690,  599 
V.  City  of  Peoria,  157  111.  499, 

1135,  1244 
V.  Corporation  &c.   of  Almonte, 
21  Up.  Can.  C.  P.  459,  521 

V.  Macon  &c.  R.  Co.,  109  U.  S. 
446,  18 

V.   Squires,  2  W.  Va.  422.  1419 

Cupp  V.  Board  &c.,  19  Ohio  St.  173.     692 

Curran  v.  Arkansas,  15  How.  304, 

410,  760 
V.  Citv  of  Boston.  151  Mass.  505,     8 
V.    City   of    Louisville,    83    Ky. 
628,  1574 

V.   Shattuck,  24  Cal.  427,  1571 

Currier  v.  Concord,  68  N.  H.  294,         930 

Currv    V.    District    of    Columbia,    14 

App.  D.  C.  423.  1809 

V.  District  Tp.  &c..  62  Iowa  104,  12 
V.  Jones,  4  Del.  Ch.  559.  1288 

V.  Mavor  &c..  64  Ga.  290.  1530 

V.  President  &c.,  15  111.  320.  591 

Curtis  V.  Butler  Co..  24  How.  435.     1014 
V.  Gowan.  34  111.  App.  516, 

181,  664,  941 
V.  Lyman.  24  Vt.  338.  229 

V.  Pocahontas  Co..  72  Iowa  151,  1572 
V.  Whipple,  24  Wis.  350. 

548,  610,  980,  1542 

Gushing  v.  Frankfort,  57  Maine  521,  289 
V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  6  Cush.  389, 

662,  664 
V.    Inhabitants   &c.,    125    Mass. 
526,  823 

Cushman  v.  Smith,  34  Maine  247,         705 

Cutcomp  V.  TTtt.  60  Iowa  156.  12.57 

Cutler  V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  121  Mass. 

588,  215 

V.  Town  of  Russellville,  40  Ark. 
105,  299.   477 

Cutliff  v.   Mavor  &c..  60  Ga.   597,      1520 

Cutter  V.  Demmon,  111  Mass.  348.       211 

Cuyler  v.  Trustees  &c.,  12  Wend.  165, 

251,  647 

Cypress  Pond  Draining  Co.  v.  Hooper, 
■      2  Met.  350,  689 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


XCIU 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Vol.  I,  pp.  1-S32;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.] 


D 

Dabney's   Adm'r  v.    Smith,    5    Leigh 

13,  323 

Dadv  V.  Mayor  &c.,  57  Hun  456,         1176 

Dafoe  V.  Ilarshaw,  60  Mich.  1200,  186 

Daggett  V.  City  of  Cohoes,  54  Hun 

639.  1180 

V.  Hudson,  43  Ohio  St.  548, 

369,  370,  371 
V.  Town  of  Mendon.  64  Vt.  323,  367 

Dailey  v.    State,   8   Blaclsf.   329,  185 

Daily  v.  Swope,  47  Miss.  367, 

1269,  1270,  1532 

Dair  v.  United  States,  16  Wall.  1,       310 

Dale  V.   Citv  of   St.   Joseph,   59   Mo. 

App.  566.  1211 

V.  Delaware  &c.  R.  Co.,  73  N.  Y. 
468.  1627.   1628 

V.   Irwin,  78  111.  170,  353,  372 

V.  Webster  Co.,  76  Iowa  370,       1802 

Dalev  V.  Norwich  &c.  R.  Co.,  26  Conn. 

591,  794 

Dallas  V.  Posdick.  40  How.  Pr.  249,  1494 

Dallas   Co.    v.    McKenzie,    110   U.    S. 

686,  998,  1024 

Dallas   Elect.   Co.   v.   City  of  Dallas, 

23  Tex.   Civ.  App.  323,  751,  875 

Dalton  V.  Angus,  6  App.  Cas.  740, 

829,  1779 

V.    City   of   Salem,    139   Mass. 
91,  1624 

V.  State,  43  Ohio  St.  652,  381 

V.  Upper  Tyrone  Tp.,  137  Pa.  St. 
18,  816 

Daly  V.   City  of  San   Francisco,   72 

Cal.  154,  647,   1186 

V.  Georgia  &c.  R.  Co.,  80  Ga.  793, 

586,  590 
V.  Morgan,  69  Md.  460, 

383,  386.  388,  1521 

Dalzpll  V.  City  of  Davenport,  12  Iowa 

437,  680 

Dammann  v.  City  of  St.  Louis,  152 

Mo.  186.  1801 

Damon    v.    Inhabitants   &c.,    2    Pick. 

345,  7.   284,   286.   290,   294,  357 

Dana  v.  City  of  Boston,  176  Mass. 

97.  1772 

Danaher  v.  City  of  Brooklyn,  119  N. 

Y.  241.  808 

Dane  v.  Gilmore.  51  Maine  544.  329 

Danforth  v.  Durrell.  8  Allen  242,       1561 
V.  Village  of  Hinsdale,  177  111. 
579.  1144,  1277 

Daniel   v.   City  of  New  Orleans,   26 

La.  An.  1,  1257 

V.  Mayor  &c.,  11  Humph.  582, 

90,  103,  663 

Daniels  v.  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.,  35  Iowa 

129.  706 

V.  ntv  of  Des  Moines,  108  Iowa 
484,    "  175 

V.  Intendant,  55  Ga.  609,  1577 

V.  Lebanon,  58  N.  H.  284,  1639 

V.  Long,  111  Mich.  562,  1685 

V.  Municipal  Council  &c.,  10  Up. 
Can.  Q.  B.  478,  211 

V.  Tearnev,  102  U.  S.  415.     649,  650 
Dannot  v.  Mayor,  66  N.  Y.  585,  722 

Danolds  v.  State,  89  N.  Y.  36,  771 

D'Antiguac  v.   City  Council,   31   Ga. 

700,  1254 

Danville  v.  Shelton.  76  Va.  325,  1521 
Danville  &c.  Co.  v.  Park,  88  111.  463.  1513 
Dapper    v.    City    of    Milwaukee,    107 

Wis.  88.  1343.  1806 

Darbv   v.    Sharon   Hill,    112    Pa.    St. 

66.  422 

Darcantel  v.  People's  Slaughter  House 

&c.  Co..  44  La.  An.  632,       481.  582 
Dargan  v.  Mayor  &c.,  31  Ala.  469,     1075 


Darling  v.  City  of  Bangor,  68  Maine 

108,  1585 

V.    City  of   St.   Paul,   19   Minn. 
389.  282,  1405 

V.  Gunn,  50  111.  424,  1238 

V.  Westmoreland,  52  N.  H.  401, 

1614,  1618 
Darlington  v.  Commonwealth,  41  Pa. 

St.  68,  692,  1425 

V.  Jackson  Co.,  101  U.  S.  688,    1001 
V.  Laclede.  4  Dill.  200,  1024 

V.  Mayor  &c.,  31  N.  Y.  164, 

799,  800,  1083,  1394,  1744 
Darrow  v.  People,  8  Colo.  417,  169,  185 
Darst  V.  People.  51  111.  286,  606 

Dartmouth    v.    County    Com'rs,    153 

Mass.  12,  290 

Dartmouth  College  v.   Woodward,  4 

Wheat.  518,  2,  4,  74,  75,   81,  84 

510,  767,  771 
Dartmouth  Sav.  Bank  v.  School  Dis- 
tricts, 16  Dak.  332,  626,  1485 
Dasent,  In  re,  2  N.  Y.  S.  609,  935 
Dasey  v.  Skinner,  UN.  Y.  S.  821,  1235 
Dashiell  v.  Mayor  &c.,  45  Md.  615,  1262 
Daugherty  v.  Brown,  91  Mo.  26, 

1225,  1568 
Dausch  V.  Crane,  109  Mo.  323.  303 

Davenant   v.    Hurdis,    Moor.   576,  467 

Davenport    v.     Buffington,    97    Fed. 

234,  1698 

v.  Dodge  Co.,  105  U.  S.  237,       1528 
V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  10  Maine  317, 

362,   866 
V.  Kleinschmidt,  6  Mont.  502, 

569,  642,  848,  897 
V.  Kleinschmidt.  8  Mont.  467,  897 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  67  N.  Y.  456,  185 

V.  Ruckman,  37  N.  Y.  568, 

1592,    1639 
V.  Town  of  Johnson,  49  Vt.  403,   871 
Davenport  &c.  Ass'n  v.   Schmidt,   15 

Iowa  213,  1570 

Davenport  &c.  Co.  v.  City  of  Daven- 
port. 13  Iowa  229,         468,  491,  1417 
Davenport  &c.   R.   Co.   v.   Lowry,   51 

Iowa  486,  1726 

Davey  v.  Baker,  4  Burr.  2471,  538 

Davidson  v.  City  of  Chicago,  178  111. 

582,  1146.  1148,  1154 

V.  City  of  Muskegon,  111  Mich. 
454,  930 

V.    County    Commissioners,    18 
Minn.  482,  983 

V.  Mayor  &c.,  27  How.  Pr.  842, 

103,   763,   1394 

V.  Mayor  &c.,  54  N.  Y.  S.  51,       785 

V.  New  Orleans.  96  Tt.  S.  97,       559, 

694.   1238.   1239,   1262,   1302,  1715 

Davies  v.  City  of  Galveston,  16  Tex. 

App.  13,  1143 

V.  City  of  Los  Angeles,  86  CaL 
37,  692 

V.  City  of  Saginaw.  87  Mich.  439, 

1193,  1236,  1253,  1255,  1261 
V.  Fairbairn,  3  How.  636,  111,  495 
V.   McKeeby,   5   Nev.  369,  369 

V.   Morgan,   1   Cromp.  &  J.  587, 

500,   533 
V.   New  York  &c.   Co.,   48  N.   Y. 
Super.  Ct.  492,  210 

Daviess  Co.  v.  Dickinson,  117  U.   S. 

657,  210.   233,   637,   890,  981. 

9S2.  998,  1000 
V.  Huidekoper,  98  U.  S.  98. 

999,    1001 

Davis  V.  Berger.  54  Mich.  652,  187 

V.  Brace.  82  III.  542,  1540 

V.  Capper,  10  B.  &  C.  28,  221 

V.  City  Council  &c.,  51  Ala.  139. 

264.   820 
V.  City  of  Austin,  22  Tex.  Civ. 
App.  460,  1799 


XCIV 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Vol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.'\ 


Davis  V.   City  of  Bangor,   42   Maine 

522.  '831,  832.  1112.  1613 

V.    City    of    Clinton,    55    Iowa 
549,  1714 

V.    City   of   Crawfordsville,    119 
Ind.  1,  1220 

V.  City  of  Des  Moines,  71  Iowa 
500,  891 

V.    City    of    Dubuque,    20    Iowa 
458,  1516 

V.  City  of  Kingston,  5  N.  Y.   S. 
506,  1617 

V.    City   of  Knoxville,   90   Tenn. 
599,  805,  1075 

V.    City   of   Litclifleld,    145    III. 
313,  1146,   1149,   1300,   1498 

V.    City    of    Litctifield,    155    III. 
390,  522,  1236,  1300 

•    V.    City    of    Lynctiburg.    84    Va.    , 
861,  1268 

V.   City  of  Newarlj,  54  N.   J.   L. 
144.   595.  1248 

V.  City  of  Omalia.  47  Neb.  836,    1333 
V.  East  Tennessee  &c.  R.  Co.,  87 
Ga.  605,  586,  590 

V.  Inliabitants  &c.,  4  Allen  557, 

1332,  1601 
V.    Inhabitants    &c.,    140    Mass. 
422.  1622 

T.  Masschusetts,  167  U.  S.  43,  1406 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  61  Mich.  530, 

714,  1586 
T.  Mayor  &c.,   14  N.  Y.  506.  568 

579.  586,  637,  1108.  1323,  1352.  1610 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  1  Duer  451.  516,  708 
V.    Mayor   &c.,    64   Ga.    128. 

1507,  1520 
V.  Morgan,  1  Cromp.  &  J.  587.      100 
V.   Patterson,  12  Pa.   Super.  Ct. 
479.  1644 

V.  Read.  65  N.  Y.  566.  282.  1539 

V.  School  Dist.,  24  Maine  349. 

259,   644,    1212 
V.   School  Dist.,  81   Mich.   214, 

852.  1473,  1491 
V.  School  Dist.,  43  N.  H.  381,  366 
V.  School  Dist..  44  N.  H.  398,  370 
V.  Smith,  130  Mass.  113.  687 

V.  Town  of  Anita,  73  Iowa  325, 

500.  1368 
V.  Town  of  Point  Pleasant.   32 
W.  Va.  289.  62,  1518 

V.  Woolnough.  9  Iowa  104,  1413 

V.  Yuba  Co.,  75  Cal.  452.  1017 

Davison  v.   Otis.   24  Mich.  23.  543 

Dawes  v.  Jackson,  9  Mass.  260.  216 

Daws  V.  Town  of  Elmwood,  34  Fed. 
,        114.  1017 

Dawson    V.    Aurelius    Tp.,    49    Mich. 

479,  1726 

Dawson   Co.   v.   Clark,   58   Neb.    756. 

1548.  1554 

Dawson   &c.   Co.   v.    Carver,   95   Ga. 

565,  1709 

Day  v.  Board  &c.,  102  Mass.  310,      1743 
V.   City   of  Clinton,    6   111.   App. 
476,  521 

V.  City  of  Morristown,  63  N.  J. 
L.  353,  106 

V.  Day,  94  N.  Y.  153.  1579 

V.  Gallup,  2  Wall.  97,  330 

V.  Green,  4  Cush.  433, 

281,   468,   1759 
V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  5  Allen  98. 

1592,  1612 
V.    Putnam    Ins.    Co.,    16   Minn. 
408.  671 

V.  Reynolds.  23  Hun  131,  228 

V.   Savage.  Hob.  212,  467 

Dayton  v.  Quigley,  29  N.  J.  Eq.  77,     500 

Dayton    Tp.    v.    Rounds,    27    Mich. 

82,  1529 


Deady  v.  Village  of  Lyons,  57  N.  Y. 

S.  448,  1549,  1553 

Dean    v.    Borchsenius,    30    Wis.    236, 

559,  1234 
V.   City  of  New  York,  61   N.   Y. 
S.  374.  722 

V.  Davis.  51  Cal.  406.         4,  5,  1084 
V.  Lufkio.  54  Tex.  265,  1535 

V.  Randolph,  132  Mass.  475.         815 

Deane  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  132  Mass. 

475,  803,   1159 

V.  Todd.  22  Mo.  90,  1722 

De    Baker    v.    Southern   &c.    R.    Co., 

106  Cal.  257,  797,  1208 

De  Blois  V.  Barker,  4  R.  I.  445,  1198 

De  Boest  v.  Gambell,  35  Or.  368, 

175,    1769 

Debs.  In  re,  158  U.  S.  564,  1706 

Decatur    v.    Stoops,    21    Ind.    App. 

397  1330 

Decatur' Co.  Board  &c.  v.  State,  86 

Ind.  8.  1525 

Decatur  Gas  &c.   Co.  v.   City  of  De- 
catur, 24  111.  App.  544,         639,  1468 

Dechert   v.    Commonwealth,    113    Pa. 

St.  229.  1667 

Decorah  v.  Dustan,  38  Iowa  96,         1405 

Decraw    St.,    Matter    of,    18    Wend. 

568  123.3 

Deeds  v.'  Sanborn.  26  Iowa  419.  1516 

Deel  V.  City  of  Pittsburgh,  3  Watts 

363  529 

Deems    v.    Mayor   &c.,    80    Md.    164, 

600.  1703 

Defer  v.    City   of   Detroit,    67    Mich. 

346,  1215 

Defiance  Water  Co.   v.   City  of  Defi- 
ance. 90  Fed.  753,  728.  1132 

De  Forth  v.  Wisconsin  &c.  R.  Co.,  52 

WMs.  320,  987 

De  Fremery  v.  Austin,  53  Cal.  380,    1551 

De  Grave  v.  Mayor  &c.,  4  Car.  &  P. 

111.  288 

Dehail  v.  Morford.  95  Cal.  457,  1259 

De  Hart  v.   Atlantic  City,   62   N.   J. 

L.  586.  75 

V.    McGuire.   10   Phila.   359.  322 

Dehm    v.    City    of    Havana,    28    111. 

App.  520,  888 

Deiman  v.  Citv  of  Fort  Madison,  30 

Iowa  542,  1516 

Deitz    V.    City    of    Central,    1    Colo. 

323,  47,  528,  529 

DeLacey  v.  City  of  Brooklyn,  12  N. 

Y.   S.   540,  165 

Delacey  v.   Neuse  &c.  Co.,   1   Hawks 

274.  207 

Delafield  v.  Illinois,  2  Hill  159, 

253,    258.    259,    715 
V.  Illinois,  26  Wend.  192.  217 

v.  Village  of  Westfeld,  58  N.  Y. 
S.  277,  722 

Delahanty    v.    Warner,    75    111.    185. 

207.  1697 

Delamater   v.    City   of   Chicago.    158 

111.   575.  511,   1275,   1277 

Delancv,  Matter  of,  52  N.  Y.  80,         1205 

De  Lano  v.  Dovle.  120  Mich.  258,        1393 

Delano  v.  Mayor  &c..  32  Hun  144,       1265 

Delany  v.  Gault.  30*Pa.  St.  63,  693 

Delaware   &c.    Canal   Co.    v.    Camden 

&c.  R.  Co..  1  C.  E.  Green  321,       584 

V.  Village  of  Whitehall.  90  N.  Y. 

21.  591 

Delaware  Co.  v.  McClintock.  51  Ind. 

325.  982 

V.  McDonald.  46  Iowa  170.  1068 

Delaware  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  City  of  Buf- 
falo. 158  N.  Y.  266.  1365 

Delaware    Railroad    Tax,    18    Wall. 

206.  1501 

Delcamhre    v.    Clere,    34    La.    An. 

1050,  1532 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


XCV 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Vol.  I,  pp.  1-S32;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.] 


Delgado,  In  re,  140  U.  S.  586,  1666 

V.  Chavez,   5  N.   M.   646,  1666 

Dells  V.  Kennedy,  49  Wis.  555,  370 

Delmonico    v.    New    York,    1    Sandf. 

222,  811 

De  Loge  v.  New  York  &e.  R.  Co.,  157 

N.  Y.  688,  483 

Demarcst    v.    Mayor    &c.,    74    N.    Y'. 

161,  74,  90,   103 

V.  Wickham,  63  N.  Y.  320,    288,  297 
Demby  v.  City  of  Kingston,  14  N.  Y. 

S.    601,  1111 

Dempsey   v.    City   of   Rome,   94   Ga. 

420,  1317 

Dempster   v.    City   of   Chicago,    175 

111.  278,  1276,  1280 

Denair  v.  City  of  Brooklyn,  5  N.  Y. 

S.  835,  1746 

Denham  v.  County  Com'rs,  108  Mass. 

202,  687,   1557 

Deni^on  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  James,  20  Tex. 

Civ.  App.  358,  1152,  1380.  1777 

Denman  v.  St.  Paul  R.  Co.,  26  Minn. 

357,  1641 

Dennehy  v.  City  of  Chicago,  120  III. 

627,  1399 

Dennett  v.  Nevers,  7  Maine  399,  866 

Denning  v.  Roome,  16  Wend.  651, 

1422,    1423.    1424,    1559,    1560,    1562 

V.  Yount.  9  Kan.  App.  708,    516,  525 
Dennis  v.  Maynard,  15  111.  37,  1084 

Dennison    v.    Kansas    City,    95    Mo. 

416,  1257,  1258 

Denniston  v.  Clark.  125  Mass.  216,     335 

V.    School   Dist.,    17   N.    H.    492, 

339,  341,  343,  1485 
Denny  v.   City  of   Spokane,   79  Fed. 

719.  741,  879 

V.  Denny.  113  Ind.  22,  655 

Denton  v.  Jackson,  2  Johns.  Ch.  320, 

50,  1536 
Denver  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Barsaloux,  15 

Colo.  290,  1652 

V.  City  of  Denver,  2  Colo.  App. 

34,  1405 

V.    City    of    Denver,    21    Colo. 

350,  1505 

V.  Domke,  11  Colo.  247,     1352,  1652 

v.  Glasscott,  4  Colo.  270,  1614 

V.  Nestor,  10  Colo.  403,  1652 

De  Pauw  Plate  Glass  Co.  v.  City  of 

Alexandria,  152  Ind.  443,  1552 

De    rierris.    Petition    of,    82    N.    Y. 

243,  1256 

Dermont  v.  Mayor  &c.,  4  Mich.  435,    1215 
Dermott  v.  State.  99  N.  Y.  101,  568 

Derry  v.   Rockingham  Co.,  62  N.  H. 

485,  1043 

De   Saussure  v.   Gaillard,   127  U.   S. 

216,  18 

Desha  Co.  v.  Newman,  32  Ark.  788,     945 
Deskins  v.  Gose,  85  Mo.  485,  1493 

Desmare  v.   United  States,  93  U.   S. 

605.  1042 

Des  Moines  Co.  v.  Harker,  34  Iowa 

84,  17 

Des  Moines  Gas  Co.  v.  City  of  Des 

Moines.   44   Iowa  505. 

110,  466.  568,  618,  1371.  1703.  1704 
Des  Moines  Water  Co.'s  Appeal.   48 

Iowa  324.  1511,  1512 

Des    Plaines   v.    Poyer,    22    111.    App. 

574.  1120 

D'Esterre  v.  City  of  Brooklyn  &c.,  90 

Fed.  586,  1007,   1013,   1031 

Detroit  v.  Martin.  34  Mich.  170. 

245.  247.   1263,  1552 

v.  Osborne,  135  U.  S.  492, 

817.   1341,   1342,   1593 
Detroit  &c.  Ass'n  v.  Highway  Com'rs, 

34  Mich.  36,  628 


Detroit  &c.  Plank  Road  Co.  v.  Ma- 
comb Circuit  Judge,  109  Mich. 
371,  1707 

Detroit  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Bcarss,  39  Ind. 

598,  348 

V.  City  of  Detroit,  64  B'ed.  628, 

1351,  1812 
v.    City    of   Detroit,    110    Mich. 
384,  1351 

V.    City    of    Grand    Rapids,    106 
Mich.    15,  1250 

V.   Mills,  85   Mich.   634,  682,  683 

De   Turk   v.    Commonwealth,    12   Pa. 

St.   151,  185 

Deufel  V.  Long  Island  City,  46  N.  Y. 

S.  355,  1342 

De  Varaigue  v.  Fox,  2  Blatchf.  95, 

675.  685,   759 

Devay  v.  Mayor  &c..  35  Barb.  264,       150 

Devenish  v.  City  of  Spokane,  21  Wash. 
77,  1337 

Deyenpeck    v.     Lambert,    44    Barb. 

596,  1567 

Dever  v.   City   of  Junction   City,   45 

Kan.  417,  1194 

Devereaux    v.    City    of    Brownsville, 

29  Fed.  742,  455,  1524 

Devlin  v.  Mayor  &c.,  63  N.  Y.  8,  1192 

V.  Smith,  89  N.  Y.  470,  1591 

Devoe  V.  School  Dist.,  77  Mich.  610. 

852,    1491 

Devor  v.  M'Clintock,  9  W.  &  S.  80,    1519 

Devore's  Appeal,  56  Pa.  St.  163,         1517 

De    Voss    V.    City    of    Richmond,    18 

Gratt.   338,  1017 

Den  V.  Carson,  26  N.  J.  L.  228,         1234 
V.  Judges,  3  Hen.  &  Mun.  1,         1657 

De  Walt  V.  Bartley,  146  Pa.  St.  529,    376 

Dewein  v.  City  of  Peoria,  24  111.  App. 

396,  1177 

Dewey  v.  Central  Car  Co.,  42  Mich. 

399.  1737 

V.  City  of  Des  Moines,  173  U.  S. 
193,  1262 

V.  City  of  Des  Moines,  101  Iowa 
416.  1130,   1139.   1242 

Dewhurst   v.    City   of   Allegheny,   95 

Pa    St    437  802 

Dewire'v.  Bailey,  131  Mass.  169,       1587 

De    Witt    V.    Village    of    Ithaca,    15 

Hun  568,  1564 

De  Wolf  V.  Watterson,  35  Hun  111,  1491 

Dexter  v.  City  of  Boston,  176  Mass. 

247,  1271,   1305 

V.    Town    Council   &c.,    17    R.    I. 
222,  1401 

Dey  V.  Lee,  4  Jones  L.  238,  301 

V.  Mayor  &c.,  19  N.  J.  Eq.  412, 

253,   279,    481,    1212 

Deyo    V.    Otoe    Co.,    37    Fed.    246, 

992,    1022 

Diamond  v.  City  of  Brooklyn,  36  N. 

Y.    S.   97,  1325 

Dibble  v.   Town  of  New  Haven,   56 

Conn.    199,  859 

Dickerson     v.     Franklin,     112     Ind. 

178,  1516 

Dickey   v.   City  of  Chicago,   164   111. 

37,  1144 

V.    City    of    Chicago,    179    111. 
184,  1153 

V.  Hurlburt,  5  Cal.  343,  368 

V.  People,   160  111.  633,  1303 

V.  Polk.  58  Iowa  287,  1726 

V.  Tennison,  27  Mo.  373,  687 

Dickinson   v.    City   of   Poughkeepsie, 

75  N.  Y.  65,  647,  851 

V.  Mayor  &c.,  92  N.  Y.  584,  1746 

V.  Worcester,  7  Allen  127,  1216 

Dickinson    Hardware   Co.   v.   Pulaski 

Co.,  55  Ark.  437,  619 


XCVl 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Tol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.] 


Dickson  v.  City  of  Racine,  61  Wis. 

545,  561,  1499 

V.    Kewanee    &c.    Co.,    53    III. 
App.  379,  1348 

Diecljmann  v.  Sheboygan  Co.,  89  Wis. 

571,  1236 

Diefentlialer  v.  Mayor  &c..  Ill  N.  Y. 

331,  244,   246,    1203,   1264 

Dieschel  v.  Town  of  Maine,  81  Wis. 

553,  281 

Dietz  V.  City  of  Neenah,  91  Wis.  422, 

1242,  1701 

Diggins  V.  Brown,  76  Cal.  318,  1206 

V.  Hartsliorne.  108  Cal.  154,  1270 

Dilcher  v.  Raap,  73  111.  266,  223 

Dill  V.   Inhabitants  &c.,  7  Met.  438, 

210,  251,   646 
V.  Roberts.  30  Wis.  178,  558 

Dillard  v.  Webb,  55  Ala.  468,  282 

Dillingham  v.  Snow,  5  Mass.  547, 

48,  86,  87,  1475,  1727 

Dillon  V,  City  of  Raleigh,  124  N,  C. 

184,  1329,  1332,  1362 

V.  City  of  Syracuse,  9  N.  Y.  S. 
98,  1212 

V.  Myers,  Bright.  426,  197 

Dimock    v.    Town    of    Suffleld,    30 

Conn.  129,  1612 

Dingley  v.  City  of  Boston,  100  Mass. 

544,  675.    685,    689 

Dingman  v.  People,  51  111.  278,  1105 

Dingwall    v.    Common    Council,    82 

Mich.    568,  292,    297 

Dinwiddie  v.   President  &c.,  37   Ind. 

66,  1288 

Directors   &c.    v.   Donnelly    (Pa.),   7 

Atl.   204,  948 

V.   Houston,   71   111.   318,  4,   6 

V.   Malany,   64  Pa.   St.  144,  1063 

Dishon  v.  Smith,  10  Iowa  212, 

152,   349,  368,   381,   1508 

District  &c.   V.   District  &c.,   18   Mo. 

App.   266,  1495 

V.  Macloon,  4  Wis.  79,  436 

V.  People,  75  111.  App.  539,  1806 

District  of  Clifton  «&c,  v,  Schneider, 

21   Ky.   L.   212,  1307 

District  of  Columbia  v.   Armes,   107 

U.   S.  519,  1617 

V.  Ashton,  14  App.  D.  C.  571,     1328 
V.    Crumbaugh,    13    App.    D.    C. 
553,  1804 

V.  Dempsey,  13  App,  D,  C.  533,  1337 
V.  Haller.  4  App.  D.  O.  405,  1317 
V.  Lyon,  161  U.  S.  200.  1306 

V.  Payne,   13  App.   D.  C.  500, 

1334,  1799 
V.  Sullivan,  11  App.  D.  C.  533,    1325 
V.   Waggaman,  4  Mackey  328,       500 
V.    Washington    &c.    R.    Co.,    1 
Mackev  361,  1183 

V,   Woodbury,   136  U.    S.   450, 

817,    1594 

District  Tp.  &c.  v.  District  Tp.  &c., 

11   Iowa  506,  240 

V.  Hardenbrook.  40  Iowa  130,  1483 
V.   Rankin,   70  Iowa  65,  662 

V.  Thomas,  59  Iowa  50,  624 

Dively   v.    City   of   Cedar    Falls,    21 

Iowa  565,  1417 

V.  City  of  Cedar  Falls,  27  Iowa 
227,  891 

Diveny  v.  City  of  Elmira.  51   N.  Y. 

506,  812.  826,  1417,  1587 

Dix  V.  School  Dist.,  22  Vt.  309,  362 

V.    Town    of    Dummerstown,    19 
Vt.   262,  662 

Dixon  V.  City  of  Cincinnati,  14  Ohio 

240,  1419 

V.    City    of    Detroit,    86    Mich. 
516,  1287 

V.  City  of  New  York,  63  N.  Y. 
S.  794,  744,  745 


Dixon  Co.  V.  Field,  111  U.  S.  83. 

634,  636,  885,  998,  999,  1000,  1002. 
1006,  1008,  1009 

Doane  v.  Houghton,  75  Cal.  360,       1259 
V.   Lake  St.   El.  R.  Co.,  165  111. 
510,  1706 

Doctor  V.  Hartman,  74  Ind.  221,  697 

Dodd  V.  City  of  Hartford,  25  Conn. 

232,  1718,  1722 

Dodds  V.  Henry,  9  Mass.  262,  351 

Dodge  V.   City  of  Memphis,   51   Fed. 

165,  978,   984 

V.  Com'rs  &c.,  3  Met.  380.  706 

V.  Gallatin,   130  N.   Y.   117,  1426 

V.  Gridley,  10  Ohio  173,  106 

V.  People,  113  111.  491,  447 

V.   Piatt  Co.,   82   N.   Y.  218,  1010 

V.  Van  Buren  Circuit  Judge,  118 
Mich.   189,  1707 

Dodson  V.  City  of  Cincinnati,  34  Ohio 

St.  276,  680 

V.   Mayor  &c.,  33  Ark.   508, 

399,    400 

Doe  V.  Deavors,  11  Ga.  79,  1714 

V.  Jones,  11  Ala.  63,  1559 

V.  McQuilkin,  8  Blackf.  335,       1540 

Doering  v.  State.  49  Ind.  56.  1433 

Doggett  V.  Cook.  11  Cush.  262,  335 

Doherty  v.  Buchanan,  173  Mass.  338,  171 
V.    Citv   of   Galveston,    19    Tex. 
Civ.  App.  708.  297 

Dolan  V.  Joint  School  Dist.,  80  Wis. 

155.  1480 

V.  Mayor  &c..  68  N.  Y.  274. 

197.    198.    212.    1258,    1445 

Dolese  v.  McDougall.  182  111.  486,  1145 
V.  McDougall.  79  111.  App.  629.  1145 
V.  Pierce,  124  111,  140,  385,  396 

Doll  V,  Devery,  57  N.  Y.  S.  767,  579 

Dollar  Sav.  Bank  v.  Ridge,  79   Mo. 

App.  26,  1174,  1295 

v.  United  States.  19  Wall.  239,    1734 

Dolliver  v.  Parks.  136  Mass.  499,         198 

Dolloflf  V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  162  Mass. 

569,  713 

Donaghy  v.  Macy.  167  Mass.   178.       201 

Donahew  v.  City  of  Kansas  City.  136 

Mo.  657.  796.  1377.   1801 

Donahoe  v.  Richards,  38  Maine  279, 

221,   222,   1495 

Donahue  v.  Graham,  61  Cal,  276,  109 
V.  Will  Co.,  100  111.  94,  1711 

Donaldson    v.    Butler    Co.,    98    Mo. 

163,  1740 

v.    City    of    Boston,    82    Mass. 
508,  1592 

Donley  v.  City  of  Pittsburg,  147  Pa. 

St.  348,  1160 

Donnellv  v.   City  of  Brooklyn,   7   N. 

Y.   49,  934 

V.   City  of  Brooklyn,   121   N.   Y. 
9,  931 

V.  City  of  New  York,  65  N.  Y.  S. 
1030,  1768 

V.  Decker,  58  Wis.   461,  1084 

V.    Town    of    Ossining,    18    Hun 
352,  870 

V,  Tripp,  12  R.  I.  97,  818 

Donnersberger    v.    Prendergast,    128 

111.  229,  396 

Donough   V.    Dewey.   82   Mich.    309. 

66,  69,  196,  273,  276.  1473 

Donovan  v.   City  of  Oswego,   59   N. 

Y.   S.  759.  931,   1756 

V.  Mayor  &c.,  29  Miss.  247,  532 

V.  Mayor  &c.,  44  Barb.  ISO.  894 

V.   Mayor  &c..  33  N.  Y.   291, 

210,   252,   233,   253,   645 
V.  McAIpin.  85  N.  Y.  185.  225 

V.   Partridge,  69  N.  H.  88,  223 

V.  President  &c.,  1  Pin.  81,  412 

Doolan  v.  City  of  Manitowoc,  48  Wis. 

312,  174 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


XCVll 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Vol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.} 


Dooley  v.  Muse.  31   Neb.  424,  14  <  3 

V.   Town   of   Sullivan,   112   Ind. 
451  820,  1100 

Doolittle  V.  County  Ct,  28  W.   Va. 

258,  1651 

V.  Selectmen  &c..  50  Conn.  402,  lOSl 
V.   Walpole.  67  N.   II.  554,  2GG 

Doon    Tp.    V.    Cummins.    142    U.    S. 

366.  800.  002,  903.  008 

Dorau  v.  Barnes.  54  Kan.  238,  1702 

V.  City  of  Camden.  40  Atl.  724.  1406 

Dorchester   v.    Youngman.    60   N.    H. 

385,  4(2 

Dore  V.  City  of  Milwaukee,  42  Wis. 

108,  1224 

Doremus    v.    People,    161    111.    26, 

1237,  1289 

Dorev  v.  City  of  Boston,  146  Mass. 

336,  28o 

Dorgan  v.  City  of  Boston.   12  Allen 

223,  687.  1177.  1231 

Dorman  v.  City  Council  &c..  81  Maine 

411.  695.  606,  1572 

V.  City  of  Jacksonville,  13  Pla. 
538,  680,  1776 

Dorn  V.  Backer,  61  N.  Y.  261,  220 

V.  Backer.  61  Barb.  507.  1727 

Dorrance  St..  Matter  of.  4  R.  I.  230.  1266 

Dorsev    v.    City   of   Racine,    60    Wis. 

292  1622 

V.  Manlove,  14  Cal.  553,  1111 

V.  Smyth,  28  Cal.  21,  1445 

Dorsev    Co.    v.    Whitehead,    47    Ark. 

205,  210,  957 

Dosdall  V.  Olmsted.  30  Minn.  96,  9 

Doster   v.    City   of   Atlanta,    72    Ga. 

233,  805 

v.  Howe.  28  Kan.  353.  664 

Dotterer  v.  Bowe.  84  Ga.  769,  1745 

Dougan  v.  Champlain  Trans.  Co.,  56 

N.  Y.  1,  1627 

Dougherty   v.    Borough   of   Norwood, 

196  Pa.  St.  92.  721 

V.   Hitchcock,  35  Cal.  512,  1255 

V.  Miller,  36  Cal.  83,  708 

V.  Trustees  &c..  159  N    Y.  154,  1364 

Doughty   V.    Hope,   3   Denio   249, 

348,    1533,    1540 

Douglas  V.  Commonwealth,  2  Rawle 

.->(!■->  1392 

V.  "commonwealth,    108    Pa.    St. 
559.  753 

V.  Craig.   4  Kan.  App.  99,  1271 

V.  Downing.  9  So.  297,  968 

V.  Kansas  Citv.  147  Mo.  428,  1388 
V.  Mayor  &c..  IS  Cal.  643,  570,  651 
V.  Pike  Co..  101  IT.  S.  677,  1524 

V.  Town  of  Chatham,  41   Conn. 
211.  983 

V.  Town  of  Harrisville.  9  W.  Va. 
162,  1287,  1520 

Douglas  Co.  V.  Bardon.  79  Wis.  641,     315 
V.  Timme,  32  Neb.  272,  173 

Douglass  V.  Board  &c.,  23  Fla.  419,     274 
V.    City    Council    &c.,    118    Ala. 
599.  1705 

V.  Pike  Co..  101  U.  S.  677,  1001 

V.  State.  31  Ind.  429.  1445 

V.  Wickwire,  19  Conn.  489.  195 

Douglasville  v.  .Tones.  62  Ga.  423.       242 

Dousman    v.    City    of    St.    Paul,    22 

Minn.  387.  1198 

Dovaston  v.  Payne,  2  Sm.  L.  Cas. 

142  1559 

Dover  v.  McMurphy.  4  N.  H.  158,       1.58 
V.  Twombly,  42  N.  H.  59,  326 

Dow  V.  Bullock.  13  Gray  136,  168 

V.    Norris.   4   N.   H.   16.  517 

Dowell  V.   City  of  Portland,   13  Or. 

248.  746 

Dowlan  v.  Sibley  Co.,  36  Minn.  430, 

1  Smith — vii 


Downend   v.   Kansas   City,    156   Mo. 

60,  1341,  1373,  1374 

Downer  v.  Lent.  6  Cal.  94.  1091 

Downing   v.    City   of    Miltonvale,    36 

Kan.  740.  488,  538,  5.39 

V.  Herrick,  47  Maine  462,  221 

v.  Mason  Co.,  87  Ky.  208,  9 

V.  Rugar,  21  Wend.  178. 

27.5,   205,  1485,  1.539 
Downs  V.  Board  &c.,  4  Wash.  309,     1737 
V.    City    of   Ansonia,    73    Conn. 
33,  791 

V.  Commissioners  &c..  2  Pen.  132, 

86,  1350.  1360.  1787 
Dows   V.    City   of  Chicago,    11    Wall. 

108.  1007.    1717.   1718.   1722 

V.    City    of    Elmwood,    34    Fed. 

114,  993 

Dowty  V.  Pittwood,  23  Mont.  113,       186 

Doxey  v.  Board  &c..  67  Mich.  601,       626 

Doyle   V.    City   of   Duluth,   74   Minn. 

157,  931 

V.  Falconer,  L.  R.  1  P.  C.  328.     205 
Drainage    Com'rs    v.    Illinois   &c.    R. 

Co.,   158  111.  353,  1249 

Drake    v.    City    of    Lowell,    13    Met. 

202.  1592,   1612 

V.  Grout.  21  Ind.  App.  534,  1272 

V.  Hudson  River  R.  Co.,  7  Barb. 
508.  464.   1706 

V.  Inhabitants  &c..  6  Cush.  303,    662 
V.  Phillips,  40  Ind.  388.         651,  1232 
Dranga  v.  Rowe,  127  Cal.  506,  1550 

Draper  v.  Cambridge.  20  Ind.  268.     1494 
V.   Town  of   Springport,   104   U. 
S.  501.  261,  1014,  1015 

Drath   v.   Burlington  &c.   R.   Co.,   15 

Neb.  367,  699 

Dressman  v.  Farmers'  &e.  Bank,  100 

Ky.  571,  1304 

Drew  v.  Morrill,  62  N.  H.  23.  191,  312 
Drexel    v.    Town    of    Lake,    127    111. 

54,  591 

Dreyfus   v.    Lonergan,    73    Mo.    App. 

336,  506.  1685 

Drhew  v.  City  of  Altoona,  121  Pa.  St. 

401.  897,  919 

Driftwood  &c.   Co.   v.   Board  &c.,   72 

Ind.  226.  234,  260,  647 

Driggs  V.  Phillips,  103  N.  Y.  77, 

1105,  1559.   1573,  1574 
Drisko  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  75  Maine 

73,  362 

Dritt  V.  Snodgrass.  66  Mo.  286.  221,  222 
Dronberger  v.  Reed,  11  Ind.  420.  608 
Drott  V.  Riverside.  4  Ohio  C.  C.  312,  175 
Drucker  v.  Manhattan  R.  Co.,  106  N. 

Y.  157,  1581 

Druiff  V.  Parker,  L.  R.  5  Eq.  131,  1015 
Druliner  v.  State,  20  Ind.  308.  158 

Drummond  v.  City  of  Eau  Claire,  79 

Wis.  97,  1255 

Drury  v.  Foster,  2  Wall.  24,  310 

Dryberry  School  Dist.  v.  Mercer,  115 

Pa."  St.  550.  1491 

Drvden  v.  Swinburne,  20  W.  Va.  89,  378 
Dubach   v.    Hannibal   &c.   R.   Co..   80 

Mo.  483.  588,  1354 

Dubois  V.   City  Council  &c.,   Dudley  . 

30.  494 

Du  Bois  V.  Decker.  130  N.  Y.  325.  1068 
Dubuque  &c.   College  v.   District  Tp. 

&c..  13  Iowa  555.  258.  715,  1480 

Dudley  v.  Board  &c.,  80  Fed.  672,       998 

V.  Grayson,  6  T.  B.  iMon.  259,     1424 

V.  Mavhew,  3  N.  Y.  9.  556 

Duer  V.  Small.  4  Blatchf.  2B3.  1510 

Duffield  V.  Williamsnort  School  Dist., 

162   Pa.   St.   476.  1762 

Duffy  V.   City  of  Dubuque.   63   Iowa 

171,  1375,   1.595,   1612 

Dugan  V.  Farrier,  47  N.  J.  L.  383. 

288,    296 


XCVlll 


TABLE   OF    CASES, 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Vol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol.  U,  pp.  S33-iS30.] 


Dugan    V.    United   States,   3    Wheat. 

172,  217 

Duggen  V.  McGruder,  Walk.  112,       1724 
Dugro,  In  re,  50  N.  Y.  513,  1234 

Duke  V.  Beeson,  79  Ind.  24,  1571 

V.  Brown.  96  N.  C.  127,         370,  646 
V.  Mayor '&e.,  20  Ga.  635,       821,  822 
Diillam  V.  Wilson,  52  Mich.  392,  207 

Dullanty  v.  Town  of  Vaughn,  77  Wis. 

38,  623 

Dumas  v.   Patterson,  9  Ala.  484. 

323,  327 
Dunavon  v.  Board  &c..  47  Hun  13,  1491 
Dunbar  v.  Board  &c.,  49  I'ac.  409, 

873,  1707,  1731 
Duncan  y.  Board  &c.,  101  Ind.  403, 

285,    1038 
V.    City  of   Buffalo,   2    N.   Y.    S. 
503.  1606 

V.   City  of  Lynchburg,  34   S.   E. 
964,  1805 

V.  City  of  Terre  Haute,  85  Ind. 
104,  693,  1571 

V.  Findlater,  6  CI.  &  F.  894,         225 
V.  State,  7  La.  An.  377,  326 

Duncombe  v.  City  of  Fort  Dodge,  38 

Iowa  281.  261 

V.  Prindle,  12  Iowa  1,  446 

Dunda.s  v.  City  of  Lansing,  75  Mich. 

499,  1618.  1620.  1626.  1638 

Dundy  v.  Board  &c.,  8  Neb.  508,      54,  56 
Dunham  v.  City  of  New  Britain,  55 

Conn.  378,  1116 

V.  People,  96  111.  331,  1084 

V.  Trustees  &c..  5  Cow.  462, 
100.   499,   501,   505,   532,   1148,   1389 
V.  Village  of  Hyde  Park,  75  111. 
371,  684 

V.  Williams.  37  N.  Y.  251.  1565 

Dunleith   &c.    Bridge   Co.   v.   City   of 

Dunleith,  32  Iowa  427,  1513 

Dunlop  V.  Keith,  1  Leigh  430,  530 

V.  Munroe,  7  Cranch  242,  225 

Dunn    V.    Long    Beach    &c.    Co.,    114 

Cal.   605,  1699 

V.  McNeely,  75  Mo.  App.  217,       719 
V.   Town   of  Barnwell,   43   S.   C. 
398,  1376 

Dunne    v.    W.    Chicago    Pk.    Com'rs, 

159   111.  60,  1237 

Dunnell    Mfg.    Co.   v.    Newell,    15    R. 

I.  233,  1551,  1552 

Dunning  v.  Railroad  Co.,  2  Ind.  437. 

86,  87 
Dunnovan  v.  Green,  57  111.  63.  1521 

Duntley  v.   Davis,   42   Hun  229,  313 

Duperier  v.  Viator,  35  La.  An.  957.  1539 
Dupont  V.  City  of  Pittsburg,  69  Fed. 

13,  875 

Durach's  Appeal.  62  Pa.  St.  491,       1503 

Durant  v.  Eaton,  98  Mass.  469,  1722 

V.  Iowa  Co.,  1  Woolw.  69,    883,  1026 

V.   Kauffman,  34  Iowa  194, 

1515,   1516,   1517 
V.  Palmer,  29  N.  J.  L.  544.  1597 

Durfev  v.  Town  of  Worcester,  63  Vt. 

418,  1051 

Durham  v.  Hyde  Park,  75  111.  371,     591 
Durkee  v.  City  of  Janesville,  28  Wis. 

464,  558 

Durr  V.  Howard.  6  Ark.  461.  1411 

Durvea  v.  Mayor  &c..  26  Hun  120,     1790 

"v.  Smith,  16  N.  Y.  S.  688,  1225 

Dusenbury    v.    Mutual    Tel.    Co.,    11 

Abb.  N.  C.  440,  681.  1581 

Dutten    V.    Village    of   Hanover,    42 

Ohio  St.   215,  340.   448 

Dutton   V.   City  of  Aurora,   114   111. 

138,  524.  848 

Dwight  V.  Mayor,  12  Allen  322.         1501 
Dwyer  v.  Hackworth,  57  Tex.  245. 

562,  974 
V.  Salt  Lake  City,  19  Utah  521,  1330 


Dyar  v.  Farmington  Village  Corpora- 
tion, 70  Maine  515,  1178 
Dyckman  v.  Mayor  &c.,  5  N.  Y.  434,    684 
Dyer  v.  Brogan.  70  Cal.  136,  1426 
V.  City  of  St.  Paul,  27  Minn.  457, 

801,  1215 
V.     Fl.vdenfeldt,    4    West    Coast 
Rep.   585,  1255 

V.  Smith,  12  Conn.  384,  220 

Dyer  Co.  v.   Railroad  Co.,  87  Tenn. 

712,  1379 

Dygert  v.    Schenck,   23   Wend.   446,     745 
Dyker  &c.  Improvement  Co.  v.  Cook, 

38   N.   Y.   222,  1247 


E 


Eachus  V.   Los  Angeles  &c.   R.   Co., 

103    Cal.    614,  1211 

Eadie  v.  Slimmon,  26  N.  Y.  9,  1263 

Eager,  In  re.  46  N.  Y.   100,  1255 

Eagle  V.   Beard,  33  Ark.  497,  434 

Eagle  Mfg.  Co.  v.  City  of  Davenport, 

101  Iowa  493.  1299 

Eames  v.   Savage,   77   Maine  212, 

142,  1526 
Earles  v.  Wells,  94  Wis.  285,  877,  879 
Earl    of    Excester   v.    Smith,    2    Keb. 

367,  467 

Earl  of  Exeter  v.  Smith,  Cart.  177,     467 
Early  v.  Hamilton,  75  Ind.  376,  696 

East    Hartford    v.    Hartford    Bridge 

Company,  10  How.  511.  767 

East    Kingston   v.    Towle,    48    N.    H. 

57,  1571 

East   Missouri  v.   Horseman,   16  LTp. 

Can.   Q.   B.  576,  211 

East  Oakland  Tp.  v.   Skinner,  94  IT. 

S.   255,  233,   636.   998 

East  168th  St..  In  re.  157  N.  Y.  409.  1319 
East   169th   St.,   In   re,   56   N.   Y.    S. 

819.  1781 

East  River  &c.   Co.  v.   Donnelly.   93 

N.  Y.  557,  225,   753,   1687 

East  St.   Louis  v.  Albrecht,   150  111. 

506,  1235 

V.  Amy,  120  U.  S.  600,         109.  1525 

v.  Board  of  Trustees,  6  111.  App. 

130,  897,  898 
V.   East   St.    Louis   Gas  &c.   Co., 

98  HI.  415.  239 

V.  People.  6  111.  App.  76,  897 

V.  United  States,  110  U.  S.  321, 

1524.   1528.   1529 
East  Syracuse,  In  re,  20  Abb.  N.  C. 

131.  927,  1199 
East  Tenn.  Tel.  Co.  v.  City  of  Rus- 

sellville.  21  Ky.  L.  305.  586 

East  Tenn.   University  v.   Knoxville, 

6   Baxt.    166,  10 

Easterly  v.  Town  of  Irwin,  99  Iowa 

694,  792 

Eastman  v.   Amoskeag  Mfg.   Co.,   44 

N.  H.  146.  1095 

V.   Concord,   64   N.   H.   263.  936 

V.    Meredith.    36   N.    H.    284. 

9,  15,  36,  89.  148.  776.  786,  803.  807 

810,   820.   830,   1076,   1113 

Easton  v.  Colander,  11  Wend.  90,     1727 

Easton  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  City  of  Easton, 

133  Pa.  St.  50.5,  1122 

Eaton  v.  Berlin,  49  N.  H.  219,  869 

V.   Boston  &c.  R.   Co.,  51  N.   H. 
504,  676,   677 

V.   Chesebrough,  82  Mich.   214.   1544 
V.  Miner,  5  N.  H.  542,  345 

V.  Supervisors  &c.,  44  Wis.  489. 

13,  14 
Eberhardt  v.  Wood.   6  Lea  467,  312 

Eberhart   v.   Chicago  &c.   R.   Co.,   70 

111.  347.  1602 

Eby  V.  Board  &c.,  87  Cal.  166,  1682 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


XCIX 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Vol.  I,  pp.  1-S32;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.'] 


Epkert  v.  Long  Island  R.  Co.,  43  N. 

Y.  502.  icr.i 

Kckniiiii  V.  Brady  Tp.,  81  Mich.  70.  lO.'jO 

ICcoiiomidfS  v.   Ilinricks,  48  La.  An. 

;!70,  605. 

Kcorse  Tp.   Board  &c.   v.   Board  &c., 

75  Mich.  •2VA,  1580 

I':cr(),vd  V.  ("ogsrcshall,  21  R.  I.  1,  7-'7 

i:dd,v  V.  Board  &c..  10  Phila.  94,       1119 
V.   (Jransior.    19   R.    L    105,  1315 

V.  Villasve  of  Ellicottville,  54  N. 
Y.   S.  800,  804 

V.  Wiison,  43  Vt.  362, 

355,  356.  360,  366,  666 

Kde  V.  Cuneo,  55  Pac.  388.  1287 

V.   Cunco,   126  Cai.   167,  1310 

Edgar  v.  Greer.  14  Iowa  211,  1711 

Edgecnmbe  v.  City  of  Burlington,  46 

Vt.  218,  689 

Edgerly  v.  Concord.  62  N.  H.  8, 

266.   786.   787.   803,   820 

lOdgerton  v.   First   Municipality  &c., 

1  La.  An.  435,  1743 

V.  Goldsboro  ^Vater  Co.,  126  N. 
C.  93,  1507 

V.   Huff,  26  Ind.  35,  675 

V.  Mayor  &c.,  19  Fla.  140,  1269 

Edinburg  American  Land  Co.  v.  City 
of  Mitchell,   1   S.   D.  593. 

.   850,  959,  968 

Edminson  v.  City  of  Abilene,  7  Kan. 

App.  305,  465,  1021 

Edmunds  v.  Banburv.  28  Iowa  267.     370 
V.  City  of  Boston,  108  Mass.  535, 

701,  703,  1182 
V.  Gookins,  20  Ind.  477,  383.  1517 
V.  Gookins,  24  Ind.  169,  392 

Edmundson  v.  School  Dist.,  98  Iowa 

639,  876 

Edward    C.    Jones   Co.    v.    Perry,    26 

Ind.  App.  554,  1309 

Edwards  v.  Berlin,  123  Cal.  544. 

748,    1153.   1290 
V.  City  of  Chicago,  140  111.  440, 

1174,  1253 
V.  City  of  Watertown,  24   Hun 
426,  285 

V.    Common    Council    &c.,    102 
Mich.  153.  1327 

V.   Davis,   16  Johns.   682,  1069 

V.   Ferguson.  73  Mo.  686,  221 

V.  Kearzly.  96  T'.  S.  595.        412.  766 
V.  Town  of  Pocahontas,  47  Fed. 
268,  806,  813 

V.    Trustees    &c.,    30    111.    App. 
528.  1487 

V.  United  States.  13  Otto  471,      199 
V.  Williamson.  70  Ala.  145.  412 

Eels  V.  American  &c.  Tel.  Co.,  20  N. 

Y.  S.  600,  1581 

Effingham    &c.    Co.    v.    Hamilton,    68 

Miss.  523,  1646 

Egan  V.  City  of  Chicago,  5  111.  App. 

70,  465 

Ege  V.  Koontz,  3  Pa.  St.  109,  242 

Eggleston  v.   President  &c.,   18   Hun 

146,  1612 

Egleston    v.    City    Council,    1    Mill 

Const.  45,  1411 

Egyptian    Levee    Co.    v.    Hardin,    27 
Mo.  495, 
1205,   1206,    1270,   1292,   1508,   1521 

Ehrgott  V.  Mayor  &c.,  96  N.  Y.  264, 

265,  783.  788,  1592 

E.   H.   Rollins  &  Sons  v.   Board  &c., 
80  Fed.  692,  49  U.  S.  App.  399, 

986.  1031 

Eichels  v.  Evansville  &c.  R.   Co..   78 

Ind.    261.  103.    108,    586.    590 

Kidam  v.  Finnegan.  48  Minn.  53.         1713 

Eilert   v.    City  of   Oshkosh,    14   Wis. 

637.  1255 

Ela  V.  Smith,  5  Gray  121,  189,  191 


Elbin  V.  Wihson.  33  Md.  135,  221 

Elder  v.  Bemis,  2  Met.  599,  335 

V.  Cnssilly,  21   Ky.   L.  1274.  1243 

V.    Dwight    Mfg.    Co.,    4    Gray 
201,  1412 

V.  Territory,  3  Wash.  T.  438. 

1486,  1496 

Electric  Power  Co.  v.  Mayor  &c.,  60 

N.  Y.  S.  590,  573 

Eleventh   Ave.,   Matter  of,   81   N.   Y. 

436,  1564 

Elias  v.  City  of  Rochester,  61  N.  Y. 

S.  712,  1361 

Elk  V.   Wilkins,  112  IT.   S.  r)4,  135 

Elliot    V.    City    of   Minneapolis,    59 

Minn.  Ill,  752 

Elliott  V.  City  of  Louisville,  101  Ky. 

262.  490,  1389 

V.  City  of  Oil  City,  129  Pa.  St. 
5V0.  1180 

V.   City  of  Philadelphia,   75   Pa. 
St.  347,  798 

V.  City  of  Pittsburgh,  6  Pa.  Dist. 
R.  455,  753 

V.    Fair   Haven    &c.    R.    Co.,    32 
Conn.  579.  590 

V.  Palmer,  10  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  427,  1419 
V.  Sackett,  108  U.  S.  132,  1015 

V.  Supervisors,  58  Mich.  452, 

859,  1088 
V.  Swartwout,   10  Pet.   137,  1725 

V.  Williamson.  11  Lea  38,  1541 

V.  Willis.  1  Allen  461,  195 

Ellis    V.    Academy   &c.,    120    Pa.    St. 

608.  1565 

V.    City   of   Cleburne,    35    S.    W. 
495.  714,  734 

V.    City   of  Lewiston,   89   Maine 
60,  1342 

V.    City   of   Peru,   23    111.    App. 
35,  1631 

V.  County  Com'rs,  2  Gray  370,     1657 
V.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  77  Wis. 
114,  622 

V.  Page.  1  Pick.  43,  523 

V.  Sheffield  Gas  &c.  Co.,  23  L.  J. 
Q.  B.  42.  745 

V.  Washoe  Co.,  7  Neb.  291,  663,  664 

Ellison  V.  Alderman,  89  N.  C.  125.       204 
V.  Allen,  30  N.  Y.  S.  441.  1369 

V.  Linford,  7  Utah  166.  1515 

Elmendorf  v.    Mayor   &e.,   25   Wend. 

693,  167,  299,  477,  480,  1421 

Elmore  v.  Drainage  Com'rs,  135  111. 

269,  267,    772.   780 

V.  Overton,  104  Ind.  548.     220,  222 

Elmore  Co.  v.  Long,  52  Ala.  277.        1527 

Elmwood  Tp.  v.  Marcy,  92  U.  S.  289. 

992,  1001.  1005 

El  Paso  Gas  &c.  Co.  v.  City  of  El 

Paso.   22  Tex.   Civ.   App.   309,        723 

Elrod  V.  Bernadotte.  53  HI.  368.  1530 

Elsberry   v.    Seay,   83   Ala.   614. 

1494,  1495 

Elson  V.  O'Dowd.  40  Ind.  300,  656 

Elster  V.  Springfield,  49  Ohio  St.  82, 

582,  809,  1181 

Elston  V.  Board  &c.,  20  Ind.  272. 

383,  1517 

Elwell  V.  Tucker,  1  Blackf.  285,  757 

Elwood  V.  Bullock,  0  Q.  B.  383. 

500,   1405 

Ely  V.  Board  &c..  36  N.  Y.  297.  800 

V.  Campbell,  59  How.  Pr.  333, 

620,  1610 
V.  City  of  Des  Moines,  86  Iowa 
55.  1638 

V.    City   of   Rochester.   26   Barb. 
133.  666 

V.  Parsons,  55  Conn.  83.       225.  226 
V.    St.    Louis    R.    Co.,    77    Mo. 
34,  1627 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Vol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Yol.  II,  pp.  SSS-ISSO.] 


Elyton   Land   Co.   v.   Ayres,    67   Ala. 

413,  651,  1287 

Emblei-  v.  Town  of  Walkill,  132  N.  Y. 

222,  1632 

Embury  v.  Conner,  3  N.  Y.  511,  675 

Bmeric  v.  Gilman.  10  Cal.  404,  1743 

Emerich  v.  City  of  Indianapolis,  118 

Ind.  279,  1677 

Emerson  v.  Babcock.  66  Iowa  258,     1368 
V.  Inhabitants  &c..  13  Pick.  377,  715 

Emery  v.  Bradford.  29  Cal.  75,  708 

V.    City   of    Lowell,    127    Mass. 
138.  246 

V.  Hapgood,  7  Gray  55,  211 

v.-  San    Francisco   Gas   Co.,    28 
Cal.   345,  1256,   1266,   1269 

Emlen    v.    Lehigh    Coal    &c.    Co.,    47 

Pa.  St.  76,  1020 

Emmitt  v.  City  of  New  York,  13  N. 

Y.    S.   887,  178,   183 

Emmons  v.  City  of  Lewiston,  132  111. 

380,  1395 

Emorv  V.  City  of  Lowell,  104  Mass. 

13,  817 

Empire  v.  Darlington,  101  U.  S.  87, 

995,  1026 

Empire   City   Subway   Co.    v.    Broad- 
way &c.  R.  Co.,   159  N.  Y.  555,  740 

Enfield  v.   Jordan,   119  U.   S.  680, 

1026,  1033 

Enfield  Toll  Bridge  Co.  v.   Hartford 

&c.  R.  Co.,  17  Conn.  40,  1323 

Engle  V.  New  York.  40  Fed.  51,  784 

English  V.  Chicot  Co.,  26  Ala.  454,       982 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  2  Marv.  63, 

1242,  1292.  1302 
V.  People,  96  111.  566,  624,  979 

V.  Smock,  34  Ind.  115,  656 

English    &c.    Inv.    Co.    v.    Hardy,    93 

Tex.   289.  1644 

Engstad  v.  Dinnie,  8  N.  D.  1,     925,  1549 

Engstrom  v.  City  of  Minneapolis,  28 

Minn.  200.  1366 

Enos  V.  City  of  Springfield.  113  111. 

65,  1143,  1158,  116G.  1107,  1268,  1303 

Enriarht  v.  Falvey,  4  L.  R.  Ir.  397,       321 

Ensign  v.  Barse,   107  N.   Y.  329, 

1166,  1505 

Episcopal  School,  Matter  of,  75  N.  Y. 

324,  1139 

Episcopal  Society  v.  Dedham  Episco- 
pal   Church.    1    Pick.    372,  258 

Erie  v.   Bootz,  72   Pa.   St.   196,  106 

Erie   City   v.    Schwingle,   22    Pa.    St. 

384  265 

Erie  Co.'  v.  City  of  Erie,  113  Pa.  St. 

360,  1546 

Erlinger  v.  Boneau,  51  111.  94.  58 

Ernst  V.  Kunkle,  5  Ohio  St.  520.         1192 

Erschler  v.  Lennox.  42  N.  Y.  S.  805,  1550 

Erskine  v.   Steel  Co.,  87  Fed.  630,       992 
V.    Van    Arsdale,    15    Wall.    (82 
IT.   S.)    75,  1551,   1552,   1726 

Erving  v.  Mayor.  131   N.  Y.  133,  753 

Erwin    v.    Central    Union    Tel.    Co., 

148   Ind.   365,  1700 

V.  City  of  Jersey  City,  60  N.  J. 

L.   141.  479 

Escanaba    &c.    Co.    v.    City    of    Chi- 
cago.   107   U.    S.    678,  801 

Eschbach  v.  Pitts,  6  Md.  71,     1262,  1544 

Eslava  v.  Jones,  83  Ala.  139,  222 

Espy    V.    Town    of    Ft.    Madison,    14 

Iowa    226,  1725 

Essex  Public  Road  Board  v.  Skinkle, 

140   I^.    S.   334,  768 

Essex   Turnpike   Corp.    v.    Collins,    8 

Mass.    292.  304 

Essroger   v.    City    of   Chicago,    185 

111.    420,  512 

Estep   V.   Keokuk   Co.,    18   Iowa   199, 

251,  647 

Estes  V.  Owen,  90  Mo.  113,         589,  1233 


Estey  V.   Starr.  56  Vt.   690,  301,  35(> 

Estopinal    v.    Peyroux,    37    La.    An. 

477,  335 

Eureka  City  v.  Wilson,  15  Utah  67, 

520,    1384.    1390 

Eureka    Springs   v.    O'Neal,    56   Ark. 

350,  520 

Eustace  V.  Jahns.  38  Cal.  3,  1588 

Eustis   V.    City   of   Henrietta,    37    S. 

W^   632,  66 

Evanisch   v.    G.    C.   &   S.    F.    R.    Co., 

57   Tex.   123,  794 

Evans  v.   City  of  Council   Bluffs.  65 

Iowa  238,  421,  1516 

V.     City    of    Denver,    26     Colo. 
193,  1290 

V.    City    of    Utica,    69    N.    Y. 
166,  1587,   1631 

V.    Etheridge.   96   N.   C.   42,  223 

V.  Hughes  Co.,  6  Dak.  102,  596 

V.  People,   139  111.   552,  1241 

V.   Sharp,  29  Wis.  564,  558 

V.    Town   of   Stanton,    23   Minn. 
368,  865 

Evanston  v.  Gunn,  99  U.  S.  660. 

8,   265,    1324 

Evansville    v.    Dennett,    161    U.    S. 

434.  609 

Evansville  &c.  Co.  v.  State,  73  Ind. 

219,  ♦  1571 

Evansville  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  City  of  Ev- 
ansville.  15   Ind.  395,  282 

Eve  V.  Simon,  78  Ga.  120,  1677 

Everett  v.  City  of  Council  Bluffs,  46 

Iowa  66.  1117 

V.  Deal,  148  Ind.  90,  306.  1711 

V.   Smith.   22   Minn.   53,  374,   473 

Evergreen  Cemetery  Ass'n  v.  Beecher, . 
53  Conn.  551.  689 

V.  City  of  New  Haven,  43  Conn. 
234,  680 

Everill  v.  Swan,  17  Utah  514,  152 

Everson    v.    City    of    Syracuse,    100 

N.  Y.  577.  818 

Everts  v.   District  Tp.  &c.,   77   Iowa 

37,  618.   1480.   1482 

Evertson  v.  National  Bank,  66  N.  Y. 

14,  1019 

V.  Sutton,  5  Wend.  280.  335 

Ewart  V.  Village  of  Western  Springs, 

180    111.    318,  1144,    1148.    1310 

Ewbanks    v.    President    &c.,    36    111. 

177,  527.  528,  1132,  1419 

Ewing  V.    State,   81    Tex.    172,  1689 

Exchange    Bank    v.    Hines,    3    Ohio 

St    1  1721 

V.  Lewis  Co.,  28  W.  Va.  273,         216    , 

Exeter  v.  Glvde.  4  Mod.  33,  207    ^ 

V.  Starre.  2  Show.  158,  536 

Eyerly  v.  Board  &c..  81  Iowa  189,  1674 
V.  Jasper  Co.,  72  Iowa  150,  1674 
V.  Jasper  Co.,  77  Iowa  470,  1674 

Eyerman  v.  Blaksley,  78  Mo.  145, 

526,    1499 

Eyke  v.  Lange.  90  Mich.  592,  1656 

Eyre    v.    Jacob,    14    Gratt.    422, 

1508,  1521 

F 

Faake  v.  City  of  Seattle,  16  Wash. 

90,  1325 

Face  V.  City  of  Ionia,  90  Mich.  104, 

1557,  1593 
Facey  v.  Puller,  13  Mich.  527,  297 

Fagan    v.    City    of    Chicago,    84    111. 

227,  1268.  1272 

Fair    V.    Citv    of    Philadelphia,    88 

Pa.    St.   309.  1378 

Fairbanks  Co.  v.  Kirk,  12  Pa.  Super. 

Ct.  210,  1744 

Fairchild    v.    City   of   St.    Louis,   97 

Mo.  85,  1697 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


CI 


[References  are  to  Pages.    Vol.  I,  pp.  1-S32;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.1 


FaiiThild    v.    City   of    St.    Paul,    4G 

iMimi.  n40,  11 GS 

V.    Kpilh.   29   Ohio   St.    15G,  3:i4 

V.  Wall,  03  Cal.  401,  1194 

Fairfax    v.    Hunter,    7    Cranch    G03, 

13L',    134 

Fairfield  v.   Gallatin   Co.,   100  U.    S. 

47.  99r>.   996 

Falconer   v.    Buffalo   &c.    R.    Co.,    (!9 

N.  Y.  491,  990,  99G 

V.  Cami)bell,  2  McLean  195,  45 

V.   Shores,   37   Ark.   38G.  313 

Falk  V.  Strother,  84  Cal.  544,     939,  16G4 

Falkner  v.  Hunt,  IG  Cal.  170.  1725 

Fallbrook  Irr.   Dist.   v.  Bradley,   164 

U.   S.   112,  551,   1302 

Faller  v.  City  of  Grand  Rapids,  105 

Mich.    529.  825 

Fallon,   In   re,   59   N.   Y.   S.   849,  873 

Fall    River    Works    v.    City    of    Fall 

River.   110  Mass.  428,  701 

Falls  V.  Cairo,  58  III.  403.  246,  247 

Fane's   Ca.se,    1    Doug.    149.  200 

Fanning   v.    Gregoire,    16   IIow.   524, 

2G1,  565 

Farley  v.  Board  &c.,  126  Ind.  4G8.  1419 
V.  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.,  36  III. 
App.  517,  906 

V.  Mayor  &c.,  41  N.  Y.  S.  622, 

1363,  1364 

Farmers'   &c.    Bank   v.    School    Dist., 

6  Dak.   255,  627,  851 

Farmers'    Loan   &c.    Co.    v.    Borough 

of  Ansonia,  61  Conn.  76.  1250 

V.  City  of  Galesburg,  133  TT.   S. 
156,  746,  1028 

Farmington  River  &c.  Co.  v.  County 
Com'rs,    112    Mass.    206, 

706,   707,   1724 

Farnham  v.  Benedict.  39  ITun  22,       212 
V.  Pierce,  141  Mass.  203,  1071 

Farnsworth  v.  City  of  Rockland,  83 

Maine   508,  1583 

V.   Pawtucket,   13  R.   I.  83,  526 

Farnum  v.  Town  of  Concord,  2  N.  H. 

392,  148.   777 

V.   Town   of   Ellington,   46   Hun 
41,  1591 

Farquar  v.  City  of  Roseberg,  18  Or. 

271,  2G5 

Farr  v.  Brackett.  30  Vt.  344,  523 

V.  IloUis,  9  B.  &  C.  315,  318 

V.    West    Chicago    Park    Com'rs, 
167  111.  355,  1310 

Farraker    v.    City    of    Keokuk,    111 

Iowa  310,  1141 

Farrar  v.  City  of  St.  Louis,  80  Mo. 

379,  1183,  1206,  1233,  1257 

Farrel    v.    Mayor   &c.,    12    Up.    Can. 

Q.    B.    343,  536 

V.  Town  of  Derby,  58  Conn.  234, 

671,  857 

Farrell    v.    City    of    Bridgeport,    45 

Conn.   91,  1432 

V.  King,  41  Conn.  448.  1427 

V.    Mayor  &c.,   5   N.    Y.    S.    672. 

620,  1370 
V.    West    Chicago    Park    Com'rs, 
182  III.  250.    1136,  1149,  1270,  1287 

Farrlngton    v.    Citv   of   Mt.    Vernon, 

64   N.  Y.   S.  863.  519.   1274 

V.    New   England   &c.   Co.,    1    N. 
D.  102,  593 

V.   Turner,   53   Mich.    27,  372 

Fai-well   V.   City  of   Chicago,   71    111. 

269,  604 

Fass  V.   Seehawer,  60  Wis.  525, 

559.    708,    1163 

Fath  V.  Koeppel,  72  Wis.  289,  1090 

Fatout  V.  Board  &c.,  102  Ind.  223.    147G 

Faulk   V.    McCartney,    42    Kan.    695, 

849,   1491 


Faulkner  v.  City  of  Aurora,  85  Ind. 

130,  774,    820 

Faveill    v.    Eastern    &c.    R.    Co.,    2 

Exch.    344,  662 

Favrot    V.     I'arisb    of    East    Baton 

Rouge,  34  La.  An.  491,  1529 

Fay  v.   City  of  Springfield,   94    Fed. 

409,  1297,  1505 

V.  Reed,  128  Cal.  357,       1153,  1154 
Fayssoux    v.    De    Chaurand,    36    La. 

An.  547,  1255 

Fecheimer  v.   City  of  Louisville,   84 

Ky.  306,  1537 

Federgreen   v.    Town   of   Fallsburgh, 

25  Hun  152,  870 

Fee  v.   Columbus   Borough,   168   Pa. 

St.  382,  1335 

Feeley  v.  Wurster,  54  N.  Y.  S.  lOGO, 

218,  1732 
Fehler   v.    Gosnell,   99    Ky.    380.    18 

Ky.   L.   238,  712,    1298 

Feiten  v.  City  of  Milwaukee,  47  Wis. 

494.  700,   701 

Felch  V.  Gilman.  22  Vt.  38.      .  1570 

V.    Town    of    Weare,    69    N.    II. 

617,  266 

Feldman  v.   City  Council  &c.,   23   S. 

C.  57,  979,   1542 

Felker  v.  City  of  New  Whatcom,  16 

Wash.    178.  1141,    1294 

Fell  V.  State,  42  Md.  71,  467 

Fellowes  V.   City  of  New  Haven,  44 

Conn.    240.  680 

Fellows    V.    Gilman,    4    Wend.    414, 

309,    311 

V.  Walker,  39  Fed.   651,  981 

Felton    V.    Short    Route   &c.    Co.,    85 

Ky.    640,  1575 

Fender  v.  Neosho  Falls  Tp.,  22  Kan. 

305,  1519 

Fenelon's  Petition,  7  Pa.   St.   173.     1266 
Fenton    v.    Salt    Lake    Co.,    4    Utah 

466,  934 

Fenwick  v.   East  London  R.  Co.,   L. 

R.    20    Eq.    544,  1448 

Ferdinand    v.    Mayor    &c.,    59    Ilun 

623.  1193 

Fergus   Falls   Water   Co.    v.    City   of 

Fergus   Falls,   65   Fed.   586,  726 

Ferguson  v.   City  of  Selma.   43  Ala. 

398,  1115,  1118.   1382 

V.  Columbus  &c.  R.  Co.,  75  Ga. 

637,  794 

V.   Crittenden  Co..   6  Ark.  479,     291 

V.   Earl  of  Kinnoull,   9   U.  &  P. 

251,  222 

V.  Landram,  5  Bush  230,  650 

Fernald  v.   Lewis,  6  Maine  264, 

142,  342,  965 
Fernbach    v.    City    of    Waterloo.    76 

Iowa   598.  1628,    1641 

Ferrari  v.  Board  &c..  24  Fla.  390.     1101 
Ferree    v.    School    Dist.,    76    Pa.    St. 

376,  675 

Ferrier,  In  re,  103  III.  367,  1071 

Ferris   v.   City   of   Chicago,    162    111. 

Ill,  1237 

Ferron  v.  Alloway,  14  Bush  580,       1252 
Fertilizing  Co.  v.  Hyde  Park,  97  U. 

S.   659,  1464 

Feusier  v.  Lammon.  6  Nev.  209.  331 

Fidelity  &c.  Co.  v.  City  of  Louisville, 

174   U.   S.   429.  192 

V.   Lawrence  Co.,  92  Fed.  576,     610 
Field    V.    Barling,    149    HI.    556. 

1316,    1703 

V.  City  of  Des  Moines,  39  Iowa 

575,  673,    802,    1122 

V.  City  of  Shawnee,  7  Okia.  73,    740 

V.    Commonwealth.    32    Pa.    St. 

478.  200,   213 

V.   Field,  9  Wend.   394,  373 


Cll 


TABLE   OP    CASES. 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Yol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.1 


Field   V.    Girard   College,   54   Pa.    St. 

233,  200 

V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  36  N.  J.  Eq. 
118,  790,    1216 

V.    Malsten,    88    Md.    691, 

194,  209,   541 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  6  N.  Y.   179,  1191 

v.   People,   3   111.   79,  151 

V.    Village   of   Western    Springs, 
181    111.    186,  514,    1703 

Fields   V.    Stokley,    99    Pa.    St.    306, 

802,  1121 

Fife    V.    City    of    Oshkosh,    89    Wis. 

540,  1344,    1375 

Fifleld    V.    Marinette    Co.,    62    Wis. 

532  593,  1204 

Fifth  Ave.,  In  re,  36  N.  Y.  S.  141,     1280 

Fifty-fourth   St.,   In  re,   165   Pa.   St. 

8,  1243 

Filbert  v.  City  of  Philadelphia,   181 

Pa.   St.   530,  717 

Finch  V.  Board  &c.,  30  Ohio  St.  37, 

9,   225,   780 

Findlav    V.    McAllister,    113    U.     S. 

104,  1526 

Fink   V.    City   of   St.    Louis,    71    Mo. 

52,  1608 

V.  Village  of  Milwaukee,  17  Wis. 

26,  1419 

Finley    v.    City    of    Philadelphia,    32 

Pa.   St.  381,  1499,  1500 

V.  Dietrick,  12  Iowa  516,  1517 

Finn    v.    City    of    Adrian,    93    Mich. 

504,  1638 

Finney  v.  City  of  Oshkosh,  18  Wis. 

O09  1254 

V.  State,  126  Ind.  577,         912,  1483 

Fire   Department   &c.    v.    Davles,    25 

Misc.   683.  88 

V.   Helfenstein,  16  Wis.  136,  137 

V.  Kip,  10  Wend.  267,  61,  83 

V.  Noble.  3  E.  D.  Smith  441,         137 

Fire   Extinguisher   Mfg.    Co.   v.    City 

of   Perrv.    8    Okla.    429,  728 

Fire    Ins.    Patrol    v.    Boyd,    120    Pa. 

St.   624,  797 

Fireman's  Ins.  Co.,  Ex  parte,  6  Hill 

243,  1674 

First    Baptist   Church    Soc.    v.    Rail- 
road   Co.,    5    Barb.    79,  1109 

First  Municipality  v.  Blineau,  3  La. 

An.   688,  503,    1110,    1121 

V.     Commissioners     of     Sinking 
Fund,  1   Rob.  279,  92 

V.  Cutting,  4  La.  An.  335, 

464,  517,  580,  1402 
V.   McDonough,    2    Rob.    244,  977 

V.   Orleans  Theatre  Co.,   2   Rob. 
209,  992 

First  Nafl  Bank  v.  Arthur,  12  Colo. 

App.   90,  956,   1688 

V.    City    of    Ottawa,    43    Kan. 
294,  1744 

V.    Cook.    77    111.    622,  1717 

V.    Keith,    84    111.    App.    103,  525 

V.  Keith,   183  111.   475,  722,  926 

V.    Mavor   &c.,    68    Ga.    119,  1551 

V.    Meredith,    44    Mo.    500,  1511 

V.   Peck.   43   Kan.   643,  910 

V.   Rush   School   Dist.,   81  y2    Pa. 
St.    307,  863 

V.     Saratoga     Co.,     106     N.     Y. 
488,  963 

V.  Sarlls,  129  Ind.  201. 

57.5,    1391,    1707 
.  V.   Scott.   14  Minn.   77,  1027 

V.     Town     of     Arlington,      16 
Blatchf.    57.  1014 

V.    Town    of    Concord,    50    Vt. 
257.  987 

V.  Town  of  Dorset,   16  Blatchf. 
62,  987 


First  Nafl  Bank  v.  Union  School  Tp., 

75  Ind.  301,  862 

V.  Watkins,  21  Mich.  483,  1551 

V.  Yankton  Co.,  101  T'.   S.   129,    992 

First    Presbyterian    Church    v.    City 

of  Ft.   Wayne,  36  Ind.  338,  1232 

First    St.,    Matter   of,    66    Mich.    42, 

637,   1323 

Fish  V.  Dodge,  38  Barb.   163,  222 

V.    Perkins,    52    Conn.    200,  1054 

Fishburn    v.    City    of    Chicago,    171 

111.   338,  734 

Fisher    v.    Board    &c.,    44    La.    An. 

184,  850 

V.  Bountiful  City,  21   Utah  29,    610 
V.  City  of  Boston,   104  Mass.  87, 

263.  797,  803,  807,  820,  1096 
V.  City  of  Mt.  Vernon,  58  N.  Y. 
S.  499.  1360 

V.     City     of     Portland,     24    Or. 
188.  130e 

V.    City    of    St.    Louis,    44    Mo. 
482,  130S 

V.  Deans,  107  Mass.  118,      334,  335 
V.  Ilarrisburg,  2  Grant  Cas.  291. 

500,  506,  526.  1084.  1406 
V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  4  Cush.  494,  644 
V.  McGirr,  1   Gray  1,  519 

V.    Municipal     Council    &c.,     10 
Up.   Can.   Q.   B.   492,  1256 

V.  People,  84  111.  491,  1533 

V.   People,   157   111.   85,        1283,   1289 
V.  Prowse,  2  B.  &  S.  770,  1561 

V.    Village    of    Cambridge,     133 
N.   Y.   527,  1581,    1642 

Fisk  V.   City  of  Hartford,   69  Conn. 

375,  1710 

V.    City    of    Kenosha,    26    Wis. 
23,  982 

V.  Hazard.  7  R.  I.  438,  668 

V.  Jefferson  &c.  Jury,  116  U.  S. 

131,  1525 
Fiske,  Ex  parte,  72  Cal.  125,  1392 
Fitch  V.   Board  &c.,   122  Cal.   285,        194 

V.  Mayor  &c.,  40  Hun  512,  188 

V.  McDiarmid.  26  Ark.  482,  1652 

V.   Pinckard,   5   111.   76, 

86,   87,   540,   1254,   1423 

Fitchburg  R.  Co.  v.  Grand  Junction 

&c.  R.   Co..   1   Allen  552,  195 

Fitzgerald  v.   City  of  Troy,  7   N.  Y. 

S.   103,  1616 

V.      Commonwealth,      5      Allen 
509,  1072 

V.    Inhabitants    &c.,    109    Mass. 
204.  1586,    1606,    1626 

V.  Walker.  55  Ark.   148.  855 

Fitzhugh   V.    City   of   Bay   City,    109 

Mich.    581,  1286 

Fitzpatrick    v.    Board    &c.,    87    Ky. 

132,  I486 
Fitzsimmons    v.    City    of    Brooklyn, 

102  N.  Y.  536.  213.   1445 

Flack   V.    Green    Island   Village.    122 

N.  Y.   107,  1558,  1559- 

V.  Harrington,  1  111.  213.  335 

Flagg  V.   Inhabitants  &c.,  142  Mass. 

280.  1601 

V.  Mayor  &c..  33  Mo.  440,  1015 

V.  Palmyra.  33  Mo.  440,  1527 

V.  Parish  of  St.  Charles,  27  La. 

An.  319.  651 

V.  Worcester.   13  Gray  601,  1216 

Flatan  v.  State,  56  Tex.  93,  314 

Flatcher  v.  Boodle,  18  C.  B.  152,  128 

Fleckner  v.   President  &c.,  8  Wheat. 

338,  260,    261 

Fleming  v.  City  of  Appleton,  55  Wis. 

90,  942 

V.  City  of  Springfield.  154  Mass.     ' 
500.    ■  1616.    1620,    1621 

V.  Dyer,  20  Ky.  L.  689,  1685 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


cm 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Vol.  I, 

Flamming  v.   Clerk  &c.,  30  N.   J.   L-      -,„ 

"SO,  _J.-i-o 

Fletcher   v.    Auburn    &c.    R.    Co.,    25 

Wend.   46-_'.  ^,      ^„    ..^^  l^*^"^ 

V.   City  of   Ellsworth,   53   Kan. 

V    City  of  Lowell,  15  Gray  103,  189 
v!    City    of    Oshkosh,    18    ^^is         . 

;:  Collins,   111  Ga.  253  .       192 

..  ^inhabitants    |c..^  ^,^l^S,s5 
'       V.    Inhabitants    &c.,    77    Maine 

oo I  iU4i 

V.    reck,    6    Crancn    Si.  7il 

Flewellin   v.    Troetzel,   80^3f>^^ioJl, 'i255 

Flint  V.  Webb,  25  Minn.  93,  1234 

Flood  V.   Atlantic  City,   63  N.   J.   L.   ^^^ 

f  ^State.   19  Tex.  App.   584,  494 

Flora  V.  Sachs,  64  Ind.  lo5,  o^" 

Floral    Springs  W.   Co.  v.   Rives,   14^^.^^ 

Flori^v.'st.  Louis,  69  Mo.  341,         9    142 
Flournoy  v.  City  of  Jeffersonville    17 
lud    1G9,  --■""• 

Floyd   v!    Atlanta  Banking   Co.,    109  ^^^ 

f  kSr.  12  coke  23,  2^0 

v^^Commissioners    &c.^^^l4^^Ga.^^^^ 

V.    Gilbreath,    27    Ark.    675,^^     ^^^^ 
Floyd    Acceptances,    7    Wall    666^     ^^^^ 

Fluty  V.  School  Di^t.,  49  Ark.  94,'     618 

Flynn  v.  Canton  Co.,  40  Md    312.     1588 
V.    City    of    Boston,    153    Mass. 
070  ^'^' 

V.  liurd.  118  N.  Y.  19.  1579 

V.    Inhabitants    &c.,    173    Mass. 
108  iooi. 

V.  Little  Falls  &c.  Co..  74  Minn 
iQO  109,   734,   735,   1700 

i®  Taylor,  127  N.Y.  596  1582 

Fobes   V.    Rome   &c.    R.    Co.,    121    N. 

Y    505  io».i 

Fogg  V.  Dummer,  58  N.  H.  505,  869 

V.     Inhabitants    &c.,    98    Mass. 
gYg  818,    IrfdJ 

Foland    v.    Town    of    Frankton,    142 

Ind     546  7Jo,   9-o 

Foley  V.' City' of  Haverhill,  144  Mass. 

v.-City   of   Troy,    45    Hun  ^396,^^^^ 

V.    East    Flamborough    Tp.,    29 
Ont.   139,  ^^^  l^-^q' 

V.  Tvler.  161  111.  167,  381 

Folsom  v.  Apple  River  L.  D.  Co.,  41 

Wis.   602,  ^^    ^„     .„„l5^2 

V.  School  Directors,  91  111.  402,  864 
V.    Town    of    Underbill,    36    Vt. 
580.  16  ii 

V.    'Township    &c.,    159    V.     S. 
611  lOdd 

Folts  Street  &c.,  In  re,  46  N,  ^^.^^^-j-jg^ 

Foltz^  V.  Kerlin,  105  Ind.  221,     185.  198 
Pones  Hardware  Co.  v.  Erb,  54  Ark. 

645,  '''-•^ 

Foot  V.  County  Court  &c.,  1  McCrary 

918  10-4 

V.   rrowse.   1   Str.  625,  166 

V.  Stiles.  57  N.  Y.  399,  311.  697 

Foote  V.  American  Product  Co.,  195 

Pa    St    190  l.3_o 

V.  Board  "&c.,  67  Miss.  156,         1647 
V    Brown.  60  Miss.  155,  84c5 

V.    City   of   Cincinnati.    11    Ohio 
408  61,  82,  117,  118 


pp.  1-822;  Yol.  II,  pp.  S33-1830.1 

Foote  V    Linck,  5  McLean  616.  1721 

V  IMke  Co.,   101  U.   S.   688.  1001 

V  Town  of  Hancock,  15  Blatchf. 
343,  1*^27 

Fopper    V.    Town   of   Wheatland,    59 

Wis    623,  lh26 

Forbes    v.    Appleton,    5    Cush.^^115,^^^^^ 

V.  Board  &c.,  28  Fla.  26.    "     '   1101 

V  Mayor  &c.,  1  Marv.  186,  51b 
Force  v.  Town  of  Batavia,  61  HI-  9^, 

Forcey  v.  Caldwell,  9  Atl.  466,  217 

Ford  V.  Booker,  53  Ind.  395,  521 

V.   Chicago  &c,   R.   Co.,   14   ^  is. 

609.  """^ 

V.   City  of  New  York,  56  N.  Y. 

?:  *Clough,    8    Maine    334.^  ^^^^   "^^ 

V  McGregor,  20  Nev.  446,     229,  230 
V.   New  York  &c.   R.  Co.,  53  N. 
Y.    S.    764,  549 

V  Parker,  4  Ohio  St.  576,  22» 
V.    School    Dist.,    121    Pa.    St. 
543                                                        147^4 
V.    Standard   Oil    Co.,   53   N.   Y. 
S.    48,  504 
V.  Thralkill,  84  Ga.   169. 

594,   608,   1392 

V.  Town  of  North  Des  Moines, 

80    Iowa   626,  ^^     ^^_^ 

57,    392,    397.    400,    1518 

V.  Umatilla  Co..  15  Or.  313,       1641 

Foreman   v.   Town   of   Marianna,   43 

Ark.   324,  ^.      400 

Forest  Co.  v.  Langlade  Co..  76  Wis. 

605  423,  424,  436,  444 

Forker  v.  Borough  of  Sandy  Lake. 

130  Pa.   St.  123,  1638,  1639 

Forks  Tp.  V.  King.  84  Pa.  St.  230,  1633 

Forshay  v.   Ferguson,   5   Hill   154.     l_bd 

Forsyth  v.  Dunnagan,  94  Cal.  438,  1561 
V.  Krueter.  100  Ind.  27.  1258 

V.   Mayor  &c.,  45  Ga.   152  821 

Forsvthe  v.   City  of  Hammond,   142 

Ind    505  ^'^ 

V    Ellis,  '4  J.  J.  Marsh.  298,  332 

Fortin  'v.    Inhabitants,    145    Mass. 

196.  161' 

Fort   Plain  Bridge  Co.  v.   Smith,  30 

N     Y.   44,  568 

Fort  Smith  v.  Dodson,  46  Ark.  296,    533 

Fort    Worth    v.    Crawford,    64    Tex. 

of)o  80-1 

FortVorth  City  Co.  v.  Smith  Bridge 

Co.,  151  U.  S.  294,  1306 

Fortune  v.  City  of  St.  Louis,  11  Mo. 

59  1<4D 

Foshav'  V.  Town  of  Glen  Haven,  25 

Wis    ''88  lbl.i 

Foss  V.  City  of  Chicago.  56^111.^54.^^^^ 

v.  Crisp.  20  Pick.   121.  _  134 

Fossett    V.    Bearce,    29    Maine    523,  ^^^ 

Foster  v.  Board  &c.,  102  Cal    483,       499 
V.   CJty  of  CapeMay,^60_V^.T.   ^^^ 

y'    City    of    Kenosha,    12    Wis. 
616.  ,         o  „  548 

v.  City  of  Wilmington,  8  Houst. 
415 

V.  Clinton  Co.,  51  Iowa  541,  775 
V.  Coleman,  10  Cal.  278  6.38 

V.  Fowler.  60  Pa.  St.  27,  4,  5,  1530 
V.  Lane.  30  N.  H.  305,  ^  „  ^^ 
V.    Lookout    &c.    Water    Co.,    3 

T  An     49  '  **** 

V.  Scarff,  15  Ohio  St.  532     349    368 
Fourth    School    Dist.    v.    Wood,    lo 

Mass.    193,  ' 


CIV 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Yol.  I,  pp.  1-S32;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.'] 


Fowle  V.  Common  Council  &c.,  3  Pet. 

398,  9,   92,   822,   1388 

Fowler  v.   Atkinson,  6  Minn.  578,       216 
V.  Bebee,  9  Mass.  231.  197,  1420 

V.   Perkins,  77  111.  271,  1668 

Fox,  Appeal  of,  73  Conn.  68,  1279 

V.  City  of  Bay  City,  122  Mich. 
499,  737 

V.  City  of  Fostoria,  60  Ohio  St. 
340.  91 

V.    City    of    New    Orleans,     12 
La.  An.  154,  254 

V.  City  of  Richmond,  19  Ky.  L. 
326.  713,  792 

V.  Drake,  8  Cowen  191,  215 

V.  Ellison.  43  Minn.  41,  1416 

V.  Middleborough  Town  Co.,  16 
Ky.  L.  455,  1286 

V.  Ohio,  5  How.  410,  607 

V.  Shipman,  19  Mich.  218,  861 

V.  Sloo,  10  La.  An.   11,  710 

V.   Village  of   Fort   Edward,    48 
Ilun   363,  87 

Foxworthy   v.    City   of  Hastings,    25 

Neb.  "133,  1596.   1608 

Frace  v.  City  of  Tacoma,   16  Wash. 

69,  1549 

Fractional   School  Dist.  v.   Board  of 

Inspectors,   63   Mich.   611,  1486 

V.  Malary,  23  Mich.  Ill,  861 

Frame  v.  Felix,  167  Pa.  St.  47.  753 

Francis  v.  Howard  Co.,  50  Fed.  44, 

839    892 
V.  Schoellkopf,  53  N.  Y.  152,      'lll2 

Frank  v.   Steamship  &c.  Co.,  20  La. 

An.  25.  1111 

Franke  v.   Padiicah  &c.  Co.,  88  Ky. 

467,  282,   1458 

Frankel  v.   City  of  New  York,  2  N. 

Y.  294,  1608 

Frankfort    v.     Inhabitants    &c.,    54 

Maine   250.  672 

Franklin  v.  Cromwell.  Dal.  95,  467 

V.  House,   104  Tenn.   1.  1333 

V.   Westfall.   27   Kan.  614,  523 

Franklin   Bank  v.   Cooper,  36  Maine 

179,  321 

Franklin  Bridge  Co.  v.  Wood,  14  Ga. 

80,  45 

Franklin    Co.    v.    Henry   Co.,    26    111. 

App.  193,  1042,  1052 

V.   Layman,  34   111.   App.   606,        840 

Franklin    Co.    Com'rs   v.    Lathrop.    9 

Kan.   453.  629 

Franklin    County    Court    v.    Deposit 

Bank.  87  Ky.  370,  1545 

Franklin    Tp.    v.    Lebanon    Tp.,    51 

N.  J.  L.  93,  1045 

Franklin  Wharf  Co.  v.  City  of  Port- 
land, 67  Maine  46.  817.  1106 

Frantz  v.  Jacob.  88  Ky.   525.  839 

Eraser  v.  Lewiston.   76  Maine  531.     148 

Frasher  v.  Rader.  124  Cal.  132,  1712 

Frazier  v.   Butler  Borough,   172   Pa. 

St.   407,  1335 

Frederick  v.  City  Council  &c.,  5  Ga. 

561,  992,   1542 

V.   Douglas  Co..   96   Wis.  411,      1731 
V.  People.  83  111.  App.  89,       192,  714 

Freeholders  &c.  v.  Strader,  18  N.  J. 

L.    108,  8 

Freeman  v.  Davis.  7  Mass.  200,  311 

V.  Howe,  24  How.  450,  331 

V.   Otis.  9  Mass.   260,  216,  218 

Preemont  v.   Boling,   11   Cal.   380.      1288 

Freemont    Bldg.    Ass'n    v.    Sherwin. 

6   Neb.    48.  981 

Freeport  v.   Isbell.  83  111.   440.  264 

Freeport  St.  R.  Co.  v.  City  of  Free- 
port.  151   111.  451,     1248.  1250.  1286 

Freeport  Water-works  Co.  v.   Prager. 

129  Pa.  St.  605,  1453 


Freetown  v.  County  Com'rs,  9  Pick. 

46,  706 

Fremont   &c.    R.    Co.    v.    Brown    Co., 

18    Neb.    516,  429 

V.   Whalen.   11   Neb.   585,  TOl 

French  v.  Benton,  44  N.  H.  28,  1053 

V.  Burlington,  42   Iowa  614,         883 
V.    City    of    Boston,    129    Mass. 
592.  263.  814 

V.  City  of  Burlington,  42   Iowa 
614,  876.  881 

V.  Common  Council  &c.,  85  Mich. 
135,  1676 

V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  3  Allen  9,       666 
V.   Spalding.  61  N.  H.  395.  346 

V.   Teschemaker,  24  Cal.   518,       982 

Frenchtown    Tp.    v.    Board    &c.,    89 

Mich.    204,  1580 

Frenner  v.  .Sunnyside  Land  Co.,  124 

Cal.   437,  1309 

Frey  v.  Michie,  68  Mich.  323,  1695 

Frick  V.  Brinkley.  61  Ark.  397.  732 

V.  City  of  Los  Angeles,  115  Cal. 
512.  735 

V.   City  of  Milwaukee,   17  Wis. 
26,  536 

Friend  v.  City  of  Pittsburg,  131  Pa. 

St.  305.  931 

V.   Hamill.   34  Md.   298.  221 

Priesner  v.  Common  Council  &c.,  91 

Mich.  504,  555 

Frith   V.   City  of  Dubuque,   45   Iowa 

406,  264 

Fritsch  v.  City  of  Allegheny,  91  Pa. 

St.  226,  1613 

Frommer   v.    City   of   Richmond,    31 

Gratt.    646,  1520 

Frorer  v.   People,  141  111.  171,  734 

Frosh  V.  City  of  Galveston,  73  Tex. 

401,  1255 

Frost  V.  Beekman,  1  Johns.  285,         228 
V.    City   of  Casselton,   8   N.   D. 
534.  928,    929 

V.  City  of  Chicago,  178  111.  2.50,    503 
V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  6  Allen  152, 

651,  672 
V.  Leatherman.  55  Mich.  33,  1255 
V.  Mayor  &c..  5  EI.  &  B.  531,  1657 
V.    Slick.   1   Dak.   131.  1717 

Fry   Y.   Albemarle   Co..    86    Va.    195, 

774,  775 

Fuchs  V.  City  of  St.  Louis,  133  Mo. 

168,  793 

Puhrman  v.  Mayor  &c.,  54  Ala.  263.  535 

FuUam    v.    Inhabitants  &c.,    9   Allen 

1,  262 

Fuller   V.    City   of   Atlanta,    66    Ga. 

80.  •         680 

V.  Citv  of  Chicago,  89  111.  282,     882 
V.   Colfax  Co.,   33   Neb.   716,  933 

V.  Hampton.  5  Conn.  416,  142 

V.    Heath.   89   111.    296. 

844.  845.  898,  1132.  1133 
V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  11  Gray  340, 

362.  667.  668 
V.  IMavor  &c..  82  Mich.  480.  1341 
v.   Morrison   Co.,  36  Alinn.   309. 

1522,  1531 
v.    Mower.    81    Maine   380.  966 

Fullerton  v.   Spring.  3   Wis.  667,  524 

Fullinm    v.    City    of    Muscatine,    70 

Iowa  436.  1634 

Fullilove  V.   Police  Jury  &c.,  51   La. 

An.  359,  1543 

Pulton  V.  City  of  Davenport,  17  Iowa 
404,  ■  1517 

v.   Citv  of  Lincoln,  9  Neb.   358, 

260,   1255 
V.   Cummings.   132   Ind.   453,  554 

V.    Short    Route    R.    &c.    Co.,    85 
Kv.   640.  1213 

Fulton  St.,  In  re,  29  How.  Pr.  429,  1158 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


CV 


[References  are  to  Pages.    Vol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.'\ 


Fuhvoilor    v.    City    of    St.    Louis,    61 

Mo.  470.  1417 

Furman  v.  Nichol,  8  Wall.  44,  89 

Furman  St.,  In  re,  17  Wend.  G49,     12:i2 


G 

Cachet  v.  McCall,  50  Ala.  307.  1551 

Gaddis  v.  Kicliland  Co.,  92  111.   119, 

982,    985 

Gaffney  v.  Gough,  30  Cal.  104,  1262 

Gagan    v.    City    of    Janesville,    lOG 

Wis.   662,  1366 

Gage    V.    City    of    Chicago,    162    111. 

313,  1146 

V.     City    of    Chicago,    178    III. 
530.  1154 

V.  Citv  of  Hornellsville,  106  N. 
Y.  667,  936 

V.   Currier,  4  Pick.  399.  230 

V.  Dudley,  64  N.   II.  437,  1542 

V.  Evans.  90  III.  569.  1287 

V.  Graham,  57  111.  144.      1531,  1721 

Gage  Co.  v.  Pulton.  16  Neb.  5,  1041 

r.alalian  v.  Gardner,  7  .Tohns.  106,    1567 

<;all)raith  v.   Lettiech,  73  III.  209,      1425 

Galbreath   v.    Newton,   30    Mo.    App. 

380.  1259 

Gale   V.    Inhabitants   &c.,    51    Maine 

174.  669 

V.     Village     of    Kalamazoo,     23 
Mich.    344, 
282,   568.   618,   637,  642.   1389.    1403 

Galena    &c.    R.    Co.    v.    Appleby,    28 

111.  283,  1105 

Galesburg  v.  Hawkinson,  75  111.  152, 

11,   385 
V.    Searles,    114    111.    217,  1268 

Gall  V.  Citv  of  Philadelphia,  18  Ohio 

St.   563,  1403 

Gallagher    v.    City    of    St.    Paul,    28 

F^ed.    305,  1609 

V.  Keating.  57  N.  Y.  S.  632,       1731 
V.     Partridge,    69    N.    H.    88.       223 

Gallaher  v.  Smith.  55  Mo.  App.  116,     551 

Galloway  v.  Corbitt.  52  Mich.  460,     1724 

Gallup  V.  Tracv.   25  Conn.   10.  295 

V.    Woodstock.    29    Vt.    347.  684 

Gait  V.  City  of  Chicago,   174  111. 

605,       ■  522,    1294 

Galveston   City   Co.   v.    City   of   Gal- 
veston. 56  Tex.  486,  245 

Galveston  Gas  Co.  v.  Galveston  Co., 

54  Tex.   287,  1552 

Galveston  &c.   R.  Co.  v.  Harris.  36 

S.    W.    776.  488 

v.    White.   32   S.   W.    186,  1362 

Galveston  Wharf  Co.  v.  Citv  of  Gal- 
veston, 63  Tex.   14,        '  1546 

Galway   v.    Metropolitan   El.   R.   Co., 

128    N.    Y.    132.  1582 

Gamble  v.  Marion  Co.,  85  Iowa  675,     943 

Gamewell  Fire  Alarm  &c.  Co.  v.  City 

of  Laporte.  96  Fed.  664.         744,  873 
V.    City    of    Laporte,    102    Fed. 
417,  736,    744,    745 

V.  Mayor  &c..  31  Fed.  312,  938 

Gandv    v.    Chicago    &c.    R.    Co.,    30 

Iowa  420.  1109 

Gans   V.   Citv   of   Philadelphia,    102 

Pa.    St.   97.  1124 

Gardiner   &c.    v.    Inhabitants   &c.,    5 

Maine  133.  1500,  1510 

Gardner.  Matter  of,  68  N.  Y.  467.       1657 
V.  City  of  New  Berne,  98  N.  C. 
228.  901 

V.  Haney,  86  Ind.  17. 

992,   1012,   1529 
V.  People,  20  111.  430,  1400 

V.  State,  21   N.  J.   L.  557.  1510 

V.    Trustees    &c.,    2    Johns.    Ch. 
162,  674,  688,  691 


(Garfield   v.   Douglass,   22   III.    100,        221 
Gargan   v.   Louisville  &c.   R.   Co.,   89 

Ky.   212.  1213,   1575 

Garland  v.  City  of  Denver,  11  Colo. 

534.  538 

v.    .lackson,   7   La.   An.   68,  1480 

Garlinghouse  v.  Jacobs,  29  N.  Y. 

297.  224 

Garnett   v.   City  of  Slater,   56   Mo. 

App.  207,  1341,  1373 

Garrard  v.  Davis,  53  Mo.  322,  228 

Garrard  Co.  Court  v.  Bayle  Co.  Court, 

10  Bush  208,  1576 

Garrett  v.  City  of  St.  Louis,  25  Mo. 

505.  1206,  1269 

V.  State,  49  N.  J.  L.  693,  1111 

Garrison   v.    City  of  New   York,   21 

Wall.   196.  767 

Garside  v.  City  of  Cohoes,  12  N.  Y. 

S.   192,  160 

Garvey,  Petition  of,  77  N.  Y.  523,       1234 
Garvie  v.  City  of  Hartford,  54  Conn. 

440.  179 

Garvin  v.  Daussman,  114  Ind.  429.     1239 

V.  Wells,  8  Iowa  286,  85,  5.38 

Garza,  Ex  parte,  28  Tex.  App.  381,  1388 
Gas  Co.   V.    Parkersburg,   30   W.   Va. 

435,  568.   1394.    1463,    1464 

Gas  &c.  Co.  V.  Borough  of  Dowring- 

ton,  175  Pa.  St.  341,  572 

Gas   L.    Co.   V.    Memphis,   93    Tenn. 

612,  746 

Gashwiler  v.  Willis.  33  Cal.  11,  1212 

Gaskill  V.  Dudley,  6  Met.  546. 

142,  342,  965,  1526 
Gastenau    v.    Commonwealth,    56    S. 

W.   705.  1385 

Gaston   V.    Babcock,    6   Wis.    503,  423 

Gatch  V.  City  of  Des  Moines,  63  Iowa 

^   .  ^^^'  X.  ,  1239 

Gates  V.  Delaware  Co.,  12  Iowa  405, 

199,  200 
V.  Hancock.  45  N.  H.  528.  '>60 

V.  School  Dist..  53  Ark.  468.  853 

Gatlin  v.  Town  of  Tarboro,  78  N    C 

r.       \'^^'        „.  1508.  1521 

Gaughan  v.  City  of  Philadelphia,  119 

Pa.  St.  503.  1596 

Gause  v.  City  of  Clarkcsville.  5  Dill. 

165,  636,  637,  838,  974.   1022 

Gaussen  v.   United   States,  97   U.    S. 

584.  .31, s.  319 

Gavett  v.  City  of  Jackson,  109  Mich. 

415.  13''5 

Gay  V.  Bradstreet.  49  Maine  580.       1321 

v.  City  of  Cambridge,  128  Mass. 

387.  1622 

G.   C.   R.   Co.   V.   G.  C.   S.  R.  Co.,   63 

Tex.   529,  1352 

Gear  v.  Dubuque  &c.  R.  Co.,  20  Iowa 
^       523.  700 

Gearhart  v.  Dixon,  1  Pa.  St.  2''4 

12.55.    1423.    142.5,    1540 
Geer  v.  Board  &c..  97  Fed.  435,  998 

V.  School  Dist.  &c.,  97  Fed.  732,  1006 
Geist's  Appeal.  104  Pa.  St.  351.  1192 
Gelpcke  v.  City  of  Dubuque.  1  Wall 

175,  764.  983,   1013,  1016,  1018 

1020,  1524 
Gemmil  v.  Arthur,  125  Ind.  258,  944 

Genesee   &c.    Bank  v.   Board  &c.,   53 

Barb.  223,  1724 

Genesee  Tp.  v.  McDonald,  98  Pa.  St 
^       444,  278.  1480 

Genet  v.  City  of  Brooklyn,  99  N.  Y. 

296,  1199 

Geneva  v.  Cole,  61  111.  397,  65 

Genois  v.  Lockett.  13  La.  545.  192 

Genovese    v.    Mavor    &c.,    55    N     Y 

Super.  Ct.  397.  'l212 

Gentle  v.   Board   &c..   73   Mich.   40,    1486 
George  v.  Dean,  47  Tex.  73,  1719 


CVl 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  Pages.    Vol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol  II,' pp.  833-1830.'\ 


George  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  6  Met.  497, 

344,  345,  355,  356,  360,   1485 

V.  Oxford  Townsbip,  16  Kan.  72, 

988,  1027 

•V.  Wyandotte  &c.  Light  Co.,  105 

Mich.  1,  733 

George  P.  Blaise  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Sanitary 

Dist.  &c.,  77  III.  App.  287,     742,  748 
George's   Creels   &c.    Co.    v.    County 

Com'rs,  59  Md.  255,  1552 

V.  New  Central  &c.  Co.,  40  Md. 

425,  693 

Georgia  v.  Atkins,  35  Ga.  315,  770 

V.  Stanton.  6  Wall.  50,  17 

Georgia  R.  &c.  Co.  v.  Smith,  128  U. 

S.    174,  1379 

Georgia  State  Bank  and  Loan  Ass'n 

V.  Owens,  88  Ga.  224,  1415 

Gerald  v.  City  of  Boston,  108  Mass. 

580,  1638 

Gerber  v.  Ackley,  32  Wis.  233,  331 

Gerberling  v.   Wunenberg,   51   Iowa 

125,  1561 

Gerdes   v.    Christopher  &e.    Co.,    124 

Mo.   347.  1361 

Gere  v.  Supervisors  &c.,  7  How.  Pr. 

255,  1054 

Gerhard  v.  Seekonk  &c.  Com'rs,  15  R. 

I.  334.  1317 

Gerken  v.  Siblcv  Co..  39  Minn.  433,     904 
Gerlach    v.    Brandreth,    54    N.    Y.    S. 

479,  1700 

Germaine  v.  City  of  Muskegon,   105 

Mich.   213.  1328 

German  American   Bank  v.  City  of 

Brenham,  35  Fed.  185,  974 

German  American  Sav.  Bank  v.  City 

of  Spokane.  17  Wash.  315,  1296 

German  Ins.  Co.  v.  City  of  Manning, 

78  Fed.  900,  1007 
V.  City  of  Manning,  95  Fed.  597, 

519,  878.  973,  1031 
V.  City  of  Minden,  51  Neb.  870,     513 

German   Sav.   Bank  v.  Franklin  Co., 

128  U.  S.  526,  100,  990.  1002 

Germania  Bank  v.  City  of  St.   Baul, 

79  Minn.  29.  1307,  1553 
Gerrard    v.    Omaha    &c.    R.    Co.,    14 

Neb.    270.  693 

Gerrish  v.  Brown,  51  Maine  256,         817 

Getchell  v.  Benton,  30  Neb.  870,  981 

V.    Inhabitants   &c.,    55    Maine 
4.33,  355 

Getzoff  V.   City  of  New  York,  64  N. 

Y.  S.  636'.  1340 

Ghee  v.  Northern  Union  Gas  Co.,  158 

N.  Y.  510.  1349 

Gibbon  v.   District  of  Columbia,   116 

U.  S.  404,  1502 

Gibbons    v.    Mobile   R.    Co.,    36   Ala. 

410,  983 

V.  United  States,  8  Wall.  269.         771 

Gibbs    V.    Commissioners,    19    Pick. 

298.  1724 

V.  Consolidated  Gas  Co.,  ISO  U. 

S.  396,  104 

Giboney  v.  City  of  Cape  Girardeau, 

58  Mo.  141,  1516,  1517 

Gibson  v.  Bailey,  9  N.  H.  168, 

345,  347,  367,  1427 
V.  Kavser,  16  Mo.  Anp.  404,  1233 
V.  Mason,  5  Nev.  283.  151 

V.  Wood,  20  Ky.  L.  1547.  186 

Gififen  v.  Cltv  of  Lewiston    (Idaho), 

55  Pac,  545,  930,  1327.  1331 

1338,   1358 

Gifford  V.  New  .Jersey  &c.  R.  Co.,  10 

N.  J.  Fq.   171.  651 

V.    Town    of   White   Plaines,    25 
Hun  606,  870 

Gilbert  v.  Board  &c.,  45  Kan.  31, 

316,  913 


Gilbert  v.  Hebard.  8  Met.  129,  1743 

V.  Luce,  11  Barb.  91,  199 

Gilchrist  v.  Little  Rock,  1  Dill.  261,  1017 
V.   Schmidling,   12  Kan.   263,  533 

Gilder  v.   City  of  Brenham,  67  Tex. 

345,  1374 

Gildersleeve  v.   Board  of  Education, 

17  Abb.  Pr.  201.  273,  305 

Giles  V.  City  of  Shenandoah,  111  Iowa 

83.  1367 

V.  School  Dist.,  31  N.  H.  304, 

12,  341,  1485 

Gilham    v.    President    «&c.,    2    Scam. 

245,  378 

V.  Wells,  64  Ga.  192,  500,  598 

Gilkey  v.   City   of  Merrill,   67  Wis. 

459,  652 

V.  Town  of  How.  105  Wis.  41,         70 

Gill  V.  Brown,  12  Johns.  385.  216 

V.  City  of  Oakland,  124  Cal.  335, 

1241,  1304 

Gillan  V.  Hutchinson.  16  Cal.  153,         705 

Gillespie  v.   McGowan,   100  Pa.   St. 

144,  795,   810 

Gillett  V.   Board  &c.,  67  111.  256,  285 

V.   McGonigal,  80  Wis.  158,  1568 

Gillette  v.   City   of  Denver,   21    Fed. 

822.  1239,  1242.  1270 

V.    City   of   Hartford,    31    Conn. 
351,  386,  1513,  1516 

Gilliam    Co.    v.    Wasco   Co.,    14    Or. 

525,  444 

Gillmore  v.   Lewis,   12   Ohio  281.  671 

Gilluly  V.   City  of  Madison,   63  Wis. 

518,  265,   517,   811 

Oilman   v.    City   of   Philadelphia,   3 

Wall.  713,  801,  1576 

V.   City   of   Sheboygan,    2   Black 
510,  1520.   1531,   1547 

V.  Contra  Costa  Co.,  8  Cal.  52.  1743 
v.    Inhabitants    &c.,    15    Gray 
577,  1635 

V.  Laconia.  55  N.  H.  130,  8,  265 
v.  School  Dist..  18  N.  H.  215,  958 
V.    Gilby   Tp.,   8   N.    D.    627.  951 

Gilmanton  v.   Sanbornton,   56  N.   H. 

336.  1058 

Gilmer  v.  Hunnicutt,  57  S.  C.  166,  1686 
V.  Lime  Point,  19  Cal.  47,  695 

Gilmore    v.    American    &c.    Ins.    Co., 

67   Cal.   366,  1713 

v.   City  of  Utica,  131  N.  Y.  26, 

278.  284,  1143,  1200,  1201,  1260 
V.  Ilentig,  33  Kan.  156,  1146,  1153 
V.  Holt.   4  Pick.  258,  348 

V.   Morton.    10  Kan.   491.  55 

Gilpatrick   v.    City   of   Biddeford,   86 

Maine  534,  789' 

Gilpin  V.  City  of  Ansonia,  68  Conn. 

72,  71 

Gilrov  V.  School  Dist.,  17  Or.   522,   1491 

Gilson  V.  Board  &c.,  128  Ind.  65.         1659 

Gimbel  v.  Stolte.  59  Ind.  446.     693.  1571 

Giovanni,   The.    v.    City   of   Philadel- 
phia, 59  Fed.  303,  795,  1333 

Girard  v.  City  of  New  Orleans,  2  La. 

An.  SOS.  563 

V.   Philadelphia.   7  Wall.   1. 

90,  92.  103.  383.  396,  459,  564.  1517 

Girvin  v.   Simon,   116  Cal.  004,  1280 

V.  Simon.  127  Cal.  491.       1237,  1279 

Glaessner  v.  Anheuser-Busch  Brewing 

Ass'n.  100  Mo.  508,  590 

Glasgow   V.    City   of    St.    Louis.    107 

Mo.    198,  801,   829,    1317.    1320. 

1574,  1697 
V.   Rowse,  43  Mo.  479. 

1508,   1520,   1521 

Glasier  v.   Town  of  Hebron,   131    N. 

Y.  447.  816,  1587 

Glass  V.  Ashbury,  49  Cal.  571,  554 


TABLE    OF    CASES, 


evil 


IReferences  are  to  Pages.    Vol.  I,  pp.  1-S32;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.'] 


Gleason  v.  Barnett,  20  Ky.  L.   1004, 

1147,  1281 
V.  Barnett,  20  Ky.  L.  1865,  476 

V.    City    of    Boston,    144    Mass. 
25,  1058 

V.   Peerless  Mfg.   Co.,  37  N.  Y. 
S.  207,  482,  499 

V.    Slopor,    24    Pick.    181,  706 

V.  Waiiliesha  Co.,  103  Wis.  225, 

1141,  1549 

Glenn  v.  Wray,   126  N.  C.  730.  9S4,  993 

Glidden  v.  Town  of  Reading,  38  Vt. 

52,  1639 

-  Globo  &c.   Mills  V.   P.ilbrough,   19   N. 

Y.  S.   176,  1412 

Glover  v.   City  of  Terre  Haute,   129 

Ind.   593,  391,   395 

Goddard,    Petitioner,    16    Pick.    504, 

116S.  1177.  1178.  1198 
V.  City  of  Boston,  20  Pick.  407,  106 
V.    Inhabitants    &c.,    84    Maine 
499,  788 

Goddin  v.  Crump,  8  Leigh  120,     609,  983 

Goeltz    V.    Town    of    Ashland,    75 

Wis.  642,  1597 

Goetcheus  v.   Matthewson,   61   N.   Y. 

■  420,  221 

Goetler  v.    State,   45   Ark.    454,  1388 

Goettman  v.  Mayor  &c..  6  Hun  132,     199 

Goetzman    v.    Whittaker,    81    Iowa 

527,  945 

Goforth  V.  Rutherford  &c.  Co.,  96  N. 

C.   535.  989 

Going  V.  Dinwiddle,  86  Cal.  633,  221 

Goins   V.    City   of   Moberly,    127   Mo. 

116,  1316 

Gold  V.   City  of  Peoria,  65  111.  App. 

602,  880 

Goldm.Tu    V.    Conway    Co.,    10    Fed. 

S8S.  959 

Goldschniid  v.   Mayor  &c.,   43  N.   Y. 

S.   447,  796 

Goldsmid  v.  Tunbridge  Wells  Com'rs, 

L.  R.  1  Eq.  161.  809 

Goldsmith    v.    Board    &c.,    115    Cal. 

36,  1744 

V.  Mavor  &c.,  120  Ala.  182,  524 

Goldthwaite  v.  City  Council  &c.,  50 

Ala.  486.  537 

Gooch  V.  Association  &c.,  109  Mass. 

558  807 

V.  Gregory.  65  N.  C.  142.  1530 

Goodale   v.    Brocknor;    61    How.    Pr. 

451,  1066 

V.  Fennell.  27  Ohio  St.  426,         1531 
V.  Lawrence,  88  N.  Y.  513,  1063 

Goodel  V.  Baker,  8  Cowen  286,  352 

Goodenow  v.  Buttrick.  7  Mass.  140,     523 

Goodfellow  V.  City  of  New  York,  100 

N.  Y.  15.  826 

Goodhue  v.  Town  of  Beloit,  21  Wis. 

636,  409 

Good'U  V.   Cincinnati  &c.  Canal  Co., 

IS  Ohio  St.   169,  703.   1222 

Goodman  v.   Simond.s.   20  How.   343, 

1018,   1032 

Goodnow  V.  Board  &c.,  11  Minn.  31, 

941,  973 

Goodrich  v.   Brown,  30  Iowa  291. 

85.  537,  1411 
V.    City    of    Detroit,    123    Mich. 
5.59.  1300 

V.  City  of  Watervllle,  88  Maine 
39.  730 

V.  Winchester  &c.,  26  Ind.  119,  1269 

Goodtitle  v.  Alker,   1   Burr.   133.  676 

Goodwillie  v.  City  of  Lake  View,  137 

111.  51,  1283,  1292 

Goodwin  v.  Roberts.  L.  R.  1  App.  Cas. 

476.  1018 

V.   State,   142   Ind.   117,  208 


Goodyear    v.    School    Dist.,    17    Or. 

S17.  1491 

Goose  River  Bank  v.   Willow  Lake 
School  Tp.,  1  N.  I).  26, 

647,  968,  1487,  1491 

Gordon  v.  Appeal  Tax  Court,  3  How. 

133,  1511 

V.  City  of  Richmond.  83  Va.  436, 

1594,    1631,    1632,    1635 
V.  Clifford,  28  N.  II.  402,  349 

V.  Comes,  47  N.  Y.  608. 

12.5.3,  1514,  1.5.38 
V.  IMayor  &c.,  5  Gill  231,  1511 

Gorgier  v.  Mieville,  3  B.  &  C.  45,         1018 

Gorham  v.  Gross,  125  Mass.  232,  811 

V.   Springfield.  21  Maine  58.     58.  61 

(Joring  v.  McTaggart,  92   Ind.  200. 

617,  1288,  1722 

Gorman  v.  Sinking  Fund  Com'rs,  25 

Fed.   641.  1020 

Gorley  v.  City  of  Louisville,  20  Ky. 

L.  602,  184 

Gormley  v.  Day,  114  111.  185,       522,  1648 

Gorton    v.    Erie    R.    Co.,    45    N.    Y. 

060.  1641 

Goshenv.  Myers,  119  Ind.  196.  1578,  1579 

Goshen  Trustees  &c.  v.  Springfield  &c. 

R.   Co..    12   Ohio   St.   624,  1023 

Gosling  v.  Voley.   12  Q.  B.  328, 

100.  161,  162,  293,  373,  378,  463,  500 

Gosselink  v.  Campbell,  4  Iowa  296. 

533,  1085 

Gossigi  v.   City  of  New  Orleans,   41 

La.  An.  522,  1403 

Goswell   V.   City  of  Louisville,  57   S. 

W.  476,  719 

Goszler   v.    Corporation    of    George- 
town,  6  Wheat.   593.      579,   587,   824 

Gottschalk   v.    Becher,    32   Neb.    653, 

394,  397 

Gougle  V.  Dorsev,  27  Wis.  119.  423 

Gould  V.  City  of  Paris,  68  Tex.  511,  893 
V.  City  of  Rochester,  105  N.  Y. 
46,  1095 

V.  City  of  Topeka,  32  Kan.  485,  1584 
V.  Glass.  19  Barb.  179.  198 

V.  Sterling.  23  N.  Y.  439, 

982,  985,  1010,  1539 

Gouldey  v.  City  Council  &c..  63  N.  J. 

L.   537.  1710 

Gove  V.  Epping.  41  N.  II.  539.  668 

Governor  v.  Allen.  8  Humph.  176,         312 
V.  Dodd.  81   111.   162,  223 

V.  Gibson.  14  Ala.  326.  322 

V.  Hancock.  2  Ala.  728,  331 

V.   McEwen.  5  Humph.  241,  456 

V.  Meredith.  4  T.  R.  794,  801 

V.  Perrine.  23  Ala.  807,  328,  333 

V.  Ridgeway,  12  111.  14,  318 

V.   Robbins.   7  Ala.   79.  323,   327 

Govett  V.  City  of  Jackson,  109  Mich. 

408,  1344 

Gowen  v.  Philadelphia  Exchange  Co.. 

5  W.  &  S.  141,  1561 

Goyne  v.  Ashley  Co.,  31  Ark.  552,         945 

Grade  Crossing  Com'rs  &c..  In  re,  64 

N.  Y.  S.  1074.  1779 

Grading  of  Shiloh  Street,  In  re,  165 

Pa.  St.  386.  1152 

Graf  V.  City  of  St.  Louis,  8  Mo.  App. 

562.  694 

Graff  V.  Mayor  &c.,  10  Md.  544, 

699,  700.  1196 

Graffty  v.  City  of  Rushville,  107  Ind. 

502.  614.    1404 

Grafton  Bank  v.   Kimball,  20  N.   H. 

107.  366 

Graham    v.    City    of    Greenville,    67 

Texas  62.  58.  66.  395,  397,  1517 

V.  Hartnett,  10  Neb,  517,  1566 

v.  State,  1  Pike  171,  1410 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  Pages.  Vol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.'] 


Gram  v.  Village  of  Greenbush,  3  N. 

Y.  S.  76,  1G04 

Grand  Ave.  R.  Co.  v.  People's  R.  Co., 

132  Mo.  34,  1697 

Grand   Chute  v.   Winegar,   15   Wall. 

355,  1001,  1031 

Grand  Gulf  &c.   R.  Co.  v.  Buck,  53 

Miss.  246,     .  1513 

Grand   Island   Gas  Co.   v.   West,   28 

Neb.  852,  1467 

Grand    Lodge   v.   Waddill,   36   Ala. 

313.  585 

Grand   Rapids   v.    Blakely,   40   Mich. 

367,  242 

V.  Grand  Rapids  &c.  R.  Co.,  58 
Mich.   641.  694 

Grand  Rapids  &c.  Co.  v.  Grand  Rapids 

&c.  Co.,  33  Fed.  659,  621,  1351 

V.  Jarvis.  30  Mich.  308,  677 

Grand  Rapids  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Alley,  34 

Mich.  16,  693 

V.  Gray,  38  Mich.  461, 

1411,  1415,  1417 
V.  Huntlev,  38  Mich.  540,  1618 

V.  Sanders,  54  How.  Pr.  214,       1019 
V.  West  Side  St.  R.  Co.,  48  Mich. 
433,  683 

Granger  v.  Pulaski  Co.,  26  Ark.  37,       14 

Granger  Cases,  94  U.  S.  155,  164.       5,  6 

Grant  v.  Bartholomew,  58  Neb.  839, 

1236,   1237 
V.  Board  of  Water  Com'rs  &c., 
122  Mich.  694,  745 

V.   Camp.   105  Ga.  428,  549 

V.   City  of   Davenport.   36   Iowa 
396,  651,  876,  877,  879,  889,  917 

V.  City  of  Erie,  69  Pa.  St.  420, 

264.  786,  820 
V.  Common  Council  &e.,  91  Mich. 
274,  1195,  1674 

V.  Courter,  24  Barb.  232,  763 

V.  Davenport.  36  Iowa  396.  1511 

Grant  Co.  v.  Lake  Co.,  17  Or.  453.       883 

Grantland    v.    City    of    Memphis,    12 

Fed.  287,  413 

Gratton  Tp.  v.  Chelton,  97  Fed.  145.  1006 

Gravel  Hill  School  Dist.  v.  Old  Farm 

School  Dist.,  55  Conn.  244.  1474 

Graves  v.  City  of  Bloomington,  17  111. 

App.  476,  1086 

V.  Colbv.  9  Ad.  &  Kl.  356.  528 

V.  .Tasper  School  Tp..  2  S.  Dak. 
414,  1486 

V.  Lebanon  Nat'l  Bank,  10  Bush 
23.  320,  321 

Gray  v.  Bavnard,  5  Del.  Ch.  499,  623 

V.  Board  &c.,  139  Mass.  328.         1182 
V.  Citv  of  Erooklvn,  2  Abb.  App. 
Dec.  267.  90,  103 

V.  City  of  Brooklyn,  10  Abb.  Pr. 
186,  763.   829 

V.    City    of    Detroit,    113    Mich. 
657.  792 

V.  Granger.  17  R.  1.  201,  169 

V.  Mayor  &c.,  2  Marv.  257,  494 

V.  Mayor  &c.,  Ill  Ga.  361. 

266.  792.  804 
V.  Richardson,  124  Cal.  460. 

723.  733 
V.  Richardson.  55  Pac.  603,  12S7 

V.  State,  2  Harr.  76.  1416 

V.  Town  of  Cicero.  177  111.  459, 

1146.  1174,  1378 

Gravham   v.    County    Court   &c.,    9 

"Dana  184,  318 

Grayson  v.  Latham,  84  Ala.  546. 

957.  959.  962,  963 

Great  Falls  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Worster,  45 

N.  H.  no.  1055 

Greeley   v.    City   of   .Tacksonville.    17 

Fia.  174.    ■  106.,  520 

Green  v.  Burke,  23  Wend.  490,  198 


Green  v.  City  of  Cape  May,  41  N.  J. 

L.  45,  464,  644,  1091 

V.  City  of  Indianapolis,  22  Ind. 
192,  538 

V.  City  of  Indianapolis,  25  Ind. 
490,  490,  1424 

V.    City   of   Springfield,    130   111. 
515  1259 

V.  City  of  Tacoma,  51  Fed.  622,  823 
V.  County  Com'rs,  27  5.  C.  9, 

939    947 
V.  Eden,  24  Ind.  App.  583,  '  151 

V.  Harrison  Co.,  61  Iowa  311,  1076 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  R.  M.  Charlt.  368, 

1500,  1508 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  1  Burr.  127,  2S9,  296 
V.  Miller.  6  Johns.  39,  294 

V.  Rutherforth,  1  Ves.  Sr.  462,  563 
V.  Shanklin,  24  Ind.  App.  608,  718 
V.  State,  73  Cal.  29,  18 

V.   Town  of  Canaan,   29   Conn. 
157,  1559 

V.  Town  of  Dyersburg,   2   Flip. 
477,  984,  1017 

V.  Ward,  82  Va.  324. 

1232,  1255,   1261,   1262 
V.  Wardwell.   17   111.   278,  309 

Greenbanks  v.  Boutwell,  43  Vt.  207, 

347.  353,  359,  666 

Green  Bay  &c.  Co.  v.  Kaukauna  &c. 

Co..  70  Wis.  635,  666 

V.  Outagamie  Co.,  76  Wis.  588,     593 

Greencastle  Tp.  v.  Black,  5  Ind.  557,  401 

Greene  v.  Damrell,  175  Mass.  394,       106 
V.  Mumford,  5  R.  I.  472, 

1717.  1718,  1722 

Greene  Co.  v.  FAibanks.  80  Ala.  204,       14 

Greenfield  v.  Wilson.   13  Gray  384.     332 

Greenley  v.  People.  60  111.  19,     666,  1084 

Greenville  Co.  v.  Runion,  9  S.  C.  1,       915 

Greenville  Water-Works  Co.   v.   City 
of  Greenville.  7  So.  409, 

571,  640.   1450 

Greenwood  v.  Freight  Co.,  105  T^.  S. 

13,  104,  510,  1184 

V.  Hassett.  61  Pac.  173.  1141,  1259 
v.  Louisville,  13  Bush  226.  264 

V.  Morrison,  128  Cal.  350,  752,  1294 
V.  State,  6  Baxt.  567,  607 

Greer,  In  re,  56  N.  Y.  S.  938,  1379 

V,  Rowley,  1  Pittsb.   1,  1745 

Gregg    Tp.    V.    Jamison.    55    Pa.    St. 

468,  196 

Gregory,  Ex  parte,  20  Tex.  App.  210, 

1397,  1406 
V.  Brooks.  37  Conn.  365.  222 

V.  BrGV>'n.'4  Bibb  28,  221 

V.  Burk.  35  Alb.  L.  J.  278.  1177 

V.  City  of  Bridgeport,  41  Conn. 

76.  281.  285,  668 

V.   Mayor  &c.,   113  N.  Y.  416. 

176.  626 
V.  Small,  39  Ohio  St.  346,     221,  222 

Gregston  v.  City  of  Chicago,  145  111. 

451,  1349 

Grenada  Co.  Supervisors  v.  Brogden. 

112  TT.  S.  261,  642.  643,  992 

Grey  v.  Mavor  &c.,  58  N.  J.  Eq.   1,  1107 
V.    Mayor   &c.,    60    N.    J.    Eq. 
385,  1710 

Gribble    v.    City   of   Sioux   City,    38 

Iowa  390.  1635 

Grider  v.  Tally.  77  Ala.  422,         222,  223 

Gridlev   v.   Citv  of  Bloomington.    68 

111.  47.  1168,  1349.  1596 

V.   Citv  of  Bloomington.   8S   111. 
555.  1032,   1587 

Grier  v.  Shackleford,  3  Brev.  491,         156 

Griffin  v.  Mavor  &c..  3  Bosw.  483,       1112 
V.  Mayor  &c..  9  N.  Y.  456. 

263,  830,  1159 
V.  Rising.  11  Met.  339.  230 


TABLR    OK    CASES. 


CIX 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Vol.  I,  pp.  1-S32;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.1 


Griffith  \.  Carter.  8  Kan.  505,  1500 

V.  Commissioners,  L'O  Ohio  609,      98H 

V.   Sebastian   Co..  49  Ark.   24,      173G 

V.  Watson,  19  Kan.  23,  1500 

Griffltb  Co.  v.  City  of  Los  Angeles, 

54  Pac.  383,  738 

Griggs  V.  St.  Croix  Co..  27  Fed.  333,  1489 
(Jrim  V.  Weissenberg  School  Dist.,  57 

Pa.   St.   433,  1551 

Grimes  v.  Hamilton  Co.,  37  Iowa  290, 

659,  660 
Grimraell  v.  City  of  Des  Moines,  57 

Iowa  144.  1270 

Grimmett  v.  Askew,  48  Ark.  151,         274 
Grimsley  v.  State.  116  Ind.  130,  912 

Grindlev  v.  Barker,  1  Bos.  &  P.  229,     294 
Griswold  v.  Brega,  160  111.  490.  1707 

Grofif  V.  City  of  Philadelphia,  150  Pa. 

St.  594.  1220 

V.  Mayor  &c..  44  Md.  ISO,  104 

Grogan  v.  Broadway  Foundry  Co.,  87 

Mo.  321,  1375 

V.  City  of  San  Francisco.  18  Cal.      "  ' 

590,  43.  242.  630.  631,  757 

V.  City  of  Worcester,  140  Mass. 

227.  1623 

V.   Town   of   Hayward,   4   Fed. 

161,  1214 

Grondin  v.  Logan,  88  Mich.  247,         1648 
Gross  V.  City  of  Grossdale,  176  111. 

572,  1294 

V.    City   of   Lampass,    74   Tex. 

195.  1179 

V.  City  of  Portsmouth,  68  N.  H. 

266,  266,  789 

Grove  v.  City  of  Ft.  Wayne,  45  Ind. 

429,  1115,  1612 

Grover  v.  Huckins,  26  Mich.  476. 

526.  533.  1085 

V.  Inhabitants.  11  Allen  88,  344,  362 
Griimon  v.  Raymond.  1  Conn.  40.  335 
Grundy   Co.    v.    Hughes,    8    111.   App. 

34,  1064 

Grusenmeyer  v.   City  of  Logansport, 

76  Ind.  549,  1095,  1660 

Gubasko  v.  City  of  New  York,  1  N.  Y. 

S.    215,  1615 

Guenther  v.  Whiteacre.  24  Mich.  504,  335 
Guerin  v.   Borough  of  Asbury  Park, 

57  N.  J.   L.   292.  605 

Guernsey  v.  Burlington  Tp.,  4  Dillon 

372,  981 

Guerrero.  In  re.  69  Cal.  88,  1539 

Guest  V.  City  of  Brooklyn.  69  N.  Y. 

506.  1202.    1719 

V.    Commissioners   &c.,    90   Md. 

689.  790,  791 

Guild  V.  City  of  Chicago,  82  111.  472, 

90,  103 
Guillotte  V.  City  of  New  Orleans.  12 

La.  An.  432.  534 

■  Guldin  V.  Schuylkill  County,  48  Phila. 

Leg.  Int.  197,  173 

Gulf  &c.  R.  Co.  V.  Gasscamp,  69  Tex. 

545,  1631 

Gulick  V.  New,  14  Ind.  93. 

189.  379,  1418,  1672 
Gullikson  v.  McDonald,  62  Minn.  278, 

804,  805 
Gulline  v.  City  of  Lowell,  144  Mass. 

491,  1595 

Gumotte   v.    Egelhoff,    2    Mo.    App. 

963.  1295 

Gundling  v.  Chicago.  177  U.  S.  183,       518 

V.  Chicago.  176  111.  340. 

469.  604.  658.  1382,  1384,  1388 
Gunn  V.  Barry,  15  Wall.  610,  996 

V.  Pulaski  Co..  3  Ark.  427.  1527 

Gunnison  Co.  v.  E.  H.  Rollins  &  Sons, 

173  U.  S.  255. 

1001,  1003,  1005,  1031,  1032 


Gunter  v.  Fayetteville,  56  Ark.  202. 

398.  400 

Gurley   v.    City   of   New   Orleans,   41 

La.  An.  75,  233,  235,  019 

Gurnee  v.  Brunswick  Co.,  1  Hughes 

270,  941 

V.  City  of  Chicago,  40  111.  165,  1233 

Gurney  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  93  Maine 

360.  1336 

Gusher  v.   City  of  New  York,  56  N. 

Y.  S.  1002,  710,  1707 

V.   City  of  New  York,  58   N.   Y. 

S.  967.  578 

Gustin   V.   Inhabitants  &c.,    10   Gray 

259,  1533 

Guthrie   v.   Armstrong,   5   B.   &  Aid. 

628,  295 

V.  City  of  Philadelphia,  73  Fed. 
688,  795 

V.  Swan,  3  Okl.  116,  1330 

Guthrie  Nat'l  Bank  v.  City  of  Guth- 
rie, 173  T^  S.  528.  69 

Gwynn  v.  Turner.  18  Iowa  1,  229 

Gwynne  v.  Burnell,  7  CI.  «&  F.  572,       325 
V.  Pool,  Lutw.  290,  220 


Haaren  v.  High.  97  Cal.  445,  1166,  1505 
Ilackensack  Water  Co.  v.  Mayor  &c., 

51  N.  J.  L.  220,  1448,  1449 

Hackett  v.   Ottawa,  99  U.   S.  86. 

979,  980,  1001.  1004 
Hackstack  v.  Keshena  Imp.   Co.,  66 

Wis.  439,  1218 

Hackworth    v.    Louisville    &c.    Stone 

Co..   20  Ky.   L.    1789,  1166.    1505 

Haddox  v.  Clarke  Co.,  79  Va.  677,  368 
Iladley   v.    Citizens'    Sav.    Inst.,    123 

Mass.  301.  1573 

V.  State,  66  Ind.  271.  1483 

Hadsel    v.    Inhabitants   &c.,    3    Gray 

526,  667 

Hafford  v.  City  of  New  Bedford,  16 

Gray  297. 

263.  797.  803.  807.  820,  1097 
Hagan  v.  City  of  Brooklyn,  126  N.  Y. 

643.  172,   184 

Hagar  v.  Board  &c.,  47  Cal.  222.       1714 

V.  Brainard.  44  Vt.  294.       693.  1571 

V.  Reclamation  Dist.,  Ill  U.   S. 

701.  559.  694.  1238.  1239.  1302.  1714 
Hager  v.  City  of  Burlington,  42  Iowa 

661.  1258 

Haggard  v.  Hawkins,  14  Ind.  299,  419 
Ilagner  v.  Heyberger.  7  W.  &  S.  104,  297 
Hagood  V.  Southern,  117  U.  S.  52,  18 
Hague    V.    City    of    Philadelphia,    48 

Pa.   St.   527, 

235,  253,  257,  258,  644,  645 
Haight  V.   City  of  Elmira,   59  N.   Y. 

S.  193.  1342 

V.  Keokuk.  4  Iowa  199.  681 

V.  New  York.  24  Fed.  93,  781 

Haile  v.  Palmer,  5  Mo.  403,  1423 

Haines  v.  Campion,  3  Ilarr.  49,  645 

V.  School  Dist..  41  Maine  246,       243 
Haisch  v.  City  of  Seattle,  10  Wash. 

43.5.  1185.  1298.  1704 

Halbert   v.    Mayor  &c.,    10   Abb.    Pr. 

439.  187 

V.  State,  22  Ind.  125,  319 

Halcombe  v.  Commissioners,  89  N.  C. 

346,  1542 

Haldeman  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co..  50 

Pa.  St.  425.  675 

Hale    V.    City    of    Kenosha.    29    Wis. 

599.  1231    1520 

V.  Commonwealth.  8  Pa.  St."4l'5.  328 

V.  Risley,  69  Mich.  596,  1496 

Haley  v.  City  of  Alton,  152  III.  113. 

719,  1241,  1283 


ex 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Vol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol.  II,  pp.  S33-1S30.} 


Haley  v.  Whitney,  53  Hun  119,  229 

Hall  V.   Baker.   74  Wis.   118, 

424,  445,  659 
V.  City  of  Buffalo,  1  Keyes  193,  1191 
V.   City  of  Chippewa  Palls,  47 
Wis.  267.  1255 

V.   Cockrell,   28  Ala.   507,  216 

V.  Corporation  of  Washington,  4 
Cranch  722,  530 

V.  De  Cuir,  95  U.  S.  485.     138.  1493 
V.    Inhabitants    &c.,    116    Mass. 
172.  357 

V.    Inhabitants   «&c.,    133    Mass. 
433,  824 

V.  People,  57  111.  307,  339,  695,  1683 
V.  School  Dist.,  46  Vt.  19,  362 

V.   Smith.   2  Bing.   156,  225 

Halleck  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  117  Mass. 

469,  365,   1425 

Hallenbeck  v.  Hahn,   2  Neb.  377,  983 

Hallman   v.   City  of  Platteville,   101 

Wis.  94.  789 

Hallock   V.    inhabitants   &c.,    2    Met. 

558,  705 

Halloran  v.  Carter,  13  N.  Y.  S.  214.  1647 

Hall's  Free  School  Trustees  v.  Home. 

80  Va.  470,  1493 

Halsey  v.  People,  84  111.  89,  1253 

V.  Rapid  Transit  St.  R.  Co..  47 
N.  .7.  Eq.  380,  279,  554,  682 

Halstead,  Ex  parte,  89  Cal.  471,         1413 
V.   Mayor.   3   Comst.   430. 

233.  251.  253,  647,  664,  668 
V.  Village  of  W'arsaw,  59  N.  Y. 
S.  518,  1364 

Ham   V.    City   of   Salem,    100   Mass. 

350.  688 

V.   Greve,  34  Ind.   18,  321 

V.  Mayor  &c.,  70  N.  Y.  459, 

781,   788,   1097 

Hamar  v.  Covington,  3  Met.  494.  831 

Hambleton    v.    Town    of    Dexter,    89 

Mo.  188,  448,  1683 

Hamilton    v.    Ci'ty    of   Detroit,    105 

Mich.  514.  1336,  1348 

V.   Gambell.   31   Or.   328.  1713 

V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  55  Maine  193, 

347,  3.58 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  52  Ga.  435,  265,  1112 
V.  Minneapolis  Desk  Mfg.  Co.,  78 
Minn.  3,  1768 

V.   Newcastle  &c.  R.   Co.,  9  Ind. 
359,  260 

V.  President  &c.,  24  111.  22,  64 

V.  State.  3  Ind.  452,  339 

V.  State.  3  Tex.  App.  643.  607 

V.  Vicksburg  &c.  R.  Co.,  119  IT. 
S.  280.  1576 

Hamilton   Co.   v.   Massachusetts,   6 

Wall.  632,  1512 

Hamlin  v.  Dingman,  5  Lans.   61. 

197,  289 
V.  Kassafer,   15  Or.  456. 

195.  196,  197 

Hammett  v.  Philadelphia,  65  Pa.  St. 

146.  593.  1195.  1231.  1233.  1297,  1537 

Hammond  v.  Haines,  25  Md.  541.         107 
V.   School   Board  &c.,   109  Mich. 
676,  1506 

Hammonds  v.  Richmond  Co.,  72  Ga. 

188.  805 

Hampshire    Co.,    In    re.    143    Mass. 

424.  1249 

Hampson  v.  Taylor,  15  R.  I.  83. 

1566.  1632 

Hancock  v.   City  of  Boston,   1   Met. 

122,  1739 

V.  District  Tp.  of  Perry,  78  Iowa 
5.50.  1474 

Hancock    St.    Extension,    18    Pa.    St. 

26,  1234 

Hand  v.  Fellows,  148  Pa.  St.  456,       583 


Hand  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  126  Mass. 

324,  824 

V.  Newton.  92  N.  Y.  88,  19 

Handley  v.  Palmer,  91  Fed.  948,  563 

Handy   v.   City   of  New   Orleans,   39 

La.  An.   107.  650 

Ilaney   v.    City   of   Kansas,    94    Mo. 

334,  1180 

V.  Marshall,  9  Md.  194.  137 

Hanger  v.  Abbott,  6  Wall.  532,  455 

V.  City  of  Des  Moines,  52  Iowa 
193,  670 

Hankins  v.  Calloway.  88  111.  155,         186 
V.    People,    106   111.    628,  496 

Bianlon  v.  Partridge.  69  N.  H.  88.       223 

Hanna  v.   Cincinnati  &c.   R.   Co.,   20 

Ind.   30,  994 

Ilannewinkle  v.  Georgetown.  15  Wall. 

547.  1697,  1717,  1718,  1722 

Hannibal   &c.   R.   Co.   v.   Marion   Co., 

36  Mo.  294,  285,  1539 

Ilannon  v.  Agnew.  96  N.  Y.  439,  282 

V.  Grizzard,  89  N.  C.  115,  185 

V.  Grizzard,  96  N.  C.  293,  221 

V.  St.  Louis  Co.,  62  Mo.  313,  778 

Hanover    School    Tp.    v.    Gant,    125 

Ind.  557.  1476 

Hanscom  v.  City  of  Boston,  141  Mass. 

242.  1615 

V.   City  of  Omaha,    11    Neb.   37, 

1231,  1253,  1499 

Hansen  v.  Hammer,  15  Wash.  315. 

1292,  1505 
V.  Hirsch.  27  Or.  487,  1315 

Hanson,  Ex  parte,  28  Fed.  127,  1404 

V.   Borough  of  Warren,   14  Atl. 
405.  1605 

V.  Eichstaedt.  69  Wis.  538,  1428 

V.  Vernon,  27  Iowa  28, 

983,    1536,   1537,    1542 
V.  Wm.  A.  Hunter  Elec.  L.  Co., 
86  Iowa  722,  1467 

Hapgood  V.  Doherty,  8  Gray  373,         699 

Harbaugh   v.  City  of  Monmouth,   74 

111.   367,  519 

Harbeck  v.   City  of  Toledo,*  11   Ohio 

St.  219,  692 

Harcoui-t  v.  Good.  39  Tex.  455,  983 

Hardaker  v.  Idle  Dist.  Council,  L.  R. 

1   Q.   B.   D.   335.  796 

Hardcastle  v.  State.  27  N.  J.  L.  551.  348 

Hardenbrook  v.  Town  of  Ligonier,  95 

Ind.  70,  493,  530.  539 

Hardenburgh  v.  Van  Keuren,  4  Abb. 

N.  C.  43,  994 

Harder   v.    City    of    Minneapolis.    40 

Minn.  446,  828,  1623 

Hardestv  v.  Fleming.  57  Tex.  395,       1552 

Hardin  v.  Carrico.  3  Met.  289,  333 

V.  Colquitt.  63  Ga.  588,  1694 

Hardin  Co.  v.   Louisville  &c.  R.  Co., 

92  Kv.  412,  281.  625 

V.  McFarlan,  82  111.  138,         835.  977 
V.  Wright  Co.,  67  Iowa  127,         1063 

Harding  v.  Bader,  75  Mich.  316,  277 

V.  Goodlet.  3  Yerg.  40.  685 

v.    Rockford  &c.    R.   Co.,   65   111. 
90.  973,  988 

V.  Vandewater.  40  Cal.  77,    275,  732 
V.  Woodcock.  137  V.  S.  43,  223 

Hardmann  v.  Bowen,  39  N.  Y.  196.     311 

Hardy  v.  City  of  Orange,  61  N.  J.  L. 

620.  163 

V.   Inhabitants  &c.,   3  Met.   163. 

576,  867 
V.   Keene.  52  N.  H.  370,  820 

V.   Keene.  54  N.   11.  449.  1573 

V.  McKinnev.  107  Ind.  364.  708 

V.  Merriweather.  14  Ind.  203,       071 

Hargreaves  v.   Deacon,   25   Mich.    1, 

795,   810 
V.  Hopper,  L.  R.  1  C.  P.  D.  195,    127 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


CXI 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Vol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.ii 


Ilargro  v.  Ilodfrdon,  80  Cal.  023,  If.fio 
Ilarsroves  v.  Cooke,  1")  Oa.  321,  14S8 

Hark  v.  Gladwoll,  40  Wis.  17:!,  300,  :i(;o 
Harkei-  v.  Mayor,  17  Wend.  199,  85,  538 
Harlem  Gaslijiht  Co.  v.  Mayor  &c.,  3 

liobt.   100,  894 

Harlow  v.  Borough  of  Beaver  Falls, 

188  ra.  St.  2G3,  741 

Harman   v.    City   of   St.    Louis,    137 

Mo.  494.  1112 

V.  Harwood.  58  Md.  1.  150 

V.  Tappenden,  1  East  555,  207 

Harmison  v.  City  of  Lewistown,  153 

111.   313,  1117 

Harmon  v.  City  of  Chicago.  110  111. 

400,  466.   492,   621,    1120 

V.  City  of  Omaha,  17  Neb.  548, 

1209.   1301 
V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  9  Cush.  525,  1519 
Harmony  v.  Bingham.  12  N.  Y.  99.     1263 
Harness    v.    Chesapeake    &c.    Canal 

Co.,   1   Md.   Ch.  248.  674 

V.  State.  76  Tex.  566,  93,  164 

Harnev  v.  Benson,  113  Cal.  314,         1281 
V.'  Heller,  47  Cal.  15,  1256 

V.    Indianapolis   &c.    R.    Co.,    32 
Ind.  244,  651 

Harper  v.  City  of  Milwaukee,  30  Wis. 

365,  811,   1112,   1208 

V.    Commissioners    &c.,    23    Ga. 
566,  1714 

V.  Lexington  &c.  R.  Co.,  2  Dana 
227.  693 

V.  Mayor  &c.,  94  Ga.  801,  596 

Harper  Co.   Com'rs  v.   Rose,   140  U. 

S.  71,  978 

Harrell  v.  Storrie,  47  S.  W.  838,  1268 
Harrigan   v.    City   of   Wilmington,   8 

Houst.   140.  1180 

V.    Village   of   Hoosick    Falls,    1 
N.  Y.  S.  57.  1604 

Harriman    v.    City    of    Boston,    114 

Mass.   241,  1616 

Harrington  v.  City  of  Buffalo,  2  N. 

Y.   S.  333,  1599.  1606 

V.    Commissioners    &c.,    2    McC. 
400,  335 

V.  County  Com'rs.  22  Pick.  263,    705 
V.  Woffoi-d.  46  Miss.  31,  693 

Harris,  Ex  parte,  52  Ala.  87,  1672 

V.  Baker,  4  M.  &  S.  27,  225 

V.  Board  &c..  105  111.  445.  1084 

V.  Chickasaw  Co.,  77  Iowa  345,     944 
V.  City  of  Atlanta,  62  Ga.   290, 

798.   1075 
V.    City    of    Fond    Du    Lac,    104 
Wis.  44,  930 

V.    City   of   St.    Joseph,   99   Fed. 
246.  723 

V.  Hanson,  2  Fairf.  241,       330,  332 
V.  Nesbit,  24  Ala.  398.  124 

V.  Pepperell.  L.  R.  5  Eq.  1.  1015 

V.   School   Dist.,  8  Fost.    (28  N. 
H.)    58.  12.  348.  366.   1480,   1485 

V.  Thompson.  9  Barb.  350,  685 

V.   T'ehplhoer,  75  N.  Y.   169,  1639 

V.   Wakeman,   Sav.   254.  467,   536 

V.  Whitcomb.  4  Gray  433.     370,  1424 
V.  Wood,  6  T.  B.  Mon.  641.  1714 

Harrison  v.  Augusta  Factory,  73  Ga. 

447.  1214 

V.  Board  &c..  51  ,Wis.  645,  1216 

V.   Brooks.  20  Ga.  537,  1387 

V.    City    of    Elgin,    53    111.    App. 
452.  1348 

V.   City  of  Milwaukee,   49  Wis. 
■247.  246.  1726 

V.  City  of  New  Orleans.  40  La. 
An.  509.  854 

V.   Mayor  &c..   1   Gill   264. 

594,   1079,   1099,   1100,   1391 


Harrison  v.   Town  of  Plainview,  27 

Minn.   224.  1539,   1728 

V.  William.s,  3  B.  &  C.  162.  11 

Ilarriss  v.  Wright,  121  N.  C.  172,       104 

Ilarshman    v.    Bates    Co.,    92    U.    S. 

569,  210,  994,  095 

V.    Knox   Co.    Court,   122   U.    S. 
306,  1525 

Hart  V.   Burnett,   15  Cal.   530, 

629,  630,  1743 
V.    City    of   Brooklyn,    36    Barb. 
226.  1198 

V.  City  of  New  Orleans,  12  Fed. 
292,  1529,  1530 

V.    Lancashire    &c.    R.    Co.,    21 
L.   T.   261.  1627 

V.  Mayor  &c.,  9  Wend.  571, 

527,  532,  535,  620.   1085,  1115 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  3  Paige  213, 

1081,  1121 
V.  Poor  Guardians,  81 1^  Pa.  St. 
406.  319 

V.  T'nited  States,  118  U.  S.  62,     773 

Harter  v.  Kernochan,  103  U.  S.  562,    995 

Hartford  Bridge  Co.  v.  Town  of  East 

Hartford.  16  Conn.  149,       435,  1519 

Hartford    Fire    Ins.    Co.    v.    City    of 

Peoria.    156   111.    420,  '542    612 

Hartford    Tp.    v.    Bennett,    10    Ohio 

St.  441,  199 

Hartman    v.    City    of   Muscatine,    70 

Iowa  511,  1635 

Hartnall  v.  Ryde  Com'rs,  4  B.  &  S. 

361,  812.   831 

Ilartrick  v.  Town  of  Farmington,  108 

Iowa  31,  1162 

Hartshorn  v.  Schoflf.  58  N.  H.  197.       287 

Hart    Tp.    V.    Oceana    Co.,    44    Mich. 

417  ;   48  Mich.  319.  868 

Hart  well  v.  Armstrong,  19  Barb.  166, 

689.    1084 
V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  3  Pick.  229.    1427 

Harvey    v.    Aurora    &c.    R.    Co.,    186 

111.  283.  492.  .508 

V.  Benson.  113  Cal.  314,  1130 

v.    City  of  Clarinda,    111    Iowa 
528.  1329.  1333 

V.    Commissioners   &c.,   32   Kan. 
159.  173 

V.  De  Woody,  18  Ark.  252.  1115 

V.    Indianapolis   &c.    R.    Co.,    32 
Ind.  244.  1730 

V.  Thomas.  10  Watts  63,         673.  674 
V.  Tyler,  2  Wall.  328,  694 

Plarward    v.    St.    Clair    &c.    Co.,    51 

111.  130,  624 

Harwinton  v.  Catlin,  19  Conn.  520.     684 

Harwood  v.  City  of  Lowell,  4  Cush. 

310.  814.  1594 

V.  Marshall.  9  Md.  83,  187 

Hasbrouck  v.  City  of  Milwaukee,  13 

Wis.  37,  548.  1523.  1534.  1538 

V.    City   of  Milwaukee,    25   Wis. 
122,  1534 

Haskell  v.  Bartlett.  34  Cal.  281,  486 

V.  New  Bedford,  108  Mass.  208,     817 

Hassell  V.  Long,  2  M.  &  S.  363.  326 

Hassen   v.   City  of  Rochester,   65   N. 

Y.  516,  1288 

Hastings  v.  Bolton,  1  Allen  529,       1740 
V.    City    of    San    Francisco,    18 
Cal.  49,  1734 

V.   Columbus.   42  Ohio  St.   585,      487 
V.  Farmer,  4  N.  Y.  293.  136 

Hatch  V.   City  of  Buffalo.   38   N.   Y. 

276.  1724 

V.    Hawkes.    126    Mass.    177. 

335.    1570 
V.  Inhabitants  &c..  97  Mass.  533,  318 
V.    Willamette    &c.    Bridge    Co., 
7   Saw.    127,  1576 


exii 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Vol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.1 


Hatcheson    v.    Tilden,    4    Harr.    & 

McII.    279,  379 

Hathaway    v.     Inhabitants    &c.,    48 

Maine  440,  352,  353 

V.  Sacliett.  32  Mich.  97,  664 

V.  Town  of  Homer,  5  Lans.  267,  870 

Havemeyer  v.  Iowa  Co.,  3  Wall.  294, 

410.  764,  1029 

Haven  v.  Asylum,  13  N.  H.  532,       1425 
V.    City    of    Lowell,    5    Met.    35, 

280,  362 
V.    Grand    Junction   R.   &c.    Co., 

109  Mass.  88,  1019 
Havens  v.  Lathem,  75  N.  C.  505,  319 
Haverhill  Bridge  Proprietors  v.  Coun- 
ty Com'rs,  103  Mass.   120,              685 

Hawes   v.    City   of   Chicago,    158    111. 

653,  501,   504,    1130,    1148,    1710 

V.   Town  of  Fox  Lake,   33   Wis. 
438,  1597 

Hawk  V.   Marion  Co.,   48   Iowa  472, 

669,  670,  671 

Hawkes  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  7  Mass. 

461,  1526 

V.    Inhabitants    &c.,    107    Mass. 
414,  11.59 

Hawk  Eye  &c.  Co.  v.  City  of  Marion, 

110  Iowa  468,  1553 
Hawkins  v.  Board  &c.  of  Carroll  Co., 

50  Miss.  735,  982,  986 

V.     Common    Council    &c.,     120 
.  Mich.  390,  1685 

V.  County  Com'rs,  2  Allen  254, 

693,  1571 
V.  Dougherty,  9  Houst.  156,  1682 
V.  United  States,  96  U.  S.  689,     647 

Hawley  v.  City  of  Atlantic,  92  Iowa 

172,  794 

V.  City  of  Gloversville,  38  N.  Y. 
S.  647,  1343 

V.  Fairbanks,  108  U.  S.  543,  1528 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  82  N.  C.  22,  1526 

Hawthorn   v.   City   of   St.    Louis,    11 

Mo.  59,  1745 

Hawthorne  v.  City  of  East  Portland, 

12   Or.   271.  1254 

Hay   V.    City   of    Springfield,    64    111. 

App.  671,  672,  877 

V.  Cohoes  Co.,  2  N.  Y.  159.  823 

Hayden  v.  Atlanta,  70  Ga.  817,        1269 
V.   City   Council   «&c.,   100   Tenn. 
582,  203,  204 

V.  Inhabitants  &c..  7  Grav  358.  1597 
V.  Memphis.  100  Tenn.  .582,  1712 
V.  Noyes.  5  Conn.  39],  100,  342.  363 
V.  Tucker,  37  Mo.   214.  1119 

Hayes    v.    City    of    Cambridge,    136 

Mass.    402.  1.584 

V.  City  of  Oshkosh,  33  Wis.  314, 

781.   797.   1096 
V.    City   of   West   Bay    Citv.    91 
Mich.  418.  1325 

V.  Douglas  Co.,  92  Wis.  429. 

1242,  1279 
V.  Hanson,  12  N.  H.  284,  1569 

V.  Holly  Springs,  114  U.  S.  120, 

233,  636.  986,  994 
V.    Inhabitants    &c.,    153    Mass. 
514,  1601 

V.  Missouri.  120  IT.  S.  68,  139 

V.  Porter.  22  Maine  371,  223 

V.  Symonds,  9  Barb.  260,  1054 

Hayford    v.    County    Com'rs   &c.,    78 

Maine   153,  696 

ITavgood  V.  .Tustices  &c..  20  Ga.  845,       9 

Ilaynes  v.  Bridge,   1   Coldw.  32.  329 

V.   City  of  Cape  May,   50 1  N.   J. 
L.  55.  5C»0 

v.   Citv  of  Cape  May,  52  N.  J. 
L.   180,  602,  1396 

V.  Covington,  21  Miss.  408,  646 

V.   Washington  Co.,  19  III.   66.     431 


Hays  V.  City  of  Cincinnati,  62  Ohio 

St.  116.  12.59,  1311 

V.  City  of  Oil  City,  11  Atl.  63,       181 
V.    Commonwealth,    82    Pa.    St. 
518.  5,    376 

V.   Ilogan,  5  Cal.  241,  1725 

V.  Pacific  &c.  Co.,  17  How.  596,  1502 
Hayward  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  2  Cush. 

419,  340,   1485 

V.  Mayor  &c.,  8  Barb.  486,  689 

Haywood   v.   Charlestown,   34   N.   H. 

23,  1572 

V.  Mayor  &c.,  12  Ga.  404, 

107,   468.  491 
Ilayzlett  v.   City  of  Mt.   Vernon,  33 

Iowa  229.  1545 

Hazard    v.    City    of    Council    Bluffs, 

79  Iowa  106,  1179 

V.  Wason,  152  Mass.  268,  1740 

ilazen    v.    Lerche,    47    Mich.    626, 

1480,  1485 
Hazzard  v.  Heacock,  39  Ind.  172,  1262 
Head  v.  Providence  Ins.  Co.,  2  Cranch 

127,  253,  638 

Headrick  v.   Whittemore,    105   Mass. 

23,  693 

Ilealey    v.    City   of   New   Haven,    49 

Conn.    394,  1224 

Healy  v.  Mayor  &c..  3  Hun  708,  1641 

Heard  v.  City  of  Brooklyn,  60  N.  Y. 

242,  675 

V.   Harris,   68  Ala.   43,  334 

Heath,  Ex  parte,  3  Hill  42,     1418,  1692 

V.  Barmore,  50  N.  Y.  302.  675 

V.    Des    Moines    &c.    R.    Co.,    61 

Iowa   11,  1368 

V.  McCrea,  21  Wash.  342,  1311 

Hebard  v.  Ashland  Co..  55  Wis.  145,    883 

Hebron  G.  R.  Co.  v.  Harvey,  90  Ind. 

192,  1177 

Hechinger   v.    City   of   Maysville,    57 

S.  W.  619.  1385 

Hecht  V.  Boughton,  2  N.  Y.  385,         1540 
Heckel    v.     Sandford,    40    N.    J.    L. 

180,  4.52 

Heckscher  v.  City  of  Philadelphia,  9 

Atl.  281,  1738 

Iledenberg   v.    City   of   Chicago,    163 

111.  129.  1145 

Hedges    v.    Madison    Co.,    1    Oilman 

567,  267,  775 

Heeney  v.   Sprague.   11   R.   I.   456, 

5'^8     158S 
V.  Trustees  &c..  33   Barb.  360'.      134 
Ileffleman    v.    Pennington    Co.,    3    S. 

Dak.  162,  958,  959 

Heffner    v.    Commonwealth.    28    Pa. 

St.  108.  339,  1655,  1681 

Heffran  v.  Hutchins,  160  111.  550. 

209,  1697 
Ileick  V.  Voight,  110  Ind.  279,  1572 

Heidelberg  v.  San  Francois  Co.,  100 

Mo.   69,  260,   1171 

Heidelberg  School  Dlst.  v.  Horst,  62 

Pa.  St.  301,  262 

Heidenway   v.   Citv   of   Philadelphia, 

168  Pa.  St.  72,  808 

Heilbron,  Ex  parte,  65  Cal.  607,         1079 
V.  Mayor  &c..  96  Ga.  312.  572 

Heilman  v.   Lebanon  &c.   St.   R.  Co., 

175  Pa.  St.  188,  1706 

Heine  v.  Levee  Com'rs,  19  Wall.  655, 

458.  1526.  1528.  1529.  1544.  1719 
Heinemann  v.  Heard,  62  N.  Y.  448,  1204 
Ileinerberg  v.  Village  of  Hyde  Park, 

130   111.   156.  1175 

Ileinrich   v.    City   of   St.    Louis.    125 

ISIo.  424,  1318,  1698 

TTeins  v.  Lincoln.  102  Iowa  69.     479,  1021 
ITeiple    V.    Clackamas    Co.,    20    Or. 

147,  1169 

Heiser  v.  Hatch,  86  N.  Y.  614,  1599 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


CXIU 


reference,  are  to  Paoe.  Vol.  I,  PP.  /-«;  Vol.  U.  »•  M-«^W 


Ileiscr 


Mayor  &c.^l04,  N.  V.^|.^^^3 

Heiskell  v.  Mayor  &c.,  Go   .>Id.   1^2;^  ^^^ 

HelaiKl_v.   City   of   Lowell, I"  AHen  ___^ 

Held'*v''Baswell.  58  Iowa  ISO,  ^'^'l^^j^riQ 
He  len  v.  Noe.  3  Ired.  I>-  49:?.  r..«.  1093 
Hlllenkamp    v.    City    of    Lafayette,   ^ 

Heller    v.    At_chison    &c.    R.    Co.,    -^'^^^.j, 

vi^city'of  Garden  City,  58  Kan.^^^^ 

?''Mayor  &c..  53  MO.  159      264    "786 

Helms  V.  Chadbourne    45  \V  is.  60      1,.;^T 

TTpimn  V     Vllon.  ^'^>C^  Mo.  5.U,     .>*ib.  i-- J 

""'"v    llandlin.  .59  Mo.  App.  49n.     1U>.. 

V.  McNamara.  77  Mo.  App.  1.     1-84 

V.  St.  Louis  Merchants    &e.  ^-O-'   „,„ 

75   Mo.  App.   372  Mo 

"'"rnn'^Tso''"  "•    """     ''  5?5:  551 

Hembljng  v.  City  of  Big  Rapids.  89  ^^^ 

Mien.  1.  .  . ,      i       c  „       oQ 

Heminway    v.  ^  Inhabitants    &c.,    •^-ij.j.^^ 

Hemphlirv.  c'uy  of  Boston,  8  Cush.^^^^ 

Hempsfead   v.   City   of  Des   Moines,  ^^ 

52  Iowa  313.  r,i    — 

Hempsl^ead^Co.    v.    Howard    Co.,^ol   ^^^ 

Hendershott  V.  City  of  Ottumwa,  46 

Iowa  658,  .      .    „    ij^ 

Henderson  v.  City  of  Covington,  14 

V.  City  ol"  Minneapolis,  24  Minn. 
054  1-10 

V.  City  of  Minneapolis,  32  M_inn.   ^^^ 

?!Jcity   of   S.   Omaha,   60   Neb.^^^^ 

v"  Davis.  106  N.  C    88.  64 

V.  Mayor,  3  La.  563  191 

V.    Mayor   &c.,    8    Md.  ^3o2.^^^^  ^^^^ 

V.   Smith.  26  W.  Va.   829,  221 

Henderson   &c.   R.   Co.   v.   Dickerson, 

17  B.  Mon.  173,  ^         .00 

Hendricks  v.  Board  &c.,  35  Kan^^4S3^^^^ 

V.   Johnson,  45  Miss.  644,       ^,     960 
Hendrickson   v.   City   of   New  York, 
160  N.  Y.  144.  f-p  M  '  Y 

V.  City  of  New  York,  56  N.   Y. 

Q      PiQO  X  -1  T"  i- 

v.'  Decow.  1  Saxt.  577.  474 

Henev  v.  Pima  Co..  17  Pac.  .263.  944 

HeSlst  V.  City  of  Cincinnati,  7  Ohio.^^^^^ 

Henion.^Ex'parte.  .55  Pac  326  1713 

Henke  v.   McCord.   55  Iowa  3 18.  5S 

Henker  v.   City  of  Fond  du  Lac 

Wis.    616, 
Henline  v.  People,  81  111.  269,    _ 
SeSly   V.    Mayor   of  Lyme   Reg.s.,^5  ^^^ 

Henn'lkef-v'  Weare.  9  N  H  |73r-1046 
V.  Wyman.  58  N.   H.   528.  »fJJ 

Henry  v.  Dubuque    10  Iowa  540.  <<>-^ 

V.  Gregory.  29  Mich.  68.  i'p- 

V    Ho?stick.    9   Watts   412.  1551 

V.     Lansdowne,     40     Mo.     ^pp.^^^^ 

f  Selvage.  99  Ky.  232,  1275 

V.  State?  98  Ind.  38^1  911 

V.  Taylor.  57  Iowa  72,  41b 

V.  Thomas.  119  Mass.  583,  12o8 

V.    Town    of    Chester,  15    Vt. 

460,  '■^^^ 
1  Smith— viii 


71 


1589 
696 


llenrv  Co.  v.  Nicolay,  95  U.  S.  619,     995 
Henshaw  v.  Cotton,  127  Mass.  00,     1.4.{ 
v.   Foster,  9   Pick.  312,  ]-J» 

Ilentig  v.  Gilmore.  33  Kan.  234,         H-*^ 
Hepburn  v.  City  of  Philadelphia,  149^^^.^ 

nequ^mbom|'v^  City  of  Dunkirk,^2  ^^^ 

Hercules  I-  Works^  v.  ,^'ot  f412%413 
Herhold  v.  City  of  Chicago,  108  lH-^j-gg 

Heriofs' Hospital  v.  Ross,  12  CI.  & 

IT,    F;n7  '-' •" 

Herman  V.  City  of  Crete,  9  Neb   350  240 

v.  City  of  Oconto,  100  W^|.  39L  ^^^ 

V.  Wolf.  23  Mo.  App.  200  '  "  '1234 
Herrj^.^City  of  Lebanon,  149  P|-3|t-jgoo 
Herri^k'v.  Carpenter.  54  Iowa  340",     556 

V.  Stover.  5  Wend.   581,  -.J 

Herring    v.    Wilmington    R.    Co.,    10 

I  red    402.  ^"'* 

Herrington  v.  District  Tp.  of  Liston, 

47  Iowa  11,  .      ^  iin 

V.   Village   of   Lansingburg.    H^^gg^ 

HersS  v.'  Boal-d  &c..  16  Wis.  198        1288 
V    Board  &c..  37  Wis.  75.    1550   1720 

Hershberger   v.    City    of    Pittsburgh, 
115   Pa.    St.   78.  .  oq  ^ 

Herzo  v.  City  of  San  Francisco    33 

Cal    134  ""^  '   ^^^^ 

Hesketh  V.  Braddock,  3  Burr.   1847,   ^^^ 

Hess  V.  Pegg.  7  Nev.  23.    ,  W* 

Hessler  v.   Drainage  Com  rs,   53   111.   ^^^ 

Hester  v.  Fortner,  2  Bmn.  40.  — » 

Heth   V.    City    of   Fond   du    Lac,    63 

Heth  Tp.  vT  Lewis.  114  Ind.  508,         862 
Heugh^e^^v.^Board^of  Education  &c..   ^^^ 

Hewes  v.Reis,-40  Cal.  2|5,    ^^^^    ^^55 

v.    Village    of    Crete,    175    HI- 
348  xo-x 

v.   Village   of  Winnetka,   60   II'-.^q^^ 
App.  654. 

Hewison  v.  City  of  New  Haven,  34 

Conn.  136,  ^  „_  -"'* 

V.     City     of     New     HY'?594    1612 
Conn.  475,  8,   «14.   lOJt,   x"^^- 

Hewitfs  Appeal,  88  Pa.^  St.  55.  ^^    ^^^^ 

V.   Board  &c.,  94  HI-  528,     973.  977 
V.   Miller.   21   Vt.   402.  1474 

V  State.  6  Har.  &  J.  95,  322 

V  White.  78  Mich.  117  606 
Hexamer  v.  Webb.  101  N.  Y.  377.  1591 
Hey?iTn  v.  Mahoney  9  Mont  497,  371 
HeVlman.  Ex  parte.  92  Cal.  492.  13J& 
HeVmann    v.    Cunningham,    51    Wis. 

"-^^Z-SJli^8?"f?|.il2^m 

V.  Mayor  &c..  7  N..  Y.  314.  675.  685 
Hibbard  V.  City  of  Chicago,  l^^^^l "^gig 

v^'ciark.  56  N.  H.  155.  '     530 

Hickey   V.    Board   &c.,    62    Mich.  ^4,^^^^ 

V.  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.,  6  111.  App.  ^^^ 
HickS  V.  O'Neil    10  Cal.  292  1411 

Hickok  V.  Hine,  23  Ohio  St.  5-3,       od* 


CXIV 


TABLE  OF   CASES. 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Vol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.'\ 


Hlckok  V.  Town  of  Shelburne,  41  Vt. 

409.  351,    355,    362,    1424 

V.  Trustees  &c.,  15  Barb.  427,       222 

Hicks  V.   Dorn.  42  N.   Y.  47,  222 

V.  Ward,  69  Maine  436.  1321 

Higbee  v.  Peed,  98  Ind.  420,  1573 

Higert    v.    City    of    Greencastle,    43 

Ind.  574.  1624 

Higgins  V.  Ausmuss,  77  Mo.  351,         1262 
V.  Bordages.  88  Tex.  458,  1262 

V.  City  o'f  Chicago,  18  111.  276,     705 
V.    City    of    New    York,    131    N. 
Y.  128,  172 

V.   Citv  of  San   Diego,   115   Cal. 
170,  609 

V.    Curtis,    39    Kan.    283,  301 

V.  San  Diego  Water  Co..  118  Cal. 
524.  725,  734,  877,  925 

V.  Village  of  Salamanca,  6  N.  Y. 
St.   119,  826 

Higginson  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  11  Al- 
len  530.  687.    692 
V.  Turner.  171  Mass.  586,       70,  563 

Hight  V.   Board  &c.,   68   Ind.   575. 

663,  670 

Highway    Com'rs    v.    Ely,    54    Mich. 

173.  223,  335 

'  V.    Van    Dusen,    40    Mich.    429, 

634,   643 

Higley  v.  Bunce,   10  Conn.  436,  485 

V.  Bunce,  10  Conn.  567,  482 

Hilbish    V.    Catherman,    64    Pa.    St. 

154,  979 

Hildman    v.    City    of    Phillips,    106 

Wis.  611.  1366 

Hildreth  v.  City  of  Lowell,  11  Gray 

345.  689 

V.  Mclntire,  1  J.  J.  Marsh.  206, 

289,  296 

Hill  V.  Board  &c.,  72  N.  C.  55, 

225,  264,  808.  830,  1388 
V.  City  of  Boston,  122  Mass.  344. 
9,  15,  129,  142,  148,  469,  776,  777 
783,  803.  810,  814,  820.  1068 
1526.  1585,  1594 
V.  City  of  Fond  du  Lac,  56  Wis. 
242,  1588 

V.  City  of  Indianapolis,  92  Fed. 
467.  711.   1710 

V.  City  of  Kahoka,  35  Fed.  32.      454 
V.    Commissioners    &c.,    22    Ga. 
203.  467 

V.   Commissioners  &e.,  67  N.   C. 
367.  983 

V.  Fitzpatrick.  6  Ala.  314.  323 

V.   Higdon.   5   Ohio   St.   243. 

1231.  1253.  1269,  1502,  1521 
V.  Kemble,  9  Cal.  71,  328 

V.    Mayor    &c.,    72    Ga.    314. 

541.   542,   1413 
V.  Memphis.   134   U.   S.    198. 
562,    635,    637,    973,    974,    978,    982 
984,    1013 
V.  Mohawk  &c.  R.  Co.,  5  Denio 
206.  701 

V.   New  Orleans  &c.   R.  Co.,   11 
La.   An.   292.  743 

V.  Portland  &c.  R.  Co.,  55  Maine 
438,  1618 

T.  School  Dist.,  17  Maine  316,  1480 
V.  Scotland  Co.,  34  Fed.  208.  1031 
V.  Selectman  &c..  140  Mass.  381,  608 
V.  State,  4  Sneed  443.  213,  831 

V.    Tionesta    Tp.,    146    Pa.    St. 
11,  1635 

V.    Tottenham    &c.    Council,    79 
L.  T.   CN.  S.)  495.  1358 

V.  Warrell.  87  Mich.  135.  1234 

V.    Winsor.    118    Mass.    251.  1595 

Hiller  v.  Village  of  Sharon  Springs. 

28  Hun  3'44,  1619 


riillesum    v.    Mayor    &c.,    56    N.    Y. 

Super.   Ct.    596,  1626 

llilliard    v.    City    of    Asheville,    118 

N.   C.   845.  1268,   1269,   1701 

Hills    V.    Peekskill    Sav.    Bank,    101 

N.  Y.  490,  1022 

Hillsborough    v.    Deering,    4    N.    H. 

86, ■  1058 

Hilton  V.  Fonda,  86  N.  Y.  339,  229 

Himmelman  v.  Danos.  35  Cal.  441,     1255 
Hinchman  v.  Paterson  Horse  R.  Co., 

17  N.  J.  Eq.  75,  590 

Hincks  v.  City  of  Milwaukee,  46  Wis. 

559,  558,  1589 

Hine  v.  City  of  New  Haven,  40  Conn. 

478,  509,  673,  1392 

Hiner   v.    City   of   Fond   du   Lac,    71 

Wis.  74,  1589,  1629 

Flines  v.  City  of  Charlotte,  72  Mich. 

278,  820,  830 

V.  City  of  Leavenworth,  3  Kan. 

186,  1253.  1269 

V.    City   of   Lockport,    50    N.    Y. 

236,  224.   778.   812.  821 

Hingham   &c.    Co.   v.   Norfolk   Co.,   6 

Allen    353,  685,    1178,    1252 

llinkle    v.    Commonwealth,    4    Dana 

518,  539 

Hinrichs  v.  City  of  New  Orleans,  50 

La.  An.   1214.  735 

Hintrager  v.   Richter,   85   Iowa   222, 

891,   959,   960 
Hintze    v.    City    of    Elgin,    186    111. 

251,  1260,    1276 

Hirn  v.  State,  1  Ohio  St.  15,  106 

Ilisey  V.  City  of  Charleston,  62  Mo. 

App.  381,  463 

V.   Citv  of   Mexico,    1    Mo.   App. 

Repr.  393.  1370 

Hiss    v.    Baltimore    &c.    R.    Co.,    52 

Md.  242.  591 

Ilisser  v.  Grafton,  33  W.  Va.  548,     1639 
Hitch  V.  Lambright.  66  Ga.  228,  221 

Hitchcock   V.    City   of  Galveston,   48 

Fed.  640,  4  Woods  308,     1529,  1655 

V.  City  of  St.  Louis,  49  Mo.  484. 

549.  1730 

V.  Danbury  &c.  R.  Co.,  25  Conn. 

516.  1570 

V.  Galveston,  96  U.  S.  341, 

238,    239,    240.    285.    547.    633,    649 

719,  746,  836,  978,  1232,  1261,  1305 
1306,  1309 
Hitchins  v.  Mayor  &c.,  68  Md.  100, 

791,   820,   1208 

Ilite   V.    Whitley   Co.   Court.   91    Ky. 

168,  805 

Ilixon    V.    City    of   Lowell.    13    Gray 

50.  814.   1594.   1612 

Hoadlev   V.    Citv   of    San    Francisco, 

124  TT.  S.  639.  630 

V.  City  of  San  Francisco,  50  Cal. 
265.  630.   1214 

V.    Citv    of    San    Francisco,    70 
Cal.    320,  630 

Hoag  v.   Citv  of  Mt.   Vernon,  58  N. 

Y.    S.    581.  1378 

V.  Durfey.  1  Aik.  286.         1425.  1427 

Iloagland    v.    Culvert.    20    N.    J.    L. 

387.  187 

Ho  Ah  Kow  V.  Nunan.  5  Saw.  552.     517 

Hobart  v.  Milwaukee  City  R.  Co.,  27 

Wis.   194,  591 

V.   Supervisors.   17  Cal.   23. 

58,  83'.  763 

Hobbs  V.  Board  &c..  116  Ind.  376.     1201 
v.    City   of  Yoiikers.    102    N.    Y. 
13.  174.    175 

V.  Inhabitants  &c..  19  Pick.  405. 

571.    15.59 

Iloblyn  V.  King,  6  Bro.  P.  C.  511,     289 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


CXV 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Vol.  I,  pp.  1-^32;  Yol.  II,  pp.  833-]830.'\ 


Iloboken    v.    I'pnnsylvauia    R.    Co., 

124  v.  S.  (ir>(;,  15G3 

Iloboken  Land  &c.  Co.  v.  Mayor  &c., 

:?(>  N.  J.  L.  .-)40,  1563 

Ilockady  v.  Board  &c.,  1  Colo.  App. 
;!r,L',  916 

Ilockett  V.  State,  105  Ind.  2.50,  6,  574 
Ilodgos  V.  Citv  of  Buffalo,  2  Denio  110, 

210.  251.  252.  253.  644,  646.  66S,  715 

V.   City   of   Waterloo,    lOi)    Iowa 

444.  1342,  1343 

V.  Perciva!,  132  111.  53,  1627 

V.  Runyan.  30  Mo.  461,  217 

V.    Western    Union   &c.    Co.,    72 

Miss.  910.  134S 

Ilodgman  v.   Chicago  &c.   R.   Co..  20 

Minn.    4S,  090,   991,    1540 

Hodgson  V.  Dexter,  1  Cranch  345, 

215,  216 
Iloester    v.    Sammelmann,    101    Mo. 

619,  586 

Iloey  V.  Gilrov.  129  N.  Y.  132,     584,  1370 

V.  Gilrov,  37  N.  Y.  St.  754,     620,  644 
Hoffeld  V.  City  of  Buffalo,  130  N.  Y. 

387.  1197,  1287 

Hoffman  v.  San  Joaquin  Co.,  21  Cal. 

426,  814 

Hogan  V.  Citv  of  Watervliet,  59  N. 

Y.   S.   103.  1343 

Hoge  v.  Railroad  Co..  99  U.  S.  348,  104 
Hogenson  v.  St.  Taul  &c.  R.  Co.,  31 

Minn.  224.  1215 

Hoggard  v.  Mayor  &c.,  51  La.  An. 

6S3,  597 

Iloglan  V.  Carpenter.  4  Bush  89,  185 

Hoitt  v.  Burnham,  61  N.  H.  620,  346 
Hoke   v.    City   of   Atlanta,    107    Ga. 

416,  1304 

V.  Henderson,  4  Dev.  1,         183,  199 

v.   Perdue,   62  Cal.   545,  1287 

Holbrook  v.  Faulkner,  55  N.  H.  311, 

302,  360,   632,   1485 
Holcomb  V.  Town  of  Danby,  51  Vt. 

428,  828 

Holdane    v.    Trustees   &c.,    23    Barb. 

10H.  1556 

v.  Trustees  «S:c.,  21  N.  Y.  474, 

1559,    1560.    1562 
Holden  v.  City  of  Alton,  179  111.  318, 

749,    1698 

V.    City    of    Chicago,    172    111. 

263,  1154 

Holder  v.  City  of  Yonkers,  56  N.  Y. 

S.   912,  609 

Holladay  v.    Frisbie,    15   Cal.   630, 

629.    1529,    1744 
Holland  v.  City  of  San  Francisco,  7 

Cal.   361.  554 

v.  Davies,  36  Ark.  446.         372,  1485 

v.  Mavor  &c.,  11  Md.  186, 

88,  108,  1236,  1257,  1533,  1722 

V.  State,  23  Fla.  123,  284 

Hollenbeck  v.  Winnebago  Co.,  95  111. 

14,S.  775,   1076 

Holleran  v.  City  of  Boston,  176  Mass. 

75.  783 

Holliday  v.  People,  10  111.  214.  759 

V.    St.    Leonard,    11    C.    B.    192, 

225,  807 
Holliraan  v.  Carroll's  Adm'r,  27  Tex. 

23,  332 

Hollingsworth  v.   Thompson,  45  La. 

An.  222,  986 

V.  Virginia,  3  Dall.  378,  45.  770 

Holloway  v.  Delano.  64  Hun  27,         1565 

V.  Ogden  School  Dist..  62  Mich. 

153.  1491 

Hollwedell.  Ex  parte,  74  Mo.  395,  1420 
Holly  V.  Bennett.  46  Minn.  386,  1424 
Holman  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  13  Met. 

297,  776 


Iloiman  v.  School  Trustees,  77  Mich. 

605,  1481,  1493 

Holmes  V.  Common  Council  &c.,  120 

Mich.    226,  750 

V.  Mayor  &c.,  12  N.  J.  Eq.  299, 

1233.  1374 
V.    Village   of   Hyde    Park,    121 
III.  128,  571,  1175,  1280,  1283 

Holt's  Appeal.  5  R.   I.  603,  1485 

Holt  V.  City  Council,  127  Mass.  408, 

300,  675,  1178,  1256 

Ilolten  V.  Board  &c.,  55  Ind.  194,         665 

Ilolton  V.  City  of  Milwaukee,  31  Wis. 

27,  1233 

Holtz  V.  Diehl,  56  N.  Y.  S.  841,  578 

Iloltzman  v.  United  States,  14  App. 

D.  C.  454,  1344 

Home  B.  &  C.  Co.  v.  City  of  Roanoke, 

91  Va.  52,  1208 

Home   Ins.    Co.    v.    City   Council,    50 

Ga.  530.  1508 

V.   Holway,  55  Iowa  571,  320 

Hommert    v.    Gleason,    14    N.    Y.    S. 

568  :  38  N.  Y.   St.  342,  189,  221 

Honey   Creek   School  Tp.   v.   Barnes, 

119  Ind.  213,  626,  1482 

Hood  V.   Finch.  8  Wis.   381,  698 

V.   Mayor  &c.,   1   Allen  103. 

251,  637,  647,  668 
V.  Trustees  &c..  12  Ky.  L.  813,    1155 

Hooksett  V.  Amoskeag  &c.  Co.,  44  N. 

H.   105,  526 

Hoole  V.  Kinkaid,  16  Nev.  217,  753 

Hooper  v.   Emery,   14  Me.  375, 

15,  776,  866,  1536 
v.  Goodwin,  48  Maine  79,     195,  196 

Hoops    V.    Village    of   Ipava,    55    111. 

App.    94.  1117 

Hope   V.    Deaderick,   8   Humph.    1,  44 

Hopkins  v.   Baltimore  &c.   R.   Co.,   6 

Mackey   311.  1354 

v.    City    of    Duluth,    81    Minn. 
189.  117 

V.  Mayor  &c.,  4  M.  &  W.  621,       466 
V.  Town  of  Elmore,  49  Vt.  176, 

342     965 
V.  Town  of  Rush  River,  70  Wis'. 
10,  1633 

Hopper  V.  Covington,  118  U.  S.  148.    637 
V.    Town   of   Covington,   8    Fed. 
777.  1001 

Hopple  V.  Trustees  &c.,  13  Ohio  St. 

311,  983 

Horan    v.    Board    &c.,    58    N.    J.    L. 

533.  164 

v.  Lane,  53  N.  J.  L.  275,         159,  170 

Horey  v.  Village  of  Haverstraw,  124 

N.  Y.   273,  1573 

Horn  V.   City  of  St.  Paul,  80  Minn. 

369,  173 

V.  Mayor  &c.,  30  Md.  218,  646 

V.  Town  of  New  Lots.  83  N.  Y. 
100.  1205.   1264.  1551 

V.  Whittier.  6  N.  H.  88.       312,  869 

Hornblower  v.   Duden,   35   Cal.   664, 

181,   663,   664 

Horner  v.  City  of  Philadelphia,  194 

Pa.  St.  542,  1340 

V.  Wood.  23  N.  Y.  350,  1192 

Hornung  v.  McCarthv.  126  Cal.  17,     1283 
v.   State.  116  Ind.  458.  298 

Horsley  v.  Bell.  1  Bro.  C.  C.  101.  n.,    216 

Ilorton  v.  City  of  Taunton,  97  Mass. 

266.  818 

V.  Harrison.  23  Barb.  176,  295 

V.  Mobile  School  Com'rs,  43  Ala. 
598.  55 

V.  Newell.  17  R.  I.  571.  818 

V.  Parsons.  37  Hun  42,  187,  198 

V.  Town  of  Thompson,  71  N.  Y. 
513,  644,   1022 


CXVl 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Vol  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol  II,  pp.  833-1830.'] 


Hosier    v.    Higgins    Tp.    Board,    45 

Mich.  340,  867 

Hoskius  V.  Brantley,  57  Miss.  814,     378 

Hosmer   v.    City   of   Gloversville,    59 

N.  Y.  S.  559,  1379 

Hospers  v.  Wyatt.  63  Iowa  264,  652 

Hospital  V.  Philadelphia  Co.,  24  Pa. 

St.  229,  1725 

Hotchkin  v.  Borough  of  Phillipsburg, 

8  Atl.  434,  1632 

Hotchkiss  V.  Plimkett,  60  Conn.  230,    667 

Hot  Springs  v.  Curi-y,  64  Ark.  152,     1406 

Hot  Springs  R.  Co.  v.  Williamson,  45 

Ark.    429,  678 

Hotz   V.    School   Dist.,    1    Colo.    App. 

40,  1491 

Hough  V.  City  of  Bridgeport,  57  Conn. 

290,  301 

Houghton    V.    Davenport,    23    Pick. 

235  348 

V.  Swarthout,  1  Denio  589,  335 

Houghton  Co.  v.  Auditor-General,  36 

Mich.  271,  1649 

House  V.  Board  &c.,  60  Ind.  580,       1580 
V.   Metcalf,   27   Conn.   631,  1618 

V.    State.   41    Miss.   737,     1389,    1400 

House   Bill   No.   231,   In   re,   9   Colo. 

624,  946 

Householder   v.    City   of  Kansas,    83 

Mo.   488,  1209.   1602 

House   of   Refuge   v.   Ryan,   37    Ohio 

St.    197,  1071 

Houston   V.    City   of   Lancaster,    191 

Pa.    St.    143,  882 

V.  Houston,  67  Ind.  276,  1571 

V.   Hutching.    33    S.    W.   269,        1219 
V.  Moore,  5  Wheat.  1,  132 

Houston    &c.    R.    Co.    v.    Carson,    66 

Tex.  345,  1354 

V.    Odum,    53   Tex.   343,  491 

Hover   v.    Barkhoof,    44    N.    Y.    113, 

222.   224,  336,  778 

Hovey  v.  Mayo.  43  Maine  322,     680,  1287 
v.   State,   119  Ind.  386,  150 

Howard  v.   Brown,  21   Maine  385,       311 
V.    City   of  Augusta,    74    Maine 
79,  1551 

V.    City   of   Providence,    6   R.    I. 
514,  701 

v.    City    of    San    Francisco,    51 
Cal.   52,  264 

V.  City  of  Worcester,  153  Mass. 
426.  803,  810 

V.  Cornett.  8  Ky.  L.  52,  1486 

V.     Drainage    Com'rs,     126     111. 
53  708 

V.  '  First    Ind.    Church,    18    Md. 
451.  1266 

V.  Francis  Co.,  50  Fed.  44,  974 

V.  Kiowa  Co.,  73  Fed.  406,  1013 

V.   McDiarmid,   26  Ark.   100,  104 

V.  Proctor.  7  Grav  128.  1540 

V.   Shaw.   18   N.   E.   313,  70S 

V.  Shields,  16  Ohio  St.  184,  152 

V.   Shoemaker,  35   Ind.   111. 

185.    189,    192,    1418 
V.  Trustees  &c.,   10  Ohio  365.      1063 

Howard  St..  In  re,  142  Pa.  St.  601,    1320 

Howe    V.    City    of    Cambridge,    114 

Mass.  388.  1178,  1714 

V.  Keeler,  27  Conn.  538,         715,  992 
V.  Mason,  14  Iowa  510,  221 

V.    Treasurer    &c.,    37    N.    J.    L. 
145,  607,  1412.  1414 

Howe   Ins.    Co.   v.   City   Council,   50 

Ga.  530,  1521 

Howell  V.   Bristol,  8  Bush  493. 

1266.    1538 
V.  City  of  Buffalo,  15  N.  Y.  512, 

722,  1232,  1533,  1726 
V.  City  of  Millville,  60  N.  J.  L. 
95,  747,   1184 


Howell  V.  City  of  Peoria,  90  111.  104,  897 
v.  City  of  Philadelphia,  38  Pa. 
St.    471,  458,    1544 

V.  State.  3  Gill  14,  1502 

Howes  V.  Cush,  131  Mass.  207,  1631 

Ilowland    v.    City    of    Chicago,    108 

111.  496,  1399 

V.  Eldred^e,  43  N.  Y.  457,  1649 

v.  School  Dist.,  15  R.  I.  184, 

347,    365,    1485,    1489 
V.   Wright   Co.,   82   Iowa   164,        177 

Howlett  V.  Camp,  115  Ala.  499,  499 

Hoyt  V.   City  of  Danbury,   69  Conn. 

341,  1338 

V.  City  of  Des  Moines,  76  Iowa 
430.  1626,   1627 

V.    City    of    East    Saginaw,    19 
Mich.    39,        590,    1131,    1201,    1252 
1255,    1271 
V.  Citv  of  Hudson,  27  Wis.  656.  1216 
V.   Thompson,    19   N.   Y.   207,  714 

Hubbard    v.    City    of    Taunton,    140 

Mass.    467,  608 

V.  Elden,  43  Ohio  St.  380,  332 

V.     Newton,     52     Vt.     346, 

344,  360,  362 
V.  Russell.  24  Barb.  404,  1095 

V.  Town  of  Medford,  20  Or.  315, 

594.  1392 
V.    Town    of    Williamstown,    01 
Wis.   397,  346,   368 

V.  Winsor,  15  Mich.  145,  274 

Hubbell  V.  City  of  Viroqua,  67  Wis. 

343,  1157 

V.    City  of  Yonkers,   104   N.   Y. 
434,  816,    817,    1587 

Huber  v.   Reily,   53   Pa.    St.    112,  369 

Iluddleston  v.  City  of  Eugene,  34  Or. 

343,  820 

Hudson   V.    City   of   Little   Falls,   68 

Minn.    463,  1326 

56,  681 

V.  Cuero  Land  &c.  Co.,  47  Tex. 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  64  Ga.  286,     260,  895 

Hudson  Co.  v.  State,  24  N.  J.  L.  718, 

273,  274 

Hudson    Electric    L.    Co.    v.    Inhab- 
itants &c.,   163   Mass.   346,  716 

Hudspeth  v.  State,  55  Ark.  323,         1473 

Huels  V.    Ilahn,   75   Wis.   468,  154 

Huesing  v.  City  of  Rock  Island,  128 

111.  465,  581,  615 

Huff   V.    Citv    of      Jacksonville,      39 

Fla.    1,  1304 

V.   City  of   Lafayette,    108   Ind. 
14,  1517 

V.    Cook.    44    Iowa    639,  185 

V.  Preuitt,  53  S.  W.  844,  62,  63 

Huffman    v.    Bayham    Tp.,      26   Ont. 

App.    514,  1376 

V.  Board  &c.,  23  Kan.   281, 

182,  663,  743 
V.  San  Joaquin  Co..  21  Cal.  426,  788 

ITuffsmith  v.  People,  8  Colo.  175,        1400 

Ilugg  V.   City  Council   &c.,   29   N.   J. 

Eq.  6,  181,  664 

Huggans  v.  Riley,  125  N.  Y.  88, 

1159,  1580 
V.    Rilev,   51   Hun  501,   4   N.   Y. 
S.   282,  1171,   1173 

Huggins  V.   Hinson,   1   Phil.   126.        1727 

Hughes  V.   Bingham,   135  N.  Y.  347, 

1563,   1574 
V.  Carl,  21  Ky.  L.  6,  1,504 

V.  City  of  Fond  du  Lac.  73  Wis. 
380,  558.   1612,   1620 

V.  City  of  Momence,   163   111. 
535,  1132,  1283.  1289 

V.  City  of  Momence,  164  111.  16, 

1294 
V.   Monroe  Co.,  147  N.  Y.  49,        786 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


CXVll 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Yol.  I,  pp.  1-S32;  Vol.  II,  pp.  SSS-ISSO.I 


Hughes  V.   Overseers  of  Chat  ham,   5 

Man.  &  «.  54,  1 1'S 

V.  I'arkor,  L'O  N.  IT.  5S.  i;".>7 

V.    I'oople,    S   Colo.    53(5,  GO" 

V.    Recorder's  Court,   75   Mich. 
574,  140.3 

V.    School    Dist.,   72    Mo.    043,  92 

ITuRhson   V.  Cvane,   11.1  Cal.   404.        1030 

Huidekoper  v.  Buchanan  Co.,  3  Dill. 

175,  1001 

V.  City  of  Meadville,  S3  Pa.  St. 
15(5.  1195 

Ilulaniski  v.  City  of  Ogden  City,  20 

Utah  T.V.i,  152 

Iluling  V.  Kaw  Val.  R.  &c.  Co.,  130 

U.  S.  559.  694 

Hull  V.  City  of  Chicago,  156  111.  384, 

1147 
V.   Independent  School  Dist.,  82 
Iowa   (586,  852,    1480,   1492 

V.   Marshall   Co.,   12   Iowa  142,     217 
V.  People,  170  111.  246,  1272 

V.   West  Chicago   Park  Commis- 
sioners, 185  111.   150, 

511,    1274,    1275 

IluUin   V,    Second   Municipality,      11 

Rob.   97,  699,   700 

Hultz   V.    Commonwealth,    3    Grant's 

Cas.   61,  310 

Humboldt  Co.  v.  Churchill  Co.  Com- 
missioners,  6  Nev.  30,  426 
V.  Dinsmfire,  75  Cal.  604,  1570,  1572 
V,   Lander  Co.,   24   Nev.   461,        1552 

Humboldt  Tp.  v.  Long,  92  IT.  S.  642, 

998,  1001.  1009,  1012,  1018,  1023 

Hume  V.   Conduitt,  7(3  Ind.   598,  1572 

V.   Mayor  &c..  47  N.  Y.   639, 

680,  826,  1592,  1611,   1612 

Humes  v.  City  of  Ft.  Smith,  93  Fed. 

857.  549.  1554 

Ilumiston  v.   School  Trustees,  7   111. 

App.   122,  1483 

Humphreys  v.   City  of  Norfolk,   25 

(iratt.  97,  1501,  1513 

V.  Mears,  1  M.  &  R.   187.  225 

V.  Woodstorm.  48  N.  J.  L.  588.  1106 

Hungerman  v.  City  of  Wheeling,  46 

W.    Va.    761,  1.333,    1374 

Hunneman   v.    Fire   District,   37    Vt. 

40,  353,  362 

V.  Inhabitants  &c..  10  Met.  454, 

355,   356,   357,   359 

Hunnerberg  v.  Village  of  Hyde  Park, 

130  111.   156,  1283 

Hunnewell  v.  Citv  of  Charleston,  106 

Mass.    350.  1722 

Hunsaker  v.   Borden,  5  Cal.  288,  774 

V.   Wright.  30  111.   146,  1502 

Hunt  v.  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.,  121  111. 

638,  1706 

V.  City  of  Dubuque,  96  Iowa  314. 

1334 
V.  City  of  Jacksonville,  34  Fla. 
504,  541 

V.   City  of  New  York,   62  N.   Y. 
S.   184.  1544 

V.    City    of    Oswego,    107    N.    Y. 
629,  936 

V.  City  of  Salem,  121  Mass.  294. 

1595 
V.  City  of  TTtica.  IS  N.  Y.  442,  722 
V.  Genet,  14  Daly  225,  1415 

V.  Gorton,  20  R.'l.  103,  1157 

V.    Kansas    &c.    Bridge    Co.,    11 
Kan.   412,  1576 

V.   School   District,    14   Vt.   300. 

340,    363,    1485 
V,  State,  22  Tex.  App.  396.  980 

v.  Town  of  Pownal,  9  Vt.  411,  1600 

Hunter,  Appeal  of,  71  Conn.  189, 

1292,    1310 

Hunter,   In  re,  163  N.  Y.  542,  1315 


Hunter  v.  Moblev.  26  S.  C.  192,  920,  1662 

v.   Nolf.   71   Pa.   St.   282,  033 

V.  Weston,  111  111.  184,  1374 

ITupert  V.  Anderson,  35  Iowa  578,       701 
Ilurford   v.    City   of  Omaha,   4    Neb. 

336,  680,   1254 

Ilurla  V.  City  of  Kansas  City.  46  Kan. 

738,  384,  393,   1515 

Ilurlev  V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  88  Maine 

293,  1336 

Huron  v.  Bank,  57  U.  S.  App.  593,       876 
Huron   Water-Works   Co.   v.   City   of 

Huron,   7   S.   D.   9,  609 

Hursen    v.    City   of   Chicago,    85    111. 

App.    298,  1328 

Ilurtado  V.  People,  110  IT.  S.  516,       1715 
Huse    V.    City    of    Lowell,    10    Allen 

149,  1480 

V.   Glover,   119  U.   S.   543,  1576 

Hussner  v.   Brooklyn  R.  Co.,  114  N. 

Y.    433,  1582 

Huston  V.  City  of  Council  Bluffs,  101 

Iowa  33,  1342,   1343 

V.  Iowa  Co.,  43  Iowa  456,  776 

Huston   Overseers  v.   Jav  Overseers, 

9  Pa.  Co.'  Ct.   R.  412,  1049 

Huston   Tp.    Poor   Dist.   v.    Benzette 

Tp.  Poor  Dist.,  135  Pa.  St.  393.  1047 
Ilutchcraft   v.    Shrout's   Heirs,    1    T. 

P..   Mon.   206,  327 

Ilutcheson   v.    Storrie,    92   Tex.   685, 

1243.   1282,   1297,  1506 

V.  Storrie,  48  S.  W.  785, 

477,    540,    1146,    1235,    1267,    1295 
Hutchings   v.    Inhabitants     &c.,      90 

Maine  131,  930,   1346 

V.    Scott,   9   N.    J.    L.    218,  1412 

Ilutchins  V.  City  of  Boston,  12  Allen 

571,  1612 

Hutchinson  v.   City  of  Parkersburg, 

25    W.    Va.    226.  678 

V.   City  of  Ypsilanti,   103   Mich. 

12,  1336,   1344 

V,  Pratt,  11  Vt.  402, 

351,    491,    1422 

V.  State,  39  N.  J.  Eq.  569,  1093 

V.  Town  of  Concord,  41  Vt.  271, 

263,   820 

V.  Western  &c.  R.  Co.,  6  Heisk. 

634,  7 

Hutchinson    Tp.    v.    Filk,    44    Minn. 

536,  1125,   1126 

Hutchisson  v.  City  of  Mt.  Vernon,  40 

111.    App.    19,  1421 

Huthsing  v.  Bousquet,  7  Fed.  833,     215 
Ilutson  V.  Mayor.  9  N.  Y.  163, 

222,  812,  816,  1159,  1592 
Hutt  V.  City  of  Chicago,  132  111.  352, 

1234 
Hutton    V.    City    of    Camden,    39    N. 

J.   L.   122,  1123 

Hyatt  V.  Bates,  40  N.  Y.  164.  556 

Hyde  V.  Brush.  34  Conn.  454,  370 

V.   State,  52  Miss.  665.  183 

V.   Town   of   Jamaica.      27      Vt. 

443,  777 

Hydes  v.  Joyes.  4  Bush  464, 

282,    509.    1198 
Hydraulic  Works  Co.  v.  Orr,  83  Pa. 

St.  332,  794 

Hyer  v.   City  of  Janesville,   101   Wis. 

371.  1343 

Hymes   v.    Aydelott.    26   Ind.   431.        698 
Hynes   v.    City   of  Chicago.    175    111. 

56,  511 


Illinois  &c.  Canal  Co.  v.  City  of  St. 

Louis,   2   Dill.   70.  579 

Illinois   Conf.      Female     College     v. 

Cooper,  25  111.  133,  97,  468,  491 


CXVlll 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Vol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol.  II,  pp.  S33-1830.'i 


Illinois  &c.   R.  Co.  v.  Beers,  27  111. 

185,  994 

V.  Chicago,  176  U.  S.  646,  1814 

V.   City   of  Bloomington,   76   111. 

447,  1379 

V.  City  of  Chicago,  141  111.  509, 

1249,  1250 

V.    City    of    Chicago,    141    111. 

586.  591.   1379 

V.  City  of  Decatur,  126  111.  92, 

12.50.  1256 

V.  City  of  Decatur,  154  111.  173, 

1165.  1246,  1249 

V.  City  of  Galena.  40  111.  344.   517 

V.  City  of  Kankakee,  164  111. 

608,  1249 

V.  City  of  Mattoon,  141  111.  32, 

1249,  1250 

V.  City  of  Winona,  163  111.  288, 

1282.   1310 

V.   Commissioners,   129   111.   477, 

1246,  1249 

V.  Decatur,   147   U.   S.   190. 

1230.  1246.   1249,  1490 

V.  McLean  Co.,  17  111.  291,  1502 

V.   People,   161   111.   244, 

470,   1289,   1309 

V.   Zimmer.   20   111.   654,  1813 

Illinois  Trust  &c.  Bank  v.  Arkansas 

City  W.  Co.,  67  Fed.  196,       734.  739 

V.  City  of  Arkansas  City.  76  Fed. 

271,  547,  566.  672 

Imlay    v.    Fnion    Branch    R.    Co,    26 

Conn.    249,  682 

Incorporated    Town    of    Scranton    v. 

Danenbaum,    109   Iowa   95,  541 

Incorporated    Town    of    Spencer    v. 

Andrew,    82    Iowa    14,  605 

Incorporated  Village  of  Inglehart  v. 

Glenville.   19   Ohio  C.  C.   285.       932 
Independent    School    Dist.   v.    Duser, 

45  Iowa  391.  1472 

V.  Gookin,  72  Iowa  387,     1495,  1496 

V.  Kellev,  55  Iowa  568,  1480 

V.   McDonald.   39   Iowa   564,  324 

V.   Wirtner,   85   Iowa  387,  281 

Indiana  Bond  Co.  v.  Shearer,  24  Ind. 

App.  622,  1304 

Indiana    Imp.    Co.    v.    Wagner,    138 

Ind.  658,  60 

Indiana  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Oakes,  20  Ind. 

9.  706 

Indianapolis  v.  Emmelman,  108  Ind. 

530,  795 

V.  Mansur,  15  Ind.   112,  1234 

Indianapolis  R.  Co.  v.   Horst,  93  IT. 

S.  291.  1016 

Indianapolis  &c.    R.   Co.   v.      Capital 

Pav.  Co..  24  Ind.  App.  114. 

1151,  1243,  1245,  1249,  1251 
Ingerman  v.  State,  128  Ind.  225. 

1651,  1653 

Inglis    V.    Sailors'    Snug    Harbor,    3 

Peters    121,  132 

Ingraham,  In  re,  64  N,  Y.  310,  1204 

Ingraham,    Matter   of.   4   Hun   495,    1564 
V.    Camden    &c.    Water    Co.,    82 
Maine  335,  1457,  14.58 

Ingram   v.    McCombs,    17    Mo.    558,      323 
Inhabitants  &c..  Petitioners,  6  Pick. 

470.  1739 

V.  Bailey,  12  Maine  254,  1480 

V.   Bell,   9   Met.   499.  325 

V.   Benjamin.   125  Mass.    15,  325 

V.    Boston   &c.   R.    Co.,   23    Pick. 
24,  1345 

V.  Brazer,  11  Mass.  447.  662 

V.   Camden  Village  Corporation, 
77    Maine    530,  666 

V.  Chapin,  132  Mass.  470.  211 

V.   City  of  Maiden,   141   Mass. 
580,  1065 


Inhabitants  &c.  v.  City  of  Taunton, 

152  Mass.  484,  104» 

V.  Cole,   3   Pick.   232,  294,   664 

V.   Commissioners,    26   Maine   206, 

695,   696 
V.  Commissioners,  16  Pick.  572, 

1500,  1501 
V.   Connecticut  River  R.   Co.,  4 
Cusb.    63,  679 

V.  Connecticut  River  R.  Co.,  144 
Mas.s.   325,  1631 

V.   County  Com'rs,   37   Maine   112, 

696 
V.  County  Com'rs,  49  Maine  143, 

1321 
V.  County  Com'rs,  5  Allen  13,  707 
V.  County  Com'rs,  7  Cush.  394,  1572 
V.  County  Com'rs,  12  Cush.  351,  696 
V.   County  Com'rs,  4   Gray   500, 

688.  1546 
V.  County  Com'rs,  16  Gray  341,  707 
V.    County   Com'rs,    1    Met.    336, 

1739,  1743 
V.  County  Com'rs,  3  Met.  202,  634 
V.  County  Com'rs.  9  Met.  423,  1740 
V.  County  Com'rs,  12  Met.  211,  1724 
V.  County  Com'rs,  9  Pick.  46,  173» 
V.   County  Com'rs,   10  Pick.   519, 

1739 
V.  County  Com'rs  &c.,  18  Pick. 
60,  763,  117T 

V.  County  Com'rs,  20  Pick.  71, 

706,  173» 
V.  County  Com'rs,  108  Mass.  68, 

1557 
V.    County    Com'rs,    117    Mass. 
416,  1572 

V.    County    Com'rs,    154    Mass. 
424,  680 

V.  County  Com'rs,  157  Mass.  94, 

1739 
V.  County  Com'rs,  31  N.  E.  693, 

1742 
V.  Cushman,  16  Mass.  393,  1068 
V.  Cutler,  114  Mass.  344,  1159 

V.   Delano,   1   Pick.   469,  1068 

V.   Dilley.   24   N.   J.   L.   209,  697 

V.  Dunning,  7  Mass.  445,  435 

V.   Easton  &c.   R.   Co.,   24  N.   J. 
Eq.  217,  1109 

V.    Eaton,    12    Mass.    328,  1002 

V.   Eaton,    13   Mass.   371.  665 

V.   Estlow,  43  N.   J.   L.   13,  52.^ 

V.  Farrar,  11  Allen  398,  1125 

V.  Field.  1  Conn.   279,  696,   1717 

V.  Fiske.  8  Cush.  264,  211 

V.   Fleming,   8   Gray  613,  309 

V.  Grubbs,  80  Mo.  App.  433. 

1304.    1311 
V.    Hackensack    Imp.    Com.,    60 
N.    J.    Eq.    229.  411 

V.  Hampden,  130  Mass.  528.  1577 
V.  Haughton.  7  Conn.  543,  311.  1015 
V.  Hazzard,  12  Cush.  112.  211,  319 
V.   Heard,   103   Mass.   543,  1727 

V.  Holbrook.  9  Allen  17.  745 

V.   Huntress,    53   Maine   89,  310 

V.    Hurd.    74    Maine    101.  1726 

V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  5  Conn.  384.  1048 
V.   Inhabitants  &c.,  2  Greenl.   28. 

1538 
V.   Inhabitants  &c.,  3  Greenl. 
136.  1048 

V.    Inhabitants   &c.,   3   Greenl. 
223.  367 

V.   Inhabitants  &c.,  5  Greenl. 
143.  1048,    1058 

V.    Inhabitants   &c.,    1    Maine 
93,  1046 

V.    Inhabitants  &c.,   11   Maine 
190,  1058 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


CXIX 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Vol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.1 


Inhabitants   &c.   v.    Inhabitants  &c., 

15  Maine  434,  104G 

V.    Inhabitants  &c.,   1(5  Maine 

45,  SfiG 

V.    Inhabitants  &c.,   17   Maine 

117.  1040 

V.  Inhabitants  &e.,  21  Maine  58, 

83,  384 
V.   Inhabitants  &e.,   26  Ma 
1G7, 

V.    Inhabitants  &c.,   32  Ma 
60, 

V.    Inhabitants  &c.,  30  Ma 
235. 

V.    Inhabitants  &c.,  36  Ma 
390, 

V.    Inhabitants  &c.,   42   Ma 
463, 

V.    Inhabitants  &e.,   47  Ma 
481. 

V.   Inhabitants  &c.,  54  Ma 
250. 

V.    Inhabitants  &c.,   55   Ma 
55, 

V.   Inhabitants  &c.,  58   Ma 
353. 

V.    Inhabitants  &c.,  60  Ma 
879. 

V.    Inhabitants  &c.,   63  Ma 
231, 

V.   Inhabitants  &c.,  64  Ma 
246. 

V.   Inhabitants  &c.,  64  Ma 
412. 

V.    Inhabitants  &c.,  65  Ma 
167. 

V.   Inhabitants  &c.,   66  Ma 
78, 

V.   Inhabitants  &c.,   70  Ma 
114, 

V.   Inhabitants  &c.,  79  Ma 
473. 

V.    Inhabitants  &c.,  82  Ma 
524, 

V.   Inhabitants  &c.,  83   Ma 
75, 

V.   Inhabitants  &c.,  83   Ma 
219. 

V.  Inhabitants  &c..  3  Mass.  322.  1045 
V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  4  Mass.  123, 

1042,  1046 
V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  4  Mass.  384, 

430,  435,  1519 
V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  4  Mass.  676,  430 
V.    Inhabitants  «&c.,    10   Mass. 
411.  1065 

V.   Inhabitants  &c.,   12  Mass. 
355.  1064 

V.    Inhabitants  &c.,    12   Mass. 
400,  48,  86 

V.    Inhabitants  &c.,    13   Mass. 
461.  1047,  1048 

V.    Inhabitants  &c..    13   Mass. 
547.  1042,   1043 

V.    Inhabitants   &c.,    14   Mass. 
186. 

V.    Inhabitants  &c.,    14   Mass. 
216. 

V.    Inhabitants  &c.,    14   Mass. 
253. 

V.   Inhabitants  &c.,   14  Mass. 
384. 

V.    Inhabitants  &c.,   15   Mass. 
237. 

V.   Inhabitants  &c.,   16   Mass. 
16.  1519,  1537 

V.    Inhabitants  &c.,    16   Mass. 
76.  1519,  1538 

V.    Inhabitants  &c..   16   Mass. 
86,  435 

V.    Inhabitants  &c.,    16   Mass. 
102,  1052 


1048 

1048 

1046 

1048 

1415 

537 

866 

1058 

131 

1044 
ne 

672,  866 
ne 

1058 

1053 
866 
1058 
1053 
1058 
1043 
1044 
1036 


1065 

142 

430 

1047 

1042 


Inhabitants  &c.   v.    Inhabitants  &c., 

10  Mass.  396,  662 

V.    Inhabitants  &c.,    103   Mass. 

358,  1045 

V.    Inhabitants  &c.,    108   Mass. 

128,  1.577 

V.    Inhabitants   &c.,   115   Mass. 

336,  1045 

V.    Inhabitants  &c.,    119   Mass. 

479,  1057 

V.    Inhabitants  &c.,    132    Mass. 

312.  1575 

V.    Inhabitants  &c.,    138   Mass. 

109.  105G 

V.    Inhabitants  &c.,   138   Mass. 

256.  1048,   1052 

V.    Inhabitants  &c.,    139    Mass. 

372.  1492 

V.    Inhabitants  &c.,    153   Mass. 

192.  1057 

V.    Inhabitants   &c.,    155   Mass. 

428.  1044,   1045 

V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  3  Met.  428,  1048 

V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  4  Met.  433.    1048 

V.   Inhabitants  &c.,   6   Met.   484,   430 

V.  Inhabitants  &c..  10  Met.  115,  1041 

V.   Inhabitants  &c.,  12  Met.  35,  1048 

V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  13  Met.  192. 

1036,  1047 
V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  1  Pick.  123. 

866.  1036,  1047 
V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  4  Picls.  358, 

1049,  1052 
V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  7  Piclt.  42.  1046 
V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  10  Pick.  150.  1065 
V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  15  Pick.  19,  1065 
V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  18  Pick.  379.  1057 
V.  Inhabitants  &c..  19  Pick.  389.  1042 
V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  19  Pick.  480,  1048 
V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  21  Pick.  233.  1048 
V.  Inhabitants  &C..21  Pick.  349.  662 
V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  23  Pick.  170. 

1042 
V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  24  Pick.  166, 

1042,  1047 
V.   Inhabitants  &c.,   50   N.   J.   L. 
509,  431 

V.  Johnson.  53  Maine  437,  866 

V.  Kennard.  151  Mass.  563.  509 
V.  Leadbetter,  16  Maine  45.  659 
V.  Leai-oed.  16  IMass.  215,  1062,  1063 
V.  Lord.  51  Maine  599.  1540 

V.  Lowell.  20  Maine  178.  6.59 

V.  Lowell.  70  Maine  437,  320 

V.  Lyons,  131  Mass.  328,  1063 

V.  Mayo.  109  Mass.  315,  673.  1125 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  116  Mass.  193.  1245 
V.  Mayor  &c..  55  N.  J.  Eq.  505,  110 
V.  McFachron.  33  N.  J.  L.  339.  319 
V.   Morton,    146   Mass.   476,  1541 

V.   Morton,   25   Mo.   593. 

692.    1205,   1206,    1499 
V.  Mnllikin.  7  Oray  280.  1526 

V.   Norfolk.   117   Mass.  416,  696 

V.   North  Yarmouth,  34   Maine 
411,  90.    103 

V.  O'Connor.  53  Mo.  468,  537,  538 
V.   Paul.   173  ]Nrass.   148,  609 

V.    Pease.    19    Maine    184,  363 

V.  Peirce.   122  Mass.  270.  3.17 

V.   Pennell.   69  Maine  357,  320 

V.  Railway  Co..  4  Cnsh.  63,  634 
V.    Randall.    105    Mass.    295.  322 

V.   Reed.   152  Mass.  568.  1159 

V.  Searle.  127  Mass.  502.  362.  1540 
V.   Skillings,   45   Maine  133. 

90.   103.  .383.  4.35.   1538 
V.    Smith.    65    Maine   203, 

345.    353.    355.    358.     361 
V.  Smith.  120  Mnss.  96.  1100 

V.    Sonle.    175    I\[ass.    400,  315 

V.  Spoflford,  12  Maine  487.     343,  347 


cxx 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


^References  are  to  Pages.   Vol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.1 


Inhabitants  &c.  v.  Stanley,  47  Maine 

515  325 

V.   Stearns,  21   Pick.  148, 

155,  290,  341,  473,  1429,  1439 
V.  Stratton,  128  Mass.  137,  1063 
V.  Sudbury,  12  Pick.  1,  1047 

V.  Tripp,  81   Maine  24,  193 

V.  Turner,   14  Mass.  227,  1003 

V.  Weir,  9  Ind.  224,  251,  647 

V.    Welsh.    166    Mass.    133,  1340 

V.   WigRins,    137    Mass,    94,  1742 

V.  Wood,   13   Mass.   193. 

11,    50,    144,    662,    1526 

Inkster  v.  Carver,  16  Mich.  484,  517 

Inman  v.   Tripp,   11   R.   I.   520,  1217 

Inman   Steamship  Co.  v.   Tinker,   94 

U.   S.  238,  1101,   1537 

Innes  v.  W.vlie,  1  C.  &  K.  257,  207 

Inos  V.  Winspear,  IS  Cal.  397,  335 

Insurance    Co.    v.    Morse,    20    Wall. 

445,  138 

V.    Sanders,   36   N.    H.   252,  273 

Intendant   &c.   v.   Chandler,   6  Ala. 

379,  543 

V.  Pippin.  31  Ala.  542,       1079,  1722 
V.  Sorrell,  1  Jones  L.  49. 

286,  289,  601 

International  Bank  v.  Franklin  Co., 

65  Mo.  105,  959 

International  &c.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Commis- 
sioners,   28    Barb.    318,  1500 

Interstate  &c.  Co.  v.  City  of  New  Or- 
leans,   52    La.    An.    1859,  223 

Interstate    Nafl    Bank   v.    Ferguson, 

48  Kan.  732,  909 

Interstate  Vitrified   Brick  &c  Co.   v. 

Philadelphia,   164  Pa.   St.   477,     753 

Inwood  V.  State,  42  Ohio  St.  186,       541 

Iowa    Brick    Co.      v.    City    of      Des 

Moines,    111    Iowa   272,  744 

Iowa  &c.  Co.  V.  Webster  Co.,  21  Iowa 

221,  517 

Iowa   &c.    Land   Co.   v.   Carroll    Co., 

39   Iowa   151,  14 

Iowa  R.  &c.  Co.  V.  Sac  Co.,  39  Iowa 

124,  1530 

Ipsom  V.   Mississippi  &c.   R.   Co.,   36 

Miss.    300,  698 

Iredell  v.  Barbee,  9  Ired.  L.  250,         312 

Irion  V.  City  of  Saginaw,  120  Mich. 

295,  1328 

Iron    R.    Co.    v.    City    of    Ironton,    19 
Ohio    St.    299,  1323 

Irvin  V.  Gregory,  86  Ga.  605, 

844,  1486,  1492,  1493 
V.    New   Orleans   &c.   R.   Co.,   94 
111.    105,  1502 

Irvine   v.    Citv   of  Chattanooga,    101 

Tenn.  291.  785 

V.  Wood,  51  N.  Y.  224,  1611 

Irving   V.    Burgess   &c.,    194    Pa.    St. 

648,  1708 

V.   Ford,   65   Mich.   241,     1161,   1379 

Irwin  V.  Exton.  125  Cal.  622,  1755 

V.  Lowe,  89  Ind.   540,  1540 

V.  Town  of  Ontario,  3  Fed.  49,  1001 

Isbell    V.    New   York   &c.    R.    Co.,    25 

Conn.   556,  365 

Iske    V.    City    of    Newton,    54    Iowa 

586,  1712 

Israel  v.  .Tewett,  29  Iowa  475.  704 

V.  President  &c.,  2  111.  290,  527,  528 

Ivanhoe    v.    City    of    Enterprise,    29 

Or.    45,  1309 

Ives  V.  City  of  Omaha,  70  N.  W.  961, 

1140,  1141 
V.  Irev.  51  Neb.  136,  1153 

Ivinson  v.  Hance,  1  Wyo.  Ter.  270,      835 


Jack  V.  Moore,  66  Ala.  184-  663,  664 

V.  Weiennett,  115  III.  105,  1498 

Jacks  V.  City  of  Helena,  41  Ark.  213,  990 

Jackson,  Ex  parte,  45  Ark.  158,  1074 

V.  Burns,  3  Binn.  75,  132 

V.   Chicago  &c.   R.   Co.,  31   Iowa 
176,  1109 

V.   City  of  Greenville,  72  Miss. 
220,  1347 

V.   Collins.   16  N.  Y.   S.   651,  41 
N.   Y.   St.   590,  281,  934 

v.  Edwards,  7  Paige  Ch.  386,  693 
v.  Fitzsimmons,   10  Wend.  9,  134 

v.   Green,   7   Wend.   333,  134 

V.  Hartwpll,  8  Johns.  422,  563 

V.  Lunn,  3  Johns:  Cas.  109,  132 

V.    Norris,   72   HI.    364,  1701 

V.    People,    9    Mich.    Ill,      543,    1724 
V.   Rankin,   67   Wis.  285,     696,   1572 
V.    Rutland   &c.    R.    Co.,    25   Vt. 
150.  675 

V.  Simonton.'4  Cranch  C.  C.  255,  313 
V.  Smith,  120  Ind.  520,  220,  1201 
V.  State,  104  Ind.  516,  1256 

V.    Town   of    Bellevieu,    30   Wis. 
250,  •  1332 

V.  White,  20  Johns.  313,  132 

v.  Young,  5  Cow.  269,  1569 

Jackson  Co.  v.  Waldo,  85  Mo.  637,     1568 

Jackson  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Interstate  &c. 

R.  Co.,  24  Fed.  306,  566,  1352 

Jackson    School    Tp.    v.    Hadley,    59 

Ind.   534,  626 

Jackson  Tp.  v.  Wagner,  127  Pa.   St. 

184,  1586,    1600 

.Jacksonville  v.  Ledwith.  26  Fla.  163.    1402 

Jacksonville  Elec.   Light  Co.   v.   City 

of  Jacksonville,   36   Fla.    229.   '    573 

Jacksonville  R.  Co.  v.   Citv  of  Jack- 
sonville,   114    111.    562, 

550,   1142,   1250 

Jacksonville    &c.    R.    Co.    v.    Virden, 

104    111.    339,  987 

V.   Walsh,   106   111.    253,  701 

Jacobs,  In  re,  9S  N.  Y.  98,  1382 

V.  City  of  Chicago,  178  111.  560, 

1153,    1154 
V.  Hamilton  Co.,  1  Bond  500.       779 
V.    Inhabitants    &c.,      16    Maine 
187,  1633 

Jacquemin  v.  Andrews,  40  Mo.  App. 

507,  914 

James  v.  City  of  Darlington,  71  Wis. 

173.  587,    621 

V.  Citv  of  Louisville,  19  Ky.  L. 
447,  1296 

V.    City    of    Portage,    48    Wis. 
677.  1597 

V.  Citv  of  Seattle,  22  Wash.  654, 

180,  955 
V.  Pine  Rluflf.  49  Ark.  199,  12.58 
V.    Sammis.    132    N.    Y.    239,        1567 

James  Co.  v.  Hamilton  Co.,  89  Tenn. 

237,  417 

Jameson   v.    People,    16   111.    257. 

49,  50,   64,  65,  86,  87 

Jamison    v.    Citv    of    Springfield,    53 

Mo.    224.  706 

Janewav  v.  City  of  Duluth,  65  Minn. 

292,  572 

Jansen  v.  City  of  Atchison,  16  Kan. 

3.^8,  1588 

Jardine     v.     Mayor     &c.,     11     Daly 

110,  1187 

Jarrett  v.   City  of  Chicago,   181    111. 

242.  512 

Jarrolt  v.  JMoberly,  103  TT.  S.  580,       996 

Jarvis  v.  Dean.  3  P.ing.  447.  571,  1559 

Jasper  Co.  v.  Ballou,  103  O.  S.  745, 

992,   1020,   1022,   1023,   1029 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


CXXl 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Yol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.1 


Jasper  Co.  v.  Osborn,  59  Iowa  208,  1063 

Jebb  V.   Sexton.  ,S4  111.  App.   45,  1284 

Jeffers  v.  Johnson,  18  X.  J.  L.  382,       322 

V.  Lawrence.  42  lovA'a  408,  1533 

Jefferson  v.  Cowan,  54  Mo.  234.  125T 

V.  lOdwards,  37  Mo.  App.  G17,     1736 

V.  Hartley,  81  Ga.  716,  332 

Jefferson   Co.   v.    Slagle,   66   Pa.    St. 

202,  284 

Jefferson  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Hazem,  7  La. 

An.  182.  1448 

Jefferson   School   Tp.   v.   Litton,    116 

Ind.  467,  857.  922,  1495 

Jeffersonville  v.   Myers,   2   Ind.   App. 

532.  1210,   1221,  1741 

Jeffersonville  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Hendricks, 

41    Ind.  4S,  137 

Jeffries  v.   Lawrence,  42  Iowa  498, 

982,  996,  1542 
Jefts  V.  York,  10  Cush.  392,  217 

Jegglin  V.  Roeder,  79  Mo.  App.  428,  1348 
Jeliff  V.  City  of  Newark,  48  N.  J.  L. 

101,  1233 

Jelly  V.  Dills,  27  W.  Va.  267,  1399 

Jenal  v.  Green  Island  Draining  Co., 

12  Neb.  163,  689 

Jenkins  v.  City  of  Cheyenne,  1  Wyom. 

Ter    287  535 

V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  103  Mass.  94,  980 

V.  Lemonds,  29  Ind.  294,       331,  332 

V.  Mayor  &c..  35  Ga.  145,     497,  1412 

V.  School  Dist.,  39  Maine  220,     294 

V.  Stetler,  118  Ind.  275.     1163,  1255 

V.  Waldron,  11  Johns.  114.  221 

Jenne  v.  Sutton.  43  N.  J.  L.  257,         807 

Jenner  v.  Joliffie,  9  Johns.  381,  222 

Jennings  v.  Le  Breton.  80  Cal.  8,         268 

V.  Van  Shaick.  108  N.  Y.  530,     1349 

V.   Wood.   20  Ohio  261,  228 

Jensen,  In  re,  59  N.  Y.   S.  653,  873 

V.  Board  &c..  47  Wis.  298,  1538 

V.   City  of  Waltham,   166  Mass. 

344.  792 

Jernee  v.   Board  &c.,   52   N.   J.   L. 

553,  1577 

Jerome  v.  Ross.  7  Johns.  Ch.  315,  674 
Jersey  City  v.  Qiiaife,  2  Dutch.  63,  175 
Jersey  City  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Jersey  City 

&c.   R.   Co.,   20  N.   J.   Eq.   61.  590 

Jessem  v.  Pierce.  25  Ind.  App.  222.  1310 
Jessup   V.    United   States,    106   U.   S. 

147,  311 

Jester  v.  Overseers.  11  Pa.  St.  540,  1062 
Jewell  V.  Mills,  3  Bush  62,  332 

Jewett    V.    City    of    New    Haven.    38 

Conn.  368,  264.  820.   1097 

Jewhnrst   v.    City   of   Syracuse.    108 

N.  Y.  303.  1596,  1597 

Jex  V.  Mayor  &c.,  103  N.  Y.  536. 

1205,  1264 
Jimison  v.  Adams  Co.,  130  111.  558.  1472 
Jobson  v.  Bridges,  84  Va.  298.  154.  163 
John   v.    Cincinnati    R.   Co.,   35   Ind. 

539,  983 

John  Hancock  &c.  Ins.  Co.  v.  City  of 

Huron.  80  Fed.  652,  1030 

V.    City    of    Huron,    100    Fed. 
1001,  875 

Johns   v.    County   Com'rs,    28    Fla. 

626.  955 

V.  People.  25  Mich.  499.  195 

Johnson  v.  Campbell.  49  111.  316,  624 

V.   Campbell.  39  Tex.  S3.  960 

V.  City  Council  &c..  2  Or.  327.  1501 
V.    City    Council    &c.,    11    Tex. 
Civ.  App.  469.  204 

V.  City  of  Kansas  City,  78  Mo. 
661,  1541 

V.  City  of  Lexington,  14  B.  Mon. 
648.  1501.  1503 

V.   City  of  Milwaukee,   40   Wis. 
315,  559,  1702 


Johnson  v.  City  of  Parkersburg,  16 

W.  Va.  402,  1209 

v.   City   of  Rock   Hill,   57    S.    C. 
371,  750.  1449 

V.    City    of    Troy,    48    N.    Y.    S. 
998.  ISGG 

V.  City  of  Winfleld,  48  Kan.  129,  539 
V.  City  of  Worcester,  172  Mass. 
122,  132G 

v.  Commonwealth,  7  Dana  338,  1511 
v.  District  of  Columbia,  1  Mackey 
427,  1207 

v.  Drummond,  20  Gratt.  417,  1502 
v.  Dunn,  134  Mass.  522,  335 

V.  Harvey,  84  N.  Y.  363,  312 

V.  Lewis.  13  Conn.  303,  1095 

V.  Mann,  77  Va.  265,  31,3 

V.  Martin,  68  Wis.  330,  1423,  1424 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  46  Ga.  80,  1417 

V.  Mayor  &c.,  62  Ga.  645,  1520,  1532 
V.  People.  177  111.  64,  1303 

V.  Philadelphia,  60  Pa.  St.  445, 

„      ,  .  517,  1406 

V.  Rankin,  70  N.  C.  550,  673 

V.  Sanitary  Dist.,  163  III.  285,  753 
V.  Santa  Clara  Co.,  28  Cal.  545,  638 
V.  School  Dist..  67  Mo.  319,  1171 
V.  Simonton.  43  Cal.  242,  1079 

V.   Smith,  64   Ind.   275,  445 

V.   Stark  Co.,  24  111.  75, 

624,  1013,  1016 
V.  State,  116  Ind.  374,  l-^oi 

V.  State.  94  Tenn.  499,  isi 

V.  Wakulla  Co.,  28  Fla.  720  934 

V.  Wilson,  2  N.  H.  202,  I171 

Johnson    City    v.    Wolfe,    103    Tenn 

277,  789 

Johnson  Home  &c.  v.  Village  of  Sen- 
eca Falls.  55  N.  Y.  S.  803,  1504 

Johnson  School  Tp.  v.  Citizens'  Bank, 

81  Ind.  515,  857,  863 

Johnston  v.  District  of  Columbia,  118 

U.  S.  19.  263,  787,  821 

V.  Moorman,  SO  Va.  131,         221,  334 
V.    People's   Natural   Gas   Co.,    5 
Cent.   R.   564.  689 

V.  Wilson.  2  N.  H.  202,  198 

Joint  Free  High  School  Dist.  v.  Town 

of  Green  Grove,  77  Wis.  532,       844 

Jonas  V.  City  of  Cincinnati.  18  Ohio 

318,  1533 
Jones  V.  Blanton,  6  Ired.  Eq.  115,         327 

V.  Board  &c.,  104  Mass.  461. 

1234,  1266 
V.  Board  &c..  88  Mich.  371,         1479 
V.   Borough  of  Bangor.   144  Pa. 
St.   638,  802,    1220,    1603 

V.    City   of  Albany,    151    N.    Y. 
223,  930 

V.   City  of  Albany,   17  N.  T.   S. 
232.  937 

V.    City    of    Boston,    104    Mass. 
75,  1612 

V.    City    of    Camden,    44    S.    C. 

319.  1032 
V.    City    of    Clinton,    100    Iowa 
333.  796 
V.  City  of  Greenboro,  124  N    C. 
310.                                           1334.  1360 
V.  City  of  New  Haven,  34  Conn. 

1,  814.   1594 

V.  City  of  New  York,  62  N.  Y.  S. 
284.  721 

V.  City  of  Portland,  35  Or.  512, 

721,   955 
V.  City  of  Seattle,  19  Wash.  669, 

752,   1141 
V.  City  of  Troy.  4  N.  Y.  S.  792,  1607 
V.    Commissioners,    107    N.    C. 
248.  984 

V.  Davis,  35  Wis.  376,  1566 


CMXll 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Yol.  I,  pp.  1-S32;  Vol.  II,  pp.  S33-1830.'] 


Jones  V.  Erie  &c.  R.  Co.,  169  Pa.  St. 

883.  1350 

V.  Firemen's  &c.  Ins.  Co.,  2  Daly 
307,  466 

V.  Foster.  50  N.  Y.  S.  738,  505 

V.  Gridley.  20  Kan.  584,  368 

V.  Hays.  8  Ired.  Eq.  502,  327 

V.  Housatonic  R.  Co.,  107  Mass. 
261.  1613 

V.    Inhabitants   &c.,    66   Maine 
585,  343 

V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  9  Pick.  146,     294 
V.   Kolb.   56  Wis.   263,  1532 

V.  Le  Tombe.  3  Dallas  384,  215 

V.  Loving,  55  Miss.  109,  218 

V.  Mayor  &e.,  8  M.  &  W.  605,         174 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  25  Ga.  610,  982 

V.  Mayor  &c.,  37  Hun  513,  1265 

V.  Mavor  &c..  9  N.  Y.  St.  247,         781 
V.  McAlpine.  64  Ala.  511,  521 

V.   New   Orleans  &e.    R.    Co.,   70 
Ala.  227,  701 

V.  Pendleton  Co.  Court,  19  S.  W. 
740,  842,   1039 

V.   People,   19  111.  App.  300,  332 

V.  Savage,  53  N.  Y.  S.  308,     717,  747 
V.  Town  of  Lind,  79  Wis.  64.         1041 
V.  Town  of  Tonawanda,   158  N. 
Y.  438,  1142,  1287 

V.  Williams,  11  M.  &  W.  176,       1115 

Jones    Co.    v.    Perry,    26    Ind.    App. 

554.  1309 

Jonesboro   v.    Cairo  &c.   R.   Co.,    110 

U.  S.  192,  992 

Jonesboro    Co.    v.    Baldwin,    57    Ind. 

86,  1639 

Jordan   v.   City  of   Benwood,   42   W. 

Va.  312.  791,  1377 

v.  Hanson,  49  N.  H.  199,  334 

V.  Osceola  Co.,  59  Iowa  388,         840 
V.    School   Dist.,   38    Maine    164, 

358,  365,  1424 

Joslyn  V.  City  of  Detroit,  74  Mich. 

459,  1325,  1609 

Jossplvn  V.  Stone.  28  Miss.  753.  1734 

Joyes"v.    Shadburn    (Ky.),   13  S.  W. 

361,  1271 

Joyner  v.   Inhabitants  &c.,   3   Cush. 

567,  245 

Judd  V.  Thompson,  125  Mass.  553.       365 
V.   Town  of  Pox  Lake,   28   Wis. 
583,  652 

Judevine   v.   Town   of  Hardwick,   49 

Vt.  180,  871 

Judge  V.  City  of  Meriden.  38  Conn. 

90,  820,  1207 

Judge  of  Probate  v.  Webster,  46  N. 

H.  518,  1055 

Judges  &c.  V.  Tavlor,  8  Bush  206,       1543 

Judkins  v.  IJiU.  50  N.  H.  140,  155 

Judson  V.  Reardon.  16  Minn.  431,         493 
V.  Smith.  104  Mo.  61,  908 

Juker  V.  Commonwealth,  20  Pa.  St. 

484,  371 

Julia  Bldg.  Ass'n  v.  Bell  Tel.  Co.,  88 

Mo.  258,  681 

Junction  R.  Co.  v.  Citv  of  Philadel- 
phia. 88  Pa.  St.  424.  1251 

Jung   v.    City    of   Stevens    Point,    74 

Wis.  547,  1632 

Jussen  V.  Board  &e.,  95  Ind.  567. 

277,  987 

Justice  V.   City  of  Logansport.    101 

Ind.  326,  1544 

Justices   v.    Smith,   2   J.    J.    Marsh. 

472,  312 

Justices  &c.  v.  Paris  &c.  Tpk.  Co.,  11 

B.  Mon.  143,  1.529 

Jutte  &  Folev  Co.  v.  City  of  Altoona, 

94  Fed.  61,  873 


Kahn  v.   Board  &c.,  79  Cal.  388,        1137 
V.  Sutro.  114  Cal.  316,  55,  82 

Kaime  v.  Harty,  4  Mo.  App.  357,         521 
Kaine    v.    Commonwealth,    101    Pa. 

St.  490,  1494 

Kaiser  v.    St.    Paul   &c.   R.   Co.,   22 

Minn.  149,  682,  1582 

Kalbrier  v.  Leonard,  34  Ind.  497,       1516 
Kamp  V.  People,  141   111.  9,  168S 

Kane  v.  City  of  Charleston,  161  111. 

179,  1021 

V.  City  of  Fond  du  Lac,  40  Wis. 
495,  662 

V.  City  of  Troy.  1  N.  Y.  S.  536.  1609 
V.  City  of  Yonkers,  60  N.  Y.  S. 
216,   43  App.   Div.   599, 

1794,  1801,  1802 
V.  Commissioners.  86  N.  C.  8,  1230 
V.  Footh.  70  111.  587,  1668 

V.   Independent  School  Dist.,  82 
Iowa  5.  890 

V.  Mavor  &c.,  15  Md.  240,  688 

V.  New  York  El.  R.  Co.,  125  N. 
Y.    164,  1581 

V.  Parker.  4  Wis.  123,  423 

V.    Philadelphia,    196    Pa.    St. 
502,  1801 

Kankakee   Co.    v.    Etna   L.    Ins.   Co., 

106  U.   S.   668,  1013 
Kanouse   v.    Town   of  Lexington,    12 

111.  App.  318,  530 

Kansas  City  v.  Bacon,  147  Mo.  259, 

88,  551,  1308 
V.   Bacon,   157  Mo.  450. 

1272,  1279,  1772 
V.  Corrigan,  86  Mo.  67.  468.  492 

v.  Duncan,  135  Mo.  571,     551,  177.S 
V.  Hallett.  59  Mo.  App.  160.  499 

y.   Marsh   Oil  Co.,  140  Mo.  458, 

89,  110,  1146 
V.  McDonald.  80  Mo.  App.  444,  754 
V.  Trieb,  76  Mo.  App.  478,  501 
v.  Ward,  134  Mo.   172.           110.  879 

Kansas  Cit.y  Grading  Co.  v.  Holden, 

107  Mo.  305,  802 
Kansas  City  &c.   R.  Co.   v.  Albright, 

33  Kan.  211,  1535 

V.  Alderman,  47  Mo.  349,     900.  905 
V.  Campbell,  62  Mo.  585.  604 

V.  Fitzsimmons.   22  Kan.  686.        704 
V.  Rich  Tp..  45  Kan.  275,     985,  988 

Kansas  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Commissioners 
•    &c.,  16  Kan.  587,         245,  247,  1551 

Kansas  Town   Co.   v.   City  of  Argen- 
tine,  59   Kan.   779.  1131.   1293 

Kaseman  v.  Borough  of  Sunbury,  197 

Pa.  St.  162.  1326 

Kassell  v.  Mayor  &c.,  109  Ga.  491.       498 

Kassman   v.    City  of   St.    Louis.    153 

Mo.   203.  1374 

Katzenberger   v.    Aberdeen,    16    Fed. 

745.  082 

V.  Aberdeen,  121  JJ.  S.  172,  643.  904 
v.  Lawo,  90  Tenn.  235,  1357 

Kavanasrh    v.    Citv    of   Brooklyn.    38 

Barb.  232.  820.  1586 

V.  Mobile  &c.  R.  Co.,  78  Ga.  271, 

586.   500 

Kavenv  v.   City  of  Troy,   108   N.   Y. 

571.  1604.  1605,  1606,  1607 

Kayser  v.  Bremen,  16  Mo.  88,  64 

Kavsville   City   v.    Ellison,    18    Utah 
■   163,  1549 

Kean  v.  Rizer.  90  Md.  507.  1658 

Keane  v.  Gushing.  15  Mo.  App.  06.       479 
V.    Village    of    Waterford,    2    N. 
Y.  S.  182.  160.5 

Kearney   y.    Andrews,    10   N.    J.    Eq. 

70.  313 

y.  City  of  Covington,  1  Met.  339, 

1306,   1748 


TABLE    OF    CASES, 


CXXlll 


IReferences  are  to  Pages.   Vol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.} 


Kearney  Co.  v.  Tuttle,  10  Neb.  34,       907 

Keasy  v.  City  of  Louisville,  4  Dana 

154,  680 

Keating   v.    Cincinnati,   38   Ohio   St. 

141,  680,   1602 

V.  City  of  Kansas,  84  Mo.  415,       646 
V.  McDonald,  73  Conn.  125,         1808 

Keator  v.  Dalton,  62  N.   Y.   S.  878, 

712,  1698,   1788 

Keck  V.    City  of  Cincinnati,   6   Ohio 

Dec.  97,  580 

Keefer  v.  Schwartz,  47  Pa.  St.  503,  1058 

Keehn  v.  McGillicuddy,  15  lud.  App. 

580,  1379,  1380 

Keeler  v.  Frost,  22  Barb.  400,  294 

V.  Milledge,  24  N.  J.  L.  142. 

536,  537,  1419 

Keenan  v.  Cook,  12  R.  I.  52.       221 

Keene  &c.   Saving  Bank  v.  Lyon  Co., 

90  Fed.  523,  878 

Keeney.  Ex  parte,  84  Cal.  304,  1086 

V.  Jersey  City,  47  N.  J.  L.  449,  260 

Keese   v.    City    of    Denver,    10    Colo. 

112,  1236,  1270,  1288 

Keffe  V.   Milwaukee  &c.   R.   Co.,   21 

Minn.   207,  794 

Kehn  v.   State.  93  N.  Y.  291.       174,  175 

Kehrer  v.  Richmond.  81  Va.  745,  1602 

Kehrig  v.  Peters,  41  Mich.  475,  1509 

Keifer    v.    City    of    Bridgeport,    68 

Conn.  401,  1157 

Keiflfer  v.   Ehler,  18  Pa.   St.  388,       1026 

Keihl  V.  Citv  of  South  Bend,  76  Fed. 

921,  877 

Keil   V.    City   of   St.    Paul,   47   Minn. 

288,  1219 

Keith' V.  Bingham,   100  Mo.  300. 

1206,    1253 
V.  Citv  of  Philadelphia,  126  Pa. 
St.  515.  1271 

V.  Howard.  24  Pick.  292,  222 

V.  Inhabitants  &c..  2  Allen  552,  1013 

Kellar  v.  Savage,  17  Maine  444. 

348,  352,  364 

Keller  v.  People,  100  111.  179, 

1237,  1278,  1289 
V.  State.  11  Md.  525.  1537 

V.  Wilson.  90  Ky.  350.  564 

Kellev  V.  Citv  of  Columbus,  41  Ohio 

St.  263.  1597 

V.  City  of  Madison,  43  Wis.  638, 

828,  942 
V.  City  of  Pittsburgh,  85  Pa.  St. 
170,  1516.  1518 

V.  Cook,  21  R.  I.  29,  804.  805 

V.  Kennard.  60  N.  H.  1.         472,  1155 
V.  Mavor  &c..  4  Hill  263,  260 

V.  Milan.  127  U.   S.   139.       562.  637 
974,  981,  984,  993.  996,  1523,  1531 

Kellinger  v.  Forty-second  St.  R.  Co., 

50  N.  Y.  206.  1317.  1582 

Kellogg  V.  Carrico,  47  Mo.  157.  486 

V.   Chicago  &c.   R.   Co.,   26  Wis. 
223.  1109 

V.  Fly.  15  Ohio  St.  64.  1723 

V.  Inhabitants  &c..  4  Gray  65.     1507 
V.  Malin.  50  Mo.  496.  675 

V.  Mayor  &c..  44  N.  Y.  S.  39,         928 

Kellow  V.  Citv  of  Scranton,  195  Pa. 

St.   134,  1339 

Kelly  V.  City  of  Chicago,  62  HI.  279, 

753.   1687 
V.  City  of  Cleveland,  34  Ohio  St. 
468.  1252 

V.  Citv  of  Minneapolis,  63  Minn. 
125.  876 

V.  City  of  Minneapolis,  77  Minn. 
76,  930 

V.  City  of  Pittsburg,  85  Pa.  St. 
170,  405 

V.   Corporation  &c.   of  Toronto, 
23  U.  C.  Q.  B.  425,  1403 


Kelly  V.  Gahn.  112  111.  23,  153 

V.  Harrison,  2  Johns.  Cas.  29,  132 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  4  Hill  263,  977 

V.  Mayor  &c.,  11  N.  Y.  432,  1591 

V.   ]\[ayor  &c.,   53   Md.    134,  1730 

V.  McCormiek.  28  N.  Y.  318,  1014 
V.  Jleeks,  87  Mo.  396,  384,  393,  400 
V.  Moon,  51  Ala.  304.  335 

V.  Multnomah  Co..  18  Or.  356,     1072 
V.  New  York  &c.  R.  Co.,  9  N.  Y. 
S.  90,  1631 

V.  Owen.  7  Wall.  496.  132 

V.  Pittsburg,  104  U.  S.  78. 

11.   1536,   1714 
V.    Southern    R.    Co.,    28    Minn. 
98,  1627 

V.  Town  of  Fond  du  Lac,  31  Wis. 
179,  1597 

V.  York.  59  N.  Y.  S.  30.  1829 

Kelly  Tp.   v.   Union  Tp.,  5  W.  &  S. 

535,  1043 

Kelsey  v.  Glover,  15  Vt.  708,  1112 

V.  King.  32  Barb.  410.  684 

V.  King,  1  Trans.  App.  133,  1565 

Kelso  V.  City  of  Boston,  120  Mass. 

297,  1724 

Kemp  V.  Neville.  10  C.  B.  523,  221 

Kemper  v.  Campbell,  45  Kan.  529.       1160 
V.    City   of   Louisville.    14   Bush 
87,  1418 

V.  King,  11  Mo.  App.   116, 

1199,    1234 

Kempner  v.   Galveston  Co.,   73  Tex. 

216,  907 

Kenady    v.    City    of    Lawrence,    128 

Mass.  318,  1622 

Kendall  v.  City  Council  &c.,  47  N.  J. 

L-  64,  1692 

V.   City  of  Albia,   73   Iowa   241, 

1630,  1635,  1802 
V.  Post,  8  Or.  141.  698 

V.  Powers,  4  Met.  553,  335 

V.    Stokes.   3   How.   87,  230 

Kenfleld  v.  Irwin.  52  Cal.  164.  368 

Kennard  v.  Cass  Co.,  3  Dill.  147,         1740 

Kennedy  v.  Board  &c.,  82  Cal.  483, 

1492,   1659 
V.  Board  &c..  2  Pa.  St.  366,  1116 

v.  City  of  New  York,  54  N.  Y.  S. 
261.  930 

V.   City  of  Sacramento.   19  Fed. 
580.  90.    103.   1526 

V.  City  of  Troy,  77  N.  Y.  493. 

1197.  1287,  1724 
V.  City  of  Troy,  14  Hun  308.     1717 
V.    Corporation    of    Washington, 
3  Cr.  C.  C.  595.  580 

V.  Jones,  11  Ala.  63.  1214 

V.  Le  Van,  23  Minn.  513.  15.59 

V.  Newman.  1   Sandf.  187.  1422 

V.  Phelps,  10  La.  An.  227, 

607,   1081,   1093,   1121 
V.  Trustees  &c..  8  Dana  50.  629 

Kennett    Square   v.    Entriken,    7   Pa. 

Co.  Ct.   R.  469.  1271 

Kenney  v.  Goergen.  36  Minn.  190.       198 

Kennirott   v.    Supervisors,    83   LT.    S. 

452.  1001,  1005 

Kennison    v.    Inhabitants    &c.,    146 

Alass.  467.  1781 

Kensington  v.  Glenat.  1  Phila.  393.     528 

Kensington    Electric    Co.    v.    City   of 
Philadelphia.   187  Pa.   St.  446. 

518.  955 

Kent    v.    Town    of    Lincoln,    82    Vt. 

591.  1617 

V.  Village  of  Enosburg  Falls.  71 

Vt.  2,55:  1236.  1548 

V.  Village  of  North  Tarrytown, 

56  N.  Y.  S.  885.  1753 

Kents  V.  Village  of  North  Tarrytown, 

64  N.  Y.   S.   178,  715 


exxiv 


TABLE   OF    CASES, 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Yol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.'] 


Kentufky   Lead   &c.   Co.    v.   New  Al- 
bany Water-Works,  62  Ind.  63.  1512 

Kentucky    Public   Kiev.    Co.   v.    Cols- 
ton. 50  S.  W.  1)81,  1307 

Kenworthy  v.  Ironton.  41  Wis.  647,         8 

Keuyon  v.  City  of  Spokane,  17  W'ash. 

57.  955 

Keokuk  &c.  Bridge  Co.  v.  People,  161 

111.    132.  1554 

Keokuk  &c.  Co.  v.  City  of  Quincy,  81 

111.  422.  517 

Keough  V.  Board  &c.,  156  Mass.  403,  1693 
V.    City    of    St.    Paul,    66   Minn. 
114,  1152 

Kepner  v.  Commonwealth,  40  Pa.  St. 

124,  465,  480 

Kernochan  v.   New  York  El.  R.   Co., 

128  N.  Y.  559,  1582 

Kerns  v.  Schoonmaker,  4  Ohio  331,       335 

Kerr  v.  Central  Board  &c.,  25  Pitts. 

Leg.  J.  54,  752 

V.  City  of  Bellefontaine,  59  Ohio 
St.  446,  711,  737,  744 

V.    City    of    Corsicana,    89    Tex. 
461.  1286 

V.  City  of  Corsicana,  35  S.  W. 
694.  1701,  1709 

V.  Hitt,  75  111.  51.  486 

V.  Jones,  19  Ind.  351.  185,  206 

V.  Seaver,  11  Allen  151,  1751 

V.  Trego.  47  Pa.  St.  292.  287 

Kersten   v.    City   of   Milwaukee.    106 

Wis.  200,         1236,  1243,  1279,  1285 

Kesler  v.   Smith,  66  N.  C.   154,  524 

Ketcham  v.  Wagner.  90  Mich.  271,       428 

Ketchum   v.    City   of   Buffalo.    14   N. 

Y.  356,  576,  658,  977 

V.  Duncan,  96  U.  S.  659.  1019 

Kettering  v.  City  of  Jacksonville,  50 

111.  39,  64,  520,  1691 

Keyes  v.   City  of  Cedar  Falls,   107 

Iowa  509.  1327.  1335 

V.  Inhabitants  &c..  17  Pick.  273,    294 
V.  Village  of  Marcellus,  50  Mich. 
439  1587,  1597 

Keymer,  In  re,  148  N.  Y.  219.  1828 

Keys  V.  Marin  Co..  42  Cal.  252.  706 

Keyser  v.  McKissan,  2  Rawle  139,       198 
V.  School  Dist.,  35  N.  H.  477, 

295,  644 

Khron  v.  Brock.  144  Mass.  516.  811 

Khroop  V.  Forman.  31  Mich.  144,        1572 
Kick  V.  Merry,  23  Mo.  72,  671 

Kidder  v.  City  of  Peoria,  29  111.  77,     692 
V.  Inhabitants  &c..  7  Gray  104,  1601 
Kieffer    v.    Hummelstown    Borough, 

151  Pa.  St.  304,  1600 

Kielley  v.  Carson.  4  Moo.  P.  C.  63.  298 
Kierman.  In  re.  62  N.  Y.  457.  1257.  12.58 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  43  N.  Y.  S.  538.  1339 
Kies  V.  CitV  of  Erie,  135  Pa.  St.  144,  797 
V.  City  of  Erie.  169  Pa.  St.  598,  790 
Kiichli    V.    Minnesota   &c.    Blec.    Co., 

58  Minn.  418,  730 

Kilbourne    v.    St.    John,    59    N.    Y. 

21.  1699 

V.  Thompson.  103  U.  S.  168,  205 

Kilev  V.  City  of  Kansas  City,  69  Mo. 

"102,  1616 

V.  City  of  Kansas  City,  87  Mo. 
103,  8,  265,  820 

V.  Cranor.  51  Mo.  541,  1427 

V.  Oppenheimer,  55  Mo.  374,         1131 
Kilgore  v.  Commonwealth,  94  Pa.  St. 

495,  106 

Kilham  v.  Ward.  2  Mass.  236.  132 

Killion  V.  Van  Patten.  42  Kan.  295,     172 
Kilnatrick  v.  Smith.  77  Va.  347.  313 

Kimball  v.  Alcorn,  45  Miss.  151,  197 

V.   Board  &c..  46  Cal.   19.  698 

V.  City  of  Boston,  1  Allen  417,     798 


Kimball  v.  City  of  Cedar  Rapids,  100 

Fed.  802,  724 

V.  City  of  Peoria,  140  111.  157,     1143 
V.   Corn   Exch.   &c.   Bank,    1    111. 
App.  209.  1551,  1727 

V.  Cushman,  103  Mass.  194,         1779 
V.   Lamprev,   19  N.   H.   215,  1429 

V.  Marshall,  44  N.  II.  465, 

273,   279,    305.    354 
V.  Merchants'  &c.  Co.,  98  111.  611, 

1699,  1721 
V.  Olmstead,  20  Wash.  629, 

209,  1686,  1687 

V.  People,  160  111.  653,  1289 

V.  Rosendale,  42  Wis.  407,       54,  992 

V.  School  Dist.,  28  Vt.  8,  1480 

Kimble    v.    City    of    Peoria,    140    111. 

157,  483.  511,  1259,  1267 

Kimmel.  In  re,  41  Fed.  775,  1399 

Kimmish   v.   Ball,   129  U.   S.   217,  137 

Kincaid  v.  Hardin  Co.,  53  Iowa  430, 

9,  142,  775,  776,  1076 
King  V.  Beeston,  3  T.  R.  592,  295 

V.  Bellringer.  4  T.  R.  810,  473 

V.  Buller.  8  East  389,  305 

V.  City  of  Buffalo,  10  N.  Y.  564,     170 
V.  City  of  Chicago,  111  111.  63,       923 
V.  City  of  Kansas  City,  58  Kan. 
334,  1.378 

V.  City  of  Madison.  17  Ind.  48,  1511 
V.  City  of  Oshkosh,  75  W'is.  517, 

827,  1609 
V.  City  of  Portland,  2  Or.  146, 

1268,  1269 
V.    Commissioners,   8   B.   &   C. 
355  801 

V.  Davenport,  98  111.  305, 

673,  1391,  1707 
V.  Granger,  21  R.  I.  93,  1781 

V.  Harris,  1  B.  &  Ad.  936,  207 

V.    Inhabitants  &c.,   5   B.  &  Ad. 
469.  1559 

V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  1  East  13.       345 
,  V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  4  T.  R.  591,     667 
V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  6  T.  R.  534,     345 
V.  Ireland.  68  Tex.  682,  311 

V.  Lamb.  117  Cal.  401.  1140 

V.   Mahaska   Co.,   75   Iowa  329, 

633.  648 
V.  Market  St.  Com'rs,  4  B.  &  Ad. 
333.  699 

V.  Mayor  &c.,  6  Ad.  &  El.  349,  1657 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  2  T.  R.  259, 

1657,  1691 
V.  ]\Iavor  &c..  4  T.  R.  699,  1657 

V.   IMcDrew,   31   111.   418,  1743 

V.  Miller,  6  T.  R.  268.  305 

V.  Minneapolis  Union  R.  Co.,  32 
Minn.  224,  701,  702.  703,  1222 

V.    Morris  &c.   R.   Co.,   18   N.    J. 
Eq.  397,  1109 

V.  Nichols.  16  Ohio  St.  80.  318 

V.  Parry.  14  East  549,  378 

V.  President  &c..  3  111.  305,  527 

V.  Russell,  6  East  427,  1610 

V.  Theodorick,  8  East  543.  344 

V.  Tizzard.  9  B.  &  C.  418.  185 

V.  Williams,  2  Man.  &  S.  141,       305 
V.  Wilson.  1  Dill.  C.  C.  555.  1717 

King  Co.  V.  Collins.  1  Wash.  469,        1052 
Kinsrhorn     v.     Corporation     &c.     of 

Kingston.  26  Up.  Can.  Q.  B.  130,  540 
Kingman    v.    City   of   Brockton,    15."^ 

Mass.  255,  559,  917 

V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  2  Cush.  426. 

644.  1480 
Kingman  &c..  Petitioners,  153  Mass. 

566.  1252 

Kingsbury  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  13  AI- 

■^len  186.  1613 

V.  School  Dist.,  12  Met.  99. 

294,  343,  362,  1485 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


CXXV 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Vol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.] 


Klngsland  v.  Mayor  &c..  5  Daly  448,     894 
V.  Mayor  &c..  110  N.  Y.  569,         620 
Kingsley    v.    Bowman,    53    N.    Y.    S. 

426,  751 

V.  Norris,  60  N.  H.  131,  715 

.  Kingston   &c.    Ins.    Co.   v.    Clark,    33 

Barb.  196,  326 

Kinkaid's  Appeal.  66  Pa.  St.  411,  1086 
Kinmimdy  v.  Mahan,  72  111.  462,  1539 
Kinnare  v.  City  of  Chicago,  171  111. 

332,  82,  771,  792 

Kinneen    v.    Wells,    144    Mass.    497, 

369,  370,  371 
Kinney  v.  City  of  Tekamah,  30  Neb. 

605.  1338 

V.  City  of  Troy,  108  N.  Y.  567,  1604 
Kinsey  v.  Pulaski  Co.,  2  Dill.  253,  836 
Kinsley  v.  City  of  Chicago,   124  111. 

359.  469.  601,  604,  1387,  1399 

Kip  V.   City   of  Buffalo,   7   N.    Y.    S. 

685,  175,  190 

V.   Mayor  &c..  26  N.   J.   L.   298, 

100.  500.  536.  537,  1507,  1509 
Kipley  v.    Luthardt,    178   111.   525. 

1824,  1825 
Kirby    v.    Boylston    Mkt.    Ass'n,    14 

Gray  249,  1588 

V.  Shaw,  19  Pa.  258, 

81,   1514,  1516.  1520 
Kirchenor    v.     Flint,     11    N.    Y.     S. 

741,  1417 

Kirchman  v.  People,  159  111.  265,        1289 

V.  West  &c.  R.  Co.,  58  111.  App. 

515  11.35 

Kirk  V.  Brazos  Co..  73  Tex.  56,  1064 

y.  Norvill,  1  T.  R.  118,  532 

Kirkendall  y.  City  of  Omaha,  39  Neb. 

1.  1211 

Kirkham  v.   Russell.  76  Va.  956.  500 

Kirkpatrick  y.  Commissioners,  42  N. 

J.  L.  510.  1198 

V.  Taylor.  118  Ind.  329.  708 

Kirkwood  y.  Soto.  87  Cal.  394.  173 

Kirtland  y.  Hotchkiss,  100  U.  S.  491, 

138.  1500,  1501 
Kisler  v.  Cameron.  39  Ind.  488.  381 

Kissell  V.  Anderson.  73  Ind.  485,  1095 
Kistner  y.  City  of  Indianapolis,  100 

Ind.   210,  264 

Kitchel  V.  Board  &c..  123  Ind.  540.  555 
Kitchell    y.    Manchester  &c.    R.    Co., 

79  Mo.  App.  340,  1813 

Kitson  y.  Mayor  &c..  26  Mich.  325.  1507 
Kittinger  y.  Buffalo  Traction  Co..  160 

N.  Y.  377,  273,  482,  506 

y.    Monroe    School    Tp..    3    Ind. 

App.  411,  8.50.  851,  1480 

Kittle  y.  Freemont.  1  Neb.  328,  1574 

V.  Sherwin.  11  Neb.  65.  1521 

Kittredge  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  138  Mass. 

286.  344,  361 

V.  Town  of  Walden.  40  Vt.  211,  362 
Klatt  y.  City  of  Milwaukee.  53  Wis. 

196.  776.  1615 

Klauder  v.  McGrath.  35  Pa.  St.  128.  212 
Klein  v.  Board  &c..  54  Miss.  254,         1527 

V.   City  of  Dallas,   71  Tex.   280. 

1619.  1629 

V.  New  Orleans.  99  TJ.  S.  149.     1530 

V.  St.  Paul  &c.  R.  Co..  30  Minn. 

451.  708 

Klemer  y.  City  of  Madison,  104  Wis. 

330  1339 

Kline  y.  City  of  Tacoma,  11  Wash. 

193.  1155 

Kling  y.  City  of  Buffalo,  156  N.  Y. 

700.  1343.  1344 

Klingler  v.  Bickel,  119  Pa.  St.  326, 

1122.  1392 
Klix  V.  Nieman.  68  Wis.  271.  795 

Klosterman  y.  Loos.  58  Mo.  290.  217 

Knapp  y.  Grant,  27  Wis.  147,      992,  1538 


Knapp  V.  Mayor  &c.,  50  111.  213,       1526 
Knapp,    Stout   &   Co.   y.    City   of   St. 

Louis,  156  Mo.  343,  1318 

y.  St.  Louis  &c.  R.  Co.,  126  Mo. 

26,  1337 

y.  St.  Louis  &c.  R.  Co..  153  Mo. 

560,  586,   1697,   1698,   1705 

Knecht  y.  City  of  Cincinnati,  18  Ohio 

Cir.  Ct.  875,  1243 

Kneedler  y.  Borough  of  Norristown, 

100   Pa.   St.   368. 

500,  506,  532,  594,   1392 
Kneeland  y.   City  of  Milwaukee,   15 

Wis.  454,  1502 

Knell  y.  City  of  Buffalo,  7  N.  Y.  S. 

233,  1186,   1256.   1257 

Knight   y.    City  of   Philadelphia,    15 

W.   N.   C.   307,  797 

V.   Clark,   48   N.    J.   L.   22, 

215.   216,  217 

V.    Inhabitants    &c.,    70    Maine 

500,  1054 

V.    Kansas   City   &c.    R.    Co.,    70 

Mo.   231,  540.   1422 

V.  Town  of  Ashland,  61  Wis.  233, 

409,  424 

V.    Town    of    Ashland,    65    Wis. 

166.  411 

y.  Town  of  West  Union,  45  W. 

Va.  194,  524,  986 

V.  Woods,   129  Ind.   101,  1472 

Kniper  y.  City  of  Louisville,  7  Bush 

599.  1507.   1509 

Knoblock  y.   Chicago  &c.   R.   Co.,   31 

Minn.  402,  1357 

Knoop's   Estate,   In   re,   11   N.   Y.   S. 

773,  1415 

Knostman  y.  City  of  Dayenport,  99 

Iowa  589.  1377 

Knowles  y.    Dayis.    2   Allen   61,  335 

V.  Seale.  64  Cal.  377.  1301 

y.  Yeates.  31  Cal.  82,  371 

Knowlton  y.   Board  &c.,  9  Wis.  410, 

548,  1513,  1520,  1721 
Knox  y.  Board  &c.,  45  Kan.  152,         1494 

V.  Challonor,  42  Maine  150,         1106 

y.  Mayor  &c..  55  Barb.  404,         1790 

y.  Peterson,  21  Wis.  247,     565,  1254 
Knox  Co.  y.  Arms.  22  Hi.  175,  1743 

y.  Dayis.  63  III.  405.  372 

V.  Johnson,  124  Ind.  145,  1473 

Knox  Co.  Court  y.  United  States,  109 

U.  S.  229.  1525 

Knoxyille  v.  Cox.  103  Tenn.  368.         1804 
Knupfle  y.  Knickerbocker  Ice  Co.,  84 

N.   Y.   488,  1588 

Kobs  y.  City  of  Minneapolis,  22  Minn. 

159,  1215 

Koch    V.    City   of   Ashland,    88    Wis. 

603.  1327,   1343 

y.   City  of  Milwaukee,   89   Wis. 

220.  714 

y.  City  of  Williamsport.  195  Pa. 

St.  488.  1363,  1801 

Koehler  y.   Hill,   60  Iowa  543.  151 

Koestenbader  y.  Price.  41  Iowa  204.     704 
Koester  y.  City  of  Ottumwa,  34  Iowa 

41,  776 

Koethe  v.  Ringer.  46  Minn.  259,         1419 
Kokes  y.  State.  55  Neb.  691.  16S6 

Kolb  V.  Mayor  &c..  64  N.  J.  L.  163.     469 

V.  O'Brien.  86  111.  210.  223 

Kolkmeyer   v.    City   of   Jefferson,    75 

Mo.    App.    678.  1144.    1149.    1166 

Kollock  V.  Dodge.  105  Wis.  187.  183 

Konrad  v.   Rogers,   70  Wis.    492.  666 

Koonce  v.  Board  &c..  106  N.  C.  192.    1664 
Koons   y.    St.    Louis   &c.    R.    Co.,    65 

Mo.   592,  794 

Koontz  V.  Burgess  &c.j  64  Md.  134. 

289.    1540 


CXXVl 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Vol.  I, 

Kopelka   v.    City    of   Bay    City,    125 

Mioh.  625.  1342 

Koppikus   V.    State   Cap.    Com'rs.    16 

Cal.  248,  881,  917 

Korah    v.    City    of    Ottawa,    32    111. 

r^l^  524,  520 

Kornbur'g    v.    Board    &c.,    10    Mont. 

325,  „    941 

Koslikonong    v.    Burton,    104,  U.    S. 

CG8,  '  1020 

Kosmak  v.  Mayor  &c.,  53  Hun  329.     1180 
Kossman  v.    City   of   St.    Louis,   153 

Mo.  293.  1794 

Kottman  v.  Aver,  3  Strob.  92,  313 

Kountze  v.   City   of   Omaha,   5   Dill. 

443,  151a 

Kraft   V.    City   of   Keokuk,    14   Iowa 

46,  1725 

Krall  V.  City  of  New  York,  60  N.  Y. 

S.    661  ;    44    App.    Div.    259. 

1784,    1793 
Kramer   v.    Cleveland   &c.    R.    Co..    5 

Ohio  St.   140.  692,  698 

Kramrath  v.  City  of  Albany,  127  N. 

Y.  575,  894 

V.  City  of  Albany,  53  Hun  206,    284 
Kranz    v.    Mayor    &c.,    64    Md.    491, 

822,  1208 
Kreidler  v.  State,  24  Ohio  St.  22,  168 
Kreigh    v.    City   of    Chicago,    86    111. 

407,  1355 

Kress  v.  State.  65  Ind.  106.  220,  334 

Krickle  v.  Commonwealth,  1  B.  Mon. 

361.  Rlfi 

Krippendorf  v.  Hvde,  110  U.  S.  276.     331 
Kriseler  v.  Le  Valley,  122  Mich.  576. 

170.  207.  209,  930 
Kroeger  v.  Pltcairn.  101  Pa.  St.  311.  217 
Kroop  V.  Forman.  31  Mich.  144.  628 

Krueger  v.   Council  &c.,  64  N.  J.  L. 

523.  201 

Kucheman  v.  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co..  46 

Iowa  366,  682 

Kudinger  v.  City  of  Saginaw,  59  Mich. 

355,  1417 

Kuehn  v.  City  of  Milwaukee,  92  Wis. 

263,  825 

Kuehner  v.  City  of  Freeport.  143  III. 

92,  1248,  1249,  1250 

Kuhls  V.   City   of  Laredo,   27  i  S.   W. 

791,  730 

Kuhn  V.  Board  &c.,  4  W.  Va.  499,       104 

v.    Citv    of    Port    Townsend.    12 

Wash.  "605,  66.  1759 

Kuhns   V.   Wisconsin  &c.    R.   Co.,   76 

Iowa  67,  1797 

Kundinsjer   v.    City    of    Saginaw,    59 

Mich.   355.  694 

Kunkle  v.  Town  of  Franklin,  13  Minn. 

127,  902 

Kunz    V.    Citv    of    Troy,    104    N.    Y. 

344.         1591.  1608.  1614,  1615.  1616 

V.    City   of   Troy,    16   N.    Y.    St. 

459,  826 

Kuschke  v.  City  of  St.  Paul,  45  Minn. 

005  1210 

Kyle  V.  Kvle,  55  Ind.  387,  1572 

V.  Malin,  8  Ind.  34. 

88.  1232.  1258.   1533 
Kynaston  v.  Mayor  &c.,  2  Str.  1051, 

270,   271 
L 

Laager  v.  Citv  of  San  Antonio.   57 

S.  W.  61,  1775,  1810 

Labs  V.  Cooper,  107  Cal.  656.  1260 

Lacv  V.  Arnett.  33  Pa.  St.  169.  1814 

Lad'd   V.    City   of   East   Portland,    18 

Or.  87,  479,  491 

V.  City  of  Gambell,  35  Or.  393. 

879.    1506 
V.  Clements,  4  Cush.  476,     340,  341 


pp.  1-S32;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-1 830.} 
Ladd  V.  Town  of  Franklin,  37  Conn. 

ro  85S 

Lade'v.   Shepherd,   2   Str.   1004,  1559 

La  Fave  v.  City  of  Superior,  104  Wis. 

454.  1802 

Lafavette   &c.    R.    Co.    v.    Geiger,    34 

Ind.   1S5,  58,  61,  83,  982 

v.   Smith,   6  Ind.   249,  706 

V.  Winslow,  66  111.   219,  701 

La  Flamme   v.   City  of   Albany,   158 

N.  Y.  699.  930 

Lafon  V.   Dufrocq,  9  La.  An.  350,     1418 

Lahr  v.  Metropolitan  &c.  R.  Co..  104 

N.   Y.   268,  620.    1582 

Laird   v.   City   of   De   Soto,    22   Fed. 

421,  407.   409,   454 

Lake    v.    City    of    Decatur,    91    111. 

596.  1142 

V.    Hurley.   66  Cal.   473,  1493 

V.   State.   18   Fla.   501.  54 

V.  Trustees  &c.,  4  Denio  520.       1232 

Lake  Co.  v.  Graham,  130  U.  S.  674, 

885,    998,    999,    1000,    1003.    1008 

1009,    1024 

V.  Rollins,  130  TJ.  S.  662,     881,  885 

Lake    Erie    &c.    R.    Co.    v.    Boker,    9 

Ind.   App.   428.  1249 

V.  Cluggish,   143  Ind.  847.  1379 

Lake   Pleasanton    W.    Co.    v.    Contra 

Costa   W.    Co..    67   Cal.    659,  688 

Lake  Shore  Foundrv  v.  City  of  Cleve- 

Imid.   S   Ohio  C.   C.   671,  750 

Lake    Shore    &c.    R.    Co.    v.    Chicago 

&c.   R.   Co.,   97   111.   506,  591 

V.  Cincinnati  &c.  R.  Co.,  116  Ind. 
578.  679,  692,  1572 

V.  City  of  Chicago,  56  111.  454,    1142 
V.  Citv  of  Chicago.  144  111.  391,    550 
V.   City  of  Cleveland,   32  Week. 
L.  Bui.  206.  1321 

Lake  St.   R.   Co.  v.  City  of  Chicago. 

183    111.    75.  1248.    1249,    1276 

Lally  V.    Holland,    1    Swan  396,  228 

Lamar    v.    Board    &c.,    4    Ind.    App. 

191.  1073 

Lamar  &c.  Co.  v.  City  of  Lamar,  140 

Mo.  145,  877 

Lamb   V.    Burlington  &c.    R.    Co.,    39 

Iowa  333,  416.  1519 

V.    Citv    of    Cedar    Rapids,    108 
Iowa  629,  1325 

V.   Lane.   4   Ohio   St.   167,     698,   699 

Lambar  v.  City  of  St.  Louis,  15  Mo. 

610.  1585 

V.    Village    of   East    Tawas,    86 
Mich.    14.  1627 

Lambert  v.   People.  76  N.  Y.   220.        196 
V.   Thornton.   1    Ld.    Raym.   91.      467 

Lamborn  v.  County  Com'rs,  97  TT.  S. 

181.  242.    245.    248,    1552 

Lament  v.   Haight,  44  How.   Pr.  1.     224 

Lamm    v.    Chicago    &c.    R.    Co.,    45 

Minn.  71,  1575.  1582 

V.  Port  Deposit  &c.  Ass'n,  49  Md. 
233,  258 

Lammert  v.  Lidwell,  62  Mo.  188,  58 

Lammon   v.    Feusier,    111    U.    S.    17, 

329,   330 

Lamoille   Vallev  R.   Co.   v.   Town   of 

Fairfield.   51    Vt.   257,  982 

Lampe  v.  Citv  of  San  Francisco,  124 

Cal.  546.  1379 

Lamson  v.  City  of  Newburyport.   14 

Allen  30.  1053,  1054 

Lancaster  Co.  v.  Fulton,  128  Pa.  St. 

48.  633 

Lancaster  Co.  Poor  Directors  v.  Hart- 
man,    9    Pa.    Co.    Ct.    Rep.    177, 

1057,  1062 

Land  v.  Allen,  65  Miss.  455.  957 

Land  &c.  Co.  v.  Brown,  73  Wis.  294, 

54,  560,  561,  1515,  1516 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


CXXVU 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Vol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol.  II,  pp.  SSS-ISSO.] 


Land  &c.  Co.  v.  Mclntyre,  100  Wis. 

245,  1731 

Landers  v.  Staten  Island  R.  Co.,  53 

N.  Y.  450,  1411 

Land   Grant   R.   Co.  v.   Board  &c.,  6 

Kan.   256,  997,   1576 

Landsrove  v.  Town  of  Plymouth,  52 

Vt.  503,  1058 

Landis   v.    Borough   of  Vineland,   54 

N.   J.   L.   75,  493,   520 

V.    Borough   of  Vineland,   60   N. 
J.   L.   264,  1141 

V.  Hamilton,  77  Mo.  554,  1373 

Lane,  Kx  parte,  76  Cal.  587,  1419 

V.  Baker.  12  Ohio  237,  1494 

V.    City    of    Saginaw,    53    Mich. 
442,  695 

V.    City    of    Syracuse,    42    N.    Y. 
S.  219,  1326 

V.    Commonwealth,   103   Pa.    St. 
481,  150 

V.  Cotton,  1  Salk.  17.  222 

V.  Inhabitants  «&c.,  72  Maine  354, 

364.  1001,  1013 
V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  10  Met.  462, 

259,  644 
V.  Schomp,  20  N.  J.  Eq.  82,         1023 

Lane  Co.  v.  Oregon,  7  Wall.  71,  530 

Lanfear  v.  Mayor,  4  La.  97.         534,  1115 

Langan  v.  City  of  Atchison,  35  Kan. 

318,  1631 

Langdon   v.    Chartiers  Tp.,    131    Pa. 

St.   77,  188 

V.    Town    of    Castleton,    30    Vt. 
285,  177,  181 

Lange  v.  Benedict,  73  N.  Y.  12,  221 

Langford  v.  Commissioners,  16  Minn. 

375,  692 

V.    United    States,    101    U.    S. 
341,  770.  772 

Langhorne  v.  Robinson,  20  Gratt.  661. 

983.  1532.  1548 

Langlois  v.  City  of  Cohoes,  58  Hun 

226;  11  N.  Y.  S.  908.         1155,  1579 

Langsdale  v.  Bonton.  12  Ind.  467,     1425 

Langston  v.  South  Car.  R.  Co.,  2  S. 

C.   248,  1020 

Langworthv  v.  City  of  Dubuque.   13 

Iowa  86,  401.   1517 

V.    City    of    Dubuque,    16    Iowa 
271.  104 

Lanier  v.  Mayor  &c.,  59  Ga.  187,         1508 
V.  Padgett.  18  Pla.  842,  858 

Lanigan  v.   New  I'ork  Gaslight  Co., 

71   N.  Y.   29.  1632 

Lanning    v.     Carpenter,     20     N.     Y. 

447,  64 

Lanpher  v.   Dewell,   56  Iowa  153,        335 

Lansing  v.  Caswell,  4  Paige  519.       1570 
V.  County  Treasurer,  1  Dill.  522. 

765,  1531 

Lapham  v.  Rice,  55  N.  Y.  472,  1579 

Lareau  v.  Davignon.  5  Abb.  Pr.  367,     134 

Largue  v.   State,   76  Tex.   323, 

94,   117.  451 

Larkin  v.  Burlington  &c.  R.  Co.,  85 

Iowa    492.  521 

V.    Burlington    &c.    R.    Co.,    91 
Iowa  654.  483 

V.    City    of    Boston,    128    Mass. 
521,  1622 

Larned  v.  Allen,  13  Mass.  295,  323 

V.  Briscoe,  62  Mich.  393,  335 

V.   Burlington,    4   Wall.    275.  838 

V.  City  of  Syracuse,  44  N.  Y.  S. 
857,  749 

Larney  v.  City  of  Cleveland,  34  Ohio 

St.  599,  536 

Larsh    v.    City    of   Des    Moines,    74 

Iowa  512.  1630.    1634 

La  Salle  Co.  v.  Simmons,  10  111.  513. 

931,   1780,   1806 


Lasbury  v.  McCague,  56  Neb.  220, 

1290,  1291 
Lasley   v.    District   of   Columbia,    14 

App.  D.  C.  407,  1388 

Lassen  Co.  v.  Shinn.  88  Cal.  510,  840 
Latham  v    Village  of  Wilmette,   168 

111.    153,  1144 

Lathrop  v.  State,  6  Blackf.  502,  1483 

V.   Town  of  Sunderland.   64   Vt. 

35,  1473 

Latta  V.  Williams.  87  N.  C.  126,  1509 
Lauenstein  v.  City  of  Fond  du  Lac, 

28  Wis.  336,  282 

Lauman  v.  Des  Moines  Co.,  29  Iowa 

310,  1726 

Launder    v.    City    of    Chicago,    111 

111.   291,  604 

Laundry  License  Cases,  22  Fed.  701, 

1405,  1406 
Launtz  v.  People.  113  111.  137, 

161,    162,    293,   296,   298,   473 
Lavalle  v.  Soncy,  96  111.  467,  1677 

Lavery    v.    Hannigan,    20    J.    &    Sp. 

463,  1610 

Law  V.  Johnson.  118  Ind.  261.  1239 

V.  People,  87  111.  385.      834.  881,  917 

V.    Town    of    Fairfield,    46    Vt. 

425,  829 

Lawbaugh    v.    Board    &c.,    177    111. 

572,  1763 

Lawrence  v.  Bassett,  5  Allen  107.       1740 

V.    City    of    Boston,    119    Mass. 

126,  701,  702 

V.  City  of  Ellensburg,  13  Wash. 

341,  1316 

V.  Hanley.  84  Mich.  399,  1657 

V.  Ingersoll,  88  Tenn.  52, 

158,  159,  160,  161,  167,  294,  298 
373,  474 

V.    Inhabitants    &c.,    35    Maine 

100.  1613 

V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  5  Gray  110,      803 

V.  Traner,  136  III.  474. 

276,   281,  843.   844.   845,   1478.   1489 
Lawrence  Co.  v.  Chattaroi  R.  Co.,  81 

Ky.    225.  14 

V.    Hudson.   41   Ark.   494,  904 

Lawton  v.   Commissioners,   2  Caines 

179,  1419 

V.  Erwin,  9  Wend.  233.  309 

Lay  V.  Wissman,  36  Iowa  305,  1019 

Laycock    v.    City    of    Baton    Rouge. 

35  La.  An.  475.  233.  646.  895 

Layton   v.   City  of  New  Orleans,    12 

La.  An.  515,       384.  394,  1517.  1522 
Lea    V.    City    of    Memphis,    9    Baxt. 

103,  1551 

V.  Hernandez.  10  Tex.   137.  446 

Leach  v.  Cargill,  60  Mo.  316,     1131.  1255 

V.  People.  122  111.  420.  196,  197 

V.    Wilson    Co.,     68    Tex.     358, 

961,    962 
Leake  v.  City  of  Phila..  171  Pa.  St. 

125,  1309 

Learned    v.    Burlington,    2    Am.    L. 

Reg.    (N.    S.)    .394.  1.535 

Learoyd  v.  Godfrey,  138  Mass.  315,  1639 
Leath  v.  Summers,  3  Ired.  L.  108.  696 
Leavenworth    Com'rs    v.    Miller,    7 

Kan.   479,  983 

Leavenworth    Co.    v.    Barnes,   94   TJ. 

S.    70.  1001 

Leavenworth   &c.    R.    Co.   v.   County 

Court,   42   Mo.    171.  986,   987 

Leavitt  V.   Bell,   55  Neb.   57.  1237 

V.    Eastman,    77    Maine    117, 

1425.  1485 
Lebcher  v.  Board  &c.,  9  Mont.  315.  638 
Le  Claire  v.   City  of  Davenport.   13 

Iowa  210.  100,   1403 

Le    Clerq    v.    Trustees    &c.,    7    Ohio 

217,  629 


CXXVlll 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


IReferences  are  to  Pages.   Vol.  I,  pp.  1-8S2;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.1 


Lecoul   V.    Police   Jury,   20   La.    An. 

308,  686,    1448 

Le  Couteulx  v.  City  of  Buffalo,   33 

N.   Y.    333,  658 

Ledey    v.    City    of    Amsterdam,    64 

N.   Y.   S.   1036,  1782 

Le    Due    V.    City    of    Hastings,    39 

Minn.    110,  1502 

Ledyard    v.     Ten    Eyck,    36    Barb. 

102,  1557 

Lee  V.  City  of  Minneapolis,  22  Minn. 

13,  680,  801,  1215 

V.     Inhabitants    &c.,     13     Gray 

476,  247,   1725 

V.   Munroe,  7  Cranch  366,  217 

V.     Pendleton     Co.     Court,     14 

Ky.  L.  159,  842,  1039 

V.  School  Dist.,  71  Mich.  361.    1491 

V.  Thomas,  49  Mo.  112,     1513,  1515 

V.  Trustees  &c.,  7  Dana  28,  670 

V.   Village  of  Greenwich,   63   N. 

Y.   S.   160,  1366 

V,  Village  of  Sandy  Hill,  40  N. 

Y.  442,  819 

V.    Wallis,    1    Kenyon    292, 

531,    532 

V.  Waring,  3  Desau.   57.  311 

Lee  Co.   v.   Lackie,   30  Ark.   764,        1052 

V.   Rogers,  7   Wall.   181,  89 

Leech   v.    State,   78    Ind.   570,  199 

Leeds  v.  City  of  Richmond,  102  Ind. 

372,  684.   822,   1177,    1748 

Leeper  v.   City  of  South   Bend,    106 

Ind.   375,  1516 

Lees  V.   Child.   17   Mass.   351,  706 

Lehew  V.  Brummel,   103  Mo.  546,       1494 
Lehigh    Co.   v.    Hoffort,    116    Pa.    St. 

119,  264,    820,    830 

V.     Kleckner,     5     Watts     &     S. 

181,  17.38 

Lehigh   Valley   Coal   Co.   v.   City   of 

Chicago,    26   Fed.   415,  1301 

Lehigh  Valley  Ins.  Co.  v.  Fuller,  81 

Pa.    St.    398,  1737 

Lehigh  Water  Co.'s  Appeal,  102  Pa. 

St.    515.  1810 

Lehigh    Water    Co.    v.    Easton,    121 

V.    S.    388,  568 

Lehman    v.    City    of    San    Diego,    73 

Fed.    105,  993 

Lehmers    v.    City    of    Chicago,    185 

111.    3.54,  1154 

Lehn  v.   City  of  San  Francisco,  66 

Cal.    76,  1207 

Leigh  V.   State.  69  Ala.  261,  381 

Leisse    v.    St.    Louis    &c.    R.    Co.,    2 

Mo.    105,  701 

V.   St.  Louis  &c.  R.  Co..  72  Mo. 

561,  700 

Leitch   V.    People,    183    111.    569,  1310 

V.  Wells,  48  N.  Y.  586.  1020 

Leloup  V.  Port  of  Mobile,  127  TJ.  S. 

640,  1399 

Leman    v.    City    of   Lake    View,    131 

111.    388.  1283 

Lemmon  v.   People.  20  N.  Y.  562,        137 
Lemon  v.  City  of  Newton,  134  Mass. 

476,  823 

Le  Neve  v.   Vestry  &c.,  8  El.  &  Bl. 

1054,  1561 

Lennehan    v.    Rollins,    137    Mass. 

123,  1779 

Lennon  v.  Mayor  &c.,  55  N.  Y.  361. 

468,    1287 
Lent  V.  Tillson,  72  Cal.  404,  1137 

V.  Tillson,   140  U.   S.  316, 

559.   1242,   1302 
Lenz  V.   Sherrott,  26  Mich.  139,  523 

Leonard    v.    Cassidy,    8    Ohio    C.    C. 

529.  1705 

V.    ritv   of   Brooklyn,    71    N.    Y. 

498.     '  1530 


Leonard  v.  City  of  Canton,  35  Miss. 

189,  88,   245,  655 

V.   City   of   Holyoke,   138   Mass. 
78,  1624 

V.   Commonwealth,   112   Pa.    St. 
607,  369 

V.    Peacock,   8   Nev.   157,   247,     1724 
V.    Sparks,    63    Mo.    App.    585,      1240 

Lepnick   v.   Gaddis,   72   Miss.   200.        795 

Le  Roy  v.   Mayor  &e.,  4  Johns.   Ch. 

352,  1720,   1721 

Leroy     v.     Mayor     &c.,     20     Johns. 

430,  1724 

Lescouzere   v.    Ducatel,    18    La.    An. 

470,  328 

Lesley  v.  Kite,  192  Pa.  St.  268,  612 

Leslie  v.  City  of  Grand  Rapids,  120 

Mich.   28,  1316,   1374 

Lester  v.   Mayor  &c.,  29  Md.  415,     1726 

Lethbridge   v.    Mayor   &c.,    15   N.   Y. 

S.    562.  177 

Lever  v.   McGlachlin,   28  Wis.  364,     28» 

Levi   V.   Coyne,   22   Ky.   L.   493, 

1275,  1276,  1373 

Levis    V.    City    of   Newton,    75    Fed. 

884,  470 

Levy    V.    City    of    Chicago,    113    111. 

650,  512 

V.  Salt  Lake  City,  5  Utah  302,  1180 
V,   State,  6  Ind.  281,  1085 

Lewey's  Island  R.  Co.  v.  Bolton,  48 

Maine    451,  346 

Lewis  V.  Albertson,   152  Ind.  693,     1294 
V.   Albertson,  23   Ind.  App.   147, 

1141,  1148,   1151,   1284,   1759,   1785 
V.  Board  &c.,  2  McCrary  464,         981 
V.    Borough    of   Homestead.    194 
Pa.    St.    199,  1776.    1782 

V.  City  of  Denver,  9  Colo.  App. 
328,  1746 

v.  City  of  Shreveport,  3  Woods 
S.  282,  210,  233,  257,  562,  643 

981,  998 
V.  City  of  Shreveport,  3  Woods 
205,  992 

v.  City  of  St.  Louis,  4  Mo.  App. 
563,  1133 

V.   Commissioners  &c.,   12  Kan. 
186.  1027 

V.   Commissioners  &c.,   12   Kan. 
230.  986 

V.   Commissioners  &c.,   16  Kan. 
102.  381 

V.  Mayor  &c..  9  C.  B.  401,     663,  667 
V.  New  York  &c.  R.  Co.,  128  N. 
Y.  496,  1567 

V.  Spencer,  7  W.  Va.  689,  1720 

V.    STtate.    21    Ark.    209,  1412 

V.  State,  96  N.  Y.  71,     770.  771,  773 
V.  Town  of  Brandenburg,  20  Ky. 
L.  1011,  206,  290 

Lexington   &c.    R.    Co.   v.   Applegate, 

8"  Dana   2S9.  1213 

L'Herault    v.    City   of   Minneapolis, 

6    Minn.    261.  1337 

L'Hote  V.   City  of  New  Orleans,   51 

La.  An.  93.  1404 

Libby  V.  Anoka  Co.,  38  Minn.  448.     905 
V.    Town   of   West   St.    Paul,    14 
ISIinn.    248.  1725 

Liberty    Bell,    The,    23    Fed.    843. 

1717,    1728 

Lichtenstein  v.  Mavor  &c.,  159  N.  Y. 

500,  1343 

Lieberman  v.  City  of  Milwaukee.  89 

Wis.    336.  1295.    1702 

Liebnian   v.    Citv   of   San   Francisco, 

11    Sawyer    147,  1157 

Liffln  V.   Inhabitants  &c.,   145  Mass. 

549.  1622 

Ligare   v.    City   of   Chicago.    139   III. 

46,  588,    611,    1111 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


exxix 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Vol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.1 


Lilgat  V.  Commonwealth,   19  Pa.  St. 

456,  698 

Light   V.   State,   14   Kan.   489,  368 

Lightburne   v.    Taxing   Dist.,    4    Lea 

219.  1507 

Lightner  v.   City  of  Peoria,  150  IH. 

80,  1248,    1250 

Lilly    V.    Taylor,    88    N.    C.    489, 

1522,  1523,  1534 

Lima    v.    Cemetery    Ass'n,    42    Ohio 

St.   128,  1247 

Lincoln  v.  Board  &c.,  176  Mass.  210, 

1279,   1290,    1293.   1299,   1301 
V.    City    of    Boston,    148    Mass. 
578,  263,    799,    803 

V.    City   of   Worcester,    8   Cush. 
55,  1724 

V.     Inhabitants    &c.,    75    Maine 
141,  234.    647,   715 

V.    Iron  Co.,    103   U.   S.   412.        1001 

Lincoln   Co.   v.   Oneida  Co.,   80   Wis. 

267,  938 

Lincoln  Land  Co.  v.  Village  of  Grant. 
57    Neb.    70,  743 

Linden    v.    Board   «&c.,    45    Cal.    6, 

339,   1681,   1682 

Lindley  v.   Polk  Co.,   84   Iowa  308, 

805.   1076 

Lindsay    v.    City    of    Chicago,    115 

111.    120,  ^  540,    1424 

T.  City  of  Des  Moines,  68  Iowa 
368,  1598 

V.  City  of  Des  Moines,  74  Iowa 
111,  1628,  1630 

V.    City    of   Sherman,   36   S.    W. 
1019,  1337 

V.   Mayor  &c..   104  Ala.   257,  603 

Linegar  v.  Rittenhouse.  94  111.  208,    381 

Linehan,    In   re,   72   Cal.   114,  1080 

V.  City  of  Cambridge,  109  Mass. 
212.  662 

Linford  v.  Pitzroy,   13  Q.   B.   240,       221 

Lingle   v.    City   of   Chicago,    178    111. 
'  628,  1153 

Lingo    V.    Burford,    112    Mo.    149, 

1225,    1568 

Lining  v.  Bentham,  2  Bay  1,  334 

Linnehan    v.     Sampson,     126    Mass. 

506.  1631 

Linton  v.  Mayor  &c.,  53  Ga.  588,     1516 

Lionberger  v.   Rowse.  43  Mo.   67,       1511 

Lipes    V.    Hand,    104    Ind.    503, 

698,    704,    1177,    1179 

Lippelman   v.   Citv  of   Cincinnati,   4 

Ohio  C.   C.   327,  1163 

Lippincott    v.    Town    of    Pana.    92 

111.    24,  98.5.    996.    1006 

Lippman  v.  City  of  South  Bend,  84 

Ind.  276.  538 

Lipns    V.    City    of    Philadelphia.    38 

Pa.    St.   503,  593 

Lisso  V.  Parish  of  Red  River,  29  La. 

An.    590.  615 

List  V.   Citv  of  Wheeling,  7  W.   Va. 

501,  882,   893,    1524 

Litchfield  v.  Ballon,  114  U.  S.  190,     885 
V.     Londonderry,     39     N.      H. 
247.  .  1058 

V.    McComber,    42    Barb.    288, 

1261,    1262 
V.  Parker.  64  N.  H.  443.  616 

v.    Polk    Co.,    18    Iowa    70,  652 

V.   Vernon,   41   N.   Y.    123. 

12.33,    1252,    1533 

Litten    v.    Wright    School    Tp.,    127 

Ind.  81,  857.   1480 

Little   V.   City   of   Madison.    49   Wis. 

605,  808 

V.    City    of    Portland,    26    Or. 
235.  1309 

V.    Coggswell,    20    Or.   345,  879 

1  Smith — ix 


Little  V.  Merrill,  10  Pick.  543, 

230,   340,   841,   1485 
V.  Moore,  4  N.  J.  L.  74,  220 

Little  Palls  Electric  &c.  Co.  v.  City 
of    Little    Palls,    102    Fed.    663, 

716,  725.  1347,  1709 

Little  Falls  Tp.  v.  Bernards  Tp.,  44 

N.   J.   L.   621,  1045 

Littlefleld    v.    City    of    Norwich,    40 

Conn.   406,  1221 

V.  State,  42  Neb.  223,  603 

Little   Miami   &c.   R.   Co.   v.   City   of 

Dayton,  23  Ohio  St.  510,  678 

Little  Rock  v.  National  Bank,  98  U. 

S.    308,  978,    1020 

v.   Willis,  27  Ark.  572,  8 

Littlewort   v.   Davis.   50   Miss.   403,   1471 

Livermore  v.  Board  &c.,  31  N.  J.  L. 

505,  814,  832,  1577 

Livingston,   Matter  of,   121   N.  Y.  94, 

1288 
v.  Lynch,  4  Johns  Ch.  573,  1088 

v.   Mayor  &c.,  8   Wend.   85, 

1233,  1564 
V.    Paducah.    80    Kv.    656,  1521 

V.   Pippin,  31   Ala.  542,  210 

V.    School    Dist.    &c.,    11    S.    D. 
150.  1030 

V.   Wider,   53   111.   302,        1531,    1538 

Livingston  Co.  v.  Darlington,  101  U. 

S.    407,  764,    1514 

V.  First  Nat'I  Bank  &c.,  128  LT. 

S.  102.  1004,  1006 

Lloyd  V.   Mayor  &c.,  5  N.  Y.   364. 

779,    788 

Loague  v.  Taxing  Dist.  &c.,  29  Fed. 

742,  455 

Loan  Ass'n  v.  Topeka,  20  Wall.  655. 

549,  559,  624,  890,  983,  1523 
1534.    1537,    1542 

Locke   V.    Central    City,    4    Colo.    65, 

174,    177 
V.   Davison.   Ill   111.   19,  835 

V.  Postmaster-General,  3  Mason 
446,  320 

Lockhart    v.    City    of   Troy,    48    Ala. 

579.  289 

V.  Craig  &c.  R.  Co.,  139  Pa.  St. 
419,  682.  683.  1352 

Lockwood    V.    City   of   St.    Louis.    24 

Mo.   20,  1206,   1231,   1247.   1722 

Loder  v.  McGovern,  48  N.  J.  Eq.  275, 

1193 

Lodie  V.  Arnold.  2  Salk.  458,  1115 

Loeb  V.  City  of  Attica,  82  Ind.  176,  1400 

Loesnitz  v.   Seelinger.   127  Ind.  422, 

1169,    1288 

Loewere  v.   City  of  Sedalia,  77  Mo. 

431.  1641 

Loftin    V.    Citizens'    Bank,    85    Ind. 

341.  1520 

Logan    V.    Pyne,    43    Iowa    524, 

568,    618,    641 
V.  Taylor,  31  111.  App.  263,  913 

Lohr   V.    Phillipsburg    Boi-ough,    165 

Pa.  St.  555.  1337 

Loker   v.    Inhabitants   &c.,    13    Pick. 

343,  233.   638.   647 

London    v.    City    of   Wilmington,    78 

N.   C.   109.  1521 

London  &c.  Land  Co.  v.  City  of  Jel- 

lico.    103   Tenn.   320.  732,   746 

Londoner  v.  People,  15  Colo.   557,        165 

Long  V.   Boone  Co.,  36   Iowa  60.  648 

V.  City  of  Duluth.  49  Minn.  280, 

565.  567.  1351,   1809 
V.    Puller,    68    Pa.    St,    170,  689 

V,   Long,   57   Iowa  497,  223 

V.  Mayor  &c.,  81   N.   Y.  425.  197 

V.  Straus.  107  Ind.  94.  857 

V.   Taxing  Dist.  &c..  7  Lea  134.  499 

Longan  v.  Taylor,  81  111.  App.  263,  1483 


cxxx 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Vol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.'] 


Look  V.    Inhabitants  &c.,   51   Maine 

375,  1'-" 

Loomis  V.  Spencer,  1  Ohio  St.  153,       983 
V.   Wadhams,  8  Gray  5.58,  1740 

Loop  V.  Woodward,  1  Ind.  App.  105,     913 

Lorbeer   v.    Hutchinson,    111    Cal. 

•^j-)  171- 

Lord"  \"'  City    of    Anoka,    36    Minn. 

170,  276,    2(<,    (32 

V.  City  of  Mobile,  n|^  Ala.^BOO,^^^^ 

V.  City  of  Oconto,  47  Wis.  386, 

282,  029 
V.  City  of  Saco,  87  Maine  231,  1306 
V.  Governor  &c.,  2  Phill.  740,  296 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  65  N.  J.  L.  27,  1311 
V.  Meadville  Water  Co.,  135  Pa. 
St.  122,  1456 

Lorence   v.   City   of   Ellensburgh,    13 

WaKh.  341.  1330.   1336 

Lorillard  v.  Town  of  Monroe,  11  N-   ^.^.r 
Y    392,  830,    1097 

Lorrilard   v.    Town   of    Monroe,    12 

Barb.  161,  l'-6 

Los  Angeles  &c.   Co.   v.   City  of  Los 

Angeles,   88    Fed.    720,  ^^    ^^^ 

547,  566,  672,  712,  724,  727 

786,    1703,    1806,    1814 

Los  Angeles  Gas  Co.  v.  Toberman,  61 

Cal     199  -"^ 

Loser  v!   Board  &c..   92   Mich.   633.   1070 

Lott  V.  Mayor  &c.,  84  Ga.  681,     877,  896 
V.    Morgan,    41    Ala.    246,  1537 

V.  Ross,  38  Ala.  156,  1232,  1254 

V.   Swezev,  29  Barb.  87,  1265 

Lotze  V.  City  of  Cincinnati,  61  Ohio 

St.    272,  1772,    1776 

Loud  V.  City  of  Charleston,  99  Mass. 

208.  1722 

V.  City  of  Charleston,  103  Mass. 
278.  1499 

Louden  v.   East   Saginaw,   41   Mich. 

18.  1552 

Loughbridge  v.   Harris,   42   Ga.   500,   685 

Loughran  v.  City  of  Des  Moines,  72 

Iowa  382,  1180 

Loughridge  v.  City  of  Huntington,  56 

Ind. ^253,  487 

Louis  V.  Brown  Tp.,  109  U.  S.  162,  1026 

Louisiana  v.  Jumel,  107  U.  S.  711.         18 
T.    Mayor    &c.,    109    IT.    S.    285, 

412.  799,  800,  1524 
V.  Pilsbury,  105  IT.  S.  278, 

412,   521,  764,  1520 
V.  Police  Jury,  111  U.   S.  716, 

1523,    1529 
V.  Taylor,   105   IT.   S.   454,  995 

V.  Wood,   102  IT.   S.   294, 

237,   240,   633,    1015 

LoTiisiana   Const.   &c.   Co.   v.   Illinois 

&e.  R.   Co.,   49  La.   An.   527.  566 

Louisiana    Ice    Mfg.    Co.    v.    City    of 

New   Orleans.   43   La.   An.   217.   1163 

Louisville  v.  Bank  of  Louisville,  174 

U.  S.  439.  977 

V.  Henning.  1  Bush  381,  248 

v.  Hyatt.  2  B.  Mon.  177,  1257 

v.   Nevin.  10  Bush   549.      1245.   1247 
v.  Savings  Bank,  104  IT.  S.  469.  995 

Louisville  Bridge  Co.  v.  City  of  Louis- 
ville. 81   Ky.  189.  1499,  1514 

Touisville    Gas    Co.    v.    Citizens'    &c. 
Co..    115    IT.    S.    683, 

104,   566,    .569.    1347 

Louisville  &c.   R.   Co.   v.   Boney,   117 

Ind.   .501.  1249 

v.  City  of  East  St.  Louis,  134  111. 
656.  1162,   12.50.   1300 

V.  City  of     Louisville,     4  Bush 
478,  1509 

V.  City  of  Louisville,  8  Bush  415, 

466,    1093 


Louisville  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Common- 
wealth. 13  Bush  388,  1109 
V.  Davidson  Co.  Court,  1  Sneed 
637,  374,  983,  985 
V.  Dryden,  39  Ind.  393,  698 
V.  Etzler,  3  Ind.  App.  562,  1566 
V.  Louisville,  8  Bush  415,  250 
V.  Orr.  91  Ky.  109,  1554 
V.  Patchen,  167  111.  204,  540 
v.  Shires,   198  111.  617, 

64,  87,  98,  1424 
V.    Smith,   91    Ind.    119,  1379 

V.  Sonne,  21  Ky.  848,  1705 

V.   State,   122   Ind.  443,  1251 

V.  State.  8  Ind.  App.  377,  1249 

Louisville  Steam  Forge  Co.  v.  Ander- 
son. 22  Ky.   L.  397,  513 
Louisville  Tr.  Co.  v.  City  of  Cincin- 
nati, 73  Fed.  716,                           1758 
V.    City    of   Cincinnati,    76    Fed. 
296,                                              13,50,  1759 
Louisville  Water  Co.   v.   Clarke,   143 

U.  S.  1.  104 

Loute   V.    Allegheny,    2    Pittsb.    411, 

951    952 
Love  V.  City  of  Atlanta,  95  Ga.  129^ 

785,    797 
V.  City  of  Raleigh,  116  N.  C.  296, 

672,   808 
V.   Mayor  &c.,   11   Vroom  456,       201 
Lovejoy  v.  Whipple,  18  Vt.  379,  1017 

Loveland  v.  City  of  Detroit,  41  Mich. 

367,  670 

Lovell  V.  City  of  St.  Paul,  10  Minn. 

290.  1262 

V.  Seeback,  45  Minn.  465,  1048 

Loverin  v.  School  Dist.,  64  N.  H.  102, 

1495 

Lovingston  v.  Board  &c.,  99  HI.  564,  1483 

Low    V.    Lewis.    46    Cal.    549,  1546 

V.  Mayor  &c.,  5  Cal.  214.  570 

V.   Pettengill,   12  N.   H.   513,        1427 

Lowber  v.  Mayor  &c.,  5  Abb.  Pr.  325, 

11,    446 
Lowe  V.   Board   &c.,   94   Ind.   553, 

457,  1245 
V.  City  of  Omaha,  33  Neb.  587,  1222 
V.  Commissioners,  R.  M.  Charlt. 
302,  168,  1414,  1420 

V.  Inhabitants  &c.,   133  Mass. 
526,  1623 

Lowell  V.  City  of  Boston.  Ill  Alass. 

454.  '    549,  559,  979.   1534,   1542 

V.  Watertown  Tp.,  58  Mich.  568. 

1803 
Lowell  Sav.  Bank  v.  Inhabitants  &c., 

8  Allen  109.  '        210 

Lower  v.  Wallick,  25  Ind.  68,  530 

Lower  Augusta  v.  Selinsgrove,  64  Pa. 

St.  166,  1043 

Lower  Augusta  Tp.   v.   Northumber- 
land Co.,  37  Pa.  St.  143,  1057 
Lowndes  Co.  v.  Hunter,  49  Ala.  507.  1734 
Lowrev   v.    City   of   Delphi,    55    Ind. 

250,  1578 

Lowry  v.  Polk  Co.,  51  Iowa  50,  319,  902 
Lozie'r  v.  Newark.  48  N.  J.  L.  452,  494 
Luburg,  Appeal  of,  17  Atl.   245.  1486 

Lucas  V.   Board   &c.,  44   Ind.   524.        419 
V.  City  of  San  Francisco,  7  Cal. 
463.  554 

V.    Hunt.    5    Ohio    St.    488.  242 

V.    Shepherd.    16   Ind.    368,  308 

Luce  V.   Board  &c..   153  Mass.   108,   1692 
V.  Fensler,  85  Iowa  596,  556 

Luckett  V.  Buckman.  8  Ky.  L.  255.  1489 
Ludington  Water  Supply  v.   City  of 
Ludington,    119    Mich.    480. 

726,  740,  875,  931,  1758 
Ludlam  v.  Ludlam,  26  N.  Y.   356. 

129,    130,    131 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


CXXXl 


IReferences  are  to  Pages.   Vol.  I,  pp.  1-S32;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.'} 


liuehrman    v.    Taxing    Dist.,    2    Lea 

4-2r,.         189,  446,  455.  456.  457,  1526 

Lufkin  V.  City  of  Galveston,  58  Tex. 

545,  1206,  1234 

Luke  V.   City  of  Brooklyn,  43   Barb. 

54,  1394 

Luling  V.  City  of  Racine,  1  Biss.  314, 

1023 

Lum  V.  City  of  Bowie,  IS  S.  W.  142, 

390,    395,    407 
V.   McCarthy.  39  N.  J.   L.   287,   1428 

Xiumbard    v.    Aldrich,    8    N.    H.    31,    1426 
V.  Stearns.  4  Cush.  60,  688 

Lumsden  v.  City  of  Milwaukee,  8  Wis. 

485,  697 

V.  Cross,  10  Wis.  282,  548,  558 

Lund    V.    Inhabitants   &e.,    11    Cush. 

563,  1601 

Lundberg    v.    City    of    Chicago,    183 

111.    572,  1235 

Lundborn    v.    City    of    Manistee,    93 

Mich.  770,  1288 

Lundon   v.    City   of   Chicago,   S3    111. 

App.    208,  1339 

Lunues  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  77  Maine 

186,  1536 

Lusk    V.    City    of    Chicago,    176    111. 

207.  512,   1148 

V.  Perkins,  48  Ark.  238,  958 

Luther  v.  Borden,  7  How.  1,  151 

Lutterloh  v.  Mayor  &c.,  15  Fla.  306, 

681,    1111 

Luzader  v.  Sargeant.  4  Wash.  299.      988 

Lyddy  v.   Long  Island   City,   104   N. 

Y.    218,  181.    233,    637,    645 

Lydecker  v.   Bells,  3   N.  Y.   S.  323,   1128 
V.  Village  of  Nyack,  39  N.  Y.  S. 
509,  713 

Lyell  V.   Supervisors  &c.,  3  McLean 

580.  1744 

V.    Supervisors  &c.,   6   McLean 
446,  951 

Lyman   v.   Commonwealth,  55   S.  W. 

686.  157,  204 

V.  Gedney,  114  111.  388,  576 

V.  Hampshire  Co.,  138  Mass.  74, 

1623,  1624 

Xynch.  Ex  parte,  2  Hill  45,  870,  1674 

V.  Clark.  1  Sandf.  Ch.  584,  131 

V.    Eastern  &c.   R.   Co.,   57  Wis. 
430.  1728 

V.  Lafland.  4  Coldw.  96,    90,  103.  456 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  76  N.  Y.  60.  1603 

V.  Mayor  &c..  47  Hun  524,  1640 

V.  People.  16  Mich.  472.  539 

Lynchburg  &c.   R.   Co.  v.   Board  &c., 

109  N.  C.  159.  855 

Lynde  v.  County,  16  Wall.  6.  1011,  1016 

Lyon  V-  Adams,  4  S.  &  R.  443,  1527 

V.  Adamson.  7  Iowa  509,  217 

V.  Alley.  130  V.  S.  177.  1254 

V.    Fairfield    Co.,    2    Root    30,    1735 
V.  Ooree.  15  Ala.  360,  222 

V.  Irish.  58  Mich.  518,  216 

V.  Jerome,   15   Wend.   569,  674 

V.   Jerome,    26   Wend.    485, 

282.  547,  705,  1539 
V.  Munson,  2  Cow.  426.  1573 

V.   Rice,   41   Conn.   245.  339.   341 

V.  Town  of  Tonawanda,  98  Fed. 
361,  1166.   1285.  1792 

Lyon  Co.  v.  Keene  &c.  Bank,  97  Fed. 

159.  999 

V.    keene    &c.    Bank,    100    Fed. 
337.  876.  ion.  1032 

Lyons  v.  City  of  Cambridge,  132  Mass. 
534.  1622 

V.   City  of  Red  Wing,  76  Minn. 
20,  930,  1330.  1796 

v.    Inhabitants    &c.,    119    Mass. 
491.  1595 

V.  Munson,  99  U.  S.  684,  1001 


Lyth  v.  City  of  Buffalo,  48  Hun  175,  188 
M 

Maanum    v.    City    of    Madison,    104 

Wis.  272,  1800 

Macauley  v.  Mayor  &c.,  67  N.  Y.  602, 

817,   1557 
Mace  V.   Nottingham-West,   1   N.   H. 

52,  1053 

Mack  V.  Jones,  21  N.  H.  393,  623,  1545 
MacKenzie    v.    Wooley,    39    La.    An. 

944,  485 

Mackey    v.    City    of    Vicksburg,    64 

Miss.  777,  794,  816 

V.  Columbus  Tp.,  71  Mich.  227,  1172 
Mackie  v.  City  of  West  Bay  City,  106 

Mich.  242,  1331 

Macklin  v.  Trustees  &c.,  88  Ky.  592, 

844.   1489 
Macklot  V.  City  of  Davenport,  17  Iowa 

379,  221,  1725 

MacLean  v.  Speed,  52  Mich.  257,  1672 
Macomber  v.  Nichols.  34  Mich.  212,  1556 
Macon  v.  Patty,  57  Miss.  378,  1262 

Macon  Co.   v.   Shores,  97  U.   S.   272 

995.  1000,  1001,  1018 
Macy  V.   City  of   Duluth,    68   Minn. 

452  731 

V.  City  of  Indianapolis,  17  Ind. 

267,  •  1177 

Madden  v.  Smeltz,  2  Ohio  C.  C.  168  544 
Maddox   v.    Graham,    2    Met.    56. 

280,  983,   1.526,   1527,   1528,   1681 

V.   Neal.   45   Ark.    121,        1494.    1496 
Maddux  v.  City  of  Newport,  12  Ky. 
,.  ,.L-    657,  -'1157 

Madi.son    v.    Harbor    Board,    76    Md 
,.  ,.3«5.  1687 

Madison  &c.  Church  v.  Baptist  Church, 

5  Robt.  649,  290 

Madison  Overseers  v.  Poor  Directors 

9  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  R.  435,  1049 

Madison  Tp.  v.  Dunkle,  114  Ind    262 

ivr  ^  r,  ^  861,   903 

Madry  v.   Cox,   73  Tex.  538, 

394,  404,  1518 

Magee  v.  City  of  Troy,  48  Hun  383, 

1  N.  Y.  S.  24.  935.  1609.  1617 

V.    Commonwealth,    46    Pa.    St. 
35S.  593,   1267 

V.  Supervisors,  10  Cal.  376.  381 

Magie  v.  Stoddard.  25  Conn.  565.         198 

Magill  V.  Kauffman.  4  S.  &  R.  317      240 

Magneau  v.  City  of  Fremont.  30  Neb. 

843,  195,  274.  276.  278,  1508 

Maguire  v.  Mayor  &c.,  76  Ga.  84.         1177 
V.   Middlesex  R.   Co.,   115   Mass. 
239.  1618 

V.  Smock,  42  Ind.  1,  1258 

V.    State    Saving    Inst.,    62    Mo. 
344,  1725 

Mahady   v.    Bushwick   R.    Co.,   91   N. 

Y.  498,  1599 

Mahaska  Co.  v.  Ingalls,  16  Iowa  81,     324 

Maher   v.    City   of   Chicago.    38    111. 

266.  239.  649.  1306 

v.  City  of  Ottawa,  114  111.  659.     624 

Mahon    v.    Mayor   &c.,    31    N.    Y.    S. 

676.  783 

Mahoney  v.  Dankwart.  108  Iowa  321,  540 

Mahony  v.  Bank.  4  Ark.  620.  50 

Main  v.  Fort  Smith,  49  Ark.  480. 

285.  1259 

Maine  Water  Co.   v.   City  of  Water- 

ville.  93  Maine  586.     722.  725.  1548 

Mairs  v.  City  of  New  York,  65  N.  Y. 

S.  160.  721 

V.   Manhattan  &c.  Ass'n,  89  N. 
Y.  498,  1599 

V.  Mayor  &c.,  62  N.  Y.  S.  351. 

720,  736 


CXXXll 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


IReferences  are  to  Pages.   Vol.  I,  VV.  1-832;  Vol.  II,  VV-  SSS-mO.I 


Kauffman,  35  Ohio  St. 


Makemson  v.  i^iiuumnu,  ^^  ..^.v,  ~-^2RR 

Makinnon   v.    Tenson,   25   Eng.   L.  & 

Ea    457 
Makleyv.  Whitmore,  61  ^^^l^l^.m'!  \^^^ 
Malcam  v.  City  of  Boston,  173  Mass.^^^^ 
Mall    v7  City    of    Portland,    35    O^.^^^^ 

Mallett  V.  Uncle  Sam  &c.  Co.,  1  Nev. 

1  <<s 
Mallory'v.  Griffey,  85  Pa.  St.  275,     1613 

V.  Supervisors,  2  Cow.  531,  -^'O 

Malone  v.  City  of  Toledo,  28  Ohio  St.  ^^^ 

v^  Murphy,  2  Kan.  250.  ,„^1412 

Maloney  v.   City  of  Cambridge,   I'-^^^g^ 

v'Took.'21  R.  I.  471,  928    930,  1366 
Maltus  V.   Shields,  2  Met.  553,  X^^o 

Manchester  v.   City  of  Hartford    30 

Conn.  118.  „   T>^nk 

Maneval^v.   Jackson  Tp.,  9  Pa.  ^Ca  ^_^ 

Mangam'v.'  Brooklyn.  98  N.  Y.  585  183 
Manhattan  Co.  v.  Van  Keuren,  23  N._^ 

7    Ea    '^51  -Li'-" 

Manhattan  R.  Co.,  In  re,  102  N.  ^- 

301  y—j^ 

Manhattan  Sav.  Inst.  v.  New  York 

&c.  Bank.  59  N.  Y   S    51,  101^ 

Manice  v.  Mayor  &c.,  8  N.  Y.  120^^^  ^^^^ 

Manker  v.  Faulhaber,  94  Mo.  J50^^^^  ^^^ 

Manley  v.  Emlen.  46  Kan.  655.  1450 

Mann  V.  City  of  Le  Mars,  109  Iowa  ^^^ 

v^Citv  of  Yazoo.  31  Miss.  574.  324 
Manning  I  City  of  Lowell,  130  Mass.^^^_ 

v^ben.  90  Cal.  610,  1262 

V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  6  Pick.  6^^^  ^^^^ 

Mannix  v.   State,   115  Ind    245,  1676 

Manor  v.  McCall.  5  <??•  ?22.  1683 

Manross  v.  City  of  Oil  City,  178  Pa. 

St    '^76  -lo-o 

Mansfield  v.'  Fuller    50  Mo.  338  1527 

V  Mavor  &.C.,  44  X.  Y.  S.  J.ly,  i(o- 
Manuel  V  Board  &c..  98  N.  C.  9,  1076 
Manufacturers-  Nafl  Bank  v.  Dicker- 

son.  41  N.  J.  L.  448.  329 

Marble  v.  City  of  Worcester,  4  Gray^^^^ 

V.  McKenney,  60  Maine  332^^^    ^^^ 

V.  Whitney.  28  N    Y.  297,  'l559 

Marbury  v.  Madison.  1  Cranch  137.     3id 
March  v.  Commonwealth,  12  B^  Mo° •_  ^23 

Marcha'nd  v.  Town  of  Maple  Grove, 
48  Minn.  276,  c-ar 

Marchant  v.  Langworthy,  ^gHillg^l^.^^^^ 

V    Tayloi*.  19  111.  633.  '  1559 

Marden  v.  City  of  Boston,  155  Mass.^^^^ 

v^Vtsmouth.  59  N:  H  1^.  201 
Marion  Co.  v.  Coler.  7o  Fed.  352,  1685 
Marion   &c.   R.   Co.   v.   Champlin,   37 

Mark'^vl^St^te,  97  N.  Y.  572,  111,  495 
Market  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Central  R.  Co-     ^ 

51   Cal    583  I.30Z 

Markey  v.  City  of  Milwaukee,  76  Wis. 

349,  ^^"^ 


Markle  V.  Town  Council  ^^-^^^^^^^^^4. 

V    Wright,  13  Ind    548,  296 

Marney  v.   State,   13   Mo.   7,  Am 

Marquette    Co.    v.    Ward,    50   Mich.     ^^^ 

Marquis'  v.   City  of  Santa  Ana,   103  ^^^ 

Marsh'v.  Board  &c.,  42  Wis.  502.  ^    ^^^^ 

V.   City   of  Brooklyn,   59   N.   Y.^^^^ 

v%ulton  Co.,  10  Wall.  676,  233 

^53    "57    ^58.  633,  636.  644,  890,  977 
984,  993,  994,  998,  1000._  lOOL  1023 

V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  153"Mass.  34,  355 
V.  Town  of  Little  Valley,  64  N 
Y    112  870,   IoJd 

Marshall  v.'  Borough  of  BUwood  City, 

189  Pa.  St.  348,  ^^^  ^      „  ^^1 

V.  City  of  Belle  Plaine,  106  lowa^^^^ 

V.  City  of  BuflCalo,  64  N.  Y.  S.  ^^^ 

V.    Commonwealth,    59    Pa.    St.     ^^ 
455  i-1—i- 

V.  Donovan.  10  Bush  681,  1513 

V.  Harwood,  5  Md.  423,  168 

V.  Silliman,  61  111.  21|.^^  ^^^^^  ^^3^ 

V.  Smith.  L.  R.  8  C.  P.  416,         535 

V.  State,  1  Ind.  72.  1660 

V.  Vicksburg.  15  Wall    146,  1537 

Marshall  Co.  v.  Cook.  38  111.  44    973,  987 

Martel  v.   City  of  St.   Louis,  ^^^^^-^^^^ 

Martens  v.  People,  386  111.  314,  492 

Martin  v.   Brown    62  Tex.   485  1490 

V.    Chicago   &c.    R.    Co.,    87    I"- 
Ar»r)     '^OS  XoUo 

V.  Cit"y  Council,   13  Rich.  Eq. 
50  io±ii 

v.'^City   of  Chelsea,   175   Mass.^^^^ 


V.  Dix,  52  Miss.  53, 

405,  673.  1516,  loi» 
V.  Gleason.  139  Mass.  183,  674  688 
V.  Hilt.  53  Ark.  300,  1175 

V  Lemon,  26  Conn.  192,  294 

^-  ^'^^r'-5l"2"3'1f47,  668,  700,  701 
V.  Neal.'l25'lnd.  547  947 

V.  Slaughter,  20  Ky.  L.  1743      1307 

V  State,  23  Neb.  371.  472,  16(i7 
v'  Stanaback.  53  N.  J.  L.  529,  1044 
V.  Territory.  5  Okl.  188,  8<8 
v.  Towle,  59  N.  IT.  31,  1Q27 
V.  Town  of  Rosedale,  130  Ind. 
109  ^ 

Martindale  v.    Martindale,   10   Ind. 

566,  ^     ,_  °~* 

V.  Palmer.  52  Ind.g411.^^    ^^^    ^^^^ 

Martinovich  v.  Wooley,  128  ^a^^l^ll,^^^^ 

Martz  V.  Long.  110  Pa    St    502,      '     154 
Martz-s  Election.  1  Atl    419.  154 

Marvin  v.  McCullum.  20  Johns.  288,  1017 

V  Town  of  Jacobs.  7<   ^^  is.  .^1,     9bb 

V  United  States.  44  Fed.  405,       179 
Maryland  v.  Baltimore  &c.  R.  Co.,  3  ^^^ 

MasonT"Bi-istol    10  N.  H    36  1053 

V.  City  of  Chicago,  178  I1L^499.^^^^ 

V.  City  of  Des  Moines,  108  I"^a 
658  '         i-i'f 

V.  City  of  Shawneetown.  77  ^m  ^^^ 

i    rearson.  9  How.  248,  1201 


TABLE   OP    CASES. 


CXXXlll 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Vol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol.  11,  pp.  833-1830.^ 


Mason  v.  Johnson,  51  Cal.  612,  1552 
V.  Kennedy,  89  Mo.  23,  302 

V.    Messengei',    17    Iowa   261,  602 

V.  School  Dist.,  20  Vt.  487, 

340,  343,  346,  1485 
V.  Trustees  &c.,  4  Bush  406. 

1399.   1507 

Massachusetts  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  154 

Mass.  402,  1631 

Massing  v.  Ames,  37  Wis.  645,  1255 

Massinger  v.  City  of  Millville,  63  N. 

J.  L.  123  527 

Master  &'c.  v.  Broolsing,  3  Q.  B.  95,       500 

Master  of  Butchers'  Co.  v.  Bullock,  3 

Bos.  &  I'ul.  434,  534 

Master  of  Vintners'  Co.  v.  Passey,  1 

Burr.  235.  517,  528 

Masters    v.    City    of    Troy,    50    Hun 

485,  1616.  1617.  1623.  1626 

V.  Village  of  Bowling  Green,  101 
Fed.  101,  804 

Matheny  v.  Wolffs,  2  Duv.   137,  745 

Mather   v.   City  of   Ottawa,    114   111. 

659,  559,  659,  980 

V.    Crawford,   36   Barb.   564. 

1172.  1580 

Matheson  v.  Town  of  Mazomanie,  20 

Wis.  191,  1726 

Mathis  V.  Rose,  64  N.  J.  L.  45,  208 

Matthews  v.  City  of  Alexandria,  68 

Mo.   115,  281,  629 

V.    Inhabitants  &c.,    131    Mass. 

521,  362,  366,  662 

Mattingly  v.  City  of  Plymouth,   100 

Ind.  545,  1224,  1255 

V.    District   of   Columbia,   97    IJ. 

S.  687,  1302 

Maudlin  v.  City  of  Trenton,  67  Mo. 

App.   452,  515.   1777 

Mauldin  v.   City   Council   &c.,   33    S. 

O.  1,  571,  1465 

Maultby  v.  City  of  Leavenworth,  28 

Kan.  745,  1632 

Maupin  v.  Franklin  Co.,  67  Mo.  327, 

233,  647,  1171 

Maurin  v.   Smith.  25  La.  An.  445.     1534 

Maury  Co.  v.  Lewis  Co..  1  Swan  236,      14 

Mans  V.  City  of  Springfield,  101  Mo. 

613,  1374,  1631 

Maxmilian   v.    Mayor   &c..    62    N.    Y. 

160,       775,  781,  786,  788,  814,  1076 
1096,  1768 

Maxwell  v.  Board  &c..  119  Ind.  20,  699 
V.  City  of  Chicago.  185  111.  18,  1277 
V.  Newbold.   18  How.  511,  1263 

V.  Tolly,  26  S.  C.  77.  381 

May  V.   Cass   Co.,   30   Fed.   762.  933 

V.    City    of    Boston,    150    Mass. 
517,  1622 

V.  City  of  Gloucester,  174  Mass. 
583.  716 

V.  Holdridge,  23  Wis.  93.  558 

V.   Juneau  Co..  30  Fed.   241,  779 

V.   Logan  Co.,  30  Fed.   250,  779 

V.  Mercer  Co.,  30  Fed.  246,  779 

•^.  People,  1  Colo.   157,  503 

Mayall  v.  City  of  St.  Paul,  30  Minn. 

294,  1140,  1202 

Mayberry    v.    Inhabitants   &c.,    56 

Maine  342,  1373 

Mayer  v.  American  Ins.  Co.,  15  Daly 

215,  1419 

V.  Sweeney,  22  Mont.  103,  186 

Mayfleld  v.  Moore.  53  111.  428,  198 

Mayhew  v.  District  of  Gay  Head.  13 

Allen  129.  300,  365 

Maylone  v.  City  of  St.  Paul,  40  Minn. 

406.  827 

Maynard    v.    Board    &e.,    84    Mich. 

228.  376 

V.    City    of   Northampton,    157 
Mass.  218,  1182 


Maynard    v.    Woodward,    36    Mich. 

423,  664 

Mayor  «!cc.,  Ex  parte,  23  Wend.  277,  1253 
Mayor  &c..  In  re,  99  N.  Y.  569,  1536 

Mayor  &c.,  In  re,  54  N.  Y.  S.  1066,  1782 
Mayor  &c.,   In  re,   11   Johns.   77, 

1247,  1512,  1545 
Mayor,  Matter  of,  58  N.  Y.  S.  736,  1318 
Mayor  «&c.  v.  Africa,  77  Fed.  501, 

1350,  1351 
V.  Allaire,  14  Ala.  400, 

98,  495,  496,  607 
V.  Althrop,   5  Coldw.   554,  1521 

V.  Bailey,  2  Denio  433, 

688,  1208,  1543 
V.  Baldwin,  57  Ala.  61, 

1287,   1502,   1722 
V.   Baltimore  &c.   R.   Co.,  6  Gill 
288,  1545 

V.  Baltimore  &c.  R.  Co.,  21  Md. 
50,  1722 

V.   Beasly,   1    Humph.   232,  499 

V.  Blache,  3  Miller  618,  326 

V.  Board  &c.,  113  Mass.  161,  1037 
V.  Board  &c.,  15  Md.  376,  1432 

V.  Bolt.  5  Ves.  Jr.  129,  1125 

V.  Bonnell,  57  N.  J.  L.  424,  749 

V.  Boone,  93  Ga.  662,  1333 

V.  Bouldin,  23  Md.  328,  692,  1572 
V.  Bowman,  39  Miss.  671,  254,  1389 
V.  Boyd.  64  Md.  10,  1137 

V.  Broadway  &c.  R.  Co.,  97  N.  Y. 
275,  521 

V.  Broadway  &c.  R.  Co.,  17  Hun 
242.  1509 

V.   Brooke,  7  Q.   B.  339,  92 

V.   Brown,   65   Cal.   583,  1542 

V.  Brown,  9  Heisk.  6,  1075 

V.  Cabot.  28  Ga.  50.  572,  1079 

V.  Caldwell.  81  Ga.  76.  1738 

V.  Central  R.  Co.,  53  Ga.  120,       699 
V.   Central  &c.  R.   Co.,  40  N.   J. 
Eq.  417.  1317 

V.  Chapman,  94  Ga.  711,  1358 

V.  Colgate.  12  N.  Y.  141.  1261 

V.  Commissioners  &c.,  122  N.  C. 
5.  986 

V.   Cowen.  88  Md.  447,  1379 

V.  Crowell,  40  N.  J.  L.  207,  326 

V.  Cunlifif,  2  N.  Y.  165, 

233,  251,  647,  1596 
V.  Dean.  62  111.  App.  41.  1712 

V.  Dearing.  15  La.  An.  208,  1410 

V.  Dechert,  32  Md.  369,  76,  109,  1410 
V.   Dennison,  69  Fed.   58, 

984.  993,  1006 
V.  Dickerson,  45  X.  J.  L.  38.  315 
V.  Dufty.  70  Md.  47.  1177,  1180 

V.  Dupuis.  30  La.   An.   1105,  480 

V.  Dykes.  103  Ga.  847.  1332 

V.  Elliott.  3  Rawie  170.  563,  664 
V.  Eschbach,  IS  Md.  276, 

217.  253,  260,   1257 
V.  Ewing.  2  Penn.  66.  1376 

V.  Fahm.  60  Ga.  109.  1436 

V.  Feeley.  66  Ga.  31.  1551 

V.  Finney.  54  Ga.  317,  58,  61,  94,  117 
V.  Furze,  3  Hill  612. 

745.   779,    1159,   1592 
V.  Gear,  27  N.  J.  L.  265, 

201.  487,  1657 
V.  Georgia  R.  Co..  72  Ga.  800,  517 
V.  Gerspach,  33  La.  An.  1011. 

608.  1081,  1110,  1121 
V.  Gieler.  13  Lea  611.  1209 

V.  Gill,  31  Md.  375. 

651.  654.  883.  889.  1730 
V.  Gilmore.  21  Fed.  870. 

996.  982,  984 
V.  Green  Mount  Cemetery,  7  Md. 
517.  1246 

V.  Groshon,  30  Md.  436,  1730 


CXXXIV 


TABLE  or  CASES. 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Vol.  I,  pp.  1-S32;  YoZ.  II,  pp.  8.?.9-/8.5r).] 


Mayor  &c.  v.  Hall.  46  Kan.  531,  1647 
V.  Ilardwicke.  1..  R.  9  Ex.  13,  261 
V.   Harrison,  30  N.  J.   L.   73,  650 

V.  Hartridge,  37  Ga.  115, 

704.  1232,  1511 
V.  Harwood.  32  Md.  471,  1101,  1232 
V.  Havs.  25  Ga.  590.  1445 

V.   Hehley,   2   CI.  &  F.   331,  123 

V.  Hoffman,  29  La.  An.  651, 

594,  1110,  1121.  1391 
V.  Holland  Tr.  Co.,  20  N.  J.  L. 
J    214,  1110,  1710 

V.  Hook,  62  Md.  371,  1196 

V.   Hughes,   110   Ga.   795,  1709 

V.  Hughes.  1  Gill  &  J.  480.  517,  1253 
V.  Hussey.  67  Md.  112,  1552 

V.  Hussv.  21  Ga.  80,  1412 

V.  Hyatt,  3  E.  D.  Smith  156, 

496,  523 
V.  Inman,  57  Ga.  370,  107 

V.  Isaacks,  68  Tex.  116, 

1618,  1619,  1636 
V.  Jackson,  1  Doug.  106,  261,  715 
V.  Jacques.  30  Ga.   506,  1403 

V.   Jersey  City  R.  Co.,  20  N.   J. 
Eq.  360,  90.  103 

V.    Johns   Hopkins   Hospital.    56 
Md.  1.  1239,  1242 

V.  Johnson.  62  Md.  225,  1288 

V.  Jones.  42  Ala.  630.  535 

V.  Jones.  67  Ga.  489.  1499 

V.  Judah.  5  Leigh  305,  246 

V.  Kellv.  98  N.  Y.  467,  178 

V.  Keyser,  72  Md.  106,  654 

V.  Kiernan,  50  N.  J.  L.  246. 

8.32,  1180 
V.  Kimbrough.  12  Heisk.  133,  1075 
V.   King,   7  Lea   441.  1085 

V.  Lanham,  67  Ga.  753.  533,  1085 
V.  Lasser.  9  Humph.  757,  8,  1075 
V.  Lewis,  92  Ala.  352,  1324 

V.  Long,  54  Ga.  330,  1545 

T.  Long,  31  Mo.  369.  697,  704,  1417 
V.  Lord,  9  Wall.  409. 

1526,  1527,  1528 
V.  Lord.  18  Wend.  126,  802 

V.  Lumpkin,  5  Ga.  447,  522 

V.  Lvon.  69  Ga.  577.  1417 

V.  Macon  &c.  Bank.  60  Ga.  133,  1511 
V.  Magruder.  34  Md.  381,  107 

V.  Marriott,  9  :Md.  160.  1125 

T.  Mayberrv,  6  Humph.  368. 

1168.  1198,  1271 
V.  Mayor  &c..  30  Ga.   506.  1106 

V.  McCarv.  84  Ala.  469,  1618,  1639 
V.  McKee.  2  Yerg.  167,  529 

V.  McWilliams,  67  Ga.  106, 

895,  1463 
V.  Merritt,  27  La.  An.  568,  326 

V.  Merrvman,  86  Md.  584.  791 

V.  Messerole,  26  Wend.   132, 

1287,  1722 
V.  Meuer,  35  La.  An.  1192,  1414 

V.  Minor.  73  Ga.  484.  1417 

V.  Mitchell.  79  Ga.  807,  1117 

V.   Moran.   46   Mich.   213,  190 

V.  Mulligan,  95  Ga.  323,  1763 

V.  Murphy.  40  X.  J.  L.  145,  527 
V.   Musgrave,  48  Md.   272, 

233.   250,   646,   699 
V.   Muzzv.   33  Mich.   61,  181 

V.  Nichols.  4  Hill  209.  97.  468,  494 
V.  OTallaghan.  41  X.  J.  L.  349,  244 
V.  O'nonnell.  53  Md.  110.  1608 

V.  Odrenan.  12  Johns.  122.     532,  534 
-     V.    Ohio  &c.   R.   Co..   26   Pa.    St. 
355,  1184,  1352 

V.  O'Neill.  63  Md.  336.  1432 

V.  O'Shee.  51  La.  An.  719.  1505 

V.    Patterson.   109   Ga.   370,  514 

V.  Phelps.  27  Ala.  55.  100,  507 

V.  Porter,  18  Md.  289,  282 


Mayor  &c.  v.  Poultney,  25  Md.  18,       27» 
V.  Kadecke.  49  Md.  217.  500,  .502 

503.  50S.  605.  1387.  1388,  1391.  1704 
V.    Railroad    Com'rs,    113    Mass. 
161,  843 

V.   Railroad  Co.,   21   Md.   50,  192 

V.  Ray.  19  Wall.  468.     210,  235,  239 
240,  637,  645,  837,  838,  863,  941,  971 
97.3   978 
V.  Reilly,  59  Hun  501,  13  N.  Y.' 
S.   521,  720,    1187 

V.  Reynolds.  20  Md.  1,  217.  646 

V.  Root,  8  Md.  95,  1745 

V.  Rowland,  26  Ala.  498,  1744 

V.   Rvan.   35  How.   Pr.   408.  318 

V.  Scharf,  54  Md.  499,  281,  1242 
V.  Scharf.  56  Md.  50.  1242 

V.   Scott.  1   Pa.   St.  309,  685 

V.  Seaber.  3  Burr.  1866.  383 

V.  Second  Ave.  R.  Co..  32  N.  Y. 
261.  568,  618,  1507 

V.  Sehner,  37  Md.  180,  104 

V.  Sharff.  54  Md.  499.  115S 

V.  Sheffield.  4  Wall.  189,  8,  1596 

V.   Shelton,  1  Head  24,  57 

V.  Sibberns,  3  Abb.  App.  Dec.  266, 

318,  332 
V.   Small.   108  Ga.  309,  1754 

V.   Smith,  80  Md.   458.  1300 

V.  Sonneborn,  113  N.  Y.  423, 

650,  746 
V.  Starr.  112  Ala.  98. 

793,   1334,   1338,   1376,   1787 
V.  State,  15  Md.  376, 

120.  440,  761,  1417,  14.33 
V.  State.  30  Md.  112,  426 

V.  State,  30  N.  J.  L.  521,  301 

V.  Steamboat  Co.,  R.  M.  Charlt. 
342.  90 

V.  Stockton.  44  N.  J.  Eq.  179,  629 
V.  Stout.  52  N.  J.  L.  35,  314.  315 
V.  Tavloe.  105  Ala.  170,  1365 

V.  Thomas,  5  Coldw.  600,  1511,  1532 
V.   Thorne,   7   Paige   Ch.    261. 

505,  1392 
V.  Tonev.  10  Lea  643.  464 

V.  United  States,  10  Pet.  662. 

629,  1214 
V.  United  States,  49  Fed.  40, 

1660,  1661 
V.  Vandegrift.  1  Marv.  5,  1329 

V.  Voorhies.  70  Tex.  356,  949 

V.  Weed.  96  Ga.  670,  1270 

V.  Weems.  5  Ind.  547.  1517 

V.  Williams,  15  N.  Y.  502,  601 

V.  Willison.  50  Md.  138,  824 

V.  Wilson,   49  Ga.  476,  681 

V.  Wilson,  82  Ga.  206,  1614 

V.  WiLson.  50  Md.  138,  1208 

V.  Winfield,  8  Humph.  707, 

100.  499,  .502 
V.  Woodward,  12  Heisk.  499,  1445 
V.  Workman.  67  Fed.  347,  798 

V.  Wright.  2  Port.  230,  1422 

V.  Yuiile.  3  Ala.  137,       526.  601,  632 
Mayrhoper   v.    Board   &c.,    89    Cal. 

110.  1734 
Mays  V.   City   of  Cincinnati.   1   Ohio 

St.  268.  494,  1232.  1533 

Mayson   v.   City  of  Atlanta,   77   Ga. 

662.  1400 

Maysville  &c.  Co.  v.  Wiggins,  20  Ky. 

L.  724.  879 

Maywood  Co.  v.  Village  of  Maywood. 

140  111.   216.  1174.  1256 

V.  Village  of  Norwood  Park.  138 

111.  147.  1173 
Mazet  V.  Citv  of  Pittsburgh.  137  Pa. 

St.   548."  654 

McAdam  v.  Mayor  &c.,  36  Hun  340,     188 
McAleer  v.  Angell,  19  R.  I.  688. 

711,  745 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


CXXXV 


{References  are  to  Pages.   Yol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-1880.'] 


McAllister  v.  City  of  Albany,  18  Or. 

426,  1590,  1608 

V.  City  of  Bridgeport,  72  Conn. 
733.  1360 

V.  Pickuk.  84  Iowa  65.  1566 

McAlpine  v.  Sweetser,  76  Ind.  78,  1572 
McArthur   v.    City   of   Saginaw,    58 

Mich.  357,  820.  1341 

McAuIiff  V.  Mayor  &c.,  155  Mass.  216, 

1436,   1437.   1441 
McAvoy  V.  City  of  New  York,  65  N. 

Y.  S.  274,  179 

McBean  v.  City  of  Fresno,  112  Cal. 

159,  722,    726 

McBean  &  Co.  v.  Chandler,  9  Heisk. 

349.  1271 

McBrian    v.    City   of   Grand    Rapids, 

56  Mich.  95,  260,  647 

MeCabe  v.  Board  &c..  46  Ind.  380.         663 
V.  City  of  Cambridge,  134  Mass. 
484.  1623 

McCafferty  v.  Guyer.  59  Pa.  St.  109,  369 
V.    Spuyten    Duyvil    R.    Co.,    61 
N.  Y.  178.  1591 

McCaffrey  v.  Smith,  41  Hun  117,  682 
McCall  V.  Coates,  148  Pa.  St.  462.  583 
McCallie  v.  Mayor  &c.,  3  Head  317, 

456,  986 
McCann  v.  City  of  Albany,  42  N.  Y. 

S.  94,  739.  1779 

V.   City  of  Waltham,   163  Mass. 
344,  789 

McCarlan  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  57  N.  J. 

Eq.   571,  719 

McCarthy   v.    City   of  Portland,   67 

Maine  167.  1595 

V.  City  of  Svracnse.  46  N.  Y.  194. 

222.  808,  821,  1159.  1208 
V.    Commonwealth,   110   Pa.    St. 
243.  43 

V.  Froelke,  63  Ind.  507,  185 

V.  Marsh,  5  N.  Y.  263.  133 

V.  Village  of  Far  Rockaway,  38 
N.  Y.  S.  989.  1370 

McCartney  v.  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.,  112 

111.    611.  589,    1706 

McCash   V.    City   of  Burlington,    72 

Iowa  26.  1226 

McCaiiley  v.  School  Dist.,  133  Pa.  St. 

403.  1491 

McChnffrey  v.  School  Dist.,  74  Wis. 

100,  1482 

McChosney  v.   City  of  Chicago,   152 

111.   543.  1144,   1293 

V.  Citv  of  Chicago,  159  111.  223,  540 
V.  Citv  of  Chicago,  161  111.  110,  1277 
V.   People,  148   111.  221.  1278 

V.  Village  of  Hyde  Park.  151  111. 
634,  1259 

McClain    v.    Incorpoi-ated    Town    of 

Garden  Grove.  83  Iowa  235.         1581 
McClay  v.   City  of  Lincoln.   32  Neb. 

412,  393,  1515 

I\TcClellan  v.  Reynolds,  49  Mo.  312,  217 
McClentlcks  v.  Bryant,  1  Mo.  598, 

216.  218 

McCIoskey  v.  Kreling.  76  Cal.  511,     1392 

V.  Mayor  &c..  7  Hun  472,  894 

V.  Willis.  44  N.  Y.  S.  682.  1684 

McClond    V.    Citv    of    Columbus,    54 

Ohio  St.  439.  747 

McClung  v.  St.  Paul,  14  Minn.  420.  175 
McClure    v.    City    of   Red    Wing,    28 

Minn.  186,  1215 

V.  Hill.  36  Ark.  268,  223 

V.  Oxford  Tp..  94  TT.  S.  429. 

210,  985,   1025.   1027,   1757 
V.    Supervisors   &c.,   3   Abb.    Ct. 
App.  S3.  1746 

McComb  V.  Bell.  2  Minn.  295.  1533 

McCombs  V.  City  of  Pittsburgh,  194 

Pa.  St.  348,  1798 


McCombs  V.  Town  Council  &c.,  15 

Ohio  474,  8    265 

McConnell  v.  Dewey,  5  Neb.  ,385,      '       8 

V.    Hamm.   16   Kan.   288,        979,   980 

V.   Simpson.  36  Fed.  750,  gn 

McConville   v.    City   of   St.    Paul,   75 

Minn.   383.  1305 

MeCool  V.  Smith,  1   Black  459,  106 

V.   State,  23  Ind.   127,  530 

McCord    V.    High,    24    Iowa   336, 

221,  223    '''>4 
V.  Pike,  121  111.  288,  '  401 

McCormack   v.    Patchin,    53   Mo.   33, 

1234,  1288,  1297,  137S 
McCormick    v.    Bay    City,    23    Mich. 

457.  299,  310,  1421 

V.  Burt,  95  111.  263,     221,  222,  1495 
V.   City  of  Harrisburg,    129   Pa 
St.   213,  1273 

V.  Moss.  41   111.  352.  393 

McCortle  v.  Bates,  29  Ohio  St.  419, 

280,  1480 
McCoy  V.   Briant,  53  Cal.   247, 

554.    646.   982,    1133 
V.   Corporation  of  Chilicothe,  3 
Ohio   370,  1722 

V.  Curtice.  9  Wend.  17,  295 

V.     Washington    Co.,     3     Phila 
_  „290,  1016 

McCracken  v.  City  of  San  Francisco, 

16   Cal.   591,  242,   259,   291     292 

553,   631,   637 
V.  Soucy,  29  111.  App.  619,  198 

V.  Village  of  Markesan,  76  Wis. 
499.  1641 

McCrary  v.   City  of  Commanche,  34 

S.  W.  679.  66 

McCraw  V.  Williams,  33  Gratt.  510,  196 
McCray   v.    Town   of   Fairmount,    46 

W.  Va.  442.  1379,  1774 

McCrea    v.    Chahoon,    54    Hun    577, 

219    9.39 
V.  Jacobs,  19  Abb.  N.  C.  188,    'l415 
McCready   v.    Guardians,   9   S.   &   R. 

94.  295.  616 

V.   Sexton,  29  Iowa  356,   1166,   1505 
V.  Virginia.  94  IT.  S.  391,  137 

McCrickart  v.  City  of  Pittsburgh,  88 

Pa.  St.  133,  246 

McCrowell  v.  City  of  Bristol,  89  Va. 

652.  509 

V.  Mayor  &c.,  5  Lea  685,  831 

McCue    V.    Wapello    Co.,    56    Iowa 

698,  198 

McCulloch  V.  Ayer,  96  Fed.   178,        1393 

V.   Maryland.  4  Wheat.  316.     45.  46 

McCullough  V.  Moss,  5  Denio  567,     1088 

V.    Talladega    Insurance   Co.,   46 

Ala.    376.  260 

McCune  v.  Norwich  Gas  Co.,  30  Conn. 

521,  4.    6 

McCunney  v.  Citv  of  New  York,  58 

N.    Y.    S.    138,  180 

McCurdy  v.   Bowes.  88  Ind.  583,  863 

V.   Rogers,  21   Wis.   199.  217 

McCiitcheon  v.  Common  Council  &c., 

43  Mich.  483.  814.  1586 

v.  Homer.  43  Mich.  483.  8 

McDade  v.  City  of  Chester.  117  Pa. 

St.    414.  264,    820,    830 

McDaniel  v.  Richards.  1  McC.  187.  134 
:McDaniell  v.  Tebbetts.  60  N.  H.  497,  229 
McDaniels  v.   Flower  Brook  &c.  Co., 

22  Vt.  274.  352 

McDermott  v.  Board  &c.,  5  Abb.  Pr. 

422.  466 

McDonald    v.    City    of    Ashland,    78 

Wis.    251,  1210 

v.   Citv  of  New  York,   59  N.   Y. 
S.    16,  164.   928.   929.   031 

V.  City  of  Toledo,  63  Fed.  60,     1344 


CXXXVl 


TABLE  OF  CASES. 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Vol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.1 


McDonald  v.  City  of  Troy,  36  N.  Y. 

St.  704,  828 

V.  English.  85  III.  232,  1112 

V.  Massachusetts  Gen'l  Hospital, 

120  Mass.  432.  806 

V.  Mayor  &c..  68  N.  Y.  23, 

210,   233,   252,   253,   254,  257,  260 
644.   645,   649.   894,   1212 

V.  Murphree,  45  Miss.  705,  1288 

V.  Payne,  114  Ind.  359.  679 

McDonogh     v.     Murdoch,     15     How. 

367,  563,   664 

McDouough  V.  Gilman,  3  Allen  264, 

811,  1095 
McDougal  V.  Board  &c.,  4  Minn.  184, 

1744,  1745 
McDowell  V.  Massachusetts  &c.  Const. 

Co.,  96  N.   C.   514,  370 

McElhaney  v.  Gilleland,  30  Ala.  183,    331 
McEIroy  v.  City  Council  &c.,  65  Ga. 

387,  798,   1075 

V.   Kansas  City,  21   Fed.   257, 

678.    1209 
McEneney  v.  Town  of  Sullivan,  125 

Ind.  407,  1258 

McEwan  v.  City  of  Spokane,  16  Wash. 

212,  741.  1779 

McEwen  v.  City  of  Nashviiie,  36  S. 

W.  968,  739 

McFadden    v.    Board    &c.,    74    Cal. 

571,  1461 

V.   Town  of  Dresden,   80   Maine 

134,  854 

McFarland  v.  Gordon,  70  Vt.  455,         173 

V.  Triton  Ins.  Co.,  4  Denio  392,  1422 
McFarlane   v.    City   of   Chicago,    185 

HI.  242,  1297,  1301 

V.   City  of  Milwaukee,   51   Wis. 

691.  1588 

McGafflgan    v.    City    of    Boston,    149 

Mass.  289,  1616 

McGaffin  v.  City  of  Cohoes,  11  Hun 

.531.  1625 

McGar  v.  Borough  of  Bristol,  71  Conn. 

652.  1380,  1777,  1786 

McGargell    v.    Hazleton   Coa!    Co.,    4 

W.  &  S.  424.  196 

McGarry   v.    Loomis,    63   N.   Y.    104, 

1375,  1595 
McGartv  v.  Deming,  51  Conn.  422. 

107.    1414 
McGear  v.  Woodruff,  33  N.  J.  L.  213, 

539.  541.  542,  1413 
McGee's  Appeal,   114  Pa.   St.   470, 

1317,  1319 
McGee  v.  Laramore,  50  Mo.  425,  217 

V.  Mathis,  4  Wall.  143,  760 

V.  State,  103  Ind.  444.  1676 

McGehee  v.   Mathis,   21   Ark.   40, 

1270.   1508.   1521 

V.   Mavor   &c..   69   Ga.    581,  1725 

McGill  V.  Bruner.  65  Ind.  421.  1150 

McGinnis    v.    Inhabitants    &c.,    176 

Mass.    67.  792 

McGinty  v.  City  of  Keokuk,  66  Iowa 

725.  1802 

McGivney  v.  Pierce,  87  Cal.  124.  115 

McGlue  V.   City  of   Philadelphia,   10 

Phila.  348.  893 

McGonigle  v.   City  of  Allegheny.   44 

Pa.  St.  118.  1498 

McGoodwin  v.  City  of  Franklin,  18 

Kv.  L.  752.  874 

McGorty  v.  Deeming.  51  Conn.  422.    1419 
McGovern  v.  Board  &c.,  57  N.  J.  L. 

580.  753 

McGowan  v.  Deyo.  8  Barb.  340.  311 

McGrath  v.  City  of  Chicago.  24  111. 

App.    19,  92,    160.    167 

McGrnw  v.  Town  of  Marion,  98  Ky. 

673.  804 

McGraw's  Estate,  111  N.  Y.  66,         1487 


McGrew  v.   Governor,   19  Ala.   89,       334 
McGruder  v.   State,  83  Ga.  616.  106 

McGuiness  v.  School  Dist.,  39  Minn. 

499.  1491 

McGuinn  v.  Peri,  16  La.  An.  326,       1257 
McGuire  v.   Atlantic  City,   63   N.   J. 

L.   91.  609 

V.  Brockman.  58  Mo.  App.  307.    1308 
V.    City   of   Rapid   City,   6   Dak. 
346.  637 

V.  Galligan.  57  Mich.  38,  222 

V.  Spence,  91  N.  Y.  303, 

1375,    1595,    1631,    1635 
V.   Williams.    123   N.   C.   349,  986 

McGurn  v.  Board  of  Education,  133 

111.    122,  121,    1474 

McHale   v.    Easton   &c.    Transit   Co., 

169    Pa.    St.    416.  1205.    1346 

McHarrey  v.  School  Trustees,  68  111. 

140,  1483 

McHenry  v.  Selvage.  18  Ky.  L.  473.  1799 

v.  Township  Board  &c.,  65  Mich. 

9.  1675 

Mcllvain  v.  State,  87  Ind.  602.  530 

Mclnerney  v.  Citv  of  Denver.  17  Colo. 

302.  496.  531,  532.  541.  542.  543 
Mclnery    v.    City    of    Galveston,    58 

Tex.  334.  174,  175 

Mclnstrv  v.  Tanner,  9  Johns.   135,     195 
Mclntire  v.  State,  5  Blackf.  384,         704 

V.     Williamson,     8     Kan.     App. 

711,  1554 

Mcintosh  V.   City  of  Charleston,   45 

S.    C.    584,  563 

Mclntyre  v.  Board  &c.,  15  Colo.  App. 

78,  612.    1698 

V.    School   Trustees,   3    111.    App. 

77,  322 

McKay   v.    City   of   Buffalo,    9    Hun 

401,  1097 

V.    Citv    of    Buffalo,    74    N.    Y. 

619.  1097 

V.  Welch,  6  N.  Y.  S.  358.  1050 

McKeague  v.  City  of  Green  Bay,  106 

Wis.   577.  1366 

McKean  v.   City  of  Mt.   Vernon.   51 

Iowa   306.  415 

McKechnJe  Brew.  Co.  v.  Trustees  &c.. 

44  N.  Y.  S.  317.  1281.  1297,  1299 
McKecknie  v.  Ward.  58  N.  Y.  541.  320 
McKee  v.  Bidwell.  74  Pa.  St.  218,     1627 

V.  Brown.  23  La.  An.  306,  1257 

V.  Lamon,  159  TT.   S.  317,  1700 

V.  McKee,  8  B.  Mon.  433.  533 

V.  Town  of  Pendleton,  154  Ind. 

652.  1151,   1266 

V.  Vernon  Co.,  3  Dill.  210. 

998.    1014,    1022.    1023 
McKeigue   v.    City   of   Janesville,    68 

Wis.  50,  936.  1620.  1632 

McKellar  v.  City  of  Detroit,  57  Mich. 

158.  1586 

McKenna,    Ex    parte.    126    Cal.    429. 

1387.  1388 

V.   Citv  of  New  York,   34  App. 

Div.    152.  88 

V.  Citv  of  St.  Louis.  6  Mo.  App. 

320.  264 

V.  Fdmundstone.  91  N.  Y.  231.     106 

V.   Kimball.   145  Mass.  555.  1474 

McKibbin    v.    Fort    Scott,    35    Ark. 

352,  533 

McKinney  v.  Robinson,  84  Tex.  489. 

902.  904 

V.  State,  68  Miss.  284.  909 

V.  Town  of  Salem,  77  Ind.  213,  1677 
McKinnon  v.  Penson,  8  Ex.  319,  831 

McKissick  v.   City  of  St.  Louis,   154 

Mo.   588,  1801 

McKnight  v.   City  of  Pittsburgh,  91 

Pa.  St.  273,  802 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


CXXXVll 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Vol.  I, 

McKnight  v.   Grant  Parish,  30  La. 

An.  361,  1530 

McKusick  V.   City  of  Stillwater,   44 

Miun.  372,  1197 

McLain  v.  Mariche,  60  Neb.  3.53,       1698 
V.    Snyder   Tp.    School   Dist.,   12 
Pa.   St.  204,  1480 

McLaughlin  v.   Burroughs,  90  Mich. 

311.  16!56 

V.  Municipality.  5  La.  An.  .504,     700 
V.  Stephens,  3  Cr.  C.  C.  148.         607 
McLauren   v.    City   of   Grand    Forks. 

6   Dak.   397,  570,   1131,   1259 

McLaury  v.  McGregor  City,  54  Iowa 

717,  1637 

McLean  Co.  v.  City  of  Bloomington, 

106   111.   209,  1245 

V.  Humphreys,  104  III.  378,         1071 
McLellan  v.  Board  &c.,  15  Mo.  App. 

362,  1492 

V.  Young.  54  Ga.  399,  1744 

McLendon  v.  City  of  La  Grange,  107 

Ga.  356,  1506 

McLin  V.  City  of  New  Berne,  70  N. 

C.  12,  1402 

McLorinan    v.    Bridgewater    Tp.,    49 

X.  J.  L.  624,  1045 

McLoud  V.   Selby,   10  Conn.   390, 

142,    341,    965,    1735 
McMahon   v.    City   of   Dubuque,    107 

Iowa  62,  789 

V.   Mayor  &c..  66  Ga.  217.  370 

McMannis  v.   Butler,  51   Barb.   436, 

1559,  1562 
McManus  v.  City  of  Philadelphia,  195 

Pa.   St.  304.  744 

V.   McDonough,   107  111.  95,  698 

V.  People,  183  111.  391. 

511,  1149,  1274,  1277 
McMasters  v.  Commonwealth,  3  Watts 

292,  1233,  1266 

McMicken    v.    City    of   Cincinnati,    4 

Ohio  St.  394.  697 

McMillan  v.  Anderson,  95  U.   S.   37, 

694,  1.537 
V.   Richards.  9  Cal.  365,  417,     1725 
V.     School    Com'rs,    107    N.    C. 
609,  1494 

McMillen  v.  Anderson,  95  U.  S.  37, 

1238,  1239 
McNallv  V.   City  of  Cohoes,  53  Hun 

202.  829,  1615 

McNamara  v.  Estes,  22  Iowa  246.       1232 
V.    Village    of    Clintonville,    62 
Wis.    207,  1802 

McNeal    v.    City   of   Waco,    89    Tex. 

83.  724 

V.  Mayor  &c.,  51  N.  J.  L.  444,     1738 
McNernev  v.  Reading  City,   150  Pa. 

St.  611,  1340 

McNultv  V.  City  of  Cambridge,  130 

Mass.  275.  1622 

McNutt   V.    Livingston,   7   Sm.   &  M. 

641,  226 

McOsker  v.  Burrell.  55  Ind.  425.  221 

McPheeters  v.  Wright,  110  Ind.  519,  1489 
McPherson    v.    Citv    of    Buffalo,    43 

N.  Y.  S.  609.  1344 

V.    Foster,   43   Iowa   48. 

890.  891,  1023,  1368,  1459.  1524 

V.  Village  of  Chebanse,  114  HI. 

46.  494 

McPike  V.  Pen.  48  Mo.  525,  1722 

V.  Pen,  51   Mo.  63.  368 

McQueen  v.  City  of  Elkhart,  14  Ind. 

App.  671.  789 

McQuiddy  v.  Smith,  67  Mo.  App.  205. 

1132.  1299 
McQuillen    v.    Hatton.    42    Ohio    St. 

202,  685 

McRea  v.  Mayor  &c.,  59  Ga.  168,  496 


pp.  1-832;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.] 

McSpedon    v.    Mayor    &c.,    7    Bosw. 

601,  253 

McTeer  v.   Lebow,  85  Tenn.  121,  222 

McTwiggan  v.  Hunter,  19  R.  I.  265,     745 
McVeany    v.    Mayor    &c.,    80    N.    Y. 

185,  213,  380 

McVerry  v.  Boyd,  89  Cal.  304,  1233 

McVichie    v.    Town    of    Knight,    82 

Wis.  137,  340.  344.  346,  347 

McWhorter  v.  People,  65  111.  290.         973 
Meacham  v.  Fitchburg  R.  Co.,  4  Cush. 

291,  704 

Mead    v.    City   of   Chicago,    186    111. 

54,  511,    512,    1275,    1279 

V.  City  of  New  Haven,  40  Conn. 
72,  1097 

V.   City  of  Pittsburgh,   194   Pa. 
St.  392.  1773 

V.    Inhabitants    &c.,    139    Mass. 
341.  559,  672 

Meadowcraft  v.  People,  154  111.  416.  1303 
Meadow  Dam  Co.  v.  Gray,  30  Maine 

547,  994 

Meagher  v.  Storey  Co.,  5  Nev.  244, 

196,    213,    1445 
Means  v.  Hendershott.  24  Iowa  78,     671 
V.   Webster.   23   Ind.   432,  957 

Meares  v.  Commissioners  &c.  of  Wil- 
mington, 9   Ired.  L.  73,  8,  265 
Mears  v.  Citv  of  Spokane,  22  Wash. 

323.  1366 

Medical    Inst.    v.    Patterson,    1    Den. 

61,  51,  84 

Medland  v.  Linton,  60  Neb.  249, 

1239.  1240,  1241.  1244,  1277 
Meech   v.   City  of  Buffalo,   29   N.   Y. 

198,  720,    1232 

Meek    v.    McClure,    49    Cal.    623. 

1552.   1725 
Meeker  v.  Van  Rensselaer.  15  Wend. 

397,  1122,  1394 

Meggett   V.    Citv   of   Eau    Claire.    81 

Wis.  326.    558.  593,  1204,  1252,  1253 
Meiners    v.    City    of    St.    Louis,    130 

Mo.  274,  1373 

Meinzer  v.   City  of  Racine,   68   Wis. 

241.  1225 

Meissner  v.   Bovle,  20  Utah  316. 

174.  1767 
Mellor   V.    Burgess   &c.,    191    Pa.    St. 

562.  1331 

Melon    St.,    In   re,    1    Pa.    Super.    Ct. 

63,  1318 

Melvin  v.  Lisenby.  72  111.  63.  991 

Memphis  v.  Brown.  97  U.  S.  300,        1531 

V.  Laski.  9  Heisk.  511.  1745 

V.   United  States,  97  U.   S.  293, 

765.  1529.  1531 
Memphis   Freight   Co.   v.   Mayor  &c., 

4  Coldw.  419,  685 

Memphis    Gaslight    Co.    v.    State,    6 

Coldw.   310.  1512 

Memphis    &c.    R.    Co.    v.    Payne,    37 

Miss.  700.  706 

V.    Railroad   Com'rs,    112   U.    S. 
619,  1689 

Menasha  v.  Hazard,  102  U.  S.  81. 

995.  1001 
Mendel   v.   City  of  Wheeling,   28   W. 

Va.  233,  264,  786.  1394 

Mendenhall  v.  Burton,  42  Kan.  570, 

59,  64,  87,  393,  1514 
Mendocino    Co.    v.    Morris.    32    Cal. 

145.  310 

Menges  v.  City  of  Albany,  56  N.  Y. 

374.  697.    1829 

Menken   v.    City  of  Atlanta,   78   Ga. 

66S,  497 

Menominee    Water    Co.    v.    City    of 

Menominee,    124    Mich.    386.  848 

Meranda   v.    Spurlin,    100    Ind.    3S0. 

696,  1573 


CXXXVlll 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


iReferences  are  to  Pages.   Vol.  I,  pp.  1-S32;  Vol.  II,  pp.  S33-J830.'\ 


Mercantile  &c.   Co.  v.   Collins  &c.  R. 

Co.,   101    Fed.    S47,  1813 

Merced  Co.  v.  Fleming.  Ill  Cal.  46,     540 

Mercer  v.  Corbin,   117  Ind.  450,  1314 

V.  Flovd.  53  N.  y.  S.  433,  926 

V.  Woodgate,  L.  R.  5  Q.  B.  26, 

1557,  1561 

Mercer  Co.  v.  Hackett,  1    Wall.   83, 

1000,  1001,  1006,  1007,  1018,  1031 
V.   Pittsburg  &c.  R.  Co.,  27   Pa. 
St.   389.  1010 

V.    Provident    Life    &c.    Co..    72 
Fed.   623.  1002.   1032,   1757 

Merchants'  &e.   Bank  v.   Bergen  Co., 

115   U.   S.  384.  ^   „ 

210,  1000,  1027,  1028 

Merchants'    Bank   v.    Cook,    4    Pick. 

405,  142 

V.  State  Bank.  10  Wall.  604.       1004 

Merchants'  Nafl  Bank  v.  McKinney, 

2   S.  Dak.   106,  967 

Merchants'  Realty  Co.  v.  City  of  St. 

Paul,  77  Minn.  343,  1310 

Meredith  v.  City  of  Perth  Amboy,  63 

N.  .7.  L.  520,  1284 

Meriwether  v.  Garrett,  102  U.  S.  472, 

81.  103.  10.^.,  124,  142.  233,  457,  458 
629.   1522.   1526.  1529.  1533,  1544 

Merkee  v.  City  of  Rochester,  13  Hun 

157,  530 

Merrell  v,  Campbell,  49  Wis.  535,       1745 

Merriam,  Petition  of,  8  N.  Y.  596,     1539 
V.  City  of  New  Orleans,  14  La. 
An.  3i8.  517,  1520 

Merrick    v.    Burlington    &c.    Co.,    11 

Iowa   74,  260,   715 

V.    Inhabitants    &c.,    12    Allen 
500,  1514 

V.   Mavor  &c..   43   Md.   219.  699 

V.  Wallace.  19  III.  486,  228 

Merrifield  v.  City  of  Worcester,  110 

Mass.    216,  1585 

Merrill  v.  Alibott,  62  Ind.  549,  1254 

V,  Humphrey,  24  Mich.  170.         1288 
V.    Inhabitants    &c.,    26    Maine 
234.  1613 

V.    Inhabitants    &c.,    78    Maine 
200.  1633 

V.  Marshall  Co.,  74  Iowa  24,       1674 
V.   Monticello.   138   IT.   S.   673. 

562.  636.  838.  971.  973.  978,  1013 
V.  Plainfleld.  45  N.  H.  126. 

651,   668,   1730 
V.  Shields.  57  Neb.  78.  1793 

V.   Town  of  Monticello,  14  Fed. 
628,  863 

Merrill    &c.    Co.    v.    City    of   Merrill, 

80  Wis.  358,  877 

Merrimack   Co.    v.    City   of   Concord, 

66  N.  H.  389,  1069 

Y.  Grafton  Co..  63  N.  H.  550.    1042 

Merrimack  River  Sav.   Bank  v.  City 

of  Lowell.  152  Mass.  556,  1461 

Merritt    v.    City    of    Kewanee,    175 

111.  .537,  1134,  1135 

V.  Farriss.  22  111.  303,  1485 

V.  Hinton,  55  Ark.   12,  172 

V.   School   Dist.,   54   Ark.   468. 

1487.  1496 
V.    Village    of    Portchester.    71 
N.  Y.  309.  570.  1133.  1201.  1255 

Mersey  Docks  v.  Gibbs,  11  H.  L.  Cas. 

686,  8 

Merwin   v.    City   of   Chicago,    45   111. 

133,  1745 

V.  Rogers,  24  N.  Y.  St.  496.  334 

V.   Rogers.  28  N.  Y.  St.  404.  221 

Merwine  v.  Monroe  Co.,  141  Pa.  St. 

162,  905,  006 

Merz  V.  City  of  Brooklyn,  33  N.  Y. 

St.   577,  829 


Merz  V.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  88  Mo. 

672.  589.   1850 

Merzbach  v.  City  of  New  York,   163 

N.  Y.   16,  ISO 

iNIesseck  v.  Board  &c.,  50  Barb.  190,  1718 

Metcalf  V.  Andrews.  7  Atl.  4,  164 

V.  City  of  St.  Louis,  11  Mo.  102, 

467,    109» 
V.  State,  21  Tex.  App.  174,  1493 

Metcalfe  v.  City  of  Seattle,  1  Wash. 

297,  374,  989 

Methodist    &c.    Church,    In    re,    66 

N.  Y.  395,  1525 

Methodist   Church   v.    Mayor,   6   Gill 

391,  1216 

Metropolitan  Board  &c.  v.  Barrie.  34 

N.  Y.  657.  1083,  1811 

V.  Heister.  37  N.  Y.  661,  1083 

Metropolitan   &c.    Co.   v.    Newton,   4 

N.  Y.  S.  593,  617 

Metropolitan  City  R.  Co.  v.  City  of 

Chicago.  96  111.  620,  1706 

Metropolitan  Gas  Light  Co.,   Matter 

of,  85  N.  Y.  526,  1256 

Metropolitan  Tel.  Co.  v.  Colwell  Lead 

Co.,   67   How.   Pr.   365,  1581 

Metsker  v.  Neally,  41  Kan.  122,  190 

Metzger  v.   Attica   R.   Co.,   79   N.   Y. 

171,  825 

Menser  v.   Risdon,   36  Cal.   239,  282 

Meyer  v.   Brown,   65   Cal.   583,  1522 

V.    City    of    Muscatine,    1    Wall. 
384.  1001.  1016 

V.  Fromm.  108  Ind.   208,     482,  1258 
V.  Jones.  20  Ky.  L.  1632,  1392 

V.  School  Dist.,  4  S.  D.  420,  998 

V.    Village    of    Teutopolis,    131 
111.  552.  1317.  1347 

Meyers  v.  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.,  57  Iowa 

555.  500 

V.    City    of    Jeffersonyille,    145 
Ind.   431.  1700 

y.   Hudson  Co.   Elec.   Co..   63   N. 
J.  L.  573,  586.  1791 

Michael  y.  City  of  Mattoon,  172  111. 

394.  1278 

Michel    V.    Police    Jury,    9    La.    An. 

67,  1306 

Michener  v.  City  of  Philadelphia.  118 

Pa.  St.  53.5.       593,  1195.  1234.  1252 

Michie    &c..    In    re,    11    Up.    Can.    C. 

P.    379.  1258 

Michigan    &c.    R.    Co.    y.    Barnes,   44 

Mich.    222.  702 

Michigan  Tel.  Co.  y.  City  of  Charlotte. 

93   Fed.   11.  586 

IMiddlesborough  Town  &c.  Co.  y.  Knoll. 
21    Ky.   L.   1399,  719.   1283.   1789 

Middlesex  Co.  y.  City  of  Lowell,  149 

■Mass.   509.  1177 

Middlesex  R.  Co.  y.  City  of  Charles- 
ton, 8  Allen  330.  1509 
V.  Wakefield,  103  Mass.  261, 

11.59,  1355 

Middleton   y.   Greeson.    106   Ind.    18. 

626.    863.    1479.    1480 
y.  Mullica  Tp..  112  V.  S.  433.     1013 
y.    Railroad    Co.,    26    N.    J.    Eq. 
269.  524 

v.  State,  120  Ind.  166.  308.  650 

Midland    School   Districts.    40   Mich. 

551,  861 

Mikesell  v.   Durkee,   34  Kan.   509. 

585.   1322 

Miles   V.    City   of   Lynn,    130   Mass. 

398,  1366 

y.  City  of  Worcester.  154  Mass. 
511.  810 

v.  Town  of  Albany.  59  Vt.  79,     1541 
V.   Wells.   22  Utah  55.  1652 

Milhau  y.  Sharp.  27  N.  Y.  611. 

568,    579,    618,    637,    1106 


TABLE   OP    CASES. 


CXXXIX 


[References  are  to  Pages.    Vol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol.  II,  pp.  S33-1SS0.'\ 


Milhau  V.   Sharp.   15  Rarb.   103,  830 

V.    Sharp,    17   Rnrb.   435.        282,   586 

Milk  V.  Kent,  GO  Ind.  226,  419 

Millard    v.    Board    &c.,    19    111.    App. 

48,  1476 

V.  Jenkins.  9  Wend.  298,  221 

Mill    Creek    Sewer,    In    re,    196    Pa. 

St.  183.  1311 

Miller  V.  Board,  66  Ind.  162,  971 

V.   Board  &c.,  37  N.  Y.   S.  766,     742 
V.  Bradford.  12  Iowa  14,  228 

V.  Brown.  56  N.  Y.  383.  335 

V.  Callaway,  32  Ark.  666.  198 

V.    City   of   Amsterdam.    149    N. 
Y.  288,  1134,  1135,  1236 

V.    City   of   Milwaukee,    14   Wis. 
699.  1306 

V.  City  of  Minneapolis,  75  Minn. 
131,  785 

V.    City    of   St.    Paul.    38    Minn. 
134,  264,   1585,   1614 

V.  Embree,  88  Ind.  133,  944 

V.   Eni?lish,   21   N.   J.   L.  317,  371 

V.  Gorman.  38  Pa.  St.  331,  1717 

V.    Grice,   2   Rich.   L.   27.  335 

V.   Horton,  152  Mass.  540. 

595,    1080,    1116 
V.  Jones.  80  Ala.  89.  622 

V.    Lerch.    1    Wall.    Jr.    210.  564 

V.    Mayor   &c.,    47    Ala.    163, 

1257,  1258 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  47  N.  J.  Eq.  62. 

1180,  1216 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  109  U.  S.  385,  801 
V.    McWilliams,    50    Ala.    427. 

142,  1527 
V.   Moore.   3   Humph.    189,  323 

V.    O'Reilly.    84    Ind.    168.  535 

V.    Perris    Irr.    Dist.,    85    Fed. 
693,  1028 

V.    Perris    Irr.    Dist.,    99    Fed. 
143.  1006 

V.  Rucker,  1  Bush  135,  221 

V.  Supervisors.  25  Cal.  93.     187,  199 
V.   Town  of  Berlin,   13  Blatchf. 
'   245.  1027 

V.  Trustees  &c..  88  111.  26.  1712 

V.  Warner,  .59  N.  Y.  S.  956,  1820 

V.  Webster  City.  94  Iowa  162.     580 
V.  White  River  School  Tp.,  101 
Ind.    503.  862 

Millett  V.  People,  117  111.  294.  734 

Millholland  v.  Bryant.  39  Ind.  363.     158 

Milliard  v.  City  of  Lafayette,  5  La. 

An.  112,  700 

Milliken  v.  City  Council  &c.,  54  Tex. 

388,  501,   502 

Million  V.    Soule.    15   Wash.   261.  958 

Mills  V.  Belbrough,  19  N.  Y.  S.  176,  1409 
V.  Board  &c.,  50  Ind.  436.  1725 

V.    Charleton,    29    Wis.    400. 

558.    1.531.    1538 

V.  City  of  Brooklyn.  32  N.  Y.  489. 

263,    819,    821,    1159,    1208.    1584 

1585.  1586 

V.  City  of  Chicago.  182  111.  249,    512 

V.   Gleason.   11   Wis.   470, 

258.   287.   715.   837.   971,   973,  992 
V.  Hall.  9  Wend.  316.  1106 

V.  Richland  Tp..  72  Mich.  100,     416 
V.  Thornton,  26  111.  300.  1499 

V.  Williams,  11  Ired.  558.     104,  105 

Millsaps  V.   Mayor  &c.,   37   La.   An. 

641,  615 

Mills   Co.   V.   Burlington   &c.    R.    Co., 

47  Iowa  66,  659 

Milner  v.  City  of  Pensacola,  2  Woods 

632,  92.  405,  409,  410,  1519 

Miltenberger     v.     Cooke,     18     Wall. 

421.  633 

Milward    v.    Thatcher,    2    T.    R.    81. 

185,  198 


Milwaukee  v.  Koeffler,  116  U.  S.  219, 

1697,  1723 

Milwaukee   Electric  &c.   Co.   v.   City 
of    Milwaukee,    95    Wis.    39, 

1247,  1812 

Milwaukee   Industrial    School   v.    Su- 
pervisors &c.,   40  Wis.   328, 

1071,  1072 

Milwaukee    &c.    R.    Co.    v.    City    of 

Faribau.c,   23   Minn.    167,     591,   686 

Mims  V.  West.  38  Ga.   18,  1026 

Miner  v.  Loggins,  14  Tex.  Civ.  App. 

15,  9.58 

V.  President  &c.,  27  N.  Y.  155,    1510 

Mineralized    Rubber    Co.    v.    City    of 

Cleburne,  22  Tex.  Civ.  App.  621,  730 

Miners'    Bank    v.    United    States,    1 

Greene  553.  4,  6 

Miners'   Ditch   Co.   v.   Zellerbach,   37 

Cal.  543.  5.  233,  253 

Minick  v.  City  of  Troy.  19  Hun  253,  1625 
V.  City  of  Troy,  83  N.  Y.  514. 

1746,  1790 

Minis  V.  Minis,  35  Ala.  23,  228 

Minneapolis    Gas-Light    Co.    v.    City 
of    Minneapolis,    36    Minn.    159, 

191.   282.   1539 

Minneapolis  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Becket,  75 

Iowa    183,  1674 

V.  Woodworth.  32  Minn.  452.         708 

Minnesota  Linseed  Oil  Co.  v.  Palmer, 

20  Minn.  468.  1202,  1232 

Minnesota    &c.    R.    Co.    v.    District 

Court.  71  N.  W.  27,  1287 

Minnesota  Trans.   R.   Co.  v.  District 

Court  &c..  68  Minn.  242,  1299 

Minor  v.  Bank,  1  Peters  46,  211 

v.  Happersett,  21  Wall.  162, 

140,   369 

Minot  V.  Curtis,  7  Mass.  441.  435 

V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  112  Mass.  1, 

641,  671 

Minturn   v.    Larue,   23   How.    435, 

88,   565,    598,    627,    642 

Missano  v.  Mayor  &c.,  160  N.  Y.  123, 

250,   929 

Mississippi  v.  Johnson,  4  Wall.  475.  1488 

Mississippi   &c.    R.    Co.   v.   Ward,    67 

U.   S.   485,  1109 

Missouri  v.   Lewis,    101   TJ.   S.   22, 

140,  1410 

Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  City  of  Wy- 

■    andotte.    44    Kan.    32,  489,"   1133 

V.   Hennessey.  75  Tex.   155,  1627 

V.  Houseman.   41   Kan.  300,  694 

V.   Humes.   115  V.   S.   512,  698 

Missouri    River   &c.    R.    Co.    v.    Com- 
missioners  &c.,    12   Kan.   230. 

260.   986 

Missouri  &c.  Trust  Co.  v.  Smart,  51 

La.  An.  416.  522 

Mitchell  V.  Brown,   18  N.   H.  315. 

303.  351.  355.  358 
V.  Burlington.  4  Wall.  270. 

561,    764.    838.    972.    985 
V.    City   of  Milwaukee,    18   Wis. 
92.  1702.    1722 

V.  City  of  Negaunee,  113  Mich. 
359.  1549 

V.    City    of    Plattsburg,    33    Mo. 
App.   555,  1627 

V.   City  of  Rockland,  41   Maine 
363.  1099 

V.   City   of  Rockland.   45   Maine 
496.  234.    251.   647 

V.    City  of  Rockland.    52   Maine 
118.  9.  148.  1097,  1433 

V.  City  of  Worcester,  129  Mass. 
525.  1622 

V.   Harmony,   13   How.   115.  1385 

V.  Illinois  &c.  R.  Co.,  68  111.  286,  698 


cxl 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Vol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.^ 


Mitchell  V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  81  Maine 

482.  967 

V.  Tallapoosa  Co.,  30  Ala.  130.     774' 

V.    Treasurer    &c.,    25    Ohio    St. 

143.  13 

V.  United  States,  21  Wall.  350,    1042 
Mitchell  Co.  V.   City  Nat'l   Bank,   15 

Tex.  Civ.  App.   172,  874 

Mix  V.  People,  106  III.  425,  1276 

V.  Ross,  57  111.  121.  1544 

Moberly  v.  Hogan.  131  Mo.  19,  1284 

Moberry  v.  City  of  Jeffersonville.  38 

Ind.   198.  1191,   1256.   1258 

Mobile   V.   United   States,    116   U.    S. 

289.  124 

V.  Watson,  116  U.  S.  289, 

71.    409,    412,   454 
Mobile  Co.  v.  Kimball.  102  U.  S.  691, 

■       771,  817,  1230,  1372.  1557 
1576,  1577 
Mobile   &c.    R.    Co.    v.    Kennerly,    74 

Ala.    566,  1545 

Mobile   Sav.    Bank  v.   Board   &c.,   24 

Fed.    110,  991,    1027.    1028 

Mock  V.  City  of  Santa  Rosa.  126  Cat. 

330,  218.  1731,  1755 

Moede    v.     Stearns    Co.,     43     Minn. 

312.  1496 

Moers  v.  City  of  Reading,  21  Pa.  St. 

188,  119,    763 

Moffett  V.  South  Park.  138  111.  620,    1561 
Moffit  V.  Brainard.  92  Iowa  122,       1317 

V.   Jordan,   127   Cal.   622, 

1240,   1283,   1800 

V.  State,  40  Ind.  217,  1095 

Moger  V.  Escott,  L.  R.  7  C.  P.  158.     128 
Mohawk  Bridge  Co.  v.  Utica  &c.   R. 

Co..    6    Paige    554,  568,    584 

Moiles   V.    Watson,    60   Mich.   415.      1487 
Moir  V.  Hopkins.  16  111.  313,  212 

Molett  V.   Keenan,  22  Ala.   484,  692 

Moll  V.  School  Directors,  23  111.  App. 

508.  907.  1495 

Mollandin  v.   Union  Pac.   R.  Co.,   14 

Fed.    394.  678 

Moller  V.  City  of  Galveston.  23  Tex. 

Civ.  App.  693,  989,  1015,  1018 

Monaghan    v.    Citv    of    Philadelphia, 

28   Pa.    St.    207.  1527 

Monie  V.  Citv  of  Grand  Rapids.  122 

Mich.  645.  929.  1325 

Monk  V.  Town  of  New  Utrecht.  104 

N.  Y.  552.     777.  778.  816.  1324.  1574 
Monongahola   Bridge   Co.   v.   Bevard. 

11  Atl.  575,  1631 

Monongahela  City  v.  Fischer,  111  Pa. 

St.  9,  1587,  1597.  1598 

Monroe  v.  City  of  Lawrence,  44  Kan. 

007.  601 

V.   Collins,   17   Ohio  St.   665. 

369,    370.    371 
Monroe  Co.  v.  City  of  Rochester,  34 

N.  Y.   S.  533.  1296 

V.   Flvnt.  80  Ga.  489.  1735 

V.   Teller,   51   Iowa  670,  1068 

Montford  v.   Allen,   111   Ga.   18. 

1295,  1543 
Montgomery   v.    Board  &c.,   22   Wis. 

69.  663 

V.  City  of  Des  Moines,  55  Iowa 

101,  1619 

-  V.   Flernande!!.   12  Wheat.   129.     455 

V.  St.  Mary's  Tp.,  43  Fed.  362.  1014 

V.    Wasem,    116    Ind.    343.  1201 

Montgomery  Co.  v.  Auchley,  92  Mo. 

126,  1487,  1740 

V.  Anchley,  103  Mo.  492.     914.  1487 

V.    Menefee    Co.    Court,    93    Ky. 

33,  440.    1540 

Montgomerv    Gasliarht    Co.    v.    Citv 

Council,  87  Ala.  245,  1465.  1466 


Montgomery  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Sayre,  72 

Ala.  443.  698 

Montieth   v.   Parker.   36  Or.   170,  952 

Montrose  v.  State,  61  Miss.  429,         1417 

Moody  v.   Mayor.  43  Barb.  282,  1095 

v.  Village  of  Saratoga,  45  N.  Y. 
S.  305,  1377 

Moody  &  Co.  V.  Chadwick,  52  La.  An. 

1888,  1271,   1309 

Mooers   v.    Smedley,    6   Johns.    Ch. 

28.  1287,  1718 

Mooney   v.   Clark,   69   Conn.   241. 

710,    1699,    1731 
v.    Kennett,    19    Mo.    551,        85,   538 

Moor   V.    City   of   Richmond,   85   Va. 

538,  1626 

Moore  v.  Atlanta.  70  Ga.  611,  1209 

V.   Beattie,  33  Vt.   219,  344,   362 

V.   Board  &c.,   2   Wyo.   8,  1725 

V.  City  of  Albany,  92  N.  Y.  396, 

257.   720,   1205 
V.    City   of   Mattoon,    163    111. 
622,  1148 

V.  City  of  Minneapolis,  43  Minn. 
418.  602 

V.   City  of  Platteville,   78  Wis. 
644,  1210 

V.    City    of    Richmond.    85    Va. 
538,  1636 

V.    City   of   St.    Paul,   61   Minn. 
427,  604 

V.  City  of  Waco.  85  Tex.  206,  1566 
V.   Cline,   61    Ind.   113,  1191 

V.   Commissioners  &c.,   62  N.   J. 
L.    386.  506 

V.  Directors,  59  Pa.  St.  232,         1728 
V.  District  of  Columbia,  12  App. 
D.    C.    537.  502 

V.    Fessenbeck.   88   HI.   422.  1483 

V.  Gadsden.  93  N.  Y.  12.  1345,  1588 
V.  Graves,  3  N.  II.  408,  312 

V.   Huntington.   31    W.   Va.   842. 

1631,  1634.  1635,  1636,  1638 
V.    Illinois.    14    How.    13,  607 

V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  32  Maine  46. 

1599.  1635 
v.    Inhabitants    &c.,    38    Maine 
204.  1332 

v.  Madison  Co.,  38  Ala.  670,  322 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  107  Ga.  704.  1805 

V.  Mayor  &c..  73  N.  Y.   238, 

233.    239.    240.    655.    746 
v.   TMayor  &c.,  4   Sandf.   456.  693 

V.  Newfield,  4  Maine  44, 

344,   365.   965.    1485 
V.   School   Directors,   59  Pa.   St. 
232.  1540 

V.   State.  9  Mo.  334.  300 

V.  State.  11  Lea  35.  533 

V.  Village  of  Fairport,  32  N.  Y. 
S.  633.  1373 

Moose  V.    Carson,    104   N.   C.   431.      1214 

Mooser  v.    White.   29   Mich.    59.  1540 

Moral    School    Tp.    v.    Harrison,    74 

Ind.   93.  217 

Moran  v.   Commissioners  of  Miami 

Co..  2  Black  722.  1000.  1018 

V.  Linden.  52  Mo.  229.  1259 

V.   Long  Island  City,  101   N.  Y. 
439.  88.    108 

V.  Mayor  &c.,  58  N.  J.  L.  653.  1291 
V.  New  Orleans.  112  U.  S.  69.  492 
V.  Pullman  &c.  Co.,  134  Mo.  641. 

527.  786,  1790 
V.   Rennard.  3  Brewst.  601.  221 

V.  Thompson.  20  Wash.  525. 

513,   712.  737 

Morano  v.  Mayor.  2  La.  217, 

580.  581.  1402,  1403 

Morbeck  v.  State.  28  Ind.  86.  319 

Morey  v.  Brown,  42  N.   H.  373,       1751 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


cxli 


[References  are  to  Pages.    Vol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.] 


Morford  v.  TTnger,  8  Iowa  82, 

58,  61,  83,   122.  38:^,  393.  426,  1517 
Morgan    v.    Beloit,    7    Wall.    613, 

383,   424,   438 
V.  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.,  36  Mich. 
428.  693 

V.  City  of  Denver,  14  Colo.  App. 
147,  208,  210 

V.    City    of    Dubuque,    28    Iowa 
575,  1306 

V.  City  of  Ilollowell,  57  Maine 
375.  814,   1594 

V.  City  of  Rhinelander,  105  Wis. 
138,  928 

V.    Commonwealth,    55    Pa.    St. 
456,  1522 

v.  Cree,  46  Vt.  773,  1545 

V.   Dudley,   18   B.   Mon.   693,  221 

V.   Long.   29   Iowa  434,  328 

V.    Menzies,   60   Cal.   341,  254 

V.    Parham.    16   Wall.    471,  1502 

V.  Quackenbush,  22  Bai-b.  72, 

197,   381 
V.  Village  of  Penn  Yan,  59  N. 

Y.  S.  504,  1328,  1360 

Morgan  Co.  v.  Seaton,  122  Ind.  521, 

842,  1040 
Morgan   Steamship  Co.  v.   Louisiana 

Board  &c..   118  U.   S.  455,  1101 

Morlev    v.    Mayor  &c.,    12    N.    Y.    S. 

609.  177,   203 

V.    Town   of   Metamora.   78    111. 
394,  211.  322,  324 

V.  Village  of  Buchanan,  124  Mich. 
128,  791 

Morrell  v.  Sylvester.  1  Greenl.  248,      308 
Morrill  v.  State,  38  WMs.  428,  1537 

V.  Tehema  Mills  &c.  Co.,  10  Nev. 
25,  1737 

v.  Thurston.   46  Vt.   732.  335 

Morris  v.   Baltimore.   5   Gill  244,  247 

V.    Barber   Asphalt    Pav.    Co.,   5 
Lack.  Leg.  N.  129.  725 

v.  Board  &c..  131  Ind.  285,  1075 

v.    City    of   Columbus,    102   Ga. 
792.  1762 

V.  Kasling,  79  Tex.  141,  671 

v.  Mayor  &c..  6  Lea  337,  1517 

v.   People.  3  Denio  381,  763 

V.  Philadelphia,  195  Pa.  St.  372, 

1340 
V.  Powell,  125  Ind.  281.  371 

V.  Sea  Girt  Land  Imp.  Co.,  38  N. 
J.   V,q.   304.  688 

V.  State,  62  Tex.  728,  120 

V.  State.  65  Tex.  53,  448 

V.  Taylor,  31  Or.  62.  876.  1021 

Morris  &  Cummings  Dredging  Co.  v. 

Mayor  &c..  64  N.  J.  L.  587.  1352 

Morris  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Mayor  &c.,  64  N. 

J.   L.    148.  1251 

V.  Pruden.  20  N.  J.  Eq.  530,       1706 
Morris   Square.   2   Hill   14.  1724 

Morrison   v.   City  of  Lawrence,  98 

Mass.  219,  819.  1424 

V.  City  of  Madison,  96  Wis.  452, 

1326,    1802 
V.  City  of  Syracuse,  65  N.  Y.  S. 
939.  1316,  1326,  1374 

V.  Fayette  Co..  127  Pa.  St.  110,     940 
V.  Hershire,  32  Iowa  271. 

1234,    1245.   1271 
V.    Howe,    120   Mass.    565,  335 

V.   Inhabitants  &c.,  36  N.   J.   L. 
219.  1741 

V.  Lawrence.  98  Mass.  219.  299 

V.    McDonald,    21    Maine    550, 

189,   192 
V.  McFarland,  51  Ind.  206, 

221,   222 

V.  Wasson.  79  Ind.  477.  1721 

Morrow  v.  Weed,  4  Iowa  77,  693 


Morrow  Co.  v.  Hendrvx,  14  Or.  397,  434 
Morse  v.  City  of  West  Port,  110  Mo. 

502,  582,   1129 

V.    City   of   W^estport.    136    Mo. 
276,  11.3!).   1147 

V.  City  of  Worcester,  139  Mass. 
389.  811 

V.  Hitchcock  Co.,  19  Neb.  566,     429 
V.  Minneapolis  &c.  R.  Co.,  30 
Minn.  65.  1627 

V.    Stocker,    1   Allen   150,  1178 

V.  Town  of  Richmond,  41  Vt. 
435.  1112,    1613 

V.    Williamson,   35   Barb.   472,       335 
Morseman  v.  City  of  Ionia,  32  Mich. 

283.  695 

Morton  v.  Carlin,  51  Neb.  202,  1030.  1698 
V.   Comptroller-General,   4   S.   C. 
430,  224 

V.  Mayor  &c.,  Ill  Ga.  162,  1387 

V.    Youngerman,    89   Ky.    505,        162 
Morville  v.  American  Tract.  Soc,  123 

Mass.  129,  240,  633 

Moser   v.    Shamleffer,   39   Kan.    635, 

165,   168 
Moses  v.  Pittsburg  &c.  R.  Co.,  21 

111.    515,  588,    1706 

V.  St.  Louis  Sectional  Dock  Co., 
84  Mo.  242.  694 

Mosher  v.   Independent  School  Dist., 

44  Iowa  122.  890 

Mosier   v.    City   of   Des   Moines,    31 

Iowa  174.  415 

Mosley  v.  Walker.   7  B.  &  C.  40.        1402 
Moss  y.  City  Council  &c.,  93  Ga.  797.  788 
v.  Cummings,  44  Mich.  359,         1727 
y.    Harpeth    Academy,    7    Heisk. 
283.  971 

V.    Overseers   of   St.    Michael,    7 
Man.   &  G.   72,  128 

v.   Shear,   25   Cal.  38.  1519 

v.    State,   10   Mo.   338,  326 

v.  Village  of  Oakland,  88  111. 
109,  488 

Mossman  v.  Forest,  27  Ind.  233,  696 

Mott  V.   Hicks,   1  Cowen  513,  216 

V.  Lewis.  65  N.  Y.  S.  31,  1773 

V.   United   States  Trust  Co.,   19 
Barb.  568,  1017 

Motz    y.    City    of   Detroit.    18    Mich. 

496,         1224.  1253,  1268.  1269,  1723 
Moulton  y.  City  of  Eyansville,  25 

Fed.  382.  998.  1007.  1023 

v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  51  Maine  127, 

1332,    1601 
Moultrie  Co.  v.   Fairfield,   105  U.   S. 

370.  995,    996 

V.   Rockingham  &c.   Say.  Bank, 
92  U.  S.  631.  1001,  1022 

Moundsville  v.  Fountain.  27  W.  Va. 

182.  1399.   1415.   1418 

Mount  Adams  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  City  of 
Cincinnati,  25  Wkly.  Law  Bull. 
91,  615.  616 

Mount  Morris.  In  re.  2  Hill  14.         1723 
Mount  Pleasant  v.  Beckwith.  100  U. 

S.  514,  71.  74.  89.  383 

408.  412.   424,   445,   1529 
V.  Breeze.  11  Iowa  399,  526 

Mount  Pleasant  Borough  v.  Balti- 
more &c.  R.  Co.,  138  Pa.  St. 
365,  1250 

Mountain  v.  Multnomah  Co..  16  Or. 

279.  638 

Mower   v.    Inhabitants   &c..    9   Mass. 

247,        7.  9.  148.  776.  777.  778.  17.50 
Mowrv  V.  Mowrv,  20  R.  I.  74.  1549 

MozIpV  v.   Alston,    1    Phill.    790.  296 

Mnhler  v.  Hedekin.  119  Ind.  4R1.  202 

Mulberger  v.  Beurhaus.  102  Wis.  1.  1731 
Mulcairns   v.   City   of  Janesville,    67 

Wis.   24,  818 


cxlii 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Vol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.'] 


Mulholland  v.  Mayor  &c.,  113  X.  Y. 

631,  1188 

MuUarky  v.  Town  of  Cedar  Falls,  19 

Iowa  21,  282,  977 

Mullen  V.  Mayor  &c.,  12  N.  Y.   S. 

269,  183 

Muller  V.  Dows,  94  U.  S.  444,  3 

V.  Kansas,  123  U.  S.  623,  1677 

Mulligan  v.  City  of  New  Britain,  69 

Conn.  96,  1338 

V.   Smith.  59  Cal.   206. 

694.   1134,   1137,   1236,   1258 

Mullikin   v.    State,    7    Blackf.   77,        1483 

Mumford  v.   Memphis  &c.   R.   Co.,   2 

Lea  393.  319 

Mumma's  Appeal,  127  Pa.  St.  474.     1062 

Muncey  v.  Joest,  74  Ind.  409,     693,  1572 

Mundell  v.  City  of  Pasadena,  87  Cal. 

520.  183 

Municipality   v.    Duncan,    2   La.   An. 

182.  1520 

V.  Dunn,   10  La.  An.   57, 

1230.    1233,    1514 

,         V.  Louisiana  State  Bank,  5  La. 

An.   394,  1510 

V.  Michaud.  6  La.  An.  605,  1515 

V.  Millaudon,  12  La.  An.  769,     1533 
V.   Morgan.    1    La.   An.    Ill,  520 

V.  White.  9  La.  An.   446.  1514 

Municipal  Sec.  Co.  v.  Baker  Co.,  33  Or. 
338.  952 

Munn,  In  re.  63  N.  Y.  S.  22.     1278,  1296 
V.   Illinois,  94  U.   S.  113. 

5,   6,   574,   1386 

Munro  v.  Merchant,  28  N.  Y.  9.  134 

Munsfield  v.  People.  164  111.  611,       1144 

Munson  v.  Fenno,  87  111.  App.  655,     541 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  3  Fed.  338,  779 

V.   Minor,   22  111.   595.  1721 

Murdock  v.  Academy.  12  Pick.  244.     207 
V.  District  of  Columbia,   22   Ct. 
CI.  464,  1185 

Murdough  v.   Inhabitants  &c.,  165 

Mass.   109.  711 

Murphy  v.  City  of  Albina,  22  Or.  106, 

1212 
V.    City   of   Brooklyn,   98    N.    Y. 
642,  1557 

V.  City  of  Chicago.  29  111.  279,  1706 
V.  City  of  Chicago,  186  111.  59,  1132 
V.  CitV  of  Indianapolis,  83  Ind. 
76.      ■  1632 

V.  City  of  Jacksonville,  18  Fla. 
318,  670.  858 

V.  City  of  Louisville.  9  Bush  189, 

646.    647.    1254 
V.  City  of  Peoria,  119  111.  509. 

1175.  1378 
T.  City  of  Yonkers,  60  N.  Y.  S. 
940.  736,  739 

,     V.  Commissioners,  14  Minn.  67, 

1064 
V.  Dayton,  8  Ohio  Com.  PI.  354, 

1374 
V.  Fast  Portland.  42  Fed.  308.     892 
V.  Farmers'  Bank  &c.,  20  Pa.  St. 
417,  1693 

V.   Hall.    68   Wis.   202.  559 

V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  176  Mass. 
422  792 

vr'Mayor  &c.,  6  Houst.   108, 

1725,   1727 
V.   People,   183   111.   18.5,  1310 

V.  People,  2  Cow.  815,  1414 

V.  Ramsey,  114  U.  S.  15,  47 

V.  Southern  R.  Co.,  99  Ga.  207. 

1707 

Murray.  In  re.  46  N.  Y.  S.  172,  1823 

V.  CitV  of  Chicago.  175   111.  340. 

1287 
V.  Hoboken  Land  Co.,  18  How. 
272,  1049 


Murray   v.    Lardner,   2   Wall.    110, 

1018,   1020 
V.   Richmond  &c.    R.   Co.,  93   N. 
C.  92  1633 

V.'  Tucker,  10  Bush  240,  707 

Muscatine  &c.   R.  Co.  v.   Horton,  38 

Iowa  33.  221 

Muscatine  Turnverein  v.   Funck,   18 

Iowa  469.  447 

Musgrave  v.  >sevison,  1  Str.  584,         271 

Musgrove    v.    St.    Louis    Church,    10 

La.    An.    431,  1086 

Mussell  V.  Tama  Co.,  73  Iowa  101,     1052 

Musselman  v.  Commonwealth,  7  Pa. 

St.    240.  309 

V.  Manley,  42  Ind.  462,  300 

Musser  v.  Johnson,  42  Mo.  74,  217 

Mutchler    v.    Easton    City,    9    Pa.    Co. 
Ct.    613,  754 

Mutual  &c.  Co.  v.  Wilcox,  8  Biss.  C. 

C.   197,  310 

Mutual  &c.  Ins.  Co.  v.  City  of  Eliza- 
beth.   42    N.    J.    L.    235,  645 
V.   Eastern  &c.  R.  Co.,  38  N.  J. 
Eq.    132,  693 

Mutual   Loan  &c.  Ass'n  v.   Price,   16 

Fla.  204.  326 

Muzzy  V.  Shattuck.  1  Denio  233,         319 

Myers  v.   City  of  Jeffersonville,   145 

Ind.  431,  741 

V.    Indianapolis  &c.   R.   Co.,   113 
111.  386,  1637 

V.  Irwin.  2  S.  &  R.  368,  51,  84 

V.  People,  26  111.  173.  1411.  1412 

V.   School  Trustees,  21  111.  App. 
223,  1490 

V.  United  States,  1  McLean  493,  322 
V.  United  States,  22  Ct.  CI.  SO.     772 

Mygatt  V.  City  of  Green  Bay,  1  Biss. 

292.  1001,  1016 

V.  Washburn,  15  N.  Y.  316,  229 

Myrick  v.  City  of  La  Crosse,  17  Wis. 

456,  1201 

N 

Naegely  v.  City  of  Saginaw,  101  Mich. 

532,  525,  715 

Naegle  v.   City  of  Centralia,   81    111. 

App.  334,  509 

Nagel   V.  City  of  Buflfalo,  102  N.  Y. 

108.    312,  1790 

V.  City  of  Buffalo,  34  Hun  1,       1625 
Nagle  V.   Mullison,  34   Pa.   St.   48.     1111 

V.  Wakey,  161  111.  387,  772,  1342 

Nail  &c.  Iron  Co.  v.  Furnace  Co.,  46 

Ohio  St.   544,  1573 

Nalick  Gas  Light  Co.   v.   Inhabitants 

&c.,  175  Mass.  246.  1778 

Nalle  V.  City  of  Austin,  23  Tex.  Civ. 

App.  595.  1293 

Xally  V.   Hartford  Carpet  Co.,   51 

Conn.  524,  1627 

Nance  v.   Johnson,  84  Tex.  401.  655 

Napa  c&c.  R.  Co.  v.  Board  &c.,  30  Cal. 

435.  685 

Napier   v.    Citv   of   Bi'ooklyn,    58    N. 

Y.  S.  506,  1770 

Napman  v.  People,  19  Mich.  352. 

467,    501,    539 
Nash  V.   Citv  of  St.   Paul,,  8   Minn. 

172.  235,  645 

V.    City   of   St.    Paul,    11    Minn. 

174,  644 

V.  Lowrv.  37  Minn.  261,         565,  735 
Nashville  &c.   R.   Co.   v.   City  of  At- 

talla.  118  Ala.  362,  1383.  1710 

Nason   v.   Directors  of  Poor.   126   Pa. 

St    445.  319.  903.  1035 

Natal  V.  Louisiana.  139  U.  S.  621. 

542.   580,   1402 
National  Bank  v.  City  of  Flmira.  53 

N.  Y.  49,  229,  242,  1724 


TABLE    OP    CASES. 


cxliii 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Vol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.'] 


National  Bank  v.  City  of  St.  Josciib, 

SI   Fed.   2](),  64(j.   1027 

V.  CoMiraouwealtli.  0  Wall.  353,  1.501 
V.   Kimball,   10.3   U.   S.   732,  1708 

V.    Kiihv.    108    Mass.    497,  1018 

V.  Mattliews,  08  U.  S.  G21,  650 

V.   Sohastian  Co.,   5   Dill.   414,        766 
V.  Towu  of  Grenada,  41  Fed.  87, 

491,  988 
V.  Town  of  Grenada,  44  Fed.  262, 

463,  483,  484 
V.   Yankton,   101   U.    S.    129,  47 

National  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Board  &c., 
62  Fed.  778,  27  U.  S.  App.  244, 
10  C.  C.  A.  637. 

66,    09,    1005,    1029,    1757 
V.    Mead,    13    S.    D.    37. 

876,    998,    1007 
National  Lumber  Co.  v.  City  of  Wy- 

more,   30  Neb.  356,  941 

National  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Central  R.  Co.. 

32    N.    J.    Eq.    755,  591 

National  State  Bank  v.  Independent 

Dist.  of  Marshall,  39  Iowa  490,     891 
National  Tube-Works  Co.  v.  City  of 

Chamberlain,    5    Dak.    54,  648 

National    Water-works  Co.   v.   Kansas 

City.    62   Fed.   853,  737 

V.    School   District,   48   Fed.    523. 

1452 
Nations  v.  Johnson,  24  How.  195,  692 
Naumann    v.    Board    &c.,    73    Mich. 

252,  153 

Naiiroo  v.  Ritter.  97  U.  S.  272,  1001 

Nave  V.  Flack,  90  Ind.  205,  1331 

Naylor  v.   City  of  Galesburg,  56  111. 

285,  521 

V.   Field,   29   N.   J.   L.   287,  106 

V.   Sharpless,   2  Mod.   23,  295 

Nazworthy   v.    City  of   Sullivan,   55 

111.   App.    48,  465 

Neal  V.  Commissioners  &c.,  85  N.  C. 

420,  1043 

V.  Delaware,  103  U.  S.  370,  140 

V.   Town  of  Marion,    126   N.    C. 
412,  1329.   1784 

Neale   v.    County   Court   &c.,   43   W. 

Va.  90,  610.   1017 

Neales  v.   State.  10  Mo.  498,  1415 

Neary  v.   Robinson,  98  N.  Y.  81,  948 

Nebraska   Citv   v.    Campbell,    2    Black 

590,  8,  813 

V.   Lampkin.   6  Neb.   27,  680 

V.  Northcutt.  45  Neb.  456,  1219 

Needham  v.  School  Dist.,  62  Vt.  176, 

1474 
Neelv  V.  Yorkville.  10  S.  C.  141,  210,  646 
Neenan  v.  Smith.  50  Mo.  525,  1262.  1268 
NeflE  V.  Covington  Stone  &c.  Co..  21 

Ky.  L.  1454.  751.  1151,  1275 

v.    Inhabitants    &c.,    148    Mass. 
487,  '  815,  1036,  1068 

Neill  V.  Gates,  152  Mo.  585, 

491.   518,   732 
Neirer   v.    Missouri    Pac.    R.    Co.,    1 

S.  W.  386,  1356 

Neitzel  v.  City  of  Concordia,  14  Kan. 

446,  535 

Neitzev  v.   Baltimore  &c.   R.   Co.,   5 

Mackey  34.  1354 

Nelden  v.   Clark,   20  TTtah   382,  712 

Nelson   v.   City   of  Laporte,   33   Ind. 

258.  1232.   1543 

V.   City  of  Saginaw,   106  Mich. 
659,  1281 

V.   Inhabitants  &c.,  7  Pick.   18, 

357,  667.  668.  1534 
V.   Mayor  &c.,   63   N.   Y.   535. 

242,  894 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  5  N.  Y.  S.  688,  729 
V.    McArthur,    38    Mich.    204.  45 

V.   Pierce,   6  N.   H.   194,  347 


Nelson  v.  St.  Martin's  Parish,  111  U. 

S.    716,  521 

V.  Tlnited  States,  22  Ct.  CI.  159,    772 
v.    Village  of  Canisteo,   100  N. 
Y.  89,  265 

Nesbit   V.    Independent   Dist.   of   Riv- 
erside,  144   U.   S.  610,  890,   1024 
V.  Independent  School  Dist.,  25 
Fed.   63.5,  1098 
V.  Matthews,  16  N.  Y.  S.  202,     1413 
V.   Trumbo,   39   111.    110,  687 

Nevada  Bank  v.  Sedgwick,  104  U.  S 

111.  1510 

V.   Steinmitz,   64  Cal.  301,  991 

Nevil   V.   Clifford.   55   Wis.   161,  652 

Nevin  v.  Roach,  86  Ky.  492,     478    l'>5'? 

Nevins    v.    City    of    Fitehburg,    174 

Mass.  545,  1775 

V.    City   of   Peoria,    41    111.    502 

680,   1.385 

New  Albany  &c.  R.   Co.  v.  Connelly, 

7   Ind.   32,  •"  706 

Newark  Aqueduct   Board   v.   City  of 

Passaic.    46    N.    J.    Eq.    552,        1092 

Newark    City    Bank   v.    Assessor,    30 

N.  J.  L.  13,  1500,  1501 

Newaygo  Co.   Mfg.  Co.  v.  Echtinaw, 

81   Mich.  416,  277    ^gy 

New  Bedford  &c.   R.  Co.  v.  Achush- 

net  &c.  R.  Co.,  143  Mass.  200,     108 

Newbery  v.   Fox,  37  Minn.   141, 

„        „     ,  ^         233,    235,    250,    645 

New  Boston  v.  Dunbarton,  12  N.  H 

409,  '  45 

V.   Dunbarton,   15  N.   H.   201, 

XT         T,  ■   ,  .        „  48,  49,  87 

New    Brighton    Borough    v.    Peirsol 
X.       ^rf^I^-  ^*-  280,  1220,  '1603 

New  ^Buffalo  v.   Iron  Co.,   105   U.   S. 

73,  995 

Newby  v.    Free,   72   Iowa  379,  1496 

Newcastle  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Peru  &e.  R. 

Co.,  3   Ind.  464,  637 

New    Central    Coal    Co.    v.    George's 

Creek  Coal  Co..  37  Md.  537,  685 

New  Decatur  v.  Berry,  90  Ala.  432    616 
New   England   &c.   Co.   v.   James,   77 

Mo.   App.    616,  1297 

Newgass  v.  City  of  New  Orleans,  42 

La.  An.   163.  636,  839,  974 

New  Haven  v.  Sargent,  38  Conn.  50, 

1221 
New  Haven  &c.  Co.  v.  City  of  New 

Haven,  72  Conn.  288.  1773,  1781 

New   Haven   &c.   R.   Co.   v.    Town  of 
Chatham,    42    Conn.    465, 

365.    1023.    1427.    1428 
New  Jersey  v.  Wilson,  7  Cranch  164,  771 
v.  Yord.  95  IT.  S.  104.  510.  1184 

New  Jer.sey  &c.   Co.   v.   Fire  Com'rs, 

34    N.    J.    Eq.    117,  233 

New   Jersey   Car    Spring   &c.    Co.    v. 
City  of  Jersey  City,     46  Atl. 
649,  71.^,    715 

Newlan   v.    President   &c.,    14   111.   364, 

541 

Newland  v.   Marsh,   19  111.  376,  517 

Newling  v.  Francis.  3  T.  R.  189,  185 

Newman  v.   Ashe.  9  Baxt.  289.  1.5.36 

V.   Board  &c..  45   N.  Y.   676,        1551 

V.   City  of  Chicago,   153   111. 

469,  1146.  1266.  1300 

V.  City  of  Emporia.  32  Kan.  456. 

259.  1254,  1256 
V.  Justices  &c.,  1  Heisk.  787,  1527 
V.    Justices,    5   Sneed   695,  1528 

V.   Metropolitan  &c.   R.  Co.,  118 
N.    Y.    618.  705 

V.    Svlvester.    42   Ind.    112,  217 

V.   United  States,  21  Ct.  CI.   205, 

773 
V.   Wait,   46  Vt.   689,  1510 


cxliv 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Vol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol.  II,  pp.  SSS-IS-SO.] 


Newmeyer  v.  Missouri  &c.  R.  Co..  52 

Mo.  81,  618,  651 

New  Orleans  v.  Claris,  95  TT.  S.  644, 

259,    405,    1522 
V.   Morris,   105  U.   S.   600,  1530 

V.   New  Orleans  &c.  Co.,  142  U. 
S.    79,  90 

V.   Piatt.  99  U.  S.  676,  1026 

V.    Poutz,    14   La.   An.   856,  992 

V.    Warner,    175    U.    S.    120. 

716.   873,    1245.    1752 

New  Orleans  &e.  Co.  v.  City  of  New 

Orleans.  30  La.  An.   1371,  1725 

V.  City  of  New  Orleans,  42  La. 
An.  188,  569,   1404,  1465 

V.  New  Orleans,  164  U.   S.  471, 

1703.  1704,  1808 

New  Orleans  Drainage  Co.  Cases,  11 

La.  An.  338.  1084 

New   Orleans  Gas   Co.   v.   Louisiana 
Light   Co.,    115    IT.    S.    650. 

566.  1183,  1184.  1347,  1808 

New  Orleans  R.  Co.  v.  Frederic,  46 

Miss.   1.  693 

New   Orleans   &c.   R.   Co.   v.   City   of 

New  Orleans,   26  La.   An.   478,     629 
V.  Delamore,   114  U.   S.  501.  510 

V.   Lasarde.    10   La.   An.    150,        705 
V.  Moye.  39  Miss.  374,  704 

V.   Stratham,   42  Miss.  607,  1111 

New  Orleans  Taxpayei's'  Assn.  v.  City 
of  New   Orleans,  33   La.  An.   567. 

651 

New    Orleans    Water-Works    Co.    v. 
Rivers,    115    U.    S.    674. 

510.  1347.  1808.  1810 

New  Providence  Tp.  v.   Halsey,   117 

U.    S.   336.  1000,   1018 

Newsom   v.    Georgia   R.   Co.,    62   Ga. 

339.  1614 

Newson  v.  City  of  Galveston,  76  Tex. 

559,  1403 

Newton  v.  Beiger.  143  Mass.  598.       503 
v.  Carberry,  5  Cranch  C.  C.  632. 

1813 
V.  City  of  Worcester,  174  Mass. 
181.  1344 

V.  Commissioners,  100  U.  S.  548. 

81,  757 
V.  Ellis.  85  Eng.  C.  L.  123.  1599 
V.  Leal.  56  8.  W.  209,  1644 

V.  Worcester.  174  Mass.  181,       1799 

New  York  v.  Furze.  3  Hill  612,  816 

New   York   &c.    Co.    v.    Brooklyn.    71 

N.    Y.    580,  781,    788 

New  York  Health  Department  v.  Van 

Cott,    51    N.    Y.    Super.    413,  193 

New  York  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Staats,  21 

Barb.   570.  295 

v.  White.   17  N.  Y.  469.  228 

New    York    &c.    R.    Co.,    Matter    of, 

66  N.   Y.   407,  1573 

New  York  &c.  R.  Co.,  Matter  of,  77 

N.  Y.  248,  1557 

V.  Bristol,  151  TT.  S.  556.  710 

V.  City  of  New  Britain,  49  Conn. 
40.  1251 

V.  City  of  New  Haven,  42  Conn. 
2T9.  1250 

V.   City  of  Waterbury,  55  Conn. 
19,  480 

V.   Forty-Second   St.   &c.   R.  Co., 
50   Barb.    285.  1352 

V.  Marsh.  12  N.  Y.  308.  1725 

V.  Marvin.  11  N.  Y.  276.  1419 

V.   Mayor  &c.,   1   Hilt.   562.  829 

V.   Mftropolitan  Gas  Co.,   63  N. 
Y.  32G,  4.  6 

V.  Van  Horn.  57  N.  Y.  473.  644.  1532 
V.   Villnse  of  New   Rochellp.   60 
N.    Y.    904.  637.    732.    1151 

V.   Wheeler.   72   Conn.   481,  710 


New  York  Security  &c.  Co.  v.  City  of 

Tacoma,    21    Wash.    303.  956 

Ney  V.  City  of  Troy,  3  N.  Y.  S.  679, 

1607 
V.   Swinney.  36  Ind.  454,  695 

Niagara  &c.   Bridge  Co.   v.    Bachman, 

66  N.   Y.  261,  1559.   1564 

Nichol  V.  Mayor  &c.,  9  Humph.  252, 

88,  982 

Nicholas  V.    People,   165   111.   502. 

1261,  1276 

Nlcholasville  W.  Co.  v.  Board  &c.,  64 

S.   W.   1133.  734,  742,  751 

Nichols,  In  re,  48  Fed.  164,  1399 

V.    Boston,    98    Mass.    39. 

189,  191,  811 
V.  City  of  Bridgeport,  23  Conn. 
189,  673,  692,  704,  1233.  1266,  1572 
V.  City  of  Duluth,   40  Minn.   389, 

801 
V.  City  of  Minneapolis,  30  Minn. 
545,  827 

V.  City  of  St.  Paul,  44  Minn.  494, 

1210 
V.    Incorporated    Town    of    Lau- 
rens, 96  Iowa  388,  793 
V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  66  Maine  402, 

1613 
V.  MacLean,  101  N.  Y.  526,  198 

V.   Stevens,   123  Mo.  96.  586 

V.  United  States,  7  Wall.  122,       1718 
V.    Walter,    37    Minn.    264,  557 

Nicholson  v.  Commissioners  &c.,  121 

N.  C.  27.  1785 

V.  Philadelphia,  194  Pa.  St.  460. 

1804 

Nicol  V.  City  of  St.  Paul,  80  Minn. 

415.  1367 

Nicolay  v.  St.  Clair  Co.,  3  Dill.  163, 

1011.  1024 

Nicoll   V.    New   York  &c.    R.    Co..    12 

N.    Y.    121,  759 

Nightingale's  Case,  11  Pick.  168,       1402 

Niklaus  v.  Conkling,  118  Ind.  289,     1201 

Niles  v.  Patch.  13  Gray  254,  360 

Niles   Water-Works   Co.   v.    Mayor  &c.. 
59   Mich.    311.  260.   847,  877,  880 

Nims  V.  Mavor  &c.,  59  N.  Y.  500.       1208 

Nisbet   V.    City   of   Atlanta,    97    Ga. 

650.  786 

Nivan  v.  City  of  Rochester,  76  N.  Y. 

619.  1587.  1632 

Niver  v.  Village  of  Bath  on  Hudson. 

58  N.  Y.  S.  270.  1151.   1281 

Nixon  V.  City  of  Biloxl,  76  Miss.  810. 

275.  1711 
v.  City  of  Newport,  13  R.  I.  454. 

803,   807 
V.    State,    96    Ind.    211,  902 

Noble  V.  Citv  of  Vincennes,  42  Ind. 

125.  987 

Noble  School  Furniture  Co.  v.  Wash- 
ington  School  Tp.,   4   Ind.   App. 
270.  856.    857 

Noel  V.  City  of  San  Antonio.  11  Tex. 

Civ.  App.  580.       712.  729,  743,  1758 

Noel  Young  &c.   Co.  v.  Mitchell  Co., 

21  Tex.   Civ.  App.  638.  1031 

Nolan  V.   King.  97   N.   Y.   565,  1633 

V.  Mayor.  4  Yerg.  163.  1104 

Nolan  Co.  v.  Simpson.  74  Tex.  218.     903 
V.  State.  83  Tex.  182,     576.  839,  892 

Noll  V.  Dubuque  &c.  R.  Co.,  32  Iowa 

66.  673 

Nolton  V.  Dyersburg.  127  U.  S.  160.     981 

Noonan  v.  City  of  Albany.  79  N.  Y. 

470.  8.  265.  790,  811.  1217 

V.  City  of  Lawrence,  130  Mass. 
161.  1366 

V.   Citv  of  Stillwater.  33  Minn. 
198.     "  1165.    1589 

V.  People.  183  111.  52,  522,  1310 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


cxlv 


IReferences  are  to  Pages.   Vol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.^ 


Noroross  v.  Thorns  51  M^ineSOS  1108 
Norfleet  v.  Cromwell,  70  N.  <-•  o;>;*'  ^y.f.:^ 
NorMk  City  v.  Ellis,  26  Gratt.  224  1209 
Norfolk  &c.  R.  Co.  v.   Ely,  95  N.  C.  _,^^ 

Normand  v.  Board  &c.,  8  Neb.  18.  651 
Norris  v.  City  of  Wa^co,  ^J^J;f^,%%,s 

V.  Eaton,   7   N.   H.   284,  345 

V.    Mayor  &c.,   44   Md.   598^^^^  ^^^^ 

V.  Mayor  &c.,  ^I^^^^J^^,  1517 

V.  Staps.  Hob.  211,  85 

Norristown  v.  Moyer,  67  Pa.  bt.  '^3''j'gg2 

North   V.    Cleveland   &c.   R.    Co..    10 

Ohio    St.    548,  ^,    Jy 

North  Beach  &c.  R.  Co.'s  Appeal,  3 

Cal    499,  1248,  l&UU 

North  Carolina  R.  Co.  v.  Commi_ssion- 

ers  &c.,   77   N.   C.  4.  looO,   1725 

North  Chicago  City  R.  Co.  v.  Town  of 

LakeView,105^ni.207,_^^^^^^^3^ 

North  Chicago  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Dudgeon 

184  111.  477,  1^1"^ 

North  Lebanon  v.  Arnold,  4<   Fa.  »t.      _^ 
488  j-'i-' 

North   Menheim   Tp.   v.   Arnold,   119 

Pa.  St.  380,  .      ,  ,      /,  ^^  "^ 

North  Missouri  R.  Co.  v.  Lackland, 

25  Mo.  515,  ,       ..^  *"" 

V.    Stephens,   36   Mo.    150^^^^    ^^^^ 

North  Pac.  Lumbering  &c   Co.  v.  City 

of  East   Portland,   14  Or.  3,        11»9 

North  Penn.  R.  Co.  v.  Adams,  54  Pa- 
st   94,  ivzo 

North  River  Electric  &c.  Co.  v.  City 

of  New  York,  62^N.  Y-^S.   726,   ^^^ 

North  Springs  Water  Co    v.  City  of 

Tacoma,  21  Wash.  517,       1810.  1814 
North  Terrace  Park,  In  re,  48  S.  W. 

ggQ  551,   loUo 

Northampton  Co.  v.  Innes,  26  Pa.  St. 

156  lUia 

NortherA  Bank  &c.v   Porter  Tp   Trus- 
tees, 110  TT.  S.  608,    256,  644,  646.  88o 
1001,    1003.   1008.    1009,   1024.    1757 
Northern  Indiana  B.   Co.  v.   Connel- 
ly.  10   Ohio   St.   159.  1248 
Northern    Liberties   v.    St.    Johns 

Church.  13  Pa.  St.  104,    ^^593,  1247 
V.    Swain.    13    Pa.    St.    113         1234 
Northern   &c.    R.    Co.    v.    Mayor  &c., 

21    Md.   93.  ,     ^        ^,   .,    28 J 

Northfield  v.   Merrimack  Co.,  43  N. 

H    165  iU4.i 

Northrop  v.'  Burrows,  10  Abb.  Pr. 

365  1110 

Northrup  v.  Town  of  Pittsfleld,  2  N. 

Y.   Super.  Ct.   108.  870 

Northwestern  Fertilizing  Co.  v.  Hyde 

Park.  97   U.   S.^659.^^^^    ^^^^    ^^^^ 

V.  Village  of  Hyde  Park.  70  HI. 

634,  1^"^ 

Northwestern  &c.   Ins.   Co.  v.  0"^er- 

holt.  4  Dill.  287.  1017 

Northwestern  Lumber  Co.  v.   City  ot 

Aberdeen.    20    Wash.    102.  742 

V.   City  of  Aberdeen.  22  Wash. 

404,  ^°*^ 

Northwestern  Packet  Co.  v.  St.  Paul, 

3  Dill    454,  °°^ 

Northwestern  &c.  Packet  Co   v.  City 

of  Louisiana.  4  Dill.  1".^.^  -  ^*" 
Northwestern  Tel.  &c    Co.  v    City  of 

Minneapolis.  81  Minn.  140,         13J0 

1  Smith — x 


Northwood  v.  Barrington,  9  N.  H. 

Norton  ;.  Board  &c.,  129  U.  S.  479      996 
v.  City  of  East  St.  Louis,  36  HI. 
Ann    171  °°® 

v.  City  of  New  Bedford,  166  Mass. 
48 
V.  City  of  St.  Louis,  97  Mo.  537^^^^ 

V.  Dyersburg,  127  U.J.  160.^    ^^^^ 

V.  Peck.  3  Wis.  714.  ^^'J^R 

V.  Petrie,  59  Conn.  200.  1419 

^•^riS^-'l96,'2i9,'89r977,993 

V.  Walkill  &c.  R.  Co.,  63  Barb. 

lyY  1571 

Norwich  &c.  Co.  V.  Norwich  City  Gas 

Co..  25  Conn.  19.  ^A^^' 

Norwood  V.  Baker,  172  U.J.  269.  ^   ^.^^^^ 

1291.    1296.    1300.    1.302,'  1708,'   1709 

V.  Gonzales  Co.,  79  Tex.  218,     1569 

Nott's  Case,  11  Maine  208.  1415 

Nottage  V.  ^ty  of  Por  land.  3^|  Or.^_^^^ 

Nowell  V.  Wright.  3  Allen  166,  -2- 

Noxon   V.    Hill.    2    Allen   21.5.  335 

Noyes   v.   Inhabitants  &c.,   11   Cush.^^^^ 

?!^|paulding.  27  Vt.  420  994 

V.   Stillman.   24  Conn.   15.  1095 

V.  Town  of  Mason  City,  53  Iowa 
303  l--* 

Nuckolls  Co.  V.  Peebler,  91  N.  W.       ^^^ 

Xudd"v^'Hobbs,  17  N.  H    524.  1561 

Nugent  V.  Supervisors,  19  Wan.^241.^^^ 

V    Wrinn.  44  Conn.  273,  278 

Nuneaton  Local  Board  v.  Sewage  Co., 

L.  R.  20  Eq.  127  .  „« 

Nunemacher  v.  City  of  Louisville,  98 

JCxr     ^^4-  ( oU 

NurnbergVr  v.  Town  of  Barnwell,  42 

S.  C.  158,  l'^54 


O 

Oakes  V.  Hill,  10  Pick.  333,  129 

V.    Hill.    14    Pick.    442,  _    1423 

Oakland   v.    Carpenter,    13    Cal.    540^^^^ 

Oaklev  v.  City  of  Atlantic  City.  63 

N.  J.  L.  127.  482.  .514,  747,  750,  1184 
O'Brien,  In  re,  119  Mich    540.  1162 

V.  City  of  New  York,  32  N.  Y.  S. 

34 

v.^'City  of  Philadelphia,  1^50^Pa^g^3 

v.-City'ofSt.Paul.l^5Minn.^331.^^^ 

V  City  of  Worcester.^l72^Mas.^^^ 

V  Mayor  &c.,  55  NY.  S  50,  932 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  160  N.  Y  691.  932 
V.  Pennsylvania  &c.  R.  Co.,  119 

Pn     St    184.  "'^ 

V  Wheelock,  95  Fed.  883.  1029    1030 
Ocean   Grove  &c.   Assn.  v.   Berthall, 

63    N.    J.    L.    312.  ^  ^      593 

O'Connor  v.  City  of  Memphis,  6  Lea 
730 
V.  Pittsburg,  18  Pa.  St.  1|7,^    ^^OQ 

V.  Town  of  Waterbury,  69  Conn. 

'>06.  -  ^"^^ 

Oconto  City  Water  &c.  Co.  v.  C'ty  of 

Oconto.  105  Wis.  76.  1507,  1554 

O-Dea  V.   City  of  Winona,  41  Minn.^^^^ 

Odelf v'^City  of  Atlanta,  97  Ga.  670,  598 


cxlvi 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Vol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.1 


Odiorne  v.  Rand.  59  N.  H.  504,  229 

O'Donnell  v.  Eailey,  24  Miss.  386, 

1511,  1532 
O'Donovan  v.  Wilkins,  4  So.  789,  1100 
O'Dowd  V.  City  of  Boston,  149  Mass. 

443,  205 

O'Farrell  v.   Colby,  2  Minn.  180,  381 

Ogden   V.   City   of   Pliiladelphia.    143 

Pa.    St.    430.  1220,    1603 

V.   Daviess   Co.,   102   U.    S.   634, 

625,   646,   982,   984 

V.  Ravmond,  22  Conn.  379,  216 

V.  Town  of  Lake  View,  121  III. 

422,  1259,   1290 

Ogden   City   v.   McLaughlin,   5   Utah 

387,  1404 

Ogg  V.  City  of  Lansing.  35  Iowa  495, 

225,  797,  798,  822,  1096,  1768 
Ogle  V.  Mayor  &c.,  90  Md.  59,  1315 

O'Hara  v.  City  of  Buffalo,  57  N.  Y. 

S.  367,  1365,  1378 

V.  City  of  New  York,  59  N.  Y.  S. 

36,  181,   184 

V.  Town  of  Park  River,  1  N.  D. 

279,  174.  175,  483 

Ohio  V.   Treasurer  &c.,   22   Ohio   St. 

419,  1480 

Ohio  &c.  R.  Co.  V.  Lawrence  Co.,  27 

in.   50.  1724 

Ohio  Valley  Iron  Works  v.  Town  of 

Moundsville.  11  W.  Va.  1.  624.  980 
Ohlquest  v.  Farwell,  71  Iowa  231,  1713 
Oil  City  V.   McAboy,   74   Pa.   St.   249, 

1738 
Oil  City  &e.  Bridge  Co.  v.  Jackson, 

114   Pa.   St.   321.  1596 

O'Laughlin   v.    City   of   Dubuque,   42 

Iowa    539,  1638 

Olcott  V.  Supervisors,  16  Wall  678, 

55.  983,  1026,  1524 
Old  Colony  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  City  of  Fall 

River,    147    Mass.    455,  1287 

Oldis    V.    Donmille,    Show.    P.    C.    58, 

1743 
Oldknow  V.  Wainwright,  2  Burr.  1017, 

157,   161,   473 
O'Leary,  Ex  parte,  65  Miss.  80.         1120 

V.    City   of   Mankato,    21   Minn. 

65  1627 

V.   Sloo,   7  La.   An.   25,  1238 

Oliphant   v.   Commissioners  &c.,   18 

Kan.    386,  695,    696,    1569 

Olive  V.   West  Mount,   16   Rap.   Jud. 

Que.  C.  S.  426,  1342 

Olive  Cemetery  Co.  v.  City  of  Phila- 
delphia,  93   Pa.    St.    129,  1247 
Oliver   v.    City   of   Denver,    13    Colo. 

App.   345,  1338.   1362 

V.   City  of  Omaha,   3  Dill.   368, 

1515,  1516 

V.  City  of  Worcester,  102  Mass. 

489,       459,  756,  803.  813,   814,  815 
1068,  1112,  1113.  1371,  1594 

V.   Keightley,   24   Ind.    514.  651 

V.  Memphis  &c.  R.  Co.,  30  Ark. 

128,  1720 

V.    Washington   Mills,    11    Allen 

268.  137.   1500,   1537 

Olmstead  v.   Board.   24  Iowa  33,  652 

V.    Camp.   33   Conn.    532.  685 

Olmsted    v.    Dennis,    77    N.    Y.    378. 

198.  199.  222,   289 
Olp  V.  Leddick,  59  Hun  627,  856 

Olson  V.  City  of  Worcester,  142  Mass. 

536,  1614 

V.  Town  of  Luck,  103  Wis.  33.  1796 
Omaha  Nat'l  Bank  v.  City  of  Omaha, 

15   Neb.   333.  990 

O'Maley  v.  Borough  of  Freeport,  96 

Pa.    St.    24.  500 

O'Malia  V.  Wentworth,  65  Maine  129,  537 


0"Malley   v.    Borough   of   Parsons,    191 

Pa.  St.  612,  1338.  1802,   1804 

O'Mally  V.  McGinn.  53  Wis.  353,  1423 
O'Mara  v.   Railroad  Co.,   20   La.  An. 

25,  1111 

O'Marrow  v.  City  of  Port  Huron,  47 

Mich.    585.  310 

O'Meara  v.  Green,  16  Mo.  App.  118,  1199 

v.  Green,  25  Mo.  App.   198,  1233 

V.  Mayor  &c.,  1  Daly  425,  1097 

Oneida    Bank    v.    Ontario    Bank,    21 

N.   Y.   490.  239,   649 

O'Neil  V.  Battle,  15  N.  Y.   S.  818,     1480 

V.  Board  &c.,  41  N.  J.  L.  161,        699 

V.  City  of  West  Branch,  81  Mich. 

544.  1596 

V.  Hanscom,  175  Mass.  313, 

1794,  1801 

V.   People,   166   111.   561,  1144 

V.    Village   of   West   Branch,   81 

Mich.   1023,  1593 

O'Neill  V.   City  of  New  Orleans,  30 

La.    An.    220.  8,    265 

V.  Register,  75  Md.  425,  1433 

Onions  v.   Covington  &c.   R.  Co.,  21 

Ky.    L.    820,  1554 

Ontario   v.    Hill,   99   N.   Y.   324.  1010 

Ontario  Bank  v.   Bunnell,   10  Wend. 

186.  1511 

Ontario  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Taylor,  6  Ont. 

Rep.    Q.    B.    D.    338.  701 

Opening  of  Beck  Street,  In  re,  44  N. 

Y.   S.   1087.  1754 

Opening  of  Berks  St.,   In  re,   12  W. 

N.    C.    10.  1251 

Opening  of  E.    169th   St.,   In   re,   56 

N.    Y.    S.    819.  1781 

Opening  of  Whitlock  Ave.,  In  re,  64 

N.   Y.    S.    717,  1294,    1311 

O'Phinney   v.   Trustees  &c.,   42   Atl. 

58,  120 

Opinion  of  Judges,  58  Maine  591,  1542 
Opinion  of  Justices,  6  Cush.  578,  384 
Opinions  of  Court.  58  N.  H.  623,  1524 
Orange  v.  Whittingham,   58   N.   J.  L. 

655,  1378 

Orange   &c.    R.   Co.   v.   City   Council, 

17   Graft.   176.  1512.   1534,   1545 

Orchard    v.    School    Dist.,    14    Neb. 

378.  988 

Oregon  v.  Jennings.  119  IT.  S.  74. 

256,   1001,   1004,  1019 

V.  Pyle,  1  Or.  149,  183 

Oregonian   R.    Co.   v.'  Oregon  &c.   R. 

Co.,  10  Saw.  464,  649 

O'Reiley   v.    Kankakee   Val.   &c.    Co., 

32"  Ind.  169,  687 

O'Reillev  v.  City  of  Kingston,  114  N. 

Y.  439.  1197.  1198,  1258.  1268 

O'Reillv  V.  City  of  Syracuse,  63  N.  Y. 

S.  520.  1375 

V.  Kankakee  Drain  Co.,  32  Ind. 

169.  1084 

V.  Village  of  Sing  Sing,  15  N.  Y. 

St.  905.  1  N.  Y.  S.  582,        826,  1640 
Orford  v.  Benton,  36  N.  H.  395.  366 

Orkney  St..  In  re,  194  Pa.  St.  425,  1246 
Orleans  v.  Piatt,  99  U.  S.  676. 

1004.  1008 
Orleans  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Dunn,  51  Ala. 

128,  982 

Orleans  Village  v.   Perry,   24   Neb. 

831,  1638 

Orman  v.  Cheworth.  6  Mad.  163.  1557 
Oroville  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Supervisors  &c., 

37  Cal.  354.  1679 

Orphan  Asylum's  Appeal,  111  Pa.  St. 

135.  1233,  12.34 

Orr  V.  Hodgson,  4  Wheat.  4.53.  132 

V.   Quimby.   54   N.   H.   590,  705 

Orser  v.  Hoag,  3  Hill  79.  132 

Orton  V.  State,  12  Wis.  509,  181 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


cxlvii 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Vol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.} 


Osborn  v.  I'eople,  103  III.  224,  1691 

V.  President  &c..  9  Wheat.  738,  4,  4(5 
V.  Seleotmen  &.C.,  2  Allen  207,     1751 
V.    Village  of   Oakland,   49   Neb. 
340.  66 

Osborne  v.  Adams  Co.,  106  U.  S.  181, 

980,  981 

V.  Borough  of  Springlake,  64  N. 

J.  L.  362,  1788 

V.  Detroit.  32  Fed.  36,         1592,  1617 

V.  Kerr,  12  Wend.  179,  215 

V.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co,,  147  U. 

S.  248.  1706 

V.  United  States,  86  U.  S.  577,     326 
Osgood  V.  Blake,  21  N.  H.  550,  346,  366 

V.    City    of    Boston,    165    Mass. 

281.  711 

Oshkosh   City   R.   Co.   v.   Winnebago 

Co.,    89    Wis.    435,  1251,    1303 

Oshkosh  Water-works  Co.  v.  City  of 

Oshkosh,  106  Wis.  S3,  930,  931 

Osterhoudt  v.  Rigney,  98  N.  Y.  222, 

212,   825,   1054 
Ostrander    v.    City   of   Lansing,    111 

Mich.  693,  1377 

O'Sullivan  v.   City  of  New  Orleans, 

49  La.  An.  616,  ISO 

Oswald  V.  Gosnell,  21  Ky.  L.  1660,     482 

V.  Mayor  &c.,  5  H.  L.  Cas.  856,     318 
Oswego   Falls  Bridge  Co.  v.   Fish,   1 

Barb.   Ch.   547,  568 

Otis  V.  City  of  Chicago,  161  111.  199, 

511,  512, 1145 

V.  De  Boer,  116  Ind.  531,  1201 

V.   Stockton,  76  Maine  506,  992 

V.   Strafford.   10  N.   H.  352,  1053 

Otoe  Co.  V.  Baldwin,  111  U.  S.  1. 

643.   992 
Otsego  Lake  Tp.  v.  Kirsten,  72  Mich. 

1.  965 

Ottawa  V.  Carey,  108  U.  S.  110, 

559.  624.  643.  980.  982,  984 

V.   First  Nat'l   Bank,   103   U.   S. 

770,  1000 

V.  National  Bank,  105  U.  S.  342, 

980,  1001.  1018 
Ottawa    Com'rs   v.    Nelson,    19    Kan. 

234,  1520 

Ottawa  Gas  Co.  v.  McCaleb,  81  111. 

556.  1513 

Ottawa  Gas  Light  &c.  Co.  v.  People, 

138  111.  336.  840 

V.   Thompson,   39   111.   598,  1112 

Ottendorfer  v.    Fortunato,   56   N.   Y. 

Super.  Ct.  495,  1187 

Ottie  V.  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.,  89  Wis. 

127,  1802 

Ottoman  Cahvey  Co.  v.  City  of  Phil- 
adelphia,  13  Am.  &  Eng.   Corp. 

Cas.   524.  210 

Ottumwa  Brick  &c.  Co.  v.  Ainlev.  109 

Iowa  386,  1176,  1246.  1308 

Ould  V.  City  of  Richmond.  23  Gratt. 

464.  1507.  1520 

Outagamie  Co.  v.  Town  of  Greenville. 

77  Wis.  165,  938,  942 

Ouverson  v.  City  of  Grafton,  5  N.  D. 

281,  1330 

Over  V.  City  of  Greenfield,  107  Ind. 

231,  261 

Overholt  v.  Vieths.  93  Mo.  422,  1790 

Overing  v.  Foote.  65  N.  Y.  263,  1238 

v.    Russell,   32   Barb.    263,  134 

Overseers  &c.  v.  Guardians  &c.,  L.  R. 

16  Q.   B.   D.   723,  1043 

V.  McCoy,  2  P.  &  W.  432,  1043 

V.    Overseers    &c.,    19    N.    J.    L. 

173.  1056 

V.    Overseers    &c.,    32    N.    J.    L. 

66.  430 

V.  Overseer  &c.,  51  N.  J,  L.  93. 

430,  431 


Overseers  v.  Overseers  &c.,  3  Johns. 

193,  430 

V.  Overseers  &c.,  15  Johns.  436,     193 
v.  Overseers,  18  Johns.  407, 

192,  210,  647 
V.  Overseers  &c..  15  N.  Y.  341,       253 
v.    Overseers    &c.,    114    Pa.    St. 
394,  1043 

V.    Overseers    &c.,    118    Pa.    St 
84,  1044 

v.    Overseers    &c.,    148    Pa.    St. 
333,  1048 

V.    Overseers   &c.,    148    Pa.    St. 
38(X  1046 

V.  Overseers  &c.,  3  Penny.  107,  1046 
V.    Overseers   &c.,    18    W.    N    C 
161,  1046 

V.  Overseers  &c.,  2  Vt.  151,         1058 
V.  Sears,  22  Pick.  122,  109 

Ovitt  V.  Cha.se,  37  Vt.  196,  344    36-7 

Owen  V.  City  of  Ft.  Dodge,  98  Iowa 

281,  1335 

V.  Hill,  67  Mich.  43,  1484 

Owens  V.  City  of  Lancaster,  182  Pa. 

St-  257.  1106 

V.    City   of   Milwaukee,   47   Wis. 
461.  1726 

V.  O'Brien,  78  Va.  116,  313 

V.  State,  64  Tex.  500.  158 

Owings  V.  Jones,  9  Md.  108.  1095 

V.  Speed.  5  Wheat.  420.  86,  87    14'>'> 

Owners  &c.   v.   Mayor  &c.,   15  Wend 

r,       ^"4'  .  .       ,  688,  692 

Owners  of  Lands  v.  People,  113  111. 

296.  1084 

Oxby  V.  Board  of  Supervisors  &c.,  124 

Mich.  463,  1659 

Oxford  &c.  Society  v.  West  &c.  Soci- 
ety, 55  N.  H.  463,  564 

Ozier  v.  Town  of  Hinesburg,  44  Vt. 

220,  1598 


Pace  V.  Ortiz,  72  Tex.  437,  1663 

V.  People,  50  111.  432,  200 

Pacific  Bridge  Co.  v.  Clackamas  Co., 

45  Fed.  217,  834 

Pacific  Coast   S.    S.   Co.   v.   Kimball, 

114  Cal.   414,  609 

Pacific    Hotel    Co.    v.    Lieb,    83    111. 

602,  1513 

Pacific  Imp.   Co.   v.   City  of  Clarks- 

dale,  74  Fed.  528,  743 

Pacific  Pav.  Co.  v.  Mowbray,  127  Cal. 

1.  952 

Pacific  R.   Co.   V.   Cass  Co.,   53   Mo. 

17,  1513 

Pacific  Road  Co.  v.  Renshaw,  18  Mo. 

210.  994 

Pack  V.  Mayor  &c.,  8  N.  Y.  222,         1591 
Packard  v.  Bergen  Neck  R.  Co.,  54  N. 

J.  L.  229,  11.56 

V.  Board,  2  Colo.  338.  652,  985.  990 

V.  Mendenhall,  42  Ind.  598,         1572 

V.    Railroad    Co.,    48    N.    J.    Bq. 

281,  592 

Packet  Co.  v.  Keokuk,  95  U.  S.  80,     579 

V.  St.  Louis.  100  U.  S.  423.  1537 

V.  Sorrels.  50  Ark.  466.  629 

Packwood  v.  Kittitas  Co.,  15  Wash. 

88.  1021 

Paddleford  v.  Mayor  &c.,  14  Ga.  438, 

1500,  1508 
Padgett  V.  State.  93  Ind.  396.  1660 

Paducah  &c.  Co.  v.  Stovall,  12  Heisk. 

1.  704 

Paducah    Lumber    Co.    v.    Paducah 

Water  Supply  Co.,  89  Ky.  340,  1460 
Page  V.  Allen,  58  Pa.  St.  338,       370,  651 

V.    Chicago    &c,    R.    Co.,    70    111. 

324,  1603 


cxlviii 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Vol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.} 


Page  V.  Hardin,  8  B.  Mon.  G48, 

200,   207,  3G9,  1660 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  34  Md.  558,  1704 

V.  O'Toole,  144  Mass.  303,  675 

Painter  v.  Inhabitants  «&c.,  43  N.  J. 

Eq.  317,  1541 

Palmer  v.  Burnham,  47  Pac.  599,         728 
V.  City  of  Danville,  154  111.  156, 

1149,    1231,    1299,   1300 
V.    Citv    of    Danville,    166    111. 
42,  1310 

V.  Citv  of  Helena.  19  Mont.  61.     876 
V.  City  of  Syracuse,  57  N.  Y.  S. 
600.  1304 

V.  Dearing,  93  N.  Y.  7,       1631,  1632 
V.  Donev.  2  Jolans.  346,  1540 

V.  Fitts,   51   Ala.   489,  1538 

V.  Hayes,   112   Ind.  289,  1757 

V.    Highway    Com'rs,    49    Mich. 
45,  1572 

V.  Mayor  &c.,  2  Sandf.  318.  178 

V.  McMahon,  133  U.  S.  660,  559 

V.  Stumph.  29  Ind.  329,     1224,  1268 
V.   Vandenbergh,  3   Wend.   193, 

193,    1054 
V.  Way,  6  Colo.  106,  1198,  1230 

Pana  v.  Bowler,  107  U.  S.  529, 

1002,   1004,   1020,  1026 
Paola  &c.   R.   Co.   v.  Commissioners, 

16  Kan.  302,  275,  277,  280,  732 

Pappenheim  v.   Metropolitan  R.  Co., 

128  N.  Y.  436,  1773 

Papworth  v.  City  of  Fitzgerald,  106 

Ga.  378,  513 

V.   City  of  Milwauliee,   64  Wis. 
389,  1589 

Paralee  v.  Camden,  49  Ark.  165,         1403 
Parcher   v.    Marathon    Co.,    52    Wis. 

388,  1551,  1552 

Pardridge  v.  Village  of  Hyde   Park, 

131   111.  537,  521 

Pareley    v.    Incorporated    Town    of 

Mechanicsville.   101    Iowa   266,    1784 
Paret  v.  Bayonne.  39  X.  J.  L.  559,       662 
Parfitt  V.  Ferguson.  38  N.  Y.  S.  466,     739 
v.   B\u-geson,   159   N.   Y.   Ill,        1349 
Parham  v.  Justices,  9  Ga.  341,  685 

Paris  V.  People,  27  111.  73.  213 

Paris   Mountain    Water   Co.    v.    City 

Council  &c.,  53  S.  C.  82,  1778 

Parish  v.   Golden,   35   N.   Y.   462.        12.'.5 

V.  Town  of  Eden,  62  Wis.  272,  1621 

V.  Wheeler,  22  N.  Y.  494.  650 

Parish    School    Board    v.    Packwood, 

42  La.  An.  468.  849,  1483 

Park  V.  Board  &c..  3  Ind.  App.  536.  1076 
V.  City  of  Boston.  15  Pick.  198,  1571 
V.   Independent  School  Dist.,  65 
Iowa  209.  1496 

V.  Mayor  &c..  8  Pick.  218.  1724 

V.    Modern   Woodman,    181    111. 
214.  734,   1752 

Park  Ave.  Sewer,  In  re,  169  Pa.  St. 

433,  1244 

Park  Co.  v.   Jefferson  Co.,   12  Colo. 

585,  1064 

Parke  v.  City  of  Seattle,  5  Wash.  1,  1602 
Parker  v.  Board  &c..  54  Mich.  308,  1675 
V.  Board  &c.,  106  N.  Y.  392, 

852,  933,  964 
V.  Buckner,  67  Tex.  20,  1495 

V.  Ch.nllis.  9  Kan.  155.  1253.  1268 
V.  Citv  of  Atchison.  58  Kan.  29.  791 
V.  City  of  Boston,  175  Mass.  .501, 

1336,  1361 
V.  Citv  of  Springfield,  147  Mass. 
391.  1631.  1634.  1636 

V.  Citv  of  St.  Paul,  47  Minn.  317. 

1.5.59.  1573 
V.   City   of   Syracuse,   31   N.   Y. 
376,  1191 

V.  Commonwealth,  6  Pa.  St.  507,    69 


Parker  v.  Mayor  &c.,  39  Ga.  725, 

1112,  1375 
V.   Smith,  3  111.  App.  356,  990 

V.  Titcomb,  82  Maine  180, 

345,  355.  357,  627,  1474 
V.  Zeisler,  139  Mo.  298,  13 

V.  Zeisler,  73  Mo.  App.  537,  518 

Parkersburg  v.  Brown,  106  TT.  S.  487, 

653.  979.  980,  1535,  1536 

Parkhill    v.    Town    of    Brighton,    61 

Iowa  103,  1634,  1802 

Parkhurst  v.  Capital  City  R.  Co.,  23 

Or.  471,  13.51 

Parkinson  v.  Parker,  48  Iowa  667,       230 

Parks   V.    City   of   Boston,    15    Pick. 

198.  693 

V.  Greenville,  44  S.  C.  168,  789 

V.  Mayor  &c.,  8  Pick.  218,  687,  1320 
V.  Newburyport,  10  Gray  28,       1216 

Parmelee  v.  City  of  Chicago,  60  111. 

„       267,  ^  1248 

Parnell    v.    Commissioners,    34    Ala. 

Parr  v.  President  &c.,  72  N.  Y.  463, 

262,  491.  638,  851 

Parrett  v.  Shaubhut.  5  Minn.  323,       228 

Parry  v.  Berry.  1  Comyns  269,     289,  296 

Parsons.  Ex  parte.  1  Hughes  282,       1.534 

V.  Brainard.   17  Wend.  522,  228 

V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  11  Pick.  396, 

251.  257.  647,  867,  1542 
V.    Inhabitants    &c.,    70    Maine 
262.  974 

V.  Jackson.  99  U.  S.  434.     1012,  1027 
V.  McGavock,  2  Tenn.  Ch.  581,  1745 
V.  Trustees,  44  Ga.  529,       491,  1425 
Passage  v.  Board  &c.,  19  Mich.  330,  1485 
Patoka    Tp.    v.    Hopkins,    131    Ind. 

142.  791 

Patrick  v.  Robinson,  83  Ala.  575,       1742 
Patten  v.  Green,  13  Cal.  325.  1238 

Patterson  v.  Barlow.  60  Pa.  St.  54,     370 
V.    Baumer,    43    Iowa    477,  689 

V.   Chicago  &c.   R.    Co.,   75   111. 
588.  1706 

V.   City  of  Austin,   15  Tex.   Civ. 
App.    201.  1326 

V.  City  of  Austin,  29  S.  W.  1139, 

1316,   1335 
V.  City  of  Macomb,  179  111.  163.  1134 
V.   Inhabitants  &e.,  38  N.   J.   L. 
255.  322 

V.  Mayor  &c..  83  Ga.  606,  1491 

V.  Miller.  2  Met.  493.  197.  198 

V.  Munyan.  93  Cal.  128.  1561 

Patton  V.  Board  &c..  9,6  Ind.  131,     1580 
V.  Caldwell.  1  Dall.  419.  1757 

V.  City  of  Philadelphia,  175  Pa. 
St.  88.  1219 

V.  City  of  Springfield,  99  Mass. 
627.  1514 

V.   Stephens,   14  Bush  324,  669,   670 
Patty  V.  Colgan.  97  Cal.  251.  926 

Paul    V.    City   of  Detroit,    32    Mich. 

108.  698 

V.    City   of  Kenosha,   22   Wis. 
266.  237 

V.  City  of  New  York,  61  N.  Y.  S. 
570,  710.  1753 

V.   Pacific  R.  Co.,  4  Dill.  C.  C. 
35.  1720 

Paulsen  v.  Portland.  149  V.  S.  30.     1302 
Paulson  V.  City  of  Portland.  16  Or. 

450,  1205,  1253.  1288 

Pause  V.  Citv  of  Atlanta,  98  Ga.  92. 

1773.  1775 
Paxson  V.  Sweet,  13  N.  J.  L.  196. 

506.  1198 

Payne  v.  Rittman.  66  Ark.  201,  209 

V.    Town    of    Dunham,    29    111. 

105  1042 

vr  Treadwell,  16  Cal.  220,  630,  1537 


TABLE    OP    CASES. 


cxlix 


[References  are  to  Pages.    Vol.  I,  j)p.  J-S32;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.1 


Payne  v.  Village  of  Soulli  Springfield. 

1<n    111.  LIS.-.,     1147.  1173,  1L'40,  1296 

Peabodv  v.  Flint,  6  Allen  .".2.  2!»G 

V.    I'eabodv.   6  Abb.    I'r.    228,  lOG 

Peacock.  Ex  parte,  2')  Fla.  478.  1417 

V.  City  of  Dallas.  89  Tex.  438.  1341 

Peake   v.    City   of   New   Orleans,   38 

Fed.  779.  954 

V.    City    of    Superior,    106    Wis. 
403,  1341 

Pearce,  In  re,  44  Ark.  .509.  1724 

V.  City  Council  &c.,  37  Ga.  597, 

1500,  1.W8 
V.  Hawkins,  2  Swan  87,  198 

V.    Village    of    Hyde    Park,    126 
111.    287.  511,    1259 

Peard  v.  City  of  Mt.  Vernon,  158  N. 

Y.  681,  1343 

V.  City  of  Mt.  Vernon,  31  N.  Y. 

S.  395.  1344 

Pearl  St.,  Re,  111  Pa.  St.  565.  1214 

Pearson  v.  City  of  Chicago,  162  111. 

383,  511,  1277 

V.    City    of    Duluth,    40    Minn.      ' 
438.  1180 

V.  Wilson,  57  Miss.  848.  187 

Peavey  v.  Bobbins.  3  Jones  L.  339,       221 

Peay  v.  City  of  Little  Eock,  32  Ark. 

31,  1271 

Peck  V.  Board,  87  Ind.  221.  1095 

V.  Booth.  42  Conn.  271,  339 

V.  Burr,  10  N.  Y.  294,  252 

V.  City  of  Rochester,  3  N.  Y.  S. 
872.  472 

V.    Louisville    &c.    R.    Co.,    101 
Ind.   366,  1490 

V.    Spencer.   26   Fla.   23,  858 

V.  Watros.  30  Ohio  St.  590,         1723 

Peckham    v.    Town    of    Lebanon,    39 

Conn.  231.  1556 

Peddicord  v.   Baltimore  &c.   R.   Co., 

52  Md.  242.  591 

Pedrick  v.  Bailev.  12  Gray  161. 

191.   500.  508,  "551,  552,  1592 
V.  City  of  Ripon.  73  Wis.  622,       652 

Peebles  v.   Commissioners,   82   N.   C. 

385,  381 

Peers  v.  Board  of  Education.  72  111. 

508,  864 

Peete  v.  Morgan,  19  Wall.  581. 

5S0.  1101.  1537 

Pegram    v.    Commissioners    &c..    64 

N.  C.  557.  1526.  1528 

V.   Commissioners  &c.,   65  N.   C. 
114,  280.   1681 

Peik  V.  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.,  94  U.  S. 

164,  6.   574 

Pell  V.  City  of  New  York,  65  N.  Y. 

S.  34.  1105,  1136 

V.  Ulmar.  21  Barb.  500,  295 

Pelletier  v.  City  of  Ashton,  12  S.  D. 

366,  1806 

Pells  V.  City  of  Paxton.  176  III.  318. 

1235,  1292 
V.  People.  159  111.  580,  1297 

r.  Wehnnish.  129  Mass.  469,  136 

Pelter  v.  Allen.  21  Ky.  L.  1122,  1295 

Pelton  V.  Ottawa  Co.  Supervisors,  52 

Mich.  517.  396 

V.   Railroad  Co.,  22  Week.  Law 
Bui.  67.  682 

V.  Supervisors  &c.,  10  Wis.  63.     959 

Pelzer    v.    City    of    Binghamton,    95 

Fed.    823.  1708 

Pendleton    v.    Inhabitants    &c.,    80 

Maine  598.  1336 

V.  Miller,  82  Va.  390,  1486 

Pendleton  Co.  v.  Amy,  l'3  Wall.  297, 

1001,  1005.  1023 

Peninsula  Iron  &  Lumber  Co.  v.  Crys- 
tal Falls  Tp.,  60  Mich.  510. 

802,  1200 


I'ennell  v.  City  of  New  York,  45  N. 

Y.  S.  229,  750 

Pennie  v.  Reis,  132  TJ.  S.  464,  762,  1434 

I'ennington  v.   Baebr.  48  Cal.  556,     1014 
V.  Streight.  54  Ind.  376.  223 

Pennock  v.  Hoover,  5  Rawle  291. 

593.  1267 

Pennoyer  v.  City  of  Saginaw,  8  Mich. 

534.  1217 

V.  Neff,  95  U.  S.  714,  694 

Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  City  of  Chicago, 

181   111.  289.  .566,  599 

V.  City  of  Chicago.  81  Fed.  317,  800 
V.   Frana,   13   111.  App.   91,  516 

V.  Langendorf.  48  Ohio  St.  316,  1631 
V.   Sinclair.   62   Ind.   301,  1639 

Pennsylvania  Hall,   In  re.   5  Pa.   St. 

204.  1394,   1414,   1522 

Pennsylvania  L.   Rod   Co.  v.  Board 

&c..  20  W.  Va.  360,  1480 

Pennsylvania  Mutual   L.   Ins.   Co.  v. 

Heirs.  141  111.  35,  1706 

Pennsylvania  R.  Co.  v.  Canal  Com'rs, 

21  Pa.  St.  9.  585 

V.   City  of  Philadelphia,  47   Pa. 
St.   189.  982 

V.  Heister,  8  Barr  445,  697 

V.  Hender.son.  51  Pa.  St.  315,  1628 
V.  Lippincott,  116  Pa.  St.  472,  1109 
V.  Marchant,  119  Pa.  St.  541,       678 

Pennsylvania    Tp.    v.    Perry   Co.,    78 

Pa.  St.  457,  1575 

Penny  v.  Penny,  37  L.  J.  Ch.  340. 

701,  702 

Penny  Pot  Landing,  In  re,  16  Pa.  St. 

79.  1214 

Penobscot   &c.    Corp.    v.    Lamson,    16 

Maine  224.  123 

Penrice  v.  Wallis,  37  Miss.  172.  704 

People  V.  Abbott,  107  N.  Y.  225,         1483 
V.   Adams.    133   N.   Y.   203,  1828 

V.  Adams.  9  Wend.  333,  1423 

V.  Adsit.  2  Hill  619.  830 

V.  Ah  Ung.  28  Pac.  272.     1412.  1420 
V.  Albany  Supervisors,  12  Johns. 
415.  1531 

V.  Albertson,  55  N.  Y.  50, 

44,  150,  1430 
V.  Albertson.  8  How.  Pr.  363,  195 
V.  Aldridge.  31  N.  Y.  S.  920,  1686 
V.   Allen.   42   N.   Y.   378,  986 

V.  Allen.  52  N.  Y.  538.  987,  1724 

V.   Andrews.   104   N.   Y.   570.  191 

V.  Angle.  109  N.  Y.  564,  1826,  1829 
V.  Anthony.  6  Hun  142.  171 

V.  Armstrong,  73  Mich.  288,  617 
V.  Assessors.  44  Barb.  148.  1650 

V.  Austin.  47  Cal.  353.  1232,  1542 
V.  Austin.  11  Colo.  134.  961 

V.   Bagley.  85  Cal.  343.  117,  406 

V.  Baltimore  &c.  R.  Co.,  117  N. 
Y.  150.  620 

V.   Bancroft,   2  Idaho  1077,  449 

V.  Bank.  24  Wend.  431.  217 

V.  Baraga  Tp..  39  Mich.  554,  210 

V.  Barden.  30  N.  Y.  St.  52.  1649 

V.  Barnes.  114  N.  Y.  317,  940,  1661 
V.  Barrett.   18  ITun  206.  988 

V.  Barrett;  8  N.  Y.  S.  677.  167 

V.  Bartels.  138  111.  322.  787 

V.  Bartlett.  6  Wend.  422.  288 

V.  Batchellor,  53  N.  Y.  128. 

43.  1531.  1538,  1542 
V.  Batchelor,  22  N.  Y.  128. 

273.  274.  275,  732 
V.   Bedell.  2  Hill   196.  168 

V.  Bell.  3  N.  Y.  S.  314. 

'  1439.   1440,   1442 
V.  Bell.  4  N.  Y.  S.  869.  1441 

V.   Bell.  8  N.  Y.  S.  748.     1440.  1444 
V.  Benevolent  Society,  24  How. 
Pr.  216,  206 


cl 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


iReferences  are  to  Pages.   Vol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.^ 


People  V.   Benhouten,  35   N.  Y.   S. 

186,  l'"^^ 

V.  Bennett,  29  Mich.  451, 

11,  35,  36,  384,   393 
V.  Bennett,  54  Barb.  480,  1529 

V.  Betts,  55  N.  Y.  600.  1724 

V.  Bingham,  82  Cal.  238,  380 

V.  Bird,  55  Hun  610,  153 

V.  Blair,  82  111.  App.  570, 

160.  165,  168,  192,  202 
V.  Blake,  19  Cal.  579,  698 

V.  Blake,  49  Barb.  6,  1»0 

V.   Blodgett,  13  Mich.   127,  Si 7 

V.  Board  &c.,  11  Cal.  206,  763,  1522 
V.  Board  &c.,  21  Cal.  668,  „„,,92 
V.  Board  &c.,  26  Cal.  641,  436,  1522 
V.  Board  &c.,  27  Cal.  655,  261,  659 
V.  Board  &c.,  33  Cal.  487,  697 

V.  Board  &c.,  50  111.  213,  959,  1526 
V.  Board  &c.,  63  111.  374,  984 

V.  Board  &c.,  84  111.  303,  1683 

V.  Board  &c.,  92  111.  441,  985,  lo24 
v.  Board  &c.,  101  111.  308,  1494 

V.  Board  &c.,  127  111.  613,  1644 

V.  Board  &c.,  26  111.  App.  476,  1477 
V.  Board  &c.,  13  Mich.  233,  1665 

.  V.  Board  &c.,  18  Mich.  400,  1494 

V.  Board  &c.,  38  Mich.  421,  1655 
V.  Board  c&c,  41  Mich.  647,  420 

V.  Board  &c.,  42  Mich.  422,  1655 

v.  Board  &c.,  2  Abb.  I'r.  177,  1649 
T.  Board  &c.,  33  Barb.  344,  554 

V.  Board  &c.,  4  Hill  20,  1650 

V.  Board  &c.,  7  Hill  171,  10.')6 

V.  Board  &c.,  3  How.  Pr.  241,  1661 
V.  Board  &c.,  21  How.  Pr.  322, 

1661 
V.  Board  &c.,  4  Hun  94,  870 

V.  Board  &c.,  5  Hun  647,  869 

V.  Board  &c..  9  Hun  222,  1443 

V.  Board  &c.,  11  Hun  403,  1443 

T.  Board  &c.,  20  Hun  333,  1443 

V.   Board  &c.,   25   Hun  131,  1661 

V.  Board  &c.,  33  Hun  305,  1661 

V.  Board  &c.,  34  Hun  266,  940 

V.  Board  &c.,  34  Hun  336,  1096 

V.   Board   &c.,   34   Hun  599,  944 

V.  Board  &c.,  46  Hun  354,  1056,1060 
V.   Board  &c..   49   Hun   32.  950 

V.   Board  &c..   55   Hun  445,  1439 

V.  Board  &c.,  56  Hun  459,  938,  1653 
V.  Board  &c.,  58  Hun  595, 

1089,  1123 
V.  Board  &c.,  89  N.  Y.  81,  1512,  1723 
V.    Board   &c.,    48    N.   Y.   390, 

1499,  1501,  1724 
V.  Board  &c.,  51  N.  Y.  401, 

1529,  1580 
V.  Board  &c.,  51  N.  Y.  442, 

1661,  1724 
V.  Board  &c.,  64  N.  Y.  600,  960 

V.   Board  &c.,  64  N.  Y.  627, 

1526,  1527 
V.  Board  &c.,  74  N.  Y.  310,  777 

V.  Board  &c.,  75  N.  Y.  316,  3.^b 

V.   Board  &c.,   75   N.   Y.   381,  174 

V.  Board  &c.,  77  N.  Y.  153,  1443 
V.  Board  &c.,  93  N.  Y.  397,  1579 
V.  Board  &c.,  98  N.  Y.  332,  1437 
V.  Board  &c..  Ill  N.  Y.  505,  1546 
V.  Board  &c.,  114  N.  Y.  245,  1439 
V.  Board  &c.,  121  N.  Y.  345,  lO.'ifi 
V.  Board  &c.,  122  N.  Y.  652,  1056 
V.  Board  &e.,  126  N.  Y.  528,  1472 
V.  Board  &c.,  131  N.  Y.  468,  554 
V.  Board  &c.,  159  N.  Y.  495,  1829 
V.  Board  &c.,  1  N.  Y.  S.  593. 

362,  1485 
V.  Board  &c.,  1  N.  Y.  S.  743,  1486 
V.  Board  &c.,  4  N.  Y.  S.  102, 

1492,  1406 
V.  Board  &c.,  5  N.  Y.  S.  392,       1676 


People  V.  Board  &c.,  7  N.  \.  S.  806,  1436 

V.  Board  &c.,  11  N.  Y.  S.  841,  1437 

V.   Board  &c.,  12  N.  Y.   S.   165,  16 iO 

V.  Board  &c.,  13  N.  Y.  S.  447,  1646 

V.  Board  &c.,  15  N.  Y.  S.  308,  1071 

V.  Board  &c.,  15  N.  Y.  S.  748,  1661 

V.  Board  &c.,  16  N.  Y.  S.  254,  1661 

V.  Board  &c.,  89  N.  Y.  S.  607,  203 

V.  Board  &c.,  45  N.  Y.  S.  46,  1830 

V.  Board  &c.,  59  N.  Y.  S.  476,  165 

V.  Board  &c.,  59  N.  Y.  S.  615,  1662 
V.  Board  &c.,  63  N.  Y.  S.  445, 

1154,  1260 

V.  Board  &c.,  13  N.  Y.  St.  860,  1161 
V.  Board  &c.,  35  N.  Y.  St.  411, 

1089,  1123 

V.   Board  &c.,   42   N.   Y.   St.   22, 

1160, 1161 
V.  Board  &c.,  47  N.  Y.  St.  891,  1568 
V.  Board  &c.,  8  Week.  Dig.  466,  1443 
V.  Bond,  10  Cal.  563,  1531 

V.   Boston  &c.   R.   Co.,  70  N.   Y. 
569,  591,   592 

V.   Bradv,   59  N.   Y.   S.   322,  209 

V.  Bradv,  62  N.  Y.  S.  603,  204,  208 
V.  Brady,  65  N.  Y.  S.  844,  1830 

V.  Bravton.  94  111.  341,  396 

V.    Breen,    53    N.    Y.    Super.    Ct. 
167,  163 

V.   Brenahm,  3  Cal.  477,       349,  368 
V.  Brennan,  39  Barb.  651,  1649 

V.  Brill,  120  Mich.  42,  525 

V.  Brookfield,  39  N.  Y.  S.  673,     1364 
V.    Brooklyn    Council,    77    N.    Y. 
503,  185,  340 

V.  Brown,  11  111.  478,  374 

V.  Brown,  80  Mich.  615,  1412,   1415 
V.  Brown,  55  N.  Y.  180.  1528 

V.  Brush,  31  N.  Y.  S.  586,  192 

V.   Buchanan,   1   Idaho  681,  538 

V.   Bull.   46  N.  Y.  57,  150,  1432 

V.  Burkhart,  76  Cal.  606,  327 

V.  Burns,  5  Mich.   114,  420 

V.  Burr,  13  Cal.  343,       90,  103,  763 
V.  Bush,  40  Cal.  344,  223 

V.   Campbell,  72  N.  Y.  496, 

1674,  1676 
V.  Canaday,  73  N.  C.  198. 

129,  369,  370 
V.  Cantv,  55  HI.  33,  1531 

V.  Carpenter,  24  X.  Y.  86, 

296,  384,  416,  1689 
V.  Carrique.  2  Hill  93,  198 

V.  Carter.   110  N.  Y.  557,  1264 

V.  Case,  19  N.  Y.  S.  625,  1663 

V.  Casegeanda,  37  N.  Y.  S.  768,     541 
V.  Cass  Co.,  77  111.  438.  985 

V.  Cassitv,  2  Lans.  294,  1509 

V.   Central  Pac.   R.  Co.,  43  Cal. 
398.  1520 

V.  Chapin,  103  N.  Y.  635,  1649 

V.  Chapin,  104  N.  Y.  96, 

1647,  1649,  1661 

V.   Chicago   Gas   Trust  Co.,    130 
HI.  268.  659 

V.  Chicago  Live  Stock  Exch.,  170 
111.  5.56,  734 

V.    Chicago  &c.   R.   Co.,   67   111. 
118.  591 

V.    Chicago   &c.    R.    Co.,    96    111. 
369  1260 

V.   Chicago  &c.   R.   Co.,   118  111. 
113  468,  492 

V.    Chicago   &c.    R.   Co.,    18    111. 
App.  12.5,  522 

V.  Cicott,  16  Mich.  282, 

155,  377,  378,  380 
V.    City   of   Brooklyn,   71    N.    Y. 
495,  1257 

V     City    of    Brooklyn,    23    Barb. 
166,  1234 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


cli 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Vol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol.  II,  pp.  SSS-lS-W-ii 


People  V.  City  of  Buffalo,  147  N.  Y. 

675.  llMC 

V.   City  of  Buffalo,   57  N.  Y.   S. 
2G8,  124G 

V.   City  of  Buffalo,  57  N.  Y.   S. 
1144,  1270 

V.   City  of  Buffalo,  65  N.  Y.   S. 
163,  1307 

V.  City  of  Butte,  4  Mont.  174, 

47,  58,  61,  83,  84 
V.  City  of  Chicago,  27  111.  App. 
217,  1683 

V.  City  of  Oakland,  92  Cal.  611, 

402,  405.  1689 
V.  City  of  Oakland.  123  Cal.  145.  106 
V.  City  of  Peoria.  166  111.  517.  1806 
V.  City  of  Pontiac,  185  111.  487. 

1287,  1685 
V.    City   of   Riverside,    70    Cal. 
461,  44,  64 

V.    City   of   Rochester,   21    Barb. 
6.56.  1257 

V.    City    of    Rochester,    44    Hun 
166,  499 

V.  City  of  Syracuse,  63  N.  Y.  S. 
878.  1136.  1142 

V.  Civil  Service  Boards,  17  Abb. 
N.  C.   64,  784 

V.  Clark,  70  N.  Y.  518.  1689,  1603 
V.   Clark,   53   Barb.   171.  987 

V.  Clark.  58  N.  Y.  S.  12,  1379,  1652 
v.  Claussen.  61  N.  Y.  S.  579,  1828 
V.  Clifford,  166  111.  165,  1260 

V.   Cline.   63   111.  394.  988.   1023 

V.  Clunie,  70  Cal.  504.  107,  108 

V.  Clute,  50  N.  Y.  451,  373,  379 
V.  Coffee.  131  N.  Y.  569.  1671 

V.  Coffev.  16  N.  Y.  S.  501,  1491 

V.  Coghill,  47  Cal.  361,  1540 

V.  Coleman,  4  Cal.  46. 

137,  1503,  1508,  1521 
V.  Coler,  157  N.  Y.  676.  1830 

V.  Coler,  159  N.  Y.  569.  204,  1823 
V.  Coler,  54  N.  Y.  S.  639,  1662 

V.  Coler,  54  N.  Y.  S.  785,  748 

V.  Coler,  57  N.  Y.  S.  461.  743 

V.  Coler,  57  N.  Y.  S.  636,  1784 

V.  Coler,  65  N.  Y.  S.  44.  1241 

V.  Coler,  66  N.  Y.  S.  163,  1303 

V.  Collins.  3  Mich.  343.  520 

V.  Collins.  34  How.  Pr.  336,  1472 
v.  Collins,  7  Johns.  549,  195 

V.  Collins,  19  Wend.  56. 

280.  339.  1653 
V.  Commissioners,  52  111.  498,  1374 
V.  Commissioners,  4  Neb.  150,  1578 
v.  Commissioners,  23  N.  Y.  224. 

1499,  1500 
V.  Commissioners  &c.,  57  N.  Y. 
549.  1570 

V.   Commissioners  &c.,  58  N.  Y. 
242.  1502 

V.  Commissioners.  59  N.  Y.  40,     1500 
V.   Commissioners  &c.,  82  N.  Y. 
459,  1509 

V.  Commissioners,  91  N.  Y.  593,  1723 
V.  Commissioners,  95  N.  Y.  554,  1544 
V.  Commissioners  &c.,  103  N.  Y'. 
370.  ■  1433 

v.  Commissioners  &c.,  106  N.  Y. 
64.  206 

V.  Commissioners.  3  Hill  509.         295 
v.  Common  Council  &c.,  85  Cal. 
369.  1645 

V.   Common  Council  &c.,   51   111. 
58.  1531 

V.  Common  Council  &e.,  27  Mich. 
131.  1523 

V.  Commob  Council  &c..  28  Mich. 
288,  14,  43,  90.  257.   755.   783 

1432,  1531,  1538 


People  V.  Common  Council  &c.,  33 

Mich.   164,  1523 

V.  Common  Council  &c.,  50  N.  Y. 
525.  684 

V.  Common  Council  &c.,  77  N.  Y. 
503.  206,   311 

V.  Common  Council  &c.,  78  N.  Y. 
33,  753,  1647,  1649 

V.  Common  Council  &c.,  78  N.  Y. 
56.  699 

V.  Common  Council  &c.,  90  Hun 
488.  482 

V.  Common  Council  &c.,  5  Lans. 
11,  301 

V.  Common  Council  &c.,  5  Lans. 
142,  273 

V.  Common  Council  &c.,  33  N.  Y. 
S.   165.  204,  209 

V.  Common  Council  &c.,  56  N.  Y. 
S.  606.  1295 

V.  Common  Council  &c.,  57  N.  Y. 
S.  617.  1684,  1686.  1822.  1830 

V.  Common  Council  &c.,  65  N.  Y. 
S.  590.  1300 

V.  Comptroller  &c.,  77  N.  Y.  45,  1191 
V.   Comptroller  &c.,  42  N.  Y.   S. 
657.  610 

V.    Comptroller   &c.,    20   Wend. 
595.  200 

V.  Conklin,  2  Hill  67,  134 

V.  Connor,  13  Mich.  238,  1695 

V.  Conover,   17  N.  Y.   64.  169 

V.   Contracting  Board.   27  N.  Y. 
378.  1646.  1649.  1668.  1673 

V.   Contracting  Board,  33  N.  Y. 
382.  1669 

V.  Controller  &c.,  18  Mich.  445,  536 
V.  Cook,   180  111.  341,  1173,  1174 

V.  Cook,  8  N.  Y.  67.  296,  373,  377 
V.  Cook,  14  Barb.  259,  152,  187.  377 
V.   Coon.   25   Cal.   635.  659.  982 

V.  Cornell.  35  How.  Pr.  31,         1430 
V.  Corporation  &c.  of  Albany,  11 
Wend.  539,  821,  830 

V.  Cotteral.  119  Mich.  27,  754 

V.  Cowles.  13  N.  Y.  3.50,  349,  368 
V.  Cox.  76  N.  Y.  47.  535 

V.  Coyle.  64  N.  Y.  S.  894,  1768 

V.  Cram.  54  N.  Y.  S.  355,  1830 

V.  Cram.  61  N.  Y.  S.  858.  1823 

V.  Cram,  63  N.  Y.  S.  1027,  1830 

V.  Cram.  64  N.  Y.  S.  158,  1821 

V.  Cregier,  138  111.  401,  1400 

V.  Crimmins.  1  N.  Y.  S.  656,  1440 
V.  Crissey,  91  N.  Y.  616. 

313.  368.  376 
V.    Croton    Aqueduct    Board.    49 
Barb.  259.  1669.  1674 

V.  Cummings.  65  N.  Y.  S.  581.  1247 
V.    Cunningham,    1    Denio    524, 

1106.  1610 
V.  Curlev.  5  Colo.  412,  1410 

V.  Dalev.  37  Hun  461.  115,  1675 

V.  Dalton.  158  N.  Y.  204.  1830 

V.  Dalton,  159  N.  Y.  235.  1823 

V.  Dalton.  53  N.  Y.  S.  291.  201 

V.  Dalton.  53  N.  Y.  S.  1060,  208 

V.  Dalton,  54  N.  Y.  S.  216.  1820 

v.  Dalton.  60  N.  Y.  S.  909,  1823 
V.  Dalton.  63  N.  Y.  S.  258.  1824 

V.  Dalton.  65  N.  Y.  S.  426.  210 

V.  Davenport,  91  N.  Y.  574. 

1512,  1.545 
V.  Davie,  114  Cal.  363,  201 

V.  Davis.  61  Barb.  456,  521 

V.  Dean.  3  Wend.  438.  187 

V.  Delanev.  49  N.  Y.  655.  1725 

V.  Delaware  &c.  R.  Co.,  42  N.  Y. 
1011,  1146 

V.  Delaware  &c.  R.  Co.,  159  N.  Y. 
545.  512 

V.  De  Mill,  15  Mich.  164,  1688 


clii 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Vol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.'i 


People  V.  Dennison,  82  N.  Y.  272,       770 
V.  Dennison,  19  Hun  137,  81)4 

V.  Detroit  White  Lead  Works,  82 
Micli.  471,  1084 

V.  Deyon,  2  T.   &  C.  142,  987 

V.  Diclsinson,  36  N.  Y.  S.  748,  1243 
V.  Dickson,  57  Hun  312,  1054 

T.  Diehl,  63  N.  Y.  S.  362,  1765 

V.  Diehl,  65  N.  Y.  S.  801,  1766 

V.  Doe,  36  Cal.  220,  1546,  1743 

V.  Dragstran,  100  111.  286,  1260 

V.  Drake,  60  N.  Y.  S.  309,  206 

V.  Draper.  15  N.  Y.  532.     44.  94.  95 
103.  296.  1083,  1432,  1433,  1829 
V.  Draper,  25  Barb.  344,  763 

V.  Duane,  121  N.  Y.  367,  206 

V.  Du  Puvt,  71  HI.  651,  624,  1538 
V.  Dutcher,  56  111.  144,  990 

V.  Dutchess  &c.  R.  Co.,  58  N.  Y. 
152,  592 

V.  Dwyer,  90  N.  Y.  402,  825,  1371 
V.  Dykman,  60  N.  Y.  S.  290,  1822 
V.  Easton,   13  Abb.   Pr.   159, 

1494,  1649 
V.  East  Saginaw,  40  Mich.  336,  1551 
V.  Edmunds,  15  Barb.  529,  960 

V.  Edwards,  9  Cal.  286,  309,  327 
V.  Egsers,  164  111.  515,  1260 

V.   English,    139   111.   622,  1486 

V.  Ennis,  79  N.  Y.   S.  946,  1432 

V.  Fairfield,  90  Cal.   186,  1426 

V.    Farnham,   35   111.   562,  50,   65 

V.  Faulkner,  107  N.  Y.  477, 

320,  911 
V.  Feitner,  156  N.  Y.  694.  88,  194 
V.  Feitner,  52  N.  Y.  S.  197,  207 

V.  Feitner,  60  N.  Y.  S.  687, 

1505  1553 
V.  Feitner,  63  N.  Y.  S.  209,  '  184 
V.  Ferguson,  8  Cowen  102.  377,  378 
V.  Ferguson.  20  Week.  Dig.  276,  313 
V.  Ferris,  76  N.  Y.  326,  1657 

V.   Ferris,   16  Hun  219,  168 

V.  Fields.  58  N.  Y.  491.  651 

V.  Fitzsimmons,  68  N.  Y.  514.  1829 
V.  Flagg,  17  N.  Y.  584.  715,  992 

V.  Flagg.  46  N.  Y.  401. 

1522,  1538,  1580 
V.  Fleming,  10  Colo.  553,  57,  58,  68 
V.  Flint,  .39  Cal.  670,  627 

V.  Follett.  53  N.  Y.   S.  956.  1830 

V.  Fort  St.  &c.  R.  Co.,  41  Mich. 
413.  1159 

V.  Fredericks,  48  Barb.  173,  1723 
V.  Freeman.  80  Cal.  233,  150 

V.  Freese.  83  Cal.  453.  207 

V.  French,  91  N.  Y.  265,  174 

V.  French,  108  N.  Y.  105.  1435 

V.  French,  1  N.  Y.  S.  878,  1444 

V.  French,  4  N.  Y.  S.  222,  1441 

V.  French.  5  N.  Y.  S.  55,  1441,  1444 
V.   French,   6  N.  Y.   S.   213. 

1438,  1444 
V.   French,   6  N.  Y.   S.  394,  1445 

V.  French,  7  N.  Y.  S.  442,  1444 

V.  French.  7  N.  Y.  S.  460.  1445 

V.  French.  8  N.  Y.   S.  456. 

1438.  1439 
V.  French,  9  N.  Y.  S.  262,  1445 

V.  French.  13  N.  Y.  S.  337.  1441 

V.  French,  60  How.  Pr.  377,  1443 
V.  French,  32  Hun  112,  1443 

V.  French.  46  Hun  232.  1435 

V.  French.  51  Hun  427.  1437,  1438 
V.  Frost.  32  111.  App.  242.  '  276 
V.  Garabed,  45  N.  Y.  S.  827,  1105 
V.  Garey.  6  Cowen  642,  428 

V.  Garner.  47  111.  246,  374 

V.   Gartland,  75  Mich.   143. 

1474,  1690 
V.  George,  2  Idaho  813.  417 

V.  Gibler,  78  111.  App.  193,         1684 


People  V.  Giegerich,  14  N.  Y.  S.  263,    173 
V.   Gillson,   109   N.   Y.  389,  1382 

V.  Gilon.  126  N.  Y.  147,  1248 

V.  Gilon.  24  Abb.  N.  C.  125,  1650 

V.   Gilroy,   15  N.  Y.   S.  242,  1828 

V.  Gleason,  8  N.  Y.  728,  1653 

V.  Gleason,  121  N.  Y.  631,  753 

V.  Goldtree,  44  Cal.  323,  627 

V.  Gooseman,  80  Mich.  611, 

1412,   1415 
V.  Gordon,  81  Mich.  306,  1120 

V.    Grand   River   Bridge   Co.,   13 
Colo.  11,  1693 

V.  Grant,  12  N.  Y.  S.  889,  1397 

V.  Gray,  53  N.  Y.  S.  274,  1769,  1830 
V.  Green,  158  111.  594, 

1275,  1278,  1281,  1289 
V.  Green,  29  Mich.  121,  1655 

V.  Green,  56  N.  Y.  466,  1790 

V.  Green,  64  N.  Y.  606,  680 

V.  Green,  5  Daly  254,  199 

V.  Green,  11  Hun  56,  1676 

V.  Gregg,  13  N.  Y.  S.  114,  188 

V.    Guggenheimer,    59    N.    Y.    S. 
913,  1644 

V.    Guggenheimer,    62    N.    Y.    S. 
11,  1684 

V.  Gunn,  85  Cal.  238.  84 

V.  Hagar,  52  Cal.  171,         693,  1138 
V.  Hall,  80  N.  Y.  117, 

380,    1647,    1692,   1694 
V.  Hall,  104  N.  Y.  170,  190 

V.  Hamill.  134  111.  666,  883,  996 

V.  Hamilton,  24  111.  App.  609,       185 
V.  Hanifan.  96  111.  420,  185,  198 

V.  Hannan,  10  N.  Y.  S.  71,  1444 

V.  Hanrahan.  75  Mich.  611, 

106.  495,   1085 
V.  Hanshaw,  60  Mich.  200,  155 

V.  Harper.  91  111.  357.  1084 

V.  Harrington.  63  Cal.  257,  295 

V.   Harrison.  185  111.  307.  525,  1406 
V.  Harshaw,  60  Mich.  200. 

286,  297,  380 
V.  Hartwell,  12  Mich.  508, 

349.  368,  1508,  1695 
V.  Hatch,  33  111.  9,  1680 

V.  Hawes,  36  Barb.  59,  960 

V.  Hawkins,  46  N.  Y.  9,         870,  1674 
V.   Hawley,   3   Mich.   330,  673 

V.  Haws,  37  Barb.  440,       763,  1522 
V.  Hayden,  6  Hill  359.  705 

V.  Hayden.  16  N.  Y.  S.  98,  1445 

V.  Havt.  66  N.  Y.  606,  1669 

V.  Head,  25  111.  287,  1645 

V.  Henshaw.  76  Cal.  436.  1410 

V.  Henshaw,  61  Barb.  409,  987 

V.  Herkimer,  4  Cow.  345,  1734 

V.  Hertle,  60  N.  Y.  S.  23, 

1684,  1823.  1824 
V.  Higgins,  3  Mich.  233,  152,  377 
V.  Hill.  7  Cal.  97.  446 

V.  Hoffman,  116  111.  587, 

370,  371,  1825 
V.   Holden.  91   111.  446.  990 

V.  Holihan.  29  Mich.  116,     387,  1690 
V.  Holley,  12  Wend.  481.  313 

V.   Holmes.   2  Wend.  281,  309 

•  V.  Hopson,  1  Denio  574. 

197,  198,  289 
V.  Horton,  64  N.  Y.  610,  1583 

V.  Howell,  13  N,  Y.  S.  217,  200 

V.  Rowland,  155  N.  Y.  270.  1S'>9 

V.   Hughitt.   5  Lans.   89.  987 

V.  Hulett.  15  N.  Y.  S.  630.  1412 

V.  Hurford,  167  111.  226.     1144,  1146 
V.  Hurlbert.  46  N.  Y.  110,  988 

V.  Hurlbut.  24  Mich.  44. 

9.  44.  90,  764,   1432 
V,  Hutton,  18  Hun  116.  990 

V.  Hvnds.  30  N.  Y.  470,  1568 

V.  Inilay,  20  Barb.  68,  137 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


cliii 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Yol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.1 


People  V.  Irwin,  21  Wend.  128,  134 

V.   Jackson,   S   Mich.   110.  1419 

V.  Jaehne,   ](»3   X.   Y.   182,  115 

V.  Jansen,  7  Johns.  332,  771 

V.   Johnson,   G  Cal.   409,  883 

V.   Johnson,   30   ("al.  9S,  535 

V.  Johr,  22  Mich.  461,  309,  312 

V.  Jones,  112  N.  Y.  597,  554 

V.  Jourdan,  15  Wkly.  Dig.  278,  1443 
V.  Judge  &c.,  31   Mich.  45G.  1672 

V.  Judge  &c.,  40  Mich.  64,  695,  1572 
V.  Judges  &c.,  23  Wend.  360,  1370 
V.  Justices,  74  N.  Y.  406,  1413 

V.   Justices,   12  Hun  65,  537 

V.    Kane,    161    N.    Y.    380. 

218.  872,  1793 
V.  Kearney.  62  N.  Y.  S.  1097,  1823 
V.    Keir,    78    Mich.    98. 

487,  603,  1402 
V.  Keller,  157  N.  Y.  90.  1784 

V.  Keller,  158  N.  Y.  187.  1784 

V.  Keller.  54  N.  Y.  S.  1011,  1820 

T.  Keller,  61  N.  Y.  S.  746,  171,  178 
V.    Kelly,    76    N.    Y.    475, 

922,  1576,  1578 
V.  Kelly.  5  Abb.  N.  C.  383,  486,  894 
V.  Kennedy,   37  Mich.  67,  377 

V.  Kenney,  96  N.  Y.  294,  376 

V.  Kent,   160  111.  655,  752,  753 

V.   Kerr,   27   N.   Y.    188, 

1083,  1352,  1582 
V.  Kilduff,  15  111.  492,  158,  1645 

V.  Kilman,   69  N.  Y.  32,  1580 

V.  King,  110  N.  Y.  418,  1390 

V.  King,  42  N.  Y.  S.  961.  1828 

T.   Kingman,  24  N.  Y.  559. 

1556,   1561,   1570 
V.    Kingston    &c.    Road    Co.,    23 
Wend.    193.  123 

V.  Kipley,  171  111.  44, 

1644,  1817,  1824 
V.  Knauber.  60  N.  Y.  S.  298,  1822 
V.   Kniffln,  21   How.   Pr.  42,  353 

V.  Knight.  13  Mich.  230,  1695 

V.  Knowles,  47  N.  Y'.  415,  988 

V.  Kopplekorn,  16  Mich.  842,  370 
V.  La  Grange,  40  N.  Y.  S.  1026, 

201,  1769 
V.   Laine,   33   Cal.   55.  370 

V.  Lane,  55  N.  Y.  217,  1657 

V.   Langdon,   40  Mich.   673,  1688 

V.  Lansing.  55  Cal.  393,  1473 

V.  La  Rue,  67  Cal.  526.  1689 

V.  Lawrence,  41  N.  Y.  137,  1252 

V.  Lawrence,  54  Barb.  589,  708 

V.  Lawrence.  6  Hill  244.  668,  960 
V.  Leavitt.  41  Mich.  470.  544 

V.  Leavy,  59  N.  Y.  S.  408.  192 

V.  Leitner.  62  N.  Y.  S.  969,  1823 
V.   Leonard.   73   Cal.   230,  185 

V.  Lingle.   165  111.   65,  1278 

V.  Lippincott,  81  III.  193,  1021 

V.  Loehfelm,   102  N.  Y.   1, 

1559,  1562,  1583 
V.  Loeffler,  175  111.  585, 

1824,  1825,  1826 
V.  Lohnas,  54  Hun  604,  1261 

V.  Londoner,   13   Colo.   303, 

106.  114,  380,  1694 
V.  Lucas,  93  N.  Y.  585,  328,  332 
V.  Lyman,  157  N.  Y.  368,  1829 

T.  MacLean,  13  N.  Y.  S.  685. 

1441,  1442 
V.  MacLean,  14  N.  Y.  S.  77,  1444 
V.  MacLean.  17  N.  Y.  S.  475.  1442 
V.   Mahaney,   18   Mich.   481. 

183.  756,  1433 
V.  Maher,  56  Hun  81.  1255 

V.  Mallorv.  46  How.  Pr.  281,  620 

V.  Mangold.  71  Mich.  335.  1417 

V.  Manhattan  R.  Co.,  20  Abb.  N. 
C.  393,  1669 


People  V.  Many,  35  N.  Y.  S.  78,  1286 

V.  Markley,  166  111.  48,  1144 

V.  Martin,  12  Cal.  409,  368 

V.  Martin,  60  Cal.  153,  1399 

V.  Martin,  5  N.  Y.   (1  Seld.)  22, 

274,  352,  353,  354 
V.    Martin,    131    N.    Y.    196, 

1435,  1648 
V.  Martin,  8  N.  Y.  S.  516,  1438 

V.  Martin,  10  N.  Y.  S.  511,  1444 
V.  Maxon,  139  111.  306,  1349,  1422 
V.  May,  9  Colo.  404,  882,  887,  958 
V.  May,  27  Barb.  238,  708 

V.  Maynard,  14  111.  419,  1418 

V.   Maynard,   15   Mich.   463, 

64,  65,  66,  69,  70,  420,  1730 
V.  Mayor  &c.  51  111.  17, 

43,  1531,  1538 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  130  111.  406,  1489 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  179  111.  615,  1685 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  2  Neb.  166,  1745 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  4  N.  Y.  (4  Comst.) 
419, 

673,  763,  1165,  1234,  1252,  1261 
1266,  1499,  1522 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  63  N.  Y.  291,    294 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  144  N.  Y.  63. 

722,  1755 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  5  N.  Y.  S.  538,  206 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  45  N.  Y.  S.  900,  1687 
V.  Mayor,  18  Abb.  N.  C.  123.  620 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  5  Barb.  43,  169,  1724 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  9  Barb.  535.  1724 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  32  Barb.  102.  673 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  2  Hill  9,  554.  1419 
V.  Mayor  &c..  7  How.  Pr.  81,  85,  538 
V.  Mayor,  59  How.  Pr.  277. 

620,  1610 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  3  Johns.  Ch.  79,  1657 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  25  Wend.  680, 

753,  763 
V.  Mays,  17  111.  App.  361,  1492 
V.  McAllister,  10  Utah  357.  209 
V.  McCarthy,  45  How.  Pr.  97.  541 
V.  McCartney,  53  N.  Y.  S.  1047,  1830 
V.  McClave,  123  N.  Y.  512, 

1438,  1439 
V.  McClave,  8  N.  Y.  S.  515,  1445 
V.  McClave,  9  N.  Y.  S.  263,  1443 
V.  McClave,  10  N.  Y.  S.  441,  1442 
V.  McClave,  10  N.  Y.  S.  561, 

1440,  1444 
v.  McClave,  13  N.  Y.  S.  340,  1439 
v.  McCreery,  34  Cal.  432, 

1287,  1498.  1522 
V.  McFadden,  81  Cal.  489,  55,  61 
V.  McPall,  26  111.  App.  319. 

1477,  1494 
V.  McKinney,  52  N.  Y.  374, 

150,  1432 
V.  McLean,  8  N.  Y.  S.  511,  1441 
V.  McMurray,  27  Colo.  277.  1652 
V.  McRoberts,  62  111.  88.  1209,  1224 
V.  McWethy,  165  111.  222. 

1282.  1296,  1308 
V.  McWethy.  177  111.  334. 

719.  1259,  1308 
V.  Meach,  14  Abb.  Pr.  429,  1173 
V.  Mead.  24  N.  Y.  114,  1009 
V.  Meakim,  133  N.  Y.  214,  816.  832 
V.  Meakim.  56  Hun  626,  1678 
V.  Mellen,  32  111.  181,  122 

V.  Merrick,  16  N.  Y.  S.  246.     169 
V.  Mersereau,  74  Mich.  687,    332 
V.  Metropolitan  Police,  19  N.  Y. 
188.  1083 

V.  Metzker.  47  Cal.  524,  380 
V.  Mevers.  95  N.  Y.  223,  598 
V.  Miller.  16  Mich.  205,  1695 
V.  Miller.  38  Hun  82,  1403 
V.  Mills.  32  Hun  459.  301.  303 
V.  Minck,  21  N.  Y'.  539,       1424 


eliv 


TABLE    OF    CASES, 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Vol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.1 


People  V.  Mitchell.  35  N.  Y.  551,    982,  983 
•    V.  Molitor,  •_'3  Mich.  341,       378,  1095 
V.  Mollov.  K51   N.   Y.  6121.  1305 

V.  Molloy.  54  X.  Y.  S.  1084,  1684 
V.  Morgan,  55  N.  Y.  587,  991 

V.  Morrell,  21  Wend.  563, 

183,  415,  428 
V.  Morris.  13  Wend.  325. 
4,  5.  9.  61,  81.  83.  90,  103,  453,  456 
V.   Mosher,   163  N.  Y.  32, 

1820.  1821,  1822 
V.  Mosher,  61  N.  Y.  S.  452, 

1825,  1826 
V.    Moss,    56    N.    Y.    S.    1032, 

201,  208,  1767 
V.  Moss,  63  N.  Y.  S.  912,  1765 

V.   Mount,    87   111.  App.   194, 

525,  1800 
V.  Murray,  57  Mich.  396, 

540,  1422,  1423 
V.  Murray,  70  N.  Y.  521,  1826 

V.  Murray.  73  N.  Y.  535.  171,  454 

V.  Nearing.  27  N.  Y.  306.  689 

V.  Newbrand.  60  N.  Y.  S.  588,  194 
V.  Newell.  13  Barb.  86.  295 

V.  Newton.  126  N.  Y.  656.  1648 

V.  New  York,  82  N.  Y.  491,  200 

V.   New  I'ork   Board  &c.,   52   N. 
Y.   Super.   520,  1492 

V.   New  York  &c.   R.   Co.,   74  N. 
Y.  302.  591 

V.  New  York  &c.   R.   Co.,  84  N. 
Y.  565.  19 

V.  Nichols.  79  N.  Y.  582,  200,  206 
V.  Niles.  35  Cal.   282,  1499 

V.  Nixon,  158  N.  Y.  221. 

152,  209,  1829 
V.  Nostrand,  46  N.  Y.  375. 

197,  198,  206,  289,  294 
V.  Nyland,  41  Cal.  129,  1412 

V.    OBrien,    111    N.    Y.    1, 

75,  521,  595 
V.  Olmsted.  45  Barb.  644,  1650 

V.  O'Neil,  109  N.  Y.  251,  115 

V.  Organ,  27  111.  26,  310 

V.  Osborn,  20  Wend.  186,  708 

V.  Osborne.  7  Colo.  605,  150 

V.  Otis,  90  N.  Y.  48,  595 

V.  Oulton.  28  Cal.  44.  168.  213 

V.   Pacheco.    27   Cal.   175,  763 

V.  Page.  6  TTtah  353.  59,  113,  115 
V.  Palmer.  52  N.  Y.  84.  294 

V.  Palmer,  152  N.  Y.  217,  1819 

V.  Parkes,  58  Cal.  624,  980 

V.  Pennock,  60  N.  Y.  421,  319,  328 
V.  Perkins,  85  Cal.  509,  187.  313 

V.  Peters.  4  Neb.  254.  1485 

V.  Phillips,   1   Denio  388,  185 

V.   Phippin.   70  Mich.   6.  137 

V.  Phcpnix  Bank.  24  Wend.  431.  259 
V.  Pinckney.  32  N.  Y.  377,  103.  1083 
V.  Police  .Tnstices.  7  Mich.  455,  1419 
V.  Pope.  53  Cal.  437,  1214 

V.  Porter,  6  Cal.  26,  199.  368 

V.    Potter,    63    Cal.    127. 

187,  213,   1445 
V.  Power,  25  111.  187, 

103,  762,  1084,  1522 
V.  Pratt,  129  N.  Y.  68.  611 

V.  President  &c.,  64  Barb.  55,     1108 
V.  President  &e.,  32  Hun  508.       535 
V.    President   &c.,   29    N.    Y.    St. 
723.  1649 

V.   President  &c.,  9  Wend.  351, 

61.  83.  123.  404 
V.  President  &c.,  23  Wend.  254,  1578 
V.  Provines.  34  Cal.  520,  223 

V.  Quigg.  59  N.  Y.  83.  106 

V.  Rathbone,  145  N.  1'.  434.  1829 

V.  Raymond,  37  N,  Y.  428,  150,  1083 
V.  Reardon.  49  Hun  425,  1649 

V.  Reat,  107  111.  581,  1260 


People  V.  Reed,  81  Cal.  70, 
V.  Regents  &c.,  4  Mich. 


1560,  1562 

98, 

339,  1655 

168 

61,  83 


V.  Reid,  11  Colo.  138, 
V.  Reynolds,  10  III.  1, 
V.  Riordan,  73  Mich.  508,    1689,  1690 
V.  Robb,  5  N.  Y.  S.  869,  1445 

V.  Robb,  8  N.  Y.  S.  418,  456,  1445 
V.  Robb,  9  N.  Y.  S.  831,  1438,  1442 
V.  Robb.  55  II un  425,  1441 

V.  Roberts.  148  N.  Y.  360,  1829 

V.  Roberts.  103  N.  Y.  70,  1662 

V.  Roche,  124  111.  9,  1489,  1496 

V.   Romero.   18  Cal.  89.  1679 

V.  Roosevelt,  43  N.  Y.  S.  73.  1766 
V.  Roosevelt,  44  N.  Y.  S.  655.  1766 
V.  Roosevelt.  44  N.  Y.  S.  1003,  1806 
V.  Roosevelt.  48  N.  Y.  S.  578,  1823 
V.  Roosevelt.  57  N.  Y.  S.  11,  1765 

V.  Rosborough.  14  Cal.  180,  368 

V.  Runkle,  9  .Tohns.  147,  167,  288 

V.  Russell.  4  ^Vend.  570,  771 

V.  Ryan.  156  111.  620,  1277,  1278 

V.  Sacramento,  6  Cal.  422,  526 

V.  Saele,  52  Cal.  620.  1473 

V.   Salomon.  51   111.  37. 

55.  61.  82.  83.  1084,  1546 
V.   Sanderson.   30   Cal.   160,  185 

V.    Sawyer,    106   Mich.   428,  .505 

V.  Scannell,  65  N.  Y.  832,  1768 

V.  Scannell.  54  N.   E.  670,  1830 

V.   Scannell,  56  N.  Y.   S.   117. 

194,  1828 
V.  Scannell.  59  N.  Y.  S.  480,  1822 
V.    Scannell,    59    N.    Y.    S.    950, 

1684,  1821,  1823 
V.  Scannell,  62  N.  Y.  S.  682,  1684 
V.  Scannell.  62  N.  Y.  S.  930,  1768 
V.  Scannell,  62  N.  Y.  S.  1064. 

171,  202 
V.  School  Trustees.  78  111.  136,  1471 
V.  Schuyler.  4  N.  Y.  173.  332 

V.  Schuvler.  5  Barb.  166.  331 

V.  Scrugham.  20  Barb.  302. 

1657,  1691 
V.  Seaman.  5  Denio  409.  377 

V.  Shea.  64  N.  Y.  S.  426,  1823 

V.  Sheffield.  47  Hun  481.  1659 

V.   Shephard,  36  N.  Y.  285, 

798,  1432,  1433 
V.  Sherman,  83  111.  165.  1276 

V.  Simis,  45  N.  Y.  S.  940,  1828 

V.  Sisson,  98  111.  335.  362,  1473 

V.  Smith,  21  N.  Y.  595. 

684.  685,  692,  698 
V.  Smith.  45  N.  Y.  772,  1009 

V.  Smyth.  28  Cal.  21.  213 

V.  Son,  19  N.  Y.  S.  309.  901 

V.  Soncy.  26  111.  Anp.  505,  1663 

V.   Spencer.  55  N.  Y.  1.  988 

V.   Squire.  107  N.  Y.  593.  1390 

V.  State  Treasurer,  23  Mich.  499. 

756.  984 
V.  State  Treasurer,  24  Mich.  468. 

984.  1429 
V.  Staton,  73  N.  C.  546.  171,  196 

V.  Stephens.'71  N.  Y.  527,  729.  771 
V.  Stevens,  5  Hill  616,  171,  288 

V.  Stevens.  13  Wend.  341,  496 

V.  Stewart.  28  Cal.  395.  763 

V.  Stewart.  0  111.  App.  62,  328 

V.  Stocking.  50  Barb.  573,    869,  1661 
V.  Stone.  78  Mich.  635,         373,  1486 
V.  Stott.  90  Mich.  343. 
V.  Stout.  23  Barb.  338. 
V.  Stowell,  9  Abb.  N.  C.  456. 

187,  280 
V.   Stupp.  49  Hun  544,  919 

V.  Suburban  R.  Co.,  178  111.  594. 

585,  1351.  1813 
V.  Summers.  30  N.  Y.  S.  614.  1649 
V.  Supervisors  &c.,  67  111.  57,       1756 


1415 
61.  69,  83 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


clv 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Vol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.'] 


People  V.   Supervisors,   88   111.   469. 

986,  988 
V.  Supervisors  &c.,  100  111.  332,  1681 
V.  Supervisors  &c.,  S  Mich.  47."),  1665 
V.  Supervisors  &c.,  14  Mich.  336,  860 
V.  Sui)crvisors  tV:c.,  26  Mich.  22,  1238 
V.  Supervisors  &c.,  36  Mich. 
377,  1652 

V.  Supervisors  &c.,  11  N.  Y.  563, 

1539,  1652,  1669 
V.  Supervisors  &c.,  20  N.  Y.  252, 

1252 
V.  Supervisors,  11  Abb.  Pr.  114,  1522 
V.  Supervisors  &c.,   15  Barb. 
607,  1668 

V.  Supervisors  &c.,  1  Hill  195,    1723 
.    V.  Supervisors.  1  Hill  362.     175,  178 
v.    Supervisors   &c.,    12    Johns. 
414.  1668 

V.   Supervisors  «&c.,   10  Wend. 
363.  1529 

V.  Supervisors,  12  Wend.  257,  179 
V.   Sutphin,  66  N.  Y.  49,  1712 

V.  Swift,  31  Cal.  26. 

258,  259,  631,  714 
V.  Taylor,  57  Cal.  620.  313 

V.  Tazewell  County,  22  111.  147,  1016 
v.  Ten  Evck,  13  Wend.  448,  323 

V.  Thompson.  99  N.  Y.  641,  1676 

V.  Throop,  12  Wend.  183,  499 

V.  Thurber.  13  111.  554,  137 

V.  Tisdale.  1  Doug.  59,  377 

V.  Titner.  63  N.  Y.  S.  209,  1822 

V.  Toal.  85  Cal.  333,  196,  1410 

V.  Tompkins,  74   111.  482.  318 

V.  Town,  37  N.  Y.  S.  864,  712 

V.  Town  Auditors.  75  N.  Y.  316.    224 
V.  Town  Board  &e.,  59  N.  Y.  S. 
248.  1662 

v.  Town  of  Fairbury.  51  111.  149,  168 
V.  Town  of  Linden.  107  Cal.  94.       63 
V.  Town  of  Mt.  Morris,  137  111. 
576.  1651 

V.  Town  of  Oran.  121  111.  650,     442 
V.  Town  of  Waynesville.  88  111. 
469.  991 

V.  Township  Board  &c.,  20  Mich. 
452.  983,  1536 

V.  Tracy,  54  N.  Y.  S.  1070,  208 

V.  Tracy,  1  Denio  617,  1681 

V.  Treasurer  &c.,  39  Mich.  554,  646 
v.  Tremain,  17  How  Pr.  142,  1662 
V.  Trustees,  78  111.  136.  1538 

V.  Trustees  &c..  54  Hun  16,  1649 

V.  Tweed.  63  N.  Y.  202.  103 

V.  Utica  Ins.  Co.,  15  Johns.  358, 

296.  1511 
V.    Van    Alstvne,    65    N.    Y.    S. 
451.  1712 

V.  Van  Cleve.  1  Mich.  362.  380 

V.  Vanderbilt,  28  N.  Y.  396,  1115 
V.  Van  Houten,  35  N.  Y.  S.  186.  541 
V.  Van  Slvck.  4  Cowen  297.  381 

V.  Van  Tassel,  19  N.  Y.  S.  643.  299 
V.  Van  Wart,  25  Misc.  215.  88 

V.  Van  Wyck,  159  N.  Y.  509, 

209,  1829 
V.  Van  Wyck,  59  N.  Y.  S.  134. 

152,  209,  1829 
V.  Vilas,  36  N.  Y.  459.  178 

V.  Vilas.  3  Abb.  Pr.  252.       308.  318 
V.  Village  of  Highland  Park.  88 
Mich.    653.  155 

V.   Village  of  Holly,   119  Mich. 
637.  638 

V.    Village    of   Hyde    Park,    117 
HI.  462,  700 

V.  Village  of  New  Rochelle,  45 
N.  Y.  S.  836.  1549 

V.  Village  of  Rochelle,  31  N.  Y. 
S.  592.  1243 

V.  Wagner,  86  Mich.  594,  490 


People  V.  Wagner,  7  Lans.  467,  987 

v.  Walker,  9  Mich.  328,  14.30 

V.   Walker,   23   Barb.  304,  270 

V.  Walter,  68  N.  Y.  403,  554 

V.  Warfleld,  20  111.  160,  374,  1150 
V.    Waring,    62   N.   Y.    S.   579, 

1828,  1830 
V.  Warner,  7  Hill  81,  183 

V.  Warren,  14  111.  App.  296,  663 
V.  Wattles,  13  Mich.  446,  214 

V.  Wearing,  27  N.  Y.  306,  1261 

V.   Weber,   86   HI.   283, 

197,  198,  1668 
V.  Weber,  89  III.  347,  170    •>60 

V.  Welde,  59  N.  Y.  S.  474,  1820 

V.  Welde,  59  N.  Y.  S.  1030,  152 

V.  Weldon,  14  N.  Y.  S.  447,  1037 

V.  Weller,  11  Cal.  49,  368 

V.  Welles,  45  N.  Y.  S.  713,  1766 

V.  Wendell,  71  N.  Y.  171,  960 

V.  Wendell.  57  Hun  362,     1649,  1682 
I;,  West   Bay   Sugar  Co.,   83   N. 
"  •  228,  1318 

V.  Whalen,  5  Weekly  Dig.  410,  869 
V.  Whitcomb,  55  HI.  172,  401 

V.   White,  24  Wend.   520, 

70,  197,  289,  296 
V.  Whitman.  10  Cal.  38,  185 

V.  Wiant.  48  HI.  263,  374,  1150 

V.  Williams.  51   111.  57,  687 

V.  Wilson,  15  HI.  388.  1410 

V.  Wilson.  62  X.  Y.  186,  370 

V.  WiLson,  119  N.  Y.  515,  1650 

V.  Wilson,  62  Hun  618,  1491 

V.  Wilson,  3  N.  Y.  S.  326,  I'^Hg 

V.  Wilson,  16  N.  Y.  S.  583.  584 

V.  Wong  Wang.  92  Cal.  277, 

„,     ^      ,  ^  1411,  1412,  1420 

V.  Woods,  7  Cal.  579,  1531 

V.  Woods,  57  N.  Y.  S.  71.5,  1711 

V.  Wren.  5  HI.  269,  61,  83,  447,  1084 
V.  Wright.  34  Mich.  371,  1483 

V.  Wurster,  35  N.  Y.  S.  89,  1828 
V.  lancey.  167  III.  255,  1310 

V.   Yeazel,   84    111.   539.  1483 

V.  York.  53  N.  Y.  S.  947,  208.  1684 
V.  lork,  59  X.  Y.  vS.  418.  1687,  1712 
V.  lork,  60  N.  Y.  S.  208,  1766 

V.  York,  64  N.  Y.   S.  2,  1766 

V.  York.  65  N.  Y.  S.  606.  1766 

y-.York.  65  N.  Y.  S.  1074.  1768 

People's  Nat'l  Bank  v.  Ayer,  24  Ind 

App.  212,  1033 

V.  City  of  Ennis,  50  S.  W^  632 

T>       ,  ,    T.    ^  1548.  1554 

People's  R.  Co.  v.  Memphis  R.  Co..  10 

Wall.  38.  637.  1323 

Peoria  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  People.  116  HI 

401,  1533 

V.  Peoria  &c.  R.  Co.,  66  111.  174,  1323 
V.   Schertz.   84   HI.   135.  1706 

Pepper  v.  Smith.  15  Lea  551,  406,  407 
Peppin  V.  Cooper.  2  B.  &  Aid.  431,  326 
Perdue  v.  Ellis,   18   Ga.   586.  467 

Pereles  v.  City  of  W^atertown,  6  Biss. 

X,       ''P-        ^  765 

Pereria  v.  Wallace,  129  Cal.  397, 

1791,  1809 

Perin  v.  Carey.  24  How.  465.       564.  664 

Perine  v.  Lewis.   12S  Cal.  236, 

1237.  1245.  1276,  1290,  1790 
V.  Moran,  127  Cal.  18.  1259 

Perine  &c.  Co.  v.  Citv  of  Pasadena, 

116  Cal.  6.  '  510.  7.54 

Perkin  v.  Proctor.  2  W^ils.  382.  220 

Perkins  v.  Board  &c..  56  Iowa  476.    1481 
V.   City  of  Burlington,   77  Iowa 
553.  1514,   1518 

V.   Citv  of  Lawrence,  136  Mass. 
305.  824 

V.  City  of  New  Haven,  53  Conn. 
214,  798 


clvi 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Vol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.'i 


rerkins  v.  City  of  Watertown,  5  Biss. 

320,  1737 
V.  Corbin,  45  Ala.  103,  1410 
V.  Crocker.  109  Mass.  128,  1485 
V.  Inhabitants,  68  Maine  152, 

1587,  1597 
V.  Ledbetter,  68  Miss.  327,  1401 

V.  Sanders.  56  Miss.  733,  1813 

V.  Slack,  86  Pa.   St.  270,  894 

V.   Weston,   3   Cush.   549,  1429 

Perkinson   v.   St.   Louis,  4  Mo.  App. 

322.  210 

Perley    v.    Inhabitants   &c.,    7    Gray 

464.  1726 

V.  Muskegon  Co.,  32  Mich.  132,     319 

Perrin  v.  Lyman,  32  Ind.  16,  216 

Perrine  v.  Farr,  22  N.  J.  L.  356,         687 

Perry  v.  Brown,  21  Ky.  L.  344,  1788 

V.  City  Council  &c..  7  Utah  143,  1401 
V.    City    of    Rockdale,    62    Tex. 
451,  1531 

V.  Cheboygan,  55  Mich.  250,  178 

V.  Cumberson,  39  Hun  436,  1564 

V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  12  Pick.  206. 

348,  1485 
V.  Keene,  56  N.  H.  514,  979,  983 
V.  Kinnean,  42  111.  160,  1701 

V.  People.   155  111.  307,  1304 

V.  State,  9  Wis.  19,  424 

V.   Torrence,   8   Ohio  521,  1502 

V.  Town  of  Putney,  52  Vt.  533,  829 
V.  Tynen.  22  Barb.  137.  294,  295 

V.  Washburn.  20  Cal.  318,  458 

Perry   Co.   v.   City  of  Du  Quoin,   99 

111.    479,  1041 

V.  Conway  Co.,  52  Ark.  430,         934 

Perryman  v.  Bethune.  89  Mo.  158.    1486 
V.    City    of    Greenville,    51    Ala. 
507,  85,  86 

Peru  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Hana,  68  Ind.  562, 

1249,  1251 

Peruvian   &c.    R.   Co.   v.   Thames  &c. 

Ins.  Co.,  L.  R.  2  Ch.  617.  971 

Pesterfleld  v.  Vickers,  3  Coldw.  205. 

97.  468,  1075 

Peterborough  v.  Lancaster.  14  N.  H. 

382.  348,  367 

Peters  v.   Bell,   51   La.   An.   1621, 

209.  1820 
V.    City    of    Lynchburg,    76    Va. 
927.  1520 

V.  Litchfield.  34  Conn.  264.  1060 

V.   Town   of  Fergus  Falls.   35 
Minn.  549.  1126 

Petersburg  v.  Applegarth,   28  Gratt. 

321,  8 
Petersilea  v.  Stone.  119  Mass.  465. 

195,  196 
Peterson  v.  Mayor  &c.,  17  N.  Y.  449, 

210,  240,  252.   260,  644,  894 
Petrie  v.  Doe,  30  Miss.  698,  294 

Pettibone    v.    Beardslee,    1    Luzerne 

Leg.  Reg.  180.  1745 

Pettigrew  v.  Bell.  34  S.  C.  104.  1486 

V.  Village  of  Evansville,  25  Wis. 

223,  1177,   1218 

Pettingill   v.   Town   of  Olean.   48   N. 

Y.  St.  96.  1604 

Pettis  V.  Johnson,  56  Ind.   130. 

585.  1322,  1757 
Pettit  V.  Duke.  10  Utah  311.  1298 

Petty  V.  Looker.  21  N.  Y.  267,  185 

V.  Myers,  49  Ind.  1.  983 

Peyser  v.  Mavor  &c..  70  N.  T.  497. 

244,  1205.  1263.  1265,  1551 
Pfeflferle  v.  Board  &c..  39  Kan.  432,  1076 
Pfefferling  v.  Mayor  &c..  88  Md.  475.  513 
Pfeiffer  v.  People.  170  III.  347.  1272 

Phelan  v.   City  of  New  York.   14  N. 

Y.   S.   785.  176 

V.  Mavor  &c..  119  N.  Y.  86,         1189 
Phelon  V.  Granville,  140  Mass.  386,     176 


Phelps  V.  City  of  Detroit,  120  Mich. 

447,  1172,   1781 

V.    City    of    Mankato,    23    Minn. 
276,  1596,    1627 

V.  City  of  Mattoon,  177  111.  169, 

1274,  1278 
V.    City    of   Tacoma,    15    Wash. 
307,  1553 

V.  Lewiiston,  15  Blatchf.  131,       1001 
V.  Lodge,  60  Kan.  122,  1685 

V.  Mayor  &c.,   112  N.   Y.   216, 

242,    244,    246,    282,    509,    1186 
1263,  1264,  1552 

Philadelphia's  Appeal,  86  Pa.  St.  179, 

1192 
V.  Bowman,  166  Pa.  St.  393,  1282 
V.  Commonwealth,  52  Pa.  St.  451, .14 
V.  Kddlemar.  169  Pa.  St.  452,  1309 
V.  Fox,  64  I'a.  St.  169. 
10,  74,  90,  103,  422.  459.  563,  756 
V.  Lockhardt.  73  Pa.  St.  211,  1192 
V.  Philadelphia  &c.  R.  Co.,  33 
Pa.  St.  41,  1250.  1251 

V.    Philadelphia   &c.    R.    Co.,    52 
Pa.   St.  177,  1503 

V.  Providence  Trust  Co.,  132  Pa. 
St.   224,  1116 

V.  Scott,  81  Pa.  St.  80,  673 

V.  Smith   (Pa.).  16  Atl.  493,       1588 
V.  Stewart,  195  Pa.  St.  309, 

617,  1738 
V.  Verner,  8  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  79,  1234 

Philadelphia  Ass'n  &c.   v.   Wood,   39 

Pa.   St.  73.  549 

Philadelphia    Ball    Club    v.    City    of 
Philadelphia,    192    Pa.    St.    632, 

1772,  1779 

Philadelphia  Citv  v.  Dungan,  124  Pa. 

St.  52.  1124 

V.    Field,   58    Pa.    St.   320,  1252 

Philadelphia  &c.  Iron  Co.  v.  City  of 

Chicago,  16  Ky.  L.  455,  1286 

Philadelphia  &c.   R.   Co.   v.   Howai'd, 

13   How.   307,  1748 

V.   Mayor  &c..  38  Fed.  159.  788 

V.  Williams.  .54  Pa.  St.  103,  693 

Philips  V.  City  of  Stevens  Point,  25 

Wis.  594,  1724,  1726 

Phillips  V.  Allen.  41  Pa.  St.  481,         532 
V.    Ash,    63   Ala.    414,  556 

V.    Board   &c..   5   Kan.   412,  1725 

V.    City    of    Boston,    150    Mass. 
491.  184 

V.    City    of   Olympia,    21    Wash. 
153,  1286 

V.    City    of    Tecumseh,    5    Neb. 
812,  1400 

V.    Commonwealth,    44    Pa.    St. 
197.  213.    1112 

V.  Foxhall,  L.  R.  7  Q.  B.  666,       321 
V.  Harrow.  93  Iowa  92.  563 

V.  Mavor  &c.,  1  Hilt.  483,  183 

V.   Reed.   107   Iowa  331. 

878.  881.  956 
V.  Ritchie  Co..  31  W.  Va.  477.  1633 
V.    School    Dist.,    79    Mich.    170. 

840.  1496 
V.  Town  of  Albanv.  28  Wis.  340. 

345.  623.  983 
V.  Wickham,  1  Paige  Ch.  590.       447 

Phillips  Co.  V.  Lee  Co..  34  Ark.  240.    441 

Phiuizy  v.   City  Council  &c.,   47  Ga. 

260,  1112 

Phoenix,  In  re.  65  N.  Y.  S.  719,  1309 

Piatt  V.   People.  29  HI.   54.  152 

Piatt  Co.  V.  Goodell.  97  HI.  84.  443 

Pickard  v.  Collins.  23  Barb.  444,       1387 

Pickens  Tp.  v.  Post,  99  Fed.  659. 

1010.  1032 

Pickering  v.  De  Rochemont.  66  N.  H. 

377.  341.  343,  1485 

V.  Pickering.  11   N.  H.  141,  365 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


clvii 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Vol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Yol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.-i 


Pickering  v.  Sbotwell,  10  Barr  23,       5G3 
V.  State,  106  Ind.  228,  1201 

Pickett  V.  Adams.  12  Ky.  L.  957,       1472 
V.  Ilari-od,  86  Ky.  485,  1472 

V.   Hastings,  47  Cal.  2G9,  629 

V.   School   Dist.,  25  Wis.  551,       291 

Pickford  v.  Mayor  &c.,  98  Mass.  491,  706 

Pickles  V.  Dry  Dock  Co.,  38  La.  An. 

412,  572 

Pickard  v.  Smith.  10  C.  B.  470,  1779 

Pidgeon  v.   McCarthy.  82   Ind.   321,        49 

Pierce  v.  Benjamin,  14  IMck.  356,       1727 
V.  City  of  Aurora,  81   111.  App. 
670,  503 

V.    Citv    of    New    Bedford,    129 
Mass.  534,  263 

V.  Dart,  7  Cow.  609.  1112 

V.  Drew.  136  Mass.  75,  681 

V.  Emery,  32  N.  H.  484.  1689 

V.  Mayor  &c.,  2  Marv.  306. 

1328.  1359,  1374 
V.  Richardson,  37  N.  H.  306,  1427 
V.  Whitcomb,  48  Vt.  127.  810 

Pierce  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Bleckwenn,  12  N. 

Y     S     768  922 

Piercy  v.  Averill.  37  Hnn  360,      222,  224 

Pieri  v.  Mavor  &c..  42  Miss.  1493.     1093 

Pierie  v.   Philadelphia,   139   Pa.   St. 

573.  178 

Pierson  v.  City  of  Chicago,  162  111. 

383  1144 

V.  Glean,  14  N.  J.  L.  36,  1095 

Pike    V.    City    of    Chicago.    155    111. 

656.  1299 

V.  Megoun,  44  Mo.  491,  221 

Pike  Co.  V.   Hosford,   11   111.   170, 

931,  1780 

Pillsbury  v.  Brown,  47  Cal.  477,         1420 
V.  Mavor  &c.,  79  Maine  71,  1320 

V.   Moore,  44   Maine  154.  1095 

Pimental   v.   City   of   San   Francisco, 

21  Cal.  351.  241,  291.  292.  631.  653 

Pine   Bluff   W.   &   L.   Co.   v.   City   of 
'       Pine  Bluff.  62  Ark.  196.  1712 

V.  Sewer  Dist.  &c..  56  Ark.  205,  1175 

Pine  City  v.  Munch.  42  Minn.  342.     1126 

Pine  Civil  Tp.  v.  Iluber  Mfg.  Co..  83 

Ind.    121.  210,    647,   857,   862 

Pine  Co.  v.  Willard.  39  Minn.  125.     321 

Pine  Grove  Tp.  v.  Tallcott,  19  Wall. 

666.  983 

Pinkerton  v.   Bailey,  8  Wend.   600,   1488 

Pinkham   v.    Inhabitants   &c.,    104 

Mass.  78,  1586,  1606 

Pinney   v.    Brown,    60   Conn.    164. 

282,  283,  349,  363 

Piollet  V.  Simmers,  106  Pa.  St.  95, 

1613,   1614 

Piper  V.  Chappell,  14  M.  &  W.  624. 

100.  507 

V.  City  of  Spokane.  22  Wash.  147. 

929.  930.   1334.   1797,   1798 

V.  Pearson.  2  Gray  120,  335 

V.  Singer.  4  Serg.  &  R.  354.       1546 
Pipher  v.   People.  183  111.  436.  1274 

Piqua  Branch  &c.  v.  Kuoop,  16  How. 

369.  90,   103 

Piscataway  Tp.,  In  re,  24  Atl.  759,     1569 
Pitman   v.   City   of  El   Reno,   2   Okl.   • 

414.  1.331 

Pittelkow  V.  Citv  of  Milwaukee,  94 

Wis.   651.  1774 

Pittman  v.  Citv  of  El  Reno.  4  Okl. 

638.  ■  1326 

Pitts  V.  Citv  of  Vicksburg,  72  Miss. 

181.  598 

V.   District  of  Opelika,   79  Ala. 

527.  482 

Pittsburg  V.  Clarksville.  58  N.  H.  291. 

15S0 

V.  Cluley,  74  Pa.  St.  262,  1425 


I'ittsburg  v.  Danforth,  56  N.  H.  272, 

342,  362,   363 
V.  Grier,  22  I'a.  St.  54,  811,  817 

v.  Murphy,  95  Fed.  57,  1311 

Pittsburgh  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Bennett,  9 

Ind.    App.    92,  466 

V.  Board  &c.,  172  U.  S.  32,  1097 

V.  City  of  Chicago,   159  111.  369. 

1349 
V.  Gilleland,  56  I'a.  St.  445,  1108 
V.    Hays.    17    Ind.    App.   261. 

1131.    1249,    1250,    1251,    1309 
V.   Hood,  94   Fed.   618,  511,   515 

V.  Rose,  74  I'a.  St.  362,  701 

V.   Swinney,   97   Ind.   586,     699,   700 
V.  Town  of  Crown  Point,  146  Ind. 
421,  502 

Pittsburg  R.  Co.  v.  Taylor,   104  Pa. 

St.  306,  1633 

I'itzman   v.   Village  of  Freeburg,   92 

111,  111,  982 

Pixley  v.  Clark.  35  N,  Y.  520,  824 

Place  V.  City  of  Providence,  12  R.  I, 

1,  651 

V.  City  of  Yonkers,  60  N.  Y.  S. 
171.  929 

V.  Taylor,  22  Ohio  St.  317,  334 

Placer    Co.    v.    Campbell    (Cal.),    11 

Pac.   602,  938 

Piano   Mfg.    Co.    v.    Rasey,    69   Wis. 

246,  942 

Planters'  Oil  Mill  v.  Monroe  Water- 
Works  &c.  Co.,  52  La.  An.  1243,  786 

Plaquemines   Police  Jury  v.   Mitchell, 

37  La.  An.  44,  1544 

Platenius  v.   State,   17  Ark.   518,  770 

Piatt  V.  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.,  31  N.  W. 

883.  1319 

V.  City  of  Waterbury,  72  Conn. 
531.  250.    1805 

Platte  Co.  V.  Gerrard.  12  Neb.  244,     664 

Platter  v.  Board  &c..  103  Ind.  360, 

210,  644.  647.  1038,  1190,  1660 

Pleuler  v.  State.  11  Neb.  547.  1508 

Plimpton  V.  Town  of  Summerset,  33 

Vt.  283.  1414 

Plumer  v.  Board  &c.,  46  Wis.  163,     1550 
V.  Harper,  3  N.  H.  88,  1095 

Plummer  v.   City  of  Milan,  79  Mo. 

App.   439,  1796,   1801 

V.  Sheldon,  94  Cal.  533,     1561,  1574 

Plymouth  Tp.  v.  Graver,  125  Pa.  St. 

24.  816 

Pocontico   Water-Works   Co.   v.   Bids, 

4  N.  Y.  S.  317.  1456 

Poe  V.   Machine  Works,   24  W.  Va. 

517,  543 

Poillon  V.   City  of  Brooklyn,  101  N. 

Y.    132,  666 

Poindexter   v.    Greenhow,    114    U.    S. 

270.  18 

Point  Pleasant  Bridge  Co.  v.  Town  of 

Point  Pleasant,  32  W.  Va.  328.      62 

Point  Pleasant  Land  Co.  v.   Trustees 

&c..  47  N.  J.  L.  235.     374.  846,  1486 

Police  Com'rs  v.   City  of  Louisville. 

3  Bush  597,  1433 

Police  Jury  v.  Britton.  15  Wall.  566, 

562.  635.  637.  863.  971.  972,  973 
V.  Mavor  &c..  38  La,  An,  630.  12 
v.  McCormack,  32  La,  An.  624,  629 
V,  McDonough.  8  La.  An.  341,  983 
V.   Michel.   4   La.  An.   84.  1743 

V.    Shreveport,   5   La.   An.   661.     104 

Polinsky  v.   People,  11   Hun  390.         496 

Polk   V.   Cosgrove,   4   Biss.   437.  228 

V.   Plummer.  2  Humph.   .500,  311 

Pollard  V.  Hagan.  3  How.  212.  673 

Pollock    V,    Lawrence    Co,,    2    Pittsb, 

137,  9.51 

V.    Louisville,    13    Bush    221, 

1075,  1097 


clviii 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Vol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.'\ 


Polly  V.  Saratoga  &c.  R.  Co.,  9  Barb. 

449.  G92 

Pomeroy  v.  Inhabitants  &c..  154  Mass. 
462.  1601,  1602,  1638 

Pomerov   Salt   Co.   v.   Davis,   21   Ohio 

St.'  555.  1499 

Pomfrev  v.  Village  of  Saratoga 
Springs,    104   N.   Y.    459. 

224.  336.  826,  936 
1542,   1562,   1604,    1614,    1617.    1631 

Pompton  V.  Cooper  Union,  101  U.  S. 

196,  1001 

Pond  V.  Mcdwav.  Quincy  193,  707 

V.  Negus.  3" Mass.  230,  301,  521.  1569 

Poock   V.    Lafayette   Bld'g  Ass'n,   71 

Ind.   357.  650 

Pool   V.    City   of  Boston,   5   Cush.    219, 

671 
V.  Trexler,  76  N.  C.  297,  689 

Pooler  V.  Reed,  73  Maine  129,  198 

Poolev  V.   City  of  Buffalo,   122  N.  Y. 

592,  1264 

Poor   Dist.    V.    Byers    (Pa.),    11   Atl. 

242,  947 

V.   Poor  Dist.,   13   Atl.   742,  1046 

Pope  V.    Phifer,   3   Ileisk.   682,  1538 

Pope  Mfg.   Co.  V.   Granger,  21   R.   I. 

298,  872,    926 

Popel   V.   Citv  of  Monmouth,   81    111. 

App.    512.  604 

Poppen  V.  Holmes.  44  III.  218,  533 

Popper  V.  Broderiek,  123  Cal.  456,       110 

Poquet  V.   Town   of  North   Hero,   44 

Vt.  91,  1041 

Port  Clinton  &c.  v.  Shafer.  5  Pa.  Dist. 
Rep.    583,  499 

Porter   v.    City  of   Chicago.    176   111. 

605,  1276,   1290 

V.   N.   Missouri   R.   Co.,  33   Mo. 
128  1354 

V.   Rockford  &e.   R.   Co.,   76   III. 
561.  1513 

V.  State.  78  Tex.  591,         1487,  1669 
V.  Village  of  Attica,  33   Hun 
605,  1562 

Port  Huron  v.  McCall,  46  Mich.  565,     88 

Port   Jervis  Water-Works   Co.   v.   Vil- 
lage of  Port   Jervis,    151   N.   Y. 
111.  714,   930 

Portland  v.  Improvement  Co.,  33  Or. 

307,  1752 

Portland  &c.   R.   Co.  v.  City  of  Port- 
land.   14   Or.    188,  578 
V.   Inhabitants  &c..  58  Maine  23. 

356.   984.   990.   991,    1022 
V.  Inhabitants  &c..  65  Maine  63. 

365.   987 

Portland  Sav.  Bank  v.  City  of  Evans- 

ville.    25   Fed.    389,  1020 

Portland    Stoneware    Co.    v.    Tavlor. 

17   R.    I.    33.  1665.    1682 

Port   of  Mobile  v.   Louisville  &c.    R. 

Co.,  84  Ala.   115,  585 

Portsmouth   Oas  Co.   v.   Sanford.   97 

Va.  124,  1746 

Portsmouth   Sav.   Bank  v.   City  of 

Springfield.  4  Fed.  276.         998.  1023 
v.   Village   of  Ashley,   91    Mich. 
670.  634 

Portwood  V.  Board  &c.,  52  Miss.  523. 

1519.  1522 

Post  V.   City  of  Boston,   141   Mass. 

189.  1586 

V.  Kendall  Co.,  105  V.  S.  667.     210 
V.   Pearshall,   22  Wend.  425.        1564 
V.  Pulaski  Co.,  47  Fed.  282,         988 
V.    Supervisors   &c..    105   U.    S. 
667.  986 

V.  Township  Board  &c.,  63  Mich. 
323.  1673,  1675 

Postal  Tel.  &c.  Co.  v.  Mayor  &c.,  79 

Md.  502,  604 


I'ostmaster-General  v.  Munger,  2  Paine 
C.  C.  189,  318,  327 

V.    Rice,    Gilpin    554,  650 

Potter  V.  Canaan,  37  Conn.  224,  859 

V.    City    of    New    Whatcom,    20 
Wash.   589,  956 

V.  Collis,  46  N.  Y.  S.  471,     577,  1684 
V.   Common  Council  &c.,  59   Mich. 
8,  1675 

V.  Douglas  Co.,  87  Mo.  239.  883 

V.  Town  of  Castleton,  53  Vt. 
435.  1597 

V.  Town  of  Greenwich,  26  Hun 
326,  1017 

Pettier  &c.  Co.  v.  Taylor,  3  MacAr- 
thur    4,  1745 

Pottner   v.    City   of   Minneapolis,    41 

Minn.    73,  1180 

Potts   V.    Breen.    167    111.    67,  1763 

V.  City  of  Pittsburgh,  14  W.  N. 
C.   38,  1738 

V.  Philadelphia,  195  Pa.  St.  619, 

721,   751 
V.    State,    75    Ind.    336,  960 

Poulters'  Co.  v.  Phillips,  6  Bing.  N.  C. 
314,  517 

Pound  V.  Supervisors  &c.,  43  Wis.  63, 

570,  1133,  1255 
V.   Turck,   95   U.    S.   459,  1576 

Powell  V.   Board  &c.,  46  Wis.  210,     1552 
V.  Boraston,  18  C.  B.  175,  127 

V.  City  of  Louisville,  21  Ky.  L. 
554.  1276,   1543 

V.  City  of  Madison,  107  Ind.  106. 

876 
V.   City  of  Parkersburg,   28   W. 
Va.    698,  108,    1722 

V.   Farmer,  18  C.  B.  168.  127 

V.   Heisler.   45   Minn.   549,  915 

V.  Pennsylvania,  127  U.  S.  678,  601 
V.  Tuttle,  3  N.  Y.   396,       295,   1539 

Power  V.  Village  of  Athens,  99  N.  Y. 

592,  568 

Powers.  Appeal  of,  29  Mich.  504. 

1232,   1540 

Powers.  In  re,  25  Vt.  261.  1414 

V.    Bears.    12    Wis.    214.  697 

V.  City  of  Council  Bluffs,  50  Iowa 
197,  1207,    1208 

V.   City  of  St.  Paul,  36  Minn.   87. 

827 
V.    County    Com'rs,    8    Ohio    St. 
2.58,  1517 

V.  Harlow,  53  Mich.  507,  794 

V.   Hazelton  &c.   R.   Co.,   33   Ohio 
St.    429.  695 

V.    Inferior   Court,    23    Ga.    65,      983 
V.    Mayor   vtc.    54    Ala.    24.  1405 

V.    Town   of   Woodstock.    38   Vt. 
44.  1575 

Poweshiek  Co.  v.  Cass  Co.,  63  Iowa 

244.  1052 

Poyer  v.  Village  of  Des  Plaines,   123 

111.    Ill,  1697 

V.  Village  of  Des  Plaines,  18  111. 
App.    225.  1120 

V.  Village  of  Des  Plaines.  22  111. 
App.  576.  1406 

Prather  v.  Jeffersonville  &c.  R.  Co., 

52  Ind.  16,  1448 

Pratt  V.  Baupre,  13  Minn.  187,    ■  217 

V.  Board  &c.,  15  Utah  1,  201 

V.    Gardner,   2   Cush.   63,  220 

V.  Lincoln  Co.,  61  Wis.  62,  593,  1204 
V.   Short.  53  How.  Pr.  506,  655 

V.  Town  of  Swanton.  15  Vt.  147, 

346,  644 

Pray  v.  Mayor  &c.,  32  N.  .7.  L.  394. 

8.  9,  814,  1594 

Preble  v.  City  of  Portland,  45  Maine 

241,  285 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


clix 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Yol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.'\ 


Prell    V.    McDonald,    7    Kan.    42(5. 

180.   192,  488,  .536,  540,  1424 

Prescott  V.   Hayes.   42   N.   II.   5(5.  198 

V.   State.  19  Ohio  St.  184,  1071 

President  &c.   v.   Anthony,   18   Pick. 

288,  320 

V.   Ranlv  &(•.,   16  lud.   105,  1511 

V.    r.(>ll,    4;!    Wis.    488.  536,    542 

V.  P.oard  &.C..  104  Mass.  470,  1247 
V.   Chopin.    8    Met.   40.  1019 

V.   City  of   Buffalo.   56   N.   Y.   S. 
970.     ■  1141.   12:?7.  1277,   1282.  1283 
V.  City  of  Indianapolis,  12  Ind. 
620.  457,    629 

V.  Cook.   4  Pick.   405.  776 

V.  DandridiiP.  12  Wheat.  64. 
169.  240.  2(!(»,  313.  1029.  1421,  1813 
V.  Diffobach.  1  Yeates  367.  695 
V.  District  of  Columbia,  4  Mac- 
Arthur  43.  1725 
V.  Dusouohett.  2  Ind.  586,  1639 
V.  Edward,  5  Ired.  L.  516,  1513 
V.  Frick,  34  111.  405.  992 
V.  Hamlin.  14  Mass  178,  1422.  1424 
V.  Holland.  19  111.  271,  529,  535 
V.  Iowa,  12  How.  1.  47 
V.  LaSalle  Co..  12  111.  339,  107 
V.  Mappin.  14  111.  193.  662 
V.   Mayor  &c.,  7  Ohio  31. 

88,    837,    971 
V.  McConnell.   12   III.   138,  1501 

V.  McKean,  10  Johns.  154,  86.  87 
V.  McKean.  11  Johns.  98.  1422,  1423 
V.    McKernan.    54    Wis.    487,  536 

V.  O'Mailey,  18  111.  407,  1422,  1427 
V.  Richardson,  1  Maine  79,  1813 

V.  Root,  2  Met.  522.  320 

V.    Schroeder.   58   III.   353.  1076 

V.  Society  &c..  24  N.  J.  L.  385, 

36,   58,   61,   69,   81,   82,   83,   103 
453,  1769 
V.  State,  45  Ala.  399. 

1514.  1531,  1538 
V.  Thompson.  20  111.  197,  447.   1691 
V.    Village  of   Canandaigua,    96 
Fed.   449.  1810 

V.  White's  Lessee,  6  Pet.  431, 

571    1559 

Press  Pub.  Co.  v.  Holahan.  62  N.  Y. 

S.   872,  710,   1698,   1788 

Presser  v.  Bice.  142  Pa.  St.  263.         1412 

Pressman    v.    Borough    of    Dickson 

City.  13  Pa.  Super.  Ct.  236.         1803 

Preston  v.  City  of  Boston,   12  Pick. 

7,  245,  1551 

V.    City    of    Cedar    Rapids,    95 
Iowa  71.  518.  1211 

V.  Culbertson,  58  Cal.  198,  372 

V.  Roberts,  12  Bush  570,  1253 

V.  Rudd,  84  Ky.  150,  1273 

Prettyman  v.  Supervisors  &c.,  19  111. 

406,  1016 

Prewett  v.  Mississippi  Co.,  38  Ark. 

213,  1052 

Prezinger  v.  Harness,  114  Ind.  491, 

276,  277,  1150,  1201 

Price  V.  Grand  Rapids  &c.  R.  Co..  13 

Ind.  58,  291,  1256 

V.  Grant.  7  N.  Y.  S.  904,  1415 

V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  92  Mo.  378,  1559 
V.  Milwaukee  &c.  R.  Co.,  27  Wis. 
98,  702.  1218 

V.  Thompson.  48  Mo.  361.  629 

Price   Co.    v.    City   of   Atlanta,    105 

Ga.  3.58.  1205 

Prichett  v.    Stanislaus  Co.,   73   Cal. 

310.  184 

Prideaux  v.   City   of  Mineral   Point. 

43  Wis.  513.  1584.  1597 

Priest  V.  Cummings,  16  Wend.  617.     133 

Priestly    v.    Foulds,    2    Scott    N.    R. 

205,  123 


Priet   V.    De   La   Montanya,   85   Cal. 

148.  314 

V.  Reis,  93  Cal.  85,  900 

Prince   v.    City   of    Fresno,   88    Cal. 

407,  177 

V.  City  of  Lynn.  149  Mass.  193.     163 

V.  City  of  Quincy,  105  111.   138. 

233.  848.  895 

V.  City  of  Quincy,  128  111.  443. 

881,  888,  893 

V.  City  of  Quincy,  28  111.  App. 

490.  796 

V.  Crocker,  166  Mass.  347,  1699 

V.  Lewis.  5  B.  &  C.  363.  1402 

Prince's  Case,  The,  8  Co.   1,  72 

Prindle  v.  Fletcher,  39  Vt.  255,  1615 

Prior  Ave,  In  re,  71  N.  W.  27,  1287 

Pritchard  v.  Atkinson,  3  N.  H.  335.  1572 
Pritchett  v.  People,  6  111.  525,  288,  311 
Privett   V.   Bickford,   26  Kan.   52,  378 

Procter  v.  Andover,  42  N.  H.  348,  687 
Proctor  V.  Town  of  Lewiston,  25  111. 

153,  1214 

Proprietors  &c.  v.  Battles,  6  Vt.  395. 

86,  87 

V.  Chandler.  6  N.  H.  271,  345 

V.  Hoboken  Land  &c.  Co.,  2  Beas. 

81,  584 

V.  Horton,  6  Hill  501.  61,  83 

V.  New  Hampshire  Bridge,  7  N. 

H.   35.  674 

V.  Page,  6  N.  H.  182, 

345.  347,  380.  1427.  1540 

V.   Proprietors  &c.,  11  Pet.  420. 

565.  584,  1463 

V.  Proprietors  &c.,  7  Pick.  344,     1813 

V.  Stalk,  7  Cush.  226,  1429 

Prospect  Park  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  William- 
son, 91  N.  Y.  552,  680 
Prosser  v.  Davis,   18   Iowa  367,  681 

V.  Secor,  5  Barb.  607,  229 

Protestant  Orphan  Asylum's  Appeal, 

111   Pa.   St.   135,  1233,   1234 

Prout  V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  154  Mass. 

450,  662 

Providence  v.  Clapp,  17  How.  161,  8 
Providence  Gas  Co.  v.  Thurber,  2  R. 

I.  15,  689,  1512 

Providence    Institution    v.    Gardner, 

4  R.  I.  484,  1510 

Providence  &c.  Plank  R,  Co.  v.  City 

of    Scranton,    1    Lack.    Leg.    N. 

183.  727 

Providence  &c.   R.   Co.   v.   Wright.   2 

R.  I.  459.  1248.  1509 

Provident  Inst.  v.  Mayor  &c.,  113  U. 

S.  506.  1234.  1344 

Provident  Life  &c.  Co.  v.  Mercer  Co., 

170  IT.  S.  593,  1011,  1031 

Provost    V.    Mayor  &c..    3    N.    Y.    S. 

531,  1607 

Prowse  V.  Foot,  3  Bro.  P.  C.  167,  314 
Pruden  v.  Grant  Co.,  12  Or.  308,       1735 

V.  Love.  67  Ga.  190.  221 

Pryor   v.    City  of  Kansas   City,   153 

Mo.    135,  106 

Public  Park  Com'rs,  In  re,  47  Hun 

302,  1250 

Public  School  Trustees  v.  Taylor,  30 

N.  J.  Eq.  618,  109 

Pueschell    v.    Kansas    City    W.    &    I. 

Works,  79  Mo.  App.  459,  1363 

Pugh  V.  City  of  Little  Rock.  35  Ark. 

75.  540.  1424 

V.  Edison  &c.  Co..  19  Ohio  C.  C. 

594.  652 

Puitt    V.    Commissioners,    94    N.    C. 

709.  1494 

Pulaski  Co.  v.  County  Judge,  37  Ark. 

339.  434 

V.   Pollock.  9  S.  F.  1065,  911 

V.  Reeve.  42  Ark.  54,  7,  14 


elx 


TABLE   or    CASES. 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Vol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.'] 


Pulaski  Co.  v.  Thompson,  83  Ga.  270,  911 
Pulitzer  v.  City  of  New  Yorli,  62  N. 

Y.    S.   587,  1790 

Pulliam    V.    Runnels    Co.,    79    Tex. 

3«3.  1490 

Pullman's  Palace  Car  Co.  v.  Pennsyl- 
vania. 141  U.  S.  18,  1399 
Pumpelly  v.  Green  Bay  Co.,  13  Wall. 

160,  673,   791 

Purcell  V.  Booth,  6  Dak.  17.  1419 

V.  Long  Island  City,  36  N.  Y.  S. 

290.  742 

V.  Town  of  Bear  Creek,  138  111. 

524,  908 

Purdy  V.   Lansing,   128  U.   S.  557,       991 

V.  People,  4  Hill  384,  55,  117 

Purinton    v.    Inhabitants    &c.,    174 

Mass.  556,  1791 

Purrington  v.   Town  of  Warren,  49 

Vt.  19.  829 

Pursell  V.  Mayor  &c.,  85  N.  Y.  330, 

1205.  1264 
Pusey  V.  City  of  Allegheny,  98   Pa. 

St.  522.  680,   1220 

Putnam  v.  Douglas  Co..  6  Or.  328,     704 

V.    Langley,    133    Mass.    204. 

302,  1692 
Pybus  V.  Gibb,  6  El.  &  Bl.  902,  318 

Pye   V.    City  of  Mankato,   36  Minn. 

373.  1215 

V.    City   of   Mankato,   38   Minn. 

536,  827 

V.  Peterson,  45  Tex.  312,     594,  1392 

Q 

Quaw  V.  Paflf.  98  Wis.  586,  1731 

Queen  v.  Aberdare  Canal  Co.,  14  Q. 

B.    854.  346 

V.  Abingdon,  L.  R.  5  Q.  B.  406,  1043 
V.  Board.  L.  R.  8  Q.  B.  227,        1517 
V.    Inhabitants  &c.,   L.    R.    1    Q. 
B.  227.  1043 

V.  Justices,  4  Q.  B.  D.  522.  529 

v.  Gilbert.  2  Pug.  &  B.  619,  531 

V.    Governors   &c.,   8   Ad.   &   El. 
632.  200 

V.  Local  Government  Board,  L. 
R.  8  Q.  B.  227.  37 

V.  Mayor  &c.,  8  Ad.  &  El.  633,  213 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  10  Ad.  &  El.  281,  11 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  19  Q.  B.  D.  602,  832 
V.  Milledge.  4  Q.  P..  D.  332.  529 

V.  Paramore,  10  Ad.  &  El.  286,       11 
V.   Saddlers'  Co.,  10  H.  L.  Cas. 
404.  207 

V.  SaintiflP,  6  Mod.  255.  1561 

V.  St.  Ives.  L.  R.  9  Q.  B.  467,  1043 
V.  St.  Leonard.  1  Q.  B.  21,  1043 

V.  Thompson.  5  Q.  B.  477,  11 

V.  Town  Council  &c.,  4  Q.   B. 
891.  971 

V.    Worcester,    L.    R.    9    Q.    B. 
340.  1043 

V.  York.  2  Q.  B.  847,  11 

Queensbury  v.  Culver,  19  Wall.  83,  1528 

Quick    V.    Board    &c.,    20    Ky.     L. 

1457.  1346 

V.  Village  of  River  Forest,  130 
111.  323.  1175 

Quigg  V.   Evans,  121   Cal.   546,  183 

Quigley  v.   City  of  Aurora,   50   Ind. 

28.  535 

Quill  v.  City  of  Indianapolis,  124  Ind. 

292.  632.  889 

V.  Mayor  &c..  55  N.  Y.  S.  889,       785 

Quimbv   v.    Vermont   &c.    R.    Co.,    23 

Vt.  387.  675 

Quinchard    v.    Board    &c.,    113    Cal. 

664.  1712 

Quincy  v.  Cooke,  107  IT.  S.  549,  992 

v.  Jackson,  113  U.  S.  332,  1535 


Quincy  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Morris,  84  111. 

410,  983 

Quinette  v.  City  of  St.  Louis,  76  Mo. 

402,  516,  523 

Quinhard  v.  City  of  New  I'ork,  64  N. 

Y.  S.  904.  184 

Quinlan    v.    City   of   Utica,    11    Hun 

217,  1617,  1625 

Quinn  v.  Mayor  &c.,  45  N.  Y.  S.  7,       719 

V.  State,  35  Ind.  485,  369 

Quint    V.    City   of   Merrill,    105   Wis. 

406,  490 

Quintini  v.  Board  &c.,  64  Miss.  483,  1119 
Quong  Woo,  In  re,  13  Fed.  229, 

1400,  1405,  1539 

R 

Racho  V.  City  of  Detroit,  90  Mich. 

92,  1593 

Radcli"ff  V.  Mayor  &c.,  4  N.  Y.  195, 

820,  823.  1603,  1776 

Rader  v.    Southeasterly   Road   Dist., 

36  N.  J.  L.  273,  453 

Radway  v.  Briggs,  37  N.  Y.  256,       1557 

Rae  V.  Mayor  &c.,  51  Mich.  526, 

859,  1088 

Raff  V.   Town  of  Calhoun,   110   Ga. 

806,  1793 

Ragan  v.  Kansas  City  &c.  R.  Co.,  Ill 

Mo.  456,  1568 

Rahway  Sav.  Inst.  v.  Mayor  &c.,  53 

N.  J.  L.  48,  1741 

Rail  V.  Potts,  8  Humph.  225,  222 

Railroad    Comm.    Cases,    116    U.    S. 

307,  5,  6 

Railroad  Co.  v.  Alabama,  101  TJ.  S. 

832.  18 

V.  Bentlev,  64  111.  438,  591 

V.  Chicago,  90  111.  573,  1248 

V.   City  of  Dayton,  23  Ohio  St. 
510  591 

V.  City  of  Defiance,  52  Ohio  St. 
262,  1352,  1379 

V.  Commissioners,  98  U.  S.  543,  1552 
V.    Dodge   Co.   Com'rs,   98  U.    S. 
541.  1717 

V.  Gaines,  97  U.  S.  697,  1524 

V.  Georgia.  98  U.   S.  359.  104 

V.   Hansing.   15  Wall.   649,  1779 

V.   Houston,  95  IT.   S.  697,  1633 

V.  Maine,  96  U.   S.  499.  104 

V.  National  Bank,  102  U.  S.  14,  1031 
V.  Otoe  Co.,  16  Wall.  667,  983 

V.  Otoe  Co..  1  Dill.  338,  1740 

V.  Richmond,  96  U.   S.  521, 

510,  596,  1358 
V.  Tennessee,  101  U.  S.  337,  18 

V.  Town  of  Lake.  71  111.  333,         591 
V.    Village    of   Belle    Center,    48 
Ohio  St.  273.  678 

Railroad  Nat'l  Bank  v.  City  of  Low- 
ell, 109  Mass.  214,  237 

Railway  Co.  v.  City  of  Louisville,  8 

Bush   415.  588 

V.  Philadelphia.  101  IT.  S.  528,  1509 
V.  Sprague.  103  U.  S.  756,  1027 

V.  Stone.  54  Kan.  83.  1375 

V.  Wilson  Co.,  89  Tenn.  597,       1546 

Raines  v.   Simpson.  50  Tex.  495,  224 

Rains  v.  Oshkosh,   14  Wis.  403,  65 

Raisler  v.    Mayor  &c.,    66   Ala.    194, 

24.5.  1551 

Raleigh  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Davis,  2  Dev. 

&  B.   451,  4,   6,   673 

Ralls    Co.    v.    Douglass,    105    U.    S. 

728.  995 

Ralls  "co.    Court    v.    United    States, 
105  IT.  S.  733. 

412.  1523.  1528.  1.533,  1534.  1535 

Ralston  v.  Town  of  Weston,  46  W. 

Va.  544,  1754 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


clxi 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Vol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.1 


Ramlsh  v.  Ilartwell,  126  Cal.  443. 

10128.  Ilfi6.  1310,  1.505 
Ramsay  v.  Iloeger.  76  111.  432,  1721 

Ramsey  v.  National  Contracting  Co., 

63  N.  Y.   S.  286.  1303 

V.   People,  142  III.  380.  734 

V.  Ramsey.  121  Ind.  215,  1063 

V.  Rilev.  13  Ohio  157.  221 

Ramson  v.  Mayor  &c..  24  Barb.  226,     664 

Ramthun  v.   Halfman.  58  Tex.  551.  1561 

Rand  v.  Wilder,  11  Cush.  294,       343,  348 

Randall    v.    Christiansen,    76    Iowa 

169.  1571 

V.  Conway.  63  N.  H.  513,  1569 

V.  Eastern  &c.  R.  Co.,  106  Mass. 
276.  263 

V.   Van  Vechten,   19  Johns.   60, 

262,  263 
Randolph  v.   Good.  3  W.  Va.  551.       369 
V.  I'nited  States,  21  Ct.  CI.  282,  773 
Randolph  Co.  v.  Post,  93  TT.  S.  502, 

991,  995.  1001 
Ranney  v.  Bader,  67  Mo.  476,  618,  638 
Rannsh  v.  Hartwell,  126  Cal.  443,  719 
Ransom  v.  Boal.  29  Iowa  68.  629 

V.  City  of  Belvidere,  87  111.  App. 
167.  1364 

Ranv  V.   Governor.  4   Blackf.   2,  326 

Rapelve  v.  Prince,  4  Hill  119.  1757 

V.  Van  Sickler,  1  Edm.  Sel.  Cas. 
175,  1471 

Rapho  Tp.  V.  Moore,  68  Pa.  St.  404,  1575 
Rathbon  v.  Budlong,  15  Johns.  1.  216 
Rathbone  v.  Board  &c.,  73  Fed.  395, 

973,  1006.  1030 

V.    Board   &c.,   83   Fed.   125  ;   49 

U.  S.  App.  577.  10,  12,  1031 

V.  Wirth.  150  N.  Y.  459,  1829 

Rathbun  v.  Acker,  18  Barb.  393,       1254 

Ratliffe  v.  County  Court,  36  W.  Va. 

202.  902 

Raton  Water-works  Co.  v.  Town  of 

Raton.  9  N.  M.  70,  728 

Rau  V.  Little  Rock.  34  Ark.  303,  519 

Ravenna    v.     Pennsylvania    Co.,    45 

Ohio  St.  118.  621 

Rawlings  v.  Biggs.  85  Ky.  251.  708 

Rawson  v.  City  of  Chicago,  185  111. 

87.  511,   1294 

V.  School  Dist..  100  Mass.  134,    1533 
V.  Spencer,  113  Mass.  40,  1538 

Ray  v.  Bank.  3  B.  Mon.  510,  1725 

V.  City  of  Jeffersonville,  90  Ind. 
567.  1261 

v.  City  of  Manchester,  46  N.  H. 
59.  264,  820 

V.    City   of   St.    Paul,    40    Minn. 
458.  1597 

V.   City  of  St.    Paul,   44   Minn. 
340.  827 

V.   Wilson,   29   Fla.  342,  960 

Ray  Co.  v.  Bentlev.  49  Mo.  236.  776 

V.  Vansycle.  96  U.  S.  675.     995.  1023 
Raymond  v.  City  of  Lowell,  6  Cush. 

'   524.  1637.  1638 

V.   City  of  Sheboygan,   70  Wis. 
318.  1588 

V.  Fish.  51  Conn.  80, 

1080.   1091,   1098.   1114,   1386 
Raynsford  v.  Phelps,  43  Mich.  342, 

221    222 

Read  v.   City  of  Buffalo,   74   N.   Y. 

463.  963 

V.  City  of  Camden,  54  N.  J.  L. 
347.  544,  592.  1164 

V.   Plattsmouth,   107  U.   S.   568. 

992,  1522 
V.  Town  of  Calais.  48  Vt.  7,  829 

Reading  City  v.  Bitting.  167  Pa.  St. 

21,  603 

V.  Reiners,   167  Pa.   St.  41,  1341 

1  Smith — xi 


Keardon    v.    City   of   San    Francisco, 

66  Cal.   492,  678 

V.    City    of    St.    Louis,    36    Mo. 
555,  776 

Reassessment   &c.,    In   re,   68   Minn. 

242.  1287 

Rebenack,  In  re,  62  Mo.  App.  8,  1762 
Reckner  v.  Warner,  22  Ohio  ^t.  275,  699 
Rector  v.  State,  6  Ark.  187,  1411 

Red  V.  City  Council  &c.,  25  Ga.  386, 

301,   987 

V.  Supervisors  of  Henry  Co..  31 

Gratt.  695,  987,  1023 

Reddell  v.  Bryan,  14  Md.  444,  688 

Reddick  v.  People.  82  111.  App.  85,     1644 

Redersheimer  v.  Flower,  52  La.  An. 

2089,  1142 

Redford    v.    City    of    Woburn,    176 

Mass.  520.  1365,  1801 

V.  Coggeshall.  19  R.  I.  313.  1358 
Red  Rock  v.  Henry.  106  U.  S.  596.  995 
Reed    v.    City    of    Madison,    83    Wis. 

171.  1595 

V.    City   of   Spokane,   21    Wash. 
218.  1803 

V.  City  of  Toledo,  18  Ohio  161,  1232 
V.  Conway,  20  Mo.  22,  221 

V.  Erie,  75  Pa.  St.  346.  1313 

V.     Home     Savings    Bank,     130 
Mass.    443,  812 

V.    Inhabitants    &c.,    20    Maine 
246,  776 

V.    Inhabitants    &c.,    117    Mass. 
384.  354.  355,  362 

V.    Inhabitants    &c.,    152    Mass. 
500.  280,  843.  1037 

V.    Town    of    Orleans,     1     Ind. 
App.  25,  857,   1741 

Reeder  v.   State,  98  Ind.  114,  229 

Reemelin  v.  Mosby,  47  Ohio  St.  570,    169 
Rees  V.  City  of  Watertown,  19  Wall. 
107, 

141,  142.  458,  1523,  1526,  1529,  1737 
Reeve  School  Tp.  v.  Dodson.  98  Ind. 

497.  210,  647,  863 

Reeves  v.  Anderson,  13  Wash.   17,  75 

V.    Treasurer    of    Wood    Co.,    8 

Ohio  St.  333,  689.  1084 

Reeves  Co.  v.  Pecos  Co.,  69  Tex.  177,  444 

Regenstein   v.    City   of  Atlanta.   98 

Ga.  167,  1130.   1705 

Regents  &c.   v.   Detroit  &c.   Soc,    12 

Mich.   138.  262 

v.   Williams,  9  Gill  &  J.  365, 

472,   756 
Regina  v.  Bailiffs,  2  Ld.  Raym.  1232, 

207,  286 
v.  Bewdlev,  1  P.  Wms.  207.  92,  445 
v.  Blizzard.  L.  R.  2  Q.  B.  55,  199 
V.   Bowen,   1   Denison  23.  539 

V.  Bradley.  3  El.  &  El.  634,  378 
V.  Coaks,  3  El.  &  Bl.  249,  378 

V.    Councillors   of  Derby,   7   Ad. 
&  El.   419.  155 

V.  Cumberlege,  36  L.  T.  700,  174 
V.  Franklin,  6  Ir.  R.  C.  L.  239,  378 
V.   Grimshaw.   10  Q.   B.   747,  276 

V.  Hiorns.  7  Ad.  &  El.  960,  155 

V.  Howard.  4  Ont.  377,  1392 

V.  Justices  &c..  8  Ad.  &  El.  173,  346 
V.  Lander,  1  Ir.  R.  C.  L.  225,  346 
V.  Lane.  2  Ld.  Raym.  1304.  199 

V.  Ledgard,  8  Ad.  &  El.  535.  155 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  7  Ad.  &  El.  963,  157 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  9  Ad.  &  El.  670,  127 
V.  M.nyor  &c.,  10  Ad.  &  El.  66,  128 
V.  M.iyor  &c.,  10  Ad.  &  El.  281.  667 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  L.  R.  3  Q.  B.  629, 

155,  37.8 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  L.  R.  4  Q.  B.  114,  127 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  6  Q.  B.  433,  261 

V.  Mayor  &c.,  7  Q.   B.  908,  128 


clxii 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Vol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol.  II,  pp.  S33-1830.'[ 


Regina  v.  Mayor  &c.,  20  L.  J.  Q.  B. 

281,  128 

V.  Mayor  &c.,  11  L.  T.   (N.  S.) 
417,  35,  77,  78 

V.  Mayor  &c.,  28  L.  T.  629.  202 

v.    Overseers  of   Christ   Church, 
7  E.  &  B.  409.  157 

V.  I'aramore,  10  Ad.  &  El.  286,     667 
V.    Petrie,    30    Eng.    L.    &    Eq. 
207,  1559 

V.  Rippon.  1  Q.  B.  D.  217,  157 

V.  Rowley.  3  Q.   B.   143,  157 

V.  Sainthill,  2  Ld.  Raym.  1174,  1575 
V.  Staples,  9  Best  &  S.  928,  1693 
V.  Tavlor.  11  A.  &  E.  949.  123 

V.  Thomas,  8  Ad.  &  El.  183,         276 
V.    Town    Council    &c.,    4    Q.    B. 
893.  667 

V.   Whipp,   4  Q.   B.   141,  276 

Rehberg  v.  Mayor  &c.,  91  N.  T.  137, 

826.    1375,    1592,    1594,    1621 

Rehmke  v.  Goodwin.  2  Wash.  676,       892 

Reid  V.  Board  &c..  128  N.  Y.  364.       1205 
V.  City  of  Chicago,  83  111.  App. 
554.  1333.  1335,  1339 

V.  Humphreys,  7  Jones  L.  258,  312 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  80  Ga.  755,  1494 

Reiff  V.  Connor,  10  Ark.  241,       301,  522 

Reighard    v.    Flinn,    29    Pittsb.    Leg. 

J.  338.  1373 

Reilly  v.  City  of  Albany,  112  N.  Y.  30, 

741.  1186.  1306.  1755 
V.   City  of  New  York,   54  N.  Y. 
Super.  Ct.  463,  1187 

V.  City  of  Racine,  51  Wis.  526, 

1322,  1563 

Reily,  Ex  parte,  85  Cal.  632,  1410 

Reineman  v.  Covington  &c.  R.  Co.,  7 

Neb.    310.  982 

Reinhard  v.  Mayor  &c.,  2  Daly  243, 

526.  1596 

Reining  v.  City  of  Buffalo,  102  N.  Y. 

308.  829,   1746.   1790 

V.  New  York  &c.  R.  Co.,  128  N. 

Y    157.  588,    1581 

Reinken  v.  Fuehring,  130  Ind.  382,     1234 

Rellstab  v.  Borough  of  Belmar,  58  N. 

J.   L.   489,  66 

Remington  v.  Harrison  Co.  Court,  12 

Bush   148,  662 

Reno   W.    &c.    Co.   v.    Osburn,    25   Nev. 
53,  749 

Rens   v.    City  of  Grand   Rapids,    73 

Mich.  237,  233,  235.  1189,  1212 

Rensselaer  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Davis,  43  N. 

Y.  137,  675,  686 

Rentz  V.  City  of  Detroit,  48  Mich.  544. 

1206 

Renwick  v.  Hall,   84  111.   162.  1689 

Republic   &c.    Co.    v.    Pollak,    75    111. 

292,  1513 

Requa  v.  City  of  Rochester,  45  N.  Y. 

129.  816.    826.    1592.    1639 

Resley  v.  Village  of  Howell,  64  Fed. 

453,  1011 

Respublica  v.  Dallas,  3  Yeates  300, 

189,  1418 

V.  Duquet,  2  Yeates  495, 

526,    1121,    1392 
Ressegieu  v.   City  of  Sioux  City,   94 

Iowa    543,  1219 

Retreat  v.  City  of  Buffalo,  53  N.  Y. 

S.    1113.  1285.    1289 

Rettinghouse  v.  City  of  Ashland,  106 

Wis.    595.  174 

Reubelt  v.  School  Town  of  Noblesville. 

106   Ind.   478,  1038 

Reusch  V.  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.,  57  Iowa 

687.  674 

Renter  v.  Lame,  94  Wis.  300,  1758 

Renting  v.  City  of  TItusville,  175  Pa. 

St    512,  711,   753,   1136 


Revill  V.   Pettit,  3  Met.  314,  335 

Rex  V.   Amory,   2  T.   R.   515,  445 

V.  Andover,  1  Ld.  Raym.  710,  200 
V.  Ashwell.  12  East  22,  520,  521 
V.  Atkins.  3  Mod.  3,  166.  271 

V.  Axmouth,  8  East  383,  128 

V.  Bailey,   1  Mood.  C.  C.  23,  127 

V.    Bankes,   3   Burr.   1452.  1657 

V.    Bellringer,    4   T.    R.    STO, 

157,  270,   290 
V.  Bird,  13  East  367,  520,  521 

V.   Bower,   1    B.  &  C.  492, 

157,   270,   290 
V.   Bridge,   1   M.  &  S.  76.  378 

V.  Bridgewater.  3  T.  R.  550,  128 

V.  Buller,  8  East  389,  272 

V.  Bumstead.  2  B.  &  Ad.  699,  185 
V.  Burgess,  2  Burr.  908,  1557,  1561 
V.   Carlisle,   Fortesc.   200,  202 

V.   Carroll,   1   Leach  237,  127 

V.  Carter,  Cowp.   58,  270 

V.  Chalke.  1  Ld.  Raym.  225,  204,  207 
V.  Chitty,  5  Ad.  &  El.  609,  185 

V.  Company  &c..  8  T.  R.  356,  270 
V.  Corry,  5  East  372.  272 

V.  Coventry,  1  Ld.  Raym.  391,  200 
V.   Croke,   Cowp.   26,  296 

V.  Cross,  3  Camp.  224,  1610 

v.  Dawes,  4  Burr.  2277,  270 

V.  Derby,  Cas.   temp  Hardw.   154, 

207 
V.    Devonshire,    1    B.   &   C.   609, 

157,   270,   290 
V.   Doncaster,   2   Burr.   738,  207 

V.    Ellis.   9   East   252,  187 

V.  Faversham  Fishermen's  Co.,  8 
T.  R.  352.  207,  520 

V.   Foxcroft,   2   Burr.   1017,  378 

V.  Gaborian.  11  East  77,  271,  272 
V.  Greet,  8  B.  &  C.  363.  157 

V.  Grimes.  5  Burr.  2598.  171,  270 
V.  Grosvenor,  7  Mod.  198,  123,  446 
V.  Harris,  1  B.  &  Ad.  936,  274,  276 
V.  Harris,  3  Burr.  1420.  1666 

V.   Hawkins.   10   East  211,  378 

V.  Head,  4  Burr.  2515,  289,  296 

V.  Headlev.  7  B.  &  C.  496,  157,  290 
V.  Hearle.   1   Stra.  626,  166 

V.  Hebden.  Andr.  389,  171,  270,  272 
V.  Hill,  4  B.  &  C.  426,  270,  271 

V.  Holmes.  Hil.  9  Geo.  II,  B.  R.,  1657 
V.  Home,  2  Corp.  672.  538 

V.  Hoyte,  6  T.  R.  430,  157 

V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  13  East  220, 

123,   446 
V.  Jones.  1  B.  &  Ad.  677,  198 

V.  Jones,  3  Camp.  230.  1610 

V.  Lathrop,  1  W.  Bl.  468,  270 

V.  Lisle,  Andr.  163.  2  Stra.  1090. 

.  171,   195,   270,   272,   1657 
V.    Liverpool.    2   Burr.   723.  207 

V.   Lyme  Regis,   1   Doug.   149, 

201,   204,   207 
V.    Mason,    2   T.    R.    581,  538 

V.  May,  4  B.  &  Ad.   843,  157 

V.  May.  5  Burr.   2681,  270.  271 

V.  Mavor  &c.,  4  D.  P.  C.  562.  1409 
V.  Mavor  &c.,  5  T.  R.  66.  171,  270 
V.  Mavor  &c.,  2  Burr.  723.  204,  277 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  4  Burr.  2008.  1657 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  Mich.  33  Car.  II, 
2    Show.    262,  123 

V.  Mayor  &c.,  8  Mod.  Ill,  289 

V.  Mayor  &c.,  8  Mod.   127,  445 

v.    Mayor  &c.,    1   Ld.   Raym.   426. 

296 

V.  Mavor  &c.,  Cas.  temp.  Hardw. 
147,    ■  271 

V.   Mavor  &c.,   1  Lev.  291.  200 

V.  Medley,  6  Car.  &  P.   292.  809 

V.    Miller,  6  T.  R.  268,  157,  270,  446 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


clxiii 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Vol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.] 


Rex  V.  Monday,  Cowp.  530, 

157,  270,  293,  378 
V.    JForris,    3    lOast   214,  445 

V.    IMoiTis,    4    Kast    17,  270 

V.  Oakcliainpton.  Burr.  S.  C.  5,  128 
V.   Osbounio,  4   Kast  326,  445 

V.   Oxford,   2   Salk.   428,  200 

V.  Oxfordshire,  20  Eng.  C.  L.  289, 

1577 
V.   rarrv,  G  A.  &  E.  810,  123 

V.  Pasmore.  3  T.  R.   199,  92,  445 

V.  Philips,  1  Stra.  394,  166 

V.  Ponsonby.  1  Ves.  Jr.  1.  204 

V.  Richardson,  1  Burr.  517, 

201,  204,  207 
V.  Saunders.  3  East  119.  123,  446 
V.  Sefton,   Russ.  &  Ry.  202,  127 

V.   Sparling,   1   Stra.   497.  538 

V.    Sponrer,    3    Burr.    1827,  185 

V.  Steward  &c.,  5  B.  &  Aid.  691. 

1409 
V.  Stewart.  4  East  17.  445 

V.   St.   Luke's  Hospital,  2  Burr. 
1053.  128 

V.   Taylor,  3   Salk.   231,  201,   204 

V.  Theodorick.  8  East  543,  270,  271 
V.  Thornton.  4  East  294,  166,  270 
V.    Tidderlev.    1    Sid.    14.  204 

V,   Tizzard.   9   B.   &  C.   418,  108 

V.  Trapshaw.  1  Leaoh  427,  127 

V.  Trew.  2  Barnard.  370,  272 

V.   Tripp.   Mich.   T.   1836,  128 

V.  Tucker,  1  Barnard.  26,  271 

V.   Varlo,   Cowp.   248,  270,   373 

V.  Wake.  1  Barnard.  80,  271 

V.   Warrington.   1    Salk.   152,  295 

V.  Westwood,   4  B.  &  C.  781. 

289,   296 
V.   Weymouth,   7  Mod.   373,  185 

V.    White,    5    A.    &    E.    613,  123 

V.  Williams,  2  Mau.  &  S.  141,  272 
V.     Wilton,     5     Mod.     257,  207 

Rexford  v.   Knight,   UN.  Y.  308,       705 

Reynolds.  In  re.  42  N.  Y.  S.  1,  1684 

V.   Baldwin,   1    La.   An.   162, 

189,  286,   296 
V.  Board  of  Education  &c.,  53  N. 
Y     S     75  788 

V.'  City  of  Waterville.  92  Maine 
292.  881 

V.   Commissioners  &c.,   5   Ohio 
204,  629 

V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  6  Met.  340, 

343,  344,  965 
V.  Lyon  Co.,  97  Fed.   155,  1029 

V.   Mayor  &c..  8  Barb.   597,  666 

V.   Reynolds,   15  Conn.  83,  687 

V.   United   States.  98  U.   S.  145,     47 

Reynolds   Land   &c.   Co.   v.   McCabe, 

72    Tex.    57.  362,    1473 

Rhea  v.  Umatilla  Co..  2  Or.  300,       1287 

Rhine  v.   City  of  McKinnev,   53  Tex. 

354.  698 

Rhoda  V.  Alameda  Co.,  69  Cal.   523,  934 

Rhode    Island    Mortgage    &c.    Co.    v. 

City  of  Spokane.  19  Wash.  616.     742 

Rhodes  v.  City  of  Cleveland,  10  Ohio 

159,  680,    811 

V.    Otis,    33    Ala.    578,  1814 

Rhyner  v.  City  of  Mena.sha.  107  Wis. 

201,  1324,  1360,  1801 

Rice  V.  City  of  Des  Moines,  40  Iowa 

638,  891 

V.    City   of   Evansville,    108    Ind. 
7,  1179 

V.  City  of  Flint,  67  Mich.  401.  1217 
V.   City   of   Milwaukee,    100   Wis. 
516.  879,   1731 

V.   Foster,  4  Harr.  479.  69,  520 

V.  Gwinn.  49  Pac.  412,  179.  955 
V.    Plymouth   Co.,   43    Iowa   136. 

619,    1088 


Rice  V.  Smith,  9  Iowa  570,  556,  651 

V.    State,    3    Kan.    141,  1412 

V.   Town   of   Montpelier,    19   Vt. 
470,  1597 

V.   Wood,   113   Mass.   133,  211 

Rich  V.   City  of  Chicago,   59   111.   286, 

299.    477.    478,    1146,    1421 
V.   City  of   Chicago,    152    111.    18, 

499,  550,   1249,   1250 
V.  City  of  Naperville,  42  111.  App. 
222,  "^  508 

V.   City  of  Rockland,   87   Maine 
188,  1335 

V.   Errol,  51   N.  H.   350,  868 

V.  Mentz  Tp.,  134  U.  S.  632,  987 

V.    Player,   2    Show.   262,  295 

V.    Town   of   Mentz,    19    Fed.    725, 

990 

Richards  v.  Brice,  15  Daly  144,  1419 

V.    City    of    Cincinnati,    31    Ohio 
St.  506.  1234 

V.  City  of  Oshkosh,  81  Wis.  226, 

1802 
V.   Clarksburg,  30  W.  Va.   491,     202 
V.    Independent    School    Dist.,    46 
Fed.     460.  969 

V.  Inhabitants  &c.,   13  Gray  344. 

1601 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  16  J.  &  Sp.  315.  783 
V.  Osceola  Bank.  79  Iowa  707,  910 
V.  Supervisors,  69  Iowa  612,  897 
V.  Town  of  Clarksburg,  30  W.  Va. 
491.  204,  279,  286 

Richardson  v.  Boston.  24  How.  188,     576 
V.    City    of    Marceline,    73    Mo. 
App.  360.  1337,  1796 

V.  City  of  Syracuse,  58  N.  Y.  S. 
487.  -  1330 

V.    City    of    Webster    City.    Ill 
Iowa  427,  1776,  1780 

V.   Davis.   91    Md.   390,  1315 

V.    Heydenfeldt,    46   Cal.    68,  509 

V.  Morgan.  16  La.  An.  429,  1270 

V.    Smith.    59    N.    II.    517,  706 

V.   Vermont   &c.    R.    Co.,   25   Vt. 

„.  ^465.  676 

Richardson    Co.    v.    Barstow,   26  Abb. 

N.    C.    150.  1.583 

V.    Frederick,   24   Neb.   596,  1068 

V.   Smith.  25  Neb.   767.  1069 

Richcreek  v.  Moorman,  14  Ind.  Ann. 

„.  ,  370,  "^^  1286 

Riche  V.   Bar  Harbor  Water  Co.,  75 

Maine  91,  688 

Richeson  v.   People,   115  111.  450,  991 

Richland    Co.    v.    Lawrence    Co..    12 

111.  1.    89,  103,  761.  1084,  1537,  1538 

V.    Village   of   Richland    Center, 

59    Wis.    591.  1509 

Richlicke    v.    City    of    St.    Louis,    98 

Mo.    497,  1180 

Richmond  v.   City  of  Lynchburg,  81 

Va.    473,  1269 

V.  Judah,  5  Leigh  305.  246 

Richmond  City  v.  Epps.  98  Va.  235.  1687 

Richmond   &c.   Co.  v.  Town  of  West 

Point,   94   Va.   668,  609 

Richmond    Co.    &c.    Co.    v.    Town    of 
Middletown,  59  N.  Y.  228, 

566,   618.   642,   1404 

Richmond  Mayoralty  Case,  19  Gratt. 

673.  1411 

Richmond   &c.    R.   Co.   v.   Louisa   &c. 

R.  Co.,  13  How.  71.     585.  1323,  1463 

Richter    v.    City    of    New    York,    54 

N.    Y.    S.    150.  1280 

Rickert  v.  Drainage  Dist.,  27  N.   E. 

86,  1544 

Ricketson  v.  City  of  Milwaukee.  105 

Wis.   591.  724,    7.50,    1704.   1711 

Ricketts  v.  Corporation  &e.  of  Mark- 
dale,  31  Ont.  610,  1363 


elxiv 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Vol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.] 


Eicketts  v.  Spraker,  77  Ind.  371, 

1201,  1288 

V.  Village  of  Hyde  Park,  85  111. 

110,  707,    719 

Rickords   v.    City    of    Hammond,    67 

Fed.  380.  1705 

Riddel    v.    School    District,    15    Kan. 

168,  326 

Riddick  v.  Amelin,  1  Mo.  5,  47 

Riddle  v.  Bedford  Co.,  7  S.  &  R.  386. 

197,   198,   289 

V.  Proprietors  &c.,  7  Mass.  169, 

7,   142,  776 

V.  Village  of  Westfleld,  65  Hun 

432,  1625 

Rideout  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  1  Allen 

232,  362,   1485 

Rider    v.    City    of    Amsterdam,    65 

N.   Y.    S.   579,  791 

Rider   Life   Raft    Co.    v.    Roach,    97 

N.  Y.  378,  746 

Ridge  Av.  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Philadelphia 

City,    124    Pa.    St.    219.  1159 

Ridgeway   v.   West,   60   Ind.   371,  532 

Ridley  v.   Doughty,   85   Iowa  418,        303 

V.  Sherbrook,  3  Coldw.  569.  369 
Riest  V.  City  of  Goshen.  42  Ind.  339,  1639 
Riggs  V.   Board  &c..   29   Mich.   262,   1317 

V.  Boylan,  4  Biss.  445,  228 

V.    Johnson   Co.,    6    Wall.    166. 

1523,  1527,  1528 
Rigler   v.    Charlotte    &c.    R.    Co.,    94 

N.    C.    604,  1633 

Rigney  v.  City  of  Chicago,  125  U.  S. 

161,  678 

Riker  v.    Jersey   City,    88   N.    J.    L. 

225,  242 

Riley    v.    City    of    Kansas,    31    Mo. 

App.    439.  1432 

V.    City    of   Rochester,    9    N.    Y. 

64,  1536 

Ring   V.    City    of   Cohoes,    77    N.    Y. 

83  1.599 

V.  Grout,  7  Wend.  341,  1485 

V.  Johnson  Co.,  6  Iowa  265,  1014 
Ripley  v.  Board  &c.,  40  N.  J.  L.  45,  1577 

V.    Warren,    2   Pick.    592.  1739 

Risley  v.  Village  of  Howell,  64  Fed. 

453,  1002,    1005 

Rison    V.    Farr,    24    Ark.    161,  369 

Ritchie  v.  City  of  South  Topeka.  38 

Kan.    368,  166.    1288,    1534 

V.  Franklin  Co.,  22  Wall.  67,         643 

V.    People,    155    HI.    98,  734 

Ritter  v.  Patch,  12  Cal.  298,     1720,  1722 
Ritterskamp   v.    Stifel,   59   Mo.   App. 

510,  1373 

Rives  V.    City   of   Columbia.   80   Mo. 

App.    173.  223,    796,    1773 

Rivers  v.   City   Council  &c.,   65   Ga. 

376,  821,   830 

Rivet   V.    City   of   New   Orleans,   35 

La.  An.  134,  651 

Roach  V.  City  of  Ogdensburg,  36  N. 

Y.    S.    112.  793 

Road  Case,  In  re,  17  Pa.  St.  71,  987 

Road   in   Roaring  Brook   Tp.,   In  re, 

140    Pa.    St.    632.  1170 

Roads   of   Sadsbury   Tp.,   In   re,   147 

Pa.    St.    471,  1170 

Roanoke  Gas  Co.  v.  City  of  Roanoke, 

88    Va.    810,  587,    1162 

Robb  v.  Carter.  65  Md.  321.         168,  183 

V.    Maysville    &c.    Tpk.    Co.,    3 

Met.     117,  702 

Robbins  v.  Board  &e.,  91  Ind.  537,       842 

V.   Board  &c.,   104   Ind.   321,        1040 

V.   Chicago,   4  Wall.   657, 

1587.    1590.    1598 

V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  20  Pick.  345, 

1042 


Robbins   v.  Milwaukee  &c.  R.  Co.,  6 

Wis.  636,  704 

V.     Shelby    Co.    Taxing    Dists., 
120   U.    S.   489,  1399 

Robert  v.  Board  &c.,  158  N.  Y.  673,  1346 
V.  City  of  Boston,  5  Cush.  198,  1494 
V.    Sadler,    104   N.   Y.   229,  1214 

Roberts  v.   Bolles,   101   U.   S.   119, 

1001,    1004,    1005 
V.    Broadfield,    12    App.    D.    C. 
453,  1731 

V.  City  of  Cambridge,  164  Mass. 
176,  714 

V.    City    of    Detroit,    102    Mich. 

64,  1376 
V.  City  of  Louisville,  93  Ky.  95, 

1371,   1372 
V.    City    of    Montreal,    16    Rap. 
Jud.   Que.   C.    S.    342,  1377 

V.  Commissioners,  10  Kan.  29,     1072 
V.    First    Nafl.    Bank,    8    N.    D. 
504.  732,  1260,  1268 

V.    Inhabitants    &c.,    140    Mass. 
129,  1624 

V.  Ogle,  30  III.  459,  607,  1085 

V.  People.  9  Colo.  458,  932 

V.  Village  of  St.  James,  76  Minn. 
456,  930 

V.    Williams,    15    Ark.    43,  687 

Roberts   &   Co.   v.   City   of   Paducah, 

95   Fed.   62,  519,   872 

Robertson  v.  Breedlove,  61  Tex.  316, 

628,  837,  839,  1728 
V.  City  of  Omaha,  55  Neb.  718, 

725,    1298 
V.   City  of  Rockford,  21  111.  451, 

103,    983 
V.    Frank    Bros.    Co.,    132   U.    S. 
17.  1263 

V.  Lambertville,  38  N.  J.  L.  69,     537 
V.   Sickel,   127  U.   S.  507,  225 

Robie  V.  Trustees  &c.,  35  Barb.  319 

48,    87 

Robins  v.   Ackerly,   91   N.  Y.   98,  19 

Robinson,  Ex  parte,   12  Nev.  263, 

1508,  1521 
V.  Benton  Co.,  49  Ark.  49,  189,  1413 
V.  Burlington,  50  Iowa  240,  247 
V.  Chamberlain,  34  N.  Y.  389, 

222,    224 
V.  City  Council  &c.,  2  Rich.  317, 

245,  1521 
V.    City    of   Cedar   Rapids,    100 
Iowa    662,  1331 

V.    City   of   Evansvllle,   87   Ind. 
334,  264,  774 

V.  City  of  St.  Louis,  28  Mo.  488,  262 
V.  Fitchburg  &c.  R.  Co.,  7  Gray 
92,  1618 

V.   Greenville,   42   Ohio   St.   625, 

799,    808,    820 
v.  Hague.  63  Iowa  273.  1490 

V.   Hamilton,   60  Iowa  134,  1078 

v.   Mayor   &c.,   8   Houst.   409, 

1327,     1340 
V.   Mayor  &c.,   1    Humph.    156,    1509 
V.    Oceanic   &c.    Co.,    112   N.    Y. 
31.5.  137 

V.    Pioche,   5   Cal.   460.  1641 

V.  Rippev.  Ill  Ind.  112,       696,  1201 
V.   Rohr.    73   Wis.    436.  224 

V.  Rowland,  26  Hun  501,        229,  230 
V.   Supervisors,   43   Cal.   353. 

1523,   152.5,    1529,   1531 
v.    Swope,   12   Bush   21,  687 

Roche    v.    Jones,    87    Va.    484, 

154,    169,    186,    193,    288 

Rochefort    v.    Inhabitants    &c.,    154 

Mass.   140,  1585.   1616 

Rochester  v.  Montgomery,  72  N.  Y. 

65,  1599 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


clxv 


[References  are  to  Pages.    Vol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.'] 


Eochestor   &c.    Co.    v.    Clarke    Nat'l. 

Kaiik.   60  Barb.   234.  195 

Rocbe.ster  White  Lead  Co.  v.  City  of 

Hochester,    3    N.    Y.    463,  1208 

Kock  V.  City  of  New  York,  63  N.  Y. 

S.    825,  179 

V.    Katzenstein,   52   Ark.    107,      1205 

V.    Stinger,    36    Ind.    346,  319 

Rock  Creek  Tp.   v.   Strong,  96  TT.   S. 

271,  1016,  1017 

Rockingham  &c.  Bank  v.  Portsmouth, 

52   N.    H.    17,  1722 

Rock  Island  Co.  v.  Sage,  88  111.  582, 

1084 

Rodger  v.  City  of  Philadelphia,  181 

I 'a.    St.    273,  1778 

Rodman  v.  Harcourt,  4  B.  Mon.  224 

185,  198 
V.  Justices,  3  Bush  144.  1529 

V.    Town    of    Washington,    122 
N.  C.  39,  986 

Roe  V.  Lincoln  Co.,  56  Wis.  66,  652,  1702 
V.  Town  of  Phillipi,  45  W.  Va. 
785,  880 

Roeller  v.  Ames,  33  Minn.   132,  1744 

Rofflgnac   St.,    In   re,   4   Rob.   357,        699 

Rogan  V.  City  of  Watertown,  30  Wis. 

259,  623 

Rogers  v.   Brunton,  10  Q.   B.  26,  467 

V.    Burlington,    3    Wall.    654, 

561.    634,    972,    983,    1001 
V.   City  of  Bloomington,  22   Ind. 
App.   601,  1329 

V.  City  of  St.  Charles,  3  Mo.  App. 
41,  701 

V.    City   of   St.    Paul,    22    Minn. 
494,  1139,  1165,  1253 

V.    City    of   St.    Paul,    79    Minn. 
5,  1553,    1791 

V.  Common  Council  &c.,  123  N. 
Y.   173,  1825 

V.   Jones,   1   Wend.   237, 

19,  98,  495,  496,  519 
V.  People,  68  111.  154,  12 

V.  Randall,  29  Mich.  41,  1101 

V.  Slonaker,  32  Kan.  191,       190,  275 
V.   Trustees  &c.,    11   Ky.    L.    934, 

1490,  1492 
V.  Voorhees,  124  Ind.  469,  947 

Rogge  V.  City  of  Elizabeth,  64  N.  J. 

L.  491,  1782 

Rohde  V.  Seavey.  4  Wash.  91,  408 

Rohland  v.   St.  Louis  &c.  R.  Co.,  89 

Mo.    180,  1416 

Rolf  V.  City  of  Greenville,  102  Mich. 

544,  1344 

Rolfs,   In  re,  30  Kan.   758,  1414 

Rollins   V.    Board   &c.,   80   Fed.    692, 

49  TT.   S.  App.  399.  986,   1031 

V.    Lake   Co.,   34    Fed.   845,  887 

V.    Town   of   Chester,    46   N.    H.         v 
411.  359,    363 

V.  Wright.  93  Cal.  395,       1166,  1505 

Rollstone  Nat'l  Bank  v.  Carleton,  136 

Mass.    226,  329 

Rolph  V.  City  of  Fargo,  7  N.  D.  640, 

1242,  1269,  1292.  1302,  1303 

Rommeney  v.  City  of  New  York.  63  N. 

Y.    S.    186,  1329,    1363 

Ronde  v.  Mayor  &c.,  18  Fed.  719.       1027 

Rondot  V.   Rogers  Tp.,   99   Fed.   202, 

1002.   1005,   1029,   1031,   1033 
,  Ronkendorff  v.  Taylor,  4  Pet.  349.     1422 

Rooney  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  128  Mass. 

580,  1584 

Roosevelt  v.  Draper,   23  N.  Y.  318,  17.30 
V.    Godard.    52   Barb.   533,  517 

Root  V.  Alexander,  18  N.  Y.  S.  632.  10G6 

Roper  V.   Inhabitants  &c.,  28   Maine 

193,  340,   343 

V.  McWhorter,  77  Va.  214,  629,  651 


Roper  V.  Town  of  I^aurinburg,  90  N. 

C.   427,  181,  663,  GG4 

V.  Trustees  &c.,  91  111.  518, 

211,   321,  324 
Rose  V.  City  of  St.  Charles,  49  Me. 

509,  1420 

V.  Trestrail,  62  Mo.  App.  352,  1149 

V.  Turnpike  Co.,  3  Watts  46,  447 
Rosebaugh  v.  SatHn,  10  Ohio  31,  532 
Rosenbaum,   In   re,   6  N.   Y.   S.   184,   1186 

V.    City   of    Newbern,    118    N.    C. 

83,  600,    797,    1703 

Roseboom   v.   Jefferson   Tp.,    122    Ind. 

377,  626,    1479 

Rosenthal   v.   Taylor  R.   Co.,   79   Tex. 

325,  1582 

Rosetta   Gravel  &c.   Co.   v.   JoIIisaint, 

51    La.    An.    804,  1284,    1304 

V.  Kennedy,  51  La.  An.  1535,  1754 
Rosevere  v.   Borough  of  Osceola  Mills, 

169   Pa.    St.   555,  1337 

Rosewell  v.  Prior.  2  Salk.  460,  1095 

Ross  V.  Brown,  74  Maine  352,  216 

V.  City  of  Madison,   1   Ind.   281,  261 

V.  City  of  Philadelphia,  115  Pa. 

St.   222,  710 

V.    Clinton,    46   Iowa   606,  1217 

V.  Stackhouse,  114  Ind.  200, 

947,    1190,    1191,    1201,    1259 

V.    Williamson,    44    Ga.    501,  313 

Rossire   v.    City   of   Boston,   4   Allen 

57.  253 

Rossiter  v.  City  of  Lake  Forest,  157 

111.   489,  1291,    1702 

v.    Peek,   3   Gray   538,  341 

Rotenberry    v.    Board   &c.,    67    Miss. 

470,  556 

Roth  V.  House  of  Refuge,  31  Md.  329, 

1071 
Rothrock  v.  School  District,  133  Pa. 

St.   487,  172 

Rounds   V.    Mansfield,   38    Maine   586, 

222,   311 

V.    Mumford,    2    R.    I.    154,  517 

V.  Waymart,  81  Pa.  St.  395.  106 
Roundtree  v.  City  of  Galveston,  42 

Tex.   612,  1207 

Rouse    V.    Moore,    18    Johns.    407,  7 

Kowe  V.  Portsmouth,  56  N.  H.  291.  1208 
Kowell  V.  City  of  Lowell,  7  Gray  100, 

1601 

V.  Horton,  58  Vt.   1,  308 

V.   Town  of  Vershire,  62  Vt.  405, 

1058 

V.  Tunbridge  School  Dist.,  59  Vt. 

658.  1480 

Rowland  v.  Mayor  &c.,  83  N.  Y.  372,  206 
Rowlett   V.   Eubank.   1   Bush   477,  311 

Rowning  v.    Goodchild,    2   W.    Bl.   906, 

222 
Rowzer  v.  Pierce.  75  Miss.  846,  1698 
Roy  V.   Eaton,   Lift.  23,  130 

Royal  St.,  In  re,  16  La.  An.  393,       1257 
Royce   v.    Salt    Lake   City,    15    Utah 

401,  792 

Royster  v.   Board  &c.,   98   N.   C.   148, 

957.  962 
Rozell  V.  Andrews,  103  N.  Y.  150,  1567 
Rozier  v.  Francois  Co.,  34  Mo.  395,  981 
Ruby  V.   Shain,  54  Mo.   207,  618 

Rudderow  v.   City  of  Philadelphia, 

166   Pa.    St.   241.  1219 

Rude   V.    City   of   St.    Louis,   93   Mo. 

408,  '  1697 

Rudy  V.    School   Dist.,   30   Mo.   App. 

113.  1491 

Rugby    Charity   v.    Merryweather,    11 

East   376.  1559 

Ruggles  V.  Board  of  Trustees  &c.,  88 

Cal.  430,  167 

V.  City  of  Fond  du  Lac,  53  Wis. 

436,  247,    942,    1551 


clxvi 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Vol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.'] 


Ruggies  V.  Collier,  4r?  Mo.  353,  281,  1539 
V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  11  Cush.  433,  281 
V.   Town  of  Nevada,  63   Iowa 
1S5.  1618,  1626 

Ruhland  v.  Supervisors,  55  Wis.  664.  344 

Rummel   v.   New  York  &c.   R.   Co.,   30 

N.   Y.    St.    235,  1564 

Rumsey  v.   City  of  Philadelphia,   171 

Pa.   St.  63,  793 

V.    People,    19   N.    Y.    41,  64 

Rumslv    &c.    Mfg.    Co.    v.    Inhabitants 
&c.,   21   Mo.   App.   175.  464 

Rund  V.  Town  of  Fowler,  142  Ind. 

214,  600 

Rundle  v.   Delaware  &c.   Canal   Co., 

1    Wall.    Jr.    275,  4,    6 

V.   Mayor  &c.,   28  .Md.   356,  1724 

Runion  v.  Latimer.  6  S.  C.  126,  197 

Runkle    v.    Commonwealth,    113    Pa. 

St.  229,  1667 

Runvan  v.  Coster.  14  Pet.  122,  1576 

Ruohs  V.  Athens,  91  Tenn.  20,     408,  977 

Rusher  v.   City  of  Dallas,   83  Tex. 

151,  799 

Rushton   V.    City   of   Alleghany,    192 

Pa.   St.   574,  1800 

Rushville  Gas  Co.  v.  City  of  Rushville, 
121  Ind.  200, 

161,  162,  293,  298,  473,  474 

Russell    V.    Cage,    66    Tex.    428, 

552,    841,    892 
v.  City  of  Chicago,  22  111.   283,   108 
V.  City  of  New  Haven,  51  Conn. 
259,  1725 

T.  City  of  St.  Louis,  9  Mo.  507. 

1515 
V.   Dver,  40  N.   H.   173,  345 

V.   Hubbard.   59   111.   335,  1814 

V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  74  Mo.  480, 

827,    1608.    1618.    1619,    1790 
V.   Mayor  &c.,   2   Denio   461, 

673,   802,   1114 
V.   Men  of  Devon,   2  T.   R.   667, 

142,   776,   777,    1734 
V.  Tate,  52  Ark.  541, 

212,    219,    623,    651,    919 
V.   Town   of  Monroe,    116   N.   C. 
720.  1317,    1329.    1331 

V.  Town  of  Steuben,  57  111.  35,  775 
V.  Turner,  62  Maine  496,  697 

V.   Village   of   Canastota,   98   N. 
Y.  496.  1587 

V.   Wellington,   157   Mass.   100,     471 
V.    Williamsport,   9    Pa.   Co.    Ct. 
129,  173 

Ruston  V.   Grimwood,  30  Ind.   364,   1570 

Rutgers  v.  Mayor  &c.,  42  N.  J.   L.  51, 

760 

Rutherford  v.   City   of  Holly,   105   N. 

Y.    632,  1217 

v.  Davis,  9.5  Ind.  245,  1570 

V.  Hamilton,  97  Mo.  543,  274.  276 
V.  Swink,  90  Tenn.  152,  1422,  1423 
V.    Swink,    96    Tenn.    564,  525 

v.    Taylor.   38   Mo.   315,  629 

Rutter  V.  Chapman.  8  M.  &  W.  1,     35,  77 

Ruttle  V.  City  of  Covington,  10  Ky. 

L.   766.  1352 

Rutz   V.    Kelm,   143   111.    558,  576 

Ryan  v.  City  of  Central  City,  21  Ky. 

L.  1070,  1554 

V.   City  of  Chicago,   79   111.   App. 
28,  1333 

V.   Copes,   11   Rich.   217,  1111 

v.  Dakota  Co..  32  Minn.  138,  303 
V.  Martin,  91   N.   C.   464,  650 

V.    Town   of   Sumner,    17   Wash. 
228,  1243 

V.  United  States.  86  TT.  S.  514.     327 

Ryder  v.    City   of  Alton,   175   111.   94. 

305,    512.    1173 
V.   Railroad  Co.,   13   111.   516,         86 


Ryerson  v.   Brown,   35  Mich.  333.        685 
V.   Laketon  Tp..   52   Mich.   509,   1532 

Ryney   v.    City   of   Chicago,    102    111. 

64,  1219 

S 

Sachs  V.  City  of  Sioux  City,  109  Iowa 

224,  1755 

Sackett   v.  City  of  New  Albany,   88 

Ind.   473,  651,   889,   895 

V.  State,  74  Ind.  486,  274 

Sadler   v.    Langham,  34  Ala.   311. 

685,    087 

Safety    Insulated    Wire    &c.    Co.    v. 

City  of  Baltimore,  74  Fed.  363,  740 
V.    Mayor    &c.,    66    Fed.    140,         547 

Sage  V.   City  of  Brooklyn,  89  N.   Y. 

189,  705 

V.    Laurain,    19   Mich.    137, 

223,    225,    335 
V.  Town  of  Fifield,  68  Wis.  546,  652 

Saginaw  Gas  &c.  Co.  v.  City  of  Sagi- 
naw,   28    Fed.    529, 

510,    566,    567,    1351,    1465 

St.    Charles    v.    Hackman,    133    Mo. 

634,  727 

St.   Clair  v.   School   Board's  Appeal, 

74  Pa.  St.  252,  1721 

St.  Francis  Co.  v.  Cummings,  55  Ark. 

419,  1073 

St.  Helena  W.  Co.  v.  Forbes,  62  Cal. 

182,  688 

St.  Helen's  Mill  Co.,  In  re,  3  Sawy. 

88,  1212 

St.  Joseph  &c.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Leland,  90 

Mo.   177,  222 

St.   Joseph   &c.   R.   Co.   v.   Buchanan 

Countv  Court,  39  Mo.  485,     369,  370 
V.  Linn  Co.  Court.  39  Mo.  485.       983 

St.  Joseph's  Orphan   Society  v.  Wol- 

pert,   80   Ky.   86.  1063 

St.  Joseph  School  Board  v.  Gaylord, 

86  Mo.  401,  1490 

St.   Joseph   Tp.   v.   Rogers,    16   Wall. 

644,     374,  473.  646,  983.  1005.  1018, 
1027,  1150.  1407,  1792 

St.   Louis  V.   Babcock,   156  Mo.   154, 

1407,  1792 
V.  Bentz,  11  Mo.  61,  607 

V.  Cafferata.  24  Mo.  94,  607 

V.  Ferry  Co.,  11  Wall.  423, 

1499,   1500,   1502 
V.  Insurance  Co.,  12  R.  I.  435,     1513 
v.   Western  U.   Tel.   Co.,  148  U. 
S.  92,  510 

St.  Louis  Bridge  Co.  v.  City  of  Fast 

St.  Louis,  121  111.  238,       1500,  1514 

St.  Louis  Co.  Court  v.  Griswold,  58 

Mo.  175,  68S 

St.  Louis  Gaslight  Co.  v.  City  of  St. 

Louis,  46  Mo.  121,  1451,  1518 

St.  Louis  Public  Schools  v.  City  of 

St.  Louis,  26  Mo.  468,  1247 

St.    Louis   &c.    R.    Co.    V.   Anderson, 

39  Ark.   167,  701 

v.  Bell.  81  111.  76.  794 

V.  Capps.  67  111.  607,  1602 

v.  Weaver,  35  Kan.  412,  1628 

St.  Marv's  Indust.  School  v.  Brown, 

45  Md.   310,  549,   654 

St.  Paul  Gaslight  Co.  v.  City  of  St. 

Paul,  78  Minn.  39.  721,  737 

St.  Paul  &c.  R.  Co.  V.  City  of  Minne- 
apolis. 35  Minn.  141.  679 
V.    City    of   St.    Paul,    21    Minn. 
256,                                                      1247 

St.  Peter  v.  Denison.  58  N.  Y.  416,     823 

St.   Vincent  Orphnn  Asylum  v.   City 

of  Trov,  76  N.  Y.  108,  1106 

Sale    v.    Aurora    &c.    Tpk.    Co.,    147 

Ind.  324,  1639 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


clxvii 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Vol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.1 


Salom  Tpk.  &c.  Co.  v.  Essex  Co.,  100 

Mass.     282,  1514,     1519 

Salem  Water  Co.  v.  City  of  Salem.  5 

Or.  29,  848,  877,  881 

Saleno  v.   City  of  Neosho,   127   Mo. 

627.  470,    877 

Salisbury  v.   Hershenroder,   106  Mass. 

458.  1612 

V.   Merrimack  Co.,  59  N.   H.  359, 

1055 
Salmon  v.   Haynes,   50  N.   J.   L.   97, 

160,  285,  286 
Saloman  v.   United   States,   19   Wall. 

17,  743 

Saloy  V.  City  of  New  Orleans,  33  La. 

An.  79,  651 

Salscheider  v.   City  of  Fort  Howard, 

45  Wis.  519.  1720 

Saltenberry  v.  Loucks,  8  La.  An.  95,  333 
Salt  Lake  City  v.  liollister,  118  U.  S. 

256,  616,    812 

Samis  v.   King.   40  Conn.   298, 

169.  213.  1427,  1430 
Sam  Kee,  In  re,  31  Fed.  680,  1082 

Sample   v.    Davis,    4   Greene   117,  328 

Samples  v.  City  of  Atlanta,  95  Ga. 

110.  1328 

San   Antonio    v.    Barnes,    96   U.    S. 

316,  1001 

V.  Berry,  48  S.  W.  496,  1293 

V.  Lewis,  9  Tex.  69,  261 

V.  Lewis.  15  Tex.  388,  629 

V.  Mehaffy,  96  U.  S.  312.  1001,  1014 
San  Antonio  &.c.  R.  Co.  v.  Bergsland, 

12  Tex.  Civ.  App.  97.  1350 

San  Antonio   St.   R.   Co.   v.  City  of 

San  Antonio,  22  Tex.  Civ.  App. 

341,  1553 

Sanborn  v.  Machiasport,  53  Maine 

82,  ■        347 

V.  Neal,  4  Minn.  126.  217 

V.  School  Dist..  12  Minn.  17, 

302,  343,  348,  357.  1480 

V.    Town   of   Deerfield,    2   N.    H. 

251,  868 

Sanders    v.    Inhabitants    &c.,    154 

Mass.  475,  1584 

V.  Southern  &c.  R.  Co.,  147  Mo. 

411  1385 

V.   Town  Com'rs,  30  Ra.   679. 

1388,  1503,  1533 
Sanderson    v.    Aston,    L.    R.    8    Ex. 

73.  320 

San    Diego    Inv.    Co.    v.    Shaw,    129 

Cal.   273,  1272 

San  Dieso  Water  Co.  v.  City  of  San 

Diego,  59  Cal.  517,  644 

Sands  v.  City  of  Richmond,  31  Graft. 

571,  1198 

V.   Manistee  &c.   Co.,   123   U.    S. 

288,  1576 

Sanford  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  32  Maine 

536.  776 

V.  Mayor  &c.,  52  Miss.  383,  1560 

V.  Prentice,  28  Wis.  358, 

356,    374,    1150 
San  Francisco  v.  Spring  Valley  Water- 
Works.  48  Cal.  493,  55 
San    Francisco   &c.    Co.    v.    City   of 

San  Francisco,  6  Cal.   190,  464.  465 
San    Francisco    &c.     Factory    v.    Brick-- 

wedel.  60  Cal.   166,         "  506 

San  Francisco  Gas  Co.  v.  Brickwedel, 

62  Cal.  641.  920 

V.  City  of  San  Francisco,  9  Cal. 

453,  649,  714.  746,  756 

San  Francisco  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  City  of 

Oakland.  43  Cal.  .502,  553 

Sangamon  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Morgan  Co., 

14  111.  16.3,  1499 

Sanger  v.  City  of  Waco.  15  Tex.  Civ. 

App.  424,  1746 


Sanger  v.  Commissioners,  25  Maine 

291,  339,  1681 

V.  Craigue,   10  Vt.  555,  228 

Sangster  v.  Commonwealth,  17  Graft. 

^      .l-»-  330,  332 

Sanitary  Dist.  &c.  v.  Goo.  F.  Blake 
Mfg.  Co.,  179  111.  107, 

742,  743,  748,  1756 
v.  McGuirl,  86  111.  App.  392,  1773 
V.    Ricker.   91    Fed.    833,        717,   754 

Sanitary  Reduction  Works  v.  Califor- 
nia &c.  Co.,  94  Fed.  693,  1393 

San  Jose  Gas  Co.  v.  January,  57  Cal. 

614,  1689 

Sank  V.  City  of  Philadelphia,  4  Brews. 

133,  304.   1133 

San    Luis   Obispo   Co.   v.    Hendricks, 

71  Cal.  242,  472,  488 

V.  White.  91  Cal.  432,  368 

San  Mateo  Co.   v.   Southern  &c.   R. 

Co..  13  Fed.  722,  1.39 

Sansbury  v.  Middleton,  11  Md.  296,     168 

Sansom  v.  Mercer,  08  Tex.  488,  421 

Santa    Ana    Water    Co.    v.    Town    of 
Buenaventura,  65  Fed.  323, 

186.  715,  730 
v.  Town  of  San  Buenaventura, 
56  Fed.  339,  672 

Santa  Cruz  &c.  Co.  v.  Broderick,  113 

Cal.  628,  711,  714,  1155 

V.  Ileaton,  105  Cal.  162,  1155 

Santa  Rosa  City  R.  Co.  v.  Central  St. 

R.  Co..  38  Pac.  986,  479 

Santo  V.  State,  2  Iowa  165,  520 

Sargent  v.  City  of  Evanston,  154  111. 

368.  1146 

V.  City  of  Lynn.  138  Mass.  599.  1624 
V.  Cornish,  54  N.  H.  18,  564,  664,  665 
V.  Gorman.  131  N.  Y.  191,  1647 

V.  Webster,  13  Met.  497,  274 

Sarles  v.  Mayor  &c.,  47  Barb.  447,       800 

Sarpy  v.  Municipality  No.  Two,  9  La. 

An.  597,  1214 

Satterfleld  v.   People,  104  111.  448,       328 

Satterlee  v.  City  of  San  Francisco,  23 

Cal.  314,  631 

V.  Mathewson,  16  S.  &  R.  169,  1160 
V.  Matthewson,  2  Peters  380,  992 
V.  Strider,  31  W.  Va.  789,  1651 

Sauer   v.    Mavor   &c.,    41    N.    Y     S 

957,  1779 

V.  Mayor  &c.,  60  N.  Y.  S.  648, 

1772,  1775 

Sauerhering    v.    Iron    Bridge   &c.    R. 

Co.,  25  Wis.  447,  987 

Saulsbury    v.    Village   of    Ithaca,    94 

N.  Y.  27.  821,  1587,  1614 

Sault  Ste.  Marie  High  Com'rs  v.  Van 

Duson,  40  Mich.  429.  868 

Saunders  v.  City  of  Ft.  Madison,  111 

Iowa   102.  818 

v.  Haynes,   13  Cal.   145,  378 

V.  Lawrence,  141  Mass.  380,  160 

V.  Nashua.  69  N.  H.  492,  519 

V.   Provisional  Municipality  &c., 
24   Fla.   226.  390 

V.  Taylor,  9  B.  &  C.  35.  321 

V.  Townsend,  26  Hun  308,  1556 

Saunderson  v.  Herman,  95  Wis.  48.  1295 

Sauntman  v.  Maxwell,  154  Ind.  114, 

1142,   1173 

Savage  v.  City  of  Buffalo,  14  N.  Y. 

S.  101,  1254 

Savannah   &c.   R.   Co.   v.   Mayor  &c., 

45  Ga.  602.  591 

Savidge  v.   Supervisors  &c.,   10  Wis. 

49,  9.59 

V.  Village  of  Spring  Lake,   112 
Mich.  91,  874,  1699 

Saving   &   Loan    Soc.    v.    Austin,    46 

Cal.  415,  1717 


clxviii 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Vol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.'] 


Saving    Society    v.    Philadelphia,    31 

Pa.  St.  175,  491 

Savings    Ass'n    v.    Topeka,    3    Dillon 

376,  55 

Savings  Banli  v.  City  of  Nashua,  46 

N:  H.  389.  1501 

V.   Davis,   8   Conn.   191,  260,   277 

V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  8  Allen  109,     252 
V.   Ward,   100   U.   S.   195.  228 

Sawyer  v.   City  of  Chicago.   183   111. 

57,  512,  736,  1553 

v.  City  of  San  Francisco,  50  Cal. 
370,  630 

V.  Corse,   17  Gratt.   230,        222,  265 
V.  Manchester  &c.  R.  Co.,  62  N. 
n.  135,  362 

V.    State   Board  &c.,   125   Mass. 
182,  468,   552 

Saxton  V.  Beach,  50  Mo.  488,  286 

V.  City  of  Peoria,  75  111.  App. 
397,  1386 

V.  City  of  St.  Joseph,  60  Mo. 
153,  286 

V.  Nimms.  14  Mass.  315.         348,  365 

Saylor    v.    City    of    Montesano,    11 

Wash.  328,  1334,  1346.  1361 

Sayre    v.    Borough    of    Phillips,    148 

Pa.  St.  482,  1404 

V.  Mayor  &c.,  60  N.  J.  Eq.  361, 

593,  1378 

V.  Tompkins,  23  Mo.  443, 

1288,   1474,   1722 

Scadding  v.  Lorant,  5  Eng.  L.  &  Eq. 

16,  274,  289 

Scaine  v.   Inhabitants  &c.,   39   N.   J. 

L.  526,  454 

Scales  V.  Ordinary  &c.,  41  Ga.  225, 

12,  775 
Scalf  V.  Collins  Co.,  80  Tex.  514,  577 
Scammon  v.  City  of  Chicago,  40  111. 

146,  1533 

V.  City  of  Chicago,  44  III.  269.  1536 

V.  Scammon.  28  N.  H.  419,  187,  346 
Scanlan  v.  City  of  Watertown,  43  N. 

Y.  S.  618,  1325 

V.  Wright,  13  Pick.  523,  134 

Scarling  v.  Criett,  Moo.  75,  467 

Schaefifer    v.    Jackson    Tp.,    150    Pa. 

St.    145.  1332,   1600 

V.  Bonham,  95  111.  368,  1023 

Schafif  V.  Upper  Connecticut  &c.  Co., 

57  N.  H.  no.  1571 

Schaffer  v.  Cadwallader,  36  Pa.  St. 

126,  457 

Schaller  v.   City  of  Omaha,   23  Neb. 

325,  678 

Scheerer  v.  Edgar,  76  Cal.  569,  953 

Schefbauer  v.  Board  &c.,  57  N.  J.  L. 

588,  747 

Scheftels  v.  Tabert,  46  Wis.  439,         524 
Schell  V.  Stein,  76  Pa.  St.  398,  229 

Schenck  v.   Peay,   1   Dill.  267,  1540 

V.    Peay.   1   Woolw.    175,        287,   295 
Schenectady  &c.  Co.  v.  Thatcher,  11 

N.  Y.  102,  994 

Schenley  v.   Commonwealth,   36  Pa. 

St.  29. 

282,  547,  1160,  1232,  1233,  1539 
Schermerhorn    v.    City    of    Schenec- 
tady, 3  N.  Y.  S.  435,  177 
Schettler  v.   City  of  Ford  Howard, 

43  Wis.   48,  1550 

Schipper  v.  City  of  Aurora,  121  Ind. 

154,  746 

Schively  v.  Borough  of  Jenkintown, 

180  Pa.  St.  196.  1360 

Schlachter   v.    Stokes,    63    N.   J.    L. 

138.  599 

Schloss  V.  White,  16  Cal.  65,  333 

Schmidt.  Ex  parte,  24  S.  C.  363,       1413 

V.  Kansas  City  Dist.  Co.,  90  Mo. 

284,  795 


Schmidt    v.    Stearns    Co.,    34    Minn. 

112,  715 

Schmitt  V.  City  of  New  Orleans,  48 

La.  An.  1440,  1155.  1162 

Schneck  v.  City  of  Jefifersonville.  152 

Ind.  204.  981.  993,  10.30 

Schneider,  Ex  parte,  11  Or.  288,       1389 

Schoen   v.    City   of   Atlanta,   97    Ga. 

697,  1392 

Schoff  V.  Gould,  52  N.  H.  512, 

346,   348,  867 
V.    Town   of   Bloomfield,    8   Vt. 
472,  349 

Schofield  V.  Eighth  School  Dist.,  27 

Conn.  499,  1730 

School  V.  Williams,  38  Ark.  454,  12 

Schoolbred  v.  Corporation  of  Charles- 
ton. 2  Bay  63,  1529 

School    Com'rs  v.   Dean,   2   St.   &   P. 

190,  50 

School  Directors  v.  Crews,  23  111.  App. 

367,  1491 

V.  Ewington,  26  111.  App.  379,  1492 
V.  Jennings,  10  111.  App.  643,  1485 
V.  McBride,  22  Pa.  St.  215,  1480 

V.  School  Directors,  105  111.  653,  443 
V.  School  Directors  &c.,  135  111. 
464,  1473 

V.  Sippv,  54  111.  287,  864 

V.    Vogelman.   76   111.   189,  864 

School  Dist.  V.  Atherton,  12  Met.  103, 

168,  367 
V.  Bennett,  52  Ark.  511.  1476,  1480 
V.  Board  &c.,  73  Mo.  627,  1519 

V.  Board  &c.,  9  Neb.  405,  1670 

V.  Bodenhamer,  43  Ark.  140,  1471 
V.  Bragdon,  23  N.  H.  507,  348,  367 
V.  Carr.  55  N.  H.  452,  1485 

V.  Carr,  63  N.   H.   201,  193 

V.  Clark,  90  Mich.  435, 

850,  1029,  1426 
V.  Cushing,  8  Kan.  App.  728,  1033 
V.  Deshon,  51  Maine  454,  1483 

V.  Driver,  50  Ark.  346.  1489 

V.  Everett.  52  Mich.  314,  1490 

V.  First  National  Bank,  19  Neb. 
89,  1014,   1015 

V.  Fuess,  98  Pa.  St.  600.  1035 

V.  Gage.  39  Mich.  484,  1745 

V.  Greenfield.  64  N.  H.  84,  1474 

V.  Howe,  62  Ark.  481,  1504 

V.  Insurance  Co.,  101  U.  S.  472,  54 
V.  Insurance  Co.,  103  U.  S.  707,  55 
V.  Jant  Board  &c.,  27  Mich.  3.  1724 
V.  Lombard,  2  Dill.  493,  941,  952 
V.  Lord,  44  Maine  374. 

340,  366,  1429,  1485 
V.  Macloon,  4  Wis.  98,  1471 

V.  Maury,  53  Ark.  471.  1492 

V.  Prentiss,  66  N.  H.  145,  1487 

V.  Randall.  7  Cush.  478,  1483 

V.  Riverside  Tp.,  67  Mich.  404,  1483 
V.  Roach,  41  Kan.  531,  1472 

V.   Roach,  43  Minn.  495,  1482 

V.  Root,  61   Mich.  373,  1486 

V.  School  Dist.,  20  Kan.  76,  1473 
V.  School  Dist.  &c.,  63  Mich.  51, 

658.  1471.  1473,  1474 
V.  School  Dist..  94  Mo.  612,  1485 

V.  Selectmen.  63  N.  H.  277.  1495 
V.  State,  29  Kan.  57,  66,  69,  70 

V.  Stone,  106  U.  S.  183, 

863,  1007,  1012 
V.  Sullivan,  48  Kan.  624,  618 

V.   Tebbetts,   67   Maine  239,  14S3 

V.  Thplander,  31  Minn.  333,  1483 
V.  Thompson,  5  Minn.  280,  1471 

V.   Town   of   Bridport,   63   Vt. 
383.  1475,  1487 

V.  Twitchell,  63  N.  H.  11,  1487 

V.  Union  School  Dist,  81  Mich. 
339,  1473 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


clxix 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Vol.  I,  jyp.  J-832;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.'] 


School   Dist.   V.  Wlckersham,  3-1  Mo. 

App.  337,  1489 

ScbooUield  v.  City  of  Lynchburg,  78 

Va.  3(5(;.  1520 

School  Fund,  In  re,  15  Neb.  684,         913 

Schools  V.   Risley.  10  Wall.  91,  579 

School  Town  of  Milford  v.   I'owner, 

126   Ind.  528.  285,   1491 

V.  Zeigler,  1  Ind.  App.  138, 

285,  853,  1491,  1492 

School   Town   of  Monticello  v.    Ken- 
dall. 72  Ind.  91,  217 

School   Tp.   &c.   V.   School   Town  &c., 

109  Ind.  559.  445 

Schopp  V.  City  of  St.  Louis,  117  Mo. 

131,  1698 

Schott  V.  People.  89  111.  195,  540 

Schriber  v.    Town  of   Langlade,   66 

Wis.  616.  447 

Schroder  v.  Overman,  61  Ohio  St.  1, 

1272,  1285 

Schroeder  v.  City  Council,  2  Treadw. 

Const.  726.  1400 

V.  City  of  Baraboo,  93  Wis.  95,  1377 

Schroth  V.  City  of  Prescott,  68  Wis. 

678,  1617 

Schroyer  v.  Lynch,  8  Watts  453, 

225,  226 

Schuett    V.    City    of    Stillwater,    80 

Minn.  287,  791 

Schulenberg  &c.  Co.  v.  City  of  East 
St.  Louis,  63  111.  App.   214, 

219,  796.  1505 
V.  St.  Louis  &c.  R.  Co.,  129  Mo. 
455,  1697 

Schultz   V.   Cambridge,   38   Ohio    St. 

659,  517 

V.   City  of  Albany,   57  N.   Y.   S. 
965,  1304,  1707 

V.    City   of   Milwaukee,    49    Wis. 
254,  264 

Schumm   v.    Seymour,    24   N.    J.    Eq. 

143,  210,   279,   645 

Schuvler   Co.    v.    Mercer    Co.,    9    111. 

20,  1668 

V.  Thomas,  98  F.  S.  169,       995,  1001 

Schwartz  v.  F.arry.  90  Mich.  267,         910 
V.  City  of  Oshkosh,  55  Wis.  490, 

483.  541.  1421 
V.  Thirty-two  Flatboats,  14  La. 
An.  243,  1539 

V.   Wilson,  75  Cal.  502,         886,  920 

Schwiesau  v.  Mahon.  128  Cal.  114.     1153 

Schwingschlegle  v.  City  of  Monroe, 

113  Mich.  683,  1328.  1803 

Schwuchow   V.    City   of   Chicago,    68 

III.  444.  598 

Scofield  V.  City  of  Council  Bluffs,  68 

Iowa  695,  648,   1306 

V.    City   of   Lansing,    17    Mich. 
437,  282 

Scoles  V.   Wilsey,   11   Iowa  261,  229 

Scollans  v.  Rollins,  173  Mass.  275,   1013 

Scotland  Co.  v.  Hill,  132  U.  S.  107, 

995,   1026 
V.  Thomas.  94  U.  S.  682,     995,  1001 

Scotland  Co.  Court  v.  United  States. 

140  U.   S.  41,  1534 

Scott   V.    Chickasaw   Co.,    53    Iowa 

47,  1550,  1727 

V.   City  of  Davenport,   34   Iowa 
208,  890,  893 

V.  City  of  New  Orleans,  75  Fed. 
373  1331 

V.   City  of  Shreveport,  20  Fed. 
714,  644 

V.  City  of  Toledo,  36  Fed.  385, 

558,  674 
v.  Paulen,  15  Kan.  162,  276,  277 
v.  State,  46  Ind.  203,  328 

V.  Union  Co.,  63  Iowa  583,  276 

Scott  Co.   V.    Hinds,   50   Minn.   204, 

569,   1271 


Scotten  V.  City  of  Detroit,  106  Mich. 

564,  1303 

Scovill  V.  City  of  Cleveland.  1  Ohio 

St.   126,        90,    103,   288,   1232,   1253 
Scoville  V.   Mattoon,   55   Conn.    144, 

1473,  1474 

V.  Salt  Lake  City,  11  Utah  60, 

1337,  1343 
Scranton  v.   Levers,  9   Pa.   Dist.   R. 

176,  1506 

Scranton   City  v.    Kingsbury,   4   Pa. 

Dist.  Rep.  555,  1297 

Scripture  v.  Burns,  59  Iowa  70,         1655 
Scudder    v.    Mayor    &c.,    146    N.    Y. 

245,  1704 

V.  Trenton  &c.  Co.,  1  N.  J.  Eq. 

694,  685,  698 

Scully  V.  O'Leary,  11  Chicago  Legal 

News  27,  1414 

Seaboard  Nat'l  Bank  v.  Woesten,  147 

Mo.  467, 

469,  712,  717,  737,  752,  1289 
Seabury   v.   Howland,    15   R.    I.    446, 

346,  362,  365,  1477,  1485 
Seagraves  v.   City   of  Alton,    13    III. 

366,  241,  1041,  1084 

Seaman  v.  Baughman,  82  Iowa  216, 

364,  849 

V.  Hicks,  8   Paige  655,  687 

V.  Mayor  &c.,  80  N.  Y.  239, 

1373    1557 

V.   Patten,   2  Caines  312,  '  1091 

Searing   v.    Heavysides,    106   111.    85, 

1699,  1722 
Searle  v.   Abraham,   73   Iowa  507, 

897.    1462 
Searles  v.  Manhattan  R.  Co.,  101  N. 

Y.  661,  1600 

Sears  v.  Board  &c..  173  Mass.  71, 

1271,    1291,    1292,    1310 

V.    Inhabitants    &c.,    105    Mass. 

310.  1601 

V.   Street  Com'rs  &c.,  173  Mass. 

350,  1271,  1300,  1378,  1506 

V.  Street  Com'rs  &c.,  173  Mass. 

876,  1299 

Seaver  v.  City  of  Seattle,  17  Wash. 

361,  1758 

Sebastian  v.  Bryan,  21  Ark.  447, 

322,  327 
Secombe   v.    Railroad   Co.,    23   Wall. 

108,  694 

Second  Cong.  Church  Soc.  &c.  v.  City 

of  Omaha,  35  Neb.  103,  587 

Second   St.   R.   Co.   v.  City  of  Phila- 
delphia. 51  Pa.  St.  465,  1503 
Second   Ward   Sav.   Bank   v.   City  of 

Huron.  80  Fed.  660.  1007,  1021,  1029 
Secrist  v.  Delaware  Com'rs,  100  Ind. 

59.  1191 

Seebold  v.  Shitler,  34  Pa.  St.  133,       629 
Seeger  v.  Mueller,  133  111.  86. 

627,  648,  1759 
Seeley  v.  City  of  Pittsburg,  82  Pa. 

St.  360,  1195,  1254,  1271,  1499 

V.  Peters,  5  Gilm.  130,  607 

V.  Town  of  Westport,  47  Conn. 

294.  1263 

Seely  v.  Sebastian,  4  Or.  25,  689 

Seibert  v.  Botts,  57  Mo.  430,  628 

Seibold  v.  People,  86  111.  33,  110 

Seibrecht  v.  Citv  of  New  Orleans.  12 

La.  An.  496.  233,  254.  260,  647 

Seifert  v.   City  of  Brooklyn.   101   N. 

Y.  136,  263.  787,  790 

V.  City  of  Brooklyn,  15  Abb.  N. 

C.  97.  822 

Seitzinger   v.    Borough   of   Tamaqua, 

187  Pa.  St.  539.  751 

V.  Steinberger,  12  Pa.  St.  379.     1417 
Selbv   V.    City   of   Portland,    14    Or. 

243,  1433,  1445 


clxx 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


IReferences  are  to  Pages.    Vol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.-[ 


Selby  V.   Levee   Com'rs,    14   La.   An. 

434,  1520 

Seljgman  v.  City  of  Santa  Rosa,  81 

Fed.    524.  1699 

Selleck    v.    City    of    Janesville,    104 

Wis.  570,  1798 

Selma  &c.  R.  Co.,  Ex  parte,  45  Ala. 

696,  983 

V.  Camp,  45  Ga.   ISO.  704 

Selpbo  V.  City  of  Broolslyn,  39  N.  Y. 

S.  520,  754 

Seneca  Co.  Supervisors  v.  Allen,  99 

N.   Y.   532.  904 

Senlipnn   v.   City   of   Evansville,   140 

lud.  675.  1361.  1362 

Serrill    v.    City    of    Philadelphia,    38 

Pa.  St.  355,  386,  1513,  1516 

Sessions  v.   Crunkilton,   20  Ohio   St. 

349,  689,   1084 

Severin  v.   Cole,  88  Iowa  463,  693 

Severy  v.   Nickerson  Co.,   120  Mass. 

306,  810 

Sewall  V.  Brainard,  38  Vt.  364,  1019 

V.    City   of    St.    Paul,    20    Minn. 

511,  1202,  1254 

Seward    v.    City   of   Rising    Suu,    79 

Ind.   351.  1500 

V.   Rheiner,  2  Kan.  App.  95, 

1130,  1759 
Sewell  V.  City  of  Cohoes,  75  N.   Y. 

45,  1596,  1627 

Sexton  V.  Cook  Co.,  114  111.  174,         619 

V.  Pepper,  28  Hun  31,  1552 

Seymer  v.    Town  of  Lake,   66   Wis. 

651,  1641 

Seymore  v.  Carter.  2  Met.  520,  1159 

Seymour   v.    School    Dist.,    53    Conn. 

502,  1745 

V.  Van  Slyck.  8  Wend.  403,  771 

Shadrock  v.   Columbus,   51   Ohio   St. 

317,  1268 

Shafer  v.  Mumma,   17  Md.  331. 

1S9,  192,  541.  607,   1085,   1414 
Shaffer  v.   Welch,   34  Kan.   595.  1258 

Shakespear  v.  Smith,  77  Cal.  638. 

968,  1482 
Shaller  v.   City  of  Omaha,   23   Neb. 

325,  1222 

Shanewerk  v.  City  of  Fort  Worth,  11 

Tex.  Civ.  App.  271,  798 

Shanfelter   v.    Mayor   &c.,    80   Md. 

483,  541 

Shaukland  v.   Phillips,   3   Tenn.    Ch. 

556,  1480 

Shanks  v.  Dupont,  3  Peters  242,  132 

Shannon  v.   City  of  Huron,   9   S.   D. 

356,  872,   878,   956 

V.  O'Boyle.  51  Ind.  565,  629 

V.  Portland,  38  Or.  382, 

751,  1131,  1259 

V.  Portsmouth.  54  N.  H.  183,         626 

V.  Reynolds,  78  Ga.  760,  950 

V.  Town  of  Tama  City,  74  Iowa 

22,  1596 

V.  Village  of  Hinsdale,  180  111. 

18,  1148,  1153,  1166 

Shapleigh  v.  City  of  San  Angelo,  167 

U.  S.  646,  66,  71,  737,  1029 

Sharp,  In  re,  56  N.  Y.  257,  1257. 

V.  Contra  Costa  Co.,  34  Cal.  284, 

774,  1522,  1743 

V.  Dunavan,  17  B.  Mon.  223, 

1515,  1517 

V.  .Johnson,  4  Hill  92,       1261,  1533 

V.  Mayor  &c.,  40  Barb.  256.  870 

V.  Smith,  32  111.  App.  336,  915 

V.  Spier,  4  Hill  76, 

341,  565,  1134,  1232,  1533 
Sharpe  v.  Robertson.  5  Graft.  518,  183 
Sharpless  v.    Mayor  &c..   21    Pa.    St. 

147,  81.  763,  979,  983,  1536,  1538 
Shaver  v.  Starrett.  4  Ohio  St.  494,  6S7 
Shaw  V.  Crocker,  42  Cal.  435,  680 


Shaw  V.  Dennis,  10  111.  405, 

763,  983,  1084.  1252,  1514 
V.  Independent  School  Dist.  &c., 
77  Fed.  277,  1030 

V.  Kennedy,  N.  C.  Term  R.  158,  533 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  19  Ga.  468,  212 

V.  Norfolk  R.  Co.,  5  Gray  162,  992 
V.  President  &c.,  74  Wis.  105,  1618 
V.  Reed,  16  Mass.  450,  335 

V.    Statler.    74   Cal.    258,        886,   920 

Shay,  In  re,  15  N.  Y.  S.  488,  1680 

Shea  V.  City  of  Muncie.  148  Ind.  14. 

490,  501.  843,  1383 
V.    Inhabitants   &c.,    145    Mass. 
525,  711,  1037 

V.   Inhabitants.  145  Mass.  528,     280 

Sheehan's  Case,  122  Mass.  445,  1420 

V.  Gleeson.  46  Mo.  100,  282 

V.    Good    Samaritan's    Hospital, 
50  Mo.  155.  1206.  1247,  1513 

V.  Martin.  10  Mo.  App.  285,  1199 
V.  Owen.  82  Mo.  458,  1131 

V.  Sturges,  53  Conn.  481,  1493 

Sheehy  v.  City  of  New  York,   160  N. 

Y.  139,  930 

V.  Clausen,  55  N.  Y.  S.  1000,     1346 
V.    Kansas   City   &c.    R.    Co..   94 
Mo.  574,  678,   1602,   1776 

Sheel   V.    City   of  Appleton.   49   Wis. 

125,  828,  942.  1615 

Sheehan  v.  Mayor  &c.,  4  N.  J.  L.  J. 

92,  872 

Sheets   v.    Selden's   Lessee,    2   Wall. 

177,  346 

Sheffield  v.  Watson,  3  Cai.  69,  216 

Sheffield    School    Tp.    v.   Andress,   56 

Ind.   157,  260,  863,   971 

Sheidley  v.   Lynch,  95  Mo.   487,  916 

Shelby  v.  Alcorn,  36  Miss.  273,  195 

Shelby   Co.    Court   v.   Cumberland  &c. 

R.  Co.,  8  Bush  209.  996 

Sheldon  v.  City  of  Asheville,  119  N. 

C.  606.  1785 

v.  Litchfield  Co.,  1   Root  158.      1735 
V.    Village    of   Kalamazoo,    24 
Mich.    383,  1726 

Shelev  v.   City  of  Detroit,  45  Mich. 

431,  1233,    1268 

Shellabarger  v.  Binns,  18  Kan.  345,     316 

Shellev   v.    St.   Charles   Co.,   30  Fed. 

603,  1522 

Shellhouse  v.   State,  110  Ind.  509,     1566 

Shelton    v.    Borough    of    Birmingham, 
61    Conn.   518,  1221 

V.  Mayor  &c.,  30  Ala.  540,  520 
V.  Piatt,  139  U.  S.  591,  1697 

V.  Town  of  Derby,  27  Conn.   414. 

693,    1571 

Shenandoah    Borough  v.    Erdman,    12 

Atl.    814,  1639 

Shepard   v.   Tulare  Irr.   Dist.,   94   Fed. 
1,  1644.  1755,  1784 

Shepardson  v.   Milwaukee  &c.   R.   Co., 

6   Wis.    605,  705 

v.   Supervisors  &c.,   28   Wis.   593, 

1702 

Shepherd  v.  Burkhalter,  13  Ga.  443,  228 
V.  District  Tp..  25  Iowa  595.  952 
V.  Lincoln,  17  Wend.  250,  222,  226 
V.    Staten.    5    Heisk.    79.  197 

Sheppard  v.   Pulaski  Co.,   13  Ky.  L. 

672  803 

Sherbourne  v.  Yuba  Co.,  21  Cal.  113, 

9.   797 

Sheridan  v.  City  of  Salem,  148  Mass. 

196,  1179 

V.    City  of   Salem.   14   Or.   328, 

89.  116.  936,  1594 
V.  Colvin.  78  111.  237,  591.  845.  1697 
V.    Mavor   &c..   33   N.   Y.    S.    71.    793 

S'lerley  v.   City  of  Louisville,  21   Ky. 

L.    945,     '  1543 

Sherlock  v.   Ailing,   93   U.   S.   99,      1333 


TABLE   Oli'    CASES. 


clxxi 


[References  are  to  Pages.    Vol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-lS30.'\ 


Sherlock  v.  Kansas  City  &c.  Co.,  142 

Mo.  172,  1697 

Sherman  v.  Board  &c.,  84  Mich.  108, 

1G46 

V.    Buicli,    32    Cal.    241,  G87 

V.  Carr,  8   R.  I.  4.31,  663.  667 

V.   Milwaukee  &c.  R.  Co.,   40  Wi.s. 

645.  682 

V.    Peterson.  91    Mich.   480,  1.^>C.8 

V.    Torrey.   99    Mass.    472,  362 

Sherman    Co.    v.    Simons.    109   U.    S. 

735.     13.  998.  1003,  1009.  1011,  1024 
Sherry   v.    Gilmore.    58    Wis.    324,  49 

Sherwin   v.    Biigbee,    16   Vt.   439, 

86,  87.  343,  349,  355,  1475 

V.   Bugbee,   17  Vt.   337. 

344.    353.    1485 
Sherwood  v.  City  of  Lafayette.   109 

Ind.    411.  693.    1571 

V.   St.  Paul  &c.  R.  Co.,  21   Minn. 

127,  1571 

Shields  v.   Chase,   32   La.   An.   409,    1528 

V.   McGregor,   91    :Mo.   534,  155 

V.  Ohio.  95  U.  S.  319,  510 

V.    Town   of   Durham,    118    N.    C. 

450,  805.   1784 

Shietart  v.  City  of  Detroit,  108  Mich. 

309.  1316 

Shiflett    V.    City   of   Cedartown.    Ill 

Ga.    834.  1801 

Shilas  V.  dinger,  50  Iowa  571.  1387 

Shiloh   St.,   In   re,   165   Pa.   St.   386,   1152 
Shimmons   v.    City   of   Saginaw,    104 

Mich.    511.  1705 

Shinbone    v.    Randoph    Co.,    56    Ala. 

183.  1527.    1528 

Shinners  v.  Proprietors  &c.,  154  Mass. 

168,  1627 

Shipley    v.    Baltimore   &c.    R.    Co..    34 

Md.   336,  704,   705 

V.   Hackeney,   34  Or.  303,     931,  953 

V.    Mechanics'    Bank,    10   Johns. 

484.  1674 

Shipman   v.    State,   42   Wis.   377,  233 

Shippy  V.  Mason,  90  Mich.  45,  949 

V.    Village  of  Au   Sable,   65   Mich. 

494,  1586 

Shirk   V.    Pulaski   Co.,   4   Dill.   209. 

941,   944 
Shock  V.   City  of   St.    Louis,   85    111. 

377.  1111 

Shoemaker  v.  LTnited  States,  147  U. 

S.    282,  1302 

Sholl  V.  German  Coal  Co.,  118  111. 

427,  685 

Shontz   V.    Evans,   40   Iowa   139.        1540 
Shook   V.   City   of  Cohoes,    108   N.    Y. 

648,  1608,    1631 

Short  V.  Symmes,  150  Mass.  298.  198 

Shorter  v.   Mayor  &c..   52  Ga.   621,   1001 
Shrader,    Ex   parte,    33    Cal.    279. 

1079.    1081 
Shreve  v.   Town   of  Cicero,   129    111. 

226,  1174,  1261 

Shriver  v.  Pittsburg,  66  Pa.   St.   446. 

1500.  1508 
Shuck    V.    City    of    Lebanon,    21    Ky. 

L.    969.  1554,    1784 

Shue    V.    Highway    Com'rs.    41    Mich. 

638,  697 

Shuetze   v.    Bailey,    40   Mo.    69,  217 

Shulz    V.    City    of    Albany.    59    X.    Y. 

S.    235,  1281.    1732 

Shuman  v.   City  of  Fort  Wayne.   127 

Ind.  109,  603,  604 

Shumway  v.  City  of  Burlington,  108 

Iowa    424,  1798.    1802 

Sias    V.    Village    of    Reed    City,    103 

Mich.    312.  1328,    1803 

Sibbald   v.    Buckell.   36   Atl.    1032,        157 
Sibley  v.  City  of  Mobile,  3  Woods  535. 

1523,    1528 
Sidener  v.  Essex,  22  Ind.  201,  701 


Sides  V.   Portsmouth.   59  N.  IT.  24,  1608 
Sidner    v.    Alexander,    31    Ohio    St. 

378,  .323 

Siefert  v.  City  of  Brooklyn,  101  N.  Y. 

136,  1180 

Sievers  v.  City  of  San  Francisco,  115 

Cal.    648,  788,    792 

Sights  V.  Yarnalls,  12   Gratt.  292,     1507 
Sikes  V.  Hatfield,  13  Gray  347,  281 

V.  Town  of  Manchester,  59  Iowa 

65,  1615 

Sill  V.   Village  of  Corning,   15  N.   Y. 

297,  440 

Silliman    v.    Fredericksburg    &c.    R. 

Co.,  27  Gratt.  119,  217 

Silsbee  v.  Stockle,  44  Mich.  561,  1536 

Silver  v.   Cummings,   7   Wend.   181,      193 

V.  People,  45  111.  224,  1G80 

Silver  Lake  Bank  v.  North,  4  Johns. 

Ch.  370.  239,  649 

Silvey  v.  Boyle,  20  Utah  205,  201 

Simar  v.   Canaday,   53   N.   Y.   298,       693 
Simis  V.   Brookfleld,   34   N.   Y.    S.   695. 

1370 
Simmer  v.  St.  Paul,  23  Minn.  408,  8 
Simmerman  v.  Borough  of  Wildwood, 

60  N.  J.   L.  367,  477 

Simmes  v.   Chicot  Co.,  50  Ark.  566,  944 
Simmons  v.  City  of  Camden,  26  Ark. 

276.  680 

V.  City  of  Toledo,  5  Ohio  C.  C. 

124,  654 

V.    State,    12   Mo.    268,  1508 

Simms  v.  City  of  Paris,  8  Ky.  L.  344, 

1516 

V.    Kern,   92   Pa.    St.   455,  1124 

Simon   v.    Northrup,   27   Or.    487, 

1147,  1315 
Simonds  v.  Heard,  23  Pick.  120,         216 

v.  Parker,  1  Met.  508.  1740 

Simons  v.   City  of  Camden,  29  Ark. 

276,  1776 

Sims  V.  Board  &c.,  39  Ind.  40,  1095 

V.  City  of  Frankfort,  79  Ind.  446. 

585,   1322 

V.   Hines,   121   Ind.   534,  707 

Singer  Mfg.   Co.   v.   City  of   Elizabeth, 

42  N.  J.  L.  249.  1017 

Single  V.  Marathon  Co..  38  Wis.  364.  994 
Sinnatt  v.  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.,  81  Wis. 

95,  589 

Sinnett  v.  Moles,  38  Iowa  25,  556 

Sinton    v.    Asbury,    41    Cal.    525, 

1317,  1522 
Sioux  City  &c.   Co.   v.   Trust  Co.  &c., 

27  C.  C.  A.  73,  1758 

Sioux  City  R.  Co.  v.   Sioux  City.  138 

U.   S.  98,  104,  510 

Sipe  V.   Murphy,   49   Ohio   St.    536,    1398 
Skaggs   V.    City    of    Martinsville,    140 

Ind.    476.  501 

Skaneateles  W.  W.  Co.  v.   Village  of 

Skaneateles,  161  N.  Y.  154. 

1349,  1814 
Skillman  v.  Board  &c.,  64  N.  J.  L. 

489,  1765 

Skinker  v.  Herman,  2  Mo.  App.  Repr. 

1095.  502.  1293,  1701 

Slack  V.  Blackburn.  64  Iowa  373.         988 

V.    Maysville   &c.    R.    Co.,    13    B. 

Mon.  1,  983 

V.  Town  of  Norwich,  32  Vt.  818. 

1726 
Slater  v.  Wood,  9  Bosw.  15,  189,  191 
Slatten  v.  Dps  Moines  &c.  R.  Co.,  29 

Iowa  148,  1108 

Slattery,    Ex    parte,    3    Ark.    484. 

1411,  1415 
Slaughter  v.  Commonwealth.  13  Gratt. 

767.  137.  1508,   1521 

V.    Mobile   Co..    73    Ala.    134.  412 

V.   O'Berrv,   126  N.  C.   1S1.  517.   612 

V.    People,    2    Doug.    334,   497,    1414 


clxxii 


TAELE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Vol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol.  II,  pp.  83S-1830.-\ 


Slaughterhouse  Cases,  16  Wall.  36,  1403 
Slee  V.  Bloom.  5  Johns.  Ch.  366,  167 
Sleeper  v.   P.uUen,  6  Kan.  300.  1723 

V.  Sandown.  52  N.  H.  244,  1640 

Sleight   V.    People.    74    111.    47,  1538 

Slessman  v.  Crozier,  80  Ind.  487,  532 
Slevin  v.  Board  &c.,  123  Cal.  130,  1(65 
Slingerland  v.   International  Cent.  Co.,_ 

43   App.   Div.   215.  1<'3 

Sloan  V.  Beebe.  24  Kan.  343.  „„1234 

V.  State,  8  Blackf.  361,     75,  76,  103 
Slocomb  V.  City  of  Fayetteville,  125 

N.  C.  362,  1506 

Small   V.    Inhabitants  &c.,   51   Maine 

359,  459.    (56 

V.  Orme,  79  Maine  78,  160,  298 

V.  Town  of  Prentice,  102  Wis. 
256,  930,   1799 

Smally  v.  City  of  Appleton,  75  Wis. 

18^  1587,   lb2J 

Smathers  v.    Commissioners,   125   N. 

C.  480,  986 

Smead  v.  Indianapolis  &c.  R.  Co.,  11 

Ind.  104.  251 

Smedley  v.  Irwin.  51   Pa.  St.  445,       685 

V.  Kirbv.  120  Mich.  253,  192 

Smeltzer  v.  "White.  92  U.   S.  390.         959 

Smiley  v.  MacDonald.  42  Neb.  5.  740 

Smith,  Ex  parte.  38  Cal.  702,  1079,  1399 

Smith,   In  re,  99  N.  Y.  424,     1158,   1234 

V.  Aston.  Freem.  Ch.  308,  1014 

V.  Bangs,  15  111.  399,  401 

V.  Birmingham  W.  Co.,  104  Ala. 

315,  1708 

V.  Board  &e.,  45  Fed.  725, 

86,  93,  94,  153,  156,  343,  368 
V.  Board  &c.,  46  Fed.  340,  774 

V.  Board  &c.,  .59  111.  412,  318 

V.  Board  &c..  148  N.  Y.   187,        1829 
V.   Bradley,  20  N.   H.   117,  1569 

V.  Chicago,  38  Fed.  388.  1604 

V.    City    of   Appleton,    19    Wis. 
468,  1531 

V.  City  of  Boston.  7  Cush.  254.  1575 
V.  City  of  Brooklyn,  46  N.  Y.  S. 
141,  1370 

V.   City  of  -Buffalo,  35  N.  Y.   S. 
635,  1160 

V.    City    of    Buffalo,    159    N.    Y. 
497  1244.  1298,  1311 

T.  City  of  Buffalo.  1  Sheld.  493,  1133 
V.  City  of  Chicago.  169  111.  257.  1147 
V.  City  of  Des  Moines,  106  Iowa 
590,  1260.  1301 

V.    City    of    Detroit,    120    Mich. 
572,  1287 

v.   City  of  Eau  Claire,   78  Wis. 
457,  1222 

V.    City    of   Jackson,    106   Mich. 
136.  1329 

V.   City  of  Louisville,   9   Ky.   L. 
779,  1397 

V.  City  of  Madison,  7  Ind.  86. 

88,   112 
V.   City  of  Milwaukee,   18   Wis. 
69,  1255 

V.  'city  of  Newburgh,   77  N.   Y. 
130,     '  257,  200.  644,  894 

V.    City    of   Newcastle,    178    Pa. 
St.  298.  1330 

V.  City  of  Omaha,  49  Neb.  883, 

1300,   1774 
V.  City  of  Philadelphia.  13  Phila. 
177.  662 

V.   City  of  Rochester,   76   N.   Y. 
506,  797.  815.  819.  1097.  1768 

V    City  of  Rochester.   92   N.   Y. 
463,  676 

V.    City    of   St.    Joseph,    45    Mo. 
449,  I'OO 

V.  City  of  San  Antonio.  17  Tex. 
643  1414.  1420 

V.  City  of  Sedalia.  152  Mo.  283.  1708 


Smith  V.  City  of  Spokane,  16  Wash. 

403,  1328 

City   of   Syracuse,    44    N.    Y.    S. 
852,  749,   750 

V.   City  of  Toledo,   24  Ohio   ?t. 
126,  1255 

V.   City  of  Vicksburg,   54   Miss. 
615,  1503 

V.  City  of  Waterbury,  54  Conn. 
174,  182 

V.  City  of  Wilmington,  98  N.  C. 
343.  370,  371 

V.  Clark  Co.,  54  Mo.  58, 

986,  995,  1001,  1016 
V.  Cofran,  34  Cal.  310,  1533 

V.  Commissioners,  21  Kan.  669,  1035 
V.  Commonwealth,  41  Pa.   St. 
335,  175 

V.  Commonwealth.  25  Graft.  780,  317 
V.   Corporation  of  Aberdeen.   25 
Miss.   209,  1270 

V.  Corporation  &c.  of  Wash- 
ington. 20  How.  135.  801,  824 
V.  Cosgrove.  44  Atl.  73,  165 
V.  Cronkhite.  8  Ind.  134,  313 
V.  Crutcher,  92  Ky.  586,  368 
V.  Davis.  30  Cal.  536,  1533 
V.  Dedham.  144  Mass.  177,  896 
V.  Directors  &c..  40  Iowa  518,  1494 
V.  Engle,  44  Iowa  265.  1201 
V.  Epping.  69  N.  H.  558,  977,  997 
V.  Farrelly.  52  Cal.  77,  1552 
V.  Ferris,  6  Hun  553,  1571 
V.  Gould,  61  Wis.  31.  212,  1216,  1218 
V.  Green,  109  Cal.  228,  1814 
V.  Holmes.  54  Mich.  104,  226 
V.  Hubbard.  1  Pickle  306,  1172 
V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  27  Maine 
145.  1725 
V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  144  Mass. 
177,  848,  877 
V.  Jefferson  Co.,  10  Colo.  17,  1472 
V.  Kernochen,  7  How.  198.  108 
V.  Kockersperger,  180  111.  527, 

1285,  1711 
V.   Law.  21  N.  Y.  296,  274 

V.  Magourich.  44  Ga.  163,  651 

V.  Marston,  5  Tex.  426,  536 

V.  Mayor  &c.,  13  Cal.  531. 

181,  663,  664 
V.    Mavor  &c.,    81    Mich.    123. 

387,  1518,  1654,  1655 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  40  N.  J.  L.  186,  181 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  10  N.  Y.  504.  253 

V.  Mayor  &c.,  42  N.  Y.  S.  522,  719 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  45  N.  Y.  S.  239.  793 
V.  Mavor  &c.,  4  Lea  69,  664,  668 
V.  McCarthy.  56  Pa.  St.  359, 

58,  61.  82.  83,  384,  1517 
V.  McDowell,  148  111.  51,  1703 

V.  Milwaukee  &c.  Exch.,  91  Wis. 
360.  596 

V.  Minto,  30  Or.  351.  1286 

V.  Morse.  2  Cal.  524.  282.  547,  1539 
V.  Nashville,  88  Tenn.  464.  572 

V.  New  York,  37  N.  Y.  518,  183 

V.  People.  154  111.  58.  53 

V.  Proctor,  6  N.  Y.  S.  212,  1486 

V.  Proctor.  130  N.  Y.  319,  989 

V.  Proprietors  &c..  8  Pick.  178.  1806 
V.  School  District,  69  Mich.  589, 

852,  1491 
V.  Schroeder,  15  Minn.  33.  1725 

V  Sherrv.  50  Wis.  210.  1516,  1518 
V.  Simmons,  103  Pa.  St.  32,  1182 
v    Smith.    3    Dessaus.    557.  445 

V.  Stapler.  53  Ga.  300.  333 

V.  State,  23  N.  J.  L.  712.  1105.  1106 
V.  Syracuse  Imp.  Co.,  101  N.  Y. 
484  750,  1136 

V.  Tobener.  32  Mo.  App.  601.       471 
V.   Town  of  Westerly,   19  R.    I. 
437  1809 


TABLK    OF    CASES. 


clxxiii 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Vol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.] 


Smith  V.  Village  of  Adrian,  1  Mich. 

495.  'JO,  103 

V.  Wcldon,  73  Ind.  454,  696 

V.  Wildes,  143  Mass.  556,  1G39 

V.  Wright,  24  Barb.  170,  222 

V.  Wright,  27  Barb.  621,  1591 

V.  Zaner,  4  Ala.  99.  134 

Smoot  V.  Mavor  &c-.,  24  Ala.  112,  85 

Smout  V.   Ilberv,  10  M.  &  W.  1,  217 

Smyrk  v.  Sharp,  82  Md.  97,  524 

Smyth  V.  City  of  Baugor,  72  Maine 

249,  1336 

V.  Titcomb,  31  Maine  272,  58 

Snedicor  v.  Davis,   17  Ala.  472,  226 

Sneeson  v.   Kiipfer,  21   K.   I.   560,        1340 

Snell    V.    Bridgewater    &c.    Co.,    24 

Pick.  296,  106 

V.   Corporation  &c.,  30  U.  C.  Q. 

B.  81,  1403 

Snelling  v,  Joffrion,  42  La.  An.  886, 

636,  835 

Snipes  v.  City  of  Winston,  126  N.  C. 

374,  730 

Snodgrass  v.  Morris.   123  Ind.  425,  1487 

Snow  V.   Inhabitants  &c.,  109  Mass. 

123,  680 

Snyder  v.  City  of  Albion,  113  Mich. 

275,  930 

V.  City  of  Lexington,  20  Ky.  L. 
1562,  785,  1373 

V.  City  of  Mt.  Pulaski,  176  111. 
397.  1105,  1316,  1758 

V.   City   of  North   Lawrence,   8 
Kan.  82,  517 

V.  Foster,  77  Iowa  638,  633,  652 
V.  Kantner.  190  Pa.  St.  440,  1708 
V.    Plass.   28   N.   Y.   465,  1570~ 

V.  President  &c..  6  Ind.  237.  1776 
V.   Trumpbour,   38   N.   Y.   355,     1570 

Snyder  Tp.  v.  Bovaird,   122  Pa.  St. 

442,  623,  966 

Society  &c.   v.   City  of  London,   29 

Conn.  174,  983.  986 

V.  Pawlet.  4  Peters  480.  51,  64,  84 
V.  Vandyke.  2  Whart.  309,  206 

Society  of  Bethany  v.    Sperry,   10 

Conn.   200,  340,   343 

Society  Perun  v.  Cleveland,  43  Ohio 

St.  481.  1029 

Soens  V.  City  of  Racine,  10  Wis.  270, 

548,  558 

Solomon  v.  City  of  Kingston,  24  Hun 

562,  800 

Solon  V.  Williamsburg  Sav.  Bank,  35 

Ilun  1,  987,  988 

Somerset  Co.  v.  Parson,  105  Pa.  St. 

360,  295 

Sonoma  Co.  Tax  Case,  13  Fed.  789, 

1550,  1.552 

Soon  Hing  v.  Crowley,  113  U.  S.  703,  492 

Soper  V.  Henry  Co..  26  Iowa  264,  14,  776 
V.   Inhabitants  &c.,   28   Maine 

193,  346,  364,  1485 

V.   State,  48  Kan.  540,  902 

Soule  V.  City  of  Passaic,  47  N.  J.  En. 

28,  1216 

V.   Thelander.  31   Minn.   227.        14S3 

South  V.  Maryland.   18  How.  396,       329 

Southard  v.   Inhabitants,  53  Maine 

389.  341,  358 

South  Carolina  v.  Georgia,  93  U.  S. 

4,  1576 

South  Covington  &c.   R.   Co.  v.   Ber- 
ry. 13  Ky.  L.  943.  596 

Southerland  v.  Board  &c.,  96  N.  C. 

49.  370,  374 

Southern    Bell    Tel.    &c.    Co.    v.    City 

of  Richmond.   98   Fed.   671.  525 

Southern  Electric  &c.  Co.  v.  City  of 

Philadelphia.  191  Pa.  St.  170.     1548 

Southern    Pac.    R.    Co.   v.   Reed,   41 

Cal.   256,  682 


Southern   Pav.   Co.   v.   City  of  Chat- 
tanooga, 48  S.  W.  92,  726 

Southern   Plank  R.   Co.   v.   Hlxon,   5 

Ind.  165,  207,  296 

Southern    R.    Co.    v.    Atlanta    R.    &c. 

Co.,  Ill  Ga.  679,  1710 

v.  City  of  Jackson.  33  Miss.  334,    1247 

South   Hampton  v.   Hampton  Falls, 

11  N.   II.  134,  1048 

South   Ottawa   v.   Perkins,   94   U.   S. 

429,  210 

South  Park  Comrs.  v.  Chicago  &c.  R. 
Co.,  107  111.  105,  1249,  1250,  1251 

South  Platte  Land  Co.  v.  Buffalo  Co., 

15   Neb.   605,  393 

V.  City  of  Crete,  11  Neb.  344,     1717 

Southport  V.  Ogden,  23  Conn.   128, 

97,  408,  494,  523 

South   School   Dist.   v.   Blakeslee,   13 

Conn.  227,  344.  350.  362.  1422.  1485 

Southwell    V.    City    of    Detroit,    105 

Mich.  514.  1336 

Sower  V.   City   of  Philadelphia,   35 

Pa.  St.  231,  464 

Sowles  V.   Village  of  St.   Albans.   71 

Vt.  418,  1273.  1274,  1293 

Spalding  v.  Kelly,  66  Mich.  693.  420 

Spangler   v.    City   &c.    of   San    Fran- 
cisco, 84  Cal.  12,  1180 
V.  Jacoby,  14  111.  297.            299,  1421 

Spann  v.  Board.  &c..  64  Ga.  498,         895 

Sparhawk  v.  Union  R.  Co.,  54  Pa.  St. 

501.  1104 

Sparks  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Town  of  Newton, 

45  Atl.  596.  610 

Sparland  v.  Barnes.  98  111.  595,  1528 

Sparrow  v.   F>ansville  &c.  R.  Co.,  7 

Ind.    369.  994 

Spaulding  v.  Andover,  54  N.  H.  38,     757 
V.  Arnold,  125  N.  Y.  194,     925,  1678 
V.   Chicago  &c.   R.   Co.,   30   Wis. 
110.  1109 

V.   City  of  Lowell.   23   Pick.   71, 

210.  23.3,  251.  647,  666,  867,  1402 
V.    City    of    Saginaw,    84    Mich. 
134.  289 

V.  City  of  Waverly,  44  N.  Y.  S. 
112.  930 

V.   Inhabitants  &c.,   153  Mass. 
129.  640 

V.  Milwaukee  &c.  R.  Co.,  57  Wis. 
304.  708 

V.    North    San    Francisco    &c. 
Assn.,  87  Cal.  40.  1137,  1194 

V.  Wesson.  115  Cal.  441,     1151,  1291 

Speaker  v.  Glass.  L.  R.  3  P.  C.  560,     205 

Spearbracker  v.  Town  of  Larrabee.  64 

Wis.  573.  1618.   1622.   1631 

Specht  V.   City  of  Detroit,   20  Mich. 

168.  628 

Speedling   v.    Worth   Co.,    68    Iowa 

152.  1068 

Speer  v.  Board  &c.,  60  U.  S.  App.  38, 
32  C.  C.  A.  101,  88  Fed.  749. 

66.  69,  70.  547.  951,  952,  1757 
v.  Mayor  &c..  85  Ga.  49.  1253 

Speight  V.  People,  87   111.  600,  845 

Speir  V.  Brooklyn.  19  N.  Y.  S.  665.     1111 
V.  City  of  Brooklyn,  18  N.  Y.  S. 
170.  807 

V.  City  of  New  Utrecht.  121  N. 
Y.  420.  1374.  1567 

Spellman  v.  City  of  New  Orleans,  45 

Fed.  3.  1399 

V.    Inhabitants  &c.,    131    Mass. 
443.  1623 

Spelman  v.  City  of  Portage,  41  Wis. 

144.  1218 

Spencer  v.  Andrew,  82  Iowa  14.  1368 
V.  Merchant.  100  N.  Y.  585.  1242 
V.  Merchant,  125  U.  S.  345. 

559,  1238.  1239.  1242.  1252.  1302 
V.  Perry,  17  Maine  413,       335 


clxxiv 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Yol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.'] 


Spencer  v.  Pierce,  5  R.  I.  63.  1020 

V.  Sully  Co.,  4  Dak.  474,  939 

Spengler  v. "Trowbridge,  02  Miss.  46,    611 

Spicer   v.   Board   &c.,    120    Ind.    369, 

1578,  1579 
V.  Hoop,  51  Ind.  365,  056 

Spidell  V.  Johnson,  128  Ind.  235,         947 

Spiller  V.   Inhabitants  &c.,   12  Allen 

127,  1495 

Spilman'  v.  City  of  Parkersburg,  35 
W.  Va.  605, 

877,  879,  880,  881,  893,  1394 

Spltzer  V.   Village  of  Blanchard,   82 

Mich.  234,  034 

Spitznogle  v.  Ward,  64  Ind.  30,  221 

Spooner    v.    Inhabitants    &c.,    139 

Mass.  235,  _         1624 

Sprague  v.   Brown.  40  Wis.  612,  150 

V.  City  of  Rochester,  34  N.  Y.  S. 
1126  1335 

V.  City  of  Rochester,  64  N.  Y.  S. 
846,  1'797 

V.  City  of  Rochester,  159  N.  Y. 
oQ  1361 

V.  'Coenen,  30  Wis.  209,  564 

V.  Norway.  31  Cal.  173,  152 

Sprigg    y.     Garrett     Park,     89     Md. 

406,  1406 

Spring  y.  Inhabitants  &c.,  137  Mass. 

554,  823 

Springer  v.  City  of  Chicago,  135  HI. 

552,  1-11'  1602 

y.  City  of  Chicago,  159  111.  515,  1290 
V.  City  of  Philadelphia,  12  Atl. 
490  1605 

y.  Clay  Co.,  35  Iowa  241,  959 

Springfield"  V.  La  Claire.  49  111.  476,    1618 
y    Walker,  42  Ohio  St.  543,  662 

Springfield  &c.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Village  of 
Keeseyille,  148  N.  Y.  46, 

785,  786,  790 
V.  Village  of  Keeseyille,  29  N.  Y. 
S.    1130,  780 

Springfield  R.  Co.  v.  City  of  Spring- 
field. 85  Mo.  676,  1574 

Spring   Valley    Coal    Co.    y.    City    of 

Spring  Valley.  65  111.  App.  571,     800 
y.   People,  157   111.   543.  1548 

Spring  Valley  Water-works  y.  City  of 
San  Francisco,  82  Cal.  286. 

1460.   1461 
V.    San   Mateo   Water-works.    64 
Cal.  123,  685,   1448 

V.  Schottler,  110  U.  S.  347,       6,  104 
V.  Schottler,  62  Cal.  69, 

106,  109,  1689 

Springwells  Tp.  y.  Wayne  Co.  Treas- 
urer, 58  Mich.  240,  409 
Sproul  y.   City  of  Seattle,   17  Wash. 

256,  793,  796 

Sprowl  y.  Lawrence,  33  Ala.  674,  313 
Spurrier  v.  Wirtner,  48  Iowa  486,  708 
Squire  y.  Preston.  31  N.  Y.  S.  174,  716 
Stack,  In  re,  50  Hun  385,  1220 

y.    City    of    East    St.    Louis,    85 
111.  377,  588 

Stackhouse  y.  City  of  Lafayette,  26 

Ind.    17,  1179,    1180 

y.  Clark.  52  N.  J.  L.  291.  355,  356 
Stackpole  v.  Ilealy,  16  Mass.  33,  1570 
Stadler  y.  City  of  Detroit,  13  Mich. 

346.  200,   212 

V.  Fahey,  87  111.  App.  411,     514.  518 
V.   Roth",  59  Mo.  400.  1427 

Stafford    v.    City   of   Oskaloosa,    57 

Iowa  748.  1598 

y.   City  of  Oskaloosa,   64   Iowa 
251,  1609 

y.  Mayor  &c.,  7  .Tohns.  541,  701 

Stnhlhut  V.  Bauer,  51   Neb.   64,  209 

Staldter  y.  City  of  Huntington,  153 

Ind.  354,  745 


Staley    v.    Mayor   &c.,    50    N.    Y.    S. 

237,  1343 

Stalleup  y.  City  of  Tacoma.  13  Fed. 

337.  1032 
Stamford   Water  Co.   y.    Stanley,   39 

Hun  424,  688 

Stamp  V.  Cass  Co.,  47  Mich.  330,  670 
Stamper  y.  Temple,  6  Humph.  113,  671 
Standart  y.  Burtis,  46  Ilun  82.  212 

Standish    y.    Washburn,    21    I'ick. 

237,  1618 

Stanford   y.   City  of   San   Francisco, 

111  Cal.  198,  1369 

Stanhart  y.  Sitley,  19  Atl.  464,  1415 

Stanley   y.    City   of   Davenport,    54 

Iowa  463.  591,  1612 

y.  McGeorge,  17  Wash.  8.  874 

Stanton  v.  Camp,  4  Barb.  274,  262 

y.  City  of  Chicago,  154  111.  23,  1145 
y.    City   of   Salem,   145   Mass. 
476,  1605 

y.  City  of  Springfield.  12  Allen 
566,  1586,  1606,  1612 

Staples  y.  Town  of  Canton,   69  Mo. 

592,  1580 

Stapleton   y.    City   of   Newburgh,    41 

N.   Y.   S.  96,  1315,   1343 

Starbird  y.  Inhabitants  &c.,  51  Maine 

101,  841 

Starbuck  y.  Murray,  5  Wend.  148,  692 
Starin  v.  Town  of  Genoa,  23  N.   Y. 

439,  635,  982 

Stark  y.  Lancaster,  57  N.  H.  88,  1596 
Starkey   y.    City   of   Minneapolis,    19 

Minn.  203.  260 

Starr  y.  City  of  Burlington,  45  Iowa 

87,  466,  1255 

y.  Trustees,  6  Wend.  564,    1418,  1724 
Starwin  v.  Genoa.  23  N.  Y.  439,  1010 

State  y.  Adams.  65  Ind.  393,  1694 

y.  Adams,  58  Vt.  694.  357 

V.  Addison,  2  S.  C.  499.  1545 

y.  Alexander,  107  Iowa  177,  206,  297 
y.  Allen,   21   Ind.  516,  206 

V.  Allen,  23  Neb.  451,  905 

V.  Allen,  7  Jones  L.  564,  333 

V.  Allen,  2  McCord  55,  1048 

V.  Ailing,  12  Ohio  16,  171 

V.  Alter.  5  Ohio  C.  C.  253,  163 

'     V.  Anderson,  26  Fla.  240,  1691 

y.  Anderson,  44  Ohio  St.  247, 

113,  120 
V.  Anderson  Co.,  8  Baxt.  249,  1528 
y.  Andrews,   11   Neb.  523.  1400 

V.  Andrews.  15  R.  I.  394,  154 

y.  Apgar.  3l  N.  J.  L.  358,  1724 

y.  Appleby.  25  S.  C.  100,  933,  1664 
y.  Applegate,  49  N.  J.  L.  376,  950 
y.  Armstrong,  30  Neb.  493,  417 

y.    Assessors    &c.,    43    N.    J.    L. 

338,  1522 
y.  Assessors  &c.,  51  N.  J.  L. 
279.  1540,  1663 
y.  Atkins.  35  Ga.  315,  17 
V.  Atkinson.  65  N.  J.  L.  171,  1686 
V.  Atlantic  City.  49  N.  J.  L.  558. 

645.  848,  877.  880.  881,  897,  1449 
V.  Bahcock,  19  Neb.  230,  1536 

y.  Babcock,  20  Neb.  522,  1255 

y.  Babcock,  21  Neb.  599,  985 

y.  Babcock.  22  Neb.  278.  973 

V.  Babcock,  23  Neb.   179,  981 

V.  Babcock,  25  Neb.  709,  59,  61,  83 
y.  Bacon,  31   S.  C.  120.  950 

y.  Bader,  56  Ohio  St.  718.  1698 

y.  Baker.  43  La.  An.  1168,  1404 

V.  Baker.  44  La.  An.  79,  537.  1419 
V.  Baker.  38  Wis.  71,  .369,  370 

y.  Baldwin.  45  Conn.  134.  524 

y.  Baltimore  &c.  R.  Co.,  12  Gill 
&  J.  399,  763 

y.  Bank,  45  Mo.  528,  217 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


clxxv 


[References  are  to  Pages.    Vol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.'i 


State  V.  Barbour,  5.*$  Conn.  76, 

1.-)!).  l(i(),  162,  301,  302 
V.  r.ardou,  lo:?  Wis.  297,  931 
V.  Barnes,  22  Fla.  8,  921 

V.  Baruet.  46  N.  J.  L.  62,  464 
V.  Barllett,  30  Miss.  624,  311,  312 
V.  Bartlett,  35  Wis.  287,  536 
V.  Bateman,  96  N.  C.  5,  1491 
V.  Baxter.  50  Arlj.  447,  614 
v.  Bavs.  31  Neb.  514,  1654 
V.  Beacbam,  125  N.  C.  652,  550 
V.  B.ean.  91  N.  C.  554,  1403 
V.  Beattie.  3  6  Mo.  App.  131,  607 
V.  Beeman,  35  Maine  242,  346,  362 
V.  B.eirce.  27  Conn.  319,  538 
V.  Bell,  34  Obio  St.  194. 

282,  547,  1132 
V.  Bennett,  22  Neb.  470,  1434 
V.  Bentley,  23  N.  J.  L.  532, 

1501,  1724 
V.  Benton,  29  Neb.  460,  1489,  1490 
V.  Berdetta,  73  Ind.  185, 

585,  1313,  1322 
V.  Bergman,  6  Or.  341,  607 
T.  P.erkelev.  140  Mo.  184,  186 
V.  P.errv,  12  Iowa  58,  106,  695 
V.  Berrv,  14  Obio  St.  315,  380 
V.  Berrv,  47  Obio  St.  232,  380,  1690 
V.  Berrv,  13  Wasb.  708,  66 
V.  P.evers,  86  N.  C.  588,  233 
V.  Bieler,  87  Ind.  320,  1676 
V.  Bilbv,  60  Kan.  130,  63 

V.  Bill."  13  Ired.  L.  373,  543 
V.  Binder,  38  Mo.  450,  112,  290,  374 
V.  Bisbop.  39  N.  J.  L.  226,  684 
V.  Blackstone,  63  Wis.  362,  988 
V.  Blair,  32  Ind.  313,  309 

V.  Blair,  76  N.  C.  78,  328 
V.  Blake,  35  N.  J.  L.  208,  645 
V.  Blake,  36  N.  J.  L.  442,  673 
V.  Blend,  121  Ind.  514,  1432,  1434 
V.  Blohm,  26  La.  An.  538,  326 
V.  Bloom,  19  Neb.  562,  1487 
V.  Bloom.  17  Wis.  521,  196 
V.  Blossom,  19  Nev.  312,  197 
V.  Bloxham,  26  Fla.  407,  173 
V.  Boal.  46  Mo.  528,  378,  379 
V.  Board  &c.,  17  Fla.  29,  381 
V.  Board  &c.,  27  Fla.  438,  1681 
V.  Board  &c.,  25  Ind.  210,  1660 
V.  Board  &c.,  45  Ind.  501,  1659 
V.  Board  &c.,  63  Ind.  497,  1659 
V.  Board  &c.,  131  Ind.  90,  1659,  1660 
V.  Board  &c.,  39  Kan.  657.  1027 
V.  Board  &c.,  41  Kan.  630,  1518 
V.  Board  &c.,  40  La.  An.  298,  924 
V.  Board  &c.,  51  La.  An.  1142,  872 
V.  Board  &e.,  27  Minn.  442. 

1139,  1198 
V.  Board  &c.,  14  Neb.  22,  1535 
V.  Board  &c..  17  Nev.  96,  1487 
V.  Board  &c.,  37  N.  J.  L.  254,  ,  667 
V.  Board  &c.,  39  N.  J.  L.  632,  1447 
V.  Board  &c.,  39  N.  J.  L.  660, 

1525,  1527 
V.  Board  &e.,  40  N.  J.  L.  302, 

1575,  1577,  1578 
V.  Board  &c.,  41  N.  J.  L.  135,  663 
V.  Board  &c.,  49  N.  J.  L.  170, 

1437,  1445 
V.  Board,  50  N.  J.  L.  457,  1689,  1693 
V.  Board  &c.,  51  N.  J.  L.  240,  1657 
V.  Board  &c.,  52  N.  J.  L.  69,  1670 
V.  Board  &c.,  53  N.  J.  L.  531,  855 
V.  Board  &c.,  54  N.  J.  L.  325, 

1091,  1092 
V.  Board  &c.,  57  N.  J.  L.  588, 

514  573 
V.  Board  &c.,  63  N.  J.  L.  55.  1711 
V.  Board  &c.,  65  N.  J.  L.  307, 

1809,  1810 
V.  Board  &c.,  8  Atl.  509,  190 
V.  Board  &e.,  27  Obio  St.  96,   1529 


State  V.  Board  &c.,  35  Ohio  St. 

368,  1478 

V.  Board  &c.,  24  Wis.  683, 

1646.  1673,  1687 
V.  Board  &c.,  61  Wis.  275,  418 

V.  Board  &c.,  63  Wis.  234,  1481 

V.  Board  &c.,  70  Wis.  485,  561 

V.  Board  &c.,  71  Wis.  321,  837 

V.  Boardman,  93  Maine  73,  1407 

V.  Boden,  51  N.  J.  L.  114,  303 

V.  Boecker.  56  Mo.  17,  199 

V.  Bolcbe,   1   S.   W.  234,  1683 

V.  Boll,  59  Mo.  321,  1119 

V.  Boneil,  42  La.  An.  1110,  526 

V.  Bonnell,  119  Ind.  494,        ,     1677 
V.  Bonner.  72  Mo.  387,  328 

V.  Borough  &c.,  52  N.  J.  L.  32,       54 
V.  Borough  of  Vineland,  60  N.  J. 
L.  264.  1153 

V.  Bradford.  32  Vt.  50,  1689 

V.  Bradley,  54  Conn.  74,       48,  1474 
V.  Branin,  23  N.  J.  L.  484,       90,  103 
107,   108,  453,   1500,   1501,  1513 
V.   Brennan's  Liquors,  25  Conn. 
278,  195 

V.  Brewer,  64  Ala.  287,  1533 

V.    Briel,   58   Minn.    152,  1299 

V.  Brigantine  Borough,  54  N.  J. 
L.  476.  856 

V.  Brinkerhoff.  66  Tex.  45,     185,  198 
V.  Brittain,  89  N.  C.  574,  494 

V.  Brittin,  52  La.  An.  94,     180,  183 
V.  Brodboll,  28  Neb.  254. 
V.  Broodbelt,  89   Md.   565, 
V.   Brossfield,   67  Mo.  331, 
V.  Brown,  11   Ired.  L.  141, 
V.  Brown,  112  Ind.  600, 
V.   Brown,  54  Md.  318. 
V.  Brown,  50  Minn.  353, 
V.    Brown,    53    N.    J.    L. 


922 
603 
638 
331 
912 
332 
1071,  1072 
162, 

1514,  1515 
V.  Browning,  28  N.  J.  L.  556,  1485 
V.  Bryce.  7  Ohio  414,  207 

V.  Burbridge,  24  Fla.  112,  371 

V.  Burdge.  95  Wis.  390,  1763 

V.  Burton,  45  Wis.  150,  1472 

V.  Button,  25  Wis.   109,  431 

V.  Butts,  31  Kan.  537,  370,  371 

V.  Buttz,  9  S.  C.   156.  198 

V.  Cainan,  94  N.  C.  880. 

507,  519,  537,  606 
V.  Campbell,  64  N.  H.  402,  601 

V.  Canal  &c.  R.  Co.,  50  La.  An. 
1189.  505 

V.  Canterbury,  28  N.  H.  195,  61,  83 
V.  Cantieny,  34  Minn.  1,  519,  530 
V.   Carleton,   1   Gill  249,  317 

V.  Carpenter,  60  Conn.  97, 

501,  538,   1419 
V.  Carr,  129  Ind.  44,  172 

V.   Carr,  5  N.   H.  367,  64 

V.  Carroll.  38  Conn.  449, 

66,  69,  195,  196,  197,  289,  1420 
V.  Cather,  22  Neb.  792,  950 

V.  Cavers,  22  Iowa  343,  381 

V.  Chamberlin,  37  N.  J.  L.  388,     519 
V.  Chamber  of  Commerce  &c.,  20 
Wis.  63.  626 

V.    Chapman,    44    Conn.    595, 

301,  302 
V.  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.,  80  Iowa 
586.  692 

V.  Churchill.  41  Mo.  41,  313 

V.    Cincinnati    Gas    &c.    Co.,    18 
Ohio  St.  262, 

516,  566,  568,  1464,  1808 
V.  Circuit  Court,  15  Atl.  272,  561 

V.   City  Council,   74  Ala.  226, 

991,  1027 
V.    City    Council,    30    N.    J.    L. 
365,  1268 

V.  City  Council  &c.,  31  N.  J.  L. 
547.  1257 


clxxvi 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Yol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.1 


State  V.  City  Council,   34  N.   J.   L. 

99,  1234 

V.  City  Council  &c.,  39  N.  J.  L. 
416,  1657 

V.  City  Council  &c.,  46  N.  J.  L. 
124,  1540 

V.  City  Council  &c.,  47  N.  J.  L. 
64.  1694 

V.  City  Council  &c.,  50  N.  J.  L. 
87,  97,  108,  119,  493 

V.  City  Council,  5  Rich.  L.  561,  1511 
V.  City  Council  &c.,  10  Rich.  L. 
240,  1537 

V.  City  Council.  12  Rich.  702.       1198 
V.  City  Council  &c.,  2  Speers  L. 
623.  1507 

V.  City  Council  &c.,  2  Speers  L. 
719,  1500,  1507 

V.  City  of  Bayonne,  35  N.  J.  L. 
335.  463,  465 

V.  City  of  Brunswick,  32  N.  J.  L. 
548,  1234 

V.  City  of  Camden,   50  N.  J.  L. 
87,  97.  108,  119,  493 

V.  City  of  Camden,  63  N.  J.  L. 
186.  612 

V.  City  of  Cape  May,  58  N.  J.  L. 
565.  1350 

V.   City   of   Cincinnati,    19   Ohio 
178.  1494 

V.    City   of  Cincinnati,   20   Ohio 
St.  18,  54,  55,  119 

V.    City  of  Columbia,   27    S.    C. 
137,  1500 

V.   City  of  Davenport,    12   Iowa 
335.  1526.  1527,  1528.  1533 

V.  City  of  Des  Moines,  96  Iowa 
521,  70 

V.  City  of  Eau  Claire,  40  Wis. 
533,  666,  688 

V.  City  of  Elizabeth,  37  N.  J.  L. 
330.  1250 

T.  City  of  Elizabeth.  37  N.  J.  L. 
432.  465,   1257 

V.  City  of  Elizabeth,  54  N.  J.  L. 
462,  592 

V.  City  of  Elizabeth,  58  N.  J.  L. 
619.  502 

V.  City  of  Emporia.  57  Kan. 
710.  1543 

V.  City  of  Great  Falls,  19  Mont. 
518,  879 

V.  City  of  Hudson,  29  N.  J.  L. 
115,  645 

V.  City  of  Jersey  City,  54  N.  J. 
L.  310.  1432 

V.   City  of  Jersey  City,   42  Atl. 
845.  754 

V.  City  of  Kansas  City,  60  Kan. 
518.  1166 

V.    City    of    Kearney,    25    Neb. 
262,  1653 

V.    City    of    Kearney,    49    Neb. 
337,  737 

V.   City  of  Milwaukee,   25   Wis. 
122,  89 

V.  City  of  Minneapolis..  32  Minn. 
501,  901 

V.  City  of  New  Albany,  127  Ind. 
221,  1667,  1675 

V.  City  of  Newark,  48  N.  J.  L. 
101,  1234,  1253 

V.  City  of  New  Orleans,  30  La. 
An.  129,  1526.  1531 

V.  City  of  New  Orleans,  34  La. 
An.  477.  1529 

V.  City  of  New  Orleans,  34  La. 
An.  1149,  1525 

V.  City  of  New  Orleans,  41  La. 
An.  91,  411,  636.   1465 

V.  City  of  New  Orleans.  50  La. 
An.  880,  617,  953,  955 


State  V.  City  of  New  Orleans,  51  La. 

An.  99,  194,  722 

V.  City  of  New  Orleans,  51  La. 
An.  699,  722 

V.    City    of    New    Whatcom,    3 
Wash.  7.  389 

V.   City  of  Orange,   54  N.   J.   L. 
Ill,  486,  1156 

V.  City  of  Orange,  13  Atl.  240,    1404 
V.   City   of   Passaic,   4   N.    J.    L. 
90,  260,  528,  1254 

V.   City  of  Passaic,  42  N.  J.   L. 
87,  535 

V.  City  of  Passaic,  B4  N.  J.  L. 
340,  1249 

V.  City  of  Passaic,  63  N.  J.  L. 
208,  732 

V.  City  of  Perth  Amboy,  38  N.  J. 
L.  425,  645,  1254 

V.  City  of  Phillipsburg,  23  Mont. 
16,  737.  1662 

V.  City  of  Plainfleld,  54  N.  J.  L. 
526.  584 

V.  City  of  Portage,  12  Wis.  562, 

558,   593,   1234 
V.    City   of   Portland,    74    Maine 
268.  831 

V.  City  of  St.  Anthony,  10  Minn. 
433.  1485 

V.    City    of    St.    Louis,    90    Mo. 
19,  20O 

V.    City  of  St.    Paul,   36  Minn. 
529.  1544 

V.   City  of  Toledo,  48  Ohio  St. 
112  1543 

V.  City  of  Topeka,  36  Kan.  76, 

541.  1415 
V.    City    of    Trenton,    35    N.    J. 
L.  485,  186,  187,  547 

V.  City  of  Waxahachie,  81  Tex. 
626.  390,  391,  398,  402 

V.  Clark,  4  Ind.  315,  1038 

V.  Clark.  42  Mo.  519,  1740 

V.  Clark,  52  N.  J.  L.  291, 

846,  1486,  1489 
V.  Clark.  73  N.  C.  255,  319 

V.  Clarke.   69  Conn.  371,  506 

V.  Clarke,  50  Mo.   17,  501 

V.  Clarke,  54  Mo.   17. 

110.  111.  112,  495.  500,  519,  1574 
V.  Clarke,  25  N.  J.  L.  54, 

111,  494,  495 
V.  Clarke,  3  Nev.  566,  185,  199 

V.  Clary.  25  Neb.  403.         1472,  1473 
V.  Clay  Co..  46  Mo.  231,  1526 

V.  Clavton.  27  Kan.  442.       199,  20O 
V.  Cleveland.  80  Mo.  108.  212 

V.   Cleveland.   3  R.   I.   117.  527 

V.  Clevenger.  27  Neb.  422.  1518 

v.  Clothier.  80  N.  J.   L.  351,        1724 
V.  Cobb.  64  Ala.  127,  1027 

v.  Cockrell.  2  Rich.  L.  6.  156 

V.  Cole  Co.  Court.  80  Mo.  80,       1055 
V.  Collins.  43  N.  J.  L.  562.  1502 

V.  Collins.  60  N.  J.  L.  367,  1504 

V.  Colvig.   15  Or.  57,  313 

V.   Commercial   Bank,   13   Sm.  & 
M.  569.  123 

V.  Commissioners.  6  Ohio  St.  280. 

1527,  1528 
V.    Commissioners  &c.,    21    Ohio 
St.   648.  663 

V.   Commissioners  &c.,   36   Ohio 
St.  526,  753 

V.   Commissioners  &c.,   37   Ohio 
St.  526,  881 

V.    Commissioners,   49   Ohio   St. 
301,  1648 

V.  Commissioners  &c.,  17  Ohio  C. 
C.  275,  1685 

V.    Commissioners  &c.,   2  N.   C. 
Law  617.  213 

V.  Commissioners,  4  Dev.  345,     214 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


clxxvii 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Vol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-lS.W.'\ 


State  V.  Commissioners,  17  Nev.  96, 

922,  923 
V.    Commissioners,    38    N.    J.    L. 
190,  1261 

V.  Commissioners  &c.,  46  N.  J. 
L.  116,  1198 

V.    Common   Council   &c.,    25   N. 
J.   L.   536,  200,    205,   626 

V.    Common    Council   &c.,    33    N. 
J.   L.    110,  340 

V.  Common  Council  &c.,  36  N.  J. 
L.  198.  106.  1106 

V.    Common   Council   &c.,   45   N. 
J.  L.  279.  592 

V.   Common  Council  &c.,   7   Wis. 
688,  837,  971,  973 

V.  Common  Council  &c.,  15  Wis. 
80,  280,  410.  1527,  1531,  1681 

V.  Common  Council  &c..  20  Wis. 
87,  1526,  1527,  1528.  1530 

V.  Common  Council  &c..  42  Wis. 
287,  694 

V.  Common  Council  &c..  90  W^is. 
612,  203,  204.  880,  875.  878,  986 

V.    Compton,    28    Neb.    485, 

627,  1473,  1484 
V.  Conlin,  27  Vt.  318,  541,  1414 

V.  Conlon.  65  Conn.  478,  504 

V.   Conover,   28  N.  J.   L.   224, 

Q90    331 

V.  Conover,  63  N.  J.  L.  191,  "  'l504 
V.  Constantine,  42  Ohio  St.  437, 

369,  376 
V.    Consumers'    Water    Co.,    51 
N.  J.  L.  420,  584,  1454 

V.  Cooper,  20  Fla.  547.  955 

V.  Copeland.  74  Minn.  371,  1684 

V.  Corner,  22  Neb.  265.  369,  370 
V.  Corning.  44  Kan.  442,  943 

V.  Cornish.  66  N.  H.  329.  1067 

V.    Corporation   of   Savannah,    1 
T.  W.  P.  Charl.  235.  497 

V.  Corporation  of  Shelbyville,  4 
Sneed  176.  831 

V.    Corrigan   &c.    St.    R.    Co.,   85 

Mo.   263.  510.   590,   1158,   1183 

V.  Council,   106  Iowa  731,  58 

V.  Council  &c.,  38  N.  J.  L.  430,  667 
V.  Council  &c..  47  N.  J.  L.  64,  153 
V.  Council,  2  Speers  L.  623.  1500 

V.    County    Board   &c.,    20    Neb. 
595,  627 

V.  County  Com'rs,  21  Fla.  1,  443 
V.  County  Com'rs,  22  Fla.  29.  1683 
V.  County  Com'rs,  23  Fla.  483.  121 
v.  County  Com'rs,  23  Kan.  264,  381 
V.  County  Com'rs,  6  Neb.  129.  695 
V.  County  Com'rs,  31  Neb.  465,  1490 
V.  County  Com'rs.  28  S.  C.  258,  i664 
V.  County  Court,  19  Ark.  360,  1502 
V.  County  Court,  34  Mo.  546,  1538 
V.  County  Court.  44  Mo.  230,  313 
V.  County  Court,  44  Mo.  504,  983 
V.  County  Court.  64  Mo.  30.  1540 
V.  County  Court,  33  W.  Va. 
589,  1651 

v.    County    Court,    47    W.    Va. 
672.  1687 

V.  County  Judge,  5  Iowa  380,  1527 
V.  County  Judge,  7  Iowa  186, 

339,  381 
V.   Court  of  Common  Pleas,  36 
N.   J.   L.   72,  84 

V.   Covington,   29   Ohio   St.   102, 

45.  150.  1433 
V.  Cowan.  29  Mo.  330.  104,  497 

V.  Cowgill  &c.  Mill  Co..  156  Mo. 
620,  463.  714,  1812 

V.  Cozzens.  42  La.  An.  1069,  1357 
V.    Cram,    84    Maine    271. 

1411,  1412,  1415 
V.  Cram,  16  Wis.  343.  424 

V.  Crane.  36  N.  J.  L.  394,     697,  1254 

1  Smith — xii 


State  V.  Crenshaw,  94  N.  C.  877,  507 

V.  Crites,  48  Ohio  St.  142,  1680 

V.  Croolts,  7  Ohio  221,  326 

V.  Crosley.  36  N.  J.  L.  425,  301 

V.  Cross,  18  S.  W.  170,  1074 

V.  Cruickshank.  71  Vt.  94,  538 

V.  Crummery,  17  Minn.  72,  496 

V.  Culver.  65  Mo.  607,  1574 

V.   Currah,   12   Ark.   321,  61.   83 

V.  Custer,  11   Ind.  210,  1472 

V.  Dahl.  65  Wis.  510.  901 

V.  Dallas  Co.  Court,  72  Mo.  329,  996 
V.  Daly,  49  N.   J.  L.  403,  955 

V.  Daly.  50  N.  J.  L.  356,       935,  954 
V.  Davidson.  50  La.  An.  1297,     1386 
V.  Davidson,  32  Wis.  114.     342,  359 
V.    Daviess    Co.    Court,    64    Mo. 
30  991 

V.  Davis,  17  Minn.  429,  1679 

V.  Davis,  44  Mo.  129,  183 

V.  Dawson,  22  Ind.  272,  1813 

V.  Dean,  23  N.  J.  L.  335,  1233 

V.  Deane,  38  Fla.  121,  1675 

V.  De  Bar.  58  Mo.  395.  110,  112 

V.  De  Gress,  53  Tex.  387,  185 

V.  Deliesseline.  1  McC.  52,  156 

V.  Denny,  118  Ind.  449, 

1075,  1432,  1433,   1532 
V.  Dering,  84  Wis.  585,  509 

V.  Deshler,  25  N.  J.  L.  177,         1475 
V.  Dillon,  125  Ind.  65,  162 

V.    District   Board   &c.,    76   Wis. 
177.  1494,  1495 

V.  District  Court  &c.,  29  Minn. 
62,  1140 

V.   District  Court  &c.,  33  Minn. 
164.  1198 

V.   District  Court  &c.,  33  Minn. 
235,  302 

V.   District  Court  &c.,  33  Minn. 
295.  1139,  1140 

V.   District  Court  &c.,  41  Minn. 
518.  480 

V.   District  Court  &c.,  47  Minn. 
406.  1287 

V.  District  Court  &c.,  66  Minn. 
161.  1310 

V.  District  Court.  68  Minn.  242.  1251 
V.  District  Court  &c.,  75  Minn. 

292,  1287.   1293,  1310 
V.   District  Court  &c.,  77  Minn. 
248,  1287 
V.  District  Court  &c.,  78  Minn. 

464.  1159 

V.   District  Court  &c..  80  Minn. 

293.  513.  1275.  1293,  1303,  1307 
V.  District  Court  &c.,  4  N.  W. 
1107,  697 
V.  District  of  Narragansett,  16 
Atl.  901.  56 
V.  Doherty,  25  La.  An.  119,  200 
V.  Doherty,  16  Wash.  382.  118,  171 
V.  Donahay,  30  N.  J.  L.  404,  348 
V.  Donovan,  89  Maine  448,  209 
V.  Douglass,  33  N.  J.  L.  363,  1503 
V.  Dousman.  28  Wis.  541.  54 
V.  Dowling.  50  Mo.  134,  1511,  1724 
V.  Downs.  60  Kan.  788.  611 
V.  Drake,  33  N.  J.  L.  194,  1238 
V.  Druly.  3  Ind.  431.  332 
V.  Duffv.  7  Nev.  342,  1494 
V.  Dulaney,  43  La.  An.  500,  508 
v.    Dunbar,   43   La.   An.  836, 

537,  1420 
v.  Dunn.  11  La.  An.  549,  326 

v.  Dunson,  71  Texas  65, 

93,   402.   407,  408,   446 
V.  Durvea,  45  N.  J.  L.  258,  1248 

v.  Dwver.  21  Minn.  512,  494 

v.  Earnhardt,  107  N.  C.  789,         606 
V.  Eastman.  109  N.  C.  785.         1556 
V.    Easton   R.   Co.,   36   N.    J.    L. 
181,  679,   1571 


clxxviii 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Vol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.-] 


1655 
1745 
1486 
1474 
1711 
1811 
425,  440 
424 


State  V.  East  Orange,  41  N.  J.  ^^^^J'^qq 

V.  Eberhai-dt,  14  Neb.  201, 
V.  Kberlv.  12  Neb.  616, 
V.  Echols.  41  Kau.   1. 
V.  Edison,  76  Tex.  302._ 
V.  Ellis,  43  La.  An.  82o._ 

V  Ellis,  52  La.  An.  lOOo, 
v'.  Elvins.  82  N.  J.  L.  .".62, 
V.  Elwood.  11  Wis.  It, 

V  Engelmann,  106  Mo.  628,  1568 
V.  Everett,  52  Mo  89,  1683 
V.  Executors  &c.,  8  La  An.  171,  563 
V.  Faber,  50  La.  An  952,  5-« 
V.  Fagan,  42  Conn.  32  297,  3^ 
V.  Falconer,  44  Ala.  696,  313 
V.  Falkenburg,  15  N.  J.  L  320,  1<24 
V.   Farr,   47   N.   J.   L.   208,  ^  ^^^_  ^^^ 

V.  Farrier,  47  N.  J.  L.  383,  197 

V.  Fenton,  29  Neb.  348,  921 
V.  Ferguson,  33  N.  H.  424     526,  581 

V  Ferluson.  31  N.  J.  L.  107,  199 
v.  Fiedler,  43  N._^J    L.  400  9.54 

V  Fillmore  Co..  32  Neb.  8(0,  1645 
V.  Findley.  10  Ohio  51, 
V.  Finlev.  74  Mo.  App.  213, 
V.  Fishblate,  83  N.  C.  654, 
V.  Fiske,  9  R.  L  94.  282,  547,  1539 
V.  Fitts.  49  Ala.  402,  200 
V.  Fitzgerald,  44  Mo.  425  1692 
V.  Fitzpatrick.  64  Mo.  185,  3^- 
V.  Flannigan,  67  Ind.  140  lira 
V.  Fleetwood.  16  Mo.  448,  538 


313 

1658 

213 


1683 


Iowa 


1526 

1522 

538 

1419 


301 

528 
549 
1694 
69 
1118 
1714 
J  694 


V.  Fletcher,  39  Mo.  3 

V.    Floyd    Co.    Judge,    5 

380 

V    Foley,  30  Minn.  350, 

V.  Follet,  6  N.  H.  53, 

V.  Folwell,  20  Atl.  1079. 

V.  Forest  Co.,  74  Wis.^610,  ^^^^  ^^^ 

V.  Forman,  50  La.  An.  1022,    506 

V.  Forney,  21  Neb.  223,  4- J 

V.  Fosdick,  21  La.  An.  434,  137 

V.  Foster.  7  N.  J.  L.  101, 

V.  Fountain.  14  Wash.  236, 

V.  Fox,  63  N.  E.  19, 

v.  Francis,  88  Mo.  557, 

V.  Francis,  95  Mo.  44, 

V.    Franklin.    40    Kan.    410, 

T.  Frazier,  48  Ga.   137. 

V.  Frazier,  28  Neb.  438. 

V.  Freeman,  88  N.  H.  426.  ^  ^^^_  ^^^ 

T.  Frost,  103  Tenn.  685.  63 

V.  Froth,  34  N.  J.  L.  377,  1106 

T.    Fuller,   96   Mo.   165,  64 

V.  Fuller,  34  N.  J.  L-Jf  >,266,  1268 

V.  Gafifney.  34  N.  J.  L.  133,         1546 

V.  Gallagher,  22  Minn.  449,  l-i 

V.   Gandv.    12    Neb.   232. 

V.   Garibaldi,  44  La.  An.  809, 

V.  Garroutte.  67  Mo.  445, 

V.  Gastinel,  20  La.  An.  114, 

V.   Gates,   43  Conn.  533, 

V.  Gates,  35  Minn.  385, 

V.  Gayhart.  34  Neb.   192. 

V  George,  23  Fla.  585,  167,  185,  186 
V.  Georgia  Medical  Society,  38 
Ga.  608,  97,  468,  494 
V.  Gilman.  33  W.  Va.  146,  137 
V.  Gisch,  31  La.  An.  544  1403 
V.  Glasgow.  N.  C.  Conf.  386,  21.3 
V.  Glavin.  67  Conn.  29.  504 
V.  Gleason.  12  Fla.  190,                  1691 

V  Glenn,  54  Md.  572,  541,  141.3 
V.  Goetze.  22  Wis.  363,  349,  368 
V.  Goff.  15  R.  L  505.  198 
V.  Goldstucker,  40  Wis.  124,  1.51 
V.  Good,  41  N.  J.  L.  296,  368 


State  V.    Goowin,  .69   Tex.||;  ^-g,  .88 

V.  Gordon,  60  Mo.  383,  496 

V.  Gorton,  33  Minn.  34.o,  1491 

V.  Gouldey,  52  N.  J.  L.  62,  163 

V.  Gouldihg,  44  N.  IL  284  o38 

V.  Gouldy,  58  N.  J.  L.  562,  527 
V.  Grace.  20  Or.  154,^.^^  ^^^^^  ^^^^ 

V.  Gracey,  11  Nev.  233,  1545 

V.  Graffmuller,  26  Mmn.  6,  o3b 

V.  Graham.   21   Neb.  329,  1490 

V.  Grammer.  29  Ind.  530,  211,  324 
V.  Graves,  19  Md.  351.,^^    ^^^^    ^^^^ 

V  Gray,  93  Ind.  303,  ^„^^i 
I:  Gray,  23  Neb.  365,  164,  296,  475 
V.  Green,  15  N.  J.  L.  88,  l»< 
v.Green,37  0hioSt^2^^^^3_^^3 

V.  Green  Co.,  54  Mo.  540,  986 

V.  Grimes.  49  Minn.  443,  526 

V  Grimes.  50  Minn.  123,  607 
V.  Grimshaw,  1   S.  W.  363.^^^^  ^^^^ 

V.  Grosvenor,  19  Neb.  494,  1491 

V.  Grubb,  85  Ind.  213  1494 

V.  Guiney.  26  Minn.  313,  295 

V.  Gumber,  37  Wis.  298,  524 
V.  Gutierrez,   15  La.  An.  190,     1413 

V.  Haben,  22  Wis.  660,  lo38 

V.  Hadley,  27  Ind.  496,  31  j. 

;:ga'M3~9N:fL.e40,  699,?fo 
V.  Hamilton,  40  Kan.  323  446 

V.  Hamilton,  69  Miss.  116.  1492 

V.  Hammer,  42  N.  J.  L.  435,  557 

V  Hammond.  40  Minn.  43, 

V  Haney.  2  Dev.  &  B.  390, 
V.  Hanna.  97  Ind.  469, 
V.  Hannibal  &c.  R-  CO;,  ^^  M*^-,^,-. 
908  623,  1520,  154o,  1547 
V.  Hansen,  20  Nev.  401,  I486 
V.  Hanson,  23  Tex.  232,  ,„„11?^ 
V.  Hardy,  7  Neb.  377  48  ^  519 
V.  Harney,  57  Miss.  863, 
V.  Harper,  42  La.  An.  312, 
V.  Harper,  6  Ohio  St.  607, 
V.  Harris.  50  Minn.  128, 
V.  Harris,  96  Mo.  29, 
V.   Harris,   19  Nev.  222, 

V  Harris,   17   Ohio   St.   608, 


960 
1403 
996 
378 
377 
380 
1673 


617 
539 
706 


312 

1399 

319 

602 

623 

1486 

1529 


V.  Harris,'  52  Vt.  216,     351,  375,  376 


274 
168,  207 

381 
435,  945 

401 

646 

217.  1737 

282,  285 

199,  200 


V.    Harrison.   67    Ind.   71, 

V.  Harrison,  113  Ind.  434, 

y.  Harrison,  38  Mo.  540, 

V.  Harshaw.  73  Wis.  211, 

V.  Ilarwi,  36  Kan.  588. 

V.  Haskell,   20  Iowa  2i6, 

V.  Hastings.  10  Wis.  518, 

V.  Hauser,  63  Ind.  155, 

V.  Hauss.  43  Ind.  105, 

V.    Hawes,    112    Ind.    323.  ^  ^^^^  ^^^ 

V.  Hayes,  7  La.  An.  118,       325,  326 
V.  Haves,  61  N.  H.  264, 
V.  Haynes,  72  Mo.  377, 

V  Haynes.  50  N.  J.  L.  97, 
V.  Hays,  50  Mo.  578, 
V.  Heath,  20  La.  An.  172, 
V.   Heidenhain,  42  La.   An.^4|3.^^^3 

V.  Heidorn.  74  Mo.  410,  485 

V  Heisev,  56  Iowa  404,  -si- 
v.-  nllfrid.  2  N.  &  McC.  233          1410 
V.  Henderson,  38  Ohio  St.  644 
V.  Herdt.  40  N.  .1.  L.  264. 
v.  Herod,  29  Iowa  12.3. 
v.  Herrmann.  <5  Mo.  340, 

V  Higgins,  76  Mo.  App.  319, 


467 

279,  576 

163,  954 

217 

663 


480 
530 

1510 
113 

1658 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


clx: 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Vol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Yol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.'\ 


State  V.  lliggs,  126  N.  C.  1014, 

509,  13G5,  1387 
V.   Ilil],  54  Ala.  67,  77H 

V.  Hill.  10  Iiid.  219,  1559 

V.  Hill,  10  Neb.  58.  381 

V.  Hill.  126  N.  C.  1139,  1387 

V.   Ilinckli'.  37  Ark.  532,  945 

V.  Hipp.  38  Ohio  St.  199,  1509 

V.  Ilobe.  lOG  Wis.  411,  1311 

V.   Iloff.  20  S.   \V.  672.  157 

V.   Ilohu,  50  La.  An.  432,  514 

V.   Hokomb.   68   Iowa   107,  1086 

V.  Ilolden,  19  Neb.  249,  403 

V.   Holmes.  43  La.  An.  1185,         172 
V.  Herd,  122  N.  C.  1092,  1388 

V.  Horn,  94  Mo.  162,  311 

V.   Home,   115   N.   C.  739,  599 

V.  Horton,  19  Nev.  199.  1486 

V.  Hotaliug,  44   N.  J.  L.  347, 

1233,  1546 
V.   Houston,   78  Ala.  576,  320 

V.   Howes.   112   Ind.   323,  863 

V.  Hoyt,  2  Or.  246.  301,  987 

V.  Hudson  Co.  Com'rs,  37  N.  J. 
L.  12.  68 

V.  Hudson  &c.  R.  Co.,  38  N.  J.  L. 
548,  637 

V.   Huggins.  47  Ind.  586,  1317 

V.   Huggins,   Harp.    L.   94,  156 

V.     Humphreys,     25     Ohio     St. 
520,  1535 

V.  Hunter,  38  Kan.  578,  1433 

V.  Hunter,  106  N.  C.  796,  503 

V.  Hurff.  38  N.  .1.  L.  310,  1485 

V.    Hutchin.s,   33   Neb.   335,  1475 

V.  Hutchinson,  60  Iowa  478,  324 

V.    Hutchinson,    39    N.    J.    Eq. 
218,  1092 

V.  Hyman,  19  Ohio  C.  C.  622,     1768 
V.   Tndependent  School  Dist.,  42 
Minn.  357.  1473 

V.     Inhabitants    &c.,    37    Maine 
451.  831.  1577, 1587 

V.   Inhabitants  &c.,  30  N.   J.   L. 
137.  1112,  1577 

V.   Inhabitants  &c.,  36  N.   J.   L. 
79,  617 

V.   Inhabitants  &c.,  36  N.   J.   L. 
499,  645,  695 

V.   Inhabitants  &c.,   38  N.   J.   L. 
95,  468 

V.    Inhabitants  &c.,  44  N.   J.   L. 
610,  532 

V.    Inhabitants  &c..  45   N.   J.   L. 
318.  275.  276.  519,  528,  529,  534,  1447 
V.    Inhabitants  &c.,  49  N.  J.   L. 
188,  1043 

V.   Inhabitants  &c.,  49   N.   J.   L. 

401,  1301 
V.    Inhabitants  &c.,  51   N.   J.   L. 
498.  496 
V.    Inhabitants  &c.,  52  N.   J.   L. 
483,                                                  194,  747 
V.    Inhabitants  &c.,  53  N.   J.   L. 
132,                                                  502,  598 
V.   Inhabitants  &c.,   54  N.  J.   L. 

^2't   u   u.  584 

V.   Inhabitants  &c.,   58   N.   J.   L. 
■    506,  465 

V.    Inhabitants  &c.,  60  N.   J.   L. 
394.  795 

V.   Inhabitants  &c.,   60  N.   J.   L. 

402,  514,  725 
V.  Ironton  Gas  Co.,  37  Ohio  St. 

45,  6,  1406 

V.  Irvin,  126  N.  C.  989.        506,  1389 
V.  Isabel,  40  La.  An.  340,  1677 

V.  Itzkovitch.  49  La.  An.  366,     1406 
V.  Jack.  90  Tenn.  614,  1074 

V.  Jackman,  69  N.  H.  318,  493 

V.    Jacksonville    St.    R.    Co.,    29 
Fla.   590.  1653 

V.  Jacobs,  17  Ohio  143,    171,  288,  429 


State  V.  Jennings,  27  Ark.  419, 

58,  90,  103 
V.  Jersey  City,  1  Dutch.  536,  207 
V.  Johnson,  100  Ind.  489,  313 

V.  Johnson,  4  Wall.  475,  •>->3 

V.  Jones,  19  Ind.  356,    349,  368,  1508 
V.   Jones,    155    Mo.    570,  1652 

V.  Jones,  18  Tex.  874,  1569 

V.  Judge  &c.,  13  Ala.  805,  378 

V.  Judge  &c.,  51  La.  An.   1768,     592 
V.  Judges,  35  Ln.  An.  1075,  204 

V.  Julian,  93  Ind.  292,  1483 

V.  Justice,  24  N.  J.  L.  413,  301 

V.  Justices  &c.,  4  Hawks  194,       213 
V.  Kantler,  33   Minn.   69, 

274,   519,    521,    1405 
V.    Ivawinagh,   24   Neb.   506.  1652 

V.   KeaTns,  47  Ohio  St.   566, 

153,  163,  170,  199,  206 
V.  Keith,  94  N.  C.  933.  497,  498 

V.  Keith  Co.,  16  Neb.  508,  981 

V.  Kempf,  69  Wis.  470, 

380,  1692,  1694 
V.    Kennedy,   69   Conn.   220,  306 

V.   Kilroy,   86   Ind.    118,  1676 

V.   King,  37   Iowa  462, 

537,   540,   1424 
V.  King,  34  Neb.  196,  1654 

V.  Kirk,  46  Conn.  395,  276    •>97 

V.  Kirk,  44  Ind.  401,  185 

V.  Kirkley.  29  Md.  85,  516,  646 

V.   Kirkwood,   15  Wash.  298,  203 

V.  Knight,  31  S.  C.  81,  1648 

V.  Knight,  82  Wis.  151,  901 

V.  Kraft,  18  Or.  550,  156,  380 

V.  Labatut,  39  La.  An.  513,    495   523 
V.    Laclede    Gas-Light    Co.,    102 
Mo.  472,  573 

V    Lafayette  Co.  Court,  41  Mo. 
221,  1649 

V.  Lambertville.  45  N.  J.  L.  282    465 
V.  Lancaster.  63  N.  H.  135,  137 

V.  Lane,  16  R.  I.  620,         1487,  1688 
V.  Lane,  21  Atl.  302,  159    170 

V.  Lanier,  31  La.  An.  423,  3'>o 

V.  Larkins,  44  S.  C.  362,  541 

V.  Larrabee.  1  Wis.  200,  403 

V.  Lashar,  71  Conn.  540,  169 

V.   Laughton,  19  Nev.  202,  313 

V.  Laverack,  34  N.  J.  L.  201,  681 

V.  Leatherman,  38  Ark.  81 

49,  58,   65 
V.  Leaver,  62  Wis.  387, 

582,  1322,  1369 
V.  Lee,  29  Minn.  445, 

^    ^  536,   541,   607,   1412 

V.    Lefflngwell,    54    Mo.    458, 

^    T  4.        ^o  .  13'  14,  54,  55 

V.  Leverton,  53  Iowa  483,  1473 

V.  Lewis,  35  N.  J.  L.  377,  846 

V.  Lingo,  26  Mo.  496.  6''6 

V.  Litus,  47  N.  J.  L.  89,  1560 

v.  Lockett,  52  La.  An.  1620,         1644 
V.    Lockwood,   43   Wis.   403,  1415 

V.  Logan,  43  N;  J.  L.  421,  645 

V.  Long.  8  Ired.  L.  415,         328,  331 
V.  Long,  94  N.  C.  896.  1556 

V.    Long   Branch   Com'rs,   42   N 
J.    L.   375,  1133 

V.  Long  Branch  Police  &c.  Com., 
59  N.  J.  L.  371,  730 

V.  Longstreet,  38  N.  J.  L.  312,     706 
V.    Lowery,    49    N.    J.    L.    391, 

499,  1081 
V.   Lucas,  9  Houst.  396,  1108 

V.  Ludwig,  21  Minn.  202,  1085 

V.    Macon   Co.    Court,    41    Mo. 
453.  995 

V.  Macon  Co.  Court,  68  Mo.  29, 

1524,   1542,    1646 
V.   Madison   St.   R.   Co.,   72  Wis. 
612  1812 

V.  Mahner,  43  La.  An.  496,   508,  605 


clxxx 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  Pages.    Vol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Yol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.1 


State  V.  Maniteau  Co.  Court,  45  Mo. 

App.    387,  1711 

V.   Mansfield,   41   Mo.   470,  141.5 

V.  Marlow,   15  Ohio  St.  114,  380 

V.  Martin,  27  Neb.  441, 

190,  659,  920,  924 
V.  Mason,  43  La.  An.  590,  1426 

V.  Mason,  153  Mo.  23,  926,  1793 
V.  Mathenv,  7  Kan.  327,  187,  313 
V.   Mav,   22  Ark.   445,  1483 

V.  Mavbew,  2  Gill  487,  386,  1714 
V.   Mavor  &c.,  24  Ala.   701. 

90,  92,  104 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  5  Port.  279,  681 

V.  Mayor  &c.,  22  Fla.  21, 

960,  961,  1679,  1680 
V.  Mayor  &e.,  R.  M.  Charl.  250, 

89,  90,  103 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  23  La.  An.  358,  917 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  30  La.  An.  129. 

1526, 1531 
V.  Mavor  &c.,  49  La.  An.  1322,  1686 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  52  La.  An.  1604,  1684 
V.   Mayor  &c.,   29   Md.   85,  646 

V.  Mayor  &c..  73  Mo.  435,  94,  117 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  19  Mont.  518, 

547,  718,  723.  731,  1684 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  32  Neb.  568,  1682 

V.  Mayor  &c.,  3  N.  J.  L.  57,  107 

V.  Mayor  &c.,  23  N.  J.  L.  280,  1507 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  25  N.  J.  L.  309, 

273,  275,  277,  284,  1539 
V.  Mayor  &e.,  26  N.  J.  L.  399,  1132 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  26  N.  J.  L.  444, 

282,    1533 


V.  Mayor  &c., 
V.  Mayor  &c., 

V.  Mayor  &c.. 


V.  Mayor  &c.,  27  N.  J.  L.  185, 

1247,  1249,  1250, 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  27  N.  J.  L.  493, 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  29  N.  J.  L.  104, 

1254, 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  29  N.  J.  L.  115, 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  29  N.  J.  L.  170. 

100,  107,  543,  1093,  1110, 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  29  N.  J.  L.  441. 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  29  N.  J.  L.  475 
481,  645, 
30  N.  J.  L.  93, 
30  N.  J.  L.  303, 

645, 
32  N.  J.  L.  49. 
693,    1257,    1259, 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  33  N.  J.  L.  57, 

111 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  34  N.  J.  L.  163, 

281,  468,  552, 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  34  N.  J.  L.  236, 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  34  N.  J.  L.  445, 
V.  Mayor  &c..  35  N.  J.  L.  157, 

1512, 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  35  N.  J.  L.  190, 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  35  N.  J.  L.  381, 
V.  Mayor  &o.,  36  N.  .T.  L.  159, 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  36  N.  J.  L.  291. 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  37  N.  J.  L.  348, 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  37  N.  J.  L.  415. 

1197,  1257,  1271, 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  38  N.  J.  L.  110. 

479, 
V.  Mayor  &e.,  40  N.  J  " 
V.  Mayor  &e.,  40  N.  J 
V.  Mayor. &c.,  40  N.  J 


L.  186 
L.  257, 
L.  550, 
54.  55 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  41  N.  J.  L.  71. 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  44  N.  J.  L.  137, 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  45  N.  J.  L.  104, 
V.  Mayor  &c..  45  N.  J.  L.  482, 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  46  N.  J.  L.  140. 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  47  N.  J.  L.  15. 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  47  N.  J.  L.  117, 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  47  N.  J.  L.  286. 
499, 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  47  N.  J.  L.  449, 


1724 
465 

1724 
645 

1117 

707 

1724 
481 

1257 

1571 

,  494 

1539 

468 

1259 

1545 
1657 
1724 

645 
1297 

499 

1297 

519 
664 
116 

119 

1388 
368 

1200 

1233 
168 

1140 
547 

519 
893 


V.  Mayor  &c.,  63  N. 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  63  N. 


State  V.  Mayor  &c.,  49  N.  J.  L.  308, 

494,  62G 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  49  N.  J.  L.  384,  1528 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  49  N.  J.  L.  515,  1689 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  51  N.  J.  L.  428.  1379 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  52  N.  J.  L.  65, 

617, 1352 
V.  Mavor  &c.,  52  N.  J.  L.  88.  475 
V.  Mayor  &c.  52  N.  J.  L.  332, 

1657,  1666,  1682 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  53  N.  J.  L.  299,  1253 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  53  N.  J.  L.  544,  1437 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  54  N.  J.  L.  102,  584 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  54  N.  J.  L.  Ill, 

486,  115& 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  54  N.  J.  L.  293, 

587,  105a 
V.  Mavor  &c.,  54  N.  J.  L.  437,  614 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  54  N.  J.  L.  476,  592 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  55  N.  J.  L.  241. 

877,  881 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  57  N.  J.  L.  252, 

1315,  1365 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  57  N.  J.  L.  293,  1351 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  58  N.  J.  L.  262, 

514,  723 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  62  N.  J.  L.  621, 

1135,  1236 
L.  61, 

1273,  1283 
L.  96, 

186,  206 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  63  N.  J.  L.  148,  1828 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  63  N.  .7.  L.  202, 

1266,  1282,  1297 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  14  Ohio  St.  472, 

106.  449,  995,  1534 
V.   Mayor  &c.,   10   Rich.   L.   491, 

594,  983 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  12  Rich.  480,  1413 

V.  Mavor  &c.,  11  Humph.  217,  214 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  15  Lea  697,  176 

V.  Mavor  &c.,  10  Wash.  4,  203 

V.  Mayor  &c.,  71  Wis.  502.  1232 

V.   Mayor  &c.,  88  Wis.  599,  1240 

V.  Mayor  &c.,  101  Wis.  208,  1286 

V.  McCann.  21  Ohio  St.  198,  1493 
V.  McOaiilev.   15  Cal.  429.  917 

V.  McCIura:,  27  N.  J.  L.  253.  1724 

v.    McCormack,   50   Mo.   568,  323 

v.  McCov.  116  N.  C.  1059.  499 

V.  McOullough,  20  Nev.  154,  1694 
V.  McOurdy,  62  Minn.  509,  727 

v.  McDaniel.  78  Miss.  1,  32& 

V.   McDonald,   26  Minn.  445,  697 

V.  McFadden,  23  Minn.  40,  434 

V.  McOovern.  100  Wis.  666,  66 

V.  McGrath.  91  Mo.  386,  753,  1687 
V.  McKee.  20  Or.  120,  298,  351 

V.  JIcMahon.  62  ISIinn.  110,  604 

V.  McMahon,  69  Minn.  205,  1387 

V.  McMillan,  108  Mo.  153,  376 

V.  McNinch.  87  N.  C.  567.  606 

V.  McRevnolds,  61  Mo.  203, 

1515,  1517 
v.  Mead.  71  Mo.  266,  986 

v.  ^leadows.  1  Kan.  90,  446 

v.  Medbery,  7  Ohio  St.  522,  917 

V.  Medbury,  3  R.  I.  138,  137,  138 
V.  Merrill,  37  Maine  329,  466,  601 
V.  Merriman.  6  Wis.  14.  423,  424 
V.  Merritt,  83  N.  C.  677,  537,  606 
V.  Messolongitis,  74  !Minn.  165,  519 
V.  Miller,  41  La.  An.  53,  589,  1356 
V.  Miller.  66  Minn.  90.  1827,  1830 
V.  Miller,  30  N.  J.  L.  368,  115 

V.  Miller,  45  N.  J.  L.  251,  290,  1657 
V.  Mills,  29  Wis.  322,  700 

V.  Mills.  34  N.  J.  L.  177,  110 

V.  Milwaukee,  20  Wis.  87.  13 

V.  Minnesota  &c.  R.  Co.,  SO  Minn. 
108,  711,  733,  735,  746 

V.  Mitchell,  58  Iowa  567,  156(> 


TAI5LH    OF    CASES. 


clxxxi 


[References  are  to  Pages.    Tol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol.  II,  pp.  8.33-J830.] 


State  V.  Mitchell.  ."^1  Ohio  St.  18, 

V.  Moiitgomer.v.  74  Ala.  IJliG,  085 

V.  Mooro.  10  Mo.  .-if!!).  332 

V.   Mooro.  74  Mo.  413,  310 

V.    !\[()on\   54   X.   J.   L,   121,  1455 

V.  >ro..io.  104  N.  O.  714,  GOO 

V.  Mooivs.  5(!  Neb.  1,  1G5 

V.  Morris,  47  La.  An.  IfiGO,  600 

V.  Morris.  14  Wash.  2G2.  381 

V.  Morse.  50  N.  II.  0.              695,  1572 

V.  Morton.  27  Vt.  310,  539 

V.  Moss.  2  Jones  G6.  1414 

V.  Mote.  4.S  Nel).  6S3,  60 

V.  Mott,  ()1   Md.  207.  502 

V.  Mullonlioff.  74  Iowa  271,  1677 

V.  Murphv.  130  Mo.  10.  1347 

V.  Murphy.  134  Mo.  54S.       741,  1348 

V.  Murray.  41  Minn.  123,  153 

V.  Murray.  28  Wis.  9G.  185 
V.    Mutchler,   41    X.    J.    L.   96, 

1717,  1720 

V.  Namias.  49  La.  An.  618,  138G 

V.  Natal.  39  La.  An.  439,  91 

T.  Natal.  41  La.  An.  887,  581 

V.  Neidt,  19  Atl.  318.  1124 

V.   Nelson.  41    Minn.  25,  1550 

V.  Nelson.  34  Neb.  162,  418 

V.  Nelson.  57  Wis.  147,  1257 

T.  Nevin.  19  Nev.  162,  319 
V.  Newark,  40  N.  J.  L.  550. 

54,  55,  119 

V.  Newman.  96  Wis.  258.  520 
V.    New   Orleans  &c.   R.   Co..   52 
La.  An.   1570.                           721,   726 

V.   Newton.   33   Ark.   276.  324 

V.  Noble,  20  La.  An.  325,  541 

V.  Nolan.  37  Minn.  16,  1400 

V.  North.  42  Conn.  79,  1475 

V.  North.  27  Mo.  464,          1503,  1537 

V.  Norton.  63  Minn.  497,  1274 
V.  Noyes.  30  N.  H.  279,       61,  83,  84 

V.  Noyes,  25  Nev.  31.  713 
V.    O'Brien,    47    Ohio    St.    464. 

380,  1690 
v.  Ocean  Grove  Camp  Meeting, 

59  N.   J.  L.  110.  550 

V.  O'Connor.  78  Wis.  282,  1169 

V.  O'Day.  69  Iowa  368.  152 

V.  Odom.  86  N.  C.  432.  327 
V.  Oleson,  26  Minn.   507.        496,  607 

V.  Olinger.  109  Iowa  669.  173 
V.  O'Neill,  49  La.  An.   1171, 

1390,  1406 
V.  Orr,  68  Conn.  101. 

740,  1386,  1388,  1797 

V.  Orr.  61  Ohio  St.  384,  200 

V.  Orvis,  20  Wis.  235.  349,  368,  1508 
V.  Osawkee  Tp.,  14  Kan.  418, 

549,  559,  979,  1050,  1060 

V.  Osborne,  36  Kan.  530.  446 

V.  Osborne,  32  Mo.  App.  536,  1493 

V.  Owen,  50  La.  An.  1181,  1387 

V.  Page,  140  Mo.  501,  1S6 

V.  Painter,  34  Neb.  173,  418 

V.   Pamperin,   42   Minn.   320,  508 

V.  Parker.  25  Minn.  215.  1680 

V.  Parker,  33  N.  J.  L.  313,  1502 

V.  Parker,  35  N,  J,  L.  575,  1724 
V.  Patterson  &c.  Co.,  21  N.  J.  L. 

9,  1693 
V.  Payssan,  47  La.  An.  1029. 

499,  600.  752 

V.  Peck.  53  Maine  284.  310 

V.  Pender,  66  N,  C.  313,  1411 
V.   Pendergrass,    106  N.   C.   664. 

600,  1403 

V.  Penney,  10  Ark.  621,  133 

V.  Pepper.  31  Ind.  76.  310 

V.  Perkins.  24  N.  .1.  L.  400,  187 
V.  Phillips.   79  Maine  506. 

160,  302,  803 

V.  Pinto.  7  Ohio  St.  355,  522 


State  V.  Police  Board  &c.,  51  La.  An. 

941.  1G86 

V.    Police   Com'rs,    16    Mo.    Ai)i). 
48,  1435 

V.  Police  Com'rs  &c.,  80  Mo.  App. 
206.  lo.-„s,  1765 

V.  Police  Jury,  34  La.  An.  673.  1523 
V.   Porter,  7   Ind.   204,  313 

V.  Porter.  113  Ind.  70.  290,  292 

V.  Powell.  40  La.  An.  234,  325,  326 
V.   Powell.  67   Mo.  305.  319 

V.  Powell.  07  N.  C.  417.  1413,  1420 
V.  I'resident  &c..  2  Iloust.  99,  1510 
V.   I'riester.  43   Minn.  37;!.  476 

V.  Proctor,  90  Mo.  334.  1568 

V.  Proprietors  &c..  46  N.  J.  L. 
405.  685 

V.  Pugh,  43  Ohio  St.  98,  55 

V.  Purse.  4  McCord  472,  1104,  1105 
V.  Randall,  35  Ohio  St.  64,  381 

V.  Rathbun.  22  Wash.  651,  1311 

V.   Reckards.  21   Minn.  47,  537 

V.  Reis,  38  Minn.  371. 

1165,   1232.   1234.   1268 
V.  Renick.  37  Mo.  270,  374,  473 

V.  Rhoades.  6  Nev.  352,  324 

V.  Rice,  97  N.  C.  421,  507 

V.  Rich,  20  Mo.  393,  66,  70 

V.    Richmond,    26   N.    H.   232, 

697,  1573 
V.  Ricker.  32  N.  H.  179,  1412 

V.  Ring.  29  Minn.  78,  313 

V.  Riordan,  24  Wis.  484,  54 

V.  Robb.  17  Ind.  536.  221 

V.  Roberts.  13  N.  J.  L.  132,  323 

V.  Robinson,  42  Minn.  107.  603,  1396 
V.  Robinson.  29  N.  II.  274,  538 

V.  Roderick,  23  Neb.  505,  1670 

V.  Rodman.  43  Mo.  256.  381 

V.  Rogers.  86  N.  C.  357,  155 

V.  Rogers.  22  Or.  348.  879 

V.   Roggen,  22  Neb.  118,  988 

V.  Rowe.  72  Md.  548,  98,  622 

V.  Ruff,  30  La.  An.  407.  531 

V.   St.   John.   47   Minn.   315,  1574 

V.   St.   Louis  Co.   Court,   47   Mo, 
595.  1724 

V.   St.   Louis  Police  Comm.,   16 
Mo.   App.   48.  200 

V.  St.  Paul  &c.  R.  Co..  35  Minn. 
131.  592 

V.     St.     Paul    &c.     R.    Co.,    78 
Minn.    331.  735 

V.  Saline  Co..  45  Mo.  242.  1010 

V.  Saline  Co.  Court.  48  Mo.  390,  1001 
V.   Sappington,   67   Mo.   529.  327 

V.   Saxon.   25  Fla.   702.  1645 

V.  Scates,  43  Kan.  330.  935 

V.  School  Dist.,  10  Neb.  544,  986 

V.  School  Dist.,  21  Neb.  725. 

1477,  1485 
V.  School  Dist.,  22  Neb.  48.  1482 
V.  School  Dist..  30  Neb.  520.  1654 
V.  School  Dist..  31  Neb.  552. 

1481.  1493.  1670 
V.    Schuchardt.    42    La.    An.    49, 

594,  619.  1392 
V.  Scott.  17  Mo.  521.  58,  61 

V.  Seavey,  22  Neb.  454,  1433,  1434 
V.   Severance.  40  Mo.   401,  517 

V.   Severance.  55  Mo.  378.  115 

V.  Seymour.  35  N.  J.  L.  47,  1432 

V.   Shakspeare,   43   La.  An.   92, 

1645,  1658 
V.  Shay,  101  Ind.  3G,  1604 

V.  Sheppard.  64  Minn.  280.  1316 

V.  Sheriff  &c..  48  Minn.  236,  558 

V.    Sberrard.   117   N.   C.   716,  409 

V.  Shropshire.  4  Neb.  411,  1652 

V.  Sickles,  24  N.  J.  L.  125,  1540 

V.  Simon.  20  Or.  365.  167 

V.  Simons.  32  Minn.  540,  58 

V.  Sims,  16  S.  C.  486,  1433 


clxxxii 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Vol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.} 


State  V.  Sinks,  42  Ohio  St.  345,  1509 

V.  Skirving.  19  Neb.  497,  349,  80S 
V.  Slociim,  34  Xeb.  368,  940,  1660 
V.  Sly.  4  Or.  277.  541 

V.  Smith,  67  Conn.  541,  13SS 

V.   Smith,  72  Conn.  572,  203 

V.  Smith,  22  Minn.  218, 

273,  275,  276,  479 
V.  Smith,  26  Mo.  226,  325 

V.  Smith,  46  Mo.  60,  401 

T.  Smith,  87  Mo.  158,  945 

V.   Smith.  89  Mo.  408,  933 

V.  Smith,  104  Mo.  661,  1647 

V.   Smith,  31   Neb.   590,  1646 

V.  Smith.  100  N.  C.  550,  1556 

V.   Smith,  25  Pac.  389,  351 

V.   Smith,   19   Wash.   C44,  1820 

V.  Smith,  11  Wis.  65.  378,  1527 

V.    Smith,    14   Wis.   497,  185 

V.  Smith.  52  Wis.  134,  542 

V.  Snodgrass.  1  Wash.  305,  374 

V.  Somers.  96  N.  C.  467,  198 

V.  Sooy.  39  N.  J.  L.  135,  321 

V.  Sovereign.  17  Neb.  173,  911 

V.  Spaude,  37  Minn.  322,  108,  109 
V.   Spidel,  44  Kan.   439,  943 

V.   Stanley.   66  N.   C.   59,  187 

T.   Stark, -18  Fla.  255,  54,  449 

V.    Starkey.    40    Minn.    503,  468 

V.    State    Board    &c.,    18    Nev. 
173,  1478 

V.   Staten,   6  Coldw.   233,  369 

V.    Staub,   61    Conn.   553,  1488 

V.   Stearns,   11   Neb.   104,  1652 

V.    Stearns,   31    N.    H.    106,  536 

V.   Steen.   43   N.   J.   L.   542,  119 

V.    Steers.    44    Mo.    223,  381 

V.    Sterling,    20   Md.    502.  386 

V.  Stevens.  21  Kan.  210.  124,  125 
V.    Stevens,   40   Maine   559,  1105 

V.     Stewart,     74     Wis.     620. 

1084,    1178 
V.    Stovall.    103   N.   C.   416.  601 

V.  Strader,  25  Ohio  St.  527,  1535 
v.    Strong.    47    S.    W.    1103,  1554 

V.    Stroud.    52    S.    W.    697,  585 

V.    Stumpf.   21    Wis.   579,  152 

V.    Sullivan,    36   N.    J.    L.    89,        846 
v.    Sullivan    Co.    Court,    51    Mo. 
522,  995     996 

vrSummerfield,  107  N.  C.  895.'    600 
V.    Superior   Court  &c.,   105   Wis. 
651.  514,    1703 

V.     Supervisors    &c.,     23     Minn. 
521,  340,    341,    345 

v.     Supervisors     &c.,     20     Wis. 
80,  1527 

V.  Supervisors,  58  Wis.  291,  340 
V.    Sutterfield,    54    Mo.    391,  374 

V.  Sweeney.  103  Wis.  404,  1764 
V.   Symonds,  57  Maine  148,  369 

V.   Taff.   37  Conn.   392.  367 

V.  Taft.   118   N.   C.   1190.  504 

V.   Tappan,    29   Wis.    664.      610,   979 
V.    Taxing    Dist.    &c.,    16    Lea 
240.  607 

V.  Taylor,  20  Ind.  517.  1104,  1105 
V.  Tavlor.   26  Neb.   580.  154 

V.  Tavlor.  108  N.  C.  196,  195,  196 
v.  Tenant.  110  N.  C.  609,  503,  504 
V.    Tennv,    58    S.    C.    215,  1311 

v.    Thaver.    74    Wis.    48,  1492 

V.    Thompson,    49    Mo.    188,  311 

V.    Tiedmann.    69    Mo.    515,  1480 

V.    Timme,    54    Wis.    318.  419 

V.   Titus,   47   N.    J.    L.   89,  1577 

V.    Tool.    4    Ohio    St.    553.  312 

V.    Toomer.    7    Rich.    L.    216,  313 

V.  Towers,  71  Conn.  657.  1688 

V.    Towle,    103    Wis.    388,  1764 

V.   Town  Council   &c..   liice   158,   534 
V.    Town    Council    &c..    6    Rich. 
L.    404,  532,    534 


State  V.  Town  of  Kaird,  79  Tex.  63,     60 
V.   Town  of  Belvidere,  44  N.   J. 
L.    350,  99,    1148 

V.  Town  of  Bergen,  33  N.  J.  L. 
39,  465,    476 

V.   Town   of  Burlington,   36   Vt. 
521,  831 

V.    Town   of   Compton,   2    N.   H. 
513,  831 

V.    Town    of   Guttenberg,    38    N. 
J.    L.    419,  1523 

V.   Town  of  Harrison,  46  N.   J. 
L.    79,  1447 

V.   Town  of  Hoboken,   53   N.   J. 
L.   64,  1140 

V.  Town  of  Maysville,  12  S.  C. 
76,  1523.   1533 

V.    Town   of   Somerset,   44    Minn. 
549.  1651 

V.  Town  of  Tipton,  109  Ind.  73,    65 
V.  Town  of  Union,  32  N.   J.   L. 
343.  1421 

V.   Town  of  Union,  33  N.   J.   L. 
350.  426,    468 

V.    Town    of    Vershire,    52    Vt. 
41,  351 

V.   Town  of  West   Hoboken,   43 
Atl.    535,  1241 

V.    Town    of    Winter    Park,    25 
Fla.   371,  64.    1769 

V.   Town  of  Wittingham,    7   Vt. 
390;  831 

V.   Townshij)  Board  &c.,  19  Ohio 
C.    C.    574,  1652 

V.  Tracy,  48  Minn.  497,  1693 

V.  Trask,   6  Vt.   355,  1559 

V.   Treasurer  &c.,   43   Mo.   228,     960 
V.    Treasurer   &c.,    43    N.    J.    L. 
139,  1415 

V.    Ti-easurer   &c.,    44    N.    J.    L. 
350,  500,    501 

V.    Treasurer   &c.,    45    N.    J.    L. 
288.  519,    528,    536 

V.    Treasurer    &c.,    53    N.    J.    L. 
329.  507.    527,    528 

V.   Trimbell,   12  Wash.   440,  1684 

V.  Troth.  34  N.  J.  L.  377.  90,  103 
V.   Trustees  &c.,   5   Ind.   77,  445 

V.    Trustees    &c.,    43    N.    J.    L. 
358.  1485 

V.    Trustees    &c.,    49    N.    J.    L. 
607.  374,   1486 

V.    Trustees    &c.,    52    N.    J.    L. 
104.  362 

V.     Trustees    &c.,     8    Ohio    St. 
394.  1002 

V.    Trustees    &c.,    14    Ohio    St. 
569.  983.    1002 

V.    Trustees    &c.,    22    Ohio    St. 
288.  291 

V.   Trvon,   39   Conn.    183,  466 

V.    Tuflv.    19    Nev.    391.  151 

V.   Tunis.   23   N.   J.   L.   546.  1511 

V.   Turnev.   8   Oill   &  J.    125,  323 

V.  Tuttle,   53   Wis.   45,  369,  370 

v.    Tyler.    48    Conn.    145,  8.59 

V.    I'nion    Dist.    School    Trustees, 
46   N.   J.   L.   76.  1493 

V.    Vail.    53    Mo.    97.  378 

V.    Vallei,    41    Mo.    29.  783 

V.   Vallius.   140   Mo.   523,  164 

V.    Van    Buskirk,    40    N.    J.    L. 
463.  301.    303 

V.  Van  ITorne.  7  Ohio  St.  327.  1002 
V.  Vanosdal.  131  Ind.  388,  274,  291 
V.    Van    I'elt.    1    Ind.    304,  322 

V.    Van    Winkle,    25    N.    J.    L. 
73.  1422,    142.^^ 

V.   Van  Wvck.   20  W^ash.  39.  953 

V.  Varnum.  81  Wis.  593,    1568,  1656 
V.   Vickers,   51    N.   .T.   L.   180.        1693 
V.    Village  of  Bradford,   32   Vt. 
50,  1693 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


elxxxiii 


[References  are  to  Pages.    Vol.  I,  pp.  1-S32;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-1S30.] 


State  V.  Village  of  Reads,  78  N.  W. 

883,  117 

V.   Village  of  South  Orange,   49 
N.   J.   L.   104,  1255 

V.    Votaw,    8    Rlackf.   2.  419 

V.    Vreelnnd,   79   Iowa   46G,  1486 

V.  Wartflell.  40  Minn.  5(t(l.  578,  1345 
V.  Wadhams,  04  Minn.  318,  171 

V.  Waggoner.  88  Tenn.  290,  446 
V.  Wakelv.  2  Nott  &  McC.  410,  1725 
V.  Waldron.  17  X.  .T.  L.  369,  700 
V.   Walker,   85   Mo.   41.  638 

V.   Walker,   17   Ohio  135,  428 

V.  Walker,  7  Cent.  L.  J'.  390,  1G46 
V.    Wall.    47    Ohio    St.    499.  113 

V.   Walsh.   70   Mo.   A]))).   142.  378 

V.  Wapello  Co.,  13  Iowa  405,  979 
V.  Wapello  Co.,  13  Iowa  388,  983 
V.    Warden.    153    Mo.    319,  1549 

V.  Ware.  13  Or.  380.  339 

V.    Water    Com'rs,    30    N.    J.    L. 
247.  645 

V.  Watts,  23  Ark.  304,  323,  327 
V.   Webber,   107   N.   C.   962, 

503,  520,  606 
V.    Weir,    33   Iowa   134,  69 

V.  Welch,  36  Conn.  215,  497,  601 
V.  Wells,  46  Iowa  662,  1415,  1417 
V.    Wells.    8    Nev.    105,  168 

V.  West.  33  La.  An.  1261.  198 

V.    West    Duluth    Land    Co.,    75 
Minn.   456.  551.   1033 

V.    Western   Union   Tel.    Co.,   73 
Maine  518,  1177 

V.   Wharton,   103  Wis.   307,  880 

V.  Wheeler.   27  Minn.  76,  1400 

V.    White,    29    Neb.    288, 

921,   1664,   1670 
V.    White,    10    Rich.    L.    442,  328 

V.    AVhitford.    54    Wis.    150,  1472 

V.  Whittemore,  50  N.  H.  245,  133 
V.   AVilcox,   42   Conn.   364,  84 

V.   Wilcox.   45   Mo.   458,  58.   61 

V.    Wilcox.    17    Neb.    219.  1670 

V.    Wilkinson,    2    Vt.    480.  1556 

V.   Williams,   25   Maine   561. 

347.  348,  367 
V.  Williams,  30  N.  J.  L.  102.  1105 
V.  Williams.  11  S.  C.  288,  601,  607 
V.  Williams.  6  S.  D.  119,  184,  209 
V.  Williams,  5  Wis.  308.  195,  369 
V.  Williamson,  44  N.  J.  L.  165,  106 
V.   Wilmington,   3   Harr.   294, 

189,   373 
V.  Wilson,  42  Maine  9.  1373 

V.    Wilson.    24    Neb.    139,  381 

V.   Wilson,   29   Ohio   St.  347,  177 

V.    Wilson,    12    Lea    290.  446 

V.    Winter,    148    Ind.    177,  157 

V.  Winter.  15  Wash.  407,  551,  612 
V.    Wish,    15   Neb.   448.  524 

V.  Witter.  107  N.  C.  792,  1400 

V.  Wolever.  127  Ind.  306.  189,  220 
V.    Woodbury.   76   Jlaine   457.  60 

V.  Woodruff.  37  N.  .7.  L.  139,  1534 
V.  Woodward.  89  Ind.  110,  1677 
V.    Woodward.    23   Vt.   92,  1105 

V.   Wordin,   56   Conn.   216,  1078 

V.   Wright,   8   Blackf.  65.  1475 

V.   Wright.   54   N.   J.   L.   130,  584 

V.   Wright.   56   Ohio   St.   540,  168 

V.    Wright.    80    Wis.    648,  1420 

V.  Yates.  19  Mont.  239.  290.  297 

V.    Young,    3   Kan.    445, 

47.    65,    88,    1410 
V.   Young,   17  Kan.   414,  110 

V.   Zeigler,   32  N.   J.   L.   262. 

507,    527,    536 
V.   Zeno.   79  Minn.   SO.  1388 

V.    Zurich,    49    La.    An.    447.        1391 
State  Bank  v.  City  Council,  3  Rich. 

L.   343,  1511 


State  Bank  v.  City  of  Madison.  3  Ind. 

43,  1510,  1511 

V.   Curran.    10   Ark.    142.  198 

V.    Oibbs,    3    McCord   377,  7 

V.   Knoop,    16   How.   309,  75 

State  Board  &c.  v.  Aberdeen,  56  Miss. 

•^•18,  240 

V.   Citizens'   St.   R.  Co.,  47  Ind. 
407,  649 

State  &c.  Co.  v.  Commonwealth  Ins 

&c.  Co.,  39  Minn.  219,  1379 

State  Railroad   Tax  Cases.  92  U.   S 

575.  I(i97.  1708.  1717.  1720.  1721 

State  Sav.   Bank  v.  Davis,  22  Wash 

406,  i(5S5 

State  Warrants,  In  re,  6  S.  D.  518.    876 

Steamship   Co.    v.    Port    Wardens,    6 

Wall.    31.  580 

Stearns    v.    City    of    Richmond,    88 

Va.   992,  1602 

V.      Village     of     Wyoming,     53 
Ohio    St.    352,  381 

Stebbins  v.   Jennings,   10   Pick.    172 

50,    51,'  662 
V.    Kay,    4    N.    Y.    S.    566 :    51 
Hun   589,  1255     l'>68 

V.  Mayer.  38  Kan.  573.       489*   1446 
V.   Merritt,   10   Cush.   27.  14'>1 

V.  Village  of  Oneida,"  5  N.  Y.  S. 
483;.23N.  Y.  St.  702.   826,1616.1625 

Steckert    v.    City    of    East    Saginaw, 
22   Mich.    104, 

291.    299.    300.    477,    1421 

Steckman  v.  Brooks,  17  Colo.  248,       1430 

Stedman  v.   City  of  Rome,  34  N.  Y 

c.     ,^-    '^^^^  1335 

Steel     V.     Borough     of    Huntington, 

191  Pa.  St.  627,  1315 

Steele's  Petition,  44  N.  H.  220,  1573 
V.  Calhoun,  61  Miss.  556,  158,  372 
V.    City    of    Boston,    128    Mass. 

c.     P^^'  263,  803 

Steele  Co.  v.  Erskine,  98  Fed.  215,     644 

Steenberg  v.   People,   164  111.   478,     1278 

Steffan  v.  City  of  Buffalo,  21  N.  Y. 

W.    Dig.    289.  8''6 

Steffen    v.    City    of    St.    Louis,    135 

Mo.    44,  1306 

Stehmeyer    v.    City    Council,    53    S. 

„^  .  C.   259.  1449,    1554 

Stein    V.    Bienville    Water    &c.    Co., 

34   Fed.    145,  567 

V.    Bienville   Water  &c.    Co.,    141 
U.    S.    67.  1810 

v.    City    of    Council    Bluffs,    72 
Iowa   180,  1619 

V.    Mayor   &c.,    17    Ala.    234. 

1511,    1512 
V.    Mayor    &c.,    24    Ala.    591. 

983.   1511,   1546 
V.  Mayor  &c..   49  Ala.   362,  1512 

Steines    v.     Franklin    Co.,    48    Mo. 

167.  986,    1001 

Steinme.ver   v.    City   of  St.    Louis,   3 

Mo.    App.    256.  1585 

Steinmuller   v.    City   of   Kansas   Citv. 
3   Kan.  App.  45.  1136.  "1701 

Stephan    v.     Daniels,    27     Ohio    St. 

527.  1550.    1552 

Stephani   v.    City  of  Manitowoc,    89 

Wis.    467.  790 

Stephens  v.   City  of  Macon,  83   Mo. 

345.  1618 

v.    City   of   Spokane,    14   Wash. 
298.  1306 

V.   Felton.   99   Ky.   395.  13 

v.  Mayor  &c..  84  Ga.   630,    370.  371 
v.    Murray.    132    Mo.    468.  609 

Sterling  v.    Parish   of   West   Feliciana. 
26   La.    An.   59.  636 

v.   Thomas.   60   111.   265,  8 

Sterling   Gas  Co.   v.    Higby,   134   111. 

557,  840 


elxxxiv 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Vol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.1 


Stern   v.    People.   96  III.   475,  322 

Stetson   V.    Chicago   &c.    R.    Co.,    75 

111.  74.  170G 

V.    Keinpton,    l.S    Mass.    272, 

15,    251.    647.    608,    867.    1532.    1542 

Steuart   v.    Mayor   &c.,    7    Md.    500, 

699.    705,    1196 

Steubenville   v.    Culp,    38    Ohio    St. 

18,  213 

Steven    v.    Nebraska    &c.    Ins.    Co., 

29   Neb.    187.  1419 

Stevens  v.   Borough  of  Danbury,  53 

Conn.   9,  699 

V.   City   of   Muskegon,   111   Mich. 
72,  1812 

V.    Commonvrealth.   6   Met.   241,   539 
V.    Dudlev.    56   Vt.    158.  223 

V.   Eden  &c.   Soc,  12  Vt.  688.     1425 
V.    Patterson    &c.    R.    Co.,    34 
N.    J.    L.    532.  1378 

v.    Rutland   &c.    R.    Co.,    29    Vt. 
546.  651 

V.    St.    Marv's   Training   School. 
144   111.    336.  1701.    17.59 

V.    Truman.    127    Cal.    155.  953 

Stevenson    v.    Bay    City,    26    Mich. 

44,  491.    1421 

V.  District  Tp..  35  Iowa  462.     1528 
v.    Missouri    &c.    R.    Co.,    31    S. 
W.   793,  1350 

V.  Weber,  29  La.  An.  105.  651 

Stevens   Point  &c.   Co.   v.   Reilly,   44 

Wis.    295.  54 

Steward    v.    Jefferson,   3    Harr.    335,      58 

Stewart  v.  Board  &c..  30  Iowa  1,  983 
V.  Board  &c.,  45  Kan.  708.  1225 
V.  Cambridge.  125  Mass.  102.  260 
V.   City  of  Clinton,   79   Mo.   603. 

491.    1426 
V.    City    of    Council    BIufiEs,    58 
Iowa  642,  285 

V.    City    of    Council    Bluffs,    84 
Iowa   61,  1221 

V.   City  of  Nashville.   96  Tenn. 
50,  1326 

V.  Lee,  3  Cal.  364.  309 

V.    Otoe   Co.,    2   Neb.    177.  632 

V.    Philadelphia.    7    Atl.    192,      1271 
V.    Sherman,    4    Conn.    553,  1060 

V.    Southard,    17    Ohio    402. 

221     222     1494 
V.    State,   4   Ind.   396.~~   '    """'      168 

Stickley    v.    Chesapeake   &c.    R.    Co., 

93    Kv.    323.  1554 

Stickney   v.    City   of   Salem,   3   Allen 

374.  1595,   1601 

v.  Village  of  Bangor,  30  Maine 
404,  1727 

Stidger    v.    City    of    Red    Oak,    64 

Iowa    465.  233 

Stifel  V.  Brown.  24  Mo.  App.  102,    1273 

Stiffler    V.    Board    &c.,    1    Ind.    App. 

368,  945 

Stiles  V.  Town  of  Middlesex,  8  Vt. 

436.  699 

Still  V.  Trustees  &c..  16  Barb.  107,    629 

Stillwater  v.  Green.  9  N.  J.  L.  59.     430 

Stillwater    Water    Co.    v.    City    of 

Stillwater.   50   Minn.   498.  587 

Stillwell  V.  Coons.  122  N.  Y.  242,  1050 
V.    Kennedy.    51    Hun    114,  1050 

V.  JIayor  &c.,  19  Abb.  Pr.  376.    763 
V.  Mayor  &c..  17  J.  &  Sp.  360,    8.30 

Stilwell  V.   Coope.  4  Den.   225.  1488 

Stilz    V.    City    of    Indianapolis.    55 

Ind.    515.  384.    1518 

V.  City  of  Indianapolis,  81  Ind. 
5S2.  1519.    1717 

Stinchfield  v.  Little.  1  GreenL  231,    216 

Stine  V.    Berry.   96   Ky.    63.  381 

Stinson    v.    City    of    Gardiner,    42 

Maine   248.  1595 

v.   Smith,  8  Minn.  366,  1165 


Stirling   v.    City   of   Camden,    65    N. 

J.    L.    190.  1406 

Stockdale   v.    Wayland   School   Dist., 

47    Mich.    226.  304 

Stockton.    Ex  parte.   33   Fed.   95.        1399 
v.  Powell.  29  Fla.  1.  273.  570.  1014 

Stockton  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Common  Coun- 
cil  &c.,   41   Cal.   147,  685,   983 
V.    City    of    Stockton,    51    Cal. 
328.  990 

Stockwell   V.    State.    101   Ind.    1,        1487 
V.    White    Lake    Tp.,    22    Mich. 
341.  861 

Stoddard  v.   Oilman,   22  Vt.    568. 

301,    305,    345,    356 
V.    Inhabitants    &c.,    154    Mass. 
149.  1.585 

V.   Johnson,  75  Ind.   20,  277 

V.    Kimball,    6   Cush.    469.  1019 

V.    Village   of   Saratoga    Springs, 
52    Hun    610.  1179 

Stodler  v.   Pahey,  87  III.  App.  411.    173 

Stokes   V.    Corporation   of   New  York, 

14   Wend.   87,  535,   601 

V.  Early.  45  N.  J.  L.  478,  706 

Stone    V.    Bank    of    Commerce.    174 

U.    S.    412.  646.    1713.    1719 

V.  City  of  Boston.   2  Met.  220,    707 
V.   City  of  Cambridge,   6  Cush. 
270,  1259 

V.     City    of    Charlestown,     114 
Mass.    214,  387.    1519 

V.   City  of  Poughkeepsie,  44  N. 
Y.    S.    609.  1344 

V.    Commercial    R.    Co.,   4   M.   & 
C.    122,  699 

V.'  Elliott,  11  Ohio  St.  252,  1026 

V.   Godfrey,   5   De  G.,   M.   &  G. 
76.  249 

V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  8  Cush.  592, 

340,    1485 
V.    Inhabitants    &c.,    100    Mass. 
49,  1332,   1626 

V.   Mayor  &c.,  25  Wend.   157.        802 
V.    Mississippi,    101    U.    S.    814. 

1390,   1677,   1811 
V.    Seymour,    15    Wend.    19,  325 

V.    Small,    54   Vt.    498,  354 

V.   Viele.    38   Ohio   St.   314.  1724 

V.  Woodbury  Co..  51  Iowa  522,  1726 

Stoneham    v.     London    &c.     R.    Co., 

L.    R.    7   Q.    B.    1.  1571 

Stoner  v.  Plournoy.  28  La.  An.  850. 

1516,  1518 

Storrie  v.  Cortes,  90  Tex.  283,  1302 

Storrs    V.     City    of    Grand    Rapids, 

110  Mich.  483.  '  1786 

V.  City  of  IJtica,  17  N.  Y.  104, 

745,    1546,    1590 

Storv   V.    New   York   &c.    R.    Co.,    90 
N.    Y.    122. 

620,    682.    1563,    1564,    1582 

Stout  V.   Chosen   Freeholdei's,   25   N. 

J.    L.    202.  684 

V.  Woods.  79  Ind.   108.  1572 

Stoutenburgh  v.   Hennick.   129  IT.   S. 

141.  13,    46,    48.    1399 

Stow  V.   Common   Council,  79   Mich. 

595.  163 

V.    Nvsc.    7   Conn.    214,  275,    733 

Stowers  v.  Gilbert,  156  N.  Y.  600,    1773 

Stoystown  &c.  Co.  v.  Craver,  45  Pa. 

St.   386.  1212 

Strack    v.    Ratterman,    18    Ohio    C. 

C.  36.  748 

Strahan    v.    Town    of    Alalvern,    77 

Iowa  454,  615 

Stratman,  In  re,  39  Cal.  517,  1411 

Stratton  v.   City  of  Oregon,   35   Or. 

409.  1033 

V.    Commonwealth,    10    Met. 

217,  707 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


clxxxv 


{References  are  to  Pages.   Vol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.] 


Strauder    v.    West    Virginia,    100    TT. 

S.    303,  140 

Strauss    v.    City    of    Cincinnati,    23 

Wis.  Law  Bui.  359,  1255 

V.    Mayor  &c..   97   Ga.   475,  499 

Streator    v.    Chrisman,    82    111.    App. 

24,  1360 

Street  v.  Board  &<-.,  70  N.  C.  644.       883 
V.    Laurens.    5    Rich.    Eq.    227,      322 

Street   R.    Co.   v.    West   Side   R.   Co., 

48   Mich.    433,  1352 

Strenny  v.   City  Council  &c.,  86  Ala. 

340.  1287 

Striclcland  v.   City  of  Stillwater,  63 

Minn.    43,  1305 

V.   Giede,  31   Or.   373.  879 

Strickler     v.     City     of     Colorado 

Springs,    16   Colo.   61,  674 

Strieb  v.   Cox,   111    Ind.    299, 

632,   889,   947,    1201 

Stril?e  V.  Collins,  54  L.  T.  152,  1403 

Striker  v.  Kelly,  7  Ilill  9. 

299.    476,    480,    1421 

Strobel    v.    City    of    New    York,    36 

N.    Y.    S.    814,  1336 

Strom    V.    City    of    Iowa    City,    47 

Iowa    42,  1730 

Strong,    Petitioner,    20    Pick.    484, 

1688,    1692 
V.    Campbell.    11    Barb.    135,  225 

V.    City   of   Brooklyn,    68    N.    Y. 
1,  1564 

V.    City    of    Stevens    Point,    62 
Wis.   255,  1595 

V.     District     of     Columbia,     4 
Mackey   242,  280,   715 

V.   Makeever,   102  Ind.   578.  1567 

V.   United   States,   6  Wall.   788,    318 

Strosser    v.    Citv    of    Fort    Wayne, 

100    Ind.    443,  401,   647.    1769 

Stroud   V.    City   of   Pliiladelphia,    61 

Pa.    St.   255.  593,    1234 

Strough    V.    Supervisors   of   Jefferson, 

119    N.    Y.    212.  1678 

Strudgeon  v.   Village  of  Sand   Beach. 

107   Mich.   496.  1336,    1786 

Strunk  v.   Ocheltree,   11   Iowa   158,     332 

Strusburg    v.    Mavor   &c.,    87    N.    Y. 

452,      1198.    1202,    1205,    1264.    1551 

Struthers    v.    Railway    Co.,    87    Pa. 

St.    282,  591 

Stryker    v.    Skellman,    14    N.    J.    L. 

189,  1765 

Stuart  V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  48  Maine 

477,  1641 

V.   Palmer,   74  N.  Y.   183, 

595,    692,    1237,    1238,    1242 
V.    School    Dist.    &c.,    30    Mich. 
69,  1730 

V.    Town  of   Warren,   37   Conn. 
225,  347,    360 

Stubbs    V.    Lee,    64    Maine    195,  198 

Studabaker    v.    Studabaker,    152    Ind. 

89.  1792 

Studeor  v.  Village  of  Gouverneur,  44 

N.   Y.   S.   122,  1364 

Stuhr    V.    Mayor    &c.,    47    N.    J.    L. 

147,  484 

Sturgeon  v.   Hampton,  88  Mo.  203,     638 

Sturm    V.    School    Dist.,    45    Minn. 

88,  343.    1485 

Sturtevant  v.   City  of  Alton,  3  Mc- 
Lean   393,  977 

Stutsman   Co.   v.   Mansfield,   5   Dak. 

78,  902 

Stuyvesant   v.    Mayor,    7    Cow.    588, 

97,    468,    1256 

Sublett   V.    Bedwell,    47   Miss.    266.      378 

Suburban   Elec.   Co.   v.   Citv  of  Eliza- 
beth,   59    N.    J.    L.    134,  925 

Suburban   Elec.   &c.    Co.   v.    Inhabit- 
ants of  E.  O.  Tp.,  41  Atl.  865,  1811 


Suburban  Elec.  &c.   Co.   v.  Town  of 

Hempstead.  38  App.  Div.  355,      735 

Suburban   &c.    Transit   Co.   v.    Mayor, 

128    N.    Y.    510,  582 

Suffolk    Sav.    Bank   v.    City   of   Bos- 
ton,   149    Mass.    364,  1026 

Sullivan,    Matter    of,    28    N.    Y.    St. 

566.   55    Hun   285,  1649,    1659 

V.   Board  &c..   58   Miss.   790,  674 

V.    City    of    Boston,    126    Mass. 
540,  803 

V.    City    of    Leadville,    11    Colo. 
483,  299,   729,   923,   1193 

v.   Gilroy.   8   N.   Y.    S.   401,  1659 

V.    Holyoke,    135    Mass.    273. 

815,   1159 
V.  Jones,  2  Gray  570,  335 

V.    Pausch,    5   Ohio   C.   C.    196.      299 
V.    School    Dist.,    39    Kan.    347, 

258,    1480 
V.    Shanklin.   63   Cal.   247,  224 

V.    State.    121    Ind.   342,  854 

V.  Walton.  20  Pla.  552,    1021,  1540 

Summers    v.    Board    &c.,    103    Ind. 

262,  210,    774,    797,    1076 

Sunapee    v.    Lempster,    65    N.     H. 

655,  1046 

Sunderland     v.     Martin,     113     Ind. 

411.  1287 

Sun    Printing    &c.    Ass'n    v.    Mayor 

&c..    152    N.    y.    257,  ■         872 

V.   Mayor  &c.,   40  N.  Y.   S.   607.    711 

Superintendents    &c.    v.    Nelson,    75 

Mich.    154,  1067 

Supervisors   &c.    v.    Bates,    17   N.   Y. 

242.  253 

V.    Birdsall.    4    Wend.    453,  662 

v.    Cook,    38    111.    44,  1023 

V.   Dorr,   25   Wend.   440.  320 

V.    Durant.   9    Wall.    415,  1527 

V.    Galbraith,    99    U.    S.    214. 

995.    1001.    1016,    1018 
V.    Horton,    75    Iowa    271, 

275,    276,    277,    301.    302,    732 
V.   Minturn,   4   W.   Va.  300.  1651 

V.    Morgan,    4    Abb.    Ct.    App. 
Dec.  335,  1056 

V.  O'Malley,  47  Wis.  332,     409,  450 
V.    People,    25    111.    163,  299 

V.    Schenck,    5    Wall.    772. 

257,   992,   998,   1001,   1002 
1018.    1023 
V.    Stimson,    4    Hill    136, 

192,    193,    198 
V.     Supervisors    &c.,     74     Mich. 

721.  433,  434 

v.     Supervisors    &c.,     58     Miss. 
619.  434 

V.     Supervisors     &c.,     13     Wis. 
490.  423 

V.    United    States,    4    Wall.    435, 

8,   847,   1201,   1527,   1531 
V.   United   States,   18   Wall.   71, 

846,    1542,    1646 
V.    Van    Campen,    3    Wend.    49,      309 
V.    Wisconsin    R.    &c.    Co.,    121 
Mass.    460,  990 

Surget     V.     Newman,     43     La.     An. 

873,  1426 

Surgi     V.     Snetchman,     11     La.     An. 

387.  1520 

Susquehanna    Bank    v.     Board    &c., 

25  N.  Y.  312,  1287,  1717 

Sutliff  V.    Lake  Co..   47   Fed.    106,        887 
V.  Lake  Co.,   147  U.  S.  230. 

998.   1003,   1008,   1009 

Sutphen    v.    Town    of    North    Hemp- 
stead,   SO   Hun   409,  1374 

Sutro   V.    Pettit,    74    Cal.    332. 

210.    233,    234.   235.    236,    237.    250 
V.   Rhodes,   92  Cal.   117,  886 

Sutton    V.     City    of    Louisville,    5 

Dana  28,  704 


clxxxvi 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


^References  are  to  Pages.   Vol.  I,  pp.  1-S32;  Vol.  II,  pp.  S33-1830.'] 


Sutton    V.    City    of    Snohomisli.     11 

Wash.  24,       1310.    i:r,n,  1335,   1347 
V.   Clarke,   6  Taiiut.   I'O,  225 

V.    McConnell.    40    \yis.    209,  536 

V.    School    Citv    of    Montpelier, 
28    lud.    App.    315.  1244 

V.  Spectacle  Makers'  Co.,  10  L. 
T.   431,  261 

Sutton's   Hospital    Case,    10   Co.    1,        38 
Swain  v.   Comstock,   18   Wis.   486,  64 

Swan   V.    Gray,    44    Miss.    393,  1672 

V.   Mayor  &c.,   S   Gill    150,  1724 

V.    AA'illiams,    2    Mich.    427,  692 

Swann  v.  Burk.  40  Miss.  268,    106,   183 
Swart    V.    Mayor    &c.,    5    N.    Y.    S. 

98,  ^         1636 

Swarth  v.   People,   109  111.  621,  1404 

Swartwood  v.    Walbridge,   10   N.   Y. 

S.   862,  1492 

Swartz  V.  Large,  47  Kan.  314,  1690 

Sweany   v.    Kansas   City   R.    Co.,   54 

Mo.    App.   265,  1251 

Sweatt  V.   Faville.   23   Iowa  321.  556 

Sweeny  v.    City  of  Butte,   15   Mont. 

274,  1336,    1340 

Sweet  V.   Buffalo  &c.  R.   Co.,  79  N. 

Y.    293,  1168 

V.    City    of   Buffalo,    158    N.    Y. 
695,  929 

V.    Village    of    Gloverville,    12 
Hun   302,  1615 

Sweetser  v.   Hay,  2  Gray  49,  311 

Sweitzer  v.    Liberty,   82   Mo.   309,        483 
Swenson    v.    City    of    Lexington,    69 

Mo.   157,  264 

Sv^epston  V.    Barton,   39   Ark.   549,      155 
Swift    V.    City   of   Newport.    7    Bush 

37,  1515.    1516,    1517 

V.   City  of  Poughkeepsie,   37   N.. 
Y.   511,  229,   1205 

V.    City    of    Topeka,    43    Kan. 
671,  517 

V.    Klein,    163    111.    269,  515 

V.  Mavor  &c.,  83  N.  Y.  528.  788 

Swindell    v.    State,    143    Ind.    153. 

477,    499.    525 
Switzer   v.    City    of    Wellington,    40 

Kan.   250,  1744 

Sykes  v.  City  of  St.  Cloud,  60  Minn. 

442,  720 

V.   Mayor  &c.,   55   Miss.    115, 

643,    994,    1524 
V.    Town   of   Pawlet,    43   Vt. 
446,  1597 

Sylvester    v.    Incorporated    Town    of 

Casey,   110   Iowa   256.        1797,   1802 
Sylvester    Coal    Co.    v.    City   of    St. 

Louis,    130   Mo.    323,  599,    1703 

Svme  V.  Bunting.  91  N.  C.  48,  327 

Symonds  v.  Clav  Co.,  71   111.   355, 

9.    142,    772 
Symons    v.    Citv    of    San    Francisco, 

115    Cal.    .555,  1318 

Syracuse  Water  Co.  v.  Citv  of  Syra- 
cuse,   116    N.    Y.    167, 

233,    566,   567,   568,   618 


Taber  v,  Ferguson,  109  Ind.  227, 

1150,    1191 

v.   Grafmiller,   109  Ind.   206.        1259 
Tacoma   Gas  &c.   Co.   v.   City  of  Ta- 

coma.    14   Wash.    288,  110,    573 

Tacoma   Land   Co.   v.   City  of  Tacoma. 

15  Wash.  133,  1286 

Tacoma    Light    &c.    Co.    v.    City    of 

Tacoma.   13   Wash.   115.  718 

Taft  V.  Gifford.   13  Met.   187,  320 

V.     Inhabitants    &c.,     14     Mass. 

282.  044.    1212 

V.    Town    of    Pittsford,    28    Vt. 

286,  260,    646 


Taft  V.  Wood,  14  Pick.  362.         230,  1533 

Taggart   v.    Detroit,   71   Mich.   92,      14U3 
V.    Newport    St.    R.    Co.,    16    R. 
I.    008,  682,   683 

Tainter   v.    City   of   Worcester,    123 

Mass.    311,  263,    786 

V.  Lucas,  29  Wis.  375,  1720 

V.  Mayor  &c.,  19  N.  J.  Eq.  46,     1106 

Talt's   ICx'r  V.   Ceutral   Lunatic  Asy- 
lum,   84    Va.    271,  685 

Talbot   V.   Dent,   9   B.   Mon.   526, 

845,   983,    1534,   1536 
V.  Hudson,   16  Gray  417,  685 

V.    Inhabitants    &c.,    76    Maine 
415,  176 

Talbot   Pav.   Co.   v.   City  of  Detroit, 

109  Mich.    657,  752,    1687 
V.     Common     Council     &c.,     91 
Mich.    262,  1673 

Talcott   V.    City  of   Buffalo,   125   N. 

Y.   280,  514,   825 

V.  City  of  Buffalo,  57  Hun  43,  655 
Talkington  v.  Turner,  71  111.  234,  378 
Tallant    v.    City    of    Burlington,    39 

Iowa   543.  1258 

Tallman  v.   White,   2  N.   Y.   66,  1533 

Tammany   W.    W.   v.    New   Orleans 

W.   W.,   120  U.   S.  64,  1808 

Tamworth    v.    Freedom,    17    N.    H. 

279,  1046,   1047 

Tapley   v.    Martin,    116   Mass.   275,      320 
Tappan   v.    Gray,    7    Hill    259,  296 

V.    Long    Branch   &c.,    59    N.    J. 
L.  371.  291 

V.     Merchants'     «&c.     Bank,     19 
Wall.    490,  1501 

V.   I'eople,   67   111.  339,  1483 

V.   Young.   9   Daly  357,  506,   572 

Tarba    v.    City   of   Rochester,    58    N. 

Y.    S.   755,  1359,   1360 

Tarbox    v.    Sughrue,    36   Kan.    225,      155 
Tarbutton    v.    Town    of    Tennille, 

110  Ga.  90,  787 
Tarry  v.  Ashton,  1  Q.  B.  D.  314,  1779 
Tash    V.    Adams,    10    Cush.    252, 

668,    1730 
Tate  V.  Missouri  fcc.  R.  Co.,  64  Mo. 

149,  1354 

Tatham's  Appeal.   80  Pa.   St.   465,     894 
Tatlock    V.    Louisa    Co.,    46    Iowa 

138,  840 

Taubert    v.    City    of    St.    Paul,    68 

Minn.    519,  1358 

Taverner's   Case,    Dyer   322,  467 

Tawas  &c.   R.   Co.   v.   Circuit  Judge, 

45    Mich.    204,  1672 

Tawney   v.    Lynn   &c.   R.   Co.,    16   L. 

J.    Eq.    282,  699 

Taxes  Delinquent  &c.,  In  re,  75  Minn. 

450.  1033 

Taxpayers   &c.,    In   re,    51    N.   Y'.    S. 

612,  1701 

Taxpayers  &c..   Matter  of,  43   How. 

Pr.    263,  988 

Taxpayers   of   Green,    Matter   of,    38 

How.   Pr.   51.5,  987 

Taxpayers  of  ^Nlilan  v.   Tennessee  &c. 

R.    Co.,    ]1    Lea    330,  982.    996 

Taxpayers   of   Plattsburg,    In   re,    157 

N.   Y.   78,  871 

Taxpayers  of  Webster  Parish  v.  Po- 
lice Jury.   52   La.   An.   465.  1760 
Taylor,   Ex  parte,   58   Miss.   478,        1395 

V.    Baltimore    &c.,    B.    Co..    33 

W.   Va.   39.  1108 

V.   Board   &c.,   31    Pa.    St.   73. 

246.  1551.  1725.  1726 

V.  Boulware.  17  Tex.  74.      1517 

V.  Citv  of  Carondelet.  22  Mo. 

105.  510.  532 

V.    City    of   Coboes,    105    N.    Y. 

54,  1746 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


clxxxvii 


[References  are  to  Pages.    Vol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Yol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.] 


Taylor   v.    City   of    Fort    Wayne,    47 

Ind.    274.  384,    1517,    17G9 

V.    City   of   Oweusboro,    98    Ky. 
-•71,  804 

V.    City   of   Pine   Bluff,   34   Ark. 
('.0:5.  4G7 

V.    City   of   Yonkers.    105    N.    Y. 
202.  15li;».    1C05,    1(>06,    1(507 

V.  Clemson,  11  CI.  &  F.  610,         695 
V.    Commissioners   &c.,    2    Jones 
Kq.     141.  118 

V.   Commissioners,   88   111.   526.   1170 
V.    Common   Council   &c.,   43    N. 
J.  Eq.  107.  1464 

V.     Commonwealth,     3     J.     J. 
Marsh.  401,  150 

V.   County  Court,   2   Ftah   405,   1735 
V.    District    Tp.    of    Wayne,    25 
Iowa    447,  052,    10S8 

V.    Dunn.   80   Tex.   652.      1367,    1368 
V.    Grand    Trunk   R.    Co.,   48   N. 
H.    304.  1108 

V.    Henry,    2   Pick.    397. 

352.   353.   355,  365,   1429 
V.  Hepper.'2  Hun  646.  1565 

V.    Hopper.    62    X.    Y.    649,  1564 

V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  8  Met.  462,  802 
V.  Kercheval.  82  Fed.  497,  182G 
V.    Knipe.    2    Pearson    151.  1745 

V.  Lake  Shore  R.  Co.,  45  Mich. 
74.  1588 

V.    Lambertville,    43    N.    J.    Eq. 
107.  240 

V.   Mayor  &c.,   39   Ga.   59.  543 

y.    Mayor    &c..    64    Md.    68.  815 

V.   McFadden.   84   Iowa   262. 

'  279.    553,    1150,    1534 
V.    Mott.    123   Cal.   497,  926 

V.  Newberue,  2  Jones  Eq.  141,  61 
V.    Palmer,    31    Cal.    240. 

480,    487,    1192,    1262 
V.   People,  66   HI.   322,  244 

V.  People.  6  Park.   Cr.   536.  1106 

V.  Phillippi.  35  W.  Va.  554,  1574 
V.    Porter,    4    Hill    140,  687 

V.    Skrine.   3    Brev.    516,  70,    197 

V.  Taylor.  10  Minn.  107,  374,  381 
V.    Thompson.    42    111.    9.  845 

V.   Town  of  Constable,    10   N.   Y. 
S.    607.  1631 

V.  Town  of  Constable,  15  N.  Y'. 
S.    795.  778 

Taylor  Co.   v.   Standley,   79   Iowa   666. 

605,   840 

Taylor.s    of    Ipswich    v.    Sherring,    1 

Rol.    4.  123 

Taylor  Tp.  v.  Morton,  37  Iowa  550,  319 

Tay mouth    Tp.    v.    Koehler.    35    Mich. 

22.  644,    1029.    1540 

T.    B.    Scott    Lumber   Co.    v.    Oneida 

Co..    72    Wis.    158.  561 

Tearney    v.    Smith,    86    111.    391.  224 

Teater  v.    Citv   of   Seattle.    10   Wash. 

327.  1329 

Teegarden  v.   City  of  Racine,   56   Wis. 
545,  555,    561,    12.53 

Teft  V.  Size.  10  III.  432.  541 

Temple  v.  Mead.  4  Vt.  535.  158 

Ten   Evck  v.   Delaware  &c.   Canal   Co., 
18  N.  J.  L.  200,  4,  6 

Tennant  v.  Crocker,  85  Mich.  328, 

297.    1665 

Tensas   &c.   Jury   v.   Britton,   15   Wall. 
566.  239 

Terhune  v.   Mayor  &c.,   88   N.   Y.    248, 

172.    213.    798 

Terrail   v.   Tinney.   20  La.   An.    444,    335 

Terre  Haute  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Clem.  123 

Ind.    15.  1627 

V.    Earn.    21    III.    291.  904 

V.    McKinly.   33   Ind.    274.  1108 

V.  Nelson.  1.30  Ind.  258.  1163 

V.  Voelker,  129  111.  540,  491 


Terre  Haute  &c.  R.  Co,  v.  Voelker, 

31   111.  App.   314,  1424 

Terrell  v.  Andrew  Co.,  44  Mo.  309,      228 
V.    Strong,    35    N.    Y.    S.    1000.      751 

Terrett  v.  Town  of  Sharon.  34  Conn. 

105.  651.   1730 

Territory  v.  Armstrong,  6  Dak.  226, 

1689 
V.  Board  &c.,  8  Mont.  396,  946 
V.  Cole,  3  Dak.  301,  330 

V.  Stewart,  1  Wash.  98,  57 

Terry    v.    City   of   Hartford,   39   Conn. 
-91.  1253 

V.    City    of   Milwaukee,    15    Wis. 
490,  950 

V.    City    of    Richmond,    94    Va. 
537,  743,   796 

V.  Town  of  Waterbury,  35  Conn. 
526,  1573 

Tesh  V.  Commonwealth,  4  Dana  522, 

1410 

Tevis    V.    Randall.    6    Cal.    632,  309 

Texarkana   v.    Leach,   66  Ark.   40,      1705 

Texas    Banking    Ins.    Co.    v.    State, 

42  Tex.  636,  1508,  1521 

Texas  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  City  of  New  Or- 
leans.   40    Fed.    11.  1183 

Thaler  v.  W.  Chicago  Pk.  Com'rs,  174 
HI.    211,  1298 

Tharp  V.  Witham,  65  Iowa  566,  699.  706 

Thatcher  v.    Chicago  &c.   R.   Co.,   120 

111.    560,  837 

V.   City   of  Toledo,    19   Ohio  C. 
C.    311.  477 

V.    Commissioners,    13    Kan.    182, 

663,    664 
V.  Humble.  67  Ind.  444,  656 

V.  People.  79  111.  597.  1720 

Thayer    v.    City   of   Boston.    19    Pick. 

511.  811.    819.    820.    1112 

V.  Montgomery  Co.,  3  Dill.  389, 

1740 
V.    Stearns.    1    Pick.    109.    347,    348 
V.     United    States,    20    Ct.    CI. 
137,  773 

Thelian  v.  Porter.  14  Lea  622,  1115 

Theisen    v.    McDavid.    34    Fla.    440,      599 

Third    Nat'l    Bank    &e.    v.    Town    of 

Seneca    Falls,    15    Fed.    783.        1001 

Third    School    Dist.    v.    Atherton.    12  " 
Met.  105.  365.  965,  1425,  1427,  1485 

Thomas.    Ex    parte.    71    Cal.    204,      1537 
V.    Ashland.    12    Ohio    St.    124.        54 
V.    Citizens'    Horse    R.    Co.,    104 
HI.    462,  276 

V.    City  of  Burlington,   69   Iowa 
140.  247.    891.    1552 

V.    City   of   Grand   Junction.    13 
.  Colo.   App.   80.  488.    1710.    1810 

V.    City    of    Olympia,    12    Wash. 
465.  1306 

V.   City  of  Port   Huron,   27   Mich. 
320.  984 

V.    City    of    Richmond.    12    Wall. 
349.  74.    88,    233,    254.    638 

V.  Dakin.  22  Wend.  9,  3,  45,  50 

V.  Gain.  35  Mich.  155. 
1238.    1254.    1267.    1270.    1297,    1303 
V.    Incorporated    Village   of   Ash- 
land.   12    Ohio    St.    124.  1410 
V.    Leland.    24    AVend.    65. 

763.  1531.  1514.  1538 
V.  Morgan  Co..  39  111.  496.  1017 
V.  Owens,  4  Md.  189.  168.  198.  369 
V.  Pacific  R.  Co.,  9  Wall.  579.  7 
V.  Town  of  Brooklyn,  58  Iowa 
438,  1556 

V.  Town  of  Grafton,  34  W.  Va. 
299.  1.394 

V.    Town    of   Mt.    Vernon,    9    Ohio 
290.  529,    1418 

V.    White,    12    Mass.    367,  311 


clxxxviii 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Vol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.'] 


Thomason    v.    Ashwortli,    73    Cal.    73, 

88,    108 

Thomasson  v.  State,  15  lud.  449,         1508 

Thompson    v.    Abbott,    61    Mo.    176, 

383,   14(4 
V.  Allen  Co.,  115  IT.  S.  550.         15:^9 
V.    Androscoggin    River    Imp.    Co., 
54   N.    n.    545.  ^'^\^^" 

V.   Board   of  Trustees,   30   111.   99. 

»  865 

V.   Citizens'    St.    R.   Co.,   152   Ind. 
461,  51^ 

V.  City  of  Corpus  Christi,  38  S- 
W     37*3  1786 

V."  City'  of   Milwaukee,    69    Wis. 
490  89,    1-1 

V. 'Holt.   52  Ala.  491,         .  223 

V.    Independent    School    Dist.,    10^_ 
Iowa    04,  ^    ^.    8'76,    «<9 

V.    Inhabitants    &c.,    7    Pick.    188, 

looy 
T    Kelly,    2    Ohio    St.    647,  995 

v!    Mayor    &c.,    52    x\.    Y.    Super. 
427  '*'° 

M\    Milwaukee    &c.    R.    Co.,    27 
Wis     93  1-1  o 

V.    Mora'n.    44    Mich,    602,  088 

V.  New   York  &c.   R.   Co.,  3   Sand. 
Ch     6''5  5v'o 

V.  Perrine,  103  U.  S.  806        643    870 
V.   Perrine.   106   U.   S.   589,  1019 

V.    Schermerhorn.   6   N.    Y'.   92, 

281,    509,    547,    572,    1232,    lo39 
V.  Searcy  Co.,  6  C.  C.  A.  674        9j>2 
V.  State,  23  Tex.  Civ.  App.  3(0,       93 
V.    Town    of    Mamakating,    Si 
Hun   400,  ^   ^       ..    10-8 

V.    Treasurer  of  "^  ood  Co.,   11 
Ohio    St.    678,  ^^    ^^.    1084 

V.    Village    of    Quincy,    83    Mich 
173  l-io 

V.  Whipple,  54  Ark.  203,  227 

Thompson-Houston    Electric    Co.    v. 
City   of  Newton,   42   Fed.    <23. 

552,    553,    574,    576.    881 
Thompson   N.   W.   Co.   v.    City   of   Chi- 
cago,   79    Fed.    984,  „  '9o 
Thomson    v.    L-^  Co.,„  3  ^Wall.  J- (^^^^ 

V.    Mayor    &c.,    61    Mo.  ^^282.^_  ^.^^ 

V.    Pacific   R.   Co..   9   Wall.   579,     45 
V.    People,    184    I11.J7,  ^^^^^    ^^^^ 

Thorn    v.    Sweenev,    12    Nev.    251,      688 
V.   W.   Chicago   Com'rs,   130   111. 
594,  1149,    l^oi 

Thornton    v.    City    of    Clinton,    148 

Mo.    648.  ^      ^         ..^^-^^ 

V.     Missouri    Pac.     R.     Co.,    42 
Mo.    App.    58.  671 

V.    Smith.    1    Wash.    81,  „l'^-0 

Thorp    V.    Town    of    Brookfleld,    36 

Conn.    320,  ^^    ^r^^^^^ 

V.    Rutland   &c.    R.    Co.,    27    Vt. 
140  80.   1381 

Thurston    v.    City    of    St.    Joseph.    51 

Mo    510,  1112.   1602.    1802 

Tice   V.    Bay   City.    84    Mich.    461,      1210 
v.    City    of    New    Brunswick,    64 
N.    J.   L.   399.  175 

Tidd  V.  Smith.  3  N.  H.  178,  346 

Tide  Water  Canal  Co.   v.   Archer,  9 

G.  &  J.  479,  ,    ^  186 

Tidewater  Co.  v.  Coster,  18  N.  J.  Eq. 
518,  1297 

Tiede  v.  Schneidt.  105  Wis.  470.  727 

Tiedt  V.  Carstensen,  61  Iowa  334,       ^  ^ 

Tie  Log,    In   re,    26   Fed.   611,         '  1083 

Tierney    v.    Brown.    65    Miss.    563,  277 
V.    Dodge.    9    Minn.    166, 

107,   115,  1419 


Tifft    V.    City    of    Buffalo,    82    N.    Y. 

204,  675 

V.    City   of   Buffalo,    7    N.   Y.    S. 
633,  1234,     1255 

Tighe  V.   City  of  Lowell,   119   Mass. 

472,  1595 

Tilden  v.  Metcalf,  2  Day  259,  1735 

Tilford  V.   City  of  Olathe,   44  Kan. 

721.  393 

V.  Mayor  &c.,  37  N.  Y.  S.  185,       804 
Tilyou    V.    Town    of    Gravesend,    104 

N.    Y.    356,  615 

Times    Pub.    Co.    v.    City   of    Everett, 

9    Wash.     518,  752 

Tims  V.  State,  26  Ala.  165,  1414.  1418 
Tindley   v.    City   of   Salem,    137    Mass. 

171,  803,    807,    1068,    1096 

Tingley   v.   Vaughn,    17    111.   App.   347, 

1492 
Tingue    v.    Village    of    Port    Chester, 

101    N.    Y.    294,  1204,    1288 

Tinsley    v.    Kirby.    17    S.    C.    1.  289 

Tinsman    v.    Belvidere    Del.    R.    Co., 

26    N.    J.    L.    148.  4,    6 

V.    Monroe    Probate    Judge,    82 
Mich.    562.  1178 

Tippets  V.  Walker.  4  Mass.  595.  216 
Tipton    Co.    V.    Locomotive    Works, 

103    U.    S.    523,  995 

Tisdale    v.    Inhabitants  &c.,    8    Met. 

388.  776 

V.    Inhabitants    &c.,    167    Mass. 
''48  1339 

V.   President  &c.,   46   III.   9, 

64,  486.  529,  1691 
Title  Guarantee  &c.   Co.    v.   City  of 
Chicago.    162    111.    505. 

501.  1130,  1147,  1174.  1244,  1296 
Titus   V.    Inhabitants   &c.,    97    Mass. 

258,  818,  1332,  1601 

Titusville  Electric  Light  &  Power 
Co.  V.  City  of  Titusville,  196 
Pa.    St.    3,  1185 

Tobev  V.  City  of  Hudson,  2  N.  Y'.  S. 

180,  ,  1606 

Tobin,  In  re,  66  N.  Y.  S.  97,  1768 

V.  Portland  &c.  R.  Co.,  59  Maine 
183,  810 

Todd   V.   Birdsall.    1   Cow.   260,   192,   193 
V.  City  of  Laurens,  48  S.  C.  395, 

875,  879 
V.  City  of  Troy,  61  N.  Y.  506. 

1587,  1591,  1607 
Todemier  v.  Aspinwall.  43  111.  401,  1571 
Toledo  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  City  of  Jackson- 
ville. 67  111.  37.  501,  1148 
V.    Detroit   &c.    R.   Co.,   62    Mich. 
564.  637 
V.   Munson.   57  Mich.   42,  696 
V.    President    &c..    43    111.    209.      526 
Toledo  R.   Co.  v.  Toledo  Electric  R. 

Co..   6  Ohio  C.   C.   362.  1422 

Toll   Bridge   Co.   v.    Bitsworth,   30 

Conn.    380.  1806 

Tomason  v.  Justices.  3  Humph.  233,  1672 
Tomlin   v.    City  of  Cape   May.    63   N. 

J.  L.  429.  527,  550,  592 

Tomlinson  v.  Jessup.  15  Wall.  454,  104 
Tompert  v.  Lithgow.  1  Bush  176.  207 
Tompkins    v.    North    Hudson    R.    Co.. 

63  N.  J.  L.  322.  1348 

V.  Sands.  8  Wend.  462,  221,  .335 

Tone  V.  Mavor  &c..  70  N.  Y.  157.  781 
Toop  V.  Citv  of  New  York,  13  N.  Y. 

S.    280.  1176 

Tootle  vT  Wells,  39  Kan.  452,  316 

Topeka  v.  Sherwood,  39  Kan.  690,  1.584 
Topeka   Water  Supply  Co.   v.   City  of 

Potwin  Place.  43  Kan.  404.  1177 
Topsham  v.  Rogers.  42  Vt.  189,  258 
Torbett  v.  City  of  Louisville.  9  Ky. 

L.    202,  1514 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


clxxxix 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Vol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.} 


Torbush  v.  City  of  Norwich,  3S  Conn. 

•2-25,  204 

Torr    V.    Corcoran,    115    Ind.    188,        276 
Torrent    v.    Common   Council   &c.,    47 

Mich.    115,  6G6 

Torre.v  v.   Inhabitants  &c.,  21   Picli. 

64,  301 

V.   Willard,  8  N.  Y.   S.  392,  1489 

Tory  V.  Lexington  &c.  R.  Co.,  2  Met. 

314,  994 

Tower  v.   Tower,   18   Pick.   202,  1751 

Towie   V.    Brown,    110    Ind.    65,  445 

V.    Brown,    llO    Ind.    599,  1487 

V.  Marrett,  3  Maine  22,  106 

V.  State,  110  Ind.  120,  1518 

Town   Council   &c.   v.   Court,   1   El.   & 

El.    770,  276 

V.  Elliott.  5  Ohio  St.  113,     629,  990 

V.  McComb,  18  Ohio  229,  811 

V.  Ohlandt,  24  S.  C.  158,  1414,  1418 

V.  Pressley.  33  S.  C.  56,       594.  1079 

V.    Railroad   Co.,   10   R.    I.   365, 

591     592 

V.  Smart,  11  Rich.  551,  'l403 

Town  &c.     See  also,  Inhabitants  &c.  ; 

Name  of  Town. 
Town   of   Ackley   v.    Town   of   Vilas, 

79  Wis.  157,  440 

Town  of  Albuquerque  v.  Zeiger,  5  N. 

M.    074.  1207,    1288 

Town   of   Areata   v.   Areata  &c.    R. 

Co.,   92   Cal.   639,  589 

Town  of  Arkadelphia  v.   Clark,   52 

Ark.    23,  1120 

Town  of  Atchison  v.  Butcher,  3  Kan. 

104,  992 

Town  of  Auburn  v.  Eldridge,  77  Ind. 

120,  537 

Town    of    Aurora    v.    Chicago    &c.    R. 

Co.,    119    111.    240,  1542 

Town  of  Bavard  v.   Baker,   70  Iowa 

220,         '  300,  477,  478,  487,   489 

Town    of   Beacon    Falls   v.    Town   of 

Seymour.    44    Conn.    210,  1051 

Town  of  Bennington  v.   Park,  50  Vt. 

178,       -  1539 

Town  of  Bergen  v.  State,  32  N.  J.  L. 

490,  408 

Town    of    Bethlehem    v.    Town    of 

Watertowu,  51  Conn.  490,  1051 

Town   of   Bloomfield   v.    Trimble,    54 

Iowa    399.  496.    607 

Town  of  Boswell  v.  Wakley,  149  Ind. 

04,  1325,    1328,    1329 

Town  of  Brookville  v.  Gagle,  73  Ind. 

177,  528,    535 

Town    of   Bruce   v.    Dickey,    110    111. 

527,  003.    715.    805,    1349 

Town  of  Burlington  v.  Schwarzman, 

52    Conn.     181,  1109 

Town  of  Burton  v.  Town  of  Wake- 
field,   4    N.    H.    47,  1046 
Town   of  Butternut  v.   O'Malley.   50 

Wis.     333,  409,    451 

Town    of   Byron   v.    State,    35    Wis. 

313,  831 

Town    of    Cabot    v.    Britt,    36    Vt. 

349,  1425 

Town   of  Camden  v.   Bloch^   65   Ala. 

236,  543,   1418 

Town   of   Canaan  v.   Derush,   47    N. 

H.    212,  240 

Town  of  Cantril  v.   Sanier,  59   Iowa 

26,  519 

Town  of  Central  Covington  v.   Park, 

21    Ky.    L.    1847,  1244 

Town    of    Charleston    v.    Town    of 

Lunenburgh.  21  Vt.  488,  1737 

Town  of  Chittenden  v.  Town  of  Bar- 
nard,   61    Vt.    145,  1042 
Town   of    Cicero   v.    Williamson,    91 

Ind.    541,  1572 


Town  of  Coloma  v.  Eaves.  92  U.  S. 

484,  256,    257,    885,    1001,    1002, 

1003,     1004,     1000,     1007,     1008 
1009.     1010,     1011.     1029 
Town  of  Colorado  City  v.  Townsend, 

9    Colo.    App.    249,  710 

Town   of  Concord  v.   I'ortsmouth 

Sav.   Bank,  92  U.   S.  025,  990.   1023 
Town    of    Covington    v.    Nelson,    35 

Ind.    532,  1288 

Town    of    Cromwell    v.    Connecticut 

&c.  Quarry  Co.,  50  Conn.  470,       629 
Town    of   Crowley    v.    West,    52    La. 

An.   526,  1387 

Town    of    Croydon    v.    Sullivan    Co., 

47    N.    H.    179,  1042,    1058 

Town  of  Dakota  v.   Town  of  Winne- 

conne.    55    Wis.    522,  1063 

Town  of  Danville  v.   Shelton,   76  Va. 

325,  1132,    1256,    1548 

Town  of  Darlington  v.  Atlantic  Tr. 

Co.,    68    Fed.    849,  610 

V.   Ward,   48   S.   C.   570,  501 

Town  of  Davis  v.   Filler,  47  W.  Va. 

413,  208 

Town  of  Decorah  v.  Bullis,  25  Iowa 

12,  288,    289,    296 

V.   Dunstan,   38    Iowa  96,   523,    1405 
Town  of  Depere  v.  Town  of  Bellevue, 

31    Wis.    120,  409,    424,    436 

Town    of   Derby   v.    Ailing,    40    Conn. 

410.  1109 

Town    of   Dixon    v.    Mayes,    72    Cal. 

166.  1515 

Town    of   Douglasville   v.    Johns,    62 

Ga.    423,  244 

Town  of  Dover  v.  Tawressey,  2  Marv. 

285.  1738 

Town    of    Duanesburgh    v.    Jenkins, 

57    N.    Y.    177, 

982,  902.   1010,   1532,   1538,   1539 
Town    of    Durango    v.     Pennington, 

8  Colo.  257,    259,  260,  715,  729.  1193 
Town  of  Eagle  v.  Kohn,  84  111.  292, 

991.  1013 
Town  of  East  Chester,  In  re,  53  Hun 

181.  92T 

Town  of  East  Hartford  v.  Hartford 

Bridge  Co.,  10  How.  536, 

90,    103,    758 
Town  of  East   Lincoln  v.   Davenport, 

94   U.    S.   801,  995.   1001,   1023 

Town  of  Edenton  v.  Wool,  65  N.  J. 

L.    218.  1412 

Town  of  I'^ldora  v.  Burlingame,   62 

Iowa    32.  519,    541 

Town  of  Elkhart  v.   Ritter,   66   Ind. 

130,  1580,    1024 

Town   of   Flora   v.    Lee,    5    111.    App. 

629,  477,    539,    540 

Town    of   Fox   v.    Town   of   Kendall, 

97   111.   72,  1084 

Town  of  Freeport  v.  Board  of  Super- 
visors,   41    111.    495.  1042 
Town  of  Geneva  v.  Cole.  61  III.  397,  1691 
Town  of  Gloster  v.  Harrell,  77  Miss. 

793,  311 

Town    of    Granby    v.    Thurston,    23 

Conn.  416.  103.  965 

Town   of   Grand   Isle  v.    Kinney,    70 

Vt.    381.  721 

Town  of  Greenburg  v.  International 

Tr.   Co.,   94   Fed.   755,  1031 

Town   of  Guilford   v.   Board  &c.,    13 

N.   Y.   143.  703.    1522 

V.   Board  &c.,   18   Barb.   615.        1521 
Town  of  Hackettstown  v.    SwacR- 

hamer.  37  N.  J.   L.   191,       634,  974 
Town  of  Hamden  v.  Bethany,  43  Conn. 

212,  1051 

v.    New    Hampshire    R.    Co.,    27 

Conn.    158.  1108 

V.    Rice,    24    Conn.    350,  664 


cxc 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Vol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.'] 


Town    of    Hamilton    v.    Chopard.    0 

Wash.  ^3:>2.  1290 

Town  of  Hampton  v.  CoflQn,  4  N.   H. 

517,  705 

Town  of  Hai'dwick  v.  Town  of  Paw- 
let.    3G    Vt.    320,  1058 
Town   of   Harrisonburg   v.    Roller,    97 

Va.  5S2.  551,  587,   1708 

Town  of  Hendersonville  v.   Price,   96 

N.    C.    423,  650 

Town   of   Jacksonport   v.    Watson,   33 

Ark.    704,  651,    1730 

Town  of  Jamestown  v.   Chicago  «&c. 

R.    Co..    69    Wis.    G48.        1171,    1667 
Town  of  Jericho  v.  Town  of  Under- 

hill,    64   Vt.    362,  1055 

Town  of  Kirkwood  v.  Newbury,  122 

N.    Y.    571,  1580 

V.    Newbury,    45    Hun    323,  1172 

Town  of  Klamath  Falls  v.   Sachs,  35 

Or.   325,   882.  999,   1011,   1030,   1033 
Town    of   Kosciusko   v.    Slomberg,    68 

Miss.  469,  1102 

Town   of   Lake   View   v.    Letz,   44   111. 

81,  503 

Town   of  Latonia  v.    Hopkins,   20   Ky. 

L.    620,  1505 

Town  of  Laurel  v.  Blue,  1  Ind.  App. 

128,  1076 

Town  of  Lemington  v.  Blodgett,  37 

Vt.  215,  240,  345 

Town   of   Lemont  v.   Singer  &c.   Co., 

98    HI.    94,  1717,    1720 

Town  of  Levis  v.    Black  River  Imp. 

Co.,    105    WMs.    391,  725 

Town  of  Lewiston  v.  Proctor,  23   111. 

483,  535,   1420 

Town    of    Lexington    v.    Union    Nat. 

Bank,  75  Miss.  1,        998,  1014,   1029 
Town    of    Ijondonderry    v.    Town    of 

Andover.    28   Vt.    416,  86,    87 

Town  of  Lyndon  v.  Miller,  36  Vt.  329, 

325 
Town  of  Lyons  v.  Cook,  9  111.  App. 

543,  1551 

v.    Cooledge,    89    111.    529,  865 

Town   of   Macon  v.    Patty,    57   Miss. 

378,  1198,    1252,    1297 

Town  of  Madison  v.  Newsome,  39  Fla. 

149.  711 

Town  of   Marietta  v.   Fearing,   4   Ohio 

427,  90,    103,   522 

Town   of   Martinsville   v.    Frieze,    33 

Ind.    507,  539 

Town  of  Mentz  v.   Cook,    108   N.   Y. 

504,  1023 

Town  of  Middlebury  v.  Waltham,  6 

Vt.    200.  1042 

Town  of  Middleport  v.    ^tna  Life 

Ins.   Co.,   82   111.  562,  625,  996 

Town  of  Milwaukee  v.   City  of  Mil- 
waukee, 12  Wis.  93,     424,  437,  1519 
Town  of  Montgomery  v.  Le  Sueur  Co., 

32  Minn.  532,  1095 

Town    of    Monticello    v.    Banks,    48 

Ark.    251,  •  1271 

v.   Cohn,   48   Ark.   254,  650 

Town  of  Montpelier  v.   Town  of  East 

Montpelier,    29    Vt.    12,        459,    1519 
Town   of   Moundsville  v.    Velton,    35 

W.    Va.    217.  538,    1420 

Town   of  Mt.   Vernon  v.    Patton,   94 

111.    65,  663,    865 

Town    of    Mt.    Zion    v.    Gillman,    14 

Fed.    123.  1720 

Town  of  Muskego  v.  Drainage  Com'rs, 

78  WMs.   40,  1178 

Town   of   New   Athens   v.    Thomas,    82 

111.    259,  260 

Town    of    New    Castle    v.    Lake    Erie 

&c.  R.  Co.,  155  Ind.  18,  1810 

Town   of   New   Hampton   v.    Conroy, 

56    Iowa    498,  532,    1400 


Town   of   New    Hartford   v.    Town   of 

Canaan.   52  Conn.   108,  1054 

Town    of    New    Haven    v.    Town    of 

Middlebury,    63    Vt.    399.  1060 

Town  of  New  Shoreham  v.  Ball,  14 

R.    I.    506,  665 

Town  of  Norman  v.  Ince,  8  Okl.  412, 

1782 
Town  of  North  Hempstead  v.  Town 

of  Hempstead.  Hopk.  288.  1536 

Town  of  North   Hempsted  v.  Town  of 

Hempsted,  2  Wend.   109, 

7,    50,   435.    445,    1519 
Town  of  Ocean  Springs  v.  Green,  77 

Miss.    472,  488,    549 

Town    of   Odell   v.    Schroeder,    58    111. 

353,  772,    789 

Town  of  Olin  v.  Meyers,  55  Iowa  209, 

299,    1421 

Town    of    Opelousas    v.    Andrus,    37 

La.    An.    699,  480 

Town   of   Pacific   v.    Seifert,    79    Mo. 

210.  516 

Town  of   Pana  v.   Lippincott,   2   111. 

App.    466.  989,    992,    1027 

Town   of   I'aris   v.    Farmers'   Bank,    30 

Mo.    575,  1513 

Town   of   Parkland   v.   Ganis,   88   Ky. 

563,  1271 

Town  of  Petersburg  v.   Mappin,  14 

111.    193,  659 

V.    Metzker,    21    111.    205. 

97,   468,   494 
Town    of    Pierrepont    v.    Loveless,    72 

N.    Y.    211,  1591 

Town    of    PlaiufleM   v.    Village   of 

Pla  infield.    67    Wis.    525,  948 

Town  of  Platteville  v.  Galena  &c.  R. 

Co.,    43    Wis.    493,  1540 

Town  of  Plattsmouth  v.   Fitzgerald, 

10   Neb.    401,  1022 

Town  of  Pleasant  v.  Kost,  29  111.  490, 

1246 
Town    of    Plymouth    v.    Paniter,    17 

Conn.  585,  195 

Town  of  Poplin  v.  Town  of  Hawke, 

8  N.  II.  305,  1058.  1064 

Town  of  Prairie  v.  Lloyd,  97  111.  179, 

1017 
Town  of  Princeton  v.  Vierling,  40  Ind. 

340,  242,   245 

Town  of  Reading  v.  Town  of  West- 
port,    19    Conn.    561,  1042 
Town    of    Remington    v.    Ward,    78 

Wis.   539,  587,   858 

Town  of  Rensselaer  v.  Leopold.   106 

Ind.   29.  687,   1301 

Town  of  Rhine  v.  City  of  Sheboygan, 

82  Wis.  352,  1059 

Town  of  Rockingham  v.   Springfield, 

59  Vt.  521,  948,  1042 

Town   of  Roswell  v.   Dominice,  9   N. 

M.  624.  1236 

Town    of    Rushville    v.    Adams,    107 

Ind.  47.5.  1612 

Town    of    Rutland    v.    Paige,    24    Vt. 

181.  1015 

Town  of  Rvegate  v.  Town  of  Wards- 

boro,   30   Vt.   746.  1058 

Town  of  Salem  v.  McClintock,  16  Ind. 

App.    656,  151 

Town  of  Saukville  v.  State,  69  Wis. 

178.  831 

Town  of  Searcy  v.  Yarnell,  47  Ark. 

269,  64.     629 

Town  of  Sliebovgan  v.  Sheboygan  &c. 

Co..     21     Wis.     675.  1171 

Town  of  Solon   v.   Williamsburg   Sav. 

Bank,    114    N.    Y.    122. 

1014,  1022.  1027 
Town    of    Somerset   v.    Town   of   Glas- 

tenbury,    61    Vt.    449,  62 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


CXCl 


[References  are  to  Pages.    Vol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.] 


Town  of  South  Ottawa  v.  Foster,  20 

III.  296,  775 

V.  Terkins.  04  U.  S.  260,       986,  998 
Town  of  Spiceland  v.  Alier,  98  Ind. 

467.  1625 

Town  of  Springfield  v.  Teutonia  Sav. 

Bank,    84    N.    Y.    403,  987 

Town  of  Stamford  v.  Town  of  Reads- 

boro,    46    Vt.    606,  1042 

Town  of  State  Center  v.   Barenstein, 

66  Iowa  249, 

500.  506,  508.  1396,   1405,  1406 
Town   of   Sullivan   v.    Phillips,    110 

Ind.   320.  1177 

Town   of    Swanton   v.    Pratt,    15   Vt. 

147,  1213 

Town  of  Thornton  v.  Fugate,  21  Ind. 

App.    537,  1780.     1800 

Town   of   Tipton   v.    Norman,    72    Mo. 

380,  464,  526.   540,  1421,   1422 

Town    of   Topsham    v.    Town    of   Chel- 
sea.   60    Vt.    219,  1058 
Town  of  Tumwater  v.  Pix,   15  Wash. 

324.  1241 

Town  of  Tupelo  v.   Beard,   56  Miss. 

532,  1552 

Town  of  Union  v.  Durkes,  38  N.  J.  L. 

21,  1216 

Town  of  Venice  v.  Murdock,  92  U.  S. 

494,        885.    1001,    1003,    1009,    1539 

V.    Woodruff.    62    N.    Y.    462,        1010 
Town  of  Wakefield  v.  Town  of  Alton. 

3    N.    H.   378,  1047 

Town  of  Waltham  v.   Kemper,  55  111. 

346,        82,   265,   267,   772,   775,    1342 
Town    of    Warrensbui'gh    v.    Miller, 

77    Mo.    56,  1727 

Town    of    Washington    v.    Hammond, 

76    N.    C.    33,  497 

V.    Town   of   Kent,    38   Conn.    249. 

1052 
Town  of  Waterville  v.  County  Com'rs, 

59  Maine  80,  1252,  1522 

Town  of  Wauwatosa  v.   Gunyon,   25 

Wis.    25,  1536 

Town    of    Weare    v.    Town    of    New 

Boston.  3   N.   H.   203.  1046 

Town   of   Wellsborough   v.    New   York 

&c.    R.    Co..   76   N.    Y.    182,  988 

Town    of    Westbrook's    Appeal,    57 

Conn.    95,  1379 

Town  of  West  Hartford  v.  Board  &c., 

44   Conn.   361,  572 

Town   of   Weyauwega  v.   Ayling,    99 

U.    S.    112.  1001,   1015 

Town   of   Whiting  v.   Doob,    152    Ind. 

157,  519,    1789 

Town    of    Williamsport    v.    Liske,    21 

Ind.   App.   414,  1325,    1329 

Town  of  Winamac  v.  Huddleston,   132 

Ind.  217.  632,  655 

Town   of  Windham   v.   Town   of   Leb- 
anon,    51     Conn.     319,  1052 
Town   of  Windsor  v.   Hallett,   97   111. 

204,  1013 

Town    of    Woodbury    v.    Brown,    101 

Tenn.  707.  63 

Town    of    Woodstock    v.    Gallup,    28 

Vt.    587.  691 

Town  of  Worcester  v.   Town  of  East 

Montpelier.   61   Vt.   139.  1042 

Town  of  Worthington  v.  Morgan,   17 

Ind.    App.    603.  1316 

Townsend.  In  re,  39  N.  Y.  171.  979,  983 

V.  City  of  Manistee,  88  Mich.  408. 

918,    1202 

V.   Copeland.   56   Cal.   612,  1712 

V.    Greely.    5    Wall.    326,  1743 

V.    Hovle,   20   Conn.   1.  684 

V.    Lamb.    14   Neb.   324,  990 

Township  Board  &c.  v.   Hackman,   48 

Mo.    243.  689 

V.    Hastings,    52    Mich.    528,  732 


Tracy  v.  Cloyd.  10  W.  Va.   19.  225 

V.   Elizabethtown  &c.   R.   Co.,  SO 

Ky.    259,  685 

V.    Goodwin,    5   Allen   409,    330,    332 

V.    People.    6    Colo.    151,  299 

300.   477.   478,   729,    1133.    1193 

V.   Town   of   Phelps,   22   Fed.   634. 

,    1028 

V.   Williams.   4   Conn.    107,   335,   536 
Trading  Stamp  Co.  v.  Memphis.   101 

Tenn.    181,  1389,    1704 

Trafton  v.  Alfred,  3   Shepl.   258,  211 

Trageser  v.   Gray,  73  Md.  250,  1399 

Train    v.     Boston    Disinfecting    Co., 

144  Mass.  523.  1116,   1600 

Trammell  v.   Lee.  94  Ala.   194.  1074 

V.  Town  of  Russellville,  34  Ark. 

105,  1075 

Transportation  Co.  v.  Chicago,  99  U. 

S.    635.  680,    801,    1317 

V.    Parkersburg,    107    U.    S.    691, 

1576 

V.    Wheeling,   99   U.   S.   273, 

1502,    1537 
Transylvania    University    v.    City    of 

Lexington.   3    B.    Mon.    25,  1213 

Trapnell    v.    Red    Oak    Junction,    76 

Iowa    744,  1620 

Travelers'   Ins.   Co.  v.  City  of  Denver, 

11    Colo.    434,  953,    961 

V.   Mayor  &c.,  99  Fed.  663,  1032 

Traver  v.  Merrick  Co.,  14  Neb.  327,  981 
Travis  v.  Uttley,  1  Q.  B.  233,  1376 

Treadway  v.  Schnauber,  1  Dak.  236,  646 
Treasurer  &c.  v.  Mulford,  26  N.  J. 

L.    49,  543,    1257,    1712 

Tredwell    v.    City    of    Brooklyn,    43 

N.   Y.   S.   458,  1281,   1291 

Tremain  v.  Cohoes  Co.,  2  N.  Y.  163.  824 
Trench  v.  Nolan.  6  Ir.  R.  C.  L.  464,  37S 
Trenor  v.  Jackson,  15  Abb.  Pr.  115,  620 
Trent   v.  Cartersville  Bridge  Co.,   11 

Leigh    521,  1463 

Trescott  v.  City  of  Waterloo,  26  Fed. 

592,  263,    822 

Trester    v.    City    of    Sheboygan,    87 

Wis.    496,  587 

Trigally  v.  Mayor  &c.,  6  Coldw.  382, 

526,  1414 
Trigg  V.  Trustees  &c.,  2  Bush  594.  1499 
Trimble  v.   City  of  Mt.   Sterling,   11 

Ky.   L.    727,  1503 

Trimmer   v.    City   of   Rochester,    130 

N.  Y.  401.  1205,   1264 

Trimmier  v.  Bomar,  20  S.  C.  354.  989 
Trinity  Co.  v.  Polk  Co.,  58  Tex.  321,  434 
Tripler    v.    Mayor    &c.,    125    N.    Y. 

617,  1263,   1265 

Tritz   V.    City   of   Kansas,   84    Mo. 

632,  1580 

Trost   V.    Eastern   R.    Co.,   64    N.    H. 

220,  795 

Trott  V.  Warren,  11  Maine  227,  48.  49 
Trotter  v.   City  of  Chicago,  33  111. 

App.   206,  605 

Trowbridge  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  144 

Mass.  139,  809,  1180 

V.  Mayor  &c..  46  N.  J.  L.   140.     519 
Troxel    v.    City   of   Vinton,    77    Iowa 

90.  1617,   1635 

Troy  V.  A.  &  N.  B.  Co.,  11  Kan.  519. 

1423 
Truax  v.  Pool.  46  Iowa  256.  1517 

Truchelut    v.    City    Council,    1    N.    & 

McC.  227,  468,  763,  1420 

True  V.  Davis,  133  111.  522. 

103,   383,  386.  396,  888,   1347 
Truesdale  v.   Peoria  Grape   Sugar  Co., 

101    111.    651,  1706 

Truesdell's  Appeal,  58  Pa.   St.  148,  1540 

V.    Combs.    33    Ohio    St.    186,        335 
Trumbo  v.  People,  75  111.  561,  1691 


excu 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Yol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.'] 


Trustees  &c.  v.  City  of  Atlanta,  76 

Ga.  181,  1247 

V.  City  of  Erie,  31  Pa.  St.  515, 

92,   491 
V.  City  of  Jacljsonville,   61   111. 
App.    199,  741 

V.  Coweu,  4  Paige  510, 

1109,  1556,  1564 
V.   Demott,    13   Ohio   104,  1063 

V.  Dillon,  16  Ohio  St.  38,  1529 

V.  Erie,  31  Pa.  St.  515.  523,  1421 

V.   Foster.   30   N.    Y.    S.   686,        1340 
V.   Garvey,   80   Ky.   159,  1540 

V.   Gibbs,    2   Cush.   39,  155 

V.    Hills,   6   Cowen   23,  288 

V.  Hohn,  82  Ky.  1,  233,  253,  648 

V.    Inhabitants   &c.,    175    Mass. 
118.  1290,    1550 

V.   Jameson,    12   Ky.   L.   719, 

850,   1472 
V.    Keeting.    4    Denio    341,  115 

V.    King,    12    Mass.    546,  563 

V.    Kirk.    68    N.    Y.    459,  19 

V.    Lefler,   23    111.    88. 

85,   538,   540,   1132 
V.   Mayor  &c.,  33  N.   J.   L.   13, 

629,  1374 
V.    McConnell,    12   111.    138,  1520 

V.  Mecox  Bay  &c.  Co.,  116  N.  Y. 
1,  1° 

V.    Merryweather,    11    East    376, 

1556 
V.    Moodv,    62    Ala.    389,  261 

V.  Otis,  37  Barb.  50,  1567 

V.    Parks,    10    Maine   441,  50 

V.    Peaslee,    15    N.    H.    317,  664 

V.    People,    121    111.    552,    1495,    1496 
V.  Perkins,  3   B.   Mon.   437,  629 

V.  Rausch,   122   Ind.   167,  1185 

V.  Rautenberg.  88  III.  219,  216 

V.  Roome,  29  Ilun  391,  901 

V.   Salmond,   11   Maine  109,  637 

V.    Satchwell.    71    N.    C.    Ill,  45 

V.   Shepard,   22  K.    I.   112,  1321 

V.    Sheperd.    139    111.    114,  1483 

V.   Southward,  31    111.   App.  359,  914 
V.    Strong,    60    N.   Y.    57,  19 

V.  Tatman,    13   111.   27. 

103,    1084,    1537 
V.   Taylor,   30  N.   J.    Eq.   618, 

76,   80,   81 
V.    Trustees.    81    111.    470,  1480 

V.    White,    48    Ohio    St.    577,        938 
V.    Winston,    5    St.    &    P.    17,  7 

V.   Woodward,   1   N.    H.   Ill,  75 

Tubesing    v.    City    of    Buffalo,    69    N. 

Y.  S.  399.  1339 

Tuckahoe  Canal  v.  Tuckahoe  &c.  R. 

Co.,    11    Leigh    42,  679 

Tucker    v.    Aiken,    7    N.    H.    113, 

196,    344,   351,    362,    379 
V.    City   of   Utica,    54    N.    Y.    S. 
855,  1247 

V.  Justices  &c.,  13  Ired.  L.  434,  301 
V.  Justices  &c..  34  Ga.  370,  1533 

V.  Rankin,  15  Barb.  471,  1568 

V.    Sellers.   130   Ind.   514,  1287 

Tucker  &  Frankfort  Sts.,  In  re,  166 

Pa.  St.  336.  1220 

Tudor  V.  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.,  154  111. 

129,  515 

Tuebner  v.  California  &c.  St.  R.  Co., 

66  Cal.  171,  1108 

Tufts  V.  City  of  Charlestown,  4  Gray 

537,  702 

V.  State,  119  Ind.  232,  1476 

V.  Town  of  Chester,  62  Vt.  353,  1059 

Tugnian  v.   City  of  Chicago.   78   111. 

405,  500.  502,  503,  614,   1357 

Tuley  V.  State,  1  Ind.  500.  1483 

Turflcr.  In  re,  44  Barb.  46,  1533 

Turnbull    v.    Alpena    Tp.,    74    Mich. 

621,  1551 


Turner  v.  Althaus,  6  Neb.  54, 

1515,   1552,   1725 
V.  City  of  Chicago,  76  111.  App. 
649,  174 

V.  City  of  Indianapolis,  96  Ind. 
51,  1624 

V.  City  of  Newburgh,  109  N.  Y. 
301,  826,  1375,  1590,  1625,  1636 

V.  Commissioners,  10  Kan.  16,  1655 
V.  Cruzen,  70  Iowa  202,  242,  655 
V.  Dartmouth.  13  Allen  291,  1216 
V.  Iladden,  62  Barb.  480,  1063 

V.  Killian,  12  Neb.  580,  332 

V.  Mayor  &c.,  78  Ga.  683,  620 

V.  Newburg,  109  N.  Y.  301,  1586 

V.  Sisson.  137  Mass.  191,  332 

V.  Thomas,  10  Mo.  App.  338,  217 
V.  Wilson.  49  Ind.  581,  530 

V.  Woodbury  Co.,  57  Iowa  440, 

9,  775 

Turney  v.   Town   of  Bridgeport,   55 

Conn.  412,  860,  916,  927 

Turpen    v.    County   Com'rs,    7    Ind. 

172,  '  183 

Turrill  v.  Grattan,  52  Cal.  97,  1258 

Tutt  V.  Hobbs.  17  Mo.  486.  216 

Tuttle  V.  Cary,  7  Maine  426,  347 

V.  Everett.  51  Miss.  27,  242,  248 
V.   Polk.  92  Iowa  433,  876,  881 

V   Town  of  Weston,  59  Wis.  151,  349 

Twenty-sixth  St.,  Matter  of,  12 

Wend.    203,  1233 

Twiss    V.    City    of    Port    Huron,    63 

Mich.   528.  1257 

Twist  V.  City  of  Rochester,  55  N.  Y. 

S.  850,     793,  1316,  1332,  1362,  1802 

Twogood    V.    Mayor   &c.,    102   N.    Y. 

216,  1621 

Tyerman,  In  re,  48  Fed.  167,  1399 

Tyler  v.  Alford,  38  Maine  530,  335 

V.  Beacher,  44  Vt.  648,  685,  980 
V.  Capeheart,  125  N.  C.  64,  993 

V.    Elizabethtown   &c.   R.   Co.,   9 
Bush  510,  92 

V.   Henry,  2  Pick.  397,  1425 

V.    Inhabitants    &e.,    147    Mass. 
609,  688 

V.  Nelson.  14  Graft.  214,  322,  323 
V.  State.  63  Vt.  300,  1420 

V.    Sturdy,    108   Mass.   106, 

1557,  1561 
V.  Township  Board  &c.,  75  Mo. 
App.  561,  1686 

V.  Williston,  62  Vt.  269,     1575,  1622 

Tyree  v.  Wilson,  0  Graft.  59,  323 

Tyrrell  v.  City  of  New  York,  159  N. 

Y.  239,  180,  181 

Tyson  v.  City  of  Milwaukee,  50  Wis. 

78,  680 

V.   School  Directors,  51   Pa.   St. 

9,  1542 

U 

Fhl  V.  Board  &c.,  6  Lea  610,  1526 

Uhrig  V.   City  of  St.   Louis,   44   Mo. 

458,  1266 

Ulam  V.  Boyd,  87  Pa.  St.  477,      262,  263 

Uline  V.   New  York  &c.   R.   Co.,   101 

N.  Y.  98,  1603,  1773 

rilman  v.  Mayor  &c.,  165  U.  S.  719,  1302 

ITlman  v.   Mayor,   72   Md.   587. 

1237,  1242,  1267 

TTnderhill  v.  City  of  Manchester.  45 

N.  H.  214,  800,  1394 

V.  Gibson.  2  N.  H.  352,  868 

Underwood    v.    Brockman,    4    Dana 

309.  1725 

V.  Greene,  42  N.  Y.  140,  1110 

V.  Stuyyesant,  19  Johns.  181,     1559 

TTnion  v.  Crawford,  19  Conn.  331,       142 

Union  Bank  &c.  v.  Board  &c.,  116  N. 

C.  339,  993 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


CXClll 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Vol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.'] 


Union   Bank   &c.    v.    Board  &c.,    90 

Fed.  7,  1758 

V.  Commissioners  &c..  119  N.  C. 
214,     736.  984.  985.  993,  1030,  1680 
V.  State.  9  Yerpr.  489,  1501,  1532 

Union  Civil  Tp.  v.  Berryman,  3  Ind. 

App.  344,  1076 

Union    Co.    v.    Knox    Co.,    90    Tenn. 

541,  418 

V.  Slocum,  16  Or-  237.  944 

Union  Co.  Court  v.  Robinson,  27  Arli. 

116.  1540 

Union    Depot   &c.    R.    Co.   v.    Smith, 


6 


191 


S. 


427 
1697 


1758 


16  Colo.   361, 
Union    Tac.    R.   Co.   v.    Board  &c. 
Kan.  256. 

V.  Chevenne.  113  U.  S.  516. 
V.  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.,  10  U 
App.  98. 

V.  City  of  Kansas  City,  42  Kan 
497,  390 

V.   Commissioners  &c.,  98   U.   S. 
541,  242.  243,  245,  246,  247,  248 

V.    Commissioners    «&c.,    4    Neb. 
450.  981 

V.  Dunden,  37  Kan.  1.  794 

V.   Foley,   19  Colo.   280.  652 

V.  Merrill  Co.,  3  Dill.  359.  1022 

V.  Lincoln  Co.,  3  Dill.  300. 

981.  985,  1022,  1717 
V.  Merrick  Co.,  3  Dill.  359.  985 

V.  Montgomery,  49  Neb.  429,         483 
Union   Paving  &c.   Co.  v.   McGovern, 

127  Cal.  638,  726.  1240 

Union  School  Tp.  v.  First  Nafl  Bank. 

102  Ind.  464,  647.  857,  862 

Union   St.   R.   Co.  v.   Stone.  54  Kan. 

83.  1325,  1332,  1336 

Union  Tp.  v.  Rader.  41  N.  J.  L.  617,    452 
V.  Smith.  39  Iowa  9.  319 

LTnion  Trust  Co.  v.  Monticello  &c.  R. 

Co.,  63   N.   Y.  311.  1019 

V.  Trumbull.  137  111.  146,  524 

V.  Weber.  96  111.  346.  1721 

United  Brethren  Church  v.  Vandusen, 

37  Wis.  54,  291 

United   Hebrew  Ass'n  v.   Beushimol, 

130  Mass.  325,  524 

United    N.    J.     R.    &c.    v.    National 
Docks  &c.   R.   Co.,  57  N.   J.   L. 
523,  1319 

United  States  v.  Adams.  24  Fed.  348,  328 
V.  Alexander,  46  Fed.  728,  195 

V.    American    Water-works    Co., 
37  Fed.  747,  1462 

V.  Anthony.   11   Blatch.  200,  369 

V.  Arredonda.  6  Pet.  691,  615 

V.  Austin,  2  Cliff.  325, 
V.  Board  &c..  20  Fed.  294, 
V.  Booth,  11  Gill  &  J.  373, 
V.  Boyd.  5  How.  29, 
V.  Boyd,  15  Peters  187, 
V.  Brown.  9  How.  486. 
V.    City    Bank   of   Columbus,    21 
How.   356,  256 

V.  City  of  New  Orleans,  31  Fed. 
537  948 

V.  City  of  Sterling,  2  Biss.  408, 

847,  1529 
V.  Clark  Co.,  95  U.   S.   769. 

1525.  1646.  1680 
V.  Clark  Co..  96  U.   S.  211.  1524 

V.  County  Court,  4  McCrary  218. 

1525,  1526 
V.  Cruikshank,  92  U.   S.   542. 

137,   138,  369 
V.  Davis.  3  McLean  483,  1734 

V.  Dashiel,  4  Wall.  182,  319 

V.  Giles,  9  Cranch  212.  322 

V.  Gilmore,  8  Wall.  330,  1790 

V.  Girault.   11  How.  22,  324 

V.  Great  Falls  Mfg.  Co.,  112  U. 
S.  645,  772 

1  Smith — xiii 


179 
1529 
1734 

324 
317,  322 

175 


United  States  v.  Green,  8  Mack.  230, 

1413,  1415 
V.  Harris,  106  U.  S.  629,  140 

V.  Harris,  1  Sumner  21,  675,  685 
V.  Hillegas,  3  Wash.  C.  C.  70,  770 
V.  Hine.  3  McArth.  27,  332 

V.  Hodson,   10  Wall.  395,  311 

V.  Holly,  3  Cr.  C.  C.  656,  607 

V.  Hoyt.  1  Blatchf.  326.  327 

V.  Hudson.  7  Cranch  32,  205 

V.  Humason,  6  Sawyer  199,  312,  819 
V.  Insurance  Co.,  22  Wall.  99,  45 
V.  Irwin.  127  U.  S.  125,  772 

V.  .Jefferson  Co.,  5  Dill.  535,  15'^3 
V.  Jefferson  Co.,  1  McCrary  356,  996 
V.   Jones,   109   U.   S.   513. 

673,  697,  698 
V.  Justices  &c.,  5  Dill.  184,  1525 

V.  Keehler,  9  Wall.  83,  319 

V.  Keokuk,  6  Wall.  514,  1528 

V.  Kirkpatrick.  9  Wheat.  720. 

317,  318,  319,  326,  771 
V.  Labette  Co..  2  McCrary  25,  1646 
V.  Le  Baron,  19  How.  73,  313 

V.  Lee,  106  U.  S.  196, 

18,  770.  772,  1721 
V.  Lincoln  Co.,  5  Dill.   184,  764 

V.  Linn.  15  Peters  290,  311,  1014 
V.   Macon  Co.,  99  U.   S.   582, 

1523.  1524.  1525.  1528,  1534,  15.35 
V.  Maurice.  2  Brock.  C.  C.  96,       312 
V.   Mayor  &c.,  2  Woods  230,        1523 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  2  Am.  L.  Reg.  N. 
S.  394,  1535 

V.  McCortney,  1  Fed.  104,  318 

V.  McDougall,  121  U.  S.  89,  772 

V.  McKelden.  MacArth.  &  M.  162 

349,  355, '368 
V.  Memphis,  97  U.  S.  284 

387.  394,  1516.  1517,  1518,  1.531 
V.  Miller  Co..  4  Dill.  233,  847 

V.  Moore,  2  Brock.  C.  C.  317,  330 
V.  Morgan.  11  How.  153.  319 

V.  Morgan,  3  Wash.  C.  C.  10,  309 
V.  Nelson,  2  Brock.  C.  C.  64,  310 

V.  New  Orleans.  98  U.  S    381        838 
1522.    1523.    1530;    1533.    1534.    1660 
V.  Nicholl.  12  Wheat.  505,      317,  771 
V.    Pacific   Railroad,    120   U.    S 
227,  "'-1385 

V.  Percheman,  7  Pet.  51.  1423 

V.   Port  of  Mobile,  12  Fed.  768  ; 
4  Woods  536,  67,  412    15''5 

V.  Powell.  14  Wall.  493,  318 

V.  Prescott,  3  How.  578,  319,  865 
V.  Railroad  Bridge  Co.,  6  Mc- 
Lean 317,  687 
V.  Reese.  92  U.  S.  214.  138,  369 
V.  Rogers,  28  Fed.  607,  311 
V.  Russell.  13  Wall.  623,  1385 
V.  Silverman,  4  Dill.  224,  15''8 
V.  Singer,  15  Wall.  Ill,  318 
v.  Slater.  4  Wood  356.  369 
V.  State  Bank,  96  U.  S.  30,  211 
V.  Thomas.  15  Wall.  337,  319 
V.  Tingey.  5  Peters  115,  311 
V.  Twenty-five  Cases  of  Cloths, 
Crabbe  356,  106 
V.  Union  Pac.  R.  Co.,  91  U.  S. 
72.  1018 
V.  Van  Zandt,  11  Wheat.  184, 

317,  771 
V.  Villato.  2  Dallas  370,  132 

V.  Watts,  1  N.  Mex.  553,  319 

V.  Wells.  2  Cr.  C.  C.  45,  607 

V.  Wiley.  11  Wall.  508.  455 

V.  Williams.  5  McLean  133,  1734 
V.    Wright,    1    McLean   509,  199 

United   States  Distilling  Co.  v.  City 

of  Chicago.  112  111.  19,  1399 

United   States  &c.   Ins.   Co.  v.   Poil- 

lon,  7  N.  Y.  S.  834,  1397 


cxcrv 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Vol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol.  II,  pp.  S33-1830.'i 


United  States  Mort.  Co.  v.  Gross,  93 

111.   4S3,  643 

United    States   Trust   Co.    v.    United 

States  Ins.  Co.,  18  N.   Y.   199.     G02 
United    States    Water-Works    Co.    v. 

Borough  of  Du  Bois,  176  Pa.  St. 

439.  717 

University  &c.  v.  Skidmore,  87  Tenn. 

15.5,  1502 

Unwin  v.  Wolseley,  1  T.  R.  674.  216 

Updegrafif  v.  Crans,  47  Pa.  St.  103,     297 

V.  Palmer.  107  Ind.  181,  1573 

Upliam  V.  Marsh.  128  Mass.  546.  335 

Upington  v.  Oviatt,  24  Ohio  St.  232,  1421 
Uppington  v.  City  of  New  York,  58 

N.  Y.  S.  533,  1378 

Upton  V.  People  &c.,  176  HI.  632,       1260 

V.  Stoddard,  47  N.  H.  167,  364 

Urquhart  v.  City  of  Ogdensbui-g,  67 

N.  Y.  71.  1159 

V.  City  of  Ogdensburg,  91  N.  Y. 

67,  821,  1584 

Urtel  V.  City  of  Flint,  122  Mich.  65, 

1334,  1802,  1803 
Utter  V.  Franklin,  172  U.  S.  416,         993 


Vacation  of  Center  St.,   In   re.   115 

Pa.    St.   247,  1200,    1261,    1262 

Vacation  of  Howard  St.,   In  re,  142 

Pa.  St.  601,  1320 

Vail  V.  City  of  Attica,  8  Kan.  App. 

668,  610 

V.  Long  Island  R.  Co.,  106  N.  Y. 

283,  1563 

V.  Morris  &c.  R.  Co.,  21  N.  J.  L. 

189.  1572 

Vale  Mills  v.  Nashua,  63  N.  H.  136,  822 
Valentine  v.  City  of  Boston,  22  Pick. 

75,  1557 

V.    City   of    St.    Paul,    34    Minn. 

446,  244 

Valley  Co.  v.  Robinson,  32  Neb.  254,  908 
Van  Allen  v.  Assessors,  3  Wall.  573,  1501 
Van    Alstine    v.    People,    37    Mich. 

523  1133 

Van  Baalen  v.  People,  40  Mich.  258, 

604,  1405 
Van    Bergen    v.    Bradley,    36    N.    Y. 

316.  1568 

Van  Brunt  v.  Town  of  Flatbush,  128 

N.  Y.  50,  1175 

Van  Buren  v.  Wells,  53  Ark.  368. 

496,  606 
Van  Camp  v.   Board  &c.,  9  Ohio  St. 

406,  1494 

Vance  v.  City  of  Little  Rock.  30  Ark. 

435,  1232.  1527,  1532,  1535 

V.  Hadfleld.  22  N.  Y.  St.  858.  509 
Van  Cott  V.  Board  &c.,  18  Wis.  247,  1722 
Vandemark  v.  Porter,  40  Hun  397, 

1559,  1567 
Van   Denburgh   v.    President  &c.,   66 

N.  Y.  1,  521 

Vanderbeck    v.    Inhabitants    &c.,    39 

N.  .7.  L.  345.  434 

Vanderbilt  v.  Adams,  7  Cowen  349, 

673,  1079 
Vanderhurst  v.  Tholcke,   113  Cal. 

147,  1369 

Vanderpool  v.  Husson.  28  Barb.  196,  745 
Vanderslice  v.   City  of  Philadelphia, 

103  Pa.  St.  102,  1620 

Vanderstolph  v.  Highway  Com'rs,  50 

Mich.  330,  706 

Van  De  Vere  v.   City  of  Kansas,  83 

Mo.   488,  1602 

V.  Kan.sas  City,  107  Mo.  S3.  1697 
Van  Doren  v.  Mayor,  9  Paige  388,  1723 
Vandrice's  Petition,  6  Pick.  187.  1085 
Van  Dusen  v.  Fridley,  6  Dak.  322,  421 
Vandyke  v.  State,  24  Ala.  81,  770 


Vane  v.   City  of  Evanston,   150   111. 

616,  511 

Van  Eppes  v.  Board  &c.,  25  Ala.  460,  774 
Van  Frachen  v.  City  of  Ft.  Howard, 

88  Wis.  570,  1790 

Van    Hastrup    v.    Madison    City,    1 

Wall.   291,  1001 

Van    Hook    v.    Barnett,    4    Dev.    L. 

268.  312 

V.  City  of  Selma,  70  Ala.  361, 

502.  1405,  1507 

Van  Horn  v.  City  of  Des  Moines.  63 

Iowa   447,  264.   786,    14.59 

V.  Kittitas  Co.,  59  N.  Y.  S.  883.    872 

Van  Ilusan  v.  Heames,  91  Mich.  519, 

583,  584 

Van  Loan  v.   Village  of  Lake   Mills, 

88    Wis.   430.  1366 

Van  Orsdall  v.  Hazard,  3  Hill  243,     199 

Vauover    v.    Davis,    27    Ga.    354, 

845,  1542,  1717 

Van   Pelt  v.   City  of  Davenport,   42 

Iowa  308,  1207,   1585 

V.  Littler,  14  Cal.  194.  332 

Van  Rensselaer  v.  City  of  Albany,  15 

Abb.  N.  C.  457,  822 

V.  Palmatier.  2  How.  Pr.  24,       1737 
v.  Petrie,  2  How.  Pr.  94,  1737 

Van    Sant   v.    Harlem    Stage   Co.,   59 

Md.  330,  622 

Van    Schaick   v.    Sigel,   60   How.   Pr. 

122,  226,  228 

Van  Sicklen  v.   Town  of  Burlington, 

27  Vt.  70,  1542 

Van  Steenbergh  v.  Bigelow,  3  Wend. 

42,  335 
Van   Swarton  v.   Commonwealth,   24 

Pa.  St.  131,  1414 

Van   Valkeubergh   v.    Mayor  &c.,   47 

N.  J.  L.  146,  328 

Van    Valkenburg   v.    Brown,   43   Cal. 

43,  369 
V.   City  of  Milwaukee,   43   Wis. 
574,                                               700,  701 
V.  Earley,  1  Luz.  Leg.  Beg.  216,  1745 

Van   Valkenburgh   v.    Mayor  &c.,    63 

N.  Y.  S.  6,  1770 

Van    Vrankin    v.    Village    of    Clifton 

Springs,  33  N.  Y.   S.  329,  1363 

Van  Wormer  v.  Mayor  &c.,  15  Wend. 

263,  1079,  1083 

Varden  v.  Mount,  78  Ky.  86.  532,  534 
Varick  v.  Smith,  5  Paige  137,  68ii 

Varney  v.  Justice,  86  Ky.  596,  152 

V.  Manchester,  58  N.  H.  430,  1595 
Vason    V.    City    of   Augusta,    38    Ga. 

542,  497,   1410 

Vaughan  v.  Johnson,  77  Va.  300,  313 
Vaughn  v.  Congdon,  56  Vt.  Ill,  335 

V.  Village  of  Portchester,  15  N. 

Y.  S.  474,  1264 

Vaught  V.  Board  &c.,  101  Ind.  123.  1580 
Vaughtman  v.  Town  of  Waterloo.  14 

Ind.   App.   649,  787,  804 

Vaux  V.  Nesbit,   1   McC.  Ch.  352,  134 

Vawter  v.  Franklin  College,  53  Ind. 

88,  300 

Veale  v.   City  of  Boston,   135   Mass. 

187,  803 

Veder    v.    Town    of    Lima,    19    Wis. 

298.  1028 

Veghte   V.    Power  Co.,   19   N.   J.    Eq. 

142,  1814 

Venable  v.  Curd,  2  Head  582.  197 

Veneman  v.  Jones,  118  Ind.  41,  1401 

Verbeck  v.   Scott.   71  Wis.   59.  373 

Verder  v.  Village  of  Little  Falls,  100 

N.   Y.   343,  1579 

Verdery   v.    Village   of    Summerville, 

82  Ga.  138,  1521 

Verdin    v.    City    of    St.    Louis.    131 

Mo.  26,  749.  1701 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


cxcv 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Vol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.1 


Vermont  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  County  Com'rs. 

10  Cush.  12,  1743 
Vestal   V.   Little  Rock,   54  Ark.   321, 

391,    392,   393,   398,    399,    400 

Vestrv  &c.  v.  Jacobs,  L.  R.  7  Q.  B. 

47.  1561 

Vicksburg     v.     Marshall,     59     Miss. 

563,  1574 

V.  Tobin.  100  U.  S.  430,  1537 

Vicksburg  &c.    R.   Co.   v.   Mayor  &c., 

48  La.  An.  1102,  514 

V.  Mayor  &c..  89  Md.  689,  1349 

Vidal   V.   Mayor  &c.,   2   How.   127, 

563,  664 

Vidalat  v.  City  of  New  Orleans,  43 

■       La.  An.  1121,  801 

Vider    v.    City    of    Chicago,    164    111. 

354,  931.  1780 

Vigeant  v.  City  of  Marlborough,  175 

Mass.  459,  1777 

Vigo    Tp.    V.    Board    &c..    Ill    Ind. 

170,  947,  957 

Village  of  Belknap  v.  Miller,  52  111. 

App.  617.  477 

Village  of  Ballston  Spa  v.  Markham, 

11  N.  Y.   S.  826,  1395 
Village  of  Betholto  v.  Conley,  9  IlL 

App.  339,  541 

Village  of  Braceville  v.  Doherty,  30 

111.  App.  645.  503.  1404 

Village    of    Brooklyn    v.    Smith,    104 

111.   429.  676 

Village    of    Buffalo    v.    Harling,    50 

Minn.   551,  1736 

V.  Webster,  10  Wend.  99. 

100,  505,  580,  1412 
Village  of  Bureau  Junction  v.  Long. 

56  111.  App.  458,  1332.  1358 

Village  of  Carthage  v.  Frederick.  122 

N.  Y.  268.  658.  1328,  1383 

Village  of  Cerro  Gordo  v.  Rawlings, 

135  111.  36.  1395 

Village  of  Corning  v.  Rector  &c.,  33 

N.  Y.  St.  766.  564 

Village  of  Coulterville  v.   Gillen,   72 

III.  599.  1400 

Village  of  Cullom  v.  Justice,  161  111. 

372,  1786 

Village  of  Bvart  v.  Postal,  86  Mich. 

325,  314 

Village  of  Fort  Edward  v.   Fish,  33 

N.  Y.   S.  784.  734 

Villaare  of  Fulton  v.  Tucker.  3   Hun 

529,  1344.  1588.   1598 

Village  of  Glenville  v.  Englehart,  19 

Ohio  C.  C.  285.  180 

Village  of  Grandville  v.  Jenison,  84 

Mich.   54,  1566 

Village   of   Green   Bay   v.    Holsinger, 

76   Mo.    App.    567.  1386 

Village  of  Hammond  v.  Leavitt.  181 

111.  416.  1131.  1148.  1277 

Village    of    Hartington    v.    Luge.    33 

Neb.  623.  392.  399 

Village  of  Harvey  v.  WMlson,  78  111. 

App.  544,  611 

Village  of  Hinsdale  v.  Shannon,  182 

111.  312.  512 

Village  of  Hyde  Park  v.  Borden,  94 

111.  26.  571,  1175,  1283 

V.  Carton,  132  III.  100, 

501,   1130,   1259 
V.  City  of  Chicago,  124  111.  156, 

396.  401 
Village   of    Itasca    v.    Schroder,    182 

111.   192,  1708 

Village  of  Jefferson  v.  Chapman,  127 

111.   438.  1590,   1619,   1620 

Village   of   Kent   v.    Dana,    100   Fed. 

56,  1006,   1018 

V,   Dethridge   &c.    Glass   Co.,    10 
Ohio  C.  C.  629,  783 


Village    of    Ladd    v.    Jones,    61    111. 

App.   584,  573 

Village  of  Le   Roy.   In  re,   55   N.   Y. 

S.  611,  1131 

Village  of  Lockporte  v.  Richards,  81 

HI.  533,  1333 

Village  of  Louisville  v.  Webster,  108 

111.  414,  1392 

Village    of    Mansfield    v.    Moore,    24 

111,  133,  1330,  1334,  1596,  1628,  1629 
Village  of  Marysville  v.  Schoonover, 

78  111.  App.   189,  646,  926,  1800 

Village   of    Morgan    Park   v.    Gahan, 

136  111.  515,  1186 

V.  Gahan,  35  111.  App.  646,  754 

V.  Wizwall,  155  111.  262,  1231,  1235 
Village  of  Niagara  Falls  v.  Salt,  45 

Hun   41,  1401 

Village   of    North    Alton   v.    Dorsett, 

59  111.  App.  612.  1211 
Village  of  North   Springfield  v.  City 

of   Springfield.    140    111.    165.  397 

Village  of   Oak   Harbor  v.   Kallager, 

52  Ohio  St.  183,  1363 

Village   of   Pine   City   v.    Munch,    42 

Minn.  342,  1107,  1108,  1125,  1737 
Village    of    Ponca    v.    Crawford,    23 

Neb.  662.  1638 

Village  of  I'ort  Jervis  v.  First  Nafl 

Bank,   96   N.   Y.    550, 

134.5,  1598.  1599 
Village  of  Rankin  v.   Smith,   63   111. 

App.   592,  13.59 

Village    of    St.    Bernard    v.    Kemper, 

60  Ohio  St.  244,  1136.  1246 
Village  of  St.  John  v.  McFarlan,  33 

Mich.  72,  830 

Village  of   St.   Johnsbury  v.   Thomp- 
son, 59  Vt.  300,  110,   111,  466 
Village   of    St.    Marvs   v.    Lake   Erie 

&c.  R.  Co.,  60  Ohio  St.  136,  505,  590 
Village  of   Seneca   Falls  v.   Zalinski, 

8  Hun  571.  1599 

Village  of  Shelby  v.  Clagett,  46  Ohio 

St,  549,  1324 

Village  of  Sheridan  v.   Hibbard,   119 

111.  307,  1628 

Village    of    Sorento    v.    Johnson,    52 

111.  App.  659,  794 

Village  of  Stamford  v.  Fisher,  17  N. 

Y.  S.  609,  1395 

Village    of    Tarrytown    v.    Pocontico 

Water-works    Co.,    1    N.    Y.    S. 

394,  1448 

Village  of  Vicksburg  v.   Briggs,   102 

Mich.   551.  599 

Village  of  Wapella  v.   Davis,  39   111. 

App.  592.  1422.  1423 

Village   of   West    Duluth   v.    Norton, 

65  N.  W.  935,  1274 

Village  of  Western   Springs  v.   Hill, 

177  111.  634,  519,  1167 

Village  of  Winooski  v.  Gokey,  49  Vt. 

282,  526 

Villavaso    v.    Barthet,    39    La.    An. 

247,  516,  1403 

Vinal  V.  Inhabitants  &c..  7  Gray  59,  1612 
Vincennes  University  v.  Indiana,  14 

How.  268,  4,  6,  46.  47.  447 

Vincennes  Water-Supply  Co.  v.  White. 

124   Ind.   376,  745 

Vincent.  In  re.  57  N.  Y.  S.  771.     1823,  1828 

v.  Board  &c.,  52  Mich.  340,  1675 

v.  Cram.  57  N.  Y,  S.  771,    1823,  1828 

v.  Inhabitants  &c,,  12  Cush.  103, 

210,  251,  647,  668 

V.  Lincoln  Co.,  30  Fed.  749,         1736 
Violette  v.  City  Council  &c.,  92  Va. 

561,  1242,  1243,  12G8,  1269 

Virginia  v.  Rives,  100  U.  S.  313,  140 

Virginia  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  County  Com'rs 

&c.,   6  Nev.  68.  990 

V.  Elliott,  5  Nev.  358,     698,  701.  702 


CXCVl 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Tol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol.  11,  pp.  833-1830.'] 


Virgo.  In  re,  20  Ont.  App.  435,  1387 

Vivian  v.  Otis,  24  Wis.  518,  322,  324 

Voegtiy   V.    Pittburgli   &c.    R.    Co.,   2 

Grant   Cas.   243,  093 

Vogel  V.  City  of  Antigo,  81  Wis.  642, 

828,  942 

V.  City  of  West  Plains,  73  Mo. 

App.  588,  1331 

V.  Little  Rock,  54  Ark.  335.         392 

V.    Little   Rock,   55   Ark.    609. 

391.  398.  399 
Vogelgesang    v     City    of    St.    Louis. 

139  Mo.  127.  1333.  13.4 

Voght  V.  City  of  Buffalo,  133  N.  Y. 

463,  720.  119  < 

V.    City    of    Detroit,    123    Mich. 

547  1310 

Von  Der  Leith  v.  State,  60  N.  J.  L. 

46.  ,   524 

Von   Hoffman   v.   City   of  Quincy.    4 

W^all.  535,  89,  412,  4.53,  765,  766 
1523,  1527,  1531 
Von  Phul  V.  Hammer.  29  Iowa  222,  54 
Von  Schmidt  v.  Widber,  105  Cal.  151-  „^ 
644,  733,  873 
Voorhies  v.  Mayor  &c.,  70  Tex.  331,  919 
Vosburg  V.  McCrary,  77  Tex.  568,         ^_^_ 

Vose  V.   Inhabitants  &c.,   64   Maine 

229  ""'' 

Vroman'v.  Dewey,  23  Wis.  530,  423 

W 

Wabash   &c.    Co.   v.    Beers,   2    Black 

448,  <60 

Wabash  R.  Co.  v.  City  of  Defiance, 
52  Ohio  St.  262,  10  Ohio  C.  C.^27.  ^  ^^^^ 

Wabash  &c.  R.  Co.  v.   Farver,   111 

Ind.   195.  '45 

V.  McCleave,  108  111.  368.  1528 

Wabaska  Elec.  Co.  v.  City  of  Wymore. 

60  Neb.  199,     788,  1384,  1407,  1704 

W^aco  Water  &c.  Co.  v.  City  of  Waco, 

27  S.  W.   675,  <40 

Wade  V.   Borough  of  Oakmont,   16.3 

Pa.  St.  479,  _     ^     '27 

V.    City  of   Newbern,   77    N.    C. 
460T  260.  261,  262 

V.   City  of  Richmond.   18  Gratt. 
583.  384.  387.   651.   1517,  1519 

V.  Travis  Co.,  174  U.   S.  499,       916 

Wadleigh  v.   Gilman,   12  ^^f^l^t^^'-^^c,^ 

Wadsworth  v.  Supervisors,  102  LT.  S. 

534  625,   99o 

V.  Wadsworth,  12  N.  Y.  376,         134 

V.  Wendell,  5  Johns.  Ch.  224,  1015 
Waffle  V.  Short,  25  Kan.  503.  316 

Wager  v.  Troy  Union  R.  Co.,  25  N. 

Y.  526,  682 

Waggeman  v.  Village  of  North  Peoria. 

155  111.  545.  1211 

W'aggener  v.  Town  of  Point  Pleasant, 

42  W.  Va.  798,  1341 

Wagon  Co.  v.  Byrd,  119  N.  C.  460,       99.3 
Wahle  V.  Reinbeck,  76  111.  322.  1104 

Wahlgreen   v.   City   of   Kansas   City, 

42  Kan.  243.  1258 

Waite  V.  Citv  of  Santa  Cruz.  89  Fed. 

619,  195.  197.  999.  1005.  1011.  1021 
Waitz  V.  Ormsby  Co..  1  Nev.  370.  1736 
Wakefield  v.  Newport.  62  N.  H.  624.    266 

V.   Patterson,  25  Kan.   709, 

350,  372,  1473 

V.  Phelps.  37  N.  H.  295.  523 

Wakeham  v.  St.  Clair  Tp..  91   Mich. 

15.  1603.   1632 

Wakelev  v.  City  of  Omaha,  58  Neb. 

245,  1237.    1286 

Walchus  v.  Highlands.  4  Bush  547.    1252 
Walden  v.  Dudley,  49  Mo.  419.  1515 


Waldo    V.    Wallace,    12    Ind.    569, 

189,    192,   1418 
Waldraven   v.    Mayor   &c.,    4    Coldw. 

431,  169.  201 

Waldron  v.  Haverhill,  143  Mass.  582, 

803,  815,  1159 
V.  Lee,  5  Pick.  323.  1519 

Wales'  V.  City  of  Muscatine,  4  Iowa 

302,  1745 

Walish    V.    City    of    Milwaukee,    95 

Wis.  16.  1776 

Walker  v.    British   Guarantee   Ass'n, 

18  Q.  B.  277,  320 

v.  Chapman,  22  Ala.  116,  318 

V.  City  of  Ann  Arbor,  111  Mich. 
1,  1338 

V.  City  of  Ann  Arbor,  118  Mich. 
251,  1269 

V.   City  of  Aurora.   140  111.  402, 

500.  1175,  1234.  1271.  1421 
V.    City   of   Cincinnati.    21    Ohio 
St.  14,  983 

V.    City   of    Evansville,    33    Ind. 
393.  465 

V.   City  of  Kansas  City.  99  Mo. 
647.  1374.    1580.   1597 

V.  City  of  Sedalia,  74  Mo.  App. 
70,  1772,  1776 

V.    City    of    Springfield.    94    111. 
364.  549,   1508,  1521 

V.  Decatur  Co.,  67  Iowa  317,     1802 
V.  District  of  Columbia.  6  Mackey 
352.  1232 

V.    Eastern    Counties    R.    Co..    6 
Hare  594.  699 

V.  .Tameson,  140  Ind.  591,  515,  740 
V.  Osgood.  98  Mass.  348,  211 

V.  People,  166  111.  96,  1144 

V.  People.  170  111.  410,  1294 

V.  Rogan,   1  Wis.  597,  295 

V.  St.  Louis,  15  Mo.  563,  1725 

V.  Swartwout,  12  Johns.  444. 

215.  216 
V.  Town  of  Reidsville,  96  N.  C. 
382.  1633 

V.  Village  of  Morgan  Park,   175 
111.  570.  1710 

V.  Wasco  Co..  19  Pac.  81.  1735 

Walklev    v.    City    of    Muscatine.     6 

Wall.   481.  1526,   1527,   1529 

Wall  V.  City  of  Portland.  35  Or.  89,  1033 
V.   Monroe  Co.,   103  U.   S.  74. 

863.  951,  978 
V.   Trumbull.   16  Mich.  228.  860 

Walla    Walla    City    v.    Walla    Walla 
Water  Co..  172  U.  S.  1, 
491.  723.  735.  1347.  1382.  1702,  1808 
Wallace  v.  City  of  Menasha.  48  Wis. 

79.  781.  818.  1726 

V.  City  of  New  York.  65  N.   Y. 
S.  85.5,  1305 

V.    City    of    Richmond.    94    Va. 
204.  1384 

V.  Fletcher,  30  N.  H.  434,  1566 

V.  Karlenoweski.  19  Barb.  118,  705 
V.  Lawyer,  54  Ind.  501,  1191,  1745 
V.    Mayor  &c.,    29    Cal.    180, 

210.  236,  646 
V.  Muscatine,  4  Greene  373.  8 

V.    Shelton,    14    La.    Ati.    498. 

1269,  1270 
V.  Trustees  &c..  84  N.  C.  164,       104 
Waller  v.  Wood.  101  Ind.  138.  1095 

Wallick    v.    Citv    of    Manitowoc.    57 

Wis.    9.  1222 

Walling  V.    Mayor  &c..   64   N.    J.    L. 

203.  1815 

Wallingford  v.  Southington.  16  Conn. 

435.  1054.  1060 

Wallis    V.    .Johnson    School    Tp..    75 

Ind.   368.  216.   217.   862 

Wain's  Heirs  v.  City  of  Philadelphia. 

99  Pa.  St.  330,  482 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


CXCVll 


.     T,     ^o    vni    T   r>n   1-S32:  Vol.  II,  PP.  833-1830.1 
^References  are  to  Pages,   ^ol.  I,  PP-JJ'^'^^^^^^  ;f  ^^^^  ^^^_. 


walnut  V.  wade,  ^Il,%%%\s,^l020 
Walnut  Tp.  v.  Jordan,  38  Kan.^  ^62,^  ^^^ 
Walsh  V.  Barron,  Gl  Ohio  St.^l|^.^^  ^^^^ 
V.  City  of  Buffalo,  44  N.  Y.  S.^^^^ 
^''^City  of  union,  13  Or.  589.^  ^^^ 
V.  Mayor  &c..  107  NY.  220  157| 
V.  Trustees  &c.,  96  N.  Y.  427,  lo.» 
V.    Village    of    Rutland,    56   Vt. 

Walston'  V.  Nevin,  128  U.  S.   57^8.^^  ^^^^ 

Walter.  Matter  of,  75  NY  354;  '  1140 
Walters,  Ex  parte    65  Cal    -69  i^^^ 

^^'^"i:-^Du\"e:ii;f:a\^-|4  1508,  1521 

V.  Town  of  Lake,  129  ^^^- ^jf^Q  ^272 
Waltham   v.    Town   of   Mullally,    27^^^^ 

Neb.  483.  ^„„  r-Q^ 

Walther  v.  Warner.  25  Mo    -77,  <uo 

Waltmeyer  v.  Wisconsin  &c.  R.  Co.,  ^^^ 

64    Iowa    boo,  r^^^.„      1Q 

Walton  V.  City  of  Canon  City,  1^     ^^^ 

^°^^ile''y''85'Ky.  413,  .  ^  ^^  8^5 
Walworth '^Banky,    Farmers-    Loan 

Wapfno  S^o-v'^BSham^fo  Iowa  39      326 

Wa?d'v.  C?ty\f  Little  Bock,  41  Ark.^^^^ 

^'^City  of  Murphysboro,  77^in.  ^^^ 

noo\%iii.App.in,^^^_^^^^ 

V.  Davis,  3  Sandf.  502.  1559 

^.    |foTd!"48^U!' 3^'  ^^^1^94 

v:   Hartford  C..^  12  ^Conn^^404.^^^^ 

V.  Maryland,  r2^^;-'l.J^%^^    ,,3, 

V.   Stahl.  81  N.  Y.  406,         328,  333 

V.  Ward,  7   Kxch.  838,  »    p^^'* 

Wardens  &c.  v.  Bostock,  2  Bos.  &  f .  ^^^ 

V."  Woodward,  26  Maine  172,^^    ^^^ 
Ware  v.  City  of  JerseyviUe,  158  111 


234, 


1269 

1727 
523 

1545 
45 

1673 
671 
558 


V.  Percival,  61  Maine  391, 
Waring  v.  Mayor  &c     24  Ala.    .01, 

V.  Mayor  &c.,^60  Ga    J.^. 
Warner  v.  Beers,  23  Wend.  103. 

V.  Board  &c.,  62  Mich.^-oi, 

V.  Grace.  14  Minn    48  (, 

V  New  Orleans.  167  U.  h.l^i,  »<Jo 
V.  Rising  Farm  Iron  Co..  3^^^^ 
Woods  514.  j,t,^Kiwv~ 

V.  Village  of  Randolph,  4o  N.  Y^^^^ 

Wnrnick  V  "Mavo,  15  Gratt.  528,         1412 
wIrSock  V.  City' of  Lafayette,  4  La.^^^ 

Warren  v^  Brown.  21  Neb.  8,  1169,  1170 

^%!°Bunnell,   11   Vt    600  688 

V.    Chandos,    115   Cal.^38..^^^^  ^^82 

V.   Charlestown.   2   Gray   84,  15 

V.  City  of  Chicago,  n^8  111.^329.^235 
V.  City  of  Grand  Haven.  30  Mich.^^ 
l^'City  of  Independence.  158  M^o^^^ 
I^City  of  Wausau,  66  Wis.  206.  _^^^^ 


Warren  v.  Clement,  24  Ilun  472.^        224 

V  Ilenly,  31  Iowa  31,      ^1195,  1253 
V.    Maybr   &c.,^^2  ^vaj^^f^^^^  ^r,^, 

V  Mavor  &c.,  22  Iowa  351,  629 
V.  Russell,  129  cal.  381,^^^^^^ 

V.  Skinner,  20  Conn    559,  1488 

V.    State,    11    Mo    583  323 

Warren^  Borough  v.  Geer,  117  Fa.  t>^g^^ 

WarS'nCo.  v.  Marcy.^97  U^S.^96.  ^  ^^^^ 

V.   Portsmouth  Sav.   Bank,  97   ^L^^g 

?:  Post,  97  U.  S.  110  1026 

V    Ward,   21    Iowa  84.  ^-^ 

WarJin  v    Baldwin,  105  N    Y.  534.     934 

Wartman^v.  CUy  of  P^^^ladelpma.  33^^^ 

Washburn  v.  Board  &c.,  1^04  Ind.J21,^^^ 

V.  City  of  Oshkosh,  60  Wis.  453, 

103,   1515,   1516,   1517,   1518 

V.   Phillips,   2   Met.   296  1,43 

Washer  v.  Bullitt  Co.,  110  U.  S.  558^^^ 

Washington  v.  Mayor  &c.^^l^  ^^198,^^271 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  2  Swan  364  '  1168 
V.  State,  13  Ark.  752,         1508    1521 

Washington  Ave.,  In  re,  69  1^.^;.  »^-  „ 
352,         1195,  1231,  1254.  12(1,  1538 

Washington  Cemetery  v.   Pi"ospect 

Park  &c.  R.  CO.,  68  N^^l.  591,  ^^^^ 

Washington  &c.  Church  v.  New  York, 

20   Hun  297,  ^       ^„   _      1^21 

Washington  Co.  v.  Wild  Co.,  12  Colo.^^^ 

Washington   Gas  Co.   v.   Seminary,   52 
Mo.   480,  ^  ^^.      -1* 

Washington  Ice  Co    v.  City  of  Chica- 

go,  147  111.  327,  465,  1151 

V.   Lav.   103   Ind.   48,  343,   1567 

Washington   &c.    R.    Co.   v.   Lacey,   94 
Va     460  ^ 

Washington  Tp.  v.  Coler,   2  C.   C.   A^.^^^ 

Wate'ilury  v.  Board  &c.,  10  Mont.  515,^^ 

V  City  of  Laredo,  60  Tex.  519,  181 

V  City  of  Laredo.  68  Tex.  565,  640 
v!   Town  of   Darien,   8   Conn.   l0'*:48 

water  Co.   v.   Ware,   16   Wall.  ^566,  ^^^^ 

Waterloo   Woolen   Mfe   Co.   v.    Sban- 
ahan,    128    N.    Y.    345,  oca 

Waters  v.   Bonvouloir,   172   Mass.   -^''^^e 

V.  Carroll.  9  Yerg    102,  327 

v.  Leech,  3  Ark.  110  ^^^\7m 

V.   Townsend.   65  Ark.   613  1407 

V.  Village  of  Bay  View.  61  Wis 
64''  D 

^^*^,^;?rTe^'^^^M.^4f^f^^'^^^"^ 

Watertown  V.   fady    20   Wis^Stn         13 
Watertown  F.  Ins.   Co.  v.   Simmons. 

131  Mass.  85.  Tn<i 

WateTjorks  Co.  v.  Burkhart.^41^Hid^gg 

Watkins  V.  County  Court,  30  W.  gVa^^^g 
f  walker  Co.,  18  Tex.  585       '     674 

Watson  V.  Bennett  12  Barb^^.f^.  -60 
V.  City  of  Appleton,  62  Wis.  -^''g^., 

V.  City  of  Chicago,  l^l|g  Ii'268^'l272 


CXCVlll 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  Pages.    Vol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.'] 


Watson  V.  City  of  Columbia,  77  Mo. 

App.   267,  1778 

V.   City  of  Huron,   97   Fed.   449, 

562,   958 
V.  Commissioners  &c.,  82  N.  C.  17, 

1519 
V.  Corey,  6  Utah  150,  403 

V.    Crowsore,    93    Ind.    220,  696 

V.  New  York  &c.  R.  Co.,  47  N.  Y. 
157  693 

V.  Smith,  26  Pa.  St.  395,  328 

V.    Sutherland.   5   Wall.   74,  655 

V.  Town  Council  &c.,  5  R.  I.  562,  687 
V.  Town  of  New  Milford,  72  Conn. 
561,  727,    791 

V.   Turnbull,   34   La.   An.   856,        572 

Watt  V.   Jones.  60  Kan.   201,     541,   1788 

Watts  V.   McLean,   28   111.  App.   537, 

849,    1496 

Watuppa  Reservoir  v.   City  of  Fall 

River,   134   Mass.   267,  809 

Way    V.    Town   of   Center   Point,    51 

Iowa  708,  415 

Waymire  v.    Powell,   105   Ind.   328.      944 

Wayne    Co.    v.    City    of    Detroit,    17 

Mich.   390,  607 

Wayne   Co.    Sav.   Bank  v.   Stockwell, 

84  Mich.  587,  1573 

Wayne  Tp.  v.  Porter  Tp.,  138  Pa.  St. 

181,  1044 

Weare  v.  Sawyer,  44  N.  H.  198,         1485 

Weaver   v.    Benjamin,    45    N.    Y.    St. 

95,  1061 

v.  Cherry,  2  Ohio  St.  564,  1536 

V.    Devendorf,   3    Denio    117, 

229.   230,   1727 
v.    Snow,   60   111.   App.   624,  541 

Webb  V.  Auspach.  3  Ohio  St.  522.         333 
v.   Heme   Bay   Com'rs,   L.    R.    5 
Q.   B.   642,  1001 

V.   La  Fayette  Co.,   67  Mo.  353,   638 
V.    Neal,    5   Allen   575,  564 

Webb  City  &c.  Co.  v.  City  of  Carter- 
ville,   153   Mo.    128,  877 

Webb  City  &c.  Water-Works  Co.  v. 
City  of  Webb  City,   78  Mo.  App. 
422,  727 

WebbeTv.  Townlev,  43  Mich.  534,     1428 

Weber  v.  Board  &c.,  59  Cal.  265,         698 
V.    City   of   Creston,    75    Iowa    16. 

1585 
v.    Dillon,    7    Okl.    568,  1788 

V.   Hamilton,   72   Iowa   577,  190 

v.   Johnson,   30   Mo.   App.   601,      488 
V.    Reinhard,    73    Pa.    St.    370,    1266 
V.    Scott   Co.   &c.    Soc,   44   Iowa 
239.  650 

V.  Traubpl.  95  111.  427,  1533 

Webster   v.    Bvrnes.    34    Cal.    273,        370 
V.   City  of  Fargo,   9   N.   D.   208, 

1303,   1506 
V.  City  of  Lansing,  47  Mich.  192, 

536 
v.   Douglas  Co.,   102  Wis.   181, 

9.56,    1701,    1731 
v.    People,    98    111.    343.  1532 

V.  Town  of  Harwington.  32  Conn. 

131,  651,    668.   965,    1730 

v.  Wheeler,  119  Mich.  601,  1685 

Webster  Co.  v.  Hutchinson,  60  Iowa 

721,  324 

V.   Tavlor,    19   Iowa   117,  941 

Weckerlv  v.   Oever,   11   S.  &  R.   35.     222 

Weckler  v.   City  of   Chicago,   61    111. 

142,  684 

Weed  V.  City  of  Boston,   172  Mass. 

28,  1269,    1713 

V.    Common   Council   &c.,    56   N. 
Y.  S.  105,  715 

V.   Mayor  &c.,    172   Mass.    28, 

1267,  1271,  1713 
V.    Village   of   Ballston    Spa,    76 
N.  Y.  329,  224,  826,  1587,  1608,  1632 


Weeks  v.  Batchelder,  41   Vt.  317, 

362,   1485 
V.    City    of    Galveston,    21    Tex. 
Civ.    App.    102,  735 

V.   City   of   Milwaukee,    10    Wis. 
242,  103,    558,   980 

lOSO,   1503,   1518,   1521.   1534 
V.  Dennett,  62  N.  H.  2,  156,  619 

V.   Forman,   16  N.   J.   L.   237, 

527.    1410 

Weet  V.  Trustees  &c.,  16  N.  Y.  161, 

813,   831 

Wehn   V.   Commissioners  &c.,    5   Neb. 

494,  676 

Weidman  v.  Board  &c.,  7  N.  Y.  S.  309, 

1480,   1491 

Weightman  v.  Clark,  103  U.   S.  256, 

981,  1538 
V.  Washington,   1   Black  39,     S,   813 

Weil  V.   Greene  Co.,  69   Mo.   281,        1737 
V.   Ricord,   24  N.   J.   Eq.   169,        1089 

Weill  V.  Kenfleld,  54  Cal.  Ill,  1257 

Weimer  v.  Bunburg.  30  Mich.  201,     1049 

Weinckie  v.  New  York  &c.  R.  Co.,  15 

N.    Y.    S.    689,  588 

Weir   V.    Borough   of   Plymouth,    148 

Pa.    St.    566,  1217 

V.   State,   96   Ind.   311,  1676 

Weirs  v.  Jones  Co.,  80  Iowa  351,       776 

Weis    V.    City    of    Madison,    75    Ind. 

241,  1177,   1179 

Weisenberg  v.   City  of  Appleton,  26 

Mass.  56,  1618 

Weismer  v.  Village  of  Douglas,  64  N. 

Y.   91,  1542 

Weisse  v.  City  of  Detroit,  105  Mich. 

482,  1340 

Weith  V.   City  of  Wilmington,   68   N. 

C.    24.  97,    468,    494 

Weitz  V.  Independent  Dist.,  78  Iowa 

37,  1482 

V.    Independent    Dist.,    79    Iowa 
423,  851,    1480 

Welch   V.    Bowen,    103    Ind.    252,  520 

V.    City   of   Portland,    77    Maine 
384,  1625 

V.   County  Court  &c.,  29  W.  Va. 
63,  433 

V.    Gleason.    2S    S.    C.    247.  335 

V.  Hotchki&s,  39  Conn.  140.    552,  1391 
V.    Inhabitants    &c.,    133    Mass. 
529,  1623 

V.    Seymour,    28    Conn.    387,  326 

V.  Ste.  Genevieve,  1  Dillon  130, 

124,    272,    289,    447,    451 
V.   Strother.  74  Cal.  413,  886 

Weld  V.   Brook.   152   Mass.   297,  1630 

Welker  v.   Potter,   18  Ohio  St.  85, 

54,  1132.  1254.  1255.  1550.  1552 

Weller  v.   City  of  Burlington.   60  Vt. 

28,  263,  782,  827 

V.  McCormick,  47  N.  J.   L.  397, 

1198,    1588 

Welles  V.  Battelle.  11  Mass.  477,       142T 

Wellman  v.  Board  &c.,  58  Hun  224.       1443 

Wells  V.   Board  &c.,   78   Mich.   260,   1484 
V.   Burbank,   17  N.   II.   393, 

51,  84,  345 
V.  Burnham,  20  Wis.  112,  1257 

V.  City  of  Brooklyn,  38  N.  Y.   S. 
309,  1326 

V.  City  of  Brooklyn,  41  N.  Y.  S. 
143,  1105 

V.  City  of  Brooklyn,  60  N.  Y.   S. 
802,  1339 

V.  City  of  Milwaukee,  70  N.  W. 
1071.  1284 

V.  Jackson  &c.  Co.,  47  N.  H.  235.  346 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  L.  R.  10  C.  P.  402, 

261 
V.  Mavor  &c..  43  Ga.  67,  572,  1543 
V.    Mavor  &c.,    107    Ga.    1,  1554 

V.  Rhodes,  114  Ind.  467,     697,  1572 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


cxeix 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Vol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.'\ 


Wells   V.    Somerset   &c.    R.    Co.,    47 

Maine  345,  674 

V.    Supervisors,    102    U.    S.    625, 

625,  982,  984 
V.   Town   of   Salina,    119   N.    Y. 
280,  839 

V.    Western   Paving  &c.   Co.,   96 
Wis.   116,  1284 

V.    Wood,   114   Cal.   255,  1280 

Welsford  v.   Weidlin,   23   Kan.   595,   1258 
Welsh  V.   Boston,  126  Mass.  442,       1386 
V.    City   of    Lansing,    111    Mich. 
589  1339 

V.   City  of  St.  Louis,  73  Mo.   71, 

1374,  1608 
V.  First  Div.  R.  &c.  Co.,  25  Minn. 
314,  1019,  1020 

V.   Taylor,   134  N.   Y.  450,  1565 

V.  Village  of  Rutland,  56  Vt.  228, 

1096 
V.   Wilson,   101   N.   Y.   254,  1582 

Welton  V.  State,  91  U.  S.  275,  1576 

V.    Town   of   Wolcott,    45   Conn. 
329,  1061 

Wendell  v.  City  of  Brooklyn,  29  Barb. 
204,  178 

V.   Mayor  &c.,  4  Abb.  App.  Dec. 
563,  1619 

V.  Mayor  &c.,  39  Barb.  329,         1615 
Wentworth    v.    Rochester,    63    N.    H. 

244,  1569 

V.    Smith,    44    N.    H.    419,  1614 

v.  Town  of  Summit,  60  Wis.  281, 

1622 
Wenzlich  v.  McCotter,  87  N.  Y.  122, 

1345,  1588 
Werner  v.  City  of  Galveston,  72  Tex. 

22,  1535 

Werth  v.   City  of  Springfield,  78  Mo. 

107,  1801,  1802 

Wertz  v.   Blair  Co.,   66  Pa.   St.    18, 

1058,    1063 
Wesch  V.   Common   Council   &c.,   107 

Mich.  149,  174 

Wessman  v.   City  of  Brooklyn,  40  N. 

Y.    St.   698,  1159 

Wesson  v.    Saline,   73   Fed.   917, 

1006,    1012 
v.   Town   of   Mt.    Vernon,   98   Fed. 
804,  1004 

West   V.    Ballard,   32   Wis.    168,  652 

V.  Bancroft,  32  Vt.  367,  1543 

V.   Berry,   98   Ga.   402,  731 

V.  City  of  Chehalis,  12  Wash.  369, 

874 
V.  City  of  Columbus,  20  Kan.  633, 

537 
V.  City  of  Eau  Claire,  89  Wis.  31, 

1317,  1337 
V.   City  of  Lynn,   110  Mass.   514, 

1612 
V.  Town  of  Errol,  58  N.  H.  233,  869 
V.  West  &c.  R.  Co.,  61  Miss.  536,  696 
West   Boston   Bridge   Co.    v.    County 

Com'rs.    10   Pick.    270,  679 

West  Carroll  Parish  v.  Gaddis,  34  La. 

An.    928,  629 

West  Chester  Gas  Co.  v.  Chester  Co., 

30    Pa.    St.    232,  1512 

West   Chester  &c.   R.   Co.   v.   McElwee, 

67    Pa.    St.    311,  1627 

West  Chicago  Park  Com'rs  v.  City  of 

Chicago,   152   III.  392,  1769 

V.  Kincade,  64  111.  App.  113.         738 
V.  McMuIIen,  134  111.  170,  1317,  1319 
V.   Metropolitan  &c.   R.   Co.,   186. 
111.   246,  12S7 

West  Chicago  St.  R.  Co.  v.  City  of  Chi- 
cago.  178   III.  339,  1248 
V.    People,    155    111.   299,    1145.    1241 
West  Jersey  Tract.  Co.  v.  Shivers,  58 

N.    J.    L.    124,  465 


West    Philadelphia    &c.     R.     Co.    v. 
City    of    Philadelphia,    10    Phila. 
70,  1184 

West    Plains   Tp.    v.    Sage,    69    Fed. 
943,  16  C.  C.  A.  553, 

1011,   1013,   1757 
West  River  Bridge  Co.  v.  Dix,  6  How. 

507,  637,  674,   691,   1323 

Westall  V.  Altschul,  126  Cal.  164, 

1282,    1370 
Western  College  v.  City  of  Cleveland, 
12   Ohio   St.   375, 

225,  251,  264,  756,  799 
Western  Pav.  &c.   Co.  v.  Citizens'   St. 

R.  Co.,  128  Ind.  525,  1158,  1184 

Western    I'ub.    House   v.    Bachman,    2 

S.   Dak.  512,  1495 

Western   R.   Co.   v.   Nolan,   48   N.   Y. 

513,  1723.  1724 

Western  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Young,  83  Ga. 

512,  491 

Western  Sav.  Soc.  v.  Citv  of  Philadel- 
phia,   31    Pa.    St.    175, 

468,  764,  996,  1333,  1543,  1546 
Western  Town  Lot  Co.  v.  Lane,  7  S. 

D.    599,  876 

Western    U.    Tel.    Co.    v.    Carew,    15 

Mich.  525,  100 

V.   City  of  Richmond,   26   Gratt. 
1,  1513 

V.    City    of    Syracuse,    53    N.    Y. 
S.    690,  712 

V.  Mayer,  28  Ohio  St.  521,  1508 
V.  Mayor  &c..  38  Fed.  552,  1390 
V.    State,   55   Tex.   314,  1521 

V.  Thayer,  28  Ohio  St.  521,  1521 
Westfleld   Borough   v.   Tioga   Co.,    150 

Pa.  St.  152,  1557,  1575,  1577,  1580 
Weston   V.    City   of   Syracuse,    158   N. 

Y.  274,  514,  717,  720.  721,  722,  1755 
V.  City  of  Syracuse,  31  N.  Y.  S. 
186,  1309 

V.  Syracuse,  17  N.  Y.  110,  877,  1464 
Wetherell  v.  Devine,  116  111.  631,  1084 
Wetherill  v.   Pennsylvania  R.   Co.,   195 

Pa.    St.    160,  1318 

Wethington  v.  City  of  Owensboro,  21 

Ky.   L.   960,  525 

Wetmore  v.  Story,   22  Barb.  414,         275 
Wettengel  v.  City  of  Denver,  20  Colo. 

552,  1386 

Wewell    V.    City    of    Cincinnati,    45 

Ohio   St.   407,  1255 

Weymire  v.  Wolfe,  52  Iowa  533,        1641 
Weymouth   v.   Citv  of   New   Orleans, 

40  La.  An.  344,  581 

Weymouth  &c.  Dist.  v.  County  Com'rs, 

108    Mass.    142,  1538,    1539 

Whalen  v.  City  of  La  Crosse,  16  Wis. 

271,  1254 

Whalin   v.   City  of  Macomb,   76   111. 

49,  1421 

Whann  v.  Coler,  159  N.  Y.  535,         1033 
Whaples   v.    City  of   Waukegan,    179 

111.    310,  1134.    1135.    1236 

Wharton  v.   School   Directors,   42   Pa. 

St.  358,  1471,  1540 

Wharton  Co.  v.  Ahldag,  84  Tex.  12,  904 

Wheat  V.  Smith.  50  Ark.  266,  185 

Wheeler  v.   Bedford,  54  Conn.  244,   1675 

V.  Bowery  Sav.  B'k,  20  Abb.  N. 

C.    243,  1415 

V.  Brady.  15  Kan.  26.  1475 

v.  City  of  Boone,  108  Iowa  235, 

1316,  1374 
V.    City    of    Chicago,    57    111.    415, 

1201 
V.    City    of    Cincinnati,    19    Ohio 
St.    19,  264.    786 

V.    City   of   Plymouth,    116    Ind. 
158,  264,    820,    830 

V.  City  of  Poplar  Bluff.  149  Mo. 
36,  746,   1144,  1152 


cc 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Vol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.'] 


Wheeler  v.  Jackson,  41  Ilim  410,         829 
V.   Miller,   IG  Cal.   124,  1744 

V.    I'atterson,    1    N.    H.   88,  221 

V.   Wavue  Co.,  31   111.  App.  299,  8.34 

"Wheeling  v.  Black,  25  W.  Va.  266, 

168,    538,    1418,    1420 

Wheelock  v.  Young,  4  Wend.  647,       674 

Whidden  v.   Cheever,  69  N.   H.   142, 

1762,  1763 
V.   Drake,   5   N.   H.   13,  1745 

Whipple  V.  Village  of  Fair  Haven,  63 
Vt.    221,  827 

Whirley   v.   Whiteman,   1   Head  610,   794 

Whitcher  v.  Town  of  Benton,  48  N. 

H.    157,  1571 

W'hite,   In  re,   43  Fed.  913,  1399 

V.    Board   &c.,    129    Ind.    396, 

805,  1076 
V.  Bond  Co.,  58  111.  297,  9,  775 
V.   Burkett,   119   Ind.   431,  1659 

V.   Chowan   Co.,   90   N.   C.   437,  9 

V.   City  of  Alameda,   124   Cal.   95, 

180 
V.  City  of  Alton,  149  111.  626,       1275 
V.   City   of   New   Orleans,    15   La. 
An.    667,  253 

V.  City  of  Quanah,  27  S.  W.  839,  71 
T.  City  of   Saginaw,   67   Mich.   33, 

570,  1131,   1254.   1255 
V.    City    of    Tacoma,    20    Wash. 
361,  1280 

V.  Commissioners  &c.,  13  Or.  317, 

369,  370 
V.    Conover,    5    Blackf.    462,  697 

V.    Corporation    of    Yazoo    City, 

27  Miss.  357,  264,  1585 
V.  County  Com'rs,  13  Or.  317,  651 
V.  Fleming,  114  Ind.  560,  276,  1169 
V.  Fox,  22  Maine  341,  318 
V.  Harris,  116  Cal.  470,  1140 
V.  Hart,  13  Wall.  646,  1524 
V.    Hindley   Local    Board,    L.   R. 

10    Q.    B.    219,  812 

V.  Inhabitants  &e.,  77  Maine  396, 

178 
V.  Inhabitants  &e.,  10  Met.  108,  211 
V.  Levy,  93  Ala.   484,  1415 

V.    Marshfleld,    48    Vt.    20,  225 

V.   Mayor  &c.,   119  Ala.   476,  915 

V.  Mayor  &c.,  44  N.  Y.  S.  454,       796 
V.    Metropolitan   &c.    R.    Co.,    154 
111.    620,  1706 

V.  Morse,   139  Mass.  162,  334 

V.    People,   94   111.   604.  1143 

1166,  1167,  1235,   1268,  1303,   1499 
V.    Polk   Co.,    17    Iowa   413,  182 

V.   School  Dist.,  8  Atl.  443,  1480 

V.   Snell,   5   Pick.   425,  1305 

V.  Tallman,  26  N.  J.  L.  67,  532 

V.    Town   of   Stamford,   37   Conn. 
578,  858 

V.   Town  of  West   Chicago,   164 
111.    196.  1296 

V.   Vermont  &c.   R.   Co.,   21   How. 
575,  1012,   1018 

V.  White,  2  Met.  185,  132 

Whiteback    v.    Common    Council    &c., 

50    Mich.    86,  1725 

White  Deer  Tp.    Poor  Overseers'   Ap- 
peal, 95   Pa.   St.   191,  1062 

Whitehall  v.  Meaux,  8  111.  App.  182,  528 

Whitehead    v.    Arkansas   &c.    R.    Co., 

28  Ark.    460.  698 
Whitesell  v.   Northampton  Co.,  49   Pa. 

St.    526,  1500 

White  S.  M.  Co.  v.  Mullins,  41  Mich. 

339  319 

Whiteside  v.   People,  26  Wend.  634, 

276,   305 
V.   United   States,  93  tl.   S.  247, 

210.   217,   647 
Whitfield  V.  City  of  Meridan,  66  Miss. 
570,  1614 


Whitfield  V.  Longest,  6  Ired.  L.  268,    533 

Whitford  v.   Laidler,  94  N.  Y.   145,     260 

Whiting  v.  City  of  Mt.  Pleasant,  11 

Iowa    482,  415,    426 

V.  Mayor  &c.,  106  Mass.  89,         1722 
V.  Quackenbush,  54  Cal.  306,        1268 
V.   Sheboygan  &c.   R.   Co..   25  Wis. 
167.  548,    610,    622,    983 

V.    Town   of   Potter,    18   Blatchf. 
165,  1023 

V.   Town   of  West   Point,   88   Va. 
905,  854,  1545,  1546,  1547 

V.  Townsend,  57  Cal.  515,  1253 

Whitlock   V.    West,   26   Conn.   406,        517 

Whitlock   Ave.,    In   re,    64    N.    Y.    S. 

717,  1294,   1311 

Whitmer   v.    Commissioners,   96    111. 

289,  1170 

Whitmore   v.    Village  of   Tarrytown, 

137   N.   y.   409,  1209 

Whitney,  In  re,  33  N.  Y.  S.  838,         1675 
V.  Citv  of  Lynn,  122  Mass.  338,  701 
V.  City  of  New  Haven,  58  Conn. 
450,  277,    279,    284,    924 

V.   City   of   Pittsburgh,    147    Pa. 
St.  351,  1258 

V.    City   of   Port   Huron,   88   Mich. 
268,  480.    933 

V.  Citv  of  Ticonderoga,  37  N.  Y. 
St.   135.  1609 

V.  Common  Council  &c.,  69  Mich. 
189,  292,   296,   300,   304,   475 

V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  Ill  Mass.  368, 

362  1519 
V.  Thomas,  23  N.  Y.  281,  "'  229 
V.  Town  of  Essex,  42  Vt.  520,     1598 

Whitney   Arms  Co.   v.   Barlow,   63   N. 

Y.  "62,  650,   746 

Whitsett   V.   Union   D.   &  R.   Co.,    10 

Colo.   243,  263,   652,   1317,   1320 

Whitson  V.  City  of  Franklin,  34  Ind. 

392,  537,   1356 

Whittaker  v.   City  of  Deadwood.    12 

S.   D.   608,  513,   1298,   1781 

V.  Tuolumne  Co.,  96  Cal.  100,     1734 

Whittal   V.   City  of  New  York,  64   N. 

Y.    S.    250,  1362 

Whittemore  v.  Sills,  76  Mo.  App.  248. 

720 

Whittv  V.  City  of  Oshkosh,  106  Wis. 

87,  1365,  1790,  1793 

Whyte  V.  City  of  Kansas,  22  Mo.  App. 
409,  '  699,    701 

V.  Mayor  &c.,  '2  Swan.  364, 

282,   499,   547,    614,    1198,    1539 
V.   Mills,   64   Miss.   158,  911 

Wice  V.    Chicago  &c.   R.   Co.,   193   111. 

357,  501,   1383 

Wick  ware  v.   Bryan,   11   Wend.   545,   221 

Wickwire  v.  City  of  Elkhart,  144  Ind. 
305,  750 

Wider  v.  City  of  East  St.  Louis,  55 

111.   133,  1531,   1538 

Widner  v.  State.  49  Ark.  172,  618,  1489 

Wier's  Appeal,  7"  Pa.  St.  230,  1108,  1119 
V.    Bush.    4    Litt.    429,  168 

Wiesmer  v.  Vill-*ge  of  Douglas,  64  N. 

Y.   91,  ■  979 

Wiggin  V.  Citv  'it  St.  Louis,  135  Mo. 

558,  1330 

V.  Elder  &i  •,  8  Met.  301,  275 

V.    Mayor,   1^   Paige   16,  1421 

V.   St.    Lou's,   135   Mo.   558.  1339 

Wiggins   V.   City  of  Chicago,   68   111. 

372,  529,    1536 

V.   Hathaw  ij,  6  Barb.   632,  226 

V.    McCleai;.y.   49   N.   Y.   346,        1565 
V.  Tallmafige,  11   Barb.  457, 

,  c  1559,  1565 

Wiggins  Perry,  Co.  v.  East  St.  Louis. 

102  111.  560,      1399,  1508,  1521 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


CCl 


[Eeferences  are  to  Pages.   Tol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.1 


Wiggins  Ferry  Co.  v.  East  St.  Louis, 

107  U.   S.  365,  1502 

Wight  V.    Phillips,   36  Maine  551,      1570 

Wilber  v.  City  of  Springfield,  123  111. 

395,  1140 

Wilberding   v.    City   of   Dubuque,    11 

Iowa  484,  1798 

Wilbur    V.    City    of    Springfield,    123 

111.   395,  1267 

V.   Tobey,   16  Pick.   177,  134 

Wilcox  V.   City   of  Chicago.    107   111. 

334,  772,  789,  1767,  1768 

V.  Deer  Lodge  Co.,  2  Mont.  574, 

981,  1531 
V.  Engle  Tp.,  81  Mich.  271,  1489 
v.  Hemming,  58  Wis.  144, 

519,  532,  533 
V.   Rodman,   46   Mo.  322,  183 

V.   Smith,  5   Wend.   231,  195 

Wild  V.  Deig,  43   Ind.  455.         687,   1425 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  47  N.  J.  L.   406,    798 

Wilde   V.   Dunne.    11    Johns.   459,  278 

Wilder   v.    Board   &c.,    41    Fed.    512,    883 
V.   Chicago   &c.   R.   Co.,   70   Mich. 
382,  558 

V.  City  of  Chicago,  26  111.  182,     168 
V.   City  of  Cincinnati,   26  Ohio 
St.    284,  1268 

V.  Mayor  &c.,  70  Ga.  760,  1508 

Wiles  V.   Hoss,   114   Ind.  371,  1190 

Wiley   V.   City  of  Columbus,    109   Ga. 

295,  1791 

V.   Corporation  of  BlufiEton,   111 
Ind.   152,  120 

V.    Flournoy,    30   Ark.    609,  1722 

V.  Parmer,  14  Ala.  627,  1537 

V.    People,   36  111.   App.   609,        1374 
V.    Silliman,    62    111.    170,    973,    1005 
V.    Town   of   Brimfield,    69    111. 
306,  985 

Wilhelm  v.  Cedar  Co.,  50  Iowa  254,  663 

Wilkes    V.    Dinsman.    7    How.    39,        221 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  79  N.  Y.  621,         1205 

Wilkey  v.  City  of  Pekin,  19  111.  159, 

1502,  1550 

Wilkie  V.   City  of  Chicago,   188   111. 

444  1388 

Wilkin  V.  St.  Paul  &c.  R.  Co.,  16  Minn. 
271,  692 

Wilkins   v.    City   of   Detroit,    46    Mich. 
120,  1233 

V.  Mayor  &c.,  30  N.  Y.  S.  424,     746 
V.  Village  of  Rutland,  61  Vt.  336, 

782,  809,  1608 

Wilkinson  v.  Bixler,  88  Ind.  574,         700 
v.    Cheatam,    48    Ga.    258, 

980,   1529,   1542 
V.  City  of  Peru,  61  Ind.   1,  1001 

V.   Leland,    2    Peters  627,      763,   992 
V.  Long  Rapids  Tp.,   74  Mich.  63, 

859,  967,   1088 
V.  Van  Orman,  70  Iowa  230, 

883,   897 

Willamette  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Pink  &c.,  119 

U.   S.   191,  1689 

Willard  v.  Albertson,  23  Ind.  App.  164, 

1152,  1246.  1  88.  1792,  1806 
V.  Comstock,  58  Wis.  565,  1717,  1728 
V.    Inhabitants  &c.,      2   Pick.    227, 

227,  867 
V.  Killingworth,  8  Cjnn.  247,  88 
V.   Pike,   59   Vt.   202.  1486 

V.  Presbury,  14  Wall.  676,  1234 

V.   Warden  &c.,   8   Conn.   248. 

365.    540 

Willett  V.  Young,  82  Iowa  292,  215,  915 

Willey  V.  Greenfield,  30  Mi.ine  452,     866 
V.   Portsmouth,   35   N.   H.   303, 

;  t8,   367.    1597 

Williams's  Case,  3  Bland  C  i.  186,  220. 

1520 
V.  Bagot,  3  B.  &  C.  7'.  2,  207 


Williams    v.    Bergin,    127    Cal.    578, 

1246,  1308,  1785 
V.  Bergin,  129  Cal.  461,  748,  1289 
V.  Board  &c.,  61  Kan.  708,  796 

V.   Brooklyn  El.   R.   Co.,   126  N. 
Y.  96,  1582 

V.    Cammack,   27   Miss.   209, 

1269,  1270 
V.  Carey,  73  Iowa  194,  1319 

V.    City   Council    &c.,   4    Ga.    509, 

535,   541,   594,   601,   1414 
V.   City   of   Brooklyn,    53    N.    Y. 
S.  1007,  1333 

V.  City  of  Gloucester,  148  Mass. 
256,  159 

V.  City  of  New  Orleans,  32  La. 
An.    507,  1394 

V.    City   of   Pittsburg,    83    Pa.    St. 
71,  /  698 

V.  City  of  Saginaw,  51  Mich.  120, 

802,  1200 
V.  City  of  Warsaw,  60  Ind.  547,  607 
V.  Clayton.  6  Utah  86,  1666 

V.  Clouse,  91  N.  C.  322,  993 

V.  Corcoran.  46  Cal.  553,  1552 

V.   Directors,   Wright  579.  1494 

V.  Duanesburg,  66  N.  Y.  129,  1010 
V.    Eggleston   Co.,   170   U.    S.   304, 

1302 
V.   Ehringhaus,  3  Dev.  L.  297,     312 
V.  Hartford  «&;c.  R.  Co.,  13  Conn. 
397,  693 

V.   Inhabitants  &c.,   119   Mass. 
237,  1601 

V.   Inhabitants  &c.,  21  Pick.  75, 
288.   290,   340,   347,   362,   1283,   1569 
V.   Mayor  &c..  2  Mich.  560. 

1232.   1233,  1253,  1722 
V.    Nashville,   89   Tenn.   487, 

383,   388.   446 
V.  New  Orleans  R.  Co.,  60  Miss. 
689.  700 

V.  New  York  &c.  R.  Co.,  16  N.  Y. 
97,  682,  1582 

V.    People.   132   111.   574,  368 

V.  Poor,  65  Iowa  410,  416 

V.  Powell,  101  Mass.  467,  222 

V.  Rawlinson,  10  Moore  362,  325 
V.   Rees,   9   Biss.   405,  1512 

V.    Roberts,    88    111.    11,  992 

V.  School  Dist.,  33  Vt.  271,  689,  1536 
V.   Smith,  2  Hill  301.  1019 

V.   Smith,  22  Wis.  594,  1109 

V.    Supervisors   &c.,    122   U.    S. 
154,  1166,  1550 

V.  Town  of  Roberts,  88  111.  11,  985 
V.  Weaver,  75  N.  Y.  30,  229,  230 
V.   Willard,   23   Vt.  369,  1133 

Williamson  v.   Board  &c.,  23  Colo.  87, 

843 
V.  City  of  Keokuk,  44  Iowa  88, 

122,  982,  1524 
v.    Commonwealth,    4    B.    Mon. 
146,  527.  528.  536,  1410,  1418,  1420 
V.    Massey,    33    Gratt.    237.  1548 

v.  New  Jersey,  130  U.  S.  189,       768 

Williamsport    v.    Commonwealth,    84 

Pa.  St.  487,  973 

Williamstown  R.  Co.  v.  Battle,  66  N. 
C.  540.  1814 

Williamstown  &c.   School  Dist.  v. 

Webb,   89   Ky.   264,  362,   1473 

Willington,   Petitioner,   16   Pick.  87, 

1681 

Willis  V.  Board  &c.,  86  Fed.  872.     1700 
V.  City  of  Boonville,   28   Mo.   543. 

1412.  1419 
V.  City  of  New  Berne,  118  N.  C. 
132.  825,   1317 

V.  City  of  Winona,  59  Minn.  27. 

1208 
V.  Legris.  45  111.  289.  533 

V.  Sproule,  13  Kan.  257,       343,  696 


ceil 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Yol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.1 


Willis  V.  Webb,  27  Pac.  825,  855 

Willman   v.   Willman,   57   Ind.   500,    1572 
Wills  V.  Austin,  53  Cal.  152,  1263 

Wilmington   Com'rs  v.   Roby,  8   Ired. 

L.  250,  1537 

Wilson  V.  Board  &c.,  133  111.  44|^^    ^^^^ 

V.   Board  &e.,   68   Ind.   507,      '      277 
V.  Burks,  71   Ga.  862.  1724 

V.  Chilcot,  12  Colo.  600,  1230 

V.  City  of  Boise  City,  60  Pac.  84. 

791.    128.5,    1407,    1711 
V.   City  of  Charlotte.   108   N.   C. 
121,  1451 

V.    Citv    of    New    Bedford,    108 
Mass.    261,  ^   1112 

V.  City  of  New  York,  65  N.  Y.  S. 
S'Jg  173,    1763 

V.  City  of  Wheeling.  16  W.  Va. 
323,  265 

V.  Commissioners  &c.,  7  Watts  & 
S    197.  1527,   1743 

V.   Eureka   City,  173  U.   S.   32,   13G5 
V.  European  &c.  R.  Co.,  67  Maine 
358,  693 

V.   Gabler.   11   S.   D.   206,  749 

V.    Hardestv,    1    Md.    Ch.    66,        992 
V.  Hathaway.  42  Iowa  173,  692 

V.  Jefferson  Co.,  13  Iowa  181,       7(6 
V.  Lewis,   10  R.  I.  285,  1746 

V.  Marsh,  34  Vt.  352.  221,  229 

V.  Mavor  &c..  88  Ga.  455,        805,  10 1  o 
V.   Mavor  &c.,   1   Denio   595,  211 

'>'>'>    ''63,  820,  821,  1159,  1506,  1603 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  4  E.  D.  Smith  675^,  ^ 

V.   Neal.   23   Fed.    129,  956 

V.  Pelton.  40  Ohio  St.  306,  1263 

V  Peverly,  1  Am.  L.  Cas.  785,  226 
V.  Poole.  33  Ind.  443,  617,  1288 
V.  Roberts.  11  C.  B.  N.  S.  50,  127 
V.  Rockford  &c.  R.  Co.,  59  111. 
273.  '05 
V.   Salamanca,  99  V.   S.  499. 

885.  995.  998,  1001,  1005,  1009,  1023 

V.    School   District,    32    N.    H. 

118  12,  259.  644,  1213,  1480 

V  Simmons,   89   Maine   242,        1369 
T.    Sutter   Co.   Supervisors,    47 

Cal.  91.  1547 

V.   Town   of   Spafford.   32   N.   Y. 
532,  1609 

V.  "Township  Board  &c.,   87   Mich. 
240,  1569 

V.  Wall,  6  Wall.  83.  ^^    136 

V.  Waltersville  School   Dist.,  44 
Conn.  157,  344,  363,  148.5 

V.  Webber,  157  N.  Y.  693,  754 

Wilson  Co.  V.  National  Bank,  103  V-^^ 
S.    770,  1018 

Wiltse  V.   Town   of  Tilden,   77   Wis. 

-[50  1587 

Winans'"v.  Williams,  5  Kan.  227,       1475 

Winbigler  v.   Mayor  &c.,    45   Cal.    36. 

9,   788,   814,   1594 

Winbish    v.    Hamilton,    47    La.    An. 

246,  219 

Winchester  v.  Cheshire  Co.,  64  N.  H-^^^ 

100,  1064 

Windfall  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Emery,  142  Ind. 

456.  ^^  63 

Windsor  v.   City  of  Des  Moines.   110 

Iowa  175.        715.  747.  878.  879.  881 

V.  Polk  Co.,  109  Iowa  156,  1504 

Wing  V.  Glick,  56  Iowa  473,  216 

Wingate  v.  City  of  Tacoma,  13  Wash. 

603,  1286 

Winham    v.    Commissioners,    26    Mo. 

406,  1572 

Winn   V.   Board   of  Park  Com'rs.   12 

Ky.  L.  339.  118 

V.  Citv  Council  &c.,  21  Ga.  275,  992 

V.  State,  7  So.  353,  1473 


Winona  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  City  of  Water- 
town.  1   S.  D.  46.  1268 
V.  Waldron,  11  Minn.  515,  674 

Winpenny  v.  I'hiladelphia,  65  Pa.  St. 

135,  817 

Winship  v.  Enfield,  42  N.  H.  197, 

1600,  1613 

Winslow  V.  Commissioners  &c.,  64  N. 

C.  218,  1528,  1530 

Winspear  v.  District  Tp.  &c.,  37  Iowa 

542,  12 

V.  Holman  Tp.,  37  Iowa  542.         890 

Winston  v.  City  of  Ft.  Worth,  47  S. 

W.  740,  926,  1833 

V.  Tennessee  &c.  R.  Co.,  1  Baxt. 
60,  985,   1542 

V.  Westfeldt,  22  Ala.  760,  1026 

Winter  v.   City  Council  &c.,  65  Ala. 

403,  1551 

Wintz  V.  Board,  28  W.  Va.  227,  1651 

Winzer    v.    City    of    Burlington,    68 

Iowa  279,  1552 

Wisconsin  Indust.  School  &c.  v.  Clark 

Co.,   103  Wis.   651,  1549 

Wisconsin    Keeley    Inst.    Co.    v.    Mil- 
waukee Co.,   95   Wis.   153,     548,  610 

Wisconsin  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Ashland  Co., 

81    Wis.   1,  300,   372,    593,   1204 

V.  Lincoln  Co.,  67  Wis.  478,  593 

V.   Taylor  Co.,   52   Wis.   37, 

1513,  1520 

Wise  V.  Foote,  81  Ky.  10,  1373 

Wiser  v.  Blachlv,  1  Johns.  Ch.  607,  1015 

Wisner  v.   Davenport,  5  Mich.  501,     860 
V.   People.   156  111.   180,      1145.   1281 

Wistar   v.    City   of   Philadelphia.    80 

Pa.   St.  505.  1149,   1196 

V.   Citv  of  Philadelphia,  92   Pa. 

St.  404,  1196 

V.  City  of  Philadelphia.  Ill  Pa. 

St.   604.  1196,   1233,   1499 

Witheril  v.  Blosher,  9  Hun  412,  786 

Witherop  v.  Titusville  School  Board, 

7   Pa.  Co.  Ct.   Rep.  451.      1476,  1485 

Withers  v.  Buckley,  20  How.  84,  673 

Witherspoon  v.  City  of  Meridian,  69 

Miss.   288,  1560,   1574 

Withington    v.    Inhabitants    &c.,    8 

Cush.    66,  355,   356,   357,    1728 

Witkowski    v.    Bradley,    35    La.    An. 

904,  1535 

V.    Skalowski.    46    Ga.    41,  1724 

Witman  v.  City  of  Reading,  169  Pa. 

St.  375.  1244,   1268 

Witte  V.  Stifel.  126  Mo.  295,  1790 

Witter   V.    Damitz,   81   Wis.   385. 

1561.  1568 

Woffenden   v.    Board   of   Supervisors 

&c.,   1   Ariz.    237,  1654 

Wohrden  v.  Northwestern  R.  Co.,  54 

S.  C.  492.  1786 

Wolcott  V.  Lawrence  Co.,  26  Mo.  272, 

638.  1171 
V.  Town  of  Wolcott,  19  Vt.  37, 

284,  295 

Wolf  V.  Brass,  72  Tex.  133.  1599 

V.    City    of    Keokuk,    48    Iowa 
129.  1271 

V.  City  of  Philadelphia,  105  Pa. 
St.    2,5.  12.34,    1261 

Wolfe  V.   Erie  &c.   Tel.  Co.,  33   Fed. 

320.  1609 

Wolff    V.    New    Orleans,    103    U.    S. 

358,     233.  412.  766,  1523,  1531,  1534 

Wolfson  V.  Township  Board  &c.,   63 

Mich.  49.  1675 

Wolsey  V.  Board,  32  Iowa  130.  1572 

Wong'v.  City  of  Astoria.  13  Or.  538,  541 

Wood,   In  re.   54  N.  Y.   S.  30,  1505 

v.  Bangs.  1  Dak.  179.  840 

v.   Bartling.   16  Kan.   109.  378 

V.  Board  &c.,  125  Ind.  270,  909 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


CCIU 


[References  are  to  Pages.   Vol.  I,  pp.  1-832;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.1 


Wood  V.  City  of  Brooklyn,  14  Barb. 

425,  97,    468,    494,   530 

V.    City    of    Danbury,    72    Conn. 
69,  1804 

V.    City   of   Galveston,   76    Tex. 
126,  1206.  125G 

V.    City    of   Hinton,    47    W.    Va. 
645,  811,   1394 

V.  City  of  Seattle,  23  Wash.  1. 

470,   506,   508.   513,    1812,   1815 
V.  City  of  Watertown,  58   Hun 
298.  1591 

V.  Cutter,  138  Mass.  149,  302 

V.  Ensel,  63  Mo.  193.  1757 

V.    Inhabitants.    11   Cush.   487,      363 
V.  MeGrath.  150  Pa.  St.  451,         1182 
V.   Nation  Water-Works  Co.,  33 
Kan.  590.  572 

V.  President  &c.,  9  Cow.  194, 

61,  83,  1422,  1423 
V.    Simmons,    51    Hun   325,  1066 

V.    Simons.    110   Mass.   116,  365 

V.  Stirman,  37  Tex.  584,  1727 

V.  Strother,  76  Cal.  545,     1256,  1649 
V.    Town    of    Oxford,    97    N.    C. 
227,  370,  984 

Woodbridge   v.   Amboy,    1    N.    J.    L. 

213,  431 

Woodbury  v.  City  of  Detroit,  8  Mich. 

274,  1198 

V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  6  Pick.  227,        867 
V.  Parshlev.  7  N.  H.  237,  1814 

Woodcock  V.  Bolster.  35  Vt.  632,       1475 
V.  City  of  Worcester,  138  Mass. 
268,  1626 

Woodhull  V.  City  of  New  York,  150 

N.  Y.  450,  792 

Woodman  v.  Metropolitan  R.  Co.,  149 

Mass.  335,  1779 

V.  Tufts,  9  N.  H.  88,  1095 

Woodruff  V.  Catlin,  54  Conn.  277.       710 
V.  Eureka  Springs,  55  Ark.  618, 

391    399 
V.  Fisher,  17  Barb.  224,  'l084 

V.   Neal,   28  Conn.   165,        629,   1221 
V.    Okolona,    57    Miss.    806.  1017 

V.  Paddock,  130  N.  Y.  618,  1574 

V.  Stewart,  63  Ala.  206.  529 

V.   Town  of  Glendale,   23  Minn. 
537.  1025.    1026 

V.   Town  of  Glendale,   26  Minn. 
78,  1125 

Woods  V.   City  of  Chicago,   135   III. 

582.  511,   1145 

V.  Colfax  Co..   10  Neb.  552,  9 

V.  Dennett.  9  N.   II.  55,  1053 

V.  Henry,  55  Mo.  560.  1517 

V.  Inhabitants.  Ill  Mass.  357,     1613 
V.  Miller,  30  App.  Div.  232,         1768 
Woodward  v.  Collett,  20  Ky.  L.  1066, 

747,    749 
V.  Town  of  Rutland.  61  Vt.  316.  174 
Woodyer  v.  Hadden.  5  Taunt.  125,     1559 
Wo  Lee,  In  re.  26  Fed.  471.  1400 

Woolley  V.  Baldwin,  101  N.  Y.  688,     222 
Worcester  v.  Ballard.  38  Vt.  60,  1059 

V.  Proprietors  &c.,  16  Pick.  541.  1625 
Worden  v.  City  of  New  Bedford.  131 

Mass.  23.  811.  1068 

V.    Inhabitants    &c.,    131    Mass. 
23,  666 

Work  V.   State.   2  Ohio  St.   296.  1414 

Workman   v.   Citv  of  New  York,   63 

Fed.  298.  795 

Worley  v.  Harris,  82  Ind.  493,  64 

V.    Town   of  Cicero,    110   Ind. 
208.  1552 

Wormley    v.    District   Tp.,    45    Iowa 

666,  1480 

Wormwood  v.  City  of  Waltham,  144 

Mass.  184,  936 


Worster  v.  Forty-Second  St.   R.  Co, 

50  N.  Y.  203,  'iios 

Worth  V.  Commissioners,  Winst.  Eq 

70,  1500,  1507,  1722 

Worthey  v.  Badgett,  32  Ark.  496,  1535 
Worthington    v.    City    of   Covington, 

82  Ky.   265.  260,   1254 

^     V.  Wade.  82  Tex.  26,  1561 

Wortman,  Matter  of,  22  Abb    N    C 

1^''  1649 

Worts  V.  City  of  Watertown,  16  Fed 

534,  1737 

Wragg  V.  Penn  Tp.,  94  111.  11,  607 

^^ray  v.  Mayor  &c.,  46  Pa.   St.  365 

593,  1233,  1234 
Wreford  v.  People,  14  Mich.  41,  1093 
Wren  v.   Luzerne  Co.,  9  Pa.  Co    Ct 

22.  ■   173 

Wright  V.  Bishop,  88  111.   302 

^    n     ^       o,  ..  651,  1699,  1701 

V.  Carter,  27  N.  J.  L.  76,  682 

V.    Chicago    &c.    R.    Co.,    7    HI 
App.  438,  527 

V.  City  Council  &c.,  78  Ga.  241,     263 
V.  City  of  Boston,  9  Cush.  233 

1234.  1498.  'l726 
V.  City  of  Chicago,  20  111.  252, 

1101  'l''32 
V.  City  of  Mt.  Vernon,  60  N    Y    " 
S.  1017,  ■     71 

V.  City  of  San  Antonio.  50  S.  W 
406  576.  1549,  1685.  1800.  1805 

Y-  City  of  Tacoma,  3  Wash.   T. 
410.  io5g 

V.  City  of  Wilmington,  92  N.  C. 
156.  '  goo 

y.    Corporation    of   Georgetown, 
4  Cranch  C.  C.  534,  1994 

V.  Forrestal.  65  Wis.  341,  476.  1399 
V.    Harris,    31    Iowa   272,  393 

y    Inhabitants  &c.,   132   Mass. 
49,  1639 

V.  Linn.  9  Pa.  St.  433,  664 

V.  Nagle,  101  U.   S.  791, 

^    XT     ^-u  o  -u     ,^'^^-  565,  1463,  1808 
V.  North  School  Dist..  53  Conn. 
E^?i       ,      o^  T  ^5^-   363,   1477,   1485 
V.  People,  87  111.  582,  1253,  1540 

V.   Rouss,  18  Neb.   234,  335 

V.  Simpson,  6  Ves.  714,  399 

V.   Southwestern  R.   Co.,  64  Ga. 
782,  1988 

y.   Town   Clerk   of   Stockport,   5 
Man.  &  G.  33,  i       >   ^  ^^^ 

V.  Town  of  Victoria,  4  Tex.  375,  628 
Wrought   Iron   Bridge  Co.   v.   Jasper 

Tp.,  68  Mich.  441,  ^       867 

V.    Town   of  Attica,   2   N    Y    S 
359,  •    ^-1172 

Wullenwaber  v.   Dunigan,   30   Neb. 

877,  gqQ 

V.  Dunigan.  33  Neb.  477.  988 

Wurts  V.  Hoagland,  114  U.  S.  606.       698 
Wyandotte   &c.    Br.    Co.    v.    Commis- 
sioners. 10  Kan.  331.  339 
Wyandotte  City  v.  Wood,  5  Kan.  603    119 
Wyandotte    Elec.    L.    Co.    v.    City   of 

Wyandotte,  124  Mich.  43.  1.809,  1812 
Wyatt  V.  City  of  Rome,  105  Ga  312  797 
Wyker  v.  Francis,  120  Ala.  509  166'' 
Wyley  v.  Wilson,  44  Vt.  404,  344  36.3 
Wyman  v.  City  of  Philadelphia,  175 

Pa.  St.  117,  1343 

Wynehamer  v.  People.  13  N.  Y.  378,     677 
Wynn   v.    State,   67   Miss.   312,  1486 

Wynne  v.  Mayor  &c.,  105  Ga.  614,     1550 
V.  Wright,  1  Dev.  &  B.  L.  19.     1537 
Wyoming  Coal   Co.   v.   Price.   81    Pa. 

St.  156.  675 

Wysinger  v.  Crookshank,  82  Cal.  588,  1494 


CCIV 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


IReferences  are  to  Pages.   Vol.  I,  pp.  1-S32;  Vol.  II,  pp.  833-1830.} 


Yaggy  V.  District  Tp.  &c.,  80  Iowa 

121.  1487 

Yale  V.  West  Middle  School  Dist.,  59 

Conn.  489,  1492 

Yanisli  v.  City  of  St.  Paul,  50  Minn. 

518,  587 

Yarnell  v.   City  of  Los  Angeles,  87 

Cal.  603,  170,  653 

Yates  V.  City  of  Milwaukee,  92  Wis. 

352,  1247,  1709 

V.  Lansing.  5  Johns.  282,  220 

V.  Milwaukee,  10  Wall.   497, 

676,  1110,  1117.  1121 
V.  Town  of  West  Grafton,  34  W. 
Va.  783,  1352 

V.  Village  of  Batavia,  79  111. 
500.  1697 

V.  Yates,  9  Barb.  324,  664 

Yavapai  Co.  v.  O'Neil,  29  Pac.  430,     937 

Yeager   y.    Town    of    Fairmount,    43 

W.  Va.  259,  1777 

Yeakel  v.  City  of  Lafayette,  48  Ind. 

116,  1191 

Yeatman   v.    Crandall,    11    La.   An. 

220.  1270.  1520 

Yellow  River  &c.  Co.  v.  Arnold,  46 

Wis.   214.  5.58 

Yelton  V.  Addison.  101  Ind.  58.  708 

Yesler  v.   City  of   Seattle.   1   Wash. 

308,  374,  489,  1014,  1150 

Yick  Wo  V.  Flopkins,  118  U.  S.  356, 

492,  503,  508,  1083,  1400 

York  Co.  v.  Watson,  15  S.  C.  1,  320 

Yorty  V.  Paine,  62  Wis.   154,       197,  424 

Young  V.  Black  Hawk  Co.,  66  Iowa 

460,  282,  1088 

V.  Buckingham.  5  Ohio  485.  294 

V.  Carev.  184  111.  613,  415,  1684 

V.  Carey.  80  111.   App.   601,  1686 

V.  Charleston.  20  S.  C.  116,  8 

V.  City  Council  &c.,  20  S.  C.  116,  814 
V.  City  of  Kansas,  27  Mo.  App. 
101,  1179.  1180 

V.  City  of  St.  Louis,  47  Mo.  429, 

1199,  1256 
V.  City  of  Webb  City,   150  Mo. 
333,  1359.   1360 

V.  Clarendon  Tp.,  132  U.  S.  340,  562 
637.  973,  974,  981,  982,  1017,  1576 
V.   Commissioners  &c.,  2  N.  & 
McC.  537,  8 


Young  V.  Harrison,  17  Ga.  30,  703 

V.  Laconia,  59  N.  H.  534,  697 

V.  Leedom,  67  Pa.  St.  351,  811 

V.  McKenzie,  3  Ga.  31,  673 

V.  People,  155  111.  247,  1145 

V.  State,  7  Gill  &  J.  253,       309,  310 
V.  Town  of  Henderson,  76  N.  C. 
420,  1508,  1521 

Young  &c.    Amuse.    Co.   v.   Atlantic 

City.  60  N.  J.  L.  125,  527 

Youngblood  v.  Sexton,  32  Mich.  406, 

1506,  1509.  1522,  1722 

Youngerman  v.  Murphy,  107  Iowa 

686,  1554 

Yule  V.  City  of  New  Orleans,  25  La. 

An.  394,  786 

Z 

Zaack  v.  N.  Y.   C.  R.  Co.,  40  N.  Y. 

S.  821,  1314 

Zable  V.  Louisville  Baptist  Orphans' 

Home.  92  Ky.  89,  1247 

Zabriskie  v.  Cleveland  &c.  R.  Co.,  23 

How.  381,  253 

V.  Jersey  City  &c.  R.  Co.,  13  N. 

J.  Eq.  314.  1706 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  23  How.  381,         61 
Zanesville   v.    Farman,   53    Ohio   St. 

605.  1375 

V.   Gas  Light  Co.,   47   Ohio   St. 

1,  574 

Zartman  v.  State,  109  Ind.  360.  445,  1489 ' 
Zeigler  v.  Chapin.  126  N.  Y.  342,         639 

V.  People,  156  111.  133,  1145 

Zeiler  v.  Central  R.  Co..  84  Md.  304,     301 
Zettler   v.    City   of   Atlanta,    66    Ga. 

195.  1637 

Ziegler  v.  Chapin,  13  N.  Y.  S.  783,       193 

V.  Flack,  54  N.  Y.  Super.  69,       1254 

V.   Hopkins,  117  U.   S.  683. 

1236,  1257,  1258 

V.  People,  164  111.  531.  1261 

Zimmerman  v.  Canfleld,  42  Ohio  St. 

463.  689 

V.  Snowden,  88  Mo.  218.  1257 

Zoeller  v.  Kellogg.  4  Mo.  App.  163,     1297 
Zorger  v.   City   of  Greensburgh,   60 

Ind.  1.  516 

Zottman  v.  City  of  San  Francisco,  20 

Cal.  96. 

254.  255.  554,  631,   638.   1212.   1254 
Zylstra  v.  Corporation  of  Charleston, 

1  Bay  382,  535,  1415 


COMMENTARIES 

ON  THE   LAW  OF 

MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS. 


CHAPTEE  I. 


INTRODUCTORY — HISTORICAL   VIEW. 


Section 

1.  The  genus  corporation  defined. 

2.  Species  of  corporations. 

3.  Public  corporations,  quasi-public 

corporations  and  private   cor- 
porations. 

4.  Subdivisions  of  public   corpora- 

tions. 

5.  Municipal  and  public  quasi-cor- 

porations defined. 

6.  Subdivisions    of    strictly    public 

corporations. 

7.  Definition  of  the  municipal  cor- 

poration. 

8.  Definition    of   the   public   quasi- 

corporation. 


Section 

9.  Examples  of  municipal  and  pub- 
lic quasi-corporations. 

10.  Counties. 

11.  The  New  England  towns. 

12.  The  same  subject  continued. 

13.  The  state. 

14.  Long  Island  towns. 

15.  The  development  of  the  munici- 

pal  corporation — (a)    In   gen- 
eral. 

16.  (b)  Greece  and  Rome. 

17.  (c)    Italy  and  France — The  me- 

diaeval cities. 
Conclusion. 


18 


§  1.  The  genus  corporation  defined. — The  definition  of  a  corpora- 
tion most  familiar  to  American  jurisprudence  is  that  of  Chief  Justice 
Marshall,  which  declares  a  corporation  to  be  "an  artificial  being,  in- 
visible, intangible,  and  existing  only  in  contemplation  of  law."^    This 


^  The  full  text  of  the  decision  from 
which  the  quotation  in  the  text  is  an 
extract  is  as  follows: — "A  corpora- 
tion is  an  artificial  being,  invisible, 
intangible,  and  existing  only  in  con- 
templation of  law.  Being  the  mere 
creature  of  law  it  possesses  only 
those  properties  which  the  charter  of 
its  creation  confers  upon  it,  either 
expressly  or  as  incidental  to  its  very 
existence.  These  are  such  as  are 
supposed  best  to  effect  the  object  for 
which  it  was  created.     Among  the 


most  important  are  immortality; 
and,  if  the  expression  may  be  al- 
lowed, individuality;  properties  by 
which  a  perpetual  succession  of 
many  persons  are  considered  as  the 
same,  and  may  act  as  a  single  indi 
vidual.  They  enable  a  corporation 
to  manage  its  own  affairs,  and  to 
hold  property  without  the  perplexing 
intricacies,  the  hazardous  and  end- 
less necessity  of  perpetual  convey- 
ances for  the  purpose  of  transmit- 
ting from  hand  to  hand.     It  is  chief- 


(1) 


§    1  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  2 

phrase  of  the  chief  justice,  however,  though  forcible  and  suggestive, 
is,  as  Judge  Dillon  observes,^  rather  a  description  than  a  definition; 
and  the  same  observation  may  be  made  of  Mr.  Justice  Story's  state- 
ment in  the  same  ease,  that  a  corporation  is  an  artificial  person  existing 
in  contemplation  of  law,  and  endowed  with  certain  powers  and  fran- 
chises, which,  though  they  must  be  exercised  through  the  medium  of 
its  natural  members,  are  yet  considered  as  subsisting  in  the  corpora- 
tion itself  as  distinctly  as  if  it  were  a  real  person.^  Chancellor  Kent 
defines  a  corporation  as  "a  franchise  possessed  by  one  or  more  indi- 
viduals who  subsist  as  a  body  politic  under  a  special  denomination, 
and  are  vested  by  the  policy  of  the  law  with  the  capacity  of  perpetual 
succession,  and  of  acting  in  several  respects,  however  numerous  the 
association  may  be,  as  a  single  individual."*  So,  Lord  Coke  had  de- 
fined a  corporation  to  be  "a  body  to  take  in  possession  framed  as  to 
its  capacity  by  policy,  and  therefore  called  by  Littleton  (section  413) 
a  body  politic;  it  is  called  a  corporation  or  body  corporate  because 
the  persons  are  made  into  a  body,  and  are  of  capacity  to  take,  grant,, 
etc.,  by  a  particular  name."^  These  definitions,  or  rather  descrip- 
tions, are,  however,  too  general  to  be  of  practical  use,  except  as  sug- 
gestions; and  they  insist  too  much  on  the  theory  that  a  corporation  is 
strictly  a  legal  or  artificial  person  or  individual ;  ignoring  the  fact 
that,  while  a  corporation  in  most  of  its  relations  acts  as  a  unit,  and  may 
therefore  for  the  most  part  be  conveniently  regarded  as  a  legal  person, 
it  is  in  many  of  its  relations  properly  conceived  of  as  composed  of  an 
aggregation  of  persons.®     As  has  been  said,  the  effort  of  practical 

ly  for  the  purpose  of  clothing  bod-  lor,  in  the  preface  of  his  work  on 

ies  of  men  in  succession  with  those  Corporations,   declares  that  the  fic- 

qualities    and    capacities    that    cor-  tion  of  the  "legal  person"  has  out- 

porations    were    invented    and    are  lived  its  usefulness,  and  is  no  longer 

in  use.     By  these  means  a  perpetual  adequate  for  the  purposes  of  an  ade- 

succession  of  individuals  are  capable  quate   treatment  of  the   legal   rela- 

of  acting  for  the  promotion  of  the  tions   arising  through   the   prosecu- 

particular  object  like  one  immortal  tion  of  a  corporate  enterprise.  In  an 

being.     But  this  being  does  not  share  article  in  the  American  Law  Review, 

in  the  civil  government  of  the  coun-  Professor  Pomeroy  approves  and  am- 

try,  unless  that  be  the  purpose  for  plifies  the  idea  contained  in  Mr.  Tay- 

which  it  was  created:"   Dartmouth  lor's  remark,  and  calls  attention  to 

College  V.  Woodward,  4  Wheat.  518,  the  fact  that  many  modern  corpora- 

636.  tions  differ  in  essentials  very  little 

- 1  Dillon  Munic.  Corp.  37.  from  partnerships,  except  that  they 

^  Dartmouth  College  v.  Woodward,  can  sue  and  be  sued,  make  contracts, 

4  Wheat.  518,  667.  acquire  rights  and  incur  liabilities  in 

*  2  Kent  Com.  267.  and  by  their  corporate  names,  and 

^  Co.  Litt.  250a.  that  a  change  of  membership  does 

'  1  Beach  Priv.  Corp.  3.     Mr.  Tay-  not  work  their  dissolution.     He  re- 


INTRODUCTOllY — HISTORICAL   VIEW. 


jurisprudence  should  bo  to  reg-ard  it  as  a  unit  or  collection  of  persons 
according  to  the  relation  in  which  it  acts  in  a  given  instance.'^  The 
most  accurate  and  serviceable  definition  of  a  corporation  is,  perhaps, 
that  of  the  earliest  writer  on  the  subject,  who  defines  it  to  be  "a 
collection  of  individuals  united  into  one  body  under  a  special  denomi- 
nation, having  perpetual  succession  under  an  artificial  form,  and 
Vested  by  the  policy  of  the  law  with  the  capacity  of  acting  in  several 
respects  as  an  individual,  particularly  of  taking  and  granting  prop- 
erty, of  contracting  obligations,  and  of  suing  and  being  sued,  of  en- 
joying privileges  and  immunities  in  common,  and  of  exercising  a 
variety  of  political  rights,  more  or  less  extensive,  according  to  the 
design  of  its  institution  or  the  powers  conferred  upon  it,  either  at  the 
time  of  its  creation  or  any  subsequent  period  of  its  existence."* 

§  2.  Species  of  corporations. — For  the  purposes  of  this  work,  cor- 
porations may  be  properly  classified  into  public  and  private  corpora- 
tions. This  division  is  recognized  by  all  writers  on  the  subject,  al- 
though they  differ  somewhat  in  limiting  the  precise  boundary  between 
the  two  classes.  In  the  Dartmouth  College  case,  Mr.  Justice  Washing- 
ton discussed  at  length  the  proper  method  of  division  of  corporations. 


marks  further  that  the  English 
courts  have  always  carefully  distin- 
guished between  the  statutory  joint- 
stock  companies  with  limited  liabil- 
ity (which  are  practically  identical 
with  the  corporations  formed  under 
the  statutes  of  our  several  states) 
and  common-law  corporations:  "Le- 
gal Idea  of  a  Corporation,"  19  Am. 
Law  Rev.  114,  115,  116.  So,  also,  it 
has  been  held  in  the  supreme  court 
of  the  United  States  that  a  suit  by 
or  against  a  corporation  is  to  be  re- 
garded for  jurisdictional  purposes  as 
a  suit  by  or  against  the  stockholders 
of  the  corporation:  Muller  v.  Dows, 
94  U.  S.  444.  Where  the  word  "per- 
sons" is  used  in  a  statute,  "corpora- 
tions are  to  be  deemed  and  consid- 
ered as  'persons'  when  the  circum- 
stances in  which  they  are  placed  are 
identical  with  those  of  natural  per- 
sons expressly  included  in  such  stat- 
utes:" Beaston  v.  Farmers'  Bank  &c., 
12  Peters  102,  134,  135;  Crafford  v. 
Supervisors  &c.,  87  Va.  110;  s.  c.  12 
S.  E.  147;  10  L.  R.  A.  129. 


^  1  Beach  Priv.  Corp.  4.  For  ex- 
planatory discussions  of  this  ques- 
tion, see  the  essay  of  Prof.  Pomeroy 
above  cited,  "The  Legal  Idea  of  a 
Corporation,"  19  Am.  Law  Rev.  114, 
116,  and  Lowell  Transfers  of  Stock, 
§  2.  Mr.  Lowell  insists  on  the  the- 
ory that  a  corporation  is  strictly  dis- 
tinct from  its  members.  He  says: 
"A  corporation  is  distinct  from  its 
members  in  the  same  sense  that  a 
state  is  distinct  from  its  citizens. 
The  parallel,  indeed,  between  a  state 
and  a  corporation  is  very  close." 

*Kyd  Corp.  13.  See  also,  for  a 
good  definition  of  a  corporation, 
Thomas  v.  Dakin,  22  Wend.  (N.  Y.) 
9,  where  it  is  said  that  a  corpora- 
tion aggregate  is  an  artificial  body 
of  men  composed  of  divers  individu- 
als, the  ligaments  of  which  body  are 
the  franchises  and  liabilities  be- 
stowed upon  it,  and  which  bind  and 
unite  all  into  one,  and  in  which  con- 
sists the  whole  frame  and  essence  of 
the  corporation. 


§    3  PUBLIC    COIU'OKATIOXS.  4 

He  said:  "Public  corporations  are  generally  esteemed  such  as  exist 
for  political  purposes  only,  such  as  towns,  cities,  parishes  and  counties ; 
and  in  many  respects  they  are  so,  although  they  involve  some  private 
interests;  but,  strictly  speaking,  public  corporations  are  such  only 
as  are  founded  by  the  government  for  public  purposes  when  the  whole 
interests  belong  also  to  the  government.  If,  therefore,  the  founda- 
tion be  private,  though  under  the  charter  of  the  government,  the  cor- 
poration is  private,  however  extensive  the  uses  may  be  to  which  it  is 
devoted,  either  by  the  bounty  of  the  founder  or  the  nature  and  objects 
of  the  institution.  For  instance,  a  bank  created  by  the  government 
for  its  own  uses,  whose  stock  is  exclusively  owned  by  the  government, 
is  in  the  strictest  sense  a  public  corporation.  So  a  hospital  created 
and  endowed  by  the  government  for  general  charity.  But  a  bank 
whose  stock  is  owned  by  private  persons  is  a  private  corporation,  al- 
though it  is  erected  by  the  government,  and  its  objects  and  operations 
partake  of  a  public  nature.  The  same  doctrine  may  be  affirmed  of 
insurance,  canal,  bridge  and  turnpike  companies.  In  all  these  cases 
the  uses  may,  in  a  certain  sense,  be  called  public,  but  the  corporations 
are  private;  as  much  so,  indeed,  as  if  the  franchises  were  vested  in 
a  single  person."^  The  division  suggested  by  Mr.  Justice  Washington 
may,  however,  be  properly  modified  in  these  modern  days  of  immense 
private  corporations,  such  as  railways,  canal  companies,  telegraph 
companies  and  express  companies,  involving  public  interests  and  sub- 
ject to  the  orders  of  the  public,  although  maintained  generally  only 
for  private  emolument  and  of  private  foundation.  The  division  set 
forth  in  a  California  case  seems  to  conform  more  nearly  to  the  re- 
quirements of  modern  conditions. 

§  3.    Public  corporations,  quasi-public  corporations  and  private  cor- 
porations.— Considering  the  general  scope  and  purpose  of  corpora- 

« Dartmouth  College  v.  Wood-  521;  New  York  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Metro- 
ward,  4  Wheat.  518,  668.  See  also,  politan  Gas  Co.,  63  N.  Y.  326;  Peo- 
on  this  subject,  Osborn  v.  Presi-  ple  v.  Morris,  13  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  325, 
dent  &c.,  9  Wheat  738;  Bank  of  337;  Bailey  v.  Mayor  &c.,  3  Hill  (N. 
United  States  v.  Planters'  Bank,  9  Y.)  531;  Ten  Eyck  v.  Delaware  &c. 
Wheat.  907;  Vincennes  University  v.  Canal  Co.,  18  N.  J.  L.  200;  Tinsman 
Indiana,  14  How.  268;  Rundle  v.  v.  Belvidere  Del.  R.  Co.,  26  N.  J.  L. 
Delaware  &c.  Canal  Co.,  1  Wall.  Jr.  148;  Bennett's  Appeal,  65  Pa.  St. 
275,  290;  Bonaparte  v.  Camden  &c.  242;  Foster  v.  Fowler,  60  Pa.  St.  27; 
R.  Co.,  1  Bald.  205;  Raleigh  &c.  R.  Bushel  v.  Commonwealth  Ins.  Co.,  15 
Co.  V.  Davis,  2  Dev.  &  B.  (N.  C.)  S.  &  R.  (Pa.)  173,186;  Directors  &c. 
451;  Alabama  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Kidd,  29  v.  Houston,  71  111.  318;  Miners'  Bank 
Ala.  221;  Commonwealth  v.  Lowell  v.  United  States,  1  Greene  (Iowa) 
Gas  Co.,  12  Allen  (Mass.)  75;  Mc-  553;  Dean  v.  Davis,  51  Cal.  406. 
Cune  V.  Norwich  Gas  Co.,  30  Conn. 


5  INTRODUCTORY HISTORICAL   VIEW.  §    3 

tions  in  this  country,  they  may  be  divided  into  three  general  classes, — 
the  first  class  being  public  municipal  corporations,  the  object  of  which 
is  to  promote  public  interests,  and  which  may  be  called  strictly  public 
corporations;  the  second  class  being  quasi-public  corporations,  which 
are  technically  private  but  are  of  a  quasi-public  character,  having  in 
view  some  public  enterprise  in  which  the  public  interests  are  involved 
and  owing  certain  duties  to  the  public  as  such, — for  example,  railroad, 
turnpike  and  canal  companies;  and  the  third  class  being  strictly  pri- 
vate corporations,  of  private  foundation,  maintained  strictly  for  pri- 
vate emolument  and  having  in  view  only  strictly  private  enterprises.^** 
The  difference  between  strictly  private  and  strictly  public  corporations 
is  obvious  and  radical;  the  former  being  formed  by  the  voluntary  ac- 
tion of  the  corporators,  between  whom  there  exists  a  contract  whereby 
each  subjects  his  interest,  with  certain  restrictions,  to  the  control  of 
the  corporate  management  for  the  accomplishment  of  the  ends  for 
which  the  company  was  formed  ;^^  and  the  latter  not  being  in  the 
same  sense  voluntary  associations,  and  no  contract  existing  between 
the  members.^-  The  distinction,  however,  between  quasi-public  and 
private  corporations  is  much  less  clearly  marked.  These  quasi-public 
corporations  partake  both  of  the  nature  of  private  and  of  public  cor- 
porations. They  are  private  corporations  in  that  they  are  voluntary 
in  their  inception,  that  they  are  maintained  for  private  gain,  and  that 
there  subsists  a  contract  between  their  incorporators.  They  are  pub- 
lic in  that  they  have  in  view  a  public  enterprise  in  which  the  public 
interests  are  involved,  that  their  property  is  devoted  to  a  use  in 
which  the  public  has  an  interest,  and  that  they  are  therefore  controlled 
by  the  public  for  the  common  good  to  the  extent  of  that  interest. ^^ 
The  old  principle  of  law  enunciated  by  Chief  Justice  Hale,  that  when 
"private  property  is  affected  with  a  public  interest  it  ceases  to  be  juris 
privati  only,""  has  been  greatly  extended  and  amplified  in  this  coun- 
try by  the  doctrine  of  Munn  v.  Illinois,^ ^  which  doctrine  was  further 
applied  in  the  line  of  decisions  known  as  the  "Granger  Cases"  and  the 
"Railroad  Commission  Cases."  This  doctrine  is  succinctly  stated  and 
the  limits  of  the  power  of  the  government  over  these  quasi-public  cor- 
porations is  clearly  defined  in  Munn  v.  Illinois,  where  it  was  said: 

"  Miners'  Ditch  Co.  v.  Zellerbacli,  Bushel  v.  Commonwealth  Ins.  Co.,  15 

37  Cal.  543.  S.  &  R.  (Pa.)  173;  People  v.  Morris, 

"Beach    Priv.    Corp.    42;     Clear-  13  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  325,  337;  Dean  v. 

water  v.  Meredeth,  1  Wall.  25;  Hays  Davis,  51  Cal.  406. 

V.   Commonwealth,    82   Pa.    St.   518;  "Munn   v.    Illinois,   94  U.   S.   113, 

Brown    v.    Hummel,    6    Pa.    St.    86;  126. 

Hare  Amer.  Const.  Law  600.  "  1  Hargrave's  Law  Tracts  78. 

'-  Bennett's     Appeal,     65     Pa.     St.  "  94  U.  S.  113. 
242;  Foster  v.  Fowler,  60  Pa.  St.  27; 


§    4  PUBLIC    CORrORATIONS.  6 

"When,  therefore,  one  devotes  his  property  to  a  use  in  which  the  public 
has  an  interest,  he  in  effect  grants  to  the  public  an  interest  in  that  use 
and  must  submit  to  be  controlled  by  the  public  for  the  common  good 
to  the  extent  of  the  interest  he  has  thus  created.  He  may  withdraw 
his  grant  by  discontinuing  the  use,  but  so  long  as  he  maintains  the 
use  he  must  submit  to  the  control."^® 

§  4.  Subdivisions  of  public  corporations. — It  is  manifest  from  the 
scheme  of  division  indicated  in  the  preceding  section  that  public  cor- 
porations are  naturally  divided  into  the  two  great  classes  of  strictly 
public  and  quasi-public  corporations.  The  courts  of  this  country, 
however,  although,  as  shown  in  the  preceding  section,  they  have  gone 
to  great  lengths  in  enforcing  governmental  control  over  quasi-public 
corporations,  have  not  generally  applied  the  term  "public"  or  "quasi- 
public"  to  such  corporations,  but  have  with  practical  unanimity  held 
that  if  the  whole  interest  does  not  belong  to  the  government,  or  if 
the  corporation  is  not  created  for  the  administration  of  political  or 
municipal  power,  it  is  a  private  corporation.^"  In  reading  the  cases 
on  this  subject,  therefore,  public  corporations  are  not  generally  con- 
sidered to  include  what  we  have  denominated  quasi-public  corpora- 
tions. 


^«Munn  v.  Illinois,  94  U.  S.  113, 
126.  The  doctrine  in  that  case  was 
applied  to  grain  elevators.  It  has 
been  also  applied  to  railroads:  See 
the  "Granger  Cases:" — Chicago  &c. 
R.  Co.  V.  Iowa,  94  U.  S.  155;  Peik  v. 
Chicago  &c.  R.  Co..  94  U.  S.  164,  178; 
also  the  "Railroad  Commission 
Cases,"  116  U.  S.  307;  s.  c.  6  S.  Ct. 
334,  348,  349,  388,  391,  1191.  It  has 
been  applied  to  telephones:  Hock- 
ett  V.  State,  105  Ind.  250;  s.  c.  5  N.  E. 
178.  Also  to  gas  and  water  compa- 
nies: State  V.  Ironton  Gas  Co.,  37 
Ohio  St.  45;  Spring  Valley  Water- 
Works  V.  Schottler,  110  U.  S.  347, 
350;  s.  c.  4  S.  Ct.  48.  See  on  this 
subject,  1  Beach  Priv.  Corp.  34-37, 
55-59 ;  "The  Dartmouth  College  Case 
and  Private  Corporations,"  by  Wil- 
liam P.  Wells,  9  Am.  Bar.  Assoc. 
Rep.  229;  Address  by  James  A.  Gar- 
field, 5  Leg.  Gaz.  408;  "The  Doctrine 
of  Presumed  Dedication  of  Private 
Property  to  Public  Use,"  by  George 


Ticknor  Curtis  (John  Wiley  &  Sons, 
N.  Y.,  1881). 

"  Rundle  v.  Delaware  &c.  Canal 
Co.,  1  Wall.  Jr.  275,  290;  Vincennes 
University  v.  Indiana,  14  How.  268; 
Bank  of  United  States  v.  Planters' 
Bank,  9  Wheat.  907;  Bonaparte  v. 
Camden  &c.  R.  Co.,  1  Bald.  205;  Ala- 
bama R.  Co.  V.  Kidd,  29  Ala.  221; 
New  York  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Metropolitan 
Gas  Co.,  63  N.  Y.  326;  Bailey  v.  May- 
or &c.,  3  Hill  (N.  Y.)  531;  Directors 
&c.  v.  Houston,  71  111.  318;  Miners' 
Bank  v.  United  States,  1  Greene 
(Iowa)  553;  Ten  Byck  v.  Delaware 
&c.  Canal  Co.,  18  N.  J.  L.  200;  Tins- 
man  V.  Belvidere  Del.  R.  Co.,  26  N.  J. 
L.  148;  McCune  v.  Norwich  Gas  Co., 
30  Conn.  521;  Raleigh  &c.  R.  Co.  v. 
Davis,  2  Dev.  &  B.  (N.  C.)  451.  It  has 
been  held  in  Georgia  that  a  corpora- 
tion deriving  part  of  its  support 
from  the  government  was  not  neces- 
sarily a  public  corporation:  Cleve- 
land v.  Steward.  3  Ga.  283.     And  the 


7  INTRODUCTOUY — TtlSTORlCAL    VIEW.  §    5 

§  5.  Municipal  and  public  quasi-corporations  defined. — Public  cor- 
porations may  be  subdivided  into  municipal  corporations  and  public 
quasi-corporations.  Municipal  corporations  embrace  incorporated 
cities,  villages  and  towns,  which  are  full-fledged  corporations,  with 
all  the  powers,  duties  and  liabilities  incident  to  such  a  status;  while 
public  quasi-corporations  possess  only  a  portion  of  the  powers,  duties 
and  liabilities  of  corporations.  As  instances  of  the  latter  class  may  be 
mentioned  counties,  hundreds,  townships,  overseers  of  the  poor,  town 
supervisors,  school  districts  and  road  districts.^*  It  must  be  borne 
in  mind  that  public  quasi-corporations  and  quasi-public  corporations 
are  entirely  distinct  classes ;  the  former  being  represented,  as  we  have 
said,  by  townships,  counties  and  such  governmental  subdivisions  of 
the  state,  the  latter  being  represented  by  corporations,  the  property 
of  which  is  devoted  to  a  use  in  which  the  public  has  an  interest,  such 
as  railroads,  grain  elevators,  telegraph  companies  and  similar  cor- 
porations. 

§  6.  Subdivisions  of  strictly  public  corporations. — The  generic  dif- 
ference between  these  two  classes  of  corporations  lies  in  the  fact  that 
municipal  corporations  are  created  at  the  request  or  with  the  consent 
of  their  members,  and  for  the  promotion  of  their  convenience  and 
welfare;  while  public  quasi-corporations  are  merely  local  subdivisions 
of  the  state,  created  by  the  state  of  its  own  sovereign  will,  without  any 
particular  solicitation  or  request  on  the  part  of  the  members  of  the 
corporation,  and  created  almost  exclusively  with  a  view  to  the  policy 
of  the  state  at  large.  The  municipal  corporation  is  asked  for,  or  at 
least  assented  to,  by  the  people  it  embraces;  the  public  quasi-corpora- 
tion  is   superimposed   by   a    sovereign   and   paramount   authority. ^^ 

fact  that  a  corporation  was  employed  ^'*  County    Com'rs    &c.    v.    County 

in   the    service    of   the   government  Com'rs  &c.,  50  Md.  245;  Pulaski  Co. 

has  been  held  not  to  malie  it  a  public  v.    Reeve,    42    Ark.    54;    Askew    v. 

corporation:   Thomson  v.  Pacific  R.  Hale,    54    Ala.    639;    Board    &c.    v. 

Co.,  9  Wall.  579.     If  the  state  is  a  Mighels,   7  Ohio  St.  109;    Rouse  v. 

stockholder  in  a  corporation  or  one  Moore,  18  Johns  (N.  Y.)  407;   Town 

of  the  corporators,  the  corporation  of    North    Hempstead    v.    Town    of 

is  not  a  public  corporation:  Bank  of  Hempstead,    2   Wend.    (N.   Y.)    109; 

United   States  v.  Planters'  Bank,  9  Fourth    School    Dist.    v.    Wood,    13 

Wheat.  904;   Hutchinson  v.  Western  Mass.  193;    Mower  v.  Inhabitants,  9 

&c.  R.  Co.,  6  Heisk.  (Tenn.)  634.    But  Mass.     247;     Damon    v.    Granby,     2 

see,  contra,  Trustees  &c.  V.  Winston,  Pick.    (Mass.)    345,    352;    Riddle   v. 

5  St.  &  P.  (Ala.)  17.     In  South  Caro-  Proprietors   &c.,    7    Mass.    169;    Ad- 

lina  a  corporation  owned  in  toto  by  ams  v.  President  &c.,  1  Maine  363. 

the  state  was  held  to  be  a  private  '"  Board  &c.  v.  Mighels,  7  Ohio  St. 

corporation:   State  Bank  v.  Gibbs,  3  109.     This  case  contains  a  clear  dis- 

McC.  (S.  C.)  377.  cussion    of    the    difference    between 

municipal    corporations  and   public 


PUBLIC    CORrORATIONS. 


8 


From  this  fundamental  difference  in  inception  flow  many  minor  and 
consequential  differences  between  the  two  classes  of  corporations  under 
discussion.  These  differences  will  be  more  fully  considered  later 
herein.  The  principal  differences  arise  from  the  fact  that  public 
quasi-corporations  are  purely  auxiliaries  to  the  state,  and  have  no 
powers,  duties  or  liabilities  except  as  conferred  expressly  by  statute; 
and  as  a  result,  in  many  cases  municipal  corpoi'ations  are  held  re- 
sponsible for  damages  to  persons  injured  through  negligence  or  default 
of  the  corporation,  where  there  is  no  express  provision  of  law  to  that 
effect;^"  while  public  quasi-corporations,  being  mere  subdivisions  of 


quasi-corporations.  See  also,  the 
cases  cited  in  the  preceding  section. 
="'The  rule  stated  briefly  seems  to 
be,  that  where  a  municipal  corpora- 
tion acts  for  a  purpose  purely  and 
essentially  public — acts  as  an  agent 
of  the  state,  and  nothing  more — the 
corporation  is  regarded  as  a  part  of 
the  sovereign  state,  and  can  not  be 
sued  for  a  tort,  unless  express  per- 
mission by  statute  to  bring  such  a 
suit  has  been  given.  But  where 
municipal  corporations  act,  as  pri- 
vate corporations,  for  the  local  bene- 
fit and  advantage  of  their  members, 
they  are  liable  in  tort  just  as  a  pri- 
vate corporation  would  be:  Mayor 
&c.  v.  Lasser,  9  Humph.  (Tenn.) 
757;  O'Neill  v.  New  Orleans,  30  La. 
An.  220;  Brinkmeyer  v.  City  of  Bv- 
ansville,  29  Ind.  187;  McConnell  v. 
Dewey,  5  Neb.  385;  Kenworthy  v. 
Ironton,  41  Wis.  647;  Wallace 
V.  Muscatine,  4  Greene  (Iowa) 
373;  Simmer  v.  St.  Paul,  23  Minn. 
408;  Young  v.  Commissioners  &c., 
2  N.  &  McC.  (S.  C.)  537;  Cur- 
ran  V.  City  of  Boston,  151  Mass. 
505;  s.  c.  24  N.  E.  781;  21  Am. 
St.  465;  8  L.  R.  A.  243;  30  Am.  & 
Eng.  Corp.  Cas.  506;  McCombs  v. 
Town  Council  &c.,  15  Ohio  474; 
Noonan  v.  Albany,  79  N.  Y.  470;  s.  c. 
35  Am.  R.  540;  Sterling  v.  Thomas, 
60  111.  265;  Hewison  v.  New  Haven, 
37  Conn.  475;  Meares  v.  Wilmington, 
9  Ired.  L.  (N.  C.)  73;  Oilman  v.  La- 
conia,  55  N.  H.  130;  s.  c.  20  Am.  R. 


175;  Commissioners  &c.  v.  Baker, 
44  Md.  1;  Boyd  v.  Insurance  Patrol 
&c.,  113  Pa.  St.  269;  s.  c.  6  Atl.  536; 
Barnes  v.  District  of  Columbia,  91 
U.  S.  540,  551;  Evanston  v.  Gunn,  99 
U.  S.  660;  Chicago  v.  Robbins,  2 
Black  418;  Mayor  &c.  v.  Sheffield,  4 
Wall.  189;  Weightman  v.  Washing- 
ton, 1  Black  39;  Providence  v.  Clapp, 
17  How.  161;  Nebraska  City  v. 
Campbell,  2  Black  590;  Supervisors 
&c.  V.  United  States,  4  Wall.  435; 
Petersburg  v.  Applegarth,  28  Gratt. 
(Va.)  321;  Kiley  v.  Kansas  City,  87 
Mo.  103;  Little  Rock  v.  Willis,  27 
Ark.  572;  Makinnon  v.  Penson,  25 
Eng.  L.  &  Eq.  457;  Mersey  Docks  v. 
Gibbs,  11  H.  L.  Cas.  (N.  S.)  686.  In 
New  Jersey,  Michigan  and  South 
Carolina  it  is  held,  as  an  application 
of  this  principle,  that  a  municipal 
corporation  is  not  liable  in  damages 
at  the  suit  of  one  who  is  injured  by 
its  failure  to  perform  the  statutory 
duty  of  keeping  highways  in  repair, 
no  right  of  action  being  expressly 
given  by  the  statute:  Freeholders  &c. 
V.  Strader,  18  N.  J.  L.  108;  Pray  v. 
Mayor  &c.,  32  N.  J.  L.  394;  City  of 
Detroit  v.  Blackeby,  21  Mich.  84 
s.  c.  4  Am.  R.  450;  followed  in  Me 
Cutcheon  v.  Homer,  43  Mich.  483 
s.  c.  5  N.  W.  668;  38  Am.  R.  212 
Young  V.  Charleston,  20  S.  C.  116 
s.  c.  47  Am.  R.  827.  But  these  cases 
are  opposed  to  the  overwhelming 
weight  of  authority:  City  of  Galves- 
ton V.  Posnainsky,  62  Texas  188,  in 


INTRODUCTORY — HISTORICAL    VIEW. 


the  state,  and  created  solely  for  a  public  purpose,  are  not  liable  in  tort 
in  the  absence  of  a  statute  expressly  creating  such  liability  and  au- 
thorizing an  action  thereon. ^^  The  doctrines  just  enumerated  have 
the  support  of  an  overwhelming  majority  of  the  cases  on  the  subject. 
There  are,  however,  authorities  holding  that  municipal  corporations 
are  not  in  any  case  liable  in  tort  unless  such  liability  is  established  by 
express  statute.'- 

§  7.  Definition  of  the  municipal  corporation. — In  the  English  Mu- 
nicipal Corporations  Act,  1882,  the  municipal  corporation  is  defined 
to  be  "the  body  corporate  constituted  by  the  incorporation  of  the  in- 
habitants of  a  borough,"^^  and  in  the  same  section  the  borough  is 
defined  to  be  "a  city  or  town  to  which  this  act  applies."  The  munici- 
pal corporation  has  also  been  tersely  defined  to  be  "the  investing  of 
the  people  of  a  place  with  the  local  government  thereof."^^  An  old 
writer  has  said:  "The  essence  of  a  municipal  corporation  is  consti- 
tuted by  uniting  the  several  circumstances  between  a  corporation  and 
other  communities."^^     The  meaning  of  this  statement  seems  to  be 


which  the  authorities  are  exhaust- 
ively cited  and  discussed  (City  of 
Navasota  v.  Pearce,  46  Texas  525, 
where  a  contrary  rule  was  applied, 
is  deprived  of  any  value);  Dillon 
Munic.  Corp.,  §  996  et  seq.;  Beach 
Contr.  Neg.,  §  244. 

^^  Sherbourne  v.  Yuba  Co.,  21  Cal. 
113;  s  c.  81  Am.  D.  151;  Mower  v. 
Inhabitants,  9  Mass.  247;  s.  c.  6  Am. 
D.  63;  White  v.  Bond  Co.,  58  111.  297; 
s.  c.  11  Am.  R.  65;  Clark  v.  Lincoln 
Co.,  1  Wash.  518;  s.  c.  20  Pac.  576; 
25  Am.  &  Eng.  Corp.  Cas.  211; 
Haygood  v.  Justices  &c.,  20  Ga. 
845;  Symonds  v.  Clay  Co.,  71 
III.  355;  Abbett  v.  Board  &c.,  114 
Ind.  61;  s.  c.  16  N.  E.  127;  City  of 
Galveston  v.  Posnainsky,  62  Tex. 
118;  Woods  V.  Colfax  Co.,  10  Neb. 
552;  s.  c.  7  N.  W.  269;  Askew  v. 
Hale  Co.,  54  Ala.  639;  Plori  v.  St. 
Louis,  69  Mo.  341;  Mitchell  v.  Rock- 
land, 52  Maine  118;  Conrad  v.  Trust- 
ees, 16  N.  Y.  158;  Baxter  v.  Winoons- 
ki  Tpk.  Co.,  22  Vt.  114,  123;  Fowle  v. 
Common  Council,  &c.,  3  Peters  398; 
Boyd  V.  Insurance  Patrol  &c.,  113  Pa. 
St.  269;  s.  c.  6  Atl.  536;  Eastman  v. 
Meredith,  36  N.  H.'  284;  s.  c.  72  Am. 


D.  302;  Dosdall  v.  Olmsted,  30  Minn. 
96;  s.  c.  14  N.  W.  458;  Brabham  v. 
Board  &c.,  54  Miss.  363;  Hill  v.  City 
of  Boston,  122  Mass.  344,  351;  s.  c. 
23  Am.  R.  332;  White  v.  Chowan 
Co.,  90  N.  C.  437;  s.  c.  47  Am.  R.  534; 
Watkins  v.  County  Court,  30  W.  Va. 
657;  s.  c.  5  S.  E.  654;  20  Am.  & 
Eng.  Corp.  Cas.  305;  Downing  v. 
Mason  Co.,  87  Ky.  208;  s,  c.  8  S. 
W.  264;  12  Am.  St.  473;  Kincaid 
V.  Hardin  Co.,  53  Iowa  430;  s.  c.  5  N. 
W.  589;  36  Am.  R.  236;  City  of  De- 
troit V.  Blackeby,  21  Mich.  84;  Tur- 
ner V.  Woodbury  Co.,  57  Iowa  440; 
s.  c.  10  N.  W.  827;  Finch  v.  Board 
of  Education,  30  Ohio  St.  37;  Pray 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  32  N.  J.  L.  394. 

--  Arkadelphia  v.  Windham,  49 
Ark.  139;  s.  c.  4  S.  W.  450;  4  Am. 
St.  32;  18  Am.  &  Eng.  Corp.  Cas. 
347;  Winbigler  v.  Mayor  &c.,  45  Cal. 
36. 

-^  English  Municipal  Corporations 
Act,  1882,  §  10. 

"-*  Cudden  v.  Eastwick,  1  Salk.  143. 
This  definition  has  been  quoted  with 
approval  in  People  v.  Morris,  13 
Wend  (N.  Y.)  325,  334,  and  in  Peo- 
ple V.  Hurlbut,  24  Mich.  44. 
^^  Glover  Munic.  Corp.  6. 


§    7  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  10 

that  by  combining  the  characteristics  of  a  community,  such  as  a  city, 
with  those  of  a  corporation,  the  idea  of  a  municipal  corporation  is 
obtained.  Bouvier  defines  a  municipal  corporation  to  be  a  public 
corporation  created  by  the  government  for  political  purposes  and  hav- 
ing subordinate  and  local  powers  of  legislation.-*^  The  idea  of  a  mu- 
nicipal corporation  has  been  frequently  defined  and  described  by  the 
courts  of  this  country.  Thus  it  has  been  said  in  Missouri  that  the 
definition  of  a  municipal  corporation  would  only  include  organized 
cities  and  towns  and  other  like  organizations  with  political  and  legis- 
lative powers  for  the  local  civil  government  and  police  regulation 
of  the  inhabitants  of  particular  districts  included  in  the  boundaries 
of  the  corporation.-^  In  Pennsylvania  a  municipal  corporation  has 
been  declared  to  be  a  public  corporation  created  by  the  government  for 
political  purposes,  and  having  subordinate  and  local  powers  of  legisla- 
tion,— an  incorporation  of  persons,  inhabitants  of  a  particular  place 
or  connected  with  a  particular  district,  enabling  them  to  conduct  its 
local  civil  government,  and  to  be  merely  an  agency  instituted  by  the 
sovereign  for  the  purpose  of  carrying  out  in  detail  the  objects  of  the 
government.^*  In  a  Tennessee  decision  it  was  said  that  a  municipal 
corporation  was  a  body  corporate  and  politic  established  by  law  to 
share  in  the  civil  government  of  the  country,  but  chiefly  to  regulate 
the  local  or  internal  afEairs  of  the  city,  town  or  district  incorpo- 
rated.^^ These  definitions,  though  useful,  are  too  narrow  to  meet 
the  requirements  of  a  broad  and  general  definition  of  the  idea.  The 
following  excellent  definition  has  been  given:  "A  municipal  cor- 
poration is  a  body  politic  specially  chartered  by  the  state  or  voluntarily 
organized  under  a  general  legislative  act,  including  both  territory  and 
inhabitants,  for  the  purpose  of  local  government  subsidiary  to  that 
of  the  state;  or  (as  in  England)  it  may  be  a  similar  body  which  has 
acquired  governmental  powers  and  privileges  by  prescription."^" 
Judge  Dillon's  fine  definition  leaves  little  if  anything  further  to  be 
desired.  He  says:  "We  may  therefore  define  a  municipal  corpora- 
tion, in  its  historical  and  proper  sense,  to  be  the  incorporation  by  the 
authority  of  the  government  of  the  inhabitants  of  a  particular  place 
or  district,  and  authorizing  them  in  their  corporate  capacity  to  exer- 

'"  Bouvier's  Law  Diet,  tit.  Munic-  continuing:     "A  municipal  corpora- 

ipal  Corporations.  tion,  in  its  broader  sense,  is  a  body 

"  Heller  v.  Stremmel,  52  Mo.  309.  politic,  such  as  a  state,  and  each  of 

-*  Philadelphia  v.   Fox,  64  Pa.   St.  the    governmental    subdivisions    of 

180.  the  state,  such  as  counties,  parishes, 

^  East    Tennessee    University    v.  townships,  hundreds,  New  England 

Knox\ille,  6  Baxt.  (Tenn.)  166.  towns,  and  school  districts,  as  well 

^°  15  Am.  &  Eng.   Encyc.  of   Law  as  cities  and  incorporated  towns,  vil- 

952,  tit.  Municipal  Corporations,  §  1,  lages  and  boroughs." 


11  INTRODUCTORY — HISTORICAL    VIEW.  §    8 

cise  subordinate  specified  powers  of  legislation  and  regulation  with 
respect  to  their  local  and  internal  concerns.  This  power  of  local 
government  is  the  distinctive  purpose  and  the  distinguishing  feature 
of  a  municipal  corporation  proper."^^  The  definition  should,  how- 
ever, be  amplified  to  embrace  the  well-settled  principle  that  the  term 
"municipal  corporation"  embraces  both  the  territory  and  its  inhabit- 
ants.''- It  follows  from  this  definition  that  the  citizens  of  the  in- 
corporated territory,  together  with  that  territory,  form  the  municipal 
corporation.^^  Neither  the  municipal  government  nor  the  officers  of 
that  government  are  the  corporation :  they  are  merely  its  agents.^* 
As  popularly  and  loosely  used,  the  term  "municipal  corporation"  fre- 
quently includes  the  public  quasi-corporations,  such  as  counties, 
school  districts,  and  like  bodies,  the  nature  of  which  has  been  dis- 
cussed in  the  preceding  sections. 

§  8.  Definition  of  the  public  quasi-corporation, — The  preceding 
sections  indicate  the  essential  differences  between  the  municipal  and 
the  public  quasi-corporation.  The  latter  may  be  defined  to  be  an 
involuntary  political  or  civil  division  of  the  state,  created  by  general 
laws  to  aid  in  the  administration  of  government. ^^  An  eminent  judge 
has  said  of  this  class  of  corporations:  "They  may  be  considered 
under  our  institutions  as  quasi-corporations  with  limited  powers, 
co-extensive  with  the  duties  imposed  upon  them  by  statute  or  usage, 
but  restrained  by  the  general  use  of  authority  which  belongs  to  these 
metaphysical  persons  by  the  common  law."^**  Counties,  townships, 
school  districts,  road  districts  and  like  public  quasi-corporations 
do  not  usually  possess  corporate  powers  under  special  charters; 
but  they  exist  under  general  laws  of  the  state,  which  apportion 
the  territory  of  the  state  into  political  divisions  for  convenience  of 
government,  and  require  of  the  people  residing  within  those  divisions 

^'^  Dillon  Mimic  Corp.,  §  20.  Williams,  3  B.  &  C.  162;    Queen  v. 

==- Kelly  V.  Pittsburg,  104  U.  S.  78;  Paramore,  10  Ad.  &  El.  286;   Queen 

Galesburg  v.  Hawkinson,  75  111.  152,  v.    Mayor    &c.,    10    Ad.    &    El.    281; 

156;  People  v.  Bennett,  29  Mich.  451.  Queen  v.  Mayor  &c.,  41  L.  J.  Q.  B. 

^^Lowber  v.  Mayor  &c.,  5  Abb.  Pr.  115;  Queen  v.  Mayor  &c.,  4  Q.  B.  796; 

(N.  Y.)  325;  Clarke  v.  Rochester,  24  s.  c.  Dav.  &  M.  143;  Queen  v.  Thomp- 

Barb.  (N.  Y.)  446.  son,  5  Q.  B.  477;  s.  c.  Dav.  &  M.  497. 

=**  Baumgartner  v.  Hasty,  100  Ind.  ^^  Dillon  Munic.  Corp.,  §  25.     This 

575;  City  of  Valparaiso  v.  Gardner,  definition  is  applied  by  Judge  Dillon 

97    Ind.    1;    s.    c.    49    Am.    R.    416;  to  counties  only,  but  is  sufficiently 

Brown  v.  Gates,  15  W.  Va.  131;  Low-  general  to  answer  as  a  definition  of 

ber  V.  Mayor  &c.,  5  Abb.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  the  class. 

325;    Clarke  v.  Rochester,  24  Barb.  ^"^  Opinion  of  Parker,  C.  J.,  in  In- 

(N.  Y.)  446;  Queen  v.  York,  2  Q.  B.  habitants  &c.  v.  Wood,  13  Mass.  193, 

847;  s.  c.  2  G.  &  D.  105;  Harrison  v.  197. 


§  9 


rUBLlO    COHrOKATlONS. 


12 


the  performance  of  certain  pnblic  duties  as  a  part  of  the  machinery 
of  the  state,  and,  in  order  that  they  may  be  able  to  perform  these 
duties,  vest  them  with  certain  corporate  powers.^'' 

§  9.   Examples  of  municipal  and  public  quasi-corporations. — As 

may  be  gathered  from  the  preceding  sections,  the  distinction  between 
these  two  classes  of  corporations  is  obvious.  As  a  result,  however, 
of  looseness  of  nomenclature  in  the  statutes  of  the  various  states 
affecting  this  subject,  it  is  frequently  a  matter  of  doubt  to  which  class 
a  particular  corporation  should  be  assigned.  Thus  where  the  Mis- 
souri statute  provided  that  no  person  should  be  eligible  to  a  certain 
office  who  held  office  under  a  municipal  corporation,  it  was  held  that 
the  incorporated  board  of  public  schools  was  not  a  municipal  corpora- 
tion within  the  meaning  of  the  act.^^  And  in  general,  school  districts 
are  considered  public  quasi-corporations  of  the  most  limited  powers.^* 
On  the  other  hand,  the  constitution  of  Iowa  prohibited  a  political  or 
municipal  corporation  from  incurring  indebtedness  to  an  amount  ex- 
ceeding five  per  cent,  on  the  taxable  property  of  the  corporation,  and 
a  school  district  township  was  considered  to  come  within  the  pro- 
hibition.*" The  police  juries  of  the  Louisiana  parishes  are  considered 
municipal  corporations.*^     In  the  constitution  of  Wisconsin  the  term 


^'  Cooley  Const.  Lim.  294.  In  City 
of  Galveston  v.  Posnainsky,  62  Texas 
118,  a  quasi-corporation  is  spoken  of 
as  "a  subdivision  of  a  state,  created 
solely  for  a  public  purpose,  by  a  gen- 
eral law  applicable  to  all  such  sub- 
divisions;" and  again,  as  being  "cre- 
ated to  carry  out  a  policy  common 
to  the  whole  state,  and  not  mainly 
to  advance  the  interest  of  the  par- 
ticular locality,  and  to  bring  ad- 
vantage or  emolument  to  the  in- 
habitants of  the  municipality."  Still 
again,  "they  are  created  for  a  public 
purpose  as  an  agency  of  the  state 
through  which  it  can  most  conve- 
niently and  effectively  discharge  the 
duties  which  the  state,  as  an  organ- 
ized government,  assumes  to  every 
person  and  by  which  it  can  best 
promote  the  welfare  of  all."  See 
also,  the  cases  cited  in  the  preceding 
section. 

''^  Heller  v.  Stremmel,  52  Mo.  309. 

'"'  Harris  v.  School  District,  8  Fost. 
(.N.    H.)    58.     In    this   case   it  was 


said: — "These  little  corporations 
have  sprung  into  existence  within  a 
few  years,  and  their  corporate  pow- 
ers and  those  of  their  officers  are  to 
be  settled  by  the  constructions  of  the 
court  upon  a  succession  of  crude, 
unconnected  and  often  experimental 
enactments.  School  districts  are  in 
New  Hampshire  quasi-corporations 
of  the  most  limited  powers  known  to 
the  law."  See  also,  Foster  v.  Lane, 
30  N.  H.  305;  Giles  v.  School  Dis- 
trict, 31  N.  H.  304;  Wilson  v.  School 
District,  32  N.  H.  118;  Rogers  v. 
People,  68  111.  154;  Scales  v.  Chatta- 
hoochee Co.,  41  Ga.  225;  Beach  v. 
Leahy,  11  Kan.  23. 

'"Winspear  v.  District  Tp.  &c.,  37 
Iowa  542;  Curry  v.  District  Tp.  &c., 
62  Iowa  104;  s.  c.  17  N.  W.  191; 
Clark  V.  Thompson,  37  Iowa  536.  See 
also.  School  Dist.  v.  Williams,  38 
Ark.  454. 

"  Police  Jury  &c.  v.  Mayor  &c.,  38 
La.  An.  630. 


V 
13  INTRODUCTORY — HISTORICAL    VIEW.  §    10 

"municipal  corporation"  has  been  held  not  to  include  towns;  and  con- 
sequently, when  the  same  term  is  used  in  the  statutes  of  that  state, 
towns  are  not  considered  to  be  within  the  meaning  of  the  provisions 
of  the  statute  unless  the  legislative  intent  to  include  them  is  clear.*- 
The  term  "city,"  of  course,  applies  only  to  municipal  corporations,''^ 
as  does  the  word  "village."**  The  District  of  Columbia  is  a  munici- 
pal corporation.'*^ 

§  10.  Counties. — Counties  are,  of  course,  to  be  classified  as  public 
quasi-corporations  under  the  scheme  of  division  that  has  been  indicated 
in  this  chapter ;  as  a  county  is  an  involuntary  civil  division  of  the  state 
created  by  statute  to  aid  in  the  administration  of  the  government. 
In  an  Ohio  case  it  is  said :  "Counties  are  at  most  but  local  organiza- 
tions, which,  for  the  purposes  of  civil  administration,  are  invested 
with  a  few  functions  characteristic  of  a  corporate  existence.  *  *  * 
They  are  local  subdivisions  of  a  state,  created  by  the  sovereign  power 
of  the  state,  of  its  own  sovereign  will,  without  the  particular  solici- 
tation, consent,  or  concurrent  action  of  the  people  who  inhabit 
them.  The  former  organization  [referring  to  municipal  corpora- 
tions] is  asked  for,  or  at  least  assented  to  by  the  people  it  em- 
braces; the  latter  [referring  to  counties]  is  superimposed  by  a  sover- 
eign and  paramount  authority."**'  But  notwithstanding  this  radical 
difference,  the  county  is  much  more  nearly  allied  to  the  municipal 
corporation  than  are  other  quasi-corporations,  such  as  school  districts, 
townships,  and  other  like  bodies,  as  the  county  has  a  much  more  com- 
pact organization  than  those  corporations,  and  possesses  generally 
much  fuller  pov/ers.  Consequently  there  is  some  conflict  in  the  de- 
cisions as  to  whether  the  term  "municipal  corporation"  should  be 
construed  to  include  counties.  In  the  large  majority  of  cases  the 
natural  division  is  followed  and  counties  are  held  not  to  be  included 
by  that  term.*^     But  both  in  Iowa  and  in  Minnesota  counties  have 

"Eaton  V.  Supervisors  &c.,  44  Wis.  Parker  v.  Zeisler,  139  Mo.  298;  s.  c. 

489;    Norton   v.    Peck,    3    Wis.    714;  40  S.  W.  881. 

State  V.  Milwaukee,  20  Wis.  87;  Wa-  •"  City  of  Wahoo  v.  Reeder,  27  Neb. 

tertown  v.  Cady,  20  Wis.  501;  Crane  770;  s.  c.  43  N.  W.  1145. 

v.  Fond  du  Lac,  16  Wis.  196.     As  to  '^  Stoutenburgh  v.  Hennick,  129  U. 

what  constitutes  a  corporation  ere-  S.  141;  s.  c.  9  S.  Ct.  256. 

ated   "for  municipal  purposes,"  see  "  Board  &c.  v.  Mighels,  7  Ohio  St. 

State  V.  Leffingwell,  54  Mo.  458.  109;    County  Com'rs  &c.   v.  County 

'^  Mitchell    V.    Treasurer    &c.,    25  Com'rs  &c.,  50  Md.  245. 

Ohio  St.  143.     As  to  what  is  not  a  "Askew  v.  Hale  Co.,  54  Ala.  639; 

municipal  corporation,  see  Stephens  s.  c.   25  Am.  R.   730;    Board  &c.  v. 

V.  Felton,  99  Ky.  395;  s.  c.  35  S.  W.  Mighels,   7  Ohio   St.   109;    Sherman 

1116;  18  Ky.  L.  248.     A  city  is  not  a  Co.  v.  Simons,  109  U.  S.  735;  s.  c.  3 

political    subdivision    of   the    state:  S.    Ct.    502;    Commissioners    &c.    v. 


11 


ruBLic  coKPOI{ATlo^^s. 


14 


been  declared  to  be  miinieipal  corporations  witbin  tbe  meaning  of 
statutes  affecting  sueb  corporations;***  and  a  provision  in  the  constitu- 
tion of  Alabama  authorizing  "municipal  corporations"  to  take  prop- 
erty by  right  of  eminent  domain  was  held  to  include  counties.'*'*  In 
Pennsylvania,  also,  a  city  which  was  coterminous  with  a  county,  and 
which  had  assumed  the  liability  of  the  county,  was  held  to  be  bound 
by  a  statute  imposing  a  liability  on  "counties.''^" 

§  11.  The  New  England  towns. — The  New  England  town  represents 
an  intermediate  stage  between  the  municipal  and  the  public  quasi- 
corporation,  having  many  of  the  powers  peculiar  to  the  former  class, 
and  at  the  same  time  performing  many  of  the  functions  of  a  township 
or  county,  and  being  subject  in  many  respects  to  the  limitations  of 
a  public  quasi-corporation.  It  lacks  the  representative  feature  that 
is  generally  so  essential  in  the  government  of  a  municipal  corporation. 
As  was  said  in  a  Massachusetts  decision:  "The  marked  and  charac- 
teristic distinction  between  a  town  organization  and  that  of  a  city 
is  that  in  the  former  all  of  the  qualified  inhabitants  meet,  deliberate, 
act  and  vote  in  their  natural  and  personal  capacities,  whereas  in  a 


Commissioners  &c.,  92  U.  S.  307; 
Maury  Co.  v.  Lewis  Co.,  1  Swan 
(Tenn.)  236;  Barton  Co.  v.  Walser, 
47  Mo.  189;  Granger  v.  Pulaski  Co., 
26  Ark.  37;  Green  Co.  v.  Bubanks.  80 
Ala.  204;  Lawrence  Co.  v.  Chattaroi 
n.  Co.,  81  Ky.  225;  County  Com'rs 
&c.  v.  County  Com'rs  &c.,  50  Md. 
245;  Pulaski  Co.  v.  Reeve,  42  Ark. 
55;  Soper  v.  Henry  Co.,  26  Iowa  264; 
State  v.  Leffingwell,  54  Mo.  458;  Peo- 
ple v.  Common  Council  &c.,  28  Mich. 
228.  In  the  case  just  cited  Judge 
Cooley  said: — "It  is  because,  where 
an  urban  population  is  collected, 
many  things  are  necessary  for  their 
comfort  and  protection  which  are 
not  needed  in  the  country,  and 
which  the  county  and  townhip  or- 
ganizations, with  their  imperfect 
powers  and  machinery,  can  not  well 
supply,  that  the  state  is  then  called 
upon  to  confer  larger  powers,  and  to 
make  of  the  locality  a  subordinate 
commonwealth,  which,  while  it  shall 
perform  for  the  state,  wholly  or  in 
part,  what  the  county  and  township 
officers  performed  before,  shall  also 


be  endowed  with  capacities  to  pro- 
vide for  its  citizens  such  matters  of 
necessity  or  convenience  as  their 
health,  protection,  comfort  or  enjoy- 
ment as  a  political  community  may 
demand."  In  Wisconsin,  also,  the 
term  "counties"  or  "municipal  cor- 
porations" has  been  construed  to  in- 
clude only  cities  and  villages  and 
other  strictly  municipal  corpora- 
tions, but  not  to  include  school  dis- 
tricts and  like  bodies:  Eaton  v.  Su- 
pervisors &c.,  44  Wis.  489. 

^  Iowa  &c.  Land  Co.  v.  Carroll  Co., 
39  Iowa  151;  Dowlan  v.  Sibley  Co., 
36  Minn.  430;  s.  c.  31  N.  W.  402.  In 
the  latter  case  the  term  was  used  in 
the  amendment  to  the  constitution 
of  the  state  concerning  the  assess- 
ment of  property  for  local  improve- 
ments. 

'"Ex  parte  Selma  &c.  R.  Co.,  45 
Ala.  696.  See  also,  Askew  v.  Hale 
Co.,  54  Ala.  639;  s.  c.  25  Am.  R.  730; 
Greene  Co.  v.  Eubanks,  80  Ala.  204. 

'"  Philadelphia  v.  Commonwealth, 
52  Pa.  St.  451. 


15  INTRODUCTORY — HISTORICAL    VIEW.  §    11 

city  government  this  is  all  done  by  their  representatives."^^  These 
towns  have  only  the  powers  conferred  on  them  by  statute.  As  was  said 
by  Mr.  Justice  Gray  in  the  supreme  court  of  the  United  States: 
"Towns  in  Connecticut,  as  in  the  other  New  England  towns,  differ 
from  trading  corporations  and  even  from  municipal  corporations  else- 
where. They  are  territorial  corporations,  into  which  the  state  is 
divided  by  the  legislature  from  time  to  time  at  its  discretion,  for  polit- 
ical purposes  and  the  convenient  administration  of  government;  they 
have  those  powers  only  which  have  been  expressly  conferred  upoii  them 
by  statute,  or  which  are  necessary  for  conducting  municipal  affairs, 
and  all  the  inhabitants  of  the  town  are  members  of  the  quasi-corpo- 
ration."^^ This  plan  of  municipal  government  by  the  citizens  with- 
out representation  is  of  course  impracticable  when  the  towns  become 
populous;  and  accordingly,  as  the -population  of  the  county  increased, 
regularly  incorporated  cities,  governed  on  the  principle  of  representa- 
tion, were  created  by  the  legislature ;  so  that  in  New  England  the  two 
classes  of  municipalities  now  exist  side  by  side,  the  smaller  towns 
being  governed  and  administered  by  the  whole  body  of  citizens,  while 
the  affairs  of  the  larger  cities  are  directed  by  a  representative  body, 
or  common  council,  such  as  is  to  be  found  in  the  cities  of  other  states. 
The  people  of  New  England  were  and  still  are,  with  reason,  much' 
attached  to  their  peculiar  local  system  of  town  government,  and  only 
adopted  with  reluctance  the  representative  system.  Thus  in  Massa- 
chusetts the  legislature  incorporated  no  city  before  1820,  and  Boston 
retained  its  town  government,  where  each  citizen  had  an  immediate 
voice  in  the  direction  of  its  policy,  until  1822,  although  it  had  at  that 
time  about  seven  thousand  qualified  voters. ^^  The  statutory  pro- 
visions regulating  the  powers  of  these  towns  are  numerous,  and  have 
been  frequently  judicially  construed.  They  will  be  considered  at 
length  in  a  subsequent  portion  of  this  work.^*     This  peculiar  system, 

"  Warren  v.  Charlestown,  2  Gray  relating  to  English  municipal  corpo- 

(Mass.)  84,  101.     See  also,  an  inter-  rations  are  but  remotely  applicable 

esting  essay  on  the  "Municipal  Court  to  New  England  towns,  inasmuch  as 

of   Boston,   and   its  Justices,"   2   L.  English  municipal  corporations  are. 

Rep.  225.  for  the  most  part,  voluntary  corpora- 

''-  Bloomfield  v.  Charter  Oak  Bank,  tions,  between  which  and  the  gov- 

121  U.  S.  121;  s.  c.  7  S.  Ct.  865.  ernment    contractual    relations    ex- 

''^Hill  V.  City  of  Boston,  122  Mass.  ist;   while  New  England  towns  are 

344;  Quincy  Munic.  Hist,  of  Boston,  involuntary      corporations,      having 

ch.  1.     See  also,  as  to  the  subject  of  given   no   assent   to   their   creation, 

New  England  towns.  Commonwealth  and    having    been    incorporated    by 

V.  Roxbury,  9  Gray   (Mass.)   451;   1  virtue  of  no  contract,  express  or  im- 

Swift's    System    116;     Eastman    v.  plied,  with  the  state. 
Meredith,  36  N.  H.  284.     In  the  lat-         "^  See  Stetson  v.  Kempton,  13  Mass. 

ter  case  it  is  said  that  the  decisions  272;   Hooper  v.  Emery,  14  Me.  375; 


§    12  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  16 

exhibiting  an  example  of  pure  democracy,  has  worked  well,  giving  to 
these  towns  an  honest,  virile  and  independent  government/'''^ 

§  12.  The  same  subject  continued. — By  some  of  the  earliest  legis- 
lation, under  the  charter  of  the  province  of  Massachusetts,  the  bounda- 
ries of  all  existing  towns  were  confirmed,  and  the  towns  were  em- 
powered to  assess  and  levy  taxes  to  maintain  schools  and  support  the 
poor,  and  meet  other  necessary  charges,  and  were  declared  for  the 
first  time  capable  of  suing  and  being  sued.^^  When  the  constitution 
of  the  state  was  adopted  it  was  declared  that  "the  inhabitants  of 
every  town  within  this  government  are  hereby  declared  to  be  a  body 
politic  and  corporate."^ ''^  In  Massachusetts,  which  may  be  taken  as 
the  typical  New  England  state,  no  provision  was  made  for  incorporat- 
ing cities  proper  until  1820,  when  the  second  amendment  to  the 
constitution  of  that  state  was  passed.^®  In  Howard's  Local  Constitu- 
tional History  of  the  United  States,  we  find  these  interesting  state- 
ments regarding  the  New  England  town :  "It  was  the  parish  of  the 
Stuarts,  already  in  some  places  passing  into  the  hands  of  an  irresponsi- 
ble oligarchy,  the  select  vestry,  with  which  the  pioneers  of  New  Eng- 
land were  acquainted.  But  it  was  not  this  institution  which  they  in- 
troduced into  the  new  world.  In  the  transplanting  of  English  local 
organisms  to  American  soil  two  remarkable  phenomena  attract  atten- 

Coolidge  V.   Inhabitants,   114   Mass.  ties,  not  repugnant  to  the  constitu- 

592.    Judge  Dillon  has  exhaustively  tion,  as  the  general  court  shall  deem 

discussed  this  subject  in  his  work  necessary  or  expedient  for  the  regu- 

on  Municipal  Corporations,  §§  28-30.  lation  and  government  thereof,  and 

'^  Quincy  Munic.   Hist,  of  Boston,  to  prescribe  the  manner  of  calling 

ch.     1;     Bryce     Amer.     Com.,     chs.  and  holding  public  meetings  of  the 

48,  49.      '  inhabitants  in  wards  or  otherwise, 

^Prov.  Stats.  1692-93  (4  W.  &  M.),  for  the  election  of  officers  under  the 

ch.  28;  1694-95  (6  W.  &  M.),  ch.  13;  constitution,  and  the  manner  of  re- 

1   Prov.   Laws    (State   ed.),   64,   66,  turning    the    votes    given    at    such 

181;  Anc.  Chart.,  247,  249,  279.  meetings:     Provided,   that   no   such 

"Stat.  1785,  ch.  75,  §  8;  Rev.  Stat.,  government  shall  be  erected  or  con- 
ch. 15,  §  8;  Gen.  Stat.,  ch.  18,  §  1.  stituted  in  any  town  not  containing 

°*  The  second  amendment  to  the  twelve  thousand  inhabitants,  nor  un- 
constitution  of  Massachusetts  pro-  less  it  be  with  the  consent  on  the 
vides  that  "the  general  court  shall  application  of  a  majority  of  the  in- 
have  full  power  and  authority  to  habitants  of  such  town,  present  and 
erect  and  constitute  municipal  or  voting  thereon,  pursuant  to  a  vote 
city  governments  in  any  corporate  at  a  meeting  duly  warned  and 
town  or  towns  in  this  common-  holden  for  that  purpose;  and  pro- 
wealth"  (thus  recognizing  the  differ-  vided  also,  that  all  by-laws  made  by 
ence  between  the  existing  towns  and  such  municipal  or  city  government 
a  true  city  government),  "and  to  shall  be  subject  at  all  times  to  be 
grant  to  the  inhabitants  thereof  annulled  by  the  general  court." 
such  powers,  privileges  and  immuni- 


17  INTRODUCTORY — HISTORICAL   VIEW.  §    13 

tion.  On  the  one  hand  there  is  so  much  that  is  new  in  constitutional 
names  and  functions,  so  much  of  original  expedient  and  experimenta- 
tion, as  to  render  New  England  town  government  almost  unique, 
while,  at  the  same  time,  its  continuity  in  general  outline  with  that 
of  the  mother  country  can  be  plainly  discerned.  On  the  other  hand 
occurs  a  most  interesting  example  of  institutional  retrogression, — 
many  features  of  the  primitive  village  community  are  revived.  The 
colonists  go  back  a  thousand  years  and  begin  again ;  or,  to  speak  with 
greater  accuracy,  new  life  is  infused  into  customs  which,  though  pass- 
ing into  decay,  are  yet  not  wholly  extinct  in  the  old  English  home. 
All  this  is  perfectly  natural.  It  is  a  case  of  revival  of  organs  and 
functions  on  recurrence  of  the  primitive  environment."^^ 

§  13.  The  state. — A  state  is  a  body  politic,  or  society  of  men  united 
together  for  the  purpose  of  promoting  their  mutual  safety  and  ad- 
vantage by  the  joint  efforts  of  their  combined  strength.^**  In  this 
country  the  term  is,  of  course,  applied  to  the  members  of  the  United 
States.  The  definition  given  above  applies  to  the  states  of  this  coun- 
try, and  it  is  clear  from  that  definition  that  each  state  is  in  many 
important  respects  a  corporation.  Although  consisting  of  many  mem- 
bers, it  acts  as  a  unit,  under  a  special  denomination,  having  perpetual 
succession  under  an  artificial  form,  and  is  vested  with  the  capacity 
of  acting  in  many  respects  as  an  individual,  particularly  of  taking 
and  granting  property,  of  contracting  obligations,  and  of  suing  and 
being  sued."^  But  the  state  is  sovereign,  and  all  other  corporations 
are  its  creatures — saving  the  corporations  created  by  the  federal  gov- 
ernment. The  state,  therefore,  notwithstanding  its  similarity  or 
identity  in  essentials  with  a  corporation,  is  not  so  denominated  in  the 
ordinary  nomenclature  of  the  subject.  Thus,  in  Iowa,  it  has  been 
held  that  the  term  "bodies  political  and  corporate,"  as  used  in  the 
statute  of  limitations,  does  not  include  the  state  f^  and  in  Geor- 
gia the  state  is  not  included  in  the  term  "corporation"  used 
in  the  United  States  revenue  statutes.*'^     The  state,  being  sovereign, 

^^  Local  Const.  Hist,  of  the  United  laws  to  which  they  submit  with  one 

States,  by  Greorge  E.  Howard,  1889,  accord:"  Burlamaqui  Polit.  Law,  ch. 

vol.  1,  ch.  2.  5.     See  Chisholm  v.  Georgia,  2  Dall. 

™Cooley  Const.  Lim.  1;  Vattel,  b.  419,  457;  Des  Moines  Co.  v.  Harker, 

1,  ch.  1,  §  1;   Story  on  Const.  207;  34  Iowa  84;    Georgia  v.   Stanton,  6 

Wheaton  Int.  Law,  pt.  1,  ch.  2,  §  2;  Wall.  50. 

Halleck  Int.  Law  63;  Bouvier's  Law  ""^  See  §  1,  ante. 

Diet.,    tit.    State.     It   is    defined   by  °- Des   Moines   Co.   v.    Harker,    34 

Burlamaqui   to  be  "A  multitude  of  Iowa  84. 

people    united    together    by    a    com-  "^  State  v.  Atkins,  35  Ga.  315.     In 

munion  of  interest,  and  by  common  that  case,  Erskine,  J.,  conceding  that 
1  Smith — 2 


§    14  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  18 

can  only  be  sued  by  its  own  permission  and  consent/*  and  to  this 
consent  any  conditions  may  be  attached,  according  to  the  pleasure  of 
the  state.*''^  The  state  may  be  said  to  be  a  public  quasi-corporation, 
differing  from  other  public  quasi-corporations  in  that  it  is  sovereign 
and  voluntary. 

§  14.  Long  Island  towns. — Long  Island  towns  were  a  somewhat 
different  organization.  They  were  nearly  all  created  by  royal  char- 
ter. The  patents  were  intended  not  only  to  create  the  corporate 
bodies  and  thus  clothe  the  inhabitants  with  the  power  of  government, 
but  they  also  served  the  purpose  of  grants,  and  conveyed  to  the  in- 
habitants the  title  to  the  land  within  the  town  boundaries.*^^  There 
was  never  any  supremacy  of  the  Dutch  over  Long  Island  at  its  eastern 
end,  and  the  rights  and  titles  of  the  towns  there  are  all  of  English 
origin,  dating  to  the  grant  of  the  Duke  of  York  and  the  royal  charters 
issued  under  his  government.  These  charters  usually  granted  the 
lands  described  to  certain  named  persons  as  inhabitants,  and  created 
them  a  body  corporate  under  a  given  name,  and  the  charter  usually 
recognized  the  existence  of  a  civil  community  already  occupying  the 
lands  granted,  having  some  form  of  government,  and  when  it  did  so 
the  oflficers  of  that  government  were  made  patentees;  and  it  was  pro- 
vided that  the  lands  granted  should  have  relation  to  the  town  in 

the  term  in  its  most  comprehensive  mined  just  as  those  of  a  private 
signification  would  comprise  a  state,  person:  Bowen  v.  State,  108  N.  Y. 
said: — "So  far  as  my  limited  re-  166;  s.  c.  15  N.  E.  56;  Green  v.  State, 
searches  go,  I  am  unable  to  discover  73  Cal.  29;  s.  c.  11  Pac.  602;  14  Pac. 
a  single  case  in  the  supreme  court,  610.  A  suit  nominally  against  an 
or  in  any  of  the  circuit  or  district  officer,  but  really  against  a  state,  to 
courts  of  the  United  States,  wherein  enforce  performance  of  its  obliga- 
it  has  been  decided  that  the  term  tion  in  its  political  capacity,  will 
'corporation' — body  corporate  or  not  lie:  In  re  Ayers,  123  U.  S.  443; 
politic — when  used  in  a  statute,  in-  s.  c.  8  S.  Ct.  443;  Hagood  v.  South- 
eludes  a  state,  or  where  the  one  ern,  117  U.  S.  52;  s.  c.  6  S.  Ct.  608; 
term  is  used  as  a  synonym  for  the  Louisiana  v.  Jumel,  107  U.  S.  711; 
other."  s.  c.  2  S.  Ct.  128.     But  if  an  officer, 

**  Railroad  Co.  v.  Tennessee,  101  claiming  to  act  as  such,  invade  pri- 
ll. S.  337;  Railroad  Co.  v.  Alabama,  vate  right  under  color  of  constitu- 
101  U.  S.  832;  Briscoe  v.  Bank,  11  tional  laws,  it  is  otherwise:  Poin- 
Peters  257.  This  immunity  can,  dexter  v.  Greenhow,  114  U.  S.  270; 
nowever,  be  waived  by  appearing:  s.  c.  5  S.  Ct.  903,  962;  Cunningham 
Clark  v.  Barnard,  108  U.  S.  436;  s.  v.  Macon  &c.  R.  Co.,  109  U.  S.  446; 
c.  2  S.  Ct.  878.  s.  c.  3  S.  Ct.  292,  609;  United  States 

^=De  Saussure  v.  Gaillard,  127  U.  v.  Lee,  106  U.  S.  196;  s.  c.  1  S.  Ct. 

S.  216;  s.  c.  8  S.  Ct.  1053.     But  under  240. 

those  conditions  the  rights  and  lia-        ""  Trustees  &c.  v.   Mecox  Bay  &c. 

bilities  of  the  state  must  be  deter-  Co.,  116  N.  Y.  1;  s.  c.  22  N.  E.  387. 


19  INTRODUCTORY — HISTORICAL   VIEW,  §    15 

general,  "for  the  well  government  thereof."  But  the  cases  show 
conclusively  that  alterations  have  been  repeatedly  made  by  act 
of  legislature  in  the  privileges  and  charters  of  these  towns,  just  as 
if  originally  created  by  the  legislature.^'^ 

§  15.  The  development  of  the  municipal  corporation — (a)  In 
general. — It  is  of  course  unnecessary  and  impossible  within  the  limits 
of  a  legal  text-book,  designed  for  the  use  of  practicing  lawyers,  to 
make  any  effort  towards  giving  any  but  the  barest  outline  of  the  inter- 
esting history  of  the  development  of  municipalities.  It  is  believed, 
however,  that  a  brief  sketch  of  the  course  of  that  development  will 
prepare  the  mind  of  the  reader  for  a  more  intelligent  appreciation  of 
the  laws  now  governing  the  corporations  of  which  this  volume  is 
to  treat.  There  have  been,  of  course,  since  mankind  first  emerged 
from  barbarism,  gatherings  and  centers  of  population.  These  rude 
and  formless  bodies  gradually  obtained  a  higher  degree  of  compact- 
ness and  organization,  until  even  in  very  remote  antiquity  there  seem 
to  have  been  cities  of  great  wealth  and  splendor,  which  could  only 
have  been  maintained  by  a  system  of  municipal  government  by  no 
means  contemptible,  although  in  every  respect  repugnant  to  modern 
theories.  The  earliest  myths  and  legends  that  are  known  to  us  seem 
to  recognize  the  existence  of  towns  and  cities;  and  the  explorations 
and  excavations  of  modern  times,  revealing  the  ruins  and  relics  of 
civilizations  wholly  vanished,  show  that  men  have  gathered  together 
for  purposes  of  mutual  protection  from  the  earliest  times.  The 
storied  splendors  of  the  prehistoric  cities  of  Egypt  and  India,  of 
Central  Asia,  of  Mexico,  of  Central  and  South  America,  have  been 
shown  to  be  not  wholly  mythical ;  while  in  our  own  country  the  mound- 
builders  and  the  cliff-dwellers,  mysterious  peoples  who  have  left  no 
trace  on  the  pages  of  history,  seem  also  to  have  had  their  towns  and 
villages.  From  the  faint  traces  of  knowledge  that  remain  to  us  of 
these  prehistoric  cities,  we  can  gather  little  or  nothing  of  their  organi- 
zation. The  cities  of  Egypt  and  of  the  East  in  general  seem  to  have 
been  the  seat  of  great  wealth  and  splendor,  where  the  government 
was  in  the  hands  of  a  small  class,  who  ruled  the  masses  by  the  forces 
of  superstition  and  military  power,  and  where  no  municipal  govern- 
ment in  its  modern  sense  existed.  As  each  nation  worked  out  its 
development  and  rose  in  the  scale  of  civilization,  a  process  of  evolu- 
tion changed  the  unformed  village  or  country  settlement  into  a  body 

«^  Trustees  &c.  v.  Strong,  60  N.  Y.  565;   Trustees  &c.  v.  Kirk,  68  N.  Y. 

57;    Hand  v.  Newton,  92  N.  Y.  88;  459;   Rogers  v.  Jones,  1  Wend.    (N. 

Robins  v.  Ackerly,  91  N.  Y.  98;  Peo-  Y.)    237;    Atkinson  v.   Bowman,   42 

pie  V.  New  York  &c.  R.  Co.,  84  N.  Y.  Hun  (N.  Y.)  404. 


§16  PUBLIC    CORPOKATIONS.  20 

more  highly  organized,  more  capable  of  action  as  a  unit, — in  a  word, 
brought  it  nearer  to  the  idea  of  the  modern  municipal  corporation. 
This  process,  of  course,  has  varied  radically  in  the  case  of  ditferent 
nations,  but  its  general  trend  and  effect  have  been  to  convert  an  unor- 
ganized into  an  organized  body;  as  the  formless  mass  of  protoplasm, 
helpless  and  unorganized,  is  developed,  according  to  the  theories  of 
the  school  of  modern  evolution,  into  the  highly  organized  and  efficient 
forms  of  life  to  be  found  in  the  higher  grades  of  the  animal  kingdom.^* 

§  16.  (b)  Greece  and  Rome. — In  the  typical  Grecian  civilization 
the  city  was  the  state.  In  the  earlier  stages  of  Hellenic  development, 
before  the  corrupting  influence  of  the  Macedonians  and  the  Eomans 
was  felt,  each  state,  with  few  exceptions,  consisted  of  a  city  with  a 
surrounding  strip  of  farm  land,  cultivated  by  the  dwellers  in  the  city. 
These  cities  were  governed  in  general  by  the  whole  body  of  free 
citizens,  who  met  in  the  agora  and  discussed  and  voted  on  questions 
of  domestic  and  foreign  policy.  This  form  of  government  is  closely 
akin  in  many  respects  to  the  present  government  of  the  New  England 
towns,  to  which  reference  has  been  made,  with  the  important  excep- 
tion that  in  the  Hellenic  cities  the  voters  were  only  the  free  inhabit- 
ants of  the  city,  while  the  slaves,  who  generally  constituted  the  large 
majority  of  the  population  of  the  city,  performed  the  manual  labor, 
were  the  hewers  of  wood  and  drawers  of  water;  so  that  the  free  citi- 
zens had  an.  abundant  leisure  to  engage  in  the  practical  government  of 
their  city.  It  is  to  be  noted  that  this  system,  in  spite  of  the  differ- 
ences, produced  the  same  virile  and  public-spirited  government  that 
exists  to-day  in  the  New- England  towns.  With  the  decadence  of  the 
Hellenic  civilization  before  the  power  of  Eome  and  of  Macedon,  this 
democratic  form  of  government  was  superseded  by  a  stifling  despot- 
ism, and  the  formerly  autonomous  cities  and  states  became  mere 
tributaries  and  puppets  in  the  hands  of  foreign  powers.^®  The  his- 
tory of  Rome  is  the  history  of  the  greatest  municipal  corporation  the 
world  has  seen.  Taking  its  origin  in  the  city  by  the  Tiber,  the  Roman 
republic  was  but  a  development  and  an  extension  of  that  city,  preserv- 
ing in  many  respects  the  essentially  municipal  features  of  the  parent 
government.  The  bestowal  of  Roman  citizenship  upon  the  inhabitants 
of  a  conquered  and  assimilated  city  made  those  inhabitants  members 
of  the  great  municipal  corporation  of  which  Rome  was  the  head. 
The  cities  subdued  under  the  Roman  dominion  were  accorded  various 

^  See  "Hist,  of  Munic.  Corp.  and  sertation  on  the  Assemblies  of  the 

Boroughs,"  13  Law  Mag.  401.  Athenians,     346;      Grote     Hist,     of 

^  See  Heeren  Polit.  Hist,  of  Greece  Greece,  vol.  2;  1  Kent  Com.  268. 
(edit.  Oxford,  1834) ;  Schomann  Dis- 


21  INTRODUCTORY HISTORICAL    VIEW,  §    1'^ 

degrees  of  liberty,  the  municipal  towns  having  the  full  privilege  of 
Eoman  citizenship,  while  the  prefectures  and  colonies  enjoyed  a 
lesser  freedom.  The  Eoman  republic,  and  the  empire  erected  upon 
its  foundations,  were  both  remarkable  for  the  great  power  and  influ- 
ence of  the  municipalities,  in  which  were  centered  all  of  the  wealth 
and  culture  of  the  period — the  country  villas  of  the  rich  being  only 
summer  houses,  for  the  most  part,  and  not  permanent  residences. 
The  great  city  of  Eome  itself  was  on  the  whole  well  governed.  The 
plunder  of  the  world  had  given  its  citizens  unbounded  resources  to 
adorn  and  beautify  the  imperial  city.  Its  great  aqueducts  and  sewers, 
its  immense  public  baths  and  public  buildings,  its  arches  and  its  mon- 
uments, were  worthy  of  its  power  and  its  greatness.  Its  citizens 
had  nominally  great  powers  of  local  self-government;  but  these  pow- 
ers seem  to  have  been  for  the  most  part  frustrated  and  evaded, 
first  by  the  wealthy  patricians  with  their  trains  of  clients,  and  after- 
wards by  the  successful  generals  and  statesmen,  who  were  able  by 
the  prestige  and  power  gained  by  successes  abroad  to  determine  and 
control  the  policy  of  the  government  of  the  city.  Under  the  empire 
the  autonomy  of  the  city  became  an  empty  name.  The  servile  maxim 
of  the  Eoman  law,  "That  which  has  pleased  the  prince  has  the  force 
of  law,"  shows  the  spirit  of  the  municipal  as  well  as  of  the  national 
government.  The  city  was  at  the  mercy  of  the  emperors,  who  were 
in  turn  controlled  largely  by  the  insolent  soldiery  of  the  Praetorian 
Guard.  The  Eoman  populace  was  lapped  into  indolence  and  degrada- 
tion by  public  supplies  of  food,  and  were  amused  by  the  great  public 
spectacles  furnished  at  the  expense  of  the  empire.  The  general  de- 
cadence and  corruption  of  the  times  rendered  the  great  government 
an  easy  prey  to  the  fierce  and  hardy  barbarians  who  assailed  it  from 
every  side.'^*' 

§  17.  (c)  Italy  and  France — -The  mediaeval  cities. — In  the  an- 
archy that  involved  civilization  after  the  fall  of  the  Eoman  empire, 
the  cities  preserved  what  was  left  of  knowledge,  of  culture  and  of 
art.  In  that  unhappy  time  there  seems  to  have  been  but  little  sem- 
blance of  municipal  or  of  other  organized  government.  The  city,  like 
the  state,  was  at  the  mercy  of  roving  bands  of  plundering  barbarians ; 
and  only  by  passive  resistance  and  the  power  of  wealth  were  they 
able  to  maintain  any  appearance  of  government.  Out  of  this  dark- 
ness Europe  emerged  with  the  rise  of  Christianity  and  the  feudal 
system.    In  that  system  the  cities  played  but  a  small  part.    The  castle 

^"Liddell  Rome,  ch.  27;  Lauci-  of  Civ.  Europe  (edit.  Oxford)  42; 
ani  Ancient  Rome  in  the  Light  of  Recent  Excavations  of  the  Roman 
Recent    Discoveries;     Guizot    Hist.     Forum,  13  Irish  L.  T.  346. 


§    18  PUBLIC    COKPORATIONS.  22 

of  the  baron  and  not  the  town  hall  of  the  burgess  was  the  unit  of 
government.  The  towns,  however,  went  on  their  way,  prospering 
under  the  security  afforded  by  the  military  protection  of  king  and 
baron,  for  which  the  towns  paid  by  tax  and  largess.  By  degrees  this 
brought  greater  rights  of  self-government,  until  the  great  cities  of 
Italy  and  of  the  Hanseatic  league  acquired  a  complete  independence 
and  became  sovereign  states.  In  Italy  the  great  cities  of  Venice, 
Florence,  Pisa  and  Genoa,  by  the  power  of  wealth  and  intellect, 
became  great  powers  in  Europe.  The  representative  system  begins 
to  appear  in  the  government  of  these  cities,  but  their  rulers  were 
for  the  most  part  the  commercial  aristocracy.  Like  all  plutocracies, 
the  period  of  their  freedom  was  short;  and  torn  by  internal  strife, 
and  betrayed  by  their  own  citizens,  they  soon  became  subservient  to 
foreign  powers.  In  France  the  towns  early  obtained  a  high  degree 
of  independence.  They  bought  or  forced  from  the  king  or  the  feudal 
barons  charters  conferring  privileges  and  immunities,  and  so  became 
true  municipal  corporations.  Their  government  was  democratic, 
every  citizen,  under  certain  restrictions,  voting  on  questions  of  public 
policy.  As  the  feudal  system  declined  and  the  power  of  the  king  be- 
came absolute,  the  towns  gradually  lost  their  independence,  and  with 
the  rest  of  France  became  subject  to  the  will  of  the  king,  by  whose 
appointees  they  were  governed. ^^  A  brief  view  of  the  development 
of  the  municipal  corporation  in  England  will  be  given  in  the  next 
chapter.  Our  American  municipal  corporations  are  so  closely  con- 
nected in  many  respects  with  their  English  prototypes  that  a  more 
extended  consideration  than  has  been  given  in  the  case  of  other 
countries  will  be  necessary. 

§  18.  Conclusion. — The  lesson  that  is  taught  from  a  view  of  the 
course  of  development  of  the  municipal  corporation  seems  to  be  that 
good  government  is  only  to  be  secured  by  the  active  co-operation  of 
good  citizens  in  the  government  of  the  municipality.  A  city  governed 
by  an  aristocracy,  whether  of  birth  or  of  wealth,  though  it  may  be 
splendidly  adorned  with  all  that  wealth  and  taste  can  afford,  will  still 
lack  the  virility  and  independence  that  can  only  be  secured  by  the 
active  interest  of  the  governed  in  the  government.  It  will  contain 
the  seeds  of  decay,  that  will  ultimately  cause  the  decadence  of  civic 
spirit  and  the  consequent  degi'adation  of  its  citizens.  On  the  other 
hand,  where  the  upper  classes,  absorbed  in  the  pursuit  of  wealth  and 
of  pleasure,  scornfully  neglect  the  details  of  the  government  of  the 
municipality,  the  ignorant  and  the  vicious,  controlled  by  unscrupulous 

"See  Hallam  Middle  Ages,  ch.  France,  §  19;  Adam  Smith  Wealth 
11,  part  2;   Guizot  Hist,  of  Civ.  in     of  Nations,  book  6,  ch.  111. 


23  INTRODUCTORY — HISTORICAL   VIEW.  §    18 

and  self-seeking  demagogues,  will  infallibly  plunge  the  municipal 
government  into  extravagance  and  corruption.  It  is  to  the  criminal 
indifference  of  the  educated  classes  that  is  due  the  great  scandals 
of  maladministration  in  the  populous  cities  of  our  country.  The 
remedy  for  the  evil  is  obvious  and  has  been  pointed  out  time  and 
again.  The  property-owning  and  tax-paying  classes,  who  suffer  most, 
from  a  material  point  of  view,  through  the  corruption  of  municipal 
administration,  have  the  remedy  in  their  own  hands  if  they  choose 
to  exercise  it.  By  discarding  political  prejudices,  and  by  taking  the 
active  and  intelligent  interest  in  the  administration  of  their  public 
property  that  they  manifest  in  the  conduct  of  their  private  affairs, 
a  clean  and  economical  municipal  administration  can  be  secured. 
When  the  citizens  of  our  great  cities  recognize  the  fact  that  the  ad- 
ministration of  city  affairs  is  a  matter  of  business  and  not  of  politics, 
and  that  it  is  to  the  advantage  of  all  classes  that  the  co*nduct  of 
municipal  affairs  should  be  along  the  same  lines  of  honesty  and  of 
common  sense  on  which  business  men  manage  their  private  enterprises, 
the  day  of  reform  in  municipal  administration  will  be  at  hand.  These 
truths  are  trite,  but  they  are  disregarded,  and  until  they  are  generally 
acknowledged  and  put  into  practice,  no  permanent  reform  can  be 
expected.  They  have  been  acted  upon  in  the  government  of  some  cit- 
ies,— notably  Glasgow  and  Berlin,  which  afford  excellent  examples 
of  a  city  government  managed  as  a  business  and  not  as  a  political 
enterprise.  In  our  own  country  the  government  of  the  great  cities 
is  almost  entirely  in  the  hands  of  professional  politicians,  and  while 
their  shrewdness  has  generally  kept  them  from  plunging  into  the  ex- 
cesses of  dishonesty  and  crime  that  characterized  the  rule  of  Tweed  in 
New  York  city,  the  whole  system  of  government  is  maintained  on 
false  and  vicious  principles,  which  make  the  offices  of  the  city  govern- 
ment the  reward  for  political  influence  instead  of  capacity  and  hon- 
esty, and  which  pile  upon  the  shoulders  of  the  taxpayer  a  heavy 
burden  for  an  indifferent  municipal  government.'''^    It  is  to  be  hoped 

''^  For  intelligent  discussions  of  the  government   of   New   York    city    is 

interesting  subject  of  municipal  re-  fully  analyzed  in  an  essay  by  Mr. 

form  the  reader  is  referred  to  Mr.  John    Franklin    Jameson    on    "The 

J.  A.  Roebuck's  essay  on  "The  Re-  Origin  and  Development  of  the  Mu- 

form  of  Municipal  Corporations,"  30  nicipal    Government    of    New    York 

Westminster    Review    48;    to    "Con-  City,"  in  8  Mag.  of  Am.  Hist.  598; 

siderations    on    Municipal    Govern-  and  the  same  subject  is  treated  in  an 

ment,"  95  Fraser's  Mag.  34;  and  to  article    on    "Municipal    Reform    in 

an  intelligent  discussion  of  the  sub-  New     York     and     the     Cumulative 

ject  of  "Municipal  Government"  by  Vote,"  in  8  L.  Mag.  &  Rev.   (N.  S.) 

Mr.  Dorman  B.  Eaton  in  5  American  206.     An   entertaining  and   instruc- 

Journal  Soc.  Sci.  1.     The  municipal  tive  account  of  the  great  Tweed  con- 


§    18      ■  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  M 

that  the  general  adoption  of  what  is  generally  known  as  civil  service 
reform,  and  an  honest  and  faithful  effort  to  carry  out  its  principles, 
will  be  highly  beneficial  in  redeeming  municipal  governments  from 
the  odium  cast  upon  them.  The  existing  laws  we  have  upon  this 
subject  are  more  or  less  defective,  and,  in  some  cases,  have  been 
found  not  in  harmony  with  established  legal  principles  and  consti- 
tutional restrictions,  as  will  be  seen  later  on,  yet  on  the  whole  their 
general  effect  has  been  salutary. 

spiracy  will  be  found  in  a  series  of  A.  Rev.  362;  and  in  an  essay  by  Mr. 

articles   by   Mr.   C.   F.   Wingate   on  Samuel  J.  Tilden  on  "Municipal  Cor- 

"The  Tweed  Ring,"  to  be  found  in  ruption — The  New  York  Ring,"  2  L. 

119  N.  A.  Rev.  359;  120  N.  A.  Rev.  Mag.  &  Rev.  (N.  S.)  225. 
119;  121  N.  A.  Rev.  113;  and  123  N. 


CHAPTEK  II. 


OF    THE    CREATION    OF    THE    CORPORATION. 


Section 

19.  The  Teutonic  town. 

20.  The  old  English  town. 

21.  The  same  subject  continued. 

22.  Guilds. 

23.  The  English  boroughs. 

24.  The  same  subject  continued. 

25.  Creation  of  modern  English  mu- 

nicipal corporations. 

26.  Municipal    corporations    created 

by  charter  from  the  crown. 

27.  Municipal    corporations    created 

by  act  of  parliament. 

28.  Municipal   corporations   at  com- 

mon law  and  by  prescription 
in  England. 

29.  Municipal     corporation    by     im- 

plication in  England. 

30.  The  Municipal  Corporations  Re- 

form Act  of  1835. 

The  Municipal  Corporations  Act 
of  1882. 

The  American  town — Local  self- 
government. 
33.  The  power  to  create  municipal 
corporations  in  the  United 
States — Where  vested — (a)  In 
the  state. 

(b)  In  the  federal  government. 

Municipal  corporations  created 
by  the  federal  government — 
(a)    Territories. 

(b)  The  District  of  Columbia. 

37.  Municipal    corporations   by   pre- 

scription in  the  United  States. 

38.  The    same    subject    continued — 

Instances  of  incorporation  by 
prescription  in  the  United 
States. 

39.  Municipal  corporations  by  impli- 

cation in  the  United  States. 


31. 


32. 


34. 
35. 


36. 


Section 

40.  The  same  subject  continued. 

41.  Creation   of   municipal   corpora- 

tions in  the  United  States — 
(a)  In  general. 

42.  (b)  By  special  charter. 

43.  (c)  By  general  municipal  incor- 

porating acts. 

44.  Constitutional      limitations      of 

legislative  power  to  create 
municipal  corporations. 

45.  Construction    of    such    constitu- 

tional limitations — (a)  Corpo- 
rations "for  municipal  pur- 
poses" and  "bodies  politic  or 
corporate." 

46.  (b)  "Corporate  powers." 

47.  Miscellaneous  instances  of  such 

constitutional  limitations. 

48.  Incorporation  by  courts. 

49.  The  same  subject  continued. 

50.  Classes  of  cities  under  general 

incorporating  acts. 

51.  The  corporate  limits — Territory 

of  the  corporation. 

52.  Acceptance  of  charters  by  corpo- 

rators not  necessary. 

53.  The  same  subject  continued. 

54.  Substantial  compliance  with  in- 

corporating acts  necessary. 

55.  Instances  of  irregularities  in  in- 

corporation. 

56.  Notice  of  incorporation. 

57.  Validity  of  incorporation — How 

tested. 

58.  The  same  subject  continued. 

59.  Existence  not  questioned  collat- 

erally. 

60.  The  charter  of  a  municipal  cor- 

poration is  a  law. 


(25) 


§  19  PUBLIC  conroRATiONS.  26 

Section  Section 

61.  The  American  township.  63.  The  same  subject  continued. 

62.  Local  self-government  a  delega-     64.  Corporations  de  facto. 

tion  of  legislative  power.  65.  Effect  of  incorporation. 

§  19.  The  Teutonic  town. — The  germ  from  which  the  great  cities 
of  the  Anglo-Saxon  peoples  have  developed  is  to  be  found  in  what 
a  modern  English  historian  calls  the  "farmer  commonwealths"  of  the 
primitive  Teutons  on  the  continent  of  Europe.  In  Sleswick,  in  the 
fifth  century,  we  find  the  first  historical  record  of  Englishmen  known 
as  such.  The  same  historian  to  whom  we  have  referred  gives  a  graphic 
and  interesting  description  of  the  government  of  these  early  forefath- 
ers of  our  nations.  "The  blood-bond  gave  both  its  military  and  social 
form  to  old  English  society:  Kinsmen  fought  side  by  side  in  the  hour 
of  battle,  and  the  feelings  of  honor  and  discipline  which  held  the 
host  together  were  drawn  from  the  common  duty  of  every  man  in 
each  little  group  of  warriors  to  his  house.  And  as  they  fought  side 
by  side  on  the  field,  so  they  dwelled  side  by  side  on  the  soil.  Harling 
abode  by  Harling  and  Billing  by  Billing;  and  each  'wick'  or  'ham* 
or  'stead'  or  'tun'  took  its  name  from  the  kinsmen  who  dwelt  together 
in  it.  The  home  or  'ham'  of  the  Billings  would  be  'Billingham,'  and 
the  'tun'  or  township  of  the  Harlings  would  be  Harlington.  Biit  in 
such  settlements  the  tie  of  blood  was  widened  into  the  larger  tie  of 
land.  Land  with  the  German  race  seems  at  a  very  early  time  to  have 
become  the  accompaniment  of  full  freedom.  The  freeman  was  strictly 
the  freeholder,  and  the  exercise  of  his  full  rights  as  a  free  member 
of  the  community  to  which  he  belonged  was  inseparable  from  the  pos- 
session of  his  'holding.'  The  landless  man  ceased  for  all  practical 
purposes  to  be  free,  although  he  was  no  man's  slave.  In  the  very 
earliest  glimpse  we  get  of  the  German  race  we  see  them  a  race  of  land- 
holders and  land-tillers.  Tacitus,  the  first  Eoman  who  sought  to 
know  these  destined  conquerors  of  Eome,  describes  them  as  pasturing 
on  the  forest  glades  around  their  villages  and  ploughing  their  village 
fields.  A  feature  which  at  once  struck  him  as  parting  them  from  the 
civilized  world,  to  which  he  himself  belonged,  was  their  hatred  of 
cities,  and  their  love,  even  within  their  little  settlements,  of  a  jealous 
independence.  'They  live  apart,'  he  says,  'each  by  himself,  as  wood- 
side,  plain  or  fresh  spring  attracts  him.'  And  as  each  dweller  within 
the  settlement  was  Jealous  of  his  own  isolation  and  independence 
among  his  fellow  settlers,  so  each  settlement  was  Jealous  of  its  inde- 
pendence among  its  fellow  settlements.  Of  the  character  of  their  life 
in  this  early  world,  however,  we  know  little  save  what  may  be  gath- 
ered from  the  indications  of  a  later  time.  Each  little  farmer  com- 
monwealth was  girt  in  by  its  own  border  or  'mark,'  a  belt  of  forest 


27  OF  THE  CREATION  OF  THE  CORrORATION.         §  20 

or  waste  or  fen,  which,  parted  it  from  its  fellow  villages,  a  ring  of 
common  ground  which  none  of  its  settlers  might  take  for  his  own, 
but  which  sometimes  served  as  a  death  ground  where  criminals  met 
their  doom,  and  was  held  to  be  the  special  dwelling-place  of  the 
nixie  and  the  will-of-the-wisp.  If  a  stranger  came  through  this  wood 
or  over  this  waste,  custom  bade  him  blow  his  horn  as  he  came,  for 
if  he  stole  through  secretly  he  was  taken  for  a  foe,  and  any  man  might 
lawfully  slay  him.  Inside  this  boundary  the  'township,'  as  the 
village  was  then  called,  from  the  'tun'  or  rough  fence  and  trench 
that  served  as  its  simple  fortification,  formed  a  ready-made  fortress 
in  war,  while  in  peace  its  intrenchments  were  serviceable  in  the  feuds 
of  village  with  village  or  house  with  house.  Within  the  village  we  find 
from  the  first  a  marked  social  difference  between  two  orders  of  its 
indwellers.  The  bulk  of  its  homesteads  were  those  of  its  freemen 
or  'ceorls,'  but  amongst  these  were  the  larger  homes  of  'eorls,'  or 
men  distinguished  among  their  fellows  by  noble  blood,  who  were  held 
in  an  hereditary  reverence,  and  from  whom  the  leaders  of  the  village 
were  chosen  in  war  time,  or  rulers  in  time  of  peace.  But  the  choice 
was  a  purely  voluntary  one,  and  the  man  of  noble  blood  enjo3^ed  no 
legal  privilege  among  his  fellows.  The  hpldings  of  the  freemen 
clustered  around  a  moot  hill  or  sacred  tree  where  the  community 
met  from  time  to  time  to  order  its  own  industry  and  to  frame  its  own 
laws.  Here  plough-land  and  meadow-land  were  shared  in  due  lot 
among  the  villagers,  and  field  and  homestead  passed  from  man  to  man. 
Here  strife  of  farmer  with  farmer  was  settled  according  to  the  'cus- 
toms' of  the  township,  as  its  'elder  men'  stated  them,  and  the  wrong- 
doer was  judged  and  his  fine  assessed  by  the  kinsfolk;  and  here  men 
were  chosen  to  follow  headman  or  'ealderman'  to  hundred  court  or 
war.  It  is  with  a  reverence  such  as  is  stirred  by  the  sight  of  the  head- 
waters of  some  mighty  river  that  one  looks  back  to  these  tiny  moots 
where  the  men  of  the  village  met  to  order  the  village  life  and  the 
village  industry,  as  their  descendants,  the  men  of  a  later  England, 
meet  in  parliament  at  Westminster  to  frame  laws  and  do  justice  for 
the  great  empire  that  has  sprung  from  this  little  body  of  farmer 
commonwealths  in  Sleswick."^ 

§  20.  The  old  English  town. — The  same  form  of  government  de- 
scribed in  the  preceding  section  was  carried  by  the  ,Angles,  the  Saxons, 
and  the  Jutes  to  Britain.  "War  was  no  sooner  over  than  the  warrior 
settled  down  into  a  farmer,  and  the  home  of  the  peasant  churl  rose 
beside  the  heap  of  goblin-haunted  stones  that  marked  the  site  of  the 
villa  he  had  burnt.     Little  knots  of  kinsfolk  drew  together  in  'tun' 

^  Green    Short   Hist.    Eng.    People   (Harper  &  Bros.,  ed.  1889),  §  1,  p.  3. 


§    21  rUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  28 

or  'ham'  hcsidc  the  Thames  and  the  Trent  as  they  had  settled  beside 
the  El])e  or  the  Weser,  not  as  kinsfolk  only,  but  as  dwellers  in  the  same 
plot,  knit  together  by  their  common  holding  within  the  same  bounds. 
Each  little  village  commonwealth  lived  the  same  life  in  Britain  as 
its  farmers  had  lived  at  home.    Each  had  its  moot  hill  or  sacred  tree 
as  a  center ;  its  'mark'  as  a  border;  each  judged  by  witness  of  the  kins- 
folk, and  made  laws  in  the  assembly  of  its  freedmen,  and  chose  the 
leaders  for  its  governance,  and  the  men  who  were  to  follow  headman 
or  ealderman  to  hundred  court  or  war."^    The  necessities  of  war  and 
conquest,  however,  modified  this  primitive  and  democratic  form  of 
government.     The  temporary  war  leader  of  the  earlier  times  became 
a  permanent  king;  and  a  military  nobility  of  "thegns"  sprang  up 
around  him.     The  nobility  gradually  superseded  the  ealderman  of 
the  primitive  society.     Under  the  king  and  the  "thegns"  the  powers 
of  the  townsmen  became  less.     Local  self-government  was  no  longer 
as  absolute  as  it  had  been.    The  beginnings  of  a  feudal  system  were  to 
be  seen.     With  the  conquest  and  the  attendant  increase  in  power  of 
the  military  classes,  and  the  consequent  temporary  subjugation  of 
the  masses,  the  towns  continued  to  lose  the  free  and  independent 
system  of  self-government  so  characteristic  of  the  Teutonic  townships. 
The  feudal  system  was  for  the  time  firmly  established  in  England,, 
and  in  that  system,  as  has  been  said,  towns  played  but  a  small  part. 
Thus,  the  municipal  system  of  England  became  affected  by  Norman 
principles  of  government,  which  were  based  on  the  Roman  law.     This 
fact  explains  why  the  commons  had  so  little  voice  in  the  creation 
of  corporations  in  England  for  so  long;  for  the  Norman  nobles  and 
clergy  controlled  all  the  departments  of  state,  and  William,  the  Con- 
queror and  his  sons  were  thorough  Normans  in  their  predispositions 
and  prejudices.     The   Norman  cities  gained  their   charters   slowly. 
Eouen  and  Falaise  are  said  to  have  been  the  first  incorporated  towns 
in  that  duchy,  their  privileges  l)eing  acquired  by  grant  in  1207.     The 
characteristic  of  the  earlier  English  charters,  being  in  fact  conces- 
sions from  a  military  superior  to  his  subjects,  was  that  they  conferred 
the  right  to  protection  of  person  and  property,  rather  than  any  right 
of  self-government.^ 

§  21.  The  same  subject  continued. — That  right  the  people  were 
not  yet  disposed  to  demand.  They  were  not  yet  in  a  position  to  defend 
themselves,  and  security  of  life  and  property  seemed  a  great  enough 

-  Green    Short   Hist.   Eng.   People  See  also,  as  to  Scotch  municipalities, 

(Harper  &  Bros.,  ed.  1889),  §  2,  p.  15.  "Municipal     Corporations     in     Scot- 

'  History    of    Municipal    Corpora-  land,"  24  Westm.  Rev.  156. 
tions  and  Boroughs,  13  L.  Mag.  401. 


29  OF  THE  CREATION  OF  THE  CORPORATION".         §  31 

boon  to  acquire.  But  as  the  nation  became  settled,  and  communities 
gained  wealth  by  trade,  they  were  encouraged  to  beg,  buy  or  demand 
greater  privileges, — more  voice  in  their  own  private  local  affairs; 
so,  little  by  little,  local  self-government  again  became  the  feature 
of  municipalities,  after  so  long  an  abeyance  that  it  is  often  deemed 
to  have  had  its  origin  at  this  point  in  history."*  And  in  the  great 
struggles  for  liberty  and  law  by  which  the  English  people  wrested 
from  king  and  priest  their  birth-right  of  freedom,  the  towns  w^ere  al- 
ways arrayed  against  arbitrary  power.  "In  the  silent  growth  and 
elevation  of  the  English  people  the  boroughs  led  the  way;  unnoticed 
and  despised  by  prelate  and  noble,  they  had  alone  preserved  or  won 
back  again  the  full  tradition  of  Teutonic  liberty.  The  rights  of  self- 
government,  of  free  speech  in  free  meeting,  of  equal  justice  by  one's 
equals,  were  brought  safely  across  the  ages  of  tyranny  by  the  burghers 
and  shop-keepers  of  the  towns.  In  the  quiet,  quaintly-named  streets, 
in  town-mead  and  market  place,  in  the  lord's  mill  beside  the  stream, 
in  the  bell  that  swung  out  its  summons  to  the  crowded  borough-mote, 
in  merchant-gild,  and  church-gild  and  craft-gild,  lay  the  life  of 
Englishmen  who  were  doing  more  than  knight  and  baron  to  make 
England  what  she  is,  the  life  of  their  home  and  their  trade,  of  their 
sturdy  battle  with  oppression,  their  steady,  ceaseless  struggle  for  rights 

*  We  quote  here  the  description  of  levy  the  old  duties,  and  become  re- 
the  rise  of  municipalities  given  in  sponsible  for  the  funds  committed 
Angell  and  Ames'  Treatise  on  the  to  their  care.  As  managers  of  the 
Law  of  Private  Corporations,  in  the  community,  therefore,  they  were 
introduction:  "§  21.  In  the  reign  of  bound  to  fulfill  its  obligations  to  the 
Henry  the  First  of  England,  who  superior,  and  by  a  very  natural  ex- 
was  a  contemporary  of  Louis  le  tension  of  the  same  principle,  it  was 
Gros,  the  inhabitants  of  London  had  finally  understood  that  they  might 
begun  to  form  their  tolls  and  duties,  be  prosecuted  for  all  its  debts.  The 
and  they  obtained  a  royal  charter  society  was  thus  viewed  in  the  light 
for  that  purpose.  The  example  of  of  body  politic,  or  fictitious  person, 
London  was  soon  followed  by  the  capable  of  legal  acts  and  executing 
other  trading  towns,  and  from  this  every  kind  of  transaction  by  means 
time  forward  the  existence  of  the  of  trustees.  This  alteration  in  the 
municipal  corporations  called  'bor-  state  of  English  towns  was  accompa- 
oughs'  became  more  and  more  con-  nied  by  many  other  improvements; 
spicuous.  The  arrangement  just  they  were  placed  in  a  condition  that 
mentioned  in  relation  to  tolls  and  enabled  them  to  dispense  with  the 
duties  seems  to  have  suggested  the  protection  of  their  superior;  and 
idea  of  a  borough,  considered  as  a  took  upon  themselves  to  provide  a 
corporation.  Some  of  the  principal  defense  against  foreign  invaders, 
inhabitants  of  a  town  undertook  to  and  to  secure  their  internal  tran- 
pay  the  yearly  rent  which  was  due  quillity.  In  this  manner  they  ulti- 
to  the  superior,  and  in  consideration  mately  became  completely  invested 
of   which   they   were   permitted   to  with  the  government  of  the  place." 


§    23  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  30 

and  freedom.  It  is  difficult  to  trace  the  steps  by  which  borough  after 
borough  won  its  freedom.  The  bulk  of  them  were  situated  in  the 
royal  demesne,  and,  like  other  tenants,  their  customary  rents  were 
collected  and  justice  administered  by  a  royal  officer.  Amongst  our 
towns  London  stood  chief,  and  the  charter  which  Henry  granted  it 
became  the  model  for  the  rest.  The  king  yielded  the  citizens  the  right 
of  justice;  every  townsman  could  claim  to  be  tried  by  his  fellow- 
townsmen  in  the  town  court  or  hustings,  whose  sessions  took  place 
every  week.  They  were  subject  only  to  the  old  English  trial  by  oath, 
and  exempt  from  the  trial  by  battle  which  the  Normans  had  intro- 
duced. Their  trade  was  protected  from  toll  or  exaction  over  the 
length  and  breadth  of  the  land.  The  king,  however,  still  nominated 
in  London,  as  elsewhere,  the  portreeve  or  magistrate  of  the  town, 
nor  were  the  citizens  as  yet  united  together  in  a  commune  or  corpora- 
tion; but  an  imperfect  civic  organization  existed  in  the  Vards'  or 
quairters  of  the  town,  each  governed  by  its  own  alderman,  and  in  the 
'gilds'  or  voluntary  associations  of  merchants  or  traders,  which  in- 
sured order  and  mutual  protection  for  their  members.  Loose,  too, 
as  these  bonds  may  seem,  they  were  drawn  firmly  together  by  the 
older  English  traditions  of  freedom  which  the  towns  preserved.  In 
London,  for  instance,  the  burgesses  gathered  in  town-mote  when  the 
bell  swung  out  from  St.  Paul's,  to  deliberate  freely  on  their  own 
affairs  under  the  presidency  of  their  aldermen.  Here,  too,  they  mus- 
tered in  arms  if  danger  threatened  the  city,  and  delivered  the  city 
banner  to  their  captain,  the  Norman  baron,  Fitz- Walter,  to  lead  them 
against  the  enemy.  Few  boroughs  had  as  yet  attained  to  power  such 
as  this,  but  charter  after  charter  during  Henry's  reign  raised  the 
townsmen  of  boroughs  from  mere  traders,  wholly  at  the  mercy  of  their 
lord,  into  customary  tenants,  who  had  purchased  their  freedom  by 
a  fixed  rent,  regulated  their  own  trade,  and  enjoyed  exemption  from 
all  but  their  own  justice."^ 

§  22.  Guilds. — In  England,  as  indicated  in  the  preceding  section, 
the  increase  and  encouragement  of  commerce  was  at  the  basis  of 
municipal  rights.  For,  long  before  municipalities  acquired  their 
chartered  privileges,  associations  of  tradesmen  secured  from  the  crown, 
for  a  consideration,  franchises  and  privileges  in  the  line  of  their  par- 
ticular business.  These  guilds  were  little  centers  of  trade;  around 
them  towns  grew  up ;  the  members  of  the  guild  being  electors  or 
franchise-holders  in  the  towns.  To  these  ^towns,  as  their  trade-homes, 
they  became  attached.  The  town  and  guild  became  more  and  more 
identified,  and  eventually  the  privileges  they  sought  were  for  the  towns 

■>  Green    Short   Hist.    Eng.   People    (Harper  &  Bros.,  ed.  1889),  §  6,  p.  93. 


31  OF  THE  CREATION  OF  THE  CORPORATION.         §  23 

themselves, — and  these  privileges  were  given  by  the  king  in  charters. 
The  privileges  conferred  in  these  charters  were  sufficient  to  build  up 
a  class  rivaling  in  power  the  great  lords  and  barons.  Glover  traces 
the  successive  steps  of  the  English  municipality  in  the  introduction 
to  his  work  on  Municipal  Corporations;  saying:  "Kespecting  the 
early  constitution  of  municipal  corporations  in  England  and  Wales, 
it  is  certain  that  many  of  their  institutions  were  established  in  prac- 
tice long  before  they  were  settled  by  law.  In  some  places,  as  at  New- 
castle-upon-Tyne, Carlisle  and  Scarborough,  the  forms  of  the  munici- 
pal government  were  defined  by  an  express  composition  between  the 
magistracy  and  the  people."  The  same  writer  continues :  "It  is  prob- 
able that  the  powers  of  government  in  all  ordinary  cases  were  exercised 
by  the  superior  magistracy,  but  that  in  extraordinary  emergencies 
the  whole  body  of  burgesses  was  called  upon  to  sanction  the  measures 
which  interested  the  community.  The  difficulty  of  conducting  busi- 
ness in  such  an  assembly  seems  to  have  suggested  the  expedient  of 
appointing  a  species  of  committee,  which  acted  in  conjunction  with 
the  burgesses,  and  which  was  dissolved  when  the  business  was  con- 
eluded."  These  boroughs,  thus  organized,  had  subsequently  represen- 
tation in  parliament.  Later,  as  they  acquired  influence  in  parliament, 
they  were  able  to  modify  the  character  of  its  laws.  New  principles 
took  root :  the  people  were  having  a  voice  in  the  making  of  the  laws 
that  were  to  affect  them ;  so  that  equality  and  public  good  were  in- 
creasingly prevailing  considerations  in  legislation.^ 

§  23.  The  English  boroughs. — The  development  of  the  English 
boroughs  under  the  influence  of  civic  spirit  made  formidable  by  the 
power  of  commerce  and  wealth  is  clearly  traced  by  Mr.  Green  in  his 
admirable  History  of  the  English  People.  First  came  the  "frith- 
guild"  or  peace-club,  a  voluntary  association  of  neighboring  land- 
owners for  the  purposes  of  order  and  self-defense.  This  rude  organi- 
zation is  but  a  step  removed  from  the  primitive  Teutonic  town.  In 
the  beginning  these  early  English  boroughs  were  but  gatherings  of 
farmers.  The  first  Dooms  of  London  provide  especially  for  the 
recovery  of  cattle  belonging  to  the  citizens.  But  with  the  growth  of 
commerce  and  the  security  of  peace,  which  enabled  each  peasant 
farmer  to  dwell  apart  on  his  own  field,  the  town  and  the  country 
were  more  sharply  distinguished.    The  frith-guilds  became  merchant- 

^  Glover,  cited  above,  treats  fully  municipal  institutions  to  the  Mii- 
of  the  history  and  growth  of  mu-  nicipal  Corporations  Act  (5  &  6 
nicipalities  in  England,  Wales,  Scot-  Will.  IV).  See  also,  Hallam  Mid- 
land and  Ireland.  Judge  Dillon,  in  die  Ages,  vol.  3,  ch.  8;  1  Stephen 
his  introductory,  historical  view  English  Const,  ch.  3,  p.  62. 
(Dillon  Munic.  Corp.,  ch.  1),  traces 


§    23  PUBLIC    CORrORATIOXS.  32 

guilds.  The  active  members  of  these  guilds  were  the  landed  burghers 
— land-owners  as  well  as  merchants.  Around  them  gathered  a  mass 
of  new  settlers,  "composed  of  escaped  serfs,  of  traders  without  landed 
holdings,  of  families  who  had  lost  their  original  lot  in  the  borough, 
and  generally  of  the  artisans  and  the  poor,  who  had  no  part  in  the 
actual  life  of  the  town."  The  burgher  class,  secure  in  their  wealth 
and  their  land,  ground  the  faces  of  the  landless  artisans,  who  for 
protection  formed  "craft-guilds"  or  associations  of  artisans,  the  pro- 
tot3q3es  of  the  labor  unions  of  modern  times.  These  associations  of 
workingmen  gained  charters  from  the  king,  and  thus  obtained  a  legal 
standing  in  the  civic  government.  The  struggle  between  these  "craft- 
guilds"  and  the  old  and  powerful  "merchant-guilds"  was  long  and 
bitter.  Little  by  little  the  monopoly  of  power  over  trade  and  the 
municipal  government,  which  the  merchant-guilds  had  gained,  was 
won  from  them  by  the  craft-guilds,  which  in  time  obtained  an  almost 
absolute  control  of  trade,  and  stand  with  the  merchant-guilds  in  the 
government  of  the  municipality.'^  As  these  English  boroughs,  towns 
and  cities  developed,  charters  were  obtained  from  time  to  time  from 
the  crown.  In  the  beginning  they  were  not  incorporated  and  could 
not  be  called  bodies  politic ;  nor  were  they  represented  in  parliament. 
The  charter  of  London  was  granted  by  Henry  I,  during  the  early 
years  of  the  twelfth  century,  and  was  secured  afterwards  by  express 
provision  of  Magna  Charta;  in  fact,  all  of  the  privileges  granted  by 
the  borough  charters  were  of  a  local  character  in  every  respect.  Judge 
Dillon  in  the  portion  of  his  work  just  cited  gives  an  excellent  historical 
sketch  of  the  English  boroughs,  to  which  the  reader  is  referred.  The 
material  for  this  section  is  largely  taken  from  that  sketch.  During 
the  reign  of  John,  indeed,  the  principal  towns  and  boroughs  received 
charters  and  the  power  of  local  self-government.^  But  it  was  not  until 
Edward  I  that  the  right  of  electing  representatives  in  parliament  was 
formally  accorded  to  the  boroughs,^  although  as  early  as  A.  D.  1365, 
Earl  Simon  of  Montford  summoned  two  citizens  from  each 
borough  to  sit  in  parliament.  Until  the  time  of  Edward  I,  however, 
these  burgess-members  attended  irregularly  and  had  but  a  slight 
influence.     That  king,  driven  by  need  of  money  to  carry  on  the  wars 

^  Green    Short   Hist.   Eng.    People  elusive    jurisdictions,    a    merchant- 

( Harper  &  Bros.,  ed.  1889),  ch.  4,  guild,  the  appointment  of  the  vari- 

§   4,   pp.   193,   201.     See   also,   Bren-  ous   officers   for   the   administration 

tano's     Essay,     prefixed     to     "Ordi-  of  justice,  fairs  and  markets,  with 

nances  of  English  Guilds."  freedom  from  all  tolls." 

n  Dillon  Munic.  Corp..  §  8,  quot-  "Green    Short    Hist.    Eng.    People 

ing  1  Stephen  English  Const,  ch.  3,  (Harper  &  Bros.,   ed.   1889),  ch.   4, 

p.     62:      "The     principal     liberties  §  2,  pp.  177-179. 
granted  in  the  early  charters  are  ex- 


33  OF  THE  CREATION  OF  THE  CORPORATION.         §  24 

of  his  reign,  summoned  two  burgesses  from  "every  city,  borough  and 
leading  town."  These  burgesses  were  at  first  the  active  supporters 
of  the  Icing.  He  used  them  to  brealc  tlie  power  of  the  great  barons 
of  the  realm;  and  the  burgesses  in  turn  sought  the  protection  of  the 
king  against  the  oppression  of  the  nobility.  But  with  the  advance 
of  the  autocratic  power  of  the  king  under  the  Tudors  and  the  Stuarts, 
these  burgesses  stood  out  as  leaders  in  the  fight  for  the  liberties  of 
the  people.  Under  Charles  II  the  municipal  corporations  of  England 
were  the  especial  objects  of  royal  displeasure.  The  city  of  London 
and  many  other  municipalities  were  deprived  of  their  charters  by 
process  of  quo  warranto.  But  under  William  and  Mary  the  charters 
of  these  cities  were  restored. 

§  24.  The  same  subject  continued. — Many  of  these  boroughs,  how- 
ever, early  lost  the  independence  which  had  characterized  their  early 
government.  "The  borough  franchise  was  suffering  from  the  general 
tendency  to  restriction  and  privilege  which  in  the  bulk  of  towns  was 
soon  to  reduce  it  to  a  mere  mockery.  Up  to  this  time  (the  fifteenth 
century)  all  freemen  settling  in  a  borough  and  paying  their  dues  to 
it  became,  by  the  mere  settlement,  its  burgesses;  but  from  the  reign 
of  Henry  the  Sixth  this  largeness  of  borough  life  was  roughly  cur- 
tailed. The  trade  companies,  which  vindicated  civic  freedom  from  the 
tyranny  of  the  older  merchant  guilds,  themselves  tended  to  become 
a  narrow  and  exclusive  oligarchy.  Most  of  the  boroughs  had  by  this 
time  acquired  civic  property;  and  it  was  with  the  aim  of  securing 
their  own  enjoyment  of  this,  against  any  share  of  it  by  'strangers,' 
that  the  existing  burgesses  for  the  most  part  procured  charters  of 
incorporation  from  the  crown,  which  turned  them  into  a  close  body, 
and  excluded  from  their  number  all  who  were  not  burgesses  by  birth, 
or  who  failed  henceforth  to  purchase  their  right  of  entrance  by  a 
long  apprenticeship.  In  addition  to  this  narrowing  of  the  burgess- 
body,  the  internal  government  of  the  boroughs  had  almost  universally 
passed,  since  the  failure  of  the  communal  movement  in  the  thirteenth 
century,  from  the  free  gathering  of  the  citizens  in  borough-mote_ 
into  the  hands  of  common  councils,  either  self -elected  or  elected  by 
the  wealthier  burgesses ;  and  it  was  to  these  councils,  or  to  a  yet  more 
restricted  number  of  'select  men'  belonging  to  them,  that  clauses  in 
the  new  charters  generally  confined  the  right  of  choosing  their  rep- 
resentatives in  parliament.  It  was  with  this  restriction  that  the  long 
process  of  degradation  began  which  ended  in  reducing  the  represen- 
tation of  our  boroughs  to  a  mere  mockery."^"    Thus  in  the  course  of 

"Green  Short  Hist.  Eng.  People   (Harper  &  Bros.,  ed.  1889),  ch.  6, 

§  1,  p.  272. 
1  Smith— 3 


§    25  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  34 

time  the  system  of  borough  representation  in  England  became  rotten 
with  abuses.  The  famous  Reform  Act  of  1832  abolished  in  great 
measure  the  abuses  of  the  system,  by  placing  the  government  of  the 
boroughs  in  the  hands  of  a  larger  electorate,  and  by  doing  away  with 
many  of  the  ^'pocket  boroughs"  which  had  dwindled  into  petty  vil- 
lages, owned  by  neighboring  landlords,  for  whose  personal  ends  the 
burgesses  were  elected.  In  1835  the  Municipal  Corporations  Eeform 
Act^^  restored  to  the  members  of  municipal  corporations  the  rights 
of  local  self-government,  of  which  they  had  been  deprived  since  the 
fourteenth  century.  The  Municipal  Corporations  Act  of  1882  con- 
solidated and  codified  all  the  previous  legislation  on  the  subject  of 
municipal  corporations  in  England.^' 

§  25.  Creation  of  modern  English  municipal  corporations. — The 
modern  English  municipal  corporation  is  created  either  by  char- 
ter granted  by  the  king  under  the  general  provisions  of  the  Municipal 
Corporations  Act  of  1882  or  by  act  of  parliament.  The  general  stat- 
ute provides  that  if,  on  the  petition  to  the  queen  of  the  inhabitant 
householders  of  any  town  or  towns  or  district  in  England,  or  of  any 
of  those  inhabitants,  praying  for  the  grant  of  a  charter  of  incorpora- 
tion, her  majesty,  by  the  advice  of  her  privy  council,  thinks  fit  by 
charter  to  create  such  town,  towns  or  district,  or  any  part  thereof 
specified  in  the  charter  with  or  without  any  adjoining  place,  a  mu- 
nicipal borough,  and  to  incorporate  the  inhabitants  thereof,  it  shall 
be  lawful  for  her  majesty  by  the  charter  to  extend  to  that  municipal 
borough  and  the  inhabitants  thereof  so  incorporated  the  provisions 
of  the  Municipal  Corporations  Act.^^  The  corporation  created  by 
charter  from  the  crown  under  the  general  statute  possesses  in  general 

"5  &  6  Will.  IV,  ch.  76.  278;  Vaughan  Revel,  in  Eng.  Hist., 

"For  a  full  treatment  of  the  inter-  book  2,  ch.  8;  Frothingham  Rise  of 

esting  subject  outlined  in   the  pre-  the  Republic  14. 

ceding   sections,   see    Dillon   Munic.  ''  Municipal    Corporations    Act   of 

Corp.,    in    loco;    Green    Short    Hist.  1882,  §  210.     The  crown  has  always 

_Bng.   People    (Harper   &   Bros.,   ed.  possessed,   says   an   English   writer, 

1889),  pp.  92-95,  129,  156,  177,  194-  the  power  of  creating  corporations 

201,     272,     402,     663,     843;     Norton  and    conferring    franchises     (see    1 

Comm.    on   Hist.    Const,   and   Char-  Kyd    Corp.    61);    but    where    privi- 

tered  Franchises  of  the  City  of  Lon-  leges  and  powers  are  to  be  conferred 

don;   3  Hallam  Middle  Ages,  ch.  8,  which    are    not    recognized    by    the 

parti;  1  Stephen  Eng.  Const.,  ch.  3;  common   or  statute  law,   an  act  of 

Hearn   Gov.   of   Eng.,   ch.   15;    Will-  parliament    is   necessary.     This    act 

cock  Munic.  Corp.  513;  Glover  Corp.,  (the  Municipal  Corporations  Act  of 

ch.  38;    Crabbe  Hist,  of  Eng.   Law,  1882),  though  even  without  the  sav- 

ch.  2;  1  Bl.  Com.  114;   2  Kent  Com.  ing   provision   contained   in   section 


35 


OF   THE    CREATION    OF    THE    CORPORATION. 


26 


all  the  common-law  powers  and  qualities  of  a  corporation,  except 
as  limited  by  express  provision  of  the  charter;^*  while  parliament  has 
power  to  confer  upon  the  corporations  created  by  its  act  special  and 
unusual  powers  not  incident  to  common-law  corporations.^^ 

§  26.    Municipal  corporations  created  by  charter  from  the  crown. — 

This  class  of  corporations,  as  indicated  in  the  preceding  section,  pos- 
sesses the  powers  and  attributes  of  common-law  corporations,  and  no 
other.  These  powers  and  attributes  are  of  course  subject  to  the  re- 
strictions imposed  by  the  charter.  It  is  a  fundamental  principle 
that  the  crown  can  impose  no  charter  upon  a  community  without  the 
acceptance  and  consent  of  the  people  of  the  community.  "And  as 
acceptance  was  necessary  to  make  the  king's  charter  operativ^e,  it  will 


259  it  would  not  at  all  abridge  the 
common-law  prerogative  of  the 
crown,  nevertheless  prevents  its 
granting  charters  of  incorporation 
with  the  powers  conferred  by  this 
act,  save  with  the  advice  of  the 
privy  council  and  on  petition  by 
"the  inhabitant  householders."  Raw- 
linson  Municipal  Corporation  Acts 
(8th  ed.  by  Thomas  Geary,  1884) 
293,  note.  The  saving  provision 
mentioned  prescribes  that  nothing 
in  this  act  shall  prejudicially  affect 
her  majesty's  royal  prerogative,  and 
the  enabling  provisions  of  this  act 
shall  be  deemed  to  be  in  addition  to 
and  not  in  derogation  of  the  powers 
exercisable  by  her  majesty  by  virtue 
of  her  royal  prerogative:  Municipal 
Corporations  Act  of  1882,  §  259.  Of 
this  provision  the  same  writer  from 
whom  we  have  quoted  says:  "This 
seems  merely  re-affirming  the  old 
doctrine  that  the  crown  is  not  af- 
fected by  any  statute  unless  express- 
ly named  therein:"  Rawlinson  Mu- 
nicipal Corporation  Acts  (8th  ed.  by 
Thomas  Geary,  1884)  339,  note. 
See  on  this  topic  generally,  "Munici- 
pal Corporations — How  Organized 
and  Dissolved,"  a  note  by  H.  B. 
Johnson,  18  Am.  L.  Reg.  (N.  S.)  43. 
See  on  the  subject  of  the  common- 
law    prerogative    of    the    crown    to 


grant  charters,  Rutter  v.  Chapman 
(in  error,  in  the  exchequer  cham- 
ber), 8  M.  &  W.  1;  Reg.  V.  Mayor 
&c.,  11  L.  T.  (N.  S.)  417;  s.  c.  13  W. 
R.  90.  It  is  further  provided  that 
every  petition  for  a  charter  under 
this  act  shall  be  referred  to  a  com- 
mittee of  the  lords  of  her  majesty's 
privy  council;  and  that  at  least  one 
month  before  the  petition  is  taken 
into  consideration  by  the  committee, 
notice  thereof  and  of  time  at  which 
it  will  be  so  taken  into  considera- 
tion shall  be  published  in  the  Lon- 
don Gazette  and  otherwise  as  the 
committee  direct,  for  the  purpose  of 
making  it  known  to  all  persons  in- 
terested: Municipal  Corporations 
Act  of  1882,  §  211. 

"  See,  for  American  cases  on  the 
powers  of  corporations  created  by 
charter  from  the  crown.  People  v. 
Bennett,  29  Mich.  451;  s.  c.  18  Am. 
R.  107;  President  &c.  v.  Society  &c., 
24  N.  J.  L.  385.  See  also,  1  Kyd 
Corp.  61;  Willcock  Munic.  Corp.  30; 
Angell  &  Ames  Corp.,  §  69. 

^^  Rawlinson  Municipal  Corpora- 
tion Acts  (8th  ed.  by  Thomas  Geary, 
1884)  293,  note  (d)  ;  Willcock  Mu- 
nic. Corp.  63,  64;  1  Kyd  Corp.  61;  1 
Dillon  Munic.  Corp.  33;  Glover 
Munic.  Corp.  24. 


§    27  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  86 

bp  foimd  that  the  municipal  charters  which  he  gave  were  all  given 
to  existing  communities,  having  a  recognized  and  organized  existence, 
and  in  the  habit  of  acting  as  one  body  through  elections  or  agencies 
and  officers.  So  far  as  we  can  judge  from  history,  they  were  to  all 
intents  and  purposes  already  as  complete  corporations  for  all  practical 
purposes  as  are  simpler  municipal  bodies,  and  accustomed  to  what 
was  practically  corporate  action,  and  known  as  quasi-corporations. 
But  even  these  could  get  nothing  from  the  royal  grant  but  liberties  or 
franchises.  Any  coercive  or  exclusive  power,  which  by  the  principles 
of  the  common  law  could  not  be  granted  by  the  king's  charter,  could 
only  be  given  by  act  of  parliament."^''  A  royal  charter  is  a  formal 
authorization,  documentary  in  form,  under  the  great  seal,  to  the  per- 
sons named  therein,  to  incorporate  themselves  in  a  certain  place  and 
for  certain  purposes.  It  is  addressed  to  all  the  subjects  of  the  king. 
The  king's  charter  is  wholly  inoperative  until  the  persons  named 
therein  as  incorporators  accept  it.  Their  assent  is  essential  to  give 
life  to  the  charter,  and  this  assent  must  be  to  the  very  charter  proffered 
them.  In  case  of  partial  acceptance  the  charter  avails  nothing,  unless 
the  modification  be  approved  by  ,the  king.  In  the  case  of  a  new  cor- 
poration, however,  a  partial  acceptance  is  considered  an  acceptance 
of  the  whole  charter.  It  is  said  to  have  been  a  settled  principle  at 
common  law  that  the  king  had  a  prerogative  right  to  grant  charters 
— municipal  as  well  as  private.  But  this  only  meant  that  he  had 
a  prerogative  to  confer  privileges.  He  had  no  power  to  impose  polit- 
ical obligations  on  any  person  or  community,  unless  they  were  in  the 
form  of  conditions,  nor  could  he  compel  the  acceptance  of  any  char- 
ter. ^^  After  the  charter  has  been  accepted,  the  crown  can  not  withdraw 
the  charter  and  thereby  destroy  the  life  of  the  corporation,  its  crea- 
ture, without  the  consent  of  the  members  of  the  corporation.^® 

§  27.    Municipal   corporations    created   by   act    of   parliament. — 

In  contrasting  parliamentary  with  royal  incorporations,  it  must  be 
borne  in  mind  that  the  charters  granted  by  the  crown  were  given  to 
existing  communities  having  a  recognized  organized  existence.  Inas- 
much as  their  assent  was  necessary  to  render  the  charter  operative, 
in  no  other  way  could  it  have  been  signified  except  by  a  body  acting 
through  agencies  or  officers.     The  powers  of  parliament  regarding 

"1  Kytl  Corp.  61.     See  President  dent  &c.  v.  Society  &c.,  24  N.  J.  L. 

&c.  v.  Society  &c.,  24  N.  J.  L.  385;  385. 

Eastman  v.  Meredith,  36  N.  H.  284;  'n  Dillon  Munic.  Corp.,  §§  33,  34; 

People    v.    Bennett,    29    Mich.    451;  Kyd     Corp.     61     et    seq.;     Willcock 

Am.  &  Bng.  Encyc.  of  Law,  tit.  Mu-  Munic.    Corp.    30;    Angell    &    Ames 

nicipal  Corporations,  p.  956.  Corp.,  §  69. 

'^Willcock  Munic.  Corp.  30;  Presi- 


37  OF  THE  CREATION  OF  THE  CORPORATION".         §  28 

ihc  institution  of  nninifipal  corporations  are  plenary;  for,  as  we  have 
^een,  there  is  only  one  party,  the  public,  concerned  in  the  creation 
of  a  municijial  corporation,  and  the  persons  incorporated  have  no 
contractual  riahts  under  their  charter.  The  charter  of  a  corporation 
created  by  parliament  is  the  act  of  parliament.  No  assent  is  necessary 
to  render  an  act  of  parliament  operative.  Not  only  that,  but  without 
assent  the  incorporated  individuals  may  be  deprived  of  the  fran- 
chises origirmlly  given.  ]\Ioreover,  the  powers  granted  may  even  be 
contrary  to  the  usual  rules  of  law ;  only,  if  that  be  so,  there  must  be 
no  ambiguity  in  terms,  as  such  grants  are  not  to  be  implied. ^^  Par- 
liament can  create  corporations  the  privileges  of  which  can  never  be 
affected  by  subsequently-granted  royal  charters,  and  can  at  the  same 
time  control  and  alter  any  corporation  instituted  under  permission 
from  the  crown.  While  it  has  been  said  that  no  assent  is  prerequisite 
in  the  case  of  parliamentary  corporations,  it  must  be  stated  in  quali- 
fication that  an  act  of  parliament  usually  contains  provisions  for  the 
conditions  of  incorporation.  The  English  statute  for  local  govern- 
ment in  "towns  and  populous  districts"-"  provides  that  this  local  gov- 
ernment is  to  be  adopted  by  the  people  who  are  to  exercise  the  power ; 
for  example,  in  a  corporate  borough  the  council  adopt  the  provisions 
of  the  act;  and  in  a  place  under  commissioners  the  adoption  would 
be  by  resolution  of  the  commissioners.  This  adoption  of  the  provi- 
sions of  the  act,  and  complying  with  the  conditions  therein  prescribed, 
is  equivalent  to  an  assent  of  the  persons  to  be  incorporated.^^  Parlia- 
mentary corporations  at  first  were  usually  such  as  were  to  be  invested 
with  extraordinary  privileges  or  powers.  When  the  ordinary  powers 
alone  were  to  be  given  the  charter  of  the  king  was  sufficient.  If  a 
Toyal  charter  gave  too  much  power,  it  was  to  that  extent  void,  and 
parliament  could  validate  it  by  enactment.  But  under  the  Municipal 
Corporations  Act  now  in  force  in  England,^-  nearly  all  corporations 
are  parliamentary  in  their  origin.  Such  laws  establish  uniform  con- 
ditions, confer  uniform  privileges,  to  all  who  will  meet  the  prescribed 
requirements.     These  general  statutes  will  now  be  considered. 

§  28.  Municipal  corporations  at  common  law  and  by  prescription 
in  England. — Although  municipal  corporations  in  England  can 
be  created  only  by  one  of  the  two  methods  pointed  out  in  the  pre- 
ceding section, — by  charter  from  the  crown  or  by  act  of  parliament, — 
still  many  municipal  corporations  which  owe  their  origin  to  neither 

^^  Glover    Munic.    Corp.    24;    Will-  =^  Queen     v.     Local     Government 

cock  Munic.  Corp.  21  et  seq.;   1  Dil-  Board,  L.  R.  8  Q.  B.  227. 

Ion  Munic.  Corp.,  §  34.  ==*  Act  of  1882. 

=">  21  and  22  Vict.,  ch.  98,  §  12. 


§   29  PUBLIC    CORPORATIOISrS.  38 

of  these  two  sources  are  in  existence  in  tliat  country.  Those  are  di- 
vided into  two  classes,  known  as  municipal  corporations  at  common 
law  and  municipal  corporations  by  prescription.  As  the  law  never 
presumes  the  continued  existence  of  anything  unlawful,  a  legal  incep- 
tion for  both  classes  is  presumed.  Municipal  corporations  at  common 
law  are  those  to  which  several  capacities  have  been  annexed,  in  virtue 
of  their  political  character,  by  the  universal  assent  of  the  community, 
from  the  most  remote  period  to  which  their  existence  can  be  traced. 
These  corporations  have  existed,  enjoying  and  exercising  corporate 
■  rights,  from  time  immemorial.  This  immemorial  usage  is  the  basis 
of  their  continuing  right.  The  second  clas,s — corporations  by  prescrip- 
tion— are  presumed  to  owe  their  origin  to  a  charter  from  the  crown 
or  an  act  of  parliament,  that  has  been  lost  or  destroyed.  Such  corpo- 
rations are  of  course  much  more  common  in  England  than  in  the 
United  States,  although  public  corporations  by  prescription  have  been 
held  to  exist  here.^^  Prescriptive  corporations  have  a  definite  legal 
status.  The  powers  and  privileges  they  have  customarily  enjoyed 
are  conceded  to  them — the  supposition  being  that  the  customs  and 
usages  regulating  them  were  defined  and  prescribed  in  the  lost  charter. 
These  customs  are  not  always  so  strictly  interpreted  as  those  under 
a  charter  of  modern  origin ;  for,  as  has  above  appeared,  the  earliest 
charters  were  granted  in  the  days  when  the  power  of  the  king  had 
few  if  any  parliamentary  restrictions,  and  hence  he  could  confer 
greater  privileges,  and  create  corporations  with  ampler  powers,  than 
the  sovereign  to-day.^* 

§  29.  Municipal  corporation  by  implication  in  England. — The  mu- 
nicipal corporation  by  implication,  as  it  is  styled,  does  not  constitute 
a  class  of  municipal  corporations  distinct  by  origin  from  the  corpora- 
tions discussed  in  the  preceding  sections.  Where  the  royal  charter 
or  act  of  parliament  plainly  intends  to  constitute  a  corporate  munici- 
pal body,  yet  fails  expressly  to  confer  on  that  body  any  attribute  or 
power  essential  to  corporate  existence,  the  law  "ut  res  magis  valeat 
quam  pereat"  implies  from  the  intention  of  the  charter  or  act  such 
attribute  or  power ;  and  the  body  so  created  is  considered  to  be 
validly  incorporated.  Such  a  municipal  corporation  is  called  a  mu- 
nicipal corporation  by  implication.^^  There  are  many  instances  of 
these  corporations  by  implication  in  the  early  English  cases.     Thus  a 

^  See  post,  §§  37,  38,  39,  40.  2     Bro.     &     G.     292;     Conservators 

=^Co.  Litt.  250a.  &c.  v.  Ash,  10  B.  &  C.  349;  1  Dillon 

^Kyd  Corp.  63;    Grant  Corp.  43;  Munlc.  Corp.,  §  42,  from  whose  text 

Case   of    Sutton's   Hospital,    10   Co.  the  instances  given  in  this  section 

1,  27a;  Borough  of  Yarmouth  Case,  are  taken. 


39  OF  THE  CKEATIOX  OF  THE  CORFORATION.         §  30 

grant  of  incorporation  to  the  burgesses  of  Yarmouth  was  held  by 
Lord  Coke  to  be  good  although  it  failed  expressly  to  confer  incorpora- 
tion upon  their  successors  ;'*'  and  a  royal  grant  to  the  men  of  a  district 
authorizing  them  to  elect  a  mayor,  and  to  plead  and  be  impleaded 
by  the  name  of  the  mayor  and  commonalty,  was  considered  sufficient 
to  incorporate  them.^^  A  grant  of  land  by  the  king  to  the  inhabit- 
ants of  B,  their  heirs  and  successors,  rendering  rent,  was  held  to  con- 
stitute them  a  corporation.-^  Also  a  grant  by  the  crown  to  the  men 
of  a  certain  locality  that  they  be  discharged  of  tolls  was  thought  to 
incorporate  them  for  that  purpose  at  least. ^^ 

§  30.    The  Municipal  Corporations  Reform  Act  of  1835. — In  the 

reign  of  William  IV  the  question  of  reforming  the  municipalities  of 
the  realm  was  agitated  in  the  house  of  commons.  An  investigating 
committee,  composed  of  barristers,  was  finally  appointed,  and  they 
made  a  thorough  tour  of  the  kingdom.  They  separated  into  several 
subdivisions,  and  facilitated  their  labor  by  all  the  expedients  known  to 
the  English  parliamentary  investigating  committees.  The  state  of 
facts  disclosed  was  startling.  It  was,  among  many  other  things, 
discovered  that  in  nearly  all  the  municipalities  the  governing  bodies 
were  self-constituted  and  self-electing,  and  that  these  governing 
bodies  appointed  the  municipal  officers  from  their  own  clique  or  ring, 
thus  giving  unbounded  opportunity  for  corruption  and  oppression. 
The  committee  reported  that  no  uniform  judicial  system  existed ;  that 
there  was  no  equable  and  uniform  fiscal  policy  pursued ;  that  the  mag- 
istrates were  not  often  qualified  by  education  or  birth  for  the  offices 
they  held;  the  juries  were  improperly  and  partially  impaneled;  the 
corporations  denied  accountability;  that  responsibility  could  not  be 
fastened  anywhere;  and  that  the  constabulary  was  ill-organized,  and 
the  usual  duties  of  a  municipality  wholly  neglected.  In  short,  the 
absence  of  system,  the  nonexistence  of  definitely  prescribed  regula- 
tions of  law,  was  manifest  everywhere  throughout  the  two  hundred 
and  forty-six  municipalities  which  the  report  of  the  commissioners 
showed  to  exist.  The  commission  pointed  out  that  the  corporations 
existed  independently  of  the  communities  in  which  they  had  been 
established,  and  that  there  was  no  identity  of  interest  between  them, 
and  that  in  some  cases  the  franchises  of  corporation  had  been  bestowed 
not  on  selected  individuals  of  the  community,  but  sometimes  on  non- 
resident freemen.     Altogether  it  was  found  that  among  the  inhabit- 

=*  Borough    of   Yarmouth    Case,    2         "*  2  Jac.  Law,  tit.  Corporation,  p. 
Bro.  &  G.  292.  94. 

^^21  Edw.  IV,  56.  ='Vin.  Abr.,  Corp.  F.,  p.  6;  Bagott's 

Case,  7  Edw.  IV,  29. 


§    31  PUBLIC    COUrORATIONS.  40 

ants  of  the  English  municipalities  generally  dissatisfaction  existed 
with  their  form  of  local  government.  The  report  closed  by  stating 
that  the  commissioners  felt  it  to  be  their  duty  to  represent  to  his 
majesty  that  the  municipal  corporations  of  England  and  Wales  neither 
possessed  nor  deserved  the  confidence  and  respect  of  his  majesty's  sub- 
jects; and  they  suggested  that  a  thorough  reform  be  effected,  in  order 
that  they  might  become  useful  and  efficient  instruments  of  local  gov- 
ernment.^°  In  consequence  of  this  report,  an  act  was  passed  the  same 
year,  1835,^^  which  in  its  main  provisions  still  obtains,  and  is  at  the 
basis  of  the  municipal  system  both  of  England  and  the  United  States. 
It  provided  that  the  governing  bodies  and  existing  magistrates  of 
every  corporation  should  be  removed  that  year;  that  town  councils 
were  to  be  elected  triennially  by  the  burgesses;  that  any  one  was 
eligible  to  be  a  burgess  who  had  been  rated  three  years  to  support  the 
poor.  It  enumerated  in  schedules  all  the  existing  municipalities,  and 
provided  for  their  reincorporation  under  the  name  of  the  mayor, 
aldermen  and  burgesses — or  citizens,  as  the  case  might  be — of  so- 
and-so,  and  that  by  such  name  it  should  "have  perpetual  succession, 
and  shall  be  capable  in  law,  by  the  council  hereinafter  mentioned  of 
such  borough,  to  do  and  sutfer  all  acts  which  now  lawfully  they  and 
their  successors  respectively  may  do  and  suffer  by  any  name  or  title 
of  incorporation."  The  act  further  settled  the  metes  and  bounds  of 
the  reorganized  municipalities,  provided  for  courts  therein,  settled 
the  qualifications  and  mode  of  election  of  the  city  or  borough  officers, 
and  organized  a  constabulary.  It  authorized  the  councils  to  make 
by-laws,  provided  for  the  municipal  funds,  abolished  chartered  ad- 
miralty jurisdiction,  laid  down  various  rules  of  procedure,  and  finally 
authorized  the  crown  to  grant  charters  of  incorporation  "upon  peti- 
tion" of  the  inhabitant  householders  in  any  municipality  alluded  to 
in  the  act.^^ 

§  31.  The  Municipal  Corporations  Act  of  1882. — The  preamble  to 
this  act  states  clearly  the  reasons  actuating  parliament  in  its  passage. 
"Whereas  divers  bodies  corporate  at  sundry  times  have  been  consti- 
tuted in  the  cities,  towns  and  boroughs  of  England  and  Wales  to  the 
intent  that  the  same  might  forever  be  and  remain  well  and  quietly 
governed:    And  whereas,  the  act  of  the  session  of  the  fifth  and  sixth 

^"Municipal  Corporations  Rep.  49.  in  1836  and  1837,  and  are  known  as 

See  also,  Reform  of  Municipal  Cor-  The  Municipal  Boundaries  Act;  The 

porations,    by    J.    A.    Roebuck,    30  Municipal  Funds  Act;   The  Munici- 

Westm.  Rev.  48.  pal  Jurisprudence  Act;  The  Record- 

^'  5  and  6  Will.  IV,  ch.  76.  ers'  Courts  Act;  The  Municipal  Elec- 

^'  The  principal  municipal  corpo-  tions  Act;  The  Municipal  Rates  Act. 
ration  amendment  acts  were  passed 


41  OF    THE    CREATION    OF    THE    CORPORATION.  §    31 

years  of  the  reign  of  King  William  the  Fourth,  chapter  seventy-six, 
*to  provide  for  the  regulation  of  municipal  corporations  in  England 
and  Wales,'  applies  to  most  of  those  hodies  constituted  before  the 
passing  of  that  act,  and  to  every  of  the  bodies  constituted  after  the 
passing  of  that  act;  and  that  act  having  been  from  time  to  time 
much  altered  and  added  to  by  other  acts,  it  is  expedient  that  all  the 
acts  aforesaid  be  reduced  into  one  act  with  some  amendments:  Be 
it  therefore  enacted,"  etc.^^  The  act  is  chiefly  a  consolidation  statute, 
the  alterations  being  generally  merely  for  the  purpose  of  accommo- 
dating its  meaning  to  that  of  the  previous  statutes  as  defined  by  sub- 
sequent decisions.^*  The  previous  legislation  affecting  municipal 
corporations  was  expressly  repealed  with  some  qualifications  and 
exceptions  by  the  act.^^  Under  the  provisions  of  the  act  no  one  can  be 
enrolled  as  a  burgess  or  citizen  unless  he  is  of  full  age ;  has  for  twelve 
months  occupied  a  house,  warehouse,  country  house,  shop  or  other 
building  in  the  borough;  has  during  the  whole  of  those  twelve 
months  resided  in  the  borough  or  within  seven  miles  thereof;  has 
been  rated  for  and  paid  all  poor-rates  in  respect  to  the  property  so 
occupied  for  those  twelve  months;  is  not  an  alien;  has  not  received 
for  twelve  months  any  union  or  parochial  relief  or  other  alms;  or  is 
not  disentitled  under  the  act  of  parliament.^*^  The  council  of  the 
borough  is  composed  of  the  mayor,  aldermen  and  councilors  of  the 

^^  Municipal    Corporations    Act    of  bilities  of  the  universities  of  Oxford 

1882,  45  and  46  Vict.,  ch.  50.  and  Cambridge;  or  the  ecclesiastical 

^  Rawlinson    Municipal    Corpora-  jurisdiction     over     cathedral     pre- 

tion  Acts  (.ISlu  ed.  by  Thomas  Geary,  cincts;    or  shall  prejudicially  affect 

1884)  1.  her  majesty's  prerogative;   or  shall 

^  See,  for  list  of  repealed  enact-  affect  anything  done  or  suffered  be- 

ments,  Rawlinson  Municipal  Corpo-  fore  the  commencement  of  this  act 

ration    Acts    (8th    ed.    by    Thomas  under   any   enactment   repealed    by 

Geary,    1884)     342-346.     It    is    pro-  this  act,  or  pending  at  its  commence- 

vided  in  the  saving  clauses  of  the  ment;    or  any   established   jurisdic- 

act  that  nothing  therein   contained  tion   or   practice;    or   the   terms   on 

shall  prejudicially  affect  any  charter  which  money  has  been  borrowed  be- 

granted    before   the   commencement  fore  the  commencement  of  this  act 

of  the  act;   or  alter  the  boundaries  under   any   enactment   repealed    by 

of  any  borough  or  the  number,  ap-  this  act,  together  with  other  savings 

portionment  or  qualification  of  the  and  exceptions  less  important.    And 

aldermen    or   councilors   thereof   or  it  is  further  provided  that  the  re- 

the  division  thereof  into  wards;   or  peal  effected  by  this  act  shall  not  ex- 

the  respective  jurisdiction  of  county  tend   to   Scotland    or   Ireland:     Mu- 

and  borough  justices;    or  the  effect  nicipal  Corporations  Act  of  1882,  45 

of  any  local  act  of  parliament;    or  and  46  Vict.,  ch.  50,  §§  250-260. 

the  effect  of  the  Prison  Acts;  or  the  ^Municipal   Corporations   Act  of 

rights,    knowledge,    duties    and    lia-  1882,  45  and  46  Vict.,  ch.  50,  §  9. 


§    32  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  42 

boroiigh.^^  The  aldermen  are  elected  by  the  council  out  of  the  number 
of  the  .councilors  or  persons  qualified  to  be  councilors;  and  if  a  coun- 
cilor is  elected  to  and  accepts  the  office  of  alderman  he  thereby  va- 
cates his  office  of  councilor.^®  The  councilors  are  elected  by  the 
burgesses.  There  are  numerous  qualifications  necessary  in  order  to 
be  chosen  councilor,  chief  of  which  is  the  requirement  that  a  person 
must  be  enrolled  or  qualified  to  be  enrolled  as  a  burgess,  and  must  be 
seized  or  possessor  of  property  in  the  borough  of  one  thousand  pounds 
if  the  borough  has  four  or  more  wards ;  and  if  the  borough  has  a 
less  number  of  wards,  of  five  hundred  pounds. ^^  No  one  holding  any 
oi^ce  or  place  of  profit  in  the  gift  of  the  council,  except  the  office  of 
mayor  or  sheriff,  can  be  elected  councilor;  nor  can  a  minister  of  the 
church  of  England  or  of  a  dissenting  congregation  be  elected.**'  The 
mayor  is  elected  by  the  council  from  among  ten  aldermen  or  coun- 
cilors or  persons  qualified  to  be  such.*^  It  is  of  course  impossible 
within  the  scope  of  this  work  to  give  any  detailed  outline  of  the 
general  provisions  of  the  act.  The  essential  distinction  between  the 
system  of  municipal  government  established  by  the  act  in  England, 
and  the  system  most  general  in  this  country,  is  that  in  the  English 
municipalities  the  entire  government  is  practically  confided  to  the 
council,  generally  consisting  of  from  twelve  to  sixty-four  members, 
of  whom  the  mayor  is  one ;  while  in  our  system  the  powers  of  govern- 
ment are  generally  divided  between  the  mayor  and  the  common 
council  or  board  of  aldermen.  Both,  systems  have  their  advantages; 
but  on  the  whole  the  English  plan  is  simpler,  and  affords  less  oppor- 
tunities for  evasion  or  shifting  of  responsibilities.*^ 

§  32.  The  American  town — Local  self-government. — As  this  coun- 
try was  founded  l^y  Englishmen  and  its  government  established  on 
the  lines  of  the  common  law  of  England  so  modified  as  to  meet  the 
requirements  of  a  republic,  our  municipal  corporations  were  estab- 
lished in  accordance  with  the  English  principles  of  liberty.  They 
generally  possess,  however,  powers  of  local  self-government  far  greater 
than  those  of  the  English  towns.  Thus  in  Pennsylvania  it  is  provided 
by  the  constitution  of  that  state  that  the  general  assembl}^  shall  not 

"  Municipal  Corporations  Act  of  "  Municipal  Corporations  Act  of 
1882,  45  and  46  Vict.,  ch.  .50,  §  10,     1882,  45  and  46  Vict,  ch.  50,  §  15. 

subdiv.  2.  "  See   Dillon   Munic.   Corp.,    §    36, 

^  Municipal    Corporations    Act  of     citing   an   excellent   article   by   Mr. 

1882,  45  and  46  Vict,  ch.  50,  §  14.  Shaw  on  Existing  Municipal  Govern- 

^^  Municipal    Corporations    Act  of     ment    in     Great    Britain,     Political 

1882,  45  and  46  Vict,  ch.  50,  §  11.  Science  Quarterly,  vol.  4,  p.  97. 

■'°  Municipal    Corporations   Act  of 
1882,  45  and  46  Vict,  ch.  50,  §  12. 


43  OF  THE  CREATION'  OP  THE  COErORATION.  §  32 

pass  any  local  or  special  law  regulating  the  affairs  of  counties,  cities, 
townships  or  like  bodies.'''''  Thus  it  has  been  said  by  an  eminent 
writer:  "In  contradistinction  to  those  governments  where  power  is 
concentrated  in  one  man  or  in  one  or  more  bodies  of  men  whose 
supervision  and  active  control  extends  to  all  the  objects  of  government 
within  the  territorial  limits  of  the  state,  the  American  system  is  one 
of  complete  decentralization,  the  primary  and  vital  idea  of  which  is 
that  local  affairs  shall  be  managed  by  local  authorities  and  general 
affairs  only  by  the  central  authorities."'**  These  municipal  corpora- 
tions are  peculiarly  the  sul)ject  of  state  as  distinguished  from  federal 
control.  They  are  the  creatures  of  the  state  legislatures,  and  must 
remain  subject  to  the  wise  control  of  their  creators  within  constitu- 
tional limitations.  It  was  said  by  an  eminent  New  York  justice: 
"When  the  present  constitution  was  formed,  the  entire  territory  of 
the  state  was  separated  and  appropriated  by  its  civil  divisions,  its 
counties,  cities  and  towns.  These  civil  divisions  are  coeval  with  the 
government.  The  state  has  never  existed  a  moment  without  them. 
All  our  thoughts  and  notions  of  civil  government  are  inseparably 
associated  with  counties,  cities  and  towns.  They  are  permanent 
elements  in  the  frame  of  government;  they  are  institutions  of 
the  state,  durable  and  indestructible  by  any  power  less  than  that 
which  gave  being  to  the  organic  law.  They  are,  however,  subject  to 
control  and  regulation  by  the  legislature.  It  may  enlarge  or  circum- 
scribe their  territorial  limits,  increase  or  diminish  their  members, 
separate  them  into  parts  and  annex  some  of  the  parts  to  others; 
but  they  must  still  assume  the  form  and  be  known  and  governed 
only  as  counties,  cities  or  towns.     The  state  at  large  is  and  ever  has 

"  City  of  Reading  v.  Savage,  120  are  entitled  to  the  benefits  of  local 

Pa.  St.  198;    s.  c.  13  Atl.  919;    Mc-  self-government."     Caldwell   v.   Jus- 

Carthy   v.   Commonwealth,    110   Pa,  tices,  4  Jones  Eq.   (N.  C.)    323.     In 

St.  243;  s.  c.  2  Atl.  423.  the     last     cited      case     Ruffin,      J. 

"  Cooley  Const.  Lim.  223;    People  (whom   Judge   Dillon  calls  "one  of 

v.    Common    Council    &c.,    28    Mich,  the  ablest  of  American  common-law 

228;    s.   c.    15    Am.   R.    204.     In    the  judges"),  exhaustively  discusses  the 

famous  Detroit  Park  Case  just  cited,  inherent  and  hereditary  right  of  lo- 

it  was  held  that  the  legislature  could  cal  self-government.     See  also,  Gro 

not  compel  a  city  to  issue  bonds  for  gan  v.  San  Francisco,  18  Cal.  590; 

the    purchase    of    land    for    a   park  People  v.  Batchellor,  53  N.  Y.  128; 

against  the  will  of  the  city  council.  People  v.  Mayor  &c.,  51  111.  17;  s.  c. 

In  his  opinion  Judge  Cooley  says: —  2  Am.  R.  278;    Barnes  v.  Lacon,  84 

"It   is   a   fundamental    principle    in  111.  461;  Cairo  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Sparta, 

this   state,   recognized   and   perpetu-  77    111.    505.     This    subject    will    be 

ated  by  express  provision  of  the  con-  more  fully  treated  post,  in  discuss- 

stitution,  that  the  people  of  every  ing  legislative  control  of  municipal 

hamlet,  town  and  city  of  the  state  corporations. 


§    33  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  44 

been  an  aggregate  of  these  local  bodies."*^  In  addition  to  the  usual 
municipal  corporations,  such  as  cities,  towns  and  villages,  it  has  been 
the  policy  of  American  legislation  to  incorporate,  at  least  for  some 
purposes,  many  minor  subdivisions  of  the  state,  such  as  townships, 
school  districts,  road  districts  and  similar  bodies,  thus  organizing 
to  the  highest  degree  the  state  government  and  affording  the  greatest 
liberty  of  action  to  even  the  unimportant  branches  of  state  admin- 
istration.'*'^ 

§  33.  The  power  to  create  municipal  corporations  in  the  United 
States — Where  vested — (a)  In  the  state. — Public  as  well  as  private 
corporations  must  in  this  country,  as  a  rule,  with  but  irregular  and 
unimportant  exceptions,  derive  their  right  to  corporate  existence 
from  the  force  of  legislative  authority.  This  authority  is  exercised 
by  the  state,  upon  which  descended  this  power  along  with  the  other 
prerogatives  vested  in  the  crown,  upon  the  emancipation  from  British 
dominion.  It  had  been,  as  we  have  seen,  the  peculiar  prerogative  of 
the  crown  to  grant  charters  to  municipalities;  and,  although  parlia- 
ment has  usurped  this  prerogative  along  with  the  other  royal  powers, 
the  acts  of  parliament  conferring  charters  upon  these  bodies  to  this 
day  direct  that  it  shall  be  lawful  for  the  crown,  under  the  circum- 
stances contemplated  by  the  statute,  to  grant  a  charter  to  the  inhabit- 
ant householders  of  any  district  in  England.*'^  As  the  states  upon 
our  separation  from  Great  Britain  became  sovereign,  and  succeeded 
to  the  powers  and  prerogatives  of  the  crown,  it  became  the  peculiar 
prerogative  of  the  law-giving  power  of  the  state  to  confer  the  gift 
of  corporate  existence  upon  public  as  well  as  private  corporations. 
Consequently  the  several  sovereign  states  have  power  to  grant  charters 
to  municipal  and  other  public  corporations,  subject  only  to  the  prohi- 
bitions and  limitations  imposed  by  the  charters  of  the  respective 
states;**  and  subject  also  to  the  limitation  that  this  power  must  be 
exercised  in  a  manner  consistent  with  the  powers  delegated  by  the 
states  to  the  federal  government.  These  principles  are  established 
beyond  all  question.*^     And  this  sovereign  power  of  the  states  has 

■''*  People  v.  Draper,  15  N.  Y.  561,  towns    preceded    the    state    govern- 

per  Brown,  J.;   People  v.  Albertson,  ment:     See  Arnold's  History,  ch.  7. 

55  N.  Y.  50;   People  v.  Hurlbut,  24  "Municipal    Corporations   Act   of 

Mich.  44;   s.  c.  9  Am.  R.  103.  1882,  §  210. 

^"Cooley    Const.    Lim.    223,    note.  « See  post,  §§  44,  45,  46. 

As  an  instance  of  a  body  possessing  ^'1  Beach  Priv.  Corp.,  §  2;  People 

unusually  pure  and  immediate  form  v.  City  of  Riverside,  70  Cal.  461;   s. 

of  self-government  the  New  England  c.  11  Pac.  759;  Hope  v.  Deaderick,  8 

town   is   remarkable.     It  is   curious  Humph.   (Tenn.)   1;   s.  c.  47  Am.  D. 

to   note   that   in   Rhode   Island   the  597;    New  Boston  v.  Dunbarton,  12 


45 


OF   TTTE    CREATION    OF    THE    CORPORATION. 


§  34 


been  so  f;ir  recognized  that  the  courts  have  held  that  it  Avas  not  with- 
drawn even  though  the  state  exercising  it  had  at  the  time  of  such 
exercise  seceded  from  the  Union  and  was  engaged  in  war  with  the 
United  States.^" 

§  34.  (b)  In  the  federal  government. — To  define  the  power  of  the 
federal  government  to  create  public  corporations  it  is  necessary  to 
consider  the  general  powers  possessed  by  that  government,  as  no  ex- 
press authority  to  create  corporations  is  granted  by  the  states  to  that 
government  in  the  constitution. "'^  There  being,  then,  no  express  dele- 
gation of  power  in  the  constitution  to  create  corporations,  there  can  be 
no  implied  power  to  do  so,  except  as  a  means  or  instrument  by  which  to 
accomplish  the  objects  for  which  the  federal  government  was  cre- 
ated.^ ^  The  federal  government,  therefore,  has  no  power  to  create 
public  or  private  corporations  except  where  such  a  power  is  necessary 
in  order  to  carry  out  some  power  expressly  delegated  in  the  constitu- 
tion to  that  government. ^^    The  federal  government  has,  consequently, 


N.  H.  409.  And  for  cases  affirming, 
in  regard  to  private  as  well  as  pub- 
lic corporations,  this  fundamental 
principle,  see  Franklin  Bridge  Co. 
V.  Wood,  14  Ga.  80;  Bell  v.  Nash- 
ville Bank,  Peck  (Tenn.)  269;  Fal- 
coner V.  Campbell,  2  McLean  195; 
Thomas  v.  Dakin,  22  Wend.  (N.  Y.) 
9;  Warner  v.  Beers,  23  Wend.  (N. 
Y.)  103;  Nelson  v.  McArthur,  38 
Mich.  204;  State  v.  Covington,  29 
Ohio  St.  102;  Cotton  v.  Mississippi 
&c.  Co.,  22  Minn.  372;  Angell  & 
Ames  Corp.  (11th  ed.),  §  71. 

'^"  United  States  v.  Insurance  Co., 
22  Wall.  99.  But  it  has  been  con- 
sidered inexpedient  to  recognize  the 
existence  of  a  corporation  so  created 
by  the  state,  in  aid  of  such  a  war: 
1  Beach  Priv.  Corp.,  §  2;  Trustees 
&c.  v.  Satchwell,  71  N.  C.  Ill;  Chi- 
cora  V.  Crews,  6  S.  C.  (N.  S.)  243. 

'^  1  Beach  Priv.  Corp.,  §  3,  where 
it  is  said:  "In  the  convention  of 
states  which  framed  the  constitution 
an  effort  was  made  to  invest  the 
congress  with  power  to  grant  acts 
of  incorporation,  but  after  three 
days  of  debate  the  proposition  was 
voted  down,  eight  out  of  the  eleven 


states  represented  voting  in  the  neg- 
ative;" citing  Madison  Papers,  Sep- 
tember 14,  1787,  and  citing  also  "Ar- 
guments by  Simon  Sterne  in  Oppo- 
sition to  the  Signature  by  the  Presi- 
dent of  the  United  States  of  Senate 
Bill  No.  1305  (50th  Congress,  2d  Ses- 
sion), to  Incorporate  the  Maritime 
Canal  Company  of  Nicaragua  (Gib- 
son Brothers,  Washington,  1889)";  4 
Jefferson  Memoirs,  Correspondence, 
etc.,  523,  526  (Charlottesville,  Va., 
1829).  One  of  the  reasons  of  the 
rejection  urged  in  debate  was  that 
congress  would  then  have  power  to 
create  a  bank,  which  would  render 
the  great  cities,  where  there  were 
prejudices  and  jealousies  on  that 
subject,  averse  to  the  adoption  of 
the  constitution. 

"  1  Beach  Priv.  Corp.,  §  3,  citing 
McCulloch  V.  Maryland,  4  Wheat. 
316. 

^^  Beach  Priv.  Corp.  §§  3-6;  U.  S. 
Const,  Amend.  10;  McCulloch  v. 
Maryland,  4  Wheat.  316;  Thomson 
v.  Pacific  R.  Co.,  9  Wall.  579;  Cali- 
fornia V.  Railroad  Co.,  127  U.  S.  1, 
39;  s.  c.  8  S.  Ct.  1073;  Chisholm  v. 
Georgia,  2  Dall.  419;   HoUingsworth 


§    35  PUBLIC    COKPORATIOXS.  4G 

under  the  power  to  govern  the  public  domain,  the  incidental  and  aux- 
iliary power  to  create  municipal  corporations  in  the  territories  and 
in  the  District  of  Columbia,  a  district  ceded  by  Virginia  and  Mary- 
land to  the  United  States  as  a  seat  of  government.^*  To  recapitulate, 
the  power  of  the  state  to  create  public  corporations  is  incidental  to  its 
sovereignty,  and  may  be  exercised  for  any  lawful  purpose  not  repug- 
nant to  its  constitution  or  to  the  voluntary  limitations  imposed  upon 
itself  by  its  ratification  of  the  federal  compact;  while  the  power  of 
the  federal  government  to  create  public  corporations  is  an  implied 
power,  and  exists  only  in  so  far  as  it  is  necessary  for  the  federal  gov- 
ernment to  create  such  corporations  in  order  to  carry  out  powers 
expressly  delegated  to  that  government  by  the  states  in  the  constitu- 
tion. 

§  35.  Municipal  corporations  created  by  the  federal  government — 
(a)  Territories. — By  virtue  of  this  implied  power  of  the  federal 
government  to  create  corporations  where  it  is  necessary  to  erect  such 
bodies  in  order  to  exercise  a  power  expressly  delegated  in  the  consti- 
tution to  that  government,  the  congress  of  the  United  States  has  power 
to  provide  for  the  creation  of  municipal  and  other  public  corporations 
in  the  territories,  as  incidental;  and  it  has  been  provided  by  act  of 

V.  Virginia,  3  Dall.  378;  Osborn  v.  an  extension  of  this  implied  power 
President  &c.,  9  Wheat.  738;  Story  is  found  in  the  charter  granted  by 
on  Constitution,  §  1266.  See,  on  the  fiftieth  congress  in  its  second 
this  topic,  "National  Corporations,"  session  to  the  Maritime  Canal  Com- 
21  Cent.  Law  J.  428;  Hare  Amer.  pany  of  Nicaragua,  a  company  or- 
Const.  Law  (Boston,  1889)  98,  105,  ganized  for  the  purpose  of  con- 
Ill,  249,  1310.  For  statutes  exer-  structing,  equipping  and  operating 
cising  this  power,  see  19  U.  S.  Stat,  a  ship  canal  from  the  Atlantic  to 
at  Large  38;  12  U.  S.  Stat,  at  Large  the  Pacific  ocean  through  the  terri- 
665;  3  U.  S.  Stat,  at  Large  266.  tory  of  Nicaragua  or  Nicaragua  and 
^^Vincennes  University  v.  Indi-  Costa  Rica.  To  the  mind  of  the 
ana,  14  How.  268;  Barnes  v.  District  writer  that  extension  is  unwarrant- 
of  Columbia,  91  U.  S.  540;  Stouten-  able,  as  the  charter  in  question  can 
burgh  v.  Hennick,  129  U.  S.  141;  s.  c.  not  be  considered  as  necessary  to 
9  S.  Ct.  256.  This  power  of  the  con-  the  exercise  of  any  power  expressly 
gress  to  create  municipal  corpora-  delegated  to  the  federal  government 
tions  stands  upon  the  same  basis  and  in  the  constitution:  1  Beach  Priv. 
is  governed  by  the  same  principles  Corp.,  §  6;  "Argument  by  Simon 
as  its  power  to  create  a  national  Sterne  in  Opposition  to  the  Sigaa- 
bank:  McCulloch  v.  Maryland,  4  ture  by  the  President  of  the  United 
Wheat.  316;  Osborn  v.  President  &c.,  States  of  Senate  Bill  No.  1305  (50th 
9  Wheat.  738;  or  its  power  to  au-  Congress,  2d  Session),  to  Incorpo- 
thorize  the  construction  of  railroads  rate  the  Maritime  Canal  Company  of 
through  the  territories:  California  Nicaragua  (Gibson  Brothers,  Wash- 
v.  Railroad  Co.,  127  U.  S.  1,  39;  s.  c.  ington,  1889)." 
8  S.  Ct.  1073.     A  curious  instance  of 


47  OF  THE  CREATION  OF  THE  CORPORATION,         §  36 

congress  that  the  legislative  assemblies  of  the  several  territories  shall 
not  grant  private  charters  or  especial  privileges,  but  may  by  general 
incorporation  acts  permit  persons  to  associate  themselves  together 
as  bodies  corporate  for  mining,  manufacturing  and  other  industrial 
pursuits.^^  And  this  act  has  been  held  to  prohibit  territorial  legisla- 
tures from  incorporating  municipal  corporations  by  special  act^*^ 
auxiliary  to  the  express  power  possessed  by  the  federal  government 
to  govern  the  public  domain.^^  This  power  possessed  by  the  federal 
government  is  delegated  to  the  territorial  legislature,  generally  by  a 
provision  in  the  act  creating  the  territory  that  the  power  of  the  terri- 
torial legislature  shall  extend  to  all  rightful  subjects  of  legislation. 
The  general  clause  embraces  the  power  to  create  municipal  and  other 
corporations.^^ 

§  36.  (b)  The  District  of  Columbia. — The  District  of  Columbia 
was  organized  under  the  act  of  congress  of  February  21,  1871.^^  Under 
this  act  it  was  authorized  to  "exercise  all  other  powers  of  a  municipal 
corporation  not  inconsistent  with  the  laws  and  constitution  of  the 
United  States  and  the  provisions  of  this  act," — with  the  usual  powers 
to  sue,  be  sued,  contract,  have  a  seal,  etc.  It  is  declared  to  be,  in  the 
first  section  of  the  act,  a  body  corporate  for  municipal  purposes.  The 
United  States  supreme  court,  having  occasion  to  consider  the  powers 

'^R.  S.  U.  S.,  §§  1889,  1890.  98  U.  S.  145;  National  Bank  v.  Yank- 
^"City  of  Seattle  v.  Yesler,  1  ton,  101  U.  S.  129;  Murphy  v.  Ram- 
Wash.  Ter.  (N.  S.)  571.  sey,  114  U.  S.  15;  s.  c.  5  S.  Ct.  747. 
"  Vincennes  University  v.  Indiana,  In  the  last  named  case  it  was  de- 
14  How.  268;  People  v.  City  of  Butte,  cided  that  congress  had  power  to  ex- 
4  Mont.  174;  s.  c.  1  Pac.  414;  Burnes  elude  polygamists  from  voting. 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  2  Kan.  454;  President  ^'*  Vincennes  University  v.  Indiana, 
&c.  V.  Iowa,  12  How.  1;  Story  on  14  How.  268;  Burns  v.  Mayor  &c.,  2 
Const.,  §  1266;  "National  Corpora-  Kan.  454;  Deitz  v.  City  of  Central,  1 
tions,"  21  Cent.  Law  J.  428;  Beach  Colo.  323.  This  power  also  neces- 
Priv.  Corp.,  §  3,  ad  finem;  Cooley  sarily  carries  with  it  the  right  to 
Const.  Lim.  37.  The  legislation  of  make  by-laws  and  ordinances  to 
the  territorial  legislatures  must  not,  control  the  members  of  the  munici- 
of  course,  be  at  variance  with  the  pal  corporation:  State  v.  Young,  3 
territorial  organic  act,  conferring  Kan.  445.  In  Riddick  v.  Amelin,  1 
the  power  to  legislate;  but  such  a  Mo.  5,  the  question  was  raised 
variance  will  be  presumed  to  be  ap-  whether  a  territorial  legislature,  not 
proved  by  congress  if  disregarded  being  sovereign,  could  create  a  cor- 
for  a  number  of  years  after  the  at-  poration.  It  was  held  that  the  con- 
tention of  congress  has  been  called  gross  had  the  power  to  create  corpo- 
to  the  conflict  of  legislation:  Clin-  rations  under  the  limitations  set 
ton  V.  Bnglebrecht,  13  Wall.  434.  forth,  and  could  lawfully  delegate 
For  cases  showing  the  complete  con-  that  power, 
trol  of  the  congress  over  the  terri-  ^^  16  U.  S.  Stat.  419. 
tories,  see  Reynolds  v.  United  States, 


§    37  PUBLIC    CORrORATIONS.  48 

of  the  district  po  con sti tilted,  and  the  powers  of  certain  of  its  depart- 
ments, nses  the  following  language,  expressing  clearly  some  of  the 
relations  of  municipalities :  "A  municipal  corporation  in  the  exercise 
of  all  of  its  duties,  including  those  most  strictly  local  or  internal,  is 
but  a  department  of  the  state.  The  legislature  may  give  it  all  the 
powers  such  a  being  is  capable  of  receiving,  making  it  an  immature 
state  within  its  locality.  Again,  it  may  strip  it  of  every  power,  leaving 
it  a  corporation  in  name  only;  and  it  may  create  and  recreate  these 
changes  as  often  as  it  chooses,  or  it  may  itself  exercise  directly  within 
the  locality  any  or  all  the  powers  usually  committed  to  a  municipality. 
We  do  not  regard  its  acts  as  sometimes  those  of  an  agency  of  the  state, 
and  at  others  those  of  a  municipality,  but  that,  its  character  and  na- 
ture remaining  at  all  times  the  same,  it  is  great  or  small  according 
as  the  legislature  shall  extend  or  contract  the  sphere  of  its  action."®* 

§  37.    Municipal  corporations  by  prescription  in  the  United  States. 

— The  general  rule  being  that  corporations  must  in  this  country 
derive  their  origin  from  express  legislative  enactment,  municipal  cor- 
porations by  prescription  are  in  the  United  States  the  rare  exception ; 
but  such  municipal  corporations  concededly  exist.  Thus,  in  New 
York,  the  existence  of  a  public  quasi-corporation,  such  as  a  school 
district,  has  been  proved  by  prescription.®^  And  in  Massachusetts 
and  other  New  England  states,  it  has  been  decided  that  where  no  char- 
ter or  act  of  incorporation  of  a  town  can  be  found,  it  may  be  proved 
to  be  a  town  by  reputation,  or  it  may  be  shown  to  have  claimed  and 
exercised  the  powers  of  a  town,  with  the  knowledge  and  assent  of  the 
legislature,  and  without  objection  or  interruption,  for  so  long  a 
period  as  to  furnish  evidence  of  a  prescriptive  right.®^  In  Illinois 
the  same  doctrine  has  been  approved,  the  opinion  of  the  court  stating 

^  Barnes  v.  District  of  Columbia,        '^  Inhabitants   &c.    v.    Inhabitants 

91  U.  S.  540;   Stoutenburgh  v.  Hen-  &c., '  12    Mass.    400;    Dillingham    v. 

nick,  129  U.  S.  141;  s.  c.  9  S.  Ct.  256.  Snow,  5  Mass.  547;    Bow  v.  Allens- 

"Robie  V.  Trustees  &c.,  35  Barb,  town,  34  N.  H.  351;   Bassett  v.  Por- 

(N.  Y.)  319.     And  it  is  further  held  ter,  4  Cush.   (Mass.)   487;  New  Bos- 

in  this  case  that  prescriptive  proof  ton   v.    Dunbarton,    15    N.    H.    201; 

of  the  existence  of  such  a  corpora-  Trott  v.  Warren,  11  Maine  227;  State 

tion  also  proved  that  the  body  pos-  v.  Bradley,  54  Conn.  74;   s.  c.  5  Atl. 

sessed  all  the  powers  given  by  law  861;  2  New  Eng.  R.  711.     In  a  Mas- 

to  such  corporations.     The  case  is  a  sachusetts  case  the  judge  remarked, 

fair  example,  as  it  was  one  where  in  allowing  public  reputation  to  be 

the   trustees   of  the   school   district  put  in  as  evidence  of  incorporation, 

and    their    predecessors    had    under  that  it  was  well  known  that  the  pub- 

the  same  name  and  title  exercised  lie  records  had  been  in  a  large  part 

their  functions  as  such  trustees  for  destroyed    by    fire:    Dillingham    v. 

forty  years,  without  objection.  Snow,  5  Mass.  547. 


49  OF  THE  CKEATION  OF  THE  CORPORATION.         §  38 

that  municipal  corporations  are  created  for  the  public  good  and  de- 
manded by  the  wants  of  the  community ;  and  the  law,  after  long  con- 
tinued use  of  corporate  powers  with  public  acquiescence,  will  presume 
in  favor  of  their  legal  existence. °^  The  question  as  to  whether  in  any 
given  instance  the  municipality  is  to  be  deemed  incorporated  by  pre- 
scription is  one  of  fact  and  not  of  law,  and  is  to  be  decided  by  the  jury 
and  not  by  the  Judge.*'* 

i<  38.  The  same  subject  continued — Instances  of  incorporation  by 
prescription  in  the  United  States. — In  Indiana,  Gen.  William  Henry 
Harrison  made  a  map  of  an  addition  to  the  city  of  Vincennes  in  which 
he  marked  a  certain  lot  as  "General  Harrison's  Eeserve."  This  lot 
was  assessed  and  taxed  by  the  city  government  for  sixty  years  without 
question  or  opposition.  This  fact  was  considered  sufficient  to  show 
that  the  lot  was  within  the  corporation  limits.*'^  So  in  a  Wisconsin 
case,  proceedings  by  which  a  certain  territory  was  added  to  a  town 
were  considered  regular  after  twenty  years.®®  And  ten  years  has  been 
held  a  sufficient  period  to  perfect  a  defective  incorporation  against 
collateral  attack.®^ 

§  39.  Municipal  corporations  by  implication  in  the  United  States. 
— The  general  principles  governing  the  creation  by  implication  of 
municipal  corporations  have  already  been  considered  in  discussing 

^  Jameson  v.  People,  16  111.  257.  however,  existed  de  facto  and  levied 
See  also,  State  v.  Leatherman,  38  taxes.  Certain  town  lots  were  sold 
Ark.  81,  where  the  original  incorpo-  at  a  tax  sale,  and  a  subsequent  own- 
ration  of  the  municipality  was  in  a  er  of  the  lots  instituted  proceedings 
court  lacking  jurisdiction;  and  it  to  clear  up  the  title.  It  was  held 
was  held  that  the  state  itself  was  that  the  incorporation  of  the  town 
estopped  by  long  acquiescence  in  could  not  be  thus  collaterally  inl- 
and recognition  of  the  incorporation  peached  after  such  a  lapse  of  time, 
as  valid,  from  quo  warranto  proceed-  The  principles  elucidated  in  the  text 
ings  attacking  the  incorporation.  were  applied  to  a  somewhat  differ- 

•"  Cooley    Const.    Lim.    238;    New  ent  state  of  facts  in  a  Kansas  case, 

Boston  V.  Dunbarton,  15  N.  H.  201;  where  a  city  was,  as  a  matter  of 

Bow  v.  Allenstown,   34   N.   H.   351;  fact,    included    in    a    certain    class 

Trott  V.  Warren,  11  Maine  227.  of  cities,   although,   according  to  a 

*"  Am.  &  Eng.  Encyc.  of  Law,  tit.  strict  legal  classification,  the  city  in 

Municipal   Corporations,  vol.   15,  p.  question    belonged    to    a    different 

956;    Pidgeon  v.  McCarthy,  82  Ind.  class.     It  was  held  that  as  the  city 

321.  was  universally  recognized  to  belong 

*°  Sherry  v.  Gilmore,  58  Wis.  324;  to   the   former   class,   it   could   law- 

s.  c.  17  N.  W.  252.  fully  act  as  belonging  to  that  class, 

"  Austrian   v.    Guy,    21    Fed.    500.  although  de  jure  belonging  to  the 

In  that  case  original  incorporation  latter:     Back  v.  Carpenter,  29  Kan. 

of  the  town  was  invalid.     The  town,  349. 
1  Smith — 4 


§    40  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  50 

the  creation  of  English  mnnicipal  corporations.  These  principles 
hold  good,  of  course,  in  the  case  of  American  as  well  as  of  English 
municipalities;  and  they  have  often  been  applied  by  the  courts  of 
this  country.  So,  where  the  legislature  confers  or  imposes  upon  a 
certain  body  of  men  powers  or  liabilities  of  such  a  character  as  to 
render  it  necessary  to  incorporate  such  body  in  order  to  give  effect  to 
the  legislative  intention,  the  body  is  considered  incorporated  to  such 
an  extent  as  to  carry  out  the  design  of  the  legislature.  For  example, 
in  Massachusetts  the  legislature  confers  upon  the  inhabitants  of  the 
different  school  districts  power  to  raise  money  to  erect,  repair  or  pur- 
chase a  school-house,  with  other  incidental  powers  of  legislation.  It 
was  decided  in  the  appellate  courts  of  that  state  that  this  legislative 
act  created  the  inhabitants  of  the  school  district  a  corporation  for  the 
purpose  of  bringing  an  action  on  a  contract  to  build  a  school-house.**® 
And  in  New  Hampshire,  where  a  certain  territory  was  annexed  by 
the  legislature  to  the  town  of  Allentown, — the  words  of  the  act  de- 
scribing Allentown  as  a  municipal  corporation, — such  action  of  the 
legislature  was  considered  sufficient  to  create  Allentown  a  municipal 
corporation  by  implication.*'^  There  are  many  cases  in  the  books 
where  similar  principles  have  been  applied  in  this  country. '^'^ 

§  40.  The  same  subject  continued. — In  a  leading  New  York  case 
Chancellor  Kent  elaborated  the  principles  indicated  in  the  preceding 
section.  The  town  of  Hempstead,  Long  Island,  was  settled  in  1644, 
under  a  patent  from  William  Kieft,  the  governor  at  that  time  of  the 
Butch  province.  By  this  patent  the  tract  of  land  comprised  in  the 
town  was  granted  to  six  persons,  named  therein,  with  their  associates, 
their  heirs  and  successors,  to  build  a  town  *  *  *  ^^^^  ^q  g^ect  a 
body  politic  or  civil  combination  among  themselves,  etc.  The  chan- 
cellor says :  "I  should  conclude  that  such  a  grant  as  this,  proceeding 
from  the  English  government,  would  have  given  a  qualified  corporate 
capacity  to  the  inhabitants  of  Hempstead,"  and  he  then  shows  that 
this  is  true  a  fortiori  of  a  Dutch  grant,  since  under  the  common  law 
of  the  Dutch,  corporations  were  created  with  "less  ceremony  and  diffi- 
culty even  than  with  us."''^    The  implication  is  in  every  case  that  the 

«' Inhabitants    &c.    v.     Wood,     13  nings,  10  Pick.  (Mass.)  172;  Mahony 

Mass.    193;    1    Dillon    Mimic.    Corp.,  v.  Bank,  4  Ark.  620;  Trustees  &c.  v. 

§  43.  Parks,  10  Maine  441 ;  People  v.  Farn- 

"^Bow  V.  Allenstown,  34  N.  H.  351.  ham,  35  111.  562;  Jameson  v.  People, 

'"Thomas  v.  Dakin,  22  Wend.  (N,  16    111.    257;    s.    c.    63    Am.    D.    304; 

Y.)   9;    Denton  v.  Jackson,  2  Johns.  School  Com'rs  v.  Dean,   2  St.  &  P. 

Ch.    (N.    Y.)    320;    Town    of    North  (Ala.)  190;  Cooley  Const.  Lim.  238; 

Hempstead  v.  Town  of  Hempstead,  2  Angell  &  Ames  Corp.,  §  77. 

Wend.  (N.  Y.)  109;  Coburn  v.  Ellen-  "Denton  v.  Jackson,  2  Johns.  Ch. 

wood,  4  N.  H.  99;    Stebbins  v.  Jen-  (N.  Y.)  320. 


51  OF   THE    CREATION    OF    THE    CORPORATION.  §    41 

intent  of  the  creating  power  was  to  erect  a  corporation ;  and  as  the 
intent  of  that  power  is  controlling,  the  corporation  is  deemed  to  have 
been  therei;pon  erected.  The  words  "creation  by  implication,"  with- 
out having  in  mind  the  above  qualifications,  are  misleading.  But  the 
intent  of  the  legislature  must  be  clearly  shown,  as  the  onus  probandi 
rests  on  those  who  endeavor  to  prove  the  existence  of  a  corporation 
by  implication.'^-  So  it  has  been  held  that  creation  by  implication 
will  not  be  recognized  by  the  courts,  unless  it  appears  that  the  powers 
conferred  by  the  legislature  can  be  enjoyed  only  through  such  implied 
incorporation,  and  in  no  other  way.'^  And  it  has  even  been  declared 
that  the  doctrine  of  creation  by  implication  will  be  upheld  only  where 
a  contract  made  in  good  faith  can  not  otherwise  be  enforced.'*  The 
creation  of  corporations  by  implication,  as  the  term  is  used,  relates 
not  so  much  to  the  act  of  creating  as  to  the  method  of  proving  cor- 
porate existence.  The  presumption  of  corporate  existence,  after  a 
long  space  of  time,  when  proof  exists  of  the  continued  exercise  of  cor- 
porate functions,  is  not  unreasonable,  and  particularly  so  where  the 
legislature  has  by  acts  recognized  such  corporate  existence. 

§  41.  Creation  of  municipal  corporations  in  the  United  States — 
(a)  In  general. — Until  comparatively  recent  times  there  were  no  gen- 
eral laws  regulating  and  providing  for  the  incorporation  of  municipal- 
ities under  general  rules.  In  this  country,  as  in  England,  each  district, 
as  its  population  increased  to  a  point  where  incorporation  became 
necessary  or  expedient,  applied  to  the  legislature  for  a  special  charter, 
by  virtue  of  which  it  assumed  corporate  existence.  But  this  system  of 
incorporation  was  open  to  grave  and  obvious  abuses.  Being  in  the 
nature  of  special  legislation,  it  possessed  all  the  disadvantages  inci- 
dent to  such  legislation.  The  privileges  granted  by  the  special  charter 
were  greater  in  the  case  of  one  city  than  of  another;  and  these  dis- 
parities, with  their  consequent  jealousies,  gave  just  cause  for  popular 
dissatisfaction  for  the  system  of  incorporation  by  special  charter.  A 
remedy  was  found  in  establishing  general  laws  under  which  each  dis- 
trict could,  by  a  method  of  procedure  established  by  the  statute,  pro- 
cure its  own  incorporation  whenever  it  became  necessary  or  desirable. 
Under  these  general  and  uniform  laws  there  was  no  longer  any  dis- 
parity in  the  privileges  of  the  different  municipalities.  Each  village, 
town,  city  or  school  district  was  one  of  a  certain  class  sharing  alike 

"Society  &c.  v.  Pawlet,  4  Peters  Corp.,  §  43;  Cooley  Const.  Lim.  238; 

480;    Medical   Institution  v.   Patter-  15  Am.  &  Bng.  Encyc.  of  Law  960. 
son,    1    Denio    (N.   Y.)    61;    s.    c.    5        ''^  Stebbins   v.    Jennings,    10    Pick. 

Denio  (N.  Y.)   618;  Myers  v.  Irwin,  (Mass.)  172. 

2  S.  &  R.  (Pa.)  368;  Wells  v.  Bur-        '^  Blair  v.  West  Point,  2  McCrary 

bank,  17  N.  H.  393;  1  Dillon  Munic.  459. 


§    42  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  52 

the  powers  and  liabilities  of  the  class  according  to  the  provisions  of 
the  general  incorporating  act.  The  great  advantage  of  this  system 
has  been  universally  recognized,  and  it  is  used  in  all  of  the  United 
States  at  the  present  day.  In  most  of  the  states  the  legislature  is 
expressly  forbidden  to  incorporate  towns  or  cities  by  special  charter, 
but  it  is  still  allowed  in  several  of  the  states.''^  In  many  of  the  states 
by  constitution  or  statutory  enactment  cities  operating  under  special 
charters  are  permitted  to  reorganize  under  the  general  law  by  compli- 
ance with  certain  statutory  methods  of  procedure.  Where  a  city  is 
incorporated  under  a  special  charter,  and  reincorporates  under  a  gen- 
eral law,  and  the  latter  contains  no  provisions  relating  to  schools,  it 
does  not  abrogate  the  provisions  of  the  special  charter  relating  to 
schools.  It  is  only  where  the  provisions  of  the  special  charter  are  in- 
consistent with  the  general  law  that  they  are  repealed.'^'' 

§  42.  (b)  By  special  charter. — Judge  Dillon  gives  an  excellent  out- 
line of  the  provisions  of  the  ordinary  special  charter  creating  a  munici- 
pal corporation.  He  observes  that  while  these  charters  were  on  the 
whole  constructed  according  to  one  general  model,  there  was  great  va- 
riety in  the  particular  provisions  of  the  difEerent  charters  as  to  the 
powers  conferred  and  the  liabilities  imposed  on  the  corporation.  Fol- 
lowing his  outline  of  the  provisions  of  such  a  charter,  we  find  that  the 
first  incorporating  clause  of  the  instrument  usually  declares  "that  the 
inhabitants  of  the  town  of  Dale  are  hereby  constituted  a  body  politic 
and  corporate  by  the  name  of  'The  Town  of  Dale,'  and  by  that  name 
shall  have  perpetual  succession,  may  use  a  common  seal,  sue  and  be 
sued,  purchase,  hold  and  sell  property,"  etc.  The  charter  then  pro- 
ceeds to  provide  for  the  legislative  body  of  the  municipal  corporation, 
usually  called  the  town  or  city  council,  regulating  the  number  of 
councilmen  or  aldermen  and  the  organization  of  the  body.  The  quali- 
fications of  voters  are  then  prescribed  and  the  manner  of  holding  elec- 

''^  In  the  following  states  the  legis-  Alabama:  15  Am.  &  Bng.  Encyc.  of 
lature  was  allowed  to  create  munici-  Law,  tit.  Munic.  Corp.,  p.  958,  n.  3. 
pal  corporations  by  special  act:  New  The  constitution  of  Missouri  pro- 
York  (Constitution  1846,  art.  8,  §  1) ;  hibits  the  creation  of  any  municipal 
Michigan  (Constitution  1850.  art.  15,  corporation  by  special  act,  unless  the 
§  1);  California  (Constitution  1849,  city  contain  at  least  five  thousand 
art.  4,  §  31) ;  Minnesota  (Constitu-  inhabitants;  and  in  that  case  the 
tion  1857,  art.  10,  §  2) ;  Oregon  (Con-  special  charter  must  be  approved  by 
stitution  1857,  art.  11,  §  2);  Louisi-  a  vote  of  the  people:  Constitution 
ana  (Constitution  1864,  title  7,  art.  1865,  art.  8,  §  5. 
121);  Nevada  (Constitution  1864,  '« Brenan  v.  People,  176  III.  620;  s. 
art.  8,  §  1).  Also  in  Maine,  Mary-  c.  52  N.  E.  353. 
land,    North    Carolina,    Texas    and 


53  OF   THE    CREATION    OF    TPIE    CORPORATION.  §    43 

tions  for  the  members  of  tlie  eouncil  and  for  the  executive  officers  of 
the  town.  The  powers  and  duties  of  these  executives  are  defined  and 
limited.  The  charter  generally  closes  with  a  specific  enumeration  of 
the  powers  of  the  city  council,  which  are  numerous,  and  include  the 
right  to  levy  taxes  for  municipal  purposes,  to  enact  ordinances  to  pro- 
tect the  healtli  and  safety  of  the  citizens  of  the  town,  and  in  general 
to  exercise  those  subordinate  powers  of  local  legislation  which  the 
state  deemed  it  necessary  and  expedient  to  delegate  to  the  council  for 
the  purposes  of  local  self-government.' ' 

§43.  (c)  By  general  municipal  incorporating  acts. — The  legisla- 
tures of  the  several  states,  in  compliance  with  the  provisions  of  their 
constitutions  respectively,  and  subject  to  the  limitations  imposed  by 
those  provisions,  have  passed  general  incorporating  and  enabling  acts 
providing  for  the  incorporation  and  government  of  municipalities 
within  the  limits  of  the  state.  These  acts  generally  provide  in  sub- 
stance that  all  corporations  organized  for  purposes  of  municipal  gov- 
ernment shall  be  divided  into  certain  specified  classes,  according  to 
the  number  of  inhabitants  of  the  city,  town  or  village.  The  manner 
of  incorporating  each  class,  and  the  powers,  duties  and  liabilities  of 
the  several  classes,  are  fully  prescribed  by  the  act.  The  method  of 
incorporation,  and  the  powers,  duties  and  liabilities  of  each  class, 
differ  from  those  of  the  other  classes ;  but  the  method  of  incorporation, 
the  powers,  duties  and  liabilities  of  the  corporations  included  in  any 
one  of  the  classes,  are  always  uniform.  It  is  sometimes  provided  in 
these  acts  that  all  special  charters  theretofore  granted  shall  be  re- 
pealed and  abolished,  and  that  all  the  municipal  corporations  of  the 
state,  whether  created  before  or  after  the  passage  of  the  act,  shall  be 
governed  by  its  provisions.'^®  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  at  times  pre- 
scribed that  municipalities  previously  incorporated  by  special  act  of 
the  legislature  shall  not  be  affected  by  the  passage  of  the  general  act, 
unless  such  corporation  shall  elect  to  come  in  and  submit  to  the  pro- 
visions of  the  general  act.^^ 

§  44.  Constitutional  limitations  of  legislative  power  to  create 
municipal  corporations. — In  many  of  the  states  there  are  constitu- 
tional provisions  that  the  legislature  shall  provide  by  general  law  for 

'"  1  Dillon  Munic.  Corp.,  §  39.  a  given  subject,  the  special  charter 

''^  See  post,  ch.  4.  on  that  subject  remains  in  force  if 

^^  Burke  v.   Jeffries,   20   Iowa  145.  the    general    law    provides    that    all 

Where  a  city,  organized  under  a  spe-  laws  and  parts  of  laws  not  inconsist- 

cial    charter,    reorganizes    under    a  ent  therewith  shall  remain  in  force: 

general  law  and  there  is  no  provi-  Smith  v.  People,  154  111.  58;  s.  c.  39 

sion  of  the  general  law  applicable  to  N.  E.  319. 


§  45 


rUBLTC    CORPOllATIONS. 


54 


the  organization  of  cities,  towns  and  municipalities,  and  the  creation 
of  municipal  corporations  by  special  act  is  expressly  forbidden.®" 
Some  of  the  states  have  provided  that  their  legislatures  shall  create 
a  uniform  system  of  county,  town  and  municipal  government.**^  Mas- 
sachusetts®^ provides  that  the  legislature  may  charter  cities  in  towns 
having  more  than  twelve  thousand  inhabitants.  Pennsylvania®^  and 
Texas®*  have  the  same  provision  in  regard  to  towns  of  over  ten  thou- 
sand. In  Missouri®^  and  California,®''  the  remarkable  provision  ex- 
ists that  any  city  having  a  population  of  more  than  a  hundred  thou- 
sand may  frame  a  charter  for  itself.  This,  as  of  course,  is  subject 
to  special  restrictions,  and  the  method  in  which  the  charter  shall  be 
framed  is  carefully  deiined. 

§  45.    Construction  of  such  constitutional  limitations — (a)  Corpo- 
rations "for  municipal  purposes"  and  "bodies  politic  or  corporate." — 

The  constitutions  of  Missouri  and  Illinois,  of  California  and  of  Ala- 


™This  is  the  case  in  Ohio  (Consti- 
tution, art.  13,  §  6);  Illinois  (Con- 
stitution, art.  10,  §  6);  Michigan 
(Constitution,  art.  15,  §  13);  Wis- 
consin (Constitution,  art.  11,  §  3); 
Kansas  (Constitution,  art.  12,  §  5); 
Nebraska  (Constitution,  art.  10,  §§  4, 
5)  ;  Virginia  (Constitution,  art.  6, 
§  20);  North  Carolina  (Constitu- 
tion, art.  8,  §  4)  ;  Missouri  (Con- 
stitution, art.  9,  §  7);  Arkansas 
(Constitution,  art.  12,  §  3)  ;  Califor- 
nia (Constitution,  art.  11,  §  6);  and 
Nevada  (Constitution,  art.  8,  §  8). 
Also  in  Iowa,  New  Jersey,  West  Vir- 
ginia, Tennessee,  Florida  and  Indi- 
ana. This  constitutional  provision 
is  construed  in  Ohio  by  Thomas  v. 
Ashland,  12  Ohio  St.  124;  Welker  v. 
Potter,  18  Ohio  St.  85;  Atkinson  v. 
Marietta  &c.  R.  Co.,  15  Ohio  St.  21; 
State  V.  City  of  Cincinnati,  20  Ohio 
St.  18;  in  Illinois  by  Covington  v. 
East  St.  Louis,  78  111.  548;  in  Wis- 
consin by  State  v.  Forest  Co.,  74 
Wis.  610;  s.  c.  43  N.  W.  551;  At- 
torney-General V.  Chicago  &c.  R. 
Co.,  35  Wis.  425;  Kimball  v.  Rosen- 
dale,  42  Wis.  407;  s.  c.  24  Am.  R. 
421;  Stevens  Point  &c.  Co.  v.  Reilly, 
44  Wis.  295;  Land  &c.  Co.  v.  Brown, 
73  Wis.  294;  s.  c.  40  N.  W.  482;  3  L. 


R.  A.  472;  in  Kansas  by  City  of  Wy- 
andotte V.  Wood,  5  Kan.  603;  Atchi- 
son V.  Bartholow,  4  Kan.  124;  in 
New  Jersey  by  State  v.  Mayor  &c., 
40  N.  J.  L.  550;  State  v.  Borough  &c., 
52  N.  J.  L.  32;  s.  c.  18  Atl.  694;  6  L. 
R.  A.  57;  in  Missouri  by  State  v. 
Leffingwell,  54  Mo.  458;  in  Nebraska 
by  Dundy  v.  Board  of  Com'rs  &c.,  8 
Neb.  508;  in  Indiana  by  City  of  La- 
fayette V.  Jenners,  10  Ind.  70;  in 
Iowa  by  Von  Phul  v.  Hammer,  29 
Iowa  222.  See  also,  School  District 
V.  Insurance  Co.,  101  U.  S..  472;  1 
Dillon  Munic.  Corp.,  §§  45-49; 
Morawetz  Corp.  (2d  ed.),  §§  9-13. 

"Wisconsin  (Constitution,  art.  4, 
§  23) ;  Missouri  (Constitution,  art.  9, 
§  7)  ;  California  (Constitution,  art. 
11,  §  4;  Nevada  (Constitution,  art.  4, 
§  25);  Georgia  (Constitution,  art. 
11,  §  31);  Florida  (Constitution,  art. 
4,  §  21).  See  State  v.  Riordan,  24 
Wis.  484;  State  v.  Dousman,  28  Wis. 
541;  State  v.  Forest  Co.,  74  Wis.  610; 
s.  c.  43  N.  W.  551;  State  v.  Stark,  18 
Fla.  255;  Lake  v.  State,  18  Fla.  501. 

^-  Constitutional  Amendments,  2. 

*'  Constitution,  art.  15,  §  1. 

^  Constitution,  art.  11,  §  4. 

"^  Constitution,  art.  9,  §  16. 

«» Constitution,  art.  11,  §  8. 


55  OF    Tllli    CREATION    OF   THE    CORPORATION.  §    46 

baina,  prohibit  the  creation  ])y  special  act  of  corporations  "for  munici- 
pal purposes."  In  Missouri  it  has  been  held  that  such  a  corporation 
must  be  connected  with  the  municipal  corporation  itself  and  must  be 
connected  with  the  municipalities;^'^  and  a  corporation  formed  for 
the  purpose  of  filling  up  ponds  in  the  city  of  St.  Louis  was  considered 
to  Ije  for  municipal  purposes  within  the  meaning  of  the  act.^^  In 
Illinois  an  act  organizing  a  board  of  park  commissioners  was  held  to 
be  constitutional  under  this  restriction.**"  In  an  Alabama  case  a 
special  act  creating  a  corporation  to  carry  on  a  public  school  was  held 
to  be  constitutional. ^"^  A  county  in  California  has  been  held  not  to 
be  a  corporation  for  municipal  purposes;®^  and  it  has  also  been  held 
that  under  this  constitutional  limitation  no  powers  can  be  conferred 
upon  a  corporation  created  for  other  than  municipal  purposes,  except 
by  general  acts.*'-  The  constitution  of  New  York  provides  that  a 
two-thirds  majority  of  the  general  assembly  shall  be  necessary  for  the 
passage  of  any  act  "creating,  continuing,  altering  or  renewing  any 
body  politic  or  corporate."  The  term  "body  politic  or  corporate"  has 
been  construed  to  include  public  as  well  as  private  corporations.®^ 

§  46.  (b)  "Corporate  powers." — In  Nebraska,  Kansas,  Ohio  and 
New  Jersey  there  are  constitutional  provisions  that  the  legislature 
shall  pass  no  special  act  conferring  corporate  powers.  This  prohibi- 
tion has  been  held  in  Kansas  and  Ohio  to  apply  to  acts  creating  munici- 
pal corporations;®*  but  in  New  Jersey  the  provision  has  been  con- 
strued to  include  only  private  corporations.®^  In  Nebraska  an  act 
authorizing  a  school  district  to  issue  bonds  to  build  a  school-house 

"State  v.  Leffingwell,  54  Mo.  458.  »*  In  re  City  of  Council  Grove,  20 

^' Board  &c.  v.  Shields,  62  Mo.  247.  Kan.    619;     City    of    Wyandotte    v. 

«» People  v.  Salomon,  51  111.  37.  Wood,  5  Kan.  603;  Atchison  v.  Bar- 

^Horton  v.  Mobile  School  Com'rs,  tholow,  4  Kan.  124;  Gilmore  v.  Mor- 

43  Ala.  598.  ton,  10  Kan.  491;    State  v.  City  of 

«' People  v.  McFadden,  81  Cal.  489;  Cincinnati,  20  Ohio  St.  18;   State  v. 

s.   c.   22   Pac.   851;    29   Am.   &   Eng.  Mitchell,    31   Ohio   St.    18;    State   v. 

Corp.  Cas.  37.  Mitchell,  31  Ohio  St.  592;    State  v. 

^=  San  Francisco  v.  Spring  Valley  Pugh,  43  Ohio  St.  98;   s.  c.  1  N.  E. 

Waterworks,  48  Cal.  493.     The  dual  439.     See  generally  on  this  subject: 

nature  of  the  municipal  government  Commercial   Nat.   Bank   v.   City   of 

of  the  county  and  city  of  San  Fran-  lola,  2  Dillon  353;  s.  c.  20  Wall.  655; 

Cisco  explained,  in   Kahn  v.   Sutro,  Olcott  v.  Supervisors,  16  Wall.  678; 

114  Cal.  316;  s.  c.  46  Pac.  87;  33  L.  Savings  Assn.  v.  Topeka,  3   Dillon 

R.  A.  620.  376;   School  Dist.  v.  Insurance  Co., 

»'Purdy  V.  People,  4  Hill   (N.  Y.)  103  U.  S.  707. 

384;  rev'g  s.  c.  2  Hill  (N.  Y.)  31.  »=  State  v.  Newark,  40  N.  J.  L.  550. 


§    47  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  56 

"was  considered  void  as  coming  within  the  prohibition  of  the  provi- 
sion.^® 

§  47.    Miscellaneous  instances  of  such  constitutional  limitations. — 

A  provision  in  the  Ehode  Island  constitution  that  when  any  bill  shall 
be  presented  to  create  a  corporation  for  any  other  than  for  religious, 
literary  or  charitable  purposes,  or  for  a  military  or  fire  company,  it 
shall  be  continued  till  another  election  of  members  of  the  general 
assembly  shall  have  taken  place,  and  public  notice  of  its  pendency 
shall  be  given,  does  not  apply  to  public  corporations.^'^  In  California 
there  is  a  constitutional  provision  that  the  charters  of  cities  must  be 
consistent  with  and  subject  to  the  constitution  of  the  state.  Under 
this  prohibition  it  has  been  held  that  charters  repugnant  in  some  of 
their  provisions  to  the  general  laws  of  the  state  are  not  entirely 
valid. ''^  Constitutional  limitations  on  the  legislative  power  to  incor- 
porate towns  and  cities  must  of  course  be  construed  with  reference 
to  other  portions  of  the  constitutions  and  the  statutes.^ ^ 

§  48.  Incorporation  by  courts. — The  legislatures  of  certain  states 
authorize  and  empower  a  court  to  incorporate  a  certain  district  upon 
the  petition  of  a  designated  number  of  the  inliabitants  of  the  district. 
The  constitutionality  of  such  acts  has  been  questioned  as  being  an 
undue  delegation  of  legislative  powers.     In  Iowa  such  an  act  has 

"^Clegg  V.  School  Dist,  8  Neb.  178;  and  change  the  boundaries  of  the 
Dundy  v.  Board  &c.,  8  Neb.  508.  In  towns  in  their  respective  counties;" 
Kansas,  however,  an  act  for  the  and  a  special  act  divided  Forest 
same  purpose  has  been  upheld  as  not  county  into  three  towns,  and  pro- 
unconstitutional  :  Beach  v.  Leahy,  vided  that  none  of  said  towns  should 
11  Kan.  23.  "be    divided,    vacated    or    have    the 

"^  State   V.    District   of   Narragan-  boundaries  thereof  changed  by  the 

sett,  16  R.  I.  424;  s.  c.  16  Atl.  901.  board  of  supervisors  of  said  county 

^^  In  re  Strand  (Cal.),  21  Pac.  654;  until  the  question  of  said  division," 

Brooks  V.  Fischer,  79  Cal.  173;  s.  c.  etc.,  "be  submitted  to  a  vote  of  the 

21  Pac.  652;  4  L.  R.  A.  429.  legal  electors  of  the  town  or  towns 

^  So  when  the  constitution  of  Wis-  to  be  affected  thereby,"  on  petition 

consin  provided  that  "the  legislature  of  two-fifths  of  such  legal  voters, — it 

may  confer  on  the  boards  of  super-  was  held  that  such  act  was  not  un- 

visors  of  the  several  counties,    .    .    .  constitutional  because  it  was  a  dis- 

such  powers,  of  a  local,  legislative  crimination  between  counties,  as  the 

and     administrative     character,     as  legislature  has  power  to  resume  the 

they  shall  from   time  to  time  pre-  authority  conferred  by  sections  670, 

scribe;"  and  the  statutes   (R.  S.,  §§  671,  upon  the  county  boards:   State 

670,   671)    delegated   to   the   county  v.  Forest  Co.,  74  Wis.  610;  s.  c.  43  N. 

board   of  the   several   counties   the  W.  551. 
power  "to  set  off,  organize,  vacate 


57 


OF    THE    OKKATION    OF    THE    CORrORATIOX. 


48 


been  upheld  as  not  being  unconstitntional.^""  A  similar  ruling  has 
been  made  in  the  courts  of  Colorado."^  But  in  Wisconsin  an  act 
authorizing  the  district  judge  to  declare  a  town  or  village  incorporated 
upon  the  petition  of  a  majority  of  the  taxable  inhabitants  praying 
for  such  incorporation,  was  declared  unconstitutional  as  being  a  dele- 
gation of  legislative  functions  to  a  judicial  court.^"^     In  Arkansas, 


100  rpjjg  code  of  Iowa  provides  that 
where  the  inhabitants  of  any  part  of 
any  county  not  embraced  in  any  in- 
corporated city  or  town  shall  desire 
to  be  organized  into  a  city  or  town, 
they  may  apply  to  the  district  court 
by  petition  signed  by  not  less  than 
twenty-five  of  the  qualified  electors 
of  such  territory,  and  the  court  shall 
appoint  commissioners  to  call  an 
election  in  the  territory;  and,  if  the 
election  be  in  favor  of  the  incorpo- 
ration, the  clerk  shall  give  notice  of 
the  result,  and  copies  of  all  the  pa- 
pers and  record  entries  shall  be  filed 
in  the  recorder's  office  of  the  county 
and  in  the  office  of  the  secretary  of 
state;  and  when  such  papers  are 
filed,  and  officers  elected,  the  incor- 
poration shall  be  complete.  The 
sections  further  provide  for  the  an- 
nexation of  territory  to  an  incorpo- 
rated city  or  town  on  the  filing  of  a 
like  petition  and  having  like  pro- 
ceedings. It  v/as  held  that  the  act 
is  not  unconstitutional  as  authoriz- 
ing the  creation  of  a  municipal  cor- 
poration by  judicial  act  instead  of 
by  the  legislature,  since  the  only 
power  thereby  conferred  on  the 
court  is  the  appointment  of  com- 
missioners of  the  election:  Ford  v. 
Town  of  North  Des  Moines,  80  Iowa 
626;   s.  c.  45  N.  W.  1031. 

•">  People  V.  Fleming,  10  Colo.  553; 
s.  c.  16  Pac.  298.  See  also.  Mayor 
&c.  V.  Shelton,  1  Head  (Tenn.)  24. 

'"=  Territory  v.  Stewart,  1  Wash. 
98;  s.  c.  23  Pac.  405;  8  L.  R.  A.  106; 
29  Am.  &  Eng.  Corp.  Cas.  22,  where 
the  judge  expressly  dissented  from 
the  doctrine  of  People  v.  Fleming, 


supra;  and  quoted  Judge  Cooley 
(Cooley  Const.  Lim.  (6th  ed.)  141), 
as  follows: — "We  think  the  better 
doctrine  is  that  laid  down  by  Judge 
Cooley  in  his  work  on  Constitutional 
Limitations,  which  is  as  follows:  — 
'The  prevailing  doctrine  in  the 
courts  appears  to  be  that  except  in 
those  cases  where,  by  the  constitu- 
tion, the  people  have  not  expressly 
reserved  to  themselves  a  power  of 
decision,  the  function  of  legislation 
can  not  be  exercised  by  them  even  to 
the  extent  of  accepting  or  neglecting 
a  law  which  has  been  framed  for 
their  consideration.'  "  But  the  same 
learned  author  quoted  by  the  judge 
in  the  case  just  cited  says  elsewhere, 
after  referring  to  the  power  of  the 
legislature  to  create  and  abolish  mu- 
nicipal corporations  without  refer- 
ence to  the  desires  of  the  Incorpo- 
rators:— "Nevertheless,  as  the  cor- 
porators have  a  special  and  peculiar 
interest  in  the  terms  and  conditions 
of  the  charter,  in  the  powers  con- 
ferred and  liabilities  imposed,  as 
well  as  in  the  general  question  wheth- 
er they  shall  originally  be  or  after- 
wards remain  incorporated  at  all  or 
not,  and  as  the  burdens  of  municipal 
government  must  rest  upon  their 
shoulders,  and  especially  as  by  be- 
coming incorporated  they  are  held 
in  law  to  undertake  to  discharge  the 
duties  the  charter  imposes,  it  seems 
eminently  proper  that  their  voice 
should  be  heard  on  the  question  of 
their  incorporation,  and  that  their 
decisions  should  be  conclusive  un- 
less for  strong  reason  of  state  policy 
and  local  necessity  it  should  seem 
important  for  the  state  to  overrule 


49 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS. 


58 


also,  the  courts  have  decided  that  the  legislature  can  not  delegate  to 
the  courts  the  power  to  create  municipal  corporations."^ 

§  49.  The  same  subject  continued. — In  order  that  the  courts  may- 
acquire  jurisdiction  under  these  acts  it  is  necessary  for  the  petition 
for  incorporation  to  be  signed  by  the  proportion  of  inhabitants  re- 
quired by  the  statute.^"*  The  findings  of  the  court  in  these  cases  will 
not    in    general    be    disturbed    by    appellate    courts  ;^*'^    and    the 


the  opinion  of  the  local  majority. 
The  right  to  refer  any  legislation  of 
this  character  to  the  people  pecu- 
liarly interested  does  not  seem  to  be 
questioned  and  the  reference  is  by 
no  means  unusual:"  Cooley  Const. 
Lim.  (6th  ed.)  139;  citing  Bull  v. 
Read,  13  Gratt.  (Va.)  78;  Corning  v. 
Greene,  23  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  33;  Mor- 
ford  V.  Unger,  8  Iowa  82;  President 
■&c.  V.  Society  &c.,  24  N.  J.  L.  385; 
Gorham  v.  Springfield,  21  Maine  58; 
Commonwealth  v.  Judges  &c.,  8  Pa. 
St.  391;  Commonwealth  v.  Painter, 
10  Pa.  St.  214;  Call  v.  Chadbourne, 
46  Maine  206;  State  v.  Scott,  17  Mo. 
521;  State  v.  Wilcox,  45  Mo.  458; 
Hobai't  V.  Supervisors  &c.,  17  Cal. 
23;  Bank  &c.  v.  Brown,  26  N.  Y.  467: 
Steward  v.  Jefferson,  3  Harr.  (Del.) 
335;  Burgess  v.  Pue,  2  Gill  (Md.) 
11;  Lafayette  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Geiger, 
34  Ind.  185;  Clarke  v.  Rogers,  81 
Ky.  43;  People  v.  City  of  Butte,  4 
Mont.  174;  s.  c.  1  Pac.  414;  Smith  v. 
McCarthy,  56  Pa.  St.  359;  Smyth  v. 
Titcomb,  31  Maine  272;  Erlinger  v. 
Boneau,  51  111.  94;  Lammert  v.  Lid- 
well,  62  Mo.  188;  Mayor  &c.  v.  Fin- 
ney, 54  Ga.  317;  Response  to  House 
Resolution,  55  Mo.  295;  People  v. 
Fleming,  10  Colo.  553;  s.  c.  16  Pac. 
298;  Graham  v.  City  of  Greenville, 
67  Tex.  62;  s.  c.  2  S.  W.  742. 

'""  State  y.  Leatherman,  38  Ark. 
81;  State  v.  Jennings,  27  Ark.  419. 
See  also.  State  v.  Simons,  32  Minn. 
540.  Under  Iowa  Code,  §§  569,  570, 
— proceedings  to  incorporate  a  town, 
— application  must  be  presented  to 
the  court  and  not  the  judge:    State 


v.  Council,  106  Iowa  731;  s.  c.  77  N. 
W.  474. 

^"^  So  under  the  Pennsylvania  stat- 
ute it  has  been  held  that  where  a 
court  finds  that  it  is  doubtful  if  a 
petition  for  the  incorporation  of  a 
borough  is  signed  by  a  majority  of 
the  freeholders  residing  within  the 
proposed  limits,  it  loses  jurisdiction 
to  entertain  the  petition  or  take 
further  proceedings  thereunder:  In 
re  Borough  of  Taylorsport  (Pa.),  18 
Atl.  224.  And  in  the  same  case  it 
was  held  that  the  court  could  not 
acquire  jurisdiction  by  reducing  the 
territorial  limits  so  that  there 
would  be  a  majority  of  freeholders 
left,  whose  names  are  on  the  peti- 
tion: In  re  Borough  of  Taylorsport 
(Pa.),  18  Atl.  224. 

"^  As  when,  upon  proceedings  by  a 
village  under  Iowa  Code,  §§  440- 
446,  to  be  severed  from  the  lim- 
its and  control  of  an  incorporated 
town,  the  trial  court  has  found  in 
favor  of  the  petitioners,  the  supreme 
court  will  not  disturb  such  finding, 
unless  there  has  been  a  manifest 
abuse  of  discretion:  Ashley  v.  Town 
of  Calliope,  71  Iowa  466;  s.  c.  32  N. 
W.  458.  And  where  the  Texas  stat- 
ute required  that,  before  an  election 
to  determine  if  a  city  should  be  in- 
corporated should  be  ordered  by  a 
county  judge,  proof  should  be  made 
before  him  that  the  territory  sought 
to  be  incorporated  contained  the 
requisite  number  of  inhabitants, 
the  finding  of  a  county  judge  in  such 
a  case  was  considered  conclusive,  as 
no  provision  was  made  for  revising 


59  OF  THE  CREATION  OF  THE  CORrORATION-.         §  50 

provisions   of   the   statiile   are   construed    with    considerable    liberal- 
ity.'"" 

§  50.  Classes  of  cities  under  general  incorporating  acts. — As  in- 
dicated in  the  preceding  sections,  it  is  customary  under  the  general 
municipal  incorporating  acts  for  the  municipal  corporations  of  the 
state  to  be  divided  into  classes  according  to  the  number  of  inhabitants 
of  the  incorporated  territory.  Under  these  statutes  the  municipality 
takes  its  position  in  the  class  to  which  it  belongs  without  any  accept- 
ance by  the  incorporators  of  their  allotment  to  that  class.  For  exam- 
ple, the  Utah  law  divides  cities  into  classes,  and  provides  the  way,  but 
not  an  exclusive  one,  by  which  cities  shall  determine  to  which  class 
they  belong.  Under  this  provision  it  was  decided  that  the  court 
would  take  judicial  notice  of  the  class  to  which  a  city  belongs,  and 
that  the  city  would  become  a  member  of  its  proper  class  without  any- 
thing done  on  its  part.^^^  And  likewise  by  the  Nebraska  statute, 
which  provides  that  "all  cities,  towns  and  villages  containing  more 
than  fifteen  hundred  and  less  than  fifteen  thousand  inhabitants  shall 
be  cities  of  the  second  class,  and  be  governed  by  the  provisions  of 
this  chapter,  unless  they  shall  adopt  a  village  government,  as  herein- 
after provided," — all  towns  and  villages  containing  more  than  fifteen 
hundred  and  less  than  fifteen  thousand  inhabitants  are  created  by 
the  force  of  such  act  into  cities  of  the  second  class,  without  any  ac- 
ceptance or  other  act  of  such  town  or  city,  or  of  its  inhabitants.^"® 

§  51.    The  corporate  limits — Territory  of  the  corporation. — The 

general  incorporating  acts  make  provision  for  determining  the  cor- 

it:  State  v.  Goowin,  69  Tex.  55;  s.  er  upon  the  probate  court  to  de- 
c.  5  S.  W.  678.  Clare  any  town  or  village  incorpo- 
^"^  In  Pennsylvania,  a  proposed  bor-  rated  upon  petition,  the  probate 
ough  which  contains  a  small  assem-  court  has  power  to  declare  a  town  to 
blage  of  houses,  collocated  on  the  be  incorporated  as  a  village:  Men- 
plan  of  streets  and  lanes,  is  entitled  denhall  v.  Burton,  42  Kan.  570;  s. 
to  incorporation  by  the  courts,  with  c.  22  Pac.  558.  Where  the  report  of 
the  concurrence  of  the  grand  jury,  a  grand  jury,  on  a  petition  for  in- 
under  act  of  Pennsylvania  of  1834,  corporation  of  a  borough,  referred 
§  1  (Brightly  Purd.  Dig.,  p.  196,  to  "the  annexed  petition,"  and  it  ap- 
§  1),  which  provides  that  "the  sev-  peared  that  the  petition  was  en- 
eral  courts  of  quarter  sessions  folded  with  it,  but  not  attached  to 
within  the  commonwealth  shall  have  the  report,  it  was  not  error  for  the 
power,  by  and  with  the  concurrence  court  to  order  the  clerk  to  attach  it: 
of  the  grand  jury  of  the  county,  to  In  re  Incorporation  of  Pennsburgh 
incorporate  any  town  or  village  (Pa.),  13  Atl.  93. 
within  their  respective  jurisdic-  ^"People  v.  Page,  6  Utah  353;  s. 
tions:"  In  re  Borough  of  Edgewood,  c.  23  Pac.  761. 

130  Pa.  St.  348;  s.  c.  18  Atl.  646.  And         ^«**  State  v.  Babcock,  25  Neb.  709; 

under     General     Statutes     Kansas,  s.  c.  41  N.  W.  654. 
1868,  ch.   108,  §   1.  conferring  pow- 


51 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS. 


60 


porate  limits  of  the  municipalities  created  under  those  acts;  and  in 
the  case  of  incorporation  by  special  act,  the  limits  of  the  city  or  town 
are  expressly  defined  in  the  act  of  incorporation.  The  Pennsylvania 
statute  provides  that  whenever  an  application  shall  be  made,  by  the 
freeholders  of  any  town,  for  incorporation  into  a  borough,  and  the 
boundaries  embrace  lands  exclusively  used  for  farming,  the  court  of 
quarter  sessions  of  the  county  where  such  application  is  made  may, 
at  the  request  of  the  party  aggrieved,  change  such  boundaries  so  as 
to  exclude  such  land.  The  proposed  boundaries  can  be  modified,  "at 
the  request  of  the  party  aggrieved,"  only  at  the  time  the  charter  is 
before  the  court  for  approval.^"**  In  Texas  the  fact  that  the  corporate 
limits  include  a  number  of  acres  of  purely  agricultural  land  will  not 
invalidate  the  corporation."**  The  description  of  the  territory  to  be 
incorporated  should  be  sufficiently  definite  to  allow  identification  of 
the  territory.  Thus  in  Maine,  a  description  wliich,  in  a  deed  by  the 
state,  would  be  sufficient  to  describe  a  plantation,  sufficiently  describes 
it  in  the  record  of  a  meeting  for  its  organization."^ 


^"^  In  re  Borough  of  Wilkinsburg, 
131  Pa.  St.  368;  s.  c.  sub  nom.  Ap- 
peal of  Singer,  18  Atl.  931.  In  the 
same  state  it  has  been  held  that  a 
village  seeking  to  incorporate  with 
itself  adjacent  territory,  with  the 
consent  of  its  landowners,  should 
not  be  denied  the  privilege  because 
of  objection,  made  by  persons  out- 
side the  disputed  territory,  that  tax- 
able property  would  be  thereby 
withdrawn  from  their  control:  In 
re  Borough  of  Edgewood,  130  Pa.  St. 
348;  s.  c.  18  Atl.  646.  And  in  the 
same  case  it  was  decided  that  the 
existence  of  a  natural  boundary  line 
between  two  villages,  such  as  a  deep, 
wooded  ravine,  is  not  such  division 
of  territory  as  requires  separate 
corporate  existence;  and  where  a 
majority  of  the  landowners  on  each 
side  of  the  ravine  demand  incorpo- 
ration with  one  of  the  villages  into 
a  borough,  it  can  not  be  said  that 
the  limits  of  that  village  would  be 
unduly  extended,  or  adjacent  terri- 
tory of  the  neighboring  village  in- 
vaded by  granting  the  application: 
In  re  Borough  of  Edgewood,  130  Pa. 
St.  348;  s.  c.  18  Atl.  646. 

""  State  V.  Town  of  Baird,  79  Tex. 


63;  s.  c.  15  S.  W.  98.  And  under  the 
same  Texas  statute,  where  a  town 
has  been  incorporated  by  a  legal 
election,  its  incorporation  will  not  be 
declared  invalid  because  there  is  in- 
cluded within  the  corporate  limits 
land  not  laid  off  into  lots  or  blocks, 
and  the  house  of  one  relator,  who, 
though  he  does  no  business  in  the 
town,  yet  attends  church  in  it,  and 
sends  his  children  to  school  there; 
State  V.  Town  of  Baird,  79  Tex.  63; 
s.  c.  15  S.  W.  98.  The  law  does  not 
contemplate  the  inclusion  of  farm 
lands  not  adapted  to  municipal  pur- 
poses in  corporate  limits:  State  v. 
Mote,  48  Neb.  683;  s.  c.  67  N.  W. 
810.  The  fact  that  creating  certain 
territory  into  a  borough  may  not  be 
immediately  advantageous  to  a  few 
property  owners  will  not  prevent  in- 
corporation, where  it  will  be  greatly 
advantageous  to  the  entire  com- 
munity: In  re  Borough  of  Prospect 
Park,  166  Pa.  St.  502;  s.  c.  31  Atl. 
257.  It  may  include  unplatted  farm 
land:  Indiana  Imp.  Co.  v.  Wagner, 
138  Ind.  658;  s.  c.  38  N.  E.  49. 

"'  State   V.    Woodbury,    76    Maine 
457. 


61 


OF   THK    CRKATJOX    OF    I'llI':    COlil'OIJATION. 


§  53 


§  52.    Acceptance  of  charter  by  corporators  not  necessary. — It  is 

now  well  .si'ttk'd  that  the  consent  of  the  corporators  is  not  necessary 
to  the  validity  of  the  incorporation  of  niunici[)a]ities.  The  acts, 
whi'ther  general  or  special,  creating  municipal  corporations,  are  laws, 
and  as  such  are  binding  upon  all  persons  subject  thereto,  whether 
consenting  or  unwilling."-  Although  this  power  of  the  legislature 
to  force  a  municipal  corporation  u})on  unwilling  corporators  is  un- 
doubted, the  exercise  of  such  power  has  been  held  to  be  contrary  to 
the  genius  of  our  government.^^^ 

§  53.  The  same  subject  continued. — ^Although  the  legislature  is 
not  bound  to  consider  the  wishes  of  the  corporators  in  creating  munic- 
ipal corporations,  it  is  constitutional  for  the  legislature  to  submit  a 
proposed  charter  to  the  inhabitants  of  the  district  to  be  incorpo- 
rated, to  be  adopted  or  rejected  by  a  vote  of  those  inhabitants.^^* 
Thus,  the  question  of  the  consolidation  of  Pittsburg  and  certain  ad- 
jacent districts  into  one  corporation  was  submitted  to  the  vote  of  the 
persons  interested ;  and  the  act  submitting  the  proposed  measure  was 
considered  constitutional."^  On  the  same  principle  it  has  been 
held  in  New  York  that  a  statute  atfecting  a  certain  municipality 
shall  terminate  unless  assented  to  by  the  voters  of  the  corporation 
within  a  fixed  time.^^® 


"=  People  v.  City  of  Butte,  4  Mont. 
174;  s.  c.  1  Pac.  414;  Gorham  v. 
Springfield,  21  Maine  58;  Berlin  v. 
Gorham.  34  N.  H.  266;  State  v.  Can- 
terbury, 28  N.  H.  195,  218;  Bristol 
V.  New  Chester,  3  N.  H.  524;  State  v. 
Curran,  12  Ark.  321;  People  v.  Wren, 
5  111.  269;  Coles  v.  Madison  Co.,  1  111. 
154;  Warren  v.  Mayor  &c.,  2  Gray 
(Mass.)  84;  People  v.  Morris,  13 
Wend.  (N.  Y.)  325;  Fire  Depart- 
ment v.  Kip,  10  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  267; 
People  V.  President  &c.,  9  Wend.  (N. 
Y.)  351;  People  v.  Stout,  23  Barb. 
(N.  Y.)  349;  Proprietors  &c.  v.  Hor- 
ton,  6  Hill  (N.  Y.)  501;  Wood  v. 
President  &c.,  9  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  194; 
Morford  v.  Unger,  8  Iowa  82;  Tay- 
lor V.  New  Berne,  2  Jones  Eq.  (N.  C.) 
141;  State  v.  Babcock,  25  Neb.  709; 
s.  c.  41  N.  W.  654;  Zabriskie  v.  Rail- 
road Co.,  23  How.  381. 

"^President  &c.  v.  Society  &c.,  24 
N.  J.  L.  385. 


'"Mayor  &c.  v.  Finney,  54  Ga.  317; 
Alcorn  v.  Hamer,  38  Miss.  652; 
Clarke  v.  Rogers,  81  Ky.  43;  Call  v. 
Chadbourne,  46  Maine  206;  People  v. 
McFadden,  81  Cal.  489;  s.  c.  22  Pac. 
851;  People  v.  Salomon,  51  111.  37; 
People  V.  Reynolds,  10  111.  1;  Presi- 
dent &c.  v.  Society  &c.,  24  N.  J.  L. 
385;  Chosen  Freeholders  &c.  v. 
State,  24  N.  J.  L.  718;  In  re  Henry 
St.,  123  Pa.  St.  346;  s.  c.  16  Atl.  785; 
Commonwealth  v.  Painter,  10  Pa.  St. 
214;  Commonwealth  v.  Judges,  8  Pa. 
St.  391;  Bull  V.  Read,  13  Gratt. 
(Va.)  78;  State  v.  Scott,  17  Mo.  521; 
State  V.  Wilcox,  45  Mo.  458;  Lafay- 
ette &c.  R.  Co.  V.  Geiger,  34  Ind. 
185;  State  v.  Noyes,  30  N.  H.  279; 
Foote  V.  City  of  Cincinnati,  11  Ohio 
408. 

"=  Smith  V.  McCarthy,  56  Pa.   St. 
359. 

""Corning  v.  Greene,  23  Barb.  (N. 
Y.)  33. 


§  54 


PUBLIC    COKPORATIONS. 


62 


^  54.  Substantial  compliance  with  incorporating  acts  neces- 
sary.— If  the  requirements  of  the  acts  authorizing  the  creation  of 
municipal  corporations  are  substantially  followed,  the  courts  will  in 
general  uphold  the  proceedings,  and  will  not  declare  the  incorporation 
void  because  unessential  formalities  have  been  overlooked  in  whole  or 
in  part.  So  in  Nebraska,  where  it  was  apparent  that  a  city  of  the 
second  class  had  in  fact  been  duly  organized  in  good  faith,  mere 
irregularities  in  some  of  the  proceedings  would  not,  it  was  held, 
render  the  organization  void.^^^  Following  this  principle,  the 
courts  will  presume  that  the  necessary  formalities  were  performed  in 
the  absence  of  proof  to  the  contrary."^  Nor  is  it  always  necessary 
for  the  records  to  show  on  their  face  that  all  the  conditions  required, 
by  the  statute  were  present.^ ^^ 


"'  City  of  Omaha  v.  City  of  Soutti 
Omaha,  31  Neb.  378;  s.  c.  47  N.  W. 
1113. 

lis  por  instance,  where  a  commit- 
tee was  appointed  by  the  court  to 
establish  the  divisional  line  between 
towns  in  response  to  a  petition  in 
accordance  with  the  Vermont  stat- 
ute, it  was  presumed,  on  exceptions 
to  the  committee's  report,  that  all 
the  facts  alleged  in  the  petition,  and 
which  were  necessary  to  be  estab- 
lished in  order  to  entitle  the  peti- 
tioner to  the  relief  prayed  for,  were 
either  admitted  or  proved  at  the  pre- 
liminary hearing:  Town  of  Somer- 
set V.  Town  of  Glastenbury,  61  Vt. 
449;  s.  c.  17  Atl.  748.  And  in  the 
same  case  it  was  held  that  it  was 
not  necessary  that  it  should  appear 
by  the  report  of  the  committee  that 
they  were  sworn  as  required  by 
law:  Town  of  Somerset  v.  Town  of 
Glastenbury,  61  Vt.  449;  s.  c.  17  Atl. 
748. 

"» By  the  code  of  West  Virginia  of 
1887,  ch.  47,  §  49.  it  is  provided 
that  the  corporate  limits  of  towns 
containing  a  population  of  less 
than  two  thousand  inhabitants 
shall  be  changed  by  a  vote  ordered 
by  the  council,  the  result  of  which 
vote,  if  in  favor  of  the  change,  shall 
be  certified  to  the  circuit  court.  Sec- 
tion   49    provides    that   the    circuit 


court  shall  enter  an  order  approv- 
ing and  confirming  the  change,  and 
directing  a  copy  certified  to  the 
council,  etc.  It  was  held  to  be  not 
necessary  to  the  validity  of  the  or- 
der approving  such  change  that  it 
should  show  on  its  face  that  the  town 
contained  less  than  two  thousand 
inhabitants:  Davis  v.  Town  of  Point 
Pleasant,  32  W.  Va.  289;  s.  c.  9  S.  E. 
228;  Point  Pleasant  Bridge  Co.  v. 
Town  of  Point  Pleasant,  32  W.  Va. 
328;  s.  c.  9  S.  B.  231.  See  also,  At- 
torney-General V.  Rice,  64  Mich.  385; 
s.  c.  31  N.  W.  203.  But  where  the 
Pennsylvania  statute  required  that 
a  petition  for  the  incorporation  of  a 
borough  should  be  signed  by  the  pe- 
titioners within  three  months  im- 
mediately preceding  its  presentation 
to  the  court,  that  fact  need  not  be 
stated  in  the  petition,  but  must  ap- 
pear in  the  record:  In  re  Summit 
Borough,  114  Pa.  St.  362;  s.  c.  7 
Atl.  219;  In  re  Osborne,  101  Pa.  St. 
284.  The  prelimianry  steps  in  re- 
gard to  the  formation  of  a  munici- 
pal corporation  are  usually  pre- 
scribed by  the  statute  and  must  be 
substantially  complied  with,  as  to 
notice,  petition,  description  and 
otherwise.  The  requirements  pre- 
liminary to  organization  are  man- 
datory: Huff  V.  Preuitt  (Tex.  Civ. 
App.),  53  S.  W.  844;   State  v.  Frost, 


63  OF   THE    CEEATIOX    OP    THE    CORPORATION.  §    55 

§  55.  Instances  of  irregularities  in  incorporation. — The  Pennsyl- 
vania act  of  1834,  relating  to  the  incorporation  of  boroughs,  pro- 
vided for  a  reference  of  an  application  for  incorporation  to  the  grand 
jury,  and  that,  if  a  majority  thereof,  "after  a  full  investigation  of 
the  case,  shall  find  that  the  conditions  presented  by  this  act  have  been 
complied  with,  and  shall  believe  that  it  is  expedient  to  grant  the  prayer 
of  the  petitioners,  they  shall  certify  the  same  to  the  court."  Under 
this  provision  an  indorsement  of  "approved"  on  the  petition  by  the 
foreman  of  the  grand  jury,  with  his  signature,  was  not  considered  a 
sufficient  certificate.^-''  But  the  failure  to  mark  as  "filed"  a  plot  of 
a  borough,  sought  to  be  incorporated,  at  the  time  it  was  presented,  can 
be  cured  by  an  order  for  it  to  be  so  marked  nunc  pro  tunc,  according  to 
a  decision  in  the  same  state.^^^  The  constitution  of  California  relat- 
ing to  the  adoption  of  city  charters  provided  that  the  charter  should  be 
"submitted  to  the  legislature  for  its  approval  or  rejection  as  a  whole, 
without  power  of  alteration  or  amendment,  and  if  approved  by  a 
majority  vote  of  the  members  elected  to  each  house,  it  should  become 
the  charter  of  such  city."  The  resolution  of  approval  need  not  be  in 
the  form  of  a  bill  passed  in  the  ordinary  manner,  and  approved  by  the 
governor,  as  the  constitution  does  not  make  the  governor  a  part  of 
the  legislature. ^^^  The  sufficiency  of  the  petition  as  to  reasons  for 
annexation  is  in  the  discretion  of  the  authority  passing  upon  it.^^^ 
On  an  application  to  a  county  judge  for  an  election  to  determine  the 
question  of  incorporation,  a  hearing  is  necessary ;  and  it  is  not  enough 
that  the  judge  is  satisfied  of  his  own  knowledge  that  the  proposed 
territory  has  the  requisite  number  of  inhabitants.^^*  Commission- 
ers, in  incorporating  a  city  of  the  third  class,  must  state  in  the  order 
that  a  majority  of  the  taxpayers  are  in  favor  of  it ;  that  the  town  con- 
tains over  250  and  less  than  2,000  inhabitants;  and  must  designate  the 
metes  and  bounds. ^^^  Piling  of  a  certified  copy  of  the  order  of  the 
board  of  supervisors  declaring  a  municipality  duly  incorporated  is 
necessary  to  a  valid  incorporation.^^® 

103  Tenn.  685;   s.  c.  54  S.  W.  986;  s.  c.  21  Pac.  652;  4  L.  R.  A.  429;  In 

Angel  v.  Town  of  Spring  City  (Tenn.  re  Strand  (Cal.),  21  Pac.  654. 

Ch.),  53  S.  W.  191.     An  attempted  ^=^  Windfall    Mfg.    Co.    v.    Emery, 

organization      without      complying  142  Ind.  456;  s.  c.  41  N.  E.  814.    But 

with  the  statutory  requirements  is  see  Forsythe  v.  City  of  Hammond, 

void:  Town  of  Woodbury  v.  Brown,  142  Ind.  505;   s.  c.  41  N.  E.  950;   30 

101  Tenn.  707;  s.  c.  50  S.  W.  743.  L.  R.  A.  576. 

^-"  In  re  Summit  Borough,  114  Pa,  ^^  Huff  v.  Preuitt  (Tex.  Civ.  App.), 

St.  362;  s.  c.  7  Atl.  219.  53  S.  W.  844. 

^"Appealof  Gross,  129  Pa.  St.  567;  ^==  State  v.  Bilby,  60  Kan.  130;   s. 

s.  c.  18  Atl.  557.  c.  55  Pac.  843. 

"==  Brooks  V.  Fischer,  79  Cal,  173;  '^People  v.  Town  of  Linden,  107 

Cal.  94;  s.  c.  40  Pac.  115. 


§    56  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  64 

§  56.  Notice  of  incorporation. — It  is  frequently  provided  in  the 
acts  relating  to  the  incorporation  of  municipalities  that  notice  of  the 
proposed  incorporation  be  published  for  a  prescribed  period.  In 
Florida  it  has  been  held  that  where  such  notice  has  been  given,  the 
proceedings  for  incorporation  may  be  had  on  the  last  day  of  the 
notice.^^'^  In  that  case  the  statute  required  the  notice  to  be  published 
"for  a  period  of  not  less  than  thirty  days."  According  to  the  judicial 
construction  of  this  requirement,  it  was  complied  with  if  thirty  days' 
notice  had  been  given  by  excluding  the  first  and  including  the  last 
day;  and  it  was  held  that  the  statute  did  not  mean  thirty  clear  days.^^^ 
The  notice  must  be  sufficiently  explicit  to  enable  the  proposed  cor- 
porators to  vote  intelligently  upon  the  question  of  incorporation.^^'' 
And  where  all  the  parties  interested  in  proceedings  to  incorporate  a 
municipality  are  in  court,  they  can  not  be  heard  to  object  that  the 
notice  of  the  proceedings  was  insufficient.^^'* 

§  57.  Validity  of  incorporation — How  tested. — The  state,  being  the 
creator  of  municipal  corporations,  is  the  proper  party  to  impeach  the 
validity  of  their  creation ;  and,  consequently,  where  the  corporation  is 
acting  under  color  of  law  and  is  recognized  by  the  state  as  so  acting, 
its  corporate  existence  can  not  be  collaterally  attacked.^^^  This  doc- 
trine applies  even  though  the  validity  of  the  incorporation  may  be 

'^'  State  V.  Town  of  Winter  Park,        ""  In   re   Edgewood   Borough,   130 

25  Fla.  371;  s.  c.  5  So.  818.  Pa.  St.  348;  s.  c.  18  Atl.  646. 

'="  State  V.  Town  of  Winter  Park,         ^'^  Society   &c.    v.    Pawlet,    4    Pet. 

25  Fla.  371;  s.  c.  5  So.  818.  480;    Bird  v.  Perkins,  33  Mich.  28 

*=®A  notice  by  the  county  super-  People   v.   Maynard,   15   Mich.   463 
visors  of  an  election  to  decide  upon  banning  v.  Carpenter,  20  N.  Y.  447 
the    incorporation    of    a    California  Rumsey    v.    People,    19    N.    Y.    41 
city,   on  petition  of  proper  parties,  Swain    v.    Comstock,    18    Wis.    486 
the  notice  stating  that  the  "petition  Jameson  v.  People,  16  111.  257;   s.  c. 
set  forth  the  boundaries  of  the  pro-  63  Am.  D.  304;  Tisdale  v.  President 
posed    corporation,    and    stated    the  &c.,  46  111.  9;  Kettering  v.  Jackson- 
number  of  inhabitants  therein  to  be  ville,  50  111.  39;   Town  of  Searcy  v. 
about  three  thousand,"  was  decided  Yarnell,  47  Ark.  269;   s.  c.  1  S.  W. 
to  be  a  sufficient  notice   to   enable  319;  Louisville  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Shires, 
the  voters  to  classify  the  proposed  108    111.    617;    Henderson   v.    Davis, 
municipal     corporation     under     the  106  N.  C.  88;  s.  c.  11  S.  E.  573;  Kay- 
law  in  cities  of  the  sixth  class,  ac-  ser  v.  Bremen,  16  Mo.  88;   State  v. 
cording  to  the  statute  of  that  state.  Fuller,  96  Mo.  165;  s.  c.  9  S.  W.  583; 
and   to   vote  intelligently  upon  the  State  v.  Carr,  5  N.  H.  367;  Hamilton 
question    of    incorporation:     People  v.  President  &c.,  24  111.  22;   Worley 
v.  City  of  Riverside,  70  Cal.  461;  s.  v.  Harris,  82  Ihd.  493;   Mendenhall 
c.  11  Pac.  759.  V.  Burton,  42  Kan.  570;  s.  c.  22  Pac. 

558. 


65  OF  THE  CREATION  OF  THE  CORPORATION".  §  58 

attacked  on  constitutional  grounds.  ^^-  In  Illinois  a  town  brought 
an  action  against  a  citizen  to  recover  a  tax  on  property  in  the  town, 
and  it  was  decided  by  the  court  that  the  validity  of  the  incorporation 
of  the  town  could  not  be  impeached  in  such  an  action. ^^^  If  the  state 
acquiesces  in  the  validity  of  a  municipal  corporation  and  recognizes 
the  corporation  as  valid  for  a  long  period,  it  will  be  estopped  from 
denying  the  validity  of  the  incorporation.^^*  In  the  words  of  Judge 
Cooley :  "The  state  itself  may  justly  be  precluded,  on  the  principle 
of  estoppel,  from  raising  such  an  objection  where  there  has  been  long 
acquiescence  and  recognition."^^^ 

§  58.  The  same  subject  continued. — And  it  may  be  laid  down  as  a 
general  principle  that  where  the  validity  of  the  incorporation  of  a  mu- 
nicipality is  attacked,  the  presumption  is  strongly  in  favor  of  its  va- 
lidity.^^"  In  a  Wisconsin  case  it  was  held,  following  this  principle, 
that  the  complaint  in  an  action  against  a  city  need  not  allege  that  the 
defendant  was  a  municipal  corporation.^^^  A  striking  application 
of  this  doctrine  is  found  in  an  Indiana  case,  where  an  information 
in  a  proceeding  in  the  nature  of  a  quo  warranto  to  test  the  legality  of 
the  organization  and  incorporation  of  a  city,  which  averred  that  a 
census  was  not  taken  as  required  by  law,  and  that  a  majority  of  the 
legal  voters  of  the  town  did  not  vote  in  favor  of  the  adoption  of  a  city 
charter,  but  which  failed  to  aver  that  the  clerk  and  inspector  did  not 
do  their  duty,  and  make  a  suitable  record  as  required  by  law,  was 
held  bad  on  demurrer,  because  such  record  was  considered  conclusive 
as  to  all  questions  except  as  to  whether  a  majority  of  the  votes  cast- 
were  in  favor  of  the  proposed  change. ^^^ 

§  59.  Existence  not  questioned  collaterally. — When  a  municipal 
body  has  assumed  under  color  of  authority,  and  exercised,  for  any  con- 

^^^  Board    &c.    v.    Shields,    62    Mo.  the  same  case  the  information  was 

247.  also  held  bad  on  demurrer,  because 

"'  Geneva  v.  Cole,  61  111.  397.  it  did   not  show   that  the  plaintiff 

"*  State   v.    Leatherman,    38   Ark.  did  not  vote   in   favor  of  adopting 

81;    People    v.    Maynard,    15    Mich,  the  city  charter,  or  otherwise  con- 

463;  1  Dillon  Munic.  Corp.,  §  43a.  cur  in  the  proceedings  of  which  he 

^^  Cooley    Const.    Lim.    (6th    ed.)  complains.     And  it  was  further  de- 

310.  cided  that  the  averment  that  a  ma- 

^^^  People  V.  Farnham,  35  111.  562;  jority   of  the   legal   voters  did   not 

Jameson  v.  People,  16  111.  257;  State  vote  in  its  favor  was  not  equivalent 

V.    Young,    3    Kan.    445;    and    cases  to  an  averment  that  a  majority  of 

cited  in  preceding  section.  the  votes  cast  were  not  favorable: 

"'Rains  v.  Oshkosh,  14  Wis.  403.  State  v.  Town  of  Tipton,   109   Ind. 

"'State   V.   Town   of   Tipton,    109  73;  s.  c.  9  N.  E.  704. 
Ind.  73;   s.  c.  9  N.  B.  704.     And  in 
1  Smith — 5 


S  GO 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS. 


66 


siderable  time,  with  the  consent  of  the  state,  the  powers  of  a  public 
corporation,  of  a  kind  recognized  by  the  organic  law,  neither  the 
corporation  nor  any  private  party  can,  in  private  litigation,  question 
the  legality  of  its  existence,^ ^'^  The  state  being  the  creator  of  mu- 
nicipal corporations,  it  is  the  proper  party  to  impeach  the  validity  of 
their  creation ;  and  where  it  acquiesces  in  the  validity  there  can  be  no 
collateral  attack.^'* ° 

§  60.  The  charter  of  a  municipal  corporation  is  a  law. — The  power 
of  the  legislature  over  the  charters  of  municipal  corporations  finds  its 
origin  in  the  fact  that  the  acts,  whether  general  or  special,  creating 
such  corporations,  are  statutes  binding  upon  the  persons  affected 
thereby ;  and  are  not  contracts  as  are  the  charters  of  private  corpora- 
tions. Being  public  statutes  or  laws  they  can  be  amended  or  re- 
pealed at  the  pleasure  of  the  legislature,  provided  no  contractual 
rights  are  injured.  Unlike  the  decision  of  a  court,  the  act  of  the 
legislature  of  this  year  can  not  bind  the  legislature  of  next  year. 
Each  represents  a  sovereignty,  the  people,  and  possesses  the  same 


"'  Speer  v.  Board  &c.,  60  U.  S. 
App.  38;  s.  c.  88  Fed.  749;  National 
L.  Ins.  Co.  V.  Board  &c.,  27  U.  S. 
App.  244;  s.  c.  62  Fed.  778;  Ashley 
V.  Board  &c.,  16  U.  S.  App.  656;  s.  c. 

60  Fed.  55;  People  v.  Maynard,  15 
Mich.  463;  School  Dist.  &c.  v.  State, 
29   Kan.   57;    Board  &c.  v.   Shields, 

'62  Mo.  247;  State  v.  Carroll,  38 
Conn.  449;  State  v.  Rich,  20  Mo. 
393;  Clement  v.  Everest,  29  Mich. 
19;  Donough  v.  Dewey,  82  Mich. 
309;  s.  c.  46  N.  W.  782;  Carleton  v. 
People,  10  Mich.  250;  Clark  v.  Com- 
monwealth, 29  Pa.  St.  129;  Com- 
monwealth V.  McCombSj  56  Pa.  St. 
436;   Cleveland  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Dunn, 

61  111.  App.  227;  Rellstab  v.  Borough 
of  Belmar,  58  N.  J.  L.  489;  s.  c.  34 
Atl.  885;  Eustis  v.  City  of  Henri- 
etta (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  37  S.  W.  632. 

"« Shapleigh  v.  City  of  San  An- 
gelo,  167  U.  S.  646;  s.  c.  17  S.  Ct. 
957;  Graham  v.  City  of  Greenville, 
67  Tex.  62;  s.  c.  2  S.  W.  742.  The 
constitutionality  of  the  act  under 
which  a  municipal  corporation  is 
created,  and  the  legality  of  the  or- 
ganization, can  not  be  attacked  col- 
laterally:   Chicago    &c.    R,    Co.    v. 


Town  of  Kentwood,  49  La.  An.  931; 
s.  c.  22  So.  192.  Quo  warranto  and 
not  injunction  is  the  appropriate 
remedy  for  testing  the  legality  of  a 
corporation:  Osborn  v.  Village  of 
Oakland,  49  Neb.  340;  s.  c.  68  N.  W. 
506.  In  a  suit  against  a  railroad 
for  killing  stock  in  the  city  limits 
the  court  can  not  determine  the  le- 
gality of  annexing  territory:  Cleve- 
land &c.  R.  Co.  V.  Dunn,  63  111.  App. 
531;  or  in  an  action  to  restrain  the 
collection  of  a  tax:  Kuhn  v.  City  of 
Port  Townsend,  12  Wash.  605;  s.  c. 
41  Pac.  923;  50  Am.  St.  911;  29  L. 
R.  A.  445;  or  in  an  action  against 
a  property  owner  to  recover  taxes: 
McCrary  v.  City  of  Commanche 
(Tex.  Civ.  App.),  34  S.  W.  679.  A 
corporation  organized  under  a  void 
act  may  be  rendered  valid  by  a  cur- 
ative act:  State  v.  Berry,  13  Wash. 
708;  s.  c.  42  Pac.  622.  A  corpora- 
tion defectively  organized  may  be 
legalized  by  the  legislature,  and  its 
acts  rendered  valid,  where  there  are 
no  vested  rights  intervening:  State 
V.  McGovern,  100  Wis.  666;  s.  c.  76 
N.  W.  593. 


G7  OF  THE  CREATION  OF  THE  CORPORATION.         §  f)l 

powers,  and  the  same  right  to  exercise  its  discretion.  An  illus- 
tration of  this  is  that  a  proposed  law  is  often  adopted  by  one  legisla- 
ture which  has  been  rejected  by  its  predecessors  for  several  years. 
Unless,  therefore,  an  act  of  legislature  assume  the  form  of  a  contract, 
it  can  not  be  irrevocable.'  Otherwise,  if  a  permanent  charter  could 
be  given  by  legislation,  the  most  injurious  consequences  would  result. 
Its  policy  on  great  interests,  once  crystallized  into  a  law,  would  be 
fixed  and  unchangeable.  This  would  retard,  perhaps  materially  injure, 
the  general  prosperity.  Consequently  every  legislative  body,  unless 
restricted  by  the  constitution,  may  modify  or  abolish  the  acts  of  its 
predecessors.^*^  In  fact  the  constitution,  as  Judge  Cooley  points  out 
in  his  treatise  on  Constitutional  Limitations,^*"  in  conferring  the 
legislative  authority,  has  prescribed  to  its  exercise  certain  limitations. 
These  limitations  were  such  as  the  people  chose  to  impose,  and  no  other 
power  but  that  of  the  people  can  superadd  other  limitations.  "To  say 
that  the  legislature  may  pass  irrepealable  laws  is  to  say  that  it  may 
alter  the  very  constitution  from  which  it  derives  its  authority;  since, 
in  so  far  as  one  legislature  could  bind  a  subsequent  one  by  its  enact- 
ments, it  could  in  the  same  degree  reduce  the  legislative  power  of  its 
successors."  ^*^ 

§  61.  The  American  township. — Every  state  in  the  Union  is  as 
to  its  internal  affairs  essentially  independent  of  every  other.  We 
might,  therefore,  expect  to  see  such  individuality  in  the  municipal  cor- 
porations erected  by  the  several  states  as  characterized  the  English 
local  bodies  of  the  seventeenth  century.  But  practically  there  are 
three  distinct  kinds  or  types  of  township  organizations,  which  we  can 
call  the  Pennsylvania.,  the  New  York  and  the  Minnesota  types.  The 
*first,  since  practically  adopted  by  Ohio,  Indiana,  Iowa,  Kansas  and 
Missouri,  has  this  general  structure:  it  gives  the  people  local  self- 
government;  the  townships  are  the  state  agencies;  the  officers 
are  the  local  administrative  body;  each  township  has  the  power  of 
self-taxation,  and  usually  controls  the  public  schools.  But  there  is 
no  right  of  representation  on  the  county  board,  nor  is  there  anything 
corresponding  to  the  town  meeting — or  folkniote,  as  it  has  been  called. 
The  county  authority  is  superior  to  and  controls  the  township,  and 
the  inhabitants  have  no  voice  except  such  as  is  expressed  in  electing 
officers  at  the  polls.     The  New  York  plan,  followed  in  Michigan, 

"1  Bloomer   v.    Stolley,   5   McLean  annotations  to  case  of  United  States 

158.  V.  Port  of  Mobile,  12  Fed.  768,  772, 

"=  Cooley  Const.  Lim.  (5th  ed.),  by  Robert  Desty;  "Legislative  Con- 
ch. 5,  p.  149.  trol  of  Municipal  Corporations,"  by 

"'  Upon    "Altering    Charter,"    see  W.  P.  Wade,  8  Cent.  L.  J.  3. 


§    63  PUBLIC    CORrORATIONS.  G8 

Illinois,  Wisconsin  and  Nebraska,  gives  freest  expression  to  the 
^'spirit  of  localism."  Each  township  is  constituted  on  a  general  model 
— it  has  a  definite  symmetrical  organism;  there  is  a  town-meeting, 
which  has  powers  sufficient  to>  deal  with  all  local  requirements  and 
emergencies;  there  is  subordination,  as  in  the  former  instance,  to 
the  county  organization,  but  the  supervisors  of  the  township  have 
seats  in  the  county  board,  and  so  the  township  has  fair  representation. 
The  Minnesota  plan  is  less  perfect;  there  is  no  representation  on 
the  county  board;  but  the  powers  possessed  are  greater  than  under 
the  Pennsylvania  plan,  for  there  is  a  town-meeting,  endued  with 
authority  to  choose  officers  and  enact  by-laws  and  local  ordinances. 
The  New  York  plan  has,  it  appears,  many  points  of  superiority  as 
compared  with  either  of  the  others.  As  has  been  said,  it  prevails  in 
the  Northwest,  and  may  possibly  and  might  well  be  adopted  more 
widely. 

§  62.    Local  self -government  a  delegation  of  legislative  power. — 

When  municipalities  are  erected  under  general  or  special  laws,  they 
are  vested  with  the  right  of  local  self-government,  carrying  with 
it,  expressly  or  by  implication,  the  right  to  pass  by-laws  and  ordi- 
nances; that  is,  to  legislate  for  local  purposes.  But  it  is  one  of  the 
settled  constitutional  axioms  that  the  power  vested  in  the  legislature 
to  enact  laws  can  not  be  by  that  body  delegated  to  any  other  body  or 
individual.  Locke,  in  his  Essay  on  Civil  Government,  has  the  fol- 
lowing impressive  passage:  "These  are  the  bounds  which  the  trust 
that  is  put  in  them  by  the  society,  and  the  law  of  God  and  nature, 
have  set  to  the  legislative  power  of  every  commonwealth,  in  all  forms 
of  government.  First.  They  are  to  govern  by  promulgated,  estab- 
lished laws,  not  to  be  varied  in  particular  cases,  but  to  have  one  rule 
for  rich  and  poor,  for  the  favorite  at  court  and  the  countryman  at 
plough.  Secondly.  These  laws  also  ought  to  be  designed  for  no 
other  end  ultimately  but  the  good  of  the  people.  Thirdly.  They 
must  not  raise  taxes  on  the  property  of  the  people  without  the  con- 
sent of  the  people,  given  by  themselves  or  their  deputies.  *  *  * 
Fourthly.  The  legislature  neither  must  nor  can  transfer  the  power 
of  making  laws  to  any  body  else,  or  place  it  anywhere  but  where  the 
people  have." 

§  63.  The  same  subject  continued. — We  have  then  a  seeming 
conflict — the  fact  that  municipalities  have  a  sort  of  legislative  power 
which  they  habitually  exercise,  as  opposed  to  the  principle  that 
legislative  power  can  not  be  delegated.^**     In  the  first  place  we  ob- 

1^  People  v.  Fleming,  10  Colo.  553;   State  v.  Hudson  County  Com'rs,  37 


69  OF  THE  CREATION  OF  THE  CORPORATION.  §  04 

serve  that  the  conferring  of  powers  upon  municipalities  to  pass  or- 
dinances is  not  a  delegation  of  power  ;^*^  and,  in  the  second  place  the 
bestowal  of  these  subordinate  powers  of  legislation  does  not  trench  on 
the  maxim  that  legislative  power  must  not  be  delegated,  "since  that 
maxim  is  to  be  understood  in  the  light  of  the  immemorial  practice  of 
this  country  and  of  England,  which  has  always  recognized  the  proprie- 
ty and  policy  of  vesting  in  the  municipal  organizations  certain  powers 
of  local  regulation,  in  respect  to  which  the  parties  immediately  in- 
terested may  fairly  be  supposed  more  competent  to  judge  of  their 
needs  than  any  central  authority.  As  municipal  organizations  are 
mere  auxiliaries  of  the  state  government  in  the  important  business 
of  municipal  rule,  the  legislature  may  create  them  at  will  from  its 
own  views  of  propriety  or  necessity,  and  without  consulting  the  parties 
interested ;  and  it  also  possesses  the  like  power  to  abolish  them  without 
stopping  to  inquire  what  may  be  the  desire  of  the  corporators  on  that 
subject."^  *^ 

§  64.  Corporations  de  facto. — As  in  the  case  of  private  corporations, 
so  also  in  the  case  of  municipal  corporations,  there  may  be  a  corpo- 
ration de  facto.  When  a  municipal  body  has  assumed  under  color  of 
authority,  and  exercised  for  a  considerable  period  of  time,  with  the 
consent  of  the  state,  the  powers  of  a  public  corporation,  of  the  kind 
recognized  by  the  organic  law,  neither  the  corporation  nor  any  pri- 
vate party  can,  in  private  litigation,  question  the  legality  of  its  exist- 
ence.^*''^ There  must  be  two  things  existing  to  constitute  a  corporation 
of  this  character:  (1)  a  law  under  which  the  corporation  might 
be  created,  and  (2)  a  bona  fide  attempt  to  organize  under  the  law.  A 
municipality  organized  under  a  law  afterwards  held  unconstitutional 
is  a  de  facto  corporation,  and  its  officers  are  de  facto  officers  until 

N.  J.  L.  12;   State  v.  Weir.  33  Iowa  778;  10  C.  C.  A.  637;  Ashley  v.  Board 

134;    Parker    v.    Commonwealth,    6  &c.,  16  U.  S.  App.  656;  s.  c.  60  Fed. 

Pa.  St.  507;  Rice  v.  Foster,  4  Harr.  55;  8C.  C.  A.  455;  People  v.  Maynard, 

(Del.)     479;     People    v.    Stout,    23  15  Mich.  463;  School  Dist.&c. v. State, 

Barb.  (N.  Y.)  349.  29  Kan.  57;  Board  &c.  v.  Shields,  62 

"*  State  v.  Francis,  95  Mo.  44;  s.  c.  Mo.  247;   State  v.  Carroll,  38  Conn. 

8  S.  W.  1.  449;    Clement  v.   Everest,   29   Mich. 

"^Cooley    Const.    Lim.    (5th    ed.)  19;    Donough    v.    Dewey,    82    Mich. 

140;   citing  President  &c.  v.  Society  309;  s.  c.  46  N.  W.  782;   Carleton  v. 

&c.,    24   N.   J.    L.    385;    Cheaney   v.  People,  10  Mich.  250;  Clark  v.  Com- 

Hooser,  9  B.  Mon.    (Ky.)    330;    Ber-  monwealth,    29    Pa.    St.    129;    Com- 

lin  V.  Gorham,  34  N.  H.  266.  monwealth  v.  McCombs,  56  Pa.  St. 

"'  Speer  v.  Board  &c.,  88  Fed.  749.  436 ;   Guthrie  Nat.  Bank  v.  City  of 

Cf.  National  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Board  Guthrie,  173  U.  S.  528;  s.  c.  19  S.  Ct. 

&c.,  27  U.  S.  App.  244;  s.  c.  62  Fed.  513. 


S  G5 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS. 


70 


a  writ  of  ouster  and  removal  has  been  issued. ^'*^  It  is  sometimes  con- 
tended that  there  can  be  no  de  facto  corporation  under  an  unconstitu- 
tional law.  The  acts  of  a  de  facto  corporation  or  officer  under  an 
unconstitutional  law,  before  its  invalidity  is  challenged  or  declared 
by  the  judicial  department  of  the  government,  can  not  be  avoided,  as 
against  the  interests  of  the  public  or  third  parties  who  have  acted 
or  invested  in  good  faith  in  reliance  upon  their  validity,  by  any  ex 
post  facto  declaration  or  decision  that  the  law  under  which  they  acted 
was  void.^***  But  where  there  is  no  law  authorizing  a  de  jure  corpo- 
ration there  can  be  no  de  facto  corporation.^ ^*^  It  must  be  understood 
of  course  that  it  will  be  treated  as  a  de  facto  corporation  until  the  law 
has  been  declared  unconstitutional.  And  so  an  officer  acting  under  an 
unconstitutional  law  is  acting  under  color  of  law  and  is  an  officer 
de  facto.^^^ 

§  65.  Effect  of  incorporation. — The  incorporation  of  a  town  as 
a  city  does  not  destroy  its  identity,  and  property  held  in  trust  for  the 
former  will  be  held  in  trust  for  the  latter  without  a  decree,  of  court 
vesting  it  in  the  latter.^^^  And  where  a  municipal  corporation  is  or- 
ganized it  has  jurisdiction  over  all  valuable  improvements  within  the 


"^  Attorney-General  v.  Town  of 
Dover,  62  N.  J.  L.  138;  s.  c.  41  Atl. 
98. 

""  Speer  v.  Board  &c.,  88  Fed.  749; 
Ashley  v.  Board  &c.,  16  U.  S.  App. 
656;  s.  c.  60  Fed.  55;  8  C.  C.  A.  455; 
People  V.  Maynard,  15  Mich.  463; 
State  V.  City  of  Des  Moines,  96  Iowa 
521;  s.  c.  65  N.  W.  818;  59  Am.  St. 
381;  31  L.  R.  A.  186;  State  v.  Rich, 
20  Mo.  393;  Board  &c.  v.  Shields,  62 
Mo.  247. 

"°  Speer  v.  Board  &c,  88  Fed.  749. 
Cf.  Norton  v.  Shelby  Co.,  118  U.  S. 
425;  s.  c.  16  S.  Ct.  1121;  School  Dist. 
&c.  V.  State,  29  Kan.  57;  People  v. 
Maynard,  15  Mich.  463;  State  v. 
City  of  Des  Moines,  96  Iowa  521;  s. 
0.  65  N.  W.  818;  59  Am.  St.  381;  31 
L.  R.  A.  186;  State  v.  Rich,  20  Mo. 
393;  Board  &c.  v.  Shields,  62  Mo. 
247. 

''^'Taylor  v.  Skrine,  3  Brev.  (S. 
C.)  516;  Cocke  v.  Halsey,  16  Pet. 
71;  People  v.  White,  24  Wend.  (N. 
Y.)     520;     Carleton    v.    People,    10 


Mich.  250;  Clark  v.  Commonwealth, 
29  Pa.  St.  129;  Commonwealth  v. 
McCombs,  56  Pa.  St.  436;  City  of 
Guthrie  v.  Wylie,  6  Okla.  61;  s.  c. 
55  Pac.  103.  Because  a  general  stat- 
ute for  the  formation  of  boroughs 
is  held  unconstitutional  in  a  pro- 
ceeding to  test  the  de  jure  existence 
of  one  corporation  under  such  stat- 
ute, it  does  not  affect  the  de  facto 
existence  of  another  corporation  un- 
der the  same  act:  Coast  Co.  v.  Bor- 
ough of  Spring  Lake,  56  N.  J.  Eq. 
615;  s.  c.  36  Atl.  21.  A  city  organ- 
ized before  the  passage  of  the  or- 
ganic act  of  May  2,  1890,  did  not  be- 
come a  corporation  de  jure  or  de 
facto:  City  of  Guthrie  v.  Wylie,  6 
Okla.  61;  s.  c.  55  Pac.  103.  Facts 
alleged  held  sufficient  to  establish 
a  de  facto  corporation,  in  Gilkey  v. 
Town  of  How,  105  Wis.  41;  s.  c.  81 
N.  W.  120. 

"^  Higginson  v.  Turner,  171  Mass, 
586;  s.  c.  37  N.  E.  172. 


71 


OF  THE  CREATION  OF  THE  CORPORATION. 


65 


corporate  limits  made  by  the  county  prior  to  the  incorporation. ^^^  Cor- 
porations legally  effected  do  not  become  responsible  for  debts  of  volun- 
tary associations  previously  existing. ^^*  While  the  repeal  of  a  charter 
abolishes  the  old  corporation,  where,  however,  substantially  the  same 
inhabitants  are  erected  into  a  new  corporation,  either  with  extended  or 
restricted  limits,  the  new  corporation  is  treated  in  law  as  the  successor 
of  the  old  and  is  entitled  to  its  property  rights  and  subject  to  its 
liabilities.^^^ 


153  Where  the  owner  of  land  subdi- 
vided it  and  dedicated  the  streets  to 
the  public  and  constructed  private 
sewers  in  the  streets,  independent 
of  and  in  no  way  connected  with  the 
village  sewers,  and  subsequently  the 
village  is  incorporated  as  a  city,  and 
the  city  constructed  a  main  sewer 
through  the  subdivision  which  ren- 
dered of  no  value  the  private  sewers, 
the  city  is  liable  for  their  value, 
plaintiff  having  only  parted  with  an 
easement:  Wright  v.  City  of  Mt. 
Vernon,  60  N.  Y.  S.  1017;  s.  c.  44 
App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  574;  Almand  v. 
Atlanta  &c.  R.  Co.,  108  Ga.  417;  s.  c. 
34  S.  E.  6. 

'""City  of  Guthrie  v.  T.  W.  Har- 
vey Lumber  Co.,  9  Okla.  464;  s.  c.  60 
Pac.    247,    A    statute    making   new 


corporation  liable  for  debts  of  the 
old — incorporation  is  constitutional: 
White  V.  City  of  Quanah  (Tex.  Civ. 
App.),  27  S.  W.  839. 

1°=  Shapleigh  v.  City  of  San  An- 
gelo,  167  U.  S.  646,  653;  s.  c.  17  S. 
Ct.  957;  Mount  Pleasant  v.  Beck- 
with,  100  U.  S.  514,-520;  Mobile  v. 
Watson,  116  U.  S.  289;  s.  c.  6  S.  Ct. 
398.  Where  the  new  corporation 
succeeds  to  all  rights  and  is  subject 
to  all  the  obligations  of  the  old  cor- 
poration, it  may  proceed  to  assess 
benefits  and  appraise  damages  occa- 
sioned by  change  in  the  grade  by 
the  old  corporation,  no  action  hav- 
ing been  taken  by  the  latter:  Gilpin 
V.  City  of  Ansonia,  68  Conn,  72;  s.  c. 
35  Atl.  777. 


CHAPTER  III. 


THE    CHARTER. 


Section 

66.  Early  charters. 

67.  Political  element  in  charters. 

68.  Charters  at  the  present  day. 

69.  Municipal    charters    not   within 

the    rule    of    the    Dartmouth 
College  case. 

70.  The  present  English  statutes. 

71.  The  municipal  corporation  acts 

and  the  royal  prerogative. 

72.  Contents  of  charter. 

73.  Prominent    features    of    special 

charters. 

74.  "What  charters  can  not  confer. 

75.  Wherein  the  constitutional  limi- 

tation consists. 

76.  Acceptance — When  necessary. 

77.  The  same  subject  continued. 

78.  Compulsory  acceptance. 

79.  Charters,  how  proved. 

80.  Proof  of  fact  of  incorporation. 

81.  Proof  of  corporate  existence. 

82.  General  rules  of  construction  of 

charters. 

83.  Can  charters  be  modified? 


Section 

84.  How  far  the  state  can  enforce 

performance  of  local  duties. 

85.  Change     in     municipal     bound- 

aries. 

86.  Effect  of  amendments   of   char- 

ter on  city  ordinances. 

87.  Reorganization     under     general 

law — Effect  of. 

88.  Reorganization  must  be  strictly 

according  to  statute. 

89.  The  same  subject  continued. 

90.  Effect    of    adoption    of    a    new 

constitution. 

91.  How   far    special   legislation    is 

permissible. 

92.  Written     constitutions  —  Opera- 

tion of. 
■93.  Power    to    make    by-laws — How 
limited. 

94.  Conflict  of  by-laws  and  general 

acts. 

95.  The     ordinance,     when     passed, 

must  be  reasonable. 

96.  Reasonableness  —  How      deter- 

mined. 


§  66.  Early  charters. — The  word  "charter"  is  derived  from  the 
Latin  word  "charta,"  which  signified  first  a  leaf  of  the  Egyptian  papy- 
rus, through  the  Greek  6  Ka/anys,  and  then  any  material  to  write  upon, 
and  subsequently  any  instrument  or  writing  under  seal.  Charta  regia 
or  a  royal  charter,  was  an  instrument  in  writing  conferring  a  grant 
from  the  crown  on  any  person  or  persons,  or  any  body  politic,  of  any 
rights,  liberties,  franchises  or  privileges.^  The  early  charters  were 
called  "muniments,"  as  they  "fortified  and  defended  that  which  was 
granted,"^     In  a  history  of  Charles  V,  by  Dr.  Eobertson,  the  manner 

^  Bracton,   fol.   336;    The   Prince's     a    muniendo,    quia   muniunt   et   de- 
Case,  8  Co.  1.  fendunt  hsereditatem : "   4  Co.  153. 
^  "Chartae  sont  appelle  'muniments' 

(73) 


73  THE    CHARTER.  §    67 

in  which  the  early  charters  were  granted  is  exhaustively  examined. 
The  learned  author  points  out  that  during  the  existence  of  the  feudal 
system,  and  the  turbulence  and  disorder  attendant  upon  it  throughout 
Europe,  personal  safety  was  the  first  great  object  of  every  individual. 
The  barons,  being  the  great  military  lords,  were  the  only  ones  strong 
enough  to  afford  protection,  and  hence  the  people,  for  the  sake  of 
their  protection,  would  become  their  vassals,  and  surrender  some 
rights  or  a  part  of  their  independence  in  exchange.  But  when  a 
large  number  of  persons  came  to  be  assembled  in  communities,  their 
number  and  the  fortifications  of  the  place  were  equally  reliable 
means  of  defense.  So  charters, were  either  granted  by  or  wrung  from 
the  lords,  or  drawn  up  among  the  individuals  of  the  community,  in 
which  they  bound  themselves  under  solemn  oath  to  aid  in  the  mutual 
defense,  and  the  redress  of  any  injury  or  affront  to  any  individual 
member.  Any  one  subsequently  entering  the  community  had  to 
subject  himself  to  the  same  oaths  and  conditions.  Little  by  little 
local  regulations,  developing  later  into  a  system  or  code  of  law,  were 
made  and  enforced.  In  addition  to  the  obligation  to  aid  in  maintain- 
ing the  personal  security  of  every  member  of  the  community,  the 
charter  usually  required  every  member  to  buy  a  house  or  land,  or  to 
keep  a  considerable  amount  of  his  personal  property  within  the  town, 
so  that  he  might  thus  be  interested  in  the  common  security  of  prop- 
erty. The  community  usually  was  subject  to  some  fixed  tax  payable 
to  the  feudal  superior,  who  was  grantor  of  the  charter,  and  which,  was 
accepted  by  him  in  lieu  of  arbitrary  imposts  and  taxes;  and  the  pay- 
ment of  this  sum  was  evenly  distributed.  So  general,  in  short,  was  the 
practical  independence  of  members  of  such  communities  that  they 
were  called  "libertates." 

§  67.  Political  element  in  charters. — Security  of  life  and  then  se- 
curity of  property  having  been  acquired,  a  desire  for  a  higher  inde- 
pendence arose.  In  England,  the  dominant  idea,  both  of  lords  and 
people,  being  the  encouragement  of  commerce,  the  custom  soon  ob- 
tained of  allowing  the  merchants  to  form  guilds,  with  power  of  making 
their  own  regulations.  We  have  already  seen  the  manner  in  which  the 
privileges  of  the  guilds  grew  into  the  privileges  of  towns.  A  measure 
of  domestic  jurisdiction  was  given  to  the  more  important  towns ;  that 
is,  the  towns  in  which  the  larger  guilds  were  located.  The  guild  might 
continue  separate  and  distinct  from  the  town,  or  it  might  become 
merged  in  and  identified  with  it.  But  wheresoever  there  was  an 
identification  of  the  two,  a  political  character  was  immediately  given 
to  the  community  interests.  The  object  of  the  members  was  to  ac- 
quire greater  local  independence,  and  less  interference  by  any  outside 


§    G8  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  74 

and  superior  powers.  And  the  financial  importance  of  the  merchants 
of  England  was  the  means  by  which  they  secured  many  of  their  rights 
and  privileges.  Many  charters  had  been  granted  and  enjoyed  before 
the  principle  was  generally  held  that  the  towns  so  enfranchised  were 
corporations;  and  many  towns  were  deemed  corporations  without  ex- 
press words  of  incorporation  having  been  used.  In  the  reign  of 
Henry  VI^  occurred  the  first  reported  instance  of  allusion  to  a  com- 
monalty as  a  body  corporate.  But  no  charters,  it  is  believed,  really 
incorporated  the  burgesses  or  commonalty  of  any  municipal  body  until 
the  eighteenth  year  of  the  same  monarchy  in  which  Kingston-upon- 
Hull  was  incorporated.* 

§  68.  Charters  at  the  present  day.— A  charter  of  incorporation  is 
the  evidence  of  the  act  of  a  legislature,  governor,  court  or  other  au- 
thorized department  or  person,  by  which  a  corporation  is  or  was  cre- 
ated.^ A  municipal  corporation  being  regarded  as  a  mere  agent  of 
government  and  a  depository  of  political  power  conferred  by  the  legis- 
lature, its  charter  is  not  a  contract,  as  is  the  charter  of  a  private  cor- 
poration." It  is  the  absence  of  the  contractual  element  which  leaves 
a  municipal  corporation  at  the  mercy,  so  to  speak,  of  the  power  that 
created  it;  for  the  reason  that  there  is  no  vested  right  to  the  franchises 
conferred — they  are  revocable  at  the  will  of  the  creating  power. '^  For 
the  same  reason  the  municipal  corporation  can  exercise  only  such  priv- 
ileges and  rights  as  are  expressly  granted  to  it  in  its  instrument  of 
incorporation,  or  charter,  or  by  some  statute  amending  or  extending 
it.^  And  the  creating  power,  being  practically  the  only  party  having 
a  voice  in  giving  these  privileges,  can  change,  modify  or  recall  any 
such  franchises  as  the  exigencies  of  the  public  service  or  welfare  may 
require.    This  is  now  well  settled  in  the  decided  cases.** 

^Year  Book,  7  Henry  VI,  43.  'Philadelphia  v.  Pox,  64  Pa.  169; 

*  There  are  proofs  of  earlier  char-  Chase  Blackstone  189,  n.;   1  Dillon 

ters  being  granted  to  this  town;  one  Munic.  Corp.  54. 

by  Edward  I,  confirmed  by  Edward  **  Mt.  Pleasant  v.  Beckwith,  100  U. 

II,  Edward   III,  Richard   II,   Henry  S.  514,  524. 

IV  and  Henry  V.     But  actual  terms  "  Thomas  v.  City  of  Richmond,  12 

of  incorporation  were  not  used  prior  Wall.  356;    Demarest  v.  New  York, 

to  the  charter  of  Henry  VI.  74  N.  Y.  161.     "A  municipal  corpo- 

^  Anderson   Law   Diet.,   tit.   Char-  ration   may  be  viewed   in   different 

ter.     A  charter  of  a  municipality  is  aspects — that   which   it   has   to   the 

not  a  contract  within  the  meaning  citizen,  and  that  which  it  bears  to 

of  the   constitution:      Covington  v.  the  state.     Seen  in  the  latter  rela- 

Kentucky,  173  U.  S.  231;  s.  c.  19  S.  tion  it  is  a  revocable  agency,  consti- 

Ct.  383.  tuted    for   the   purpose   of   carrying 

"  Dartmouth     College     v.     Wood-  out  in  detail  such  objects  of  the  gov- 

ward,  4  Wheat.  518,  624,  712.  ernment    as    may    be    properly    in- 


75 


THE    CHARTER. 


69 


§  69.  Municipal  charters  not  within  the  rule  of  the  Dartmouth 
College  case. — Tlie  prohibition  in  the  federal  constitution  against  tliu 
passage  of  state  laws  impairing  the  obligations  of  contracts,  and  the 
rule  in  the  Dartmouth  College  case  applying  this  prohibition  to  stat- 
utes amending  or  repealing  the  charters  of  private  corporations,  have 
no  application  to  public  and  municipal  charters.^^  But  while  the  pro- 
hibition does  not  extend  to  the  municipal  charter  itself,  it  is  applica- 
ble to  contracts  made  by  the  municipality  prior  to  the  enactment  of 
the  amending  or  repealing  statute;  and  obligations  incurred  or  rights 
vested  prior  thereto  are  not  affected  by  subsequent  legislation.^^  Mu- 
nicipal corporations  have  vested  in  them  merely  a  small  portion  of 
the  public  administration,  and  their  charters  may  be  changed  at  the 
will  of  the  legislature.^-  As  has  been  said,  they  are  established  only 
for  the  local  government  of  towns  or  particular  districts.  The  special 
powers  conferred  upon  them  are  not  vested  rights  as  against  the 
state,  but,  being  wholly  political,  exist  only  during  the  will  of  the 
general  legislature.^^  These  powers  can  at  any  time  be  abrogated  by 
the  legislature,  either  by  a  general  law  operating  upon  the  whole 


trusted  to  a  subordinate,  having  no 
vested  right  to  any  of  its  forms  or 
franchises,  and  entirely  under  the 
control  of  the  legislature,  which 
may  enlarge  or  circumscribe  its  ter- 
ritorial limits  or  functions,  may 
change  or  modify  its  various  de- 
partments, or  extinguish  it  with  the 
breath  of  arbitrary  power:"  1  Hare 
Amer.  Const.  Law  628;  15  Am.  &  Eng. 
Encyc.  Law  976.  It  is  a  continu- 
ing right  not  exhausted  by  one  exer- 
cise: Reeves  v.  Anderson,  13  Wash. 
17;  s.  c.  42  Pac.  625.  A  municipal 
corporation  can  be  dissolved  only  by 
consent  of  the  legislature,  or  pur- 
suant to  its  legislation;  nonuser  for 
a  time  is  not  sufficient:  Coin  v. 
Brown,  111  Mich.  657;  s.  c.  70  N.  W. 
337.  A  statute  may  provide  that  the 
grant  of  municipal  powers  shall 
take  effect  on  the  adoption  of  the 
representative  body:  De  Hart  v.  At- 
lantic City,  62  N.  J.  L.;  s.  c.  41  Atl. 
687. 

"The  distinction  between  private 
and  public  charters  in  this  regard 
was  fully  discussed  in  Dartmouth 
College  V.  Woodward,  4  Wheat.  518, 


and  the  ratio  decidendi  of  the  case 
in  the  federal  court  as  against  the 
decision  of  the  New  Hampshire 
court  turned  upon  the  private  na- 
ture of  the  institution  whose  char- 
acter was  in  question.  The  sanctity 
of  charters  granted  to  private  corpo- 
rations was  freely  admitted  by  the 
state  tribunal  in  Dartmouth  College 
V.  Woodward,  1  N.  H.  111.  See 
Beach  Priv.  Corp.,  §  17. 

"People  V.  O'Brien,  111  N.  Y.  1;  s. 
c.  18  N.  E.  692;  7  Am.  St.  684;  "Mu- 
nicipal Debts  Not  Discharged  by 
Repeal  of  Charter,"  annotations  by 
H.  H.  Ingersoll,  21  Am.  L.  Reg.  (N. 
S.)  181.  Cf.  "Relations  of  Munici- 
pal Corporations  to  the  State,"  an 
address  before  the  Alleghany  Coun- 
ty Bar  Association  by  W.  S.  Pier,  in 
1886;  "Municipal  Corporations:  Can 
the  Legislature  of  a  State  Empower 
Them  to  Amend  Their  Own  Char- 
ters?" 2  Cent.  L.  J.  33. 

^-  State  Bank  v.  Knoop,  16  How. 
369,  380. 

"Sloan  V.  State,  8  Blackf.  (Ind.) 
361. 


§    70  PUBLIC    COIU'ORATIONS.  76 

state,  or  by  a  special  act  altering  the  powers  of  the  corporation,  or  they 
may  be  repealed  by  an  amendment  to  the  constitution,  inconsistent 
with  the  provisions  in  the  charter.^*  The  reason  is  distinct;  for  were 
this  not  the  case,  there  would  have  been  numberless  petty  governments 
existing  within  the  state,  forming  part  of  it,  but  independent  of  its 
control.^^  Political  Frankensteins  are  the  dread  of  all  governments. 
The  creation  of  corporations  would  rapidly  have  to  determine  if, 
when  created,  they  became  equal  or  superior  to  the  power  that  created 
them." 

§  70.  The  present  English  statutes. — It  will  be  interesting  here  to 
give  in  substance  the  English  statutes  regarding  the  granting  of 
charters.  They  are  included  in  what  have  been  already  referred  to 
as  the  Municipal  Corporation  Acts.^'^  "§  210.  If  on  the  petition  to 
the  queen  of  the  inhabitant  householders  of  any  town  or  towns,  or 
district  in  England,  or  of  any  of  those  inhabitants,  praying  for  the 
grant  of  a  charter  of  incorporation,  her  majesty,  by  the  advice  of  her 
privy  council,  thinks  fit  by  charter  to  create  such  town,  towns  or  dis- 
trict, or  any  part  thereof  specified  in  the  charter,  with  or  without 
any  adjoining  place,  a  municipal  borough,  and  to  incorporate  the 
inhabitants  thereof,  it  shall  be  lawful  for  her  majesty,  by  the  charter, 
to  extend  to  that  municipal  borough  and  the  inhabitants  thereof  so 
incorporated,  the  provisions  of  the  Municipal  Corporation  Acts." 
"§  211.  (1)  Every  petition  for  a  charter  under  this  act  shall  be 
referred  to  a  committee  of  the  lords  of  her  majesty's  privy  council" 
(in  this  part  called  the  committee  of  council).  "(2)  One  month  at 
least  before  the  petition  is  taken  into  consideration  by  the  committee 
of  council,  notice  thereof  and  of  the  time  when  it  will  be  so  taken  into 
consideration  shall  be  published  in  the  London  Gazette,  and  other- 
wise in  such  manner  as  the  committee  direct,  for  the  purpose  of  mak- 
ing it  known  to  all  persons  interested."  The  queen,  having  received 
such  a  petition,  and  the  council  having  examined  and  approved  there- 
of, if  she  determines  to  grant  a  charter  of  incorporation,  has  certain 
powers  regarding  the  election  and  officers  in  the  new  boroughs.  She 
can  fix  the  number  of  councilors,  and  also  the  number  and  bounda- 
ries of  the  borough  wards,  and  assign  the  councilors  among  the 
wards.  She  may  also  "fix  the  years,  days  and  times  for  the  retire- 
ment of  the  first  aldermen  and  councilors, — thus  giving  the  crown 

"  Trustees    of    Public    Schools    v.         ^"  See  the  chapter  on  Legislative 
Taylor,  30  N.  J.  Eq.  618;  Mayor  &c.     Control,  post, 
v.  Dechert,  32  Md.  369.  "  See  Rawlinson  Municipal  Corpo- 

^•^  Sloan  V.  State,  8  Blackf.  (Ind.)  ration  Acts,  8th  ed.;  also  45  &  46 
361.  Vict.,  ch.  50.     See  also,  ante,  §§  30, 

31. 


77  THE    CHARTER.  §    71 

the  power  of  fixing  the  time  of  elections."^''  The  committee  of  coun- 
cil, before  approving  a  petition  to  the  queen,  may  settle  a  scheme  for 
the  adjustment  of  the  powers,  rights,  privileges,  franchises,  duties, 
property  and  liabilities  of  any  then  existing  local  authority  whose  dis- 
trict comprises  the  whole  or  part  of  the  area  of  that  borough,  either 
with  or  without  any  adjoining  or  other  place,  and  also  of  any  officer 
of  that  authority.  This  scheme  is  not  binding  if  objected  to  by  the 
inhabitants  or  a  part  of  them,  unless  confirmed  by  parliament,  and  it 
must  in  any  wise  be  submitted  for  approval  to  the  secretary  of  state 
and  the  local  government  board.  ^^  Section  216  of  this  act  further 
provides  that  "A  charter  creating  a  municipal  borough,  which  pur- 
ports to  be  granted  in  pursuance  of  the  royal  prerogative  and  in  pur- 
suance of  or  in  accordance  with  this  act,  shall  after,  acceptance  be 
deemed  to  be  valid  and  within  the  powers  of  this  act,  and  her  majes- 
ty's prerogative,  and  shall  not  be  questioned  in  any  legal  proceeding 
whatever."  This  section  was  intended  to  prevent  the  necessity,  which 
so  frequently  arose  before  the  passing  of  these  acts,  of  having  acts  of 
parliament  to  confirm  different  charters."** 

§  71.    The  municipal  corporation  acts  and  the  royal  prerogative. — 

Sir  Christopher  Eawlinson,  whose  compilation  of  the  municipal  cor- 
poration acts  is  a  standard  English  work,  calls  attention  to  the  sec- 
tion concerning  the  queen's  power  to  grant  charters :  '^'The  crown 
has  always  possessed  the  power  of  creating  corporations  and  conferring 
franchises  (see  1  Kyd  on  Corporations,  61)  ;  but  where  privileges 
and  powers  are  to  be  conferred  which  are  not  recognized  by  the  common 
or  statute  law  an  act  of  parliament  is  necessary.  This  act,  though  it 
would  not  at  all  abridge  the  common-law  prerogative  of  the  crown, 
nevertheless  prevents  its  granting  charters  of  incorporation  with  the 
powers  conferred  by  this  act,  save  with  the  advice  of  the  privy  council, 
and  on  petition  by  'the  inhabitant  householders.'  The  petition  to  the 
queen  must  be  by  the  inhabitant  householders.  It  seems  a  compound 
householder  is  included  under  the  term."^^  Notwithstanding  the  pro- 
vision of  section  216,  quoted  above,  as  to  the  validity  of  charters 
purporting  to  he  granted  in  pursuance  of  this  act,  there  is  an  inter- 
esting case  regarding  the  validity  of  a  l)orough  charter  granted  under  5 
and  6  Will.  IV,  ch.  76,  §  Ul,  and  7  Will.  IV,  and  1  Vict.,  ch.  78,  §  49, 
both  of  which  sections  were  repealed  by  40  and  41  Vict,,  ch.  69,  but 

^MO  &  41  Vict.,  ch.   69;    45  &  46     §  9;  18  and  19  Vict.,  ch.  31;  20  and 

Vict.,  ch.  50,  §  212;  Rutter  v.  Chap-     21  Vict,  ch.  10. 

man,  8  M.  &  W.  1.  -'  See  Reg.  v.  Mayor  &c.,  11  L.  T. 

^M5  &  46  Vict,  ch.  50,  §  214.  (N.  S.)    417;    s.  c.  13  W.  R.  90;   41 

^"See  also,  40  and  41  Vict,  ch.  69,     and  42  Vict,  ch.  26,  §  14;  42  and  43 

Vict,  ch.  10. 


g    73  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  78 

substantially  reproduced  in  this  act.  It  was  the  case  of  Rutter  v. 
Chapman,-^  decided  in  the  court  of  exchequer  chamber,  and  it  related 
to  the  charter  of  Manchester.  It  appears  that  a  petition,  which  had 
'been  agreed  upon  at  a  meeting  of  the  rate-payers  of  the  parliamentary 
borough  of  Manchester,  convened  by  public  advertisement,  and  wliich 
was  in  fact  attended  (and  which  petition  was  afterwards  signed)  by 
four  thousand  inhabitant  householders  of  the  borough,  was  presented 
to  her  majesty,  praying  for  the  grant  of  a  charter  of  incorporation 
to  the  inhabitants  of  such  borough  under  the  provision  of  the  act. 
Afterwards,  and  before  the  day  appointed  for  this  petition  being  taken 
into  consideration  by  the  privy  council,  a  counter  petition,  signed  by 
six  thousand  of  such  inhabitant  householders,  was  presented  to  her 
majesty,  praying  her  not  to  grant  such  charter.  The  whole  number 
of  inhabitant  householders  in  Manchester  was  at  that  time  forty-eight 
thousand.  The  court  of  exchequer  chamber  held  as  follows:  First, 
that  the  second  petition  did  not  necessarily,  in  point  of  law,  deprive 
her  majesty  of  the  power  to  grant  such  charter  upon  the  first  petition ; 
but  that  whether  the  first  petition  was,  under  all  the  circumstances, 
the  petition  of  the  inhabitant  householders  of  the  borough,  so  as 
to  authorize  the  exercise  of  the  powers  conferred  by  the  act,  was  a 
question  of  fact  for  a  jury,  and  that  the  determination  of  the  privy 
council  to  advise  the  crown  to  grant  the  charter  upon  such  petition 
was  not  conclusive  of  its  validity.  The  court  further  held  that  the 
grant  of  such  charter  of  incorporation  is  an  exercise  of  the  common- 
law  prerogative  of  the  crown,  although  it  also  extends  to  the  new 
corporation  the  powers  of  the  municipal  act,^^  which  the  crown  has 
power  to  do  only  by  virtue  of  the  sections  of  this  act.  Moreover,  the 
charter  may  be  granted  to  a  part  only  of  the  borough,  from  the  whole 
of  which  the  petition  emanated,  and  is  not  necessarily  to  be  "conferred 
on  the  inhabitant  householders  of  the  whole  borough.  The  decision 
went  much  further  into  detail  than  this  brief  summary.  The  point 
first  mentioned  was  upheld  by  a  subsequent  decision,  to  the  effect  that 
when  the  first  petition  had  once  given  the  crown  power  to  act  under 
these  sections,  such  power  could  not  be  taken  away  by  anything  that 
happened  subsequently.^* 

§  72.  Contents  of  charter. — In  the  United  States,  the  charter 
being  an  act  of  the  legislature  usually,  either  specially  directed  to 
the  incorporation  of  one  separate  city  therein  named,  or  general  in 
its  provisions,  it  is  instructive  to  take  up  and  examine  an  illustrative 
example  of  a  special  charter.     The  general  laws  of  the  states  have 

^^8  M.  &  W.  1.  ''Reg.  V.  Mayor  &c.,  11  L.  T.   (N. 

==5  and  6  Will.  IV,  ch.  76.  S.)  417;  s.  c.  13  W.  R.  90. 


79  THE    CHARTER.  §    73 

already  been  discussed.  Selection  may  be  made  almost  at  random 
among  special  municipal  incorporations,  for  the  general  features  are 
the  same.  The  city  of  Auburn  was  incorporated  by  the  people  of  the 
state  of  New  York,  represented  in  senate  and  assembly,  by  an  act 
passed  March  21,  1848.  The  act  sets  out  the  territorial  outline  of  the 
proposed  municipality,  and  declares  that  it  "shall  hereafter  be  known 
by  the  name  of  The  City  of  Auburn,  and  the  inhabitants  residing 
therein  shall  bo  a  corporation  under  the  name  and  style  of  The  Mayor 
and  Common  Council  of  the  City  of  Auburn,  and  as  such  may  sue 
and  be  sued,  complain  and  defend,  in  any  court  of  law  or  equity  in 
this  state."  The  city  is  then  set  ofE  in  wards.  Then  follow  provisions 
as  to  the  election  of  ward  and  city  officers,  and  the  powers  and  duties 
of  the  "common  council"  are  then  enumerated.  The  powers  conferred 
are  the  powers  of  the  city  relating  to  its  domestic  economy,  its  con- 
stabulary and  its  finances.  Subordinate  legislative  powers  are  dele- 
gated, "such  as  are  necessary  to  carry  into  full  effect  the  powers  given 
to  said  council  by  this  act."  The  duties  of  the  city  officers  are  next 
defined,  after  which  the  subject  of  municipal  taxes  is  fully  treated. 
The  common  council  are  constituted  commissioners  of  highways  to 
keep  the  streets  and  roads  in  repair.  Additional  powers  are  conferred 
on  them  with  regard  to  prevention  of  fires,  to  establishing  school  dis- 
tricts, to  caring  for  the  poor,  to  regulations  as  to  pestilence  and  dis- 
ease, and  numerous  subordinate  miscellaneous  duties.  .Such  in  brief 
is  the  outline  of  a  special  municipal  charter. 

§  73.  Prominent  features  of  special  charters. — In  the  charter  just 
examined,  it  will  be  seen  that  the  act  is  more  minute  and  specific 
regarding  the  powers  and  privileges  given  than  in  any  other  part. 
It  would  seem  as  if  local  self-government  were  so  great  and  valuable 
a  right  that  the  people  feel  that  it  is  to  be  exercised  only  upon  terms 
and  conditions ;  and  the  determination  of  what  these  terms  and  condi- 
tions shall  in  a  given  instance  be  is  to  be  left  to  the  wisdom  and 
discretion  of  the  legislature,  which  bears  the  relation  of  mouth  and 
voice  to  the  body  of  the  people.  This  succinctness  in  stating  what 
powers  are  conferred  makes  it  possible  to  know  exactly  the  limits  of 
the  city's  jurisdiction;  and,  in  case  of  the  passage  of  general  acts 
subsequently,  the  charter  is  the  criterion  of  inconsistency  between  the 
special  and  the  general  acts.  But  under  a  general  law — which  may 
be  said  to  be  a  species  of  divisible  charter,  as  many  municipalities 
may  at  the  same  time  point  to  it  as  containing  the  enumeration  of 
their  charter  rights — the  provisions  are  much  the  same ;  only,  general 
terms  are  used,  such  as  "any  *  *  *  complying  with  the  provi- 
sions of  this  act     *     *     *     shall,"  etc.     A  royal  charter  is  an  instru- 


§    74  PUBLIC    CORrORATIOXS.  80 

ment  in  writing  setting  forth  the  privileges  or  an  assurance  of  rights 
granted  by  the  sovereign  to  the  people. ^^  When  it  establishes  a  mu- 
nicipal corporation,  it  prescribes  the  territorial  limits,  the  form, 
methods  and  franchises  of  the  proposed  municipality,  very  much  as 
an  act  of  parliament  would.  It  is,  however,  addressed  by  the  king  to 
all  his  subjects,  and  names  the  persons  to  be  incorporated,  and  con- 
stitutes them  and  their  successors  a  body  corporate. ^^  Whether,  then, 
the  incorporation  be  by  means  of  a  formal,  special  document,  such  as 
a  charter  proper,  or  by  means  of  a  particular  enactment  of  the  gov- 
erning body,  or  whether  it  be  concealed  in  a  general  statute,  such  as 
the  Municipal  Corporations  Act,  it  is  equally  the  criterion  of  every 
right  and  privilege  enjoyed.  It  is  the  constitution  of  the  municipality. 
If  the  power  of  the  common  council,  or  of  the  city  executive,  be 
called  in  question,  the  charter,  in  whatever  form  it  exist,  has  to  be 
judicially  examined  and  construed.  If  the  right  to  lease  ferry  privi- 
leges is  controverted,  the  charter  is  the  controlling  witness  to  the  exist- 
ence or  lack  of  the  right. 

§  74.  What  charters  can  not  confer. — Judge  Hare,  in  his  learned 
treatise  on  American  Constitutional  Law,^^  in  discussing  charters  of 
incorporation,  and  particularly  whether  or  not  charters  confer  con- 
tractual rights  which  can  not  be  violated  consistently  with  the  consti- 
tution, draws  a  distinction  between  public  and  private  corporations 
in  this  regard,  and  points  out  not  only  that  the  powers  delegated  are 
liable  to  recall,  but  that  many  powers  can  not,  by  reason  of  their 
very  nature,  be  delegated  irrevocably.  "Many  powers,'^  he  argues, 
"and  among  them  the  power  to  coin  money  and  regulate  the  value 
thereof,  the  police  power  and  that  of  eminent  domain,  are  not 
only  sovereign,  but  so  essential  to  the  care  which  the  state  should 
have  for  the  lives  and  fortunes  of  its  citizens  that  they  can 
not  be  vested  irrevocably  in  private  hands,  or  exercised  save  for  a  pub- 
lic purpose ;  and  any  attempt  made  by  the  state  to  alienate  its  author- 
ity in  these  regards  will  be  merely  void,  and  may  be  so  treated  by 
the  courts."^^  The  same  writer  states  certain  qualifications  of  this 
general  proposition  as  follows:  "A  state  may  forego  the  power  of 
taxation,  but  can  not  confer  it ;  or,  in  other  words,  may  covenant  not 
to  tax  the  covenantee,  though  not  that  he  shall  have  the  right  to  tax 

2=  3  Amer.  &  Eng.  Encyc.  of  Law,  "'  Vol.  1,  p.  608. 

tit.  Charter.  "'  Beer  Co.  v.  Massachusetts,  97  U. 

^'A  royal  charter  may,  however,  S.  32:  Thorpe  v.  Rutland  &c.  R.  Co., 

empower   another   to    prescribe   the  27     Vt.     140;     Trustees     of     Public 

form,  appoint  the  officers  and  give  a  Schools  v.  Taylor,  30  N.  J.  Eq.  618. 
proper   name   to   the   municipality: 
Glover  Munic.  Corp.  24. 


81  THE    CHARTER.  §    75 

other  people.^^  So  the  powers  requisite  for  municipal  and  local  gov- 
ernment may  be  delegated  to  a  natural  or  artificial  person  appointed 
by  the  state,  or  chosen  by  the  inhabitants  of  a  town  or  district,  but 
can  not  be  vested  irrevocably  in  the  appointee;  and  a  stipulation  to 
that  effect  will  be  nugatory." 

§  75.  Wherein  the  constitutional  limitation  consists. — It  appears, 
therefore,  from  the  preceding  section,  that  the  federal  constitution, 
in  providing  that  no  state  shall  pass  any  law  impairing  the  obligation 
of  contracts,  looks  to  the  protection  of  property  rights  and  not  political 
rights.  The  latter  are  vested  in  the  people  at  large,  but  can  not  be 
vested  in  communities.  The  constitution  is  general,  and  embraces  in 
its  scope  every  citizen.  No  absolute  political  rights,  then,  can  vest 
in  any  one  individual  or  collection  of  individuals,  as  against  the  legis- 
lature, representing  the  people  at  large,  or  as  against  any  other  indi- 
vidual or  individuals.^*'  If  the  state,  therefore,  chooses  to  organize 
governmental  agencies, — as  all  public  corporations  are  shown  to  be 
under  the  rule  of  the  Dartmouth  College  case,'"^ — this  agency  can  be 
modified  or  revoked  at  any  time  by  the  state.  "This  is  true  of  all 
public  corporations,"  says  Judge  Hare,  in  the  treatise  to  which  refer- 
ence has  already  been  made,^^  "and  applies  with  full  force  to  the 
charters  which  confer  the  right  of  local  self-government  on  towns  and 
boroughs."^  ^  "One  distinctive  feature  of  such  an  agency  is  that  the 
legislature  creates  the  body  which  it  employs  and  authorizes,  another 
that  the  corporation  contracts  in  its  own  name,  and  not  on  the  credit  of 
the  citizens  individually,  or  of  the  state.  Hence,  when  it  is  dissolved, 
the  entire  fabric  crumbles,  and  if  another  is  substituted,  it  will  not 
necessarily  inherit  the  obligations  of  its  predecessor."^^ 

^  In  Trustees  of  Public  Schools  v.  ^^  Hare  Amer.  Const.  Law,  §  43. 

Taylor,   30  N.   J.   Bq.   618,   622,   the  ='=  Sharpless  v.   Mayor  &c.,   21    Pa. 

court  declared  it  was  impossible  for  St.  147,  149;  Kirby  v.  Shaw,  19  Pa. 

the  legislature  to  clothe  a  munici-  St.  258;   City  of  Erie  v.  Erie  Canal 

pality    with    the    power    of    taxing  Co.,  59  Pa.  St.  174;  President  &c.  v. 

state  property.    "Taxation,"  to  quote  Society  &c.,  24  N.  J.  L.  385;   Berlin 

the  language  of  the  master,  "is,  in  v.  Gorham,  34  N.  H.  266;  Butler  v. 

its  essence,  an  exercise  of  sovereign  Pennsylvania,  10  How.  402;  Newton 

power  over  an  inferior;  it  is  an  ex-  v.  Commissioners,  100  U.  S.  548. 

action,  payment  of  which  by  the  in-  ^^  Meriwether  v.  Garrett,  102  U.  S. 

ferior  is  compelled  by  the  superior."  472.     Further     on,     the     extent    to 

^"People  V.  Morris,  13  Wend.   (N.  which    municipal    obligations    rest 

Y.)  325,  337.  upon    the    organization    that    takes 

""a  Dartmouth    College    v.    Wood-  the  place  of  one  that  has  been  dis- 

ward,  4  Wheat.  518.  solved  will  be  more  fully  discussed. 
1  Smith — 6 


§    76  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  82 

§  76.  Acceptance — When  necessary. — As  in  the  case  of  private 
corporations,  so  also  in  the  case  of  strictly  municipal  corporations, 
such  as  cities,  there  must  be  an  acceptance  of  the  charter  either  ex- 
press or  implied.  In  this  respect  they  differ  from  public  quasi-corpo- 
rations. Cities  are  regarded  as  corporations  created  for  their  own 
benefit ;  while  inhabitants  of  a  district  invested  by  statute,  in  invitum, 
with  particular  powers,  arc  made  corporations  without  their  consent.'* 
One  feature  by  which  a  city  is  distinguished  from  a  county  is  in  that 
the  powers  under  a  county  government  are  conferred  by  the  legisla- 
ture irrespective  of  the  will  of  the  inhabitants  of  the  county ;  whereas 
the  inhabitants  of  a  city  must  determine  whether  they  will  accept 
the  corporate  powers  offered  them  to  be  exercised  by  the  officers  of 
their  own  selection.'^  In  other  words,  municipal  corporations  proper 
are  called  into  existence  through  the  direct  solicitation,  or  by  the  free 
consent  of  the  people  who  compose  them.  Counties  are  the  legal 
subdivisions  of  the  state,  created  by  the  sovereign  power  of  the  state, 
of  its  own  sovereign  will,  without  the  particular  solicitation,  consent, 
or  concurrent  action  of  the  people  who  inhabit  them.^**  An  act  in- 
corporating a  municipality  takes  effect  without  acceptance,  as  an  act ; 
and  yet  without  organization  thereunder  it  would  be  a  dead  letter.^^ 
The  legislature  may  provide  that  any  particular  charter  shall  not  take 
effect  until  accepted ;  and  it  can  prescribe  the  way  in  which  the  accept- 
ance shall  be  signified ;  as  that  it  must  be  by  a  majority  vote  of  the  in- 
habitants. And  if  such  provision  is  not  unconstitutional,  as  has  been 
repeatedly  held,'^  there  is  no  tenable  ground  to  take  against  its  going 
further,  and  prescribing  the  manner  in  which  such  majority  vote 
shall  be  ascertained.  Thus,  in  the  Ohio  case  just  cited,  the  township 
and  city  occupying  identical  territorial  limits,  and  the  legislature 
having  provided  that  an  amendment  to  the  city  charter  should  be 
accepted  by  a  majority  of  the  voters  of  the  city,  the  vote  was  proceeded 
to,  but  the  council  ordered  the  vote  to  be  taken  at  the  township  polls ; 
and  this  was  held  not  to  be  a  city  vote,  and  not  an  acceptance  within 
the  provisions  of  the  act,  for  the  voters  of  the  city  and  township  had 
to  possess  different  qualifications. 

**  Town  of  Waltham  v.  Kemper,  55  ^  Smith  v.   McCarthy,   56   Pa.   St. 

111.  346;  Kinnare  v.  City  of  Chicago,  359;    Commonwealth  v.  Painter,  10 

171  111.  332;  s.  c.  49  N.  E.  536.  Barr    (Pa.)    214;    Commonwealth  v. 

3»Kahn  v.  Sutro.  114  Cal.  316;  s.  c.  Quarter  Sessions,  8  Barr  (Pa.)  391; 

46  Pac.  87;  33  L.  R.  A.  620.  President  &c.  v.  Society  &c.,  24  N.  J. 

="  Board  &c.  v.  Mighels,  7  Ohio  St.  L.  385;    People  v.   Salomon,   51   111. 

109.  37;   Foote  v.  City  of  Cincinnati,  11 

"State  V.  Haines,  35  Or.  379;  s.  c,  Ohio  408. 
58  Pac.  39. 


83  THE    CHARTER.  §    77 

§  77.  The  same  subject  continued. — A  royal  charter  was  never 
operative  until  the  acceptance  of  those  to  be  incorporated  was  signi- 
fied. The  proposed  body  of  incorporators  were  supposed  to  receive 
and  consider  the  charter,  and  then  to  accept  or  reject  it.  If  they  ac- 
cepted it,  their  acceptance  was  irrevocable;  but  the  acceptance  had  to 
be  of  the  whole  charter,  or  it  was  deemed  to  be  rejected;  and  if  the 
crown  assented  to  the  proposed  alterations,  then  the  amended  charter 
was  offered  again  as  a  new  charter.  And  in  the  case  of  the  creation 
of  a  corporation  hj  the  legislature,  the  acceptance  of  the  charter,  or 
indeed,  whether  there  need  be  any  acceptance,  is  wholly  for  the  legis- 
lature to  say.  It  was  at  first  thought  unconstitutional  for  the  legis- 
lature to  provide  that  a  charter  shall  not  take  effect  until  accepted 
by  a  majority  of  the  inhabitants,  on  the  ground  that  it  is  a  delega- 
tion of  legislative  power.  The  courts  have,  however,  interpreted  it 
otherwise,  holding  such  a  provision  to  be  wholly  constitutional.  It  is 
not  a  delegation  of  legislative  power,  but  merely  the  declaration  by 
the  legislature  of  a  condition  precedent  to  incorporation ;  to  wit,  the 
vote  of  a  certain  proportion  of  the  inhabitants.^^  By  the  same  rea- 
soning, the  legislature  can  make  the  right  to  make  certain  improve- 
ments or  incur  certain  liabilities  depend  upon  a  vote  of  the  people 
interested.'*^  And  the  power  of  the  police  regulation,  one  of  the  most 
essential  attributes  of  sovereignty,  may  be  committed  to  the  majority 
of  the  citizens  in  separate  communities.*^     The  right  of  the  legisla- 

'"  Lafayette  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Geiger,  Brouwer  v.  Appleby,   1   Sandf.    (N. 

34  Ind.  185;   Hobart  v.  Supervisors,  Y.)    158;    People  v.  Stout,  23  Barb. 

17  Cal.  23;   Call  v.  Chadbourne,  46  (N.  Y.)    338;    State  v.   Babcock,  25 

Maine  206;    Bank  v.   Brown,   26  N.  Neb.  709;  s.  c.  41  N.  W.  654;  Berlin 

Y.   467;    People  v.   Salomon,   51   111.  v.  Gorham,  -34  N.  H.  266;    State  v. 

37;   Alcorn  v.  Hamer,  38  Miss.  652;  Canterbury,  28  N.  H.  195;  Bristol  v. 

President  &c.  v.   Society  &c.,  24  N.  New  Chester,  3  N.  H.  524;   Inhabit- 

J.   L.   385;    People   v.   Reynolds,   10  ants    &c.     v.     Inhabitants    &c.,     21 

111.  1;  State  v.  Noyes,  30  N.  H.  279;  Maine  58;  State  v.  Curran,  12  Ark. 

Sedgwick  Constr.  of  Stat.  &  Const.  321;    People    v.    Wren,    5    111.    269; 

Law  135,  n.     A  statute  submitting  Coles   v,  Madison    Co.,    1    111.    154; 

to    the    people    of    several    munici-  Warren  v.  Mayor  &c.,  2  Gray  (Mass.) 

palities  the  question  whether  they  84;    Morford  v.  Unger,   8   Iowa  82; 

shall  be  consolidated  is  valid:  Smith  People   v.    City   of   Butte,    4    Mont. 

V.  McCarthy,  56  Pa.  St.  359.  174;  s.  c.  1  Pac.  414. 

■"'  For    decisions    holding    accept-        "  The   "local   option"   liquor  laws 

ance  not  to  be  essential,  see  People  are  instances  in  point.     These  have 

V.   Morris,   13   Wend.    (N.   Y.)    325;  been  declared  constitutional  in  many 

People  v.  President  &c.,  9  Wend.  (N.  courts.     Said  the  supreme  court  of 

Y.)  351;  Fire  Department  v.  Kip,  10  errors  of  Connecticut: — "The  law  is 

Wend.  (N.  Y.)  267;  Proprietors  &c.  perfect   and    complete   as   it   comes 

v.  Horton,  6  Hill  (N.  Y.)  501;  Wood  from  the  hands  of  the  law-making 

V.  President  &c.,  9  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  194;  power:"   State  v.  Wilcox,  42  Conn. 


§    78  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  84 

tiire  to  organize  mimicipalities  regardless  of  the  consent  of  those  to  he 
affected  rests  on  the  very  theory  of  our  government.  That  theory  is 
that  it  is  a  government  hy  the  people,  who  act  through  their  repre- 
sentatives. They  delegate  their  authority  to  their  agents,  who  speak 
and  act  for  them  in  making  laws,  and  hence  they  are  hound  hy  prop- 
erly enacted  laws  promulgated  by  their  agents.  They  give  their  con- 
sent to  these  laws  by  clothing  their  agents  with  power  and  authority 
to  make  them,  and  there  is,  therefore,  no  reserved  power  in  the  people 
to  consent  to  or  reject  laws  properly  enacted  by  their  lawfully  consti- 
tuted agents.'*^ 

§  78.  Compulsory  acceptance. — In  no  respect  is  the  distinction  be- 
tween private  and  public  corporations,  such  as  counties,  more  marked 
than  in  the  fact  that  no  private  corporation,  or  rather  body  of  indi- 
viduals, can  be  incorporated  compulsorily,  while  in  the  case  of  public 
corporations  the  rule  is  otherwise.  The  reason  is  evident;  for  a  pri- 
vate corporation  by  its  incorporation  enters  into  a  contract  with  the 
legislative  power;  when  it  accepts  its  charter  the  grant  is  irrevocable, 
and  the  contractual  rights  can  not  be  impaired  or  destroyed  by  any 
subsequent  act  of  legislation;*^  but  when  the  legislative  body  deter- 
mines that  the  public  interest  demands  that  a  city  or  other  municipal 
corporation  should  be  incorporated,  it  can  confer  the  necessary  fran- 
chises and  impose  the  necessary  duties  on  the  inhabitants  of  the 
place.  As  a  matter  of  fact  the  prevalence  of  general  laws  on  the  sub- 
ject of  the  incorporation  of  municipalities  makes  this  question  of 
acceptance  of  less  importance,  inasmuch  as  under  a  general  law  it  is 
only  possible  to  prescribe  under  what  conditions  certain  communities 
can  avail  themselves  of  the  provisions  of  the  act  and  become  munici- 
palities. Acceptance,  then,  is  implied  when  a  particular  community 
avails  itself  of  the  said  provisions,  and  is  constituted  a  municipality.*** 

364;  s.  c.  19  Am.  R.  536;  Common-  480.  Under  the  classification  of 
wealth  v.  Bennett,  108  Mass.  30;  cities  made  by  Pennsylvania  act  of 
Commonwealth  v.  Dean,  110  Mass.  May  23,  1874,  a  city  having  more 
357;  State  v.  Noyes,  10  Foster  (N.  than  ten  thousand  population  by  the 
H.)  279;  State  v.  Court  of  Common  last  decennial  census  became  ipso 
Pleas,  36  N.  J.  L.  72;  s.  c.  13  Am.  R.  facto  a  city  of  the  third  class  with- 
422.  out  accepting  or  adopting  the  provi- 
■•-Angell  &  Ames  Corp.,  §  79,  and  sions  of  the  act:  Commonwealth  v. 
cases  cited;  People  v.  City  of  Butte,  McGroarty,  6  Kulp  (Pa.)  195. 
4  Mont.  174;  s.  c.  1  Pac.  414;  Medi-  ^*  Dartmouth  College  v.  Wood- 
cal  Inst.  V.  Patterson,  1  Den.  (N.  ward,  4  Wheat.  518. 
Y.)  61;  s.  c.  5  Den.  (N.  Y.)  618;  "A  failure  to  proceed  in  the  man- 
Myers  V.  Irwin,  2  S.  &  R.  (Pa.)  368;  ner  prescribed  invalidates  the  char- 
Wells  V.  Burbank,  17  N.  H.  393;  So-  ter:  People  v.  Gunn,  85  Cal.  238;  s. 
ciety  &c.  v.  Town  of  Pawlet,  4  Pet.  c.  24  Pac.  718. 


85  THE    CHARTER.  §    79 

Supposing  that  the  general  law  provides  that  whenever  the  inhabit- 
ants, or  a  majority  thereof,  of  a  commnnity  containing  at  least  so 
many  inhabitants,  desire  to  be  incorporated  as  a  municipality,  they 
shall  express  such  desire  by  a  petition  to  a  certain  authority,  and 
upon  such  petition  an  election  shall  be  held  to  ascertain  the  wishes  of 
the  inhabitants,  with  similar  regulations,  after  which  the  community 
shall  be  a  village  or  town,  or  city  of  the  first,  second  or  third  class, 
as  the  case  may  be,  the  incorporation  becomes  the  voluntary  act  of 
the  incorporators,  and  is  compulsory  only  in  cases  where  there  is  dis- 
sent on  the  part  of  a  minority,  who  are  bound  by  the  majority's  action. 

§  79.  Charters,  how  proved. — The  charter  of  a  municipality  incor- 
porated by  the  legislature  is  matter  of  public  record  and  knowledge, 
like  any  other  act  of  the  legislature ;  consequently  the  courts  will  take 
judicial  notice  thereof.  This  is  as  of  course  when  the  charter  is  de- 
clared to  be  a  public  statute ;  but.there  are  a  number  of  cases — for  ex- 
ample, in  Alabama*^ — holding  that,  even  when  the  act  of  incorpora- 
tion is  merely  public  or  general  in  its  nature  and  purposes,  and  is  not 
expressly  declared  to  be  a  public  statute,  the  courts  will  judicially 
notice  it.  But  while  the  charter  is  judicially  noticed  by  the  courts, 
the  laws  or  ordinances  enacted  by  the  municipality  are  not  so  noticed 
unless  by  the  courts  of  the  municipality.  This  is  true  both  in  England 
and  America."*®  Therefore,  when  any  such  by-laws  or  ordinances  are 
to  be  pleaded  they. must  be  pleaded  in  substance.  If  the  charter  or  a 
statute  directs  the  courts  judicially  to  notice  such  ordinances,  the 
statute  prevails  over  the  general  rule  and  the  courts  are  bound  by  it. 
How,  then,  is  this  charter  brought  before  a  court  ?  How  is  it  proved  ? 
Courts  will  take  judicial  notice  of  a  charter  of  a  municipality  whether 
it  be  in  the  form  of  a  general  statute  or  be  declared  to  be  general  or 
public  in  its  character  or  purposes.  It  being  an  expression  of  the 
supreme  will  of  the  state,  the  courts  will  presume  it  to  be  a  matter  of 
universal  knowledge  within  the  state;  therefore  it  need  not  be  spe- 
cially pleaded.*'^    But  if  it  prove  necessary  to  establish  the  fact  that  a 

*'Albrittin  v.  Mayor  &c.,  60  Ala.  Wells,  8  Iowa  286;   Conboy  v.  Iowa 

486;  Ferryman  v.  City  of  Greenville,  City,  2  Iowa  90;   Cox  v.  City  of  St. 

51  Ala.  507,  510;  Case  v.  Mayor  &c.,  Louis,  11  Mo.  431;   People  v.  Mayor 

30  Ala.  538;  Smoot  v.  Mayor  &c.,  24  &c.,  7  How.  Pr.   (N.  Y.)   84;  Harker 

Ala.  112,  121.  V.  Mayor  &c.,  17  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  199; 

^''Norris  v.  Staps,  Hob.  211;   s.  c.  City  of  New  Orleans  v.  Boudra,  14 

Willc.    166,   pi.    403;    Willc.   172,   pi.  La.  An.  303;    Trustees  v.  Lefler,  23 

423;  Willc.  173,  pi.  425;  Broadnac's  111.  90;   Mooney  v.  Kennett,  19  Mo. 

Case,  1  Vent.  196;  Barber  Surgeons  551. 

v.  Pelson,   2   Lev.   252;    Goodrich  v.  ^^  Smoot  v.  Mayor  &c.,  24  Ala.  112, 

Brown,    30    Iowa    291;     Garvin    v.  121;  Case  v.  Mayor  &c.,  30  Ala.  538; 


§    80  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  86 

municipality  was  duly  incorporated,  the  charter  itself — ^that  is  to  say, 
the  act  or  a  true  copy  thereof,  certified  or  otherwise  authenticated — 
is  admissible,  and  such  evidence  would  be  primary.  In  the  absence 
of  primary  evidence,  it  is  proper  to  produce  secondary  or  parol  evi- 
dence.*'^ 

§  80.  Proof  of  fact  of  incorporation. — Although  the  charter  of  a 
city  may  be  judicially  noticed,  yet  it  may  be  the  case  that  the  corporate 
existence  of  a  municipality  is  alleged,  while  there  is  no  charter  for  the 
courts  judicially  to  notice.  This  would  occur  in  the  case  of  a  corpora- 
tion by  prescription.  In  such  case,  proof  of  user  of  corporate  privi- 
leges is  admissible,  and  it  is  competent  to  show  that  the  town  has  for 
many  years  exercised  corporate  powers.  Or  it  may  be  that  the  legis- 
lature has  passed  an  act  conferring  some  additional  right  or  duty  on 
the  town,  thus  giving  it,  as  it  were,  legislative  recognition.'*^  The 
principle  is  that  the  public  is  the  party  interested  in  the  incorporation 
of  municipalities,  and  if  the  public  chooses  to  consider  an  existing 
unincorporated  municipality  as  incorporate,  and  waives  its  right  to 
refuse  its  recognition,  no  one  else  is  in  a  position  to  assert  that  it  is 
not  a  corporate  body.  Eeputation  and  user  are  therefore  competent 
to  be  proven  to  establish  corporate  existence.^ '^  While  there  may  have 
been  irregularities  in  the  incorporation  of  a  municipality,  yet  the 
courts  will  not  favor  their  interposition  long  afterward  to  disprove 
corporate  existence.  ^^     And  in  no  case  can  the  legal  character  of  a 

Ferryman  v.  City  of  Greenville,  51  ates  to  cure  all  defects  in  steps  lead- 
Ala.  507;  Albrittin  v.  Mayor  &c.,  60  ing  up  to  the  organization,  and 
Ala.  486.  makes  a  de  jure  out  of  what  before 

**  Proprietors  &c.  v.  Battles,  6  Vt.  was  only  a  de  facto  corporation:" 

395  (a  certified  copy  from  the  secre-  Brewer,  J.,  in  Comanche  Co.  v.  Lew- 

tary    of   state    was   admitted    when  is,  133  U.  S.  198,  202;  s.  c.  10  S.  Ct. 

the  original  could  not  be  found   in  286. 

the  town  clerk's  office);   Blackstone  ^"Barnes  v.  Barnes,  6  Vt.  388;  Bas- 

V.  White,  41   Pa.   St.   330    (a  sworn  sett  v.  Porter,  4  Cush.  (Mass.)  487; 

copy — not  official — held  to  be  proper  Dillingham   v.   Snow,   5   Mass.   547; 

secondary     evidence);     Inhabitants  Ryder  v.   Railroad   Co.,  13   111.   516, 

&c.  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  12  Mass.  400  523;    President   &c.    v.    McKean,    10 

(a  case  of  proof  by  parol).     Courts  Johns.     (N.    Y.)     154;     Owings    v. 

will  not  take  judicial  notice  of  an  Speed,  5  Wheat.  420;   Town  of  Lon- 

act  incorporating  a  city  and  of  the  donderry   v.   Town   of   Andover,   28 

powers     granted     in     the     charter:  Vt.  416;   Sherwin  v.  Bugbee,  16  Vt. 

Downs  v.  Commissioners  &c.,  2  Pen.  439. 

(Del.)  132;  s.  c.  45  Atl.  717.  "Fitch  v.  Pinckard,  5  111.  69,  76; 

^""It  is  universally  affirmed  that  Jameson  v.  People,  16  111.  257;  Dun- 
when  a  legislature  has  full  power  to  ning  v.   New  Albany  &c.  R.  Co.,  2 
create  corporations,  its  act  recogniz-  Ind.  437.     See  also,  Smith  v.  Board 
ing  as  valid  a  de  facto  corporation,  &c.,  45  Fed.  725. 
whether  private  or  municipal,  oper- 


87  THE    CHARTER.  §    81 

de  facto  municipal  corporation  be  collaterally  impeached  by  private 
citizens :  it  belongs  to  the  state  alone,  by  the  proper  officers,  to  insti- 
tute proceedings  in  which  the  regularity  of  its  incorporation  may  be 
determined. ^- 

§81.  Proof  of  corporate  existence. — A  recent  writer  has  said: 
*'The  charter  or  the  act  of  incorporation  of  a  municipality,  like  rec- 
ords generally,  are  [is]  to  be  proved  by  inspection,  or  by  copies  [a 
copy]  properly  authenticated;  but  if  there  be  sufficient  proof  of  the 
loss  or  destruction  of  the  record,  much  inferior  evidence  of  its  contents 
may  be  admitted."^^  When  the  inquiry  into  the  corporate  existence  of 
a  municipality  is  merely  collateral,  only  that  the  municipality  exists 
de  facto  need  be  proved.^*  The  incorporation  of  a  town  may  be  proved 
by  reputation,  or  by  long  user  of  corporate  powers,  or,  as  we  have  pre- 
viously seen,  by  grants  from  the  legislature  implying  a  corporate  exist- 
ence.^^ It  is  not  conclusive  proof  of  no  previous  corporate  existence 
that  a  town  has  been  incorporated  under  act  of  the  legislature,  for  it 
may  have  desired  to  obtain  the  rights  and  privileges  given  by  virtue 
of  some  general  statute;  at  the  most  it  would  be  a  question  for  the 
jury.  So  in  an  action  against  a  village,  it  was  held  that  a  recital  in 
a  statute  to  the  effect  that  the  village  had  been  incorporated  was 
proof  of  such  incorporation.^^ 

§  82.  General  rules  of  construction  of  charters. — "It  is  a  well- 
settled  rule,  in  regard  to  acts  of  incorporation,  that  they  must  be 
strictly  construed,  and  especially  municipal  corporations,  for  the  rea- 
son that  as  they  are  invested  with  a  portion  of  the  authority  which 
properly  appertains  to  the  sovereign  power  of  the  state,  they  must 
be  confined  to  those  powers  which  are  clearly  granted,  as  it  is  only 
by  such  grants  that  the  government  proper  can  surrender  its  just 

^'Mendenhall  v.  Burton,  42  Kan,  bee,   16  Vt.   439;    Town  of  London- 

570;  s.  c.  22  Pac.  558.  derry  v.   Town   of  Andover,   28   Vt. 

"15  Am.  &  Eng.  Encyc.  of  Law,  416;  Dunning  v.  New  Albany  &c.  R, 

tit.  Municipal  Corporations,  §  10,  p.  Co.,  2  Ind.  437;  Owings  v.  Speed,  5 

965.  Wheat.  420.     See  also,  the  preceding 

^*  Parol    proof    of    incorporation:  section. 

Robie  v.  Trustees,  35  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  °=  See  Bow  v.  Allenstown,  34  N.  H. 

319;    President   &c.   v.   McKean,    10  351;    New  Boston  v.  Dunbarton,  15 

Johns.    (N.    Y.)    154,    159;    Billing-  N.  H.  201. 

ham  V.  Snow,  5  Mass.  547;   Bassett  '"Fox  v.  Village  of  Fort  Edward, 

V.    Porter,    4    Cush.     (Mass.)     487;  48  Hun  (N.  Y.)  363;  s.  c.  1  N.  Y.  S. 

Fitch  v.  Pinckard,  5  111.  76;   Jame-  81.     See,  as  to  manner  of  proving 

son  v.  People,  16  111.  257;  Barnes  v.  organization    under    a   general    act, 

Barnes,  6  Vt.  388;  Proprietors  &c.  v.  Louisville  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Shires,  108 

Battles,  6  Vt.  395;    Sherwin  v.  Bug-  111.  617. 


83 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS. 


88 


authority."^^  But  where  the  inquiry  is  merely  as  to  whether  there 
is  a  corporation,  the  foregoing  rule  does  not  apply,  and  every  intend- 
ment must  be  taken  in  favor  of  the  sufficiency  of  the  legislative  ac- 
tion. ^^  And  where  the  extent  of  the  powers  conferred  has  been  ascer- 
tained by  the  cardinal  rule  of  interpretation,  the  exercise  of  authority 
within  the  recognized  limits  is  favored  by  the  courts."**  The  charter 
of  a  city  in  Michigan  empowered  the  common  council  to"  "issue  new 
bonds  for  the  refunding  of  bonds  and  evidences  of  indebtedness  al- 
ready issued;"  and  in  deciding  that  a  judgment  against  the  city  was 
within  the  language  quoted  Judge  Cooley  said:  "When  a  power 
is  conferred  which  in  its  exercise  concerns  only  the  municipality 
and  can  wrong  or  injure  no  one,  there  is  not  the  slightest  reason  for 
any  strict  or  literal  interpretation  with  a  view  to  narrowing  its  con- 
struction.'"^^  That  is  good  sense,  and  it  is  the  application  of  correct 
principles  in  municipal  affairs.  The  whole  instrument,  all  preceding 
charters,  the  general  legislation  of  the  state,  and  the  object  of  the 
legislature  in  the  erection  of  municipalities,  should  be  consulted  in 
constrmng  particular  provisions  of  charters.^^ 


"  Leonard  v.  City  of  Canton,  35 
Miss.  189,  190;  Minturn  v.  Larue,  23 
How.  435;  City  of  Lafayette  v.  Cox, 
5  Ind.  38;  President  &c.  v.  Mayor 
&c.,  7  Ohio  (pt.  2)  31;  Thomas  v. 
City  of  Richmond,  12  Wall.  349; 
Willard  v.  Killingworth,  8  Conn. 
247;  Port  Huron  v.  McCall,  46  Mich. 
565,  574;  s.  c.  10  N.  W.  23;  Nichol  v. 
Mayor  &c.,  9  Humph.  (Tenn.)  252; 
Henderson  v.  City  of  Covington,  14 
Bush  (Ky.)  312;  Sedgwick  Constr. 
of  Stat.  &  Const.  Law  338;  1  Dillon 
Munic.  Corp.,  §  91;  15  Am.  &  Eng. 
Encyc.  of  Law  1041. 

="  State  V.  Young,  3  Kan.  445. 

='Kyle  V.  Malin,  8  Ind.  34.  "The 
strictness  to  be  observed  in  giving 
construction  to  municipal  charters 
should  be  such  as  to  carry  into  effect 
every  power  clearly  intended  to  be 
conferred  on  the  municipality  and 
every  power  necessarily  implied  in 
order  to  the  complete  exercise  of  the 
powers  granted:"  Smith  v.  City  of 
Madison,  7  Ind.  86,  87. 

^''Port  Huron  v.  McCall,  46  Mich. 
565,  574;  s.  c.  10  N.  W.  23. 

"1    Dillon    Munic.    Corp.,    §    87; 


Thomason  v.  Ashworth,  73  Cal.  73; 
s.  c.  14  Pac.  615;  Chicago  Dock  &c. 
Co.  V.  Garrity,  115  111.  155;  s.  c.  3  N. 
E.  448;  Holland  v.  Mayor  &c.,  11 
Md.  186;  Moran  v.  Long  Island  City, 
101  N.  Y.  439;  s.  c.  5  N.  E.  80;  Bab- 
cock  V.  City  of  Helena,  34  Ark.  499. 
Construction  of  charter  of  Greater 
New  York  in  relation  to  board  of 
assessors:  People  v.  Feitner,  156  N. 
Y.  694;  s.  c.  51  N.  E.  1093.  Con- 
struction of  charter  of  Greater  New 
York  in  relation  to  abolishing  Rich- 
mond Hill  and  effect  upon  officers: 
Fire  Department  &c.  v.  Davies,  25 
Misc.  (N.  Y.)  683;  s.  c.  54  N.  Y.  S. 
1077.  Construction  of  charter  of 
Greater  New  York  in  relation  to  of- 
ficials in  justices'  courts:  People  v. 
Van  Wart,  25  Misc.  (N.  Y.)  215;  s.  c. 
55  N.  Y.  S.  68;  McKenna  v.  City  of 
New  York,  34  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  152; 
s.  c.  54  N.  Y.  S.  634.  Charter  of 
Kansas  City,  Mo.,  is  constitutional: 
City  of  Kansas  City  v.  Bacon  (In  re 
North  Terrace  Park),  147  Mo.  259; 
s.  c.  48  S.  W.  860.  Construction  of 
charter  of  the  city  of  Kansas  City  in 
relation  to  eminent  domain:  City  of 


89  THE   CHARTER.  •     §   83 

§  83.  Can  charters  be  modified  ? — All  public  corporations  created 
for  municipal  purposes  may  be  controlled,  and  have  their  charters 
amended  and  altered,  at  the  pleasure  of  the  legislature.®^  Still,  it 
is  conceivable  that  the  legislature  may  in  incorporating  a  municipality 
make  a  grant  in  the  nature  of  a  contract  with  the  municipality, 
which  contract  it  can  neither  impair  nor  resume.®^  And  moreover, 
the  power  of  the  legislature  to  change  existing  charters  at  pleasure 
is  modified  by  the  constitution  of  the  United  States.  For  example, 
no  state  can  so  legislate  as  to  prevent  an  existing  municipality 
from  performing  any  contract  it  may  have  entered  into,  for  the  reason 
that  no  state  can  pass  a  law  impairing  the  obligation  of  contracts.®* 
Mr.  Justice  Clifford,  in  discussing  the  relations  of  the  legislature  to 
municipalities  which  it  has  created,  said:®^  "Corporations  of  a 
municipal  character,  such  as  towns,  are  usually  organized  in  this 
country  by  special  acts  or  pursuant  to  some  general  state  law; 
and  it  is  clear  that  their  powers  and  duties  differ  in  some 
important  particulars  from  the  towns  which  existed  in  the  parent 
country  before  the  Eevolution,  when  they  were  created  by  special 
charters  from  the  crown,  and  acquired  many  of  their  privileges  by 
prescription,  without  any  aid  from  parliament.  Corporate  franchises 
of  the  kind  granted  during  that  period  partook  much  more  largely 
of  the  nature  of  private  corporations  than  do  the  municipalities  cre- 
ated in  this  country,  and  known  as  towns,  cities  and  villages.®®  Power 
exists  here  in  the  legislature,  not  only  to  fix  the  boundaries  of  such 
a  municipality  when  incorporated,  but  to  enlarge  or  diminish  the 
same  subsequently,  without  the  consent  of  the  residents,  by  annexa- 
tion or  set-off,  unless  restrained  by  the  constitution,  even  against 
the  remonstrance  of  every  property  holder  and  voter  within  the  limits 
of  the  original  municipality."®'^     Neither  a  charter  of  a  municipal 

Kansas  City  v.  Marsh  Oil  Co.,  140  "  Mount  Pleasant  v.  Beckwith,  100 

Mo.  458;  s.  c.  41  S.  W.  943.  U.  S.  514,  532;  Von  Hoffman  v.  City 

«=  State  v.  Mayor  &c.,  R.  M.  Charl.  of   Quincy,    4    Wall.    535,    554.     See 

(Ga.)     250.     And    amendatory    acts  Lee  Co.  v.  Rogers,  7  Wall.  181,  184; 

are  not  local  or  private  within  the  Butz  v.  City  of  Muscatine,  8  Wall, 

meaning     of     constitutional     provi-  575,  583;  Furman  v.  Nichol,  8  Wall, 

sions    requiring    such    laws    to    em-  44,   62;    Dillon  Munic.   Corp.,   §   69; 

brace  only  one  subject,  and  that  to  State  v.  City  of  Milwaukee,  25  Wis. 

be  expressed  in  the  title:  Thompson  122;  Brooklyn  Park  Com'rs  v.  Arm- 

V.  City  of  Milwaukee,  69  Wis.  492;  strong,  45  N.  Y.  234. 

s.  c.  34  N.  W.  402.     See  also,  Sheri-  "^  Mount  Pleasant  v.  Beckwith,  100 

dan  v.  City  of  Salem,  14  Or.  328;  s.  U.  S.  514,  531. 

c.  12  Pac.  925.  ''The  dissimilarities  are  well  set 

'*  Richland   Co.   v.    Lawrence   Co.,  forth    by    Chief    Justice    Perley,    in 

12  111.  1.  Eastman  v.  Meredith,  36  N.  H.  284. 

'^  See    further,    as    to    repeal    or 


§  84 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS. 


90 


corporation  nor  any  statute  regulating  the  use  of  property  held  by 
the  municipality  for  governmental  or  public  purposes  is  a  contract 
within  the  meaning  of  the  federal  constitution.*'* 

§  84.    How  far  the  state  can  enforce  performance  of  local  duties. — 

Where  the  legislative  control  is  confined  simply  to  municipal  corpora- 
tions as  agencies  of  the  state  in  its  government,  then  this  legislative 
control  is  ample/®  because  in  all  matters  of  general  concern  there 
is  no  local  right  to  act  independently  of  the  state.  The  local  authori- 
ties of  a  city  have  no  right,  and  can  not  be  permitted,  to  determine 
for  themselves  whether,  for  example,  they  will  contribute  through 
taxation  to  the  support  of  the  state  government,  or  assist,  when  called 
upon  by  the  state,  to  suppress  insurrection,  or  aid  in  the  enforcement 
of  the  police  laws.  Upon  all  subjects  the  state  may  exercise  compul- 
sory authority  and  may  enforce  the  performance  of  local  duties.''*' 
But  at  the  same  time  the  fact  remains  and  must  not  be  lost  sight  of, 
that  municipal  corporations  have  objects  and  purposes  peculiarly 
local,  in  which  the  state  at  large  has  legally  no  concern  whatever, 
and  in  wliich  it  is  not  its  function  to  intermeddle,  except  in  so  far  as 
it  confers  the  powers  and  can  regulate  their  exercise.''^ 


change  of  charter,  Town  of  East 
Hartford  v.  Hartford  Bridge  Co.,  10 
How.  551;  Pi  qua  Branch  &c.v.Knoop, 
16  How.  369;  Girard  v.  Philadelphia, 
7  Wall.  1;  State  v.  Mayor  &c.,  24 
Ala.  701;  City  of  Little  Rock  v.  Par- 
ish, 36  Ark.  166;  State  v.  Jennings, 
27  Ark.  419;  Crook  v.  People,  106  111. 
237;  State  v.  Troth,  34  N.  J.  L.  377, 
379;  State  v.  Branin,  23  N.  J.  L.  484; 
Mayor  &c.  v.  Jersey  City  R.  Co.,  20 
N.  J.  Eq.  360;  Philadelphia  v.  Fox, 
64  Pa.  St.  169;  City  of  Reading  v. 
Keppleman,  61  Pa.  St.  233;  Buckner 
v.  Gordon,  81  Ky.  665;  Boyd  v. 
Chambers,  78  Ky.  140;  In  re  Hinkle, 
31  Kan.  712;  s.  c.  3  Pac.  531;  Dema- 
rest  v.  Mayor  &c.,  74  N.  Y.  161;  Gray 
v.  -City  of  Brooklyn,  2  Abb.  App. 
Dec.  (N.  Y.)  267;  People  v.  Morris, 
13  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  325;  Berlin  v.  Gor- 
ham,  34  N.  H.  266;  Cobb  v.  Kingman, 
15  Mass.  197;  Smith  v.  Village  of 
Adrian,  1  Mich.  495;  Roberts  Case,  51 
Mich.  548;  s.  c.  17  N.  W.  50;  Inhabi- 
tants &c.  V.  North  Yarmouth,  34 
Maine  411;   Inhabitants  &c.  v.  Skill- 


ings,  45  Maine  133;  Carpenter  v.  Peo- 
ple. 8  Colo.  116;  s.  c.  5  Pac.  828;  Clin- 
ton V.  Cedar  Rapids  &c.  R.  Co.,  24 
Iowa  455;  State  v.  Mayor  &c.,  R.  M. 
Charl.  (Ga.)  250;  Mayor  v.  Steam- 
boat Co.,  R.  M.  Charl.  (Ga.)  342; 
People  v.  Burr,  13  Cal.  343;  City  of 
San  Francisco  v.  Canavan,  42  Cal. 
541;  Town  of  Marietta  v.  Fearing,  4 
Ohio  St.  427;  Scovill  v.  Cleveland,  1 
Ohio  St.  126;  Lynch  v.  Lafland,  4 
Coldw.  (Tenn.)  96;  Daniel  v.  Mayor 
&c.,  11  Humph.  (Tenn.)  582;  Guild 
v.  City  of  Chicago,  82  111.  472;  Ken- 
nedy v.  City  of  Sacramento,  19  Fed. 
580. 

"^  Covington  v.  Kentucky,  173  U.  S_. 
231;  s.  c.  19  S.  Ct.  383;  New  Orleans 
V.  New  Orleans  &c.  Co.,  142  U.  S.  79; 
s.  c.  12  S.  Ct.  142. 

"'•  People  V.  Hurlbut,  24  Mich.  44. 

""People  V.  Council  &c.,  28  Mich. 
236,  by  Cooley,  J.,  who  treats  the 
subject  in  an  exhaustive  essay  with 
characteristic  clearness  and  learn- 
ing. 

■'  Cf.  "Power  of  the  Legislature  to 
Compel  Levy  of  Tax  by  Municipal 


91  THE    CHARTER.  '  §   85 

§  85  Change  in  municipal  boundaries. — The  right  to  increase  or 
diminish  the  area  of  a  municipality  must  be  given  by  the  legislature 
— the  same  power  which  is  competent  to  amend  the  charter;  for  any 
change  in  the  boundaries  of  a  municipality — whether  the  territory  be 
enlarged  or  diminished,  or  whether  a  division  of  territory  be  made, 
or  any  change  whatsoever  be  effected  in  boundaries  or  otherwise — 
must  necessarily  contract  or  enlarge  the  sphere  of  the  municipal 
jurisdiction;  and  therefore  it  constitutes  pro  tanto  an  amendment 
of  an  existing  charter.  The  power  is  thus  clearly  legislative,  and  it 
is,  in  general,  incapable  of  being  delegated.  In  that  it  is  legislative 
it  can  not  be  conferred  on  the  judiciary.  The  courts  can  not  then 
determine  to  what  extent  a  city  can  acquire  additional  territory, 
or  whether  it  can  or  can  not  acquire  it,  except  in  so  far  as  such  ques- 
tions may  arise  in  construing  and  interpreting  the  city  charter. 
The  legislature  may,  however,  delegate  to  the  municipal  corporation 
itself  power  and  authority  to  make  changes  in  its  boundaries ;  because 
this  is  not  in  fact  a  delegation  of  legislative  power;  it  is  in  legal 
intent  only  a  provision  by  the  legislature  that  if  certain  exigencies 
arise  and  certain  conditions  then  exist,  then,  and  in  that  event,  the 
boundaries  may  be  altered  or  enlarged.  No  discretion  is  given;  and 
if  the  city  proceeds  to  enlarge  its  boundaries,  supposing  the  conditions 
to  exist  when  as  a  matter  of  fact  they  do  not,  the  courts  will  pronounce 
the  action  invalid  and  void.'^ 

§  86.    Effect  of  amendments  of  charter  on  city  ordinances. — It  is 

often  necessary  to  inquire  whether  the  ordinances  of  a  city  passed 
prior  to  the  enactment  of  certain  amendments  to  the  city  charter  are 
affected  thereby.  It  is  the  better  view  to  hold  that  they  are  not  the 
less  binding  on  that  account.  The  acquisition  of  a  new  charter  by  a 
city  does  not  abrogate  city  ordinances  passed  under  the  old  charter 
unless  they  are  clearly  inconsistent  therewith  ;'^^  nor  would  the  ordi- 
nances of  a  city,  or  the  provisions  of  its  charter,^*  be  affected  by  a 
general  law,  unless  they  were  obviously  inconsistent.  Thus,  in  Mis- 
Corporations,"  a  note  by  T.  Burwell,  "  Under  a  constitutional  provision 
11  Am.  L.  Reg.  (N.  S.)  80.  that  city  charters  must  be  "consist- 

"  City  of  Galesburg  v.  Hawkinson,  ent  with  and  subject  to  the  constitu- 
75  111.  152,  156.  A  city  partly  situ-  tion  and  laws  of  this  state/'  a  char- 
ated  in  two  counties  has  its  situs  in  ter  will  not  be  declared  invalid  in 
the  county  where  its  municipal  of-  toto  because  a  few  of  its  provisions 
fices  and  government  are  located:  may  conflict  with  general  statutes: 
Fox  v.  City  of  Postoria,  60  Ohio  St.  Brooks  v.  Fischer,  79  Cal.  173;  s.  c. 
340;  s.  c.  54  N.  B.  370.  21  Pac.  652;   4  L.  R.  A.  429;    In  re 

"State  v.  Natal,  39  La.  An.  439;     Strand  (Cal.),  21  Pac.  654. 
s.  c.  1  So.  923. 


§    87  PUBLIC    CORPORATION'S.  92 

souri  the  court  held,  in  a  case  where  the  city  charter  authorized  the 
mayor  and  aldermen  to  remove  for  cause  any  person  holding  an  office 
created  by  the  charter  or  by  ordinance,  that  it  was  not  inconsistent 
with,  and  therefore  not  repealed  by,  a  general  act  providing  for  the 
removal  from  office  of  any  officer  who  did  not  actually  spend  his  time 
in  performing  the  duties  of  his  office,  or  of  any  official  guilty  of  will- 
ful violation  or  neglect  of  his  official  duty.'^ 

§  87.  Reorganization  under  general  law — Effect  of. — When  a  char- 
ter is  amended,  we  have  elsewhere  seen  that  it  has  no  effect  on  ordi- 
nances passed  prior  to  the  amendment  which  are  not  inconsistent 
with  the  charter  as  amended.  It  is  usually  held  that  a  mere  amend- 
ment of  a  charter  has  no  effect  on  city  officers,  so  as  to  determine  their 
tenure  of  office.  But  suppose  an  incorporated  municipality  reorgan- 
izes under  a  general  incorporation  act,  it  is  clear  that  the  reorganiza- 
tion must  have  some  effect  upon  the  officers  under  the  old  charter. 
This  effect  is  to  abrogate  their  tenure  of  office,  unless  the  general  law 
contains  some  saving  clause  continuing  them  in  office.'^®  "Where  a 
new  form  is  given  to  an  old  municipal  corporation,  or  such  corporation 
is  reorganized  under  a  new  charter,  taking  in  its  new  organization 
the  place  of  the  old  one,  embracing  substantially  the  same  corporators 
and  the  same  territory,  it  will  be  presumed  that  the  legislature  in- 
tended a  continued  existence  of  the  same  corporation,  although  dif- 
ferent powers  are  possessed  under  the  new  charter,  and  different  offi- 
cers administer  its  affairs ;  and  in  the  absence  of  express  provision  for 
their  payment  otherwise,  it  will  be  presumed  that  the  legislature  in- 
tended that  the  liabilities  as  well  as  the  rights  of  property  of  the 
corporation  in  its  old  form  should  accompany  the  corporation  in  its 
reorganization."'^'^  The  United  States  circuit  court  has  held  that  the 
reorganization  of  the  city  of  Pensacola  under  a  general  law  of  the 
state  of  Florida  was  merely,  in  legal  effect,  an  assumption  by  the 
city  of  the  new  powers  and  privileges  which  the  act  conferred.''^ 

^'Manker    v.    Faulhaber,    94    Mo.  50    111.    453;    City    of    Maysville    v. 

430;  s.  c.  6  S.  W.  372.  Shultz,  3  Dana   (Ky.)    10;    State  v. 

™McGrath  v.  City  of  Chicago,  24  Mayor  &c.,  24  Ala.  701;  O'Connor  v. 

111.  App.  19.  City    of    Memphis,    6    Lea     (Tenn.) 

"15  Am.  &  Eng.  Encyc.  of  Law  972,  730;  Hughes  v.  School  Dist,  72  Mo. 
973;  citing  Broughton  v.  Pensacola,  643;  Tyler  v.  Elizabethtown  &c.  R. 
93  U.  S.  266;  Rex  v.  Pasmore,  3  T.  Co.,  9  Bush  (Ky.)  510. 
R.  199;  Reg.  v.  Bewdley,  1  P.  Wms.  '«Milner  v.  City  of  Pensacola,  2 
207;  Mayor  &c.  v.  Brooke,  7  Q.  B.  Woods  632;  Fowle  v.  Common  Coun- 
339;  Trustees  &c.  v.  City  of  Erie,  31  oil  &c.,  3  Pet.  398;  First  Municipal- 
Pa.  St.  515;  Girard  v.  Philadelphia,  ity  v.  Commissioners  of  Sinking 
7  Wall.  1;  People  v.  Board  &c.,  21  Fund,  1  Rob.  (La.)  279.  An  elec- 
Cal.  668;   City  of  Olney  v.  Harvey,  tion  to  incorporate  under  a  general 


93  TUB  CIIAKTEI!.  §    88 

§  88.  Reorganization  must  be  strictly  according  to  statute. — The 
statutes  often  ])rovi(lo,  wliere  a  city  wishes  to  be  incorporated  and  ap- 
plication is  made  to  a  judge  of  the  county  to  order  an  election  to  be 
held,  that  proof  must  be  made  upon  such  application  that  the  terri- 
tory sought  to  be  incorporated  contains  the  requisite  number  of  in- 
habitants.'^^ Whatever  finding  the  court  makes  on  the  proof  as  pre- 
sented to  him  is  in  such  cases  conclusive.*'*  And  when  a  petition  con- 
tained the  necessary  statement  of  the  number  of  inhabitants,  which 
was  supported  by  an  express  finding,  but  the  notice  of  election  was 
deficient  in  that  particular,  the  court  declined  to  adjudge  the  subse- 
quent proceedings  invalid  on  account  of  the  mere  irregularity.^^  The 
provisions  of  the  statutes  are  usually  held  to  be  mandatory.  For  ex- 
ample, the  town  of  Nacogdoches,  in  Texas,  kept  up  its  corporate 
existence  until  about  the  year  1882,  having  been  originally  incorpo- 
rated in  1859.  The  revised  statutes  of  the  state  prescribe  the  manner 
in  which  an  existing  municipal  corporation  may  surrender  its  corpo- 
rate existence  and  reincorporate  under  the  general  act.  Notwith- 
standing this,  steps  were  taken  in  1887  as  for  the  original  incorpora- 
tion of  a  city  or  town.  The  court  held  that  these  proceedings  did 
not  operate  to  create  a  corporation,  nor  to  dissolve  the  one  existing 
prior  to  their  institution.*^  / 

§  89.  The  same  subject  continued. — A  town  in  Louisiana  was  or- 
ganized under  a  general  law.  Subsequently  it  obtained  and  reorgan- 
ized under  a  special  charter.  This  charter  being  repealed,  it  was 
held  to  be  no  longer  an  incorporated  town.*^  The  legislature,  in  pro- 
viding for  the  amendment  of  a  municipal  charter  or  for  the  reorgani- 
zation of  the  municipality,  may  expressly  provide  that  the  act  shall 

law  may  be  ordered  while  the  town  the  original  corporate  existence  re- 
is  in  existence  under  a  special  act:  mains:  Harness  v.  State,  76  Texas 
Thompson  v.  State,  23  Tex.  Civ.  566;  s.  c.  13  S.  W.  535;  29  Am.  & 
App.  370;  s.  c.  56  S.  W.  603.  Eng.  Corp.  Cas.  50.     An  act  permit- 

"  For    example,    Rev.    Stat.    Tex.,  ting  certain  towns  to  reincorporate 

art.  508.  that   had   attempted   to   incorporate 

**"  State  V.  Goowin,  69  Tex.  55;   s.  under  a  previous  void  act  was  con- 

c.  5  S.  W.  678.  strued  not  as  a  validating  act,  but 

''  Smith  V.  Board  &c.,  45  Fed.  725.  as  a  grant  of  a  new  power,  under 

'^  State  V.  Dunson,  71  Texas  65;  s.  which  a  town  might  reincorporate 
c.  9  S.  "W.  103.  Where  a  municipal  with  a  larger  territory  than  was  in- 
corporation attempts  to  reincorpo-  eluded  in  the  first  attempt:  In  re 
rate  under  a  statute  which  does  not  Campbell,  1  Wash.  287;  s.  c.  24  Pac. 
authorize  such  reincorporation,  but  624. 

only  an  original  incorporation,  the  "^  Burk   v.    State,   5   Lea    (Tenn.) 

proceedings  are  without  effect,  and  349. 


§  90  PUBLIC  conroHATiONS.  94 

take  effect  only  upon  the  assent  of  the  people  of  the  municipality  or  a 
given  majority  thereof. '^^  But  if  such  an  act  be  adopted  or  consented 
to,  acts  amendatory  thereof  do  not  require  additional  consenting,  un- 
less the  amendatory  act  itself  calls  for  such  assent.**^ 

§  90.  Effect  of  adoption  of  a  new  constitution. — The  constitution 
of  1846  adopted  by  the  state  of  New  York  was  a  constitution  not 
framed  for  a  people  entering  into  a  political  society  for  the  first  time, 
but  for  a  community  already  organized,  and  furnished  with  legal  and 
political  institutions  adapted  to  all  or  nearly  all  the  purposes  of  civil 
government.  It  was  not  intended  to  abolish  these  institutions,  except 
where  they  might  be  repugnant  to  the  new  constitution.  In  its  first 
article  it  provides  that  all  the  acts  of  the  legislature  then  in  force, 
and  not  repugnant  to  it,  should  continue  to  be  the  law  of  the  state, 
subject  to  such  alterations  as  the  legislature  might  see  fit  to  make. 
What  effect,  then,  did  the  adoption  of  this  general  law,  this  new  consti- 
tution, have  upon  existing  municipalities  and  their  officials?  By  the 
acts  of  the  legislature,  thus  continued  in  force,  a  great  number  of  of- 
fices had  been  created,  and  among  them,  and  constituting  numerically 
far  the  largest  portion  of  all  the  functionaries  of  the  state,  were  the 
county,  city,  town  and  village  offices,  by  which  the  local  government 
was  carried  on.  As  to  these  existing  offices  and  their  incumbents,  it  is 
clear  that  neither  their  functions  nor  rights  changed  at  all  in  conse- 
quence of  this  new  general  act.^^  Wlrat,  then,  was  its  effect?  It  was 
to  set  up  a  criterion,  a  standard,  by  which  to  determine  whether  the 
legislature,  in  creating,  amending  or  repealing  municipal  franchises, 
is  acting  in  contravention  of  any  vested  right.  But  it  affected  no 
office  or  officer  not  antagonistic  to  or  inconsistent  with  the  provisions 
thereof. 

§  91.  How  far  special  legislation  is  permissible. — It  is  the  busi- 
ness of  the  legislature  to  adjust  in  the  interest  of  the  whole  people 
of  the  state  the  distribution  of  the  powers  of  government,  taking  care 
that  no  direct  provision  of  the  constitution  is  violated,  and  that  no 
arrangement  which  it  has  made  is  incidentally  disturbed.     Plenary 

^*  Mayor  &c.  v.  Finney,  54  Ga.  317;  property  within  the  proposed  limits 

In  re  Henry  St.,  123  Pa.  St.  346;  s.  may  have  an  injunction  restraining 

c.  16  Atl.  785;  State  v.  Mayor  &c.,  73  the  canvassing  of  the  returns:  Smith 

Mo.  435;  City  of  St.  Louis  v.  Russell,  v.  Board  &c.,  45  Fed.  725. 

9  Mo.  507;  Largen  v.  State,  76  Tex.  '''15   Am.  &   Bng.   Encyc.   of  Law 

323;  s.  c.  13  S.  W.  16L     An  election  972. 

held    in    disregard    of    the    registry  **"  People  v.  Draper,  15  N.  Y.  532, 

laws   does   not   effect   an   incorporar  540. 
tion,    and   a    nonresident   owner   of 


95  THE    CHARTER.  §    92 

power  in  the  legislature  for  all  purposes  of  civil  government  is  the  rule. 
As  a  political  society  the  state  has  an  interest  in  the  repression  of 
disorder  and  the  maintenance  of  peace  and  security  in  every  locality 
within  its  limits;  and  if,  from  exceptional  causes,  the  public  good 
requires  that  legislation,  either  permanent  or  temporary,  be  directed 
toward  any  particular  locality,  whether  consisting  of  one  county  or 
of  several  counties,  it  is  within  the  discretion  of  the  legislature  to 
apply  such  legislation  as  in  its  judgment  the  exigency  of  the  case  may 
require;  and  it  is  the  sole  judge  of  the  existence  of  such  conditions. 
The  representatives  of  the  whole  people,  convened  in  the  two 
branches  of  the  legislature,  are,  subject  to  constitutional  limitations, 
the  organs  of  the  public  will  in  every  district  or  locality  of  the  state. 
It  follows,  therefore,  that  to  the  legislature  belongs  the  arranging 
and  distributing  of  the  administrative  functions;  committing  such 
portions  as  it  may  deem  suitable  to  local  jurisdictions,  and  retaining 
other  portions  to  be  exercised  by  officers  appointed  by  the  central 
power.  As  to  the  constitutional  limitations,  they  are  not  so  much 
limitations  of  the  legislature  as  of  the  power  of  the  people  them- 
selves, self-imposed  by  the  constitutional  compact.  So,  when  a  law  is 
declared  unconstitutional,  it  amounts  to  saying  that  the  sovereign 
power  of  the  people  in  that  regard  has  been  abdicated  by  themselves. 
Otherwise  the  legislature  is  untrammeled,  and  can  legislate  in  cases 
of  local  disorder  as  it  will.^'^ 

§  92.  Written  constitutions — Operation  of. — Limitation  upon  leg- 
islative power  is  one  of  the  purposes  to  be  effected  by  a  written 
constitution.  Its  necessity  lies  in  the  fact  that,  if  no  limitations 
existed,  the  government  could  have  no  elements  of  permanence  and 
durability ;  and  the  distribution  of  its  powers  and  the  vesting  of  their 
exercise  in  separate  departments  would  be  an  idle  ceremony.  The 
right  of  self-government  in  the  local  bodies  and  the  power  of  the  peo- 
ple of  those  communities  to  select  the  local  officers  and  conduct  the 
local  administration  would  utterly  disappear,  or  exist  only  at  the 
pleasure  of  the  legislature.  But  the  theory  of  the  constitution  is  that 
the  several  counties,  cities,  towns  and  villages  are  of  right  entitled 
to  choose  whom  they  will  have  to  rule  over  them  f^  and  this  right  can 
not  be  taken  from  them,  or  the  electors  and  inhabitants  be  disfran- 
chised, by  any  act  of  the  legislature,  or  of  any  or  all  the  departments 

*'  People  v.  Draper,  15  N.  Y.  532-  its    system    of    administration    re- 

537.  moved  tlie  strongest  inducement  for 

*'  The  Roman  empire  tottered  into  its  constituent  peoples  to  maintain 

ruin  because  all  power  was  centered  the  status  quo. 
at   Rome.     This   cardinal   defect   in 


92 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS. 


96 


of  the  state  government  combined.  Therefore  a  written  constitution 
must  be  interpreted,  and  effect  given  to  it,  as  the  paramount  law  of 
the  land,  equally  obligatory  upon  the  legislature  as  upon  other  de- 
partments of  government  and  individual  citizens.  Nor  must  it  be 
literally  construed.  A  written  constitution  would  be  of  little  avail 
as  a  practical  and  useful  restraint  upon  the  different  departments  of 
government,  if  a  literal  reading  only  were  to  be  given  it,  to  the  ex- 
clusion of  all  necessary  implication,  and  the  clear  intent  ignored. 
Broad,  reasonable  interpretations  must  be  placed  on  its  provisions  in 
order  that  it  may  operate  equally  and  beneficently.  The  difference  be- 
tween a  written  and  an  unwritten  constitution,  according  to  Hare,'''^  is 
similar  to  that  which  "distinguishes  the  natural  integuments,  which 
yield  to  the  motions  of  the  body  and  expand  with  the  growth  of  every 
limb,  from  an  artificial  covering  that  may  become  too  narrow  in  the 
course  of  time.  A  country  that  is  bound  by  fixed  rules-  prescribed  by 
a  former  generation,  which  can  not  be  altered  without  a  long  and  com- 
plicated process,  may  find  itself  powerless  in  the  face  of  some  unfore- 
seen exigency,  and  be  obliged  to  violate  its  organic  law  as  the  price  of 
safety  ."^« 


'^''l  Hare  Amer.  Const.  Law  214, 
215. 

""  Daniel  Webster,  in  his  speech  on 
the  Independence  of  the  Judiciary 
(Works,  vol.  3),  said: — "It  can 
not  be  denied  that  one  great  object 
of  written  constitutions  is  to  keep 
the  departments  of  government  as 
distinct  as  possible;  and  for  this 
purpose  to  impose  restraints  de- 
signed to  have  that  effect.  And  it 
is  equally  true  that  there  is  no  de- 
partment on  which  it  is  more  neces- 
sary to  impose  restraints  than  upon 
the  legislature.  The  tendency  of 
things  is  almost  always  to  augment 
the  power  of  that  department  in  its 
relation  to  the  judiciary.  The  ju- 
diciary is  composed  of  few  persons, 
and  those  not  such  as  mix  habitu- 
ally in  the  pursuits  and  objects 
which  most  engage  public  men." 
Then  he  comments  upon  the  legis- 
lature, and  its  liability,  if  in  no 
wise  restrained,  to  encroach  upon 


the  judiciary: — "The  constitution 
being  the  supreme  law,  it  follows,  of 
course,  that  every  act  of  the  legis- 
lature contrary  to  that  law  must  be 
void.  But  who  shall  decide  this 
question?  Shall  the  legislature  itself 
decide  it?  If  so,  then  the  constitu- 
tion ceases  to  be  a  legal,  and  becomes 
only  a  moral,  restraint  upon  the  leg- 
islature. If  they,  and  they  only, 
are  to  judge  whether  their  acts  be 
conformable  to  the  constitution, 
then  the  constitution  is  admonitory 
or  advisory  only,  not  legally  bind- 
ing; because  if  the  construction  of 
it  rests  wholly  with  them,  their  dis- 
cretion in  particular  cases  may  be 
in  favor  of  erroneous  and  dangerous 
constructions.  Hence,  the  courts  of 
law  necessarily,  when  the  case 
arises,  must  decide  on  the  validity 
of  particular  acts.  Without  this 
check,  no  certain  limitation  could 
exist  on  the  exercise  of  legislative 
power." 


97  TILE    CHARTER.  §    93 

§  93.  Power  to  make  by-laws — How  limited. — "The  power  of  mu- 
nicipal corporations  to  make  by-laws,"  said  Judge  Cooley/^  "is 
limited  in  various  ways:  1.  It  is  controlled  by  the  constitution 
of  the  United  States  and  of  the  state.  The  restrictions  imposed  by 
those  instruments  which  directly  limit  the  legislative  power  of  the 
state  rest  equally  upon  all  the  instruments  of  government  created  by 
the  state.  If  a  state  can  not  pass  an  ex  post  facto  law,  or  law  impair- 
ing the  obligation  of  contracts,  neither  can  any  agency  do  so  which 
acts  under  the  state  with  delegated  authority.^^  By-laws,  therefore, 
which  in  their  operation  would  be  ex  post  facto  or  violate  contracts, 
are  not  within  the  power  of  municipal  corporations;  and  whatever 
the  people  by  the  state  constitution  have  prohibited  the  state  govern- 
ment from  doing,  it  can  not  do  indirectly  through  the  local  govern- 
ments. 2.  Municipal  by-laws  must  also  be  in  harmony  with  the 
general  laws  of  the  state,  and  with  the  provisions  of  the  municipal 
charter.  Whenever  they  come  in  conflict  with  either  the  by-law 
must  give  way.'"*^  It  is  often  the  case,  however,  that  the  charter 
contains  a  provision  that  the  general  laws  of  the  state  on  some  par- 
ticular subject  shall  not  be  operative  in  that  particular  city,  and  that 
the  corporation  may  pass  local  laws  at  discretion.  But  this  exclusive 
privilege,  when  granted,  can  be  at  any  time  recalled.^*  And  this 
privilege  of  passing  local  by-laws,  although  denied  to  other  cities  by 
a  general  law,  if  not  inconsistent  with  the  general  law  is  not  affected 
by  it,  and  can  stand  together  with  it. 

§  94.  Conflict  of  by-laws  and  general  acts. — "It  is  said  that  the 
by-law  of  a  town  or  corporation  is  void  if  the  legislature  have  regulated 

"Cooley  Const.  Lim.  238;  "Power  drews   v.    Insurance   Co.,   37   Maine 

of  Municipal  Corporations  to  Make  256;  City  of  Canton  v.  Nist,  9  Ohio 

By-Laws,"  15  Sol.  J.  &  Rep.  209  and  St.  439;  Carr  v.  City  of  St.  Louis,  9 

230;     "Municipal    Ordinances,"     by  Mo.  191;  Commonwealth  v.  Erie  &c. 

Irving  Browne,  27  Alb.  L.  J.  284.  R.  Co.,  27  Pa.  St.  339;   City  of  Bur- 

"^Cooley   Const.   Lim.   238;    citing  lington  v.  Kellar,  18  Iowa  59;   Con- 

Stuyvesant  v.  Mayor,  7  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  well  v.  O'Brien,  11  Ind.  419;   March 

588;    Brooklyn  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Brook-  v.  Commonwealth,  12  B.  Mon.  (Ky.) 

lyn  &c.  R.  Co.,  32  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  358;  25.     See  also,  Baldwin  v.  Green,  10 

Illinois    Conf.    Female    College    v.  Mo.  410;   Cowen  v.  Village  of  West 

Cooper,  25  111.  148.  Troy,  43  Barb.   (N.  Y.)   48;   State  v. 

"'Cooley   Const.   Lim.   238;    citing  Georgia  Medical  Society,  38  Ga.  608; 

Wood  V.  City  of  Brooklyn,  14  Barb.  Pesterfield     v.     Vickers,     3     Coldw. 

(N.  Y.)  425;  Mayor  &c.  v.  Nichols,  4  (Tenn.)   205;   Weith  v.  City  of  Wil- 

Hill    (N.  Y.)    209;    Town  of  Peters-  mington,  68  N.  C.  24. 

burg  V.  Metzker,  21  111.  205;   South-  ^  State  v.  City  of  Camden,  50  N. 

port   V.    Ogden,    23    Conn.    128;    An-  J.  L.  87;  s.  c.  11  Atl.  137. 

1  Smith — 7 


§    94  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  98 

the  subject  by  law.  If  the  legislature  have  passed  a  law  regulating  as 
to  certain  things  in  a  city,"  says  Mr.  Justice  Woodworth,'''^  "I  ap- 
prehend the  corporation  are  not  thereby  restricted  from  making 
further  regulations.  Cases  of  this  kind  have  occurred  and  never 
been  questioned  on  that  ground ;  it  is  only  to  notice  a  case  or  two  out 
of  many.  The  legislature  have  imposed  a  penalty  of  one  dollar  for 
servile  labor  on  Sunday;  the  corporation  of  New  York  have  passed  a 
by-law,  imposing  the  penalty  of  five  dollars  for  the  same  offense. 
As  to  storing  gunpowder  in  New  York,  the  legislature  and  corporation 
have  each  imposed  the  same  penalty.  Suits  to  recover  the  penal- 
ties have  been  sustained  under  the  corporation  law.  It  is  believed 
that  the  ground  has  never  been  taken  that  there  was  a  conflict  with 
the  state  law."  In  a  case  in  Mobile,  where  the  validity  of  a  municipal 
by-law  was  questioned,  which  provided  a  fine  of  fifty  dollars  for 
assault  and  battery  committed  within  the  city  limits,  the  court  held: 
"The  object  of  the  power  conferred  by  the  charter,  and  the  purpose 
of  the  ordinance  itself,  was  not  to  punish  for  an  offense  against  the 
criminal  justice  of  the  country,  but  to  provide  a  mere  police  regu- 
lation, for  the  enforcement  of  good  order  and  quiet  within  the  limits 
of  the  corporation.  It  is  altogether  immaterial  whether  the  state 
tribunal  has  interfered  and  exercised  its  powers  in  bringing  the  de- 
fendant before  it  to  answer  for  the  assault  and  battery;  for  whether 
he  has  been  punished  or  acquitted  is  alike  unimportant.  The  offense 
against  the  corporation  and  the  state  are  distinguishable  and  wholly 
disconnected,  and  the  prosecution  at  the  suit  of  each  proceeds  upon 
a  different  hypothesis:  the  one  contemplates  the  observance  of  the 
peace  and  good  order  of  the  city;  the  other  has  a  more  enlarged 
object  in  view,  the  maintenance  of  the  peace  and  dignity  of  the 
state."®*'  The  power  to  pass  a  city  ordinance  must  be  vested  in  the 
governing  body  of  the  city  by  the  legislature  in  express  terms,  or  be 
necessarily  or  fairly  implied  in  and  incident  to  the  powers  expressly 
granted,  and  must  be  essential  to  the  declared  purposes  of  the  corpo- 
ration,— not  simply  convenient,  but  indispensable.  ■  Any  fair  or  reason- 
able doubt  concerning  the  existence  of  the  power  is  resolved  by  the 
courts  against  the  corporation,  and  the  power  is  denied.®^     Powers 

''^  Rogers   v.   Jones,   1   Wend.    (N.  10   Am.    St.   175;    2   L.   R.   A.   110; 

Y.)  237,  261.  Brockman    v.    City    of    Creston,    79 

*«  Mayor  &c.  v.  Allaire,  14  Ala.  400.  Iowa  587;  s.  c.  44  N.  W.  822;   State 

Cf.  "Proper  Relations  of  the  State  v.  Rowe,  72  Md.  548;    s.  c.  20  Atl. 

to  Municipal  Institutions,"  by  H.  M.  179;    Vosburg  v.   McCrary,   77   Tex. 

White,  5  Tenn.  Bar  Assn.  Rep.  159.  568;   s.  c.  14  S.  W.  195;    Louisville 

"'  Anderson  v.  City  of  Wellington,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Shires,  108  111.  617. 
40    Kan.    173;    s.    c.    19    Pac.    719; 


99 


THE    CHARTER. 


95 


encroaching  npon  the  rights  of  the  public  or  of  individuals  must 
be  plainl}^  and  literally  conferred  by  the  charter.''^ 

§  95.  The  ordinance,  when  passed,  must  be  reasonable. — A  city, 
although  fully  authorized  to  enact  ordinances,  can  not  therefore  pass 
unreasonal)le  ones.  The  ordinance  of  a  city  must  be  reasonable ;  not 
inconsistent  with  the  laws  of  the  state;  not  repugnant  to  funda- 
mental rights;  it  must  not  be  oppressive;  it  must  not  be  partial  or 
unfair;  it  must  not  make  special  or  unwarranted  discriminations; 
in  short,  it  must  not  contravene  common  right.  The  Kansas  courts 
held,  in  a  case  where  an  ordinance  was  passed  directed  at  the  street 
parades  of  the  Salvation  Army  and  interdicting  them,  that  if  was 
illegal  and  void,  as  being  partial,  unreasonable  and  in  contravention 
of  common  right."®     All  charters  and  laws  and  ordinances  must  be 


^  State  v.  Town  of  Belvidere,  44 
N.  J.  L.  350;  Horr  &  Bemis  Munic. 
Police  Ord.  18. 

="•  Anderson  v.  City  of  "Wellington, 
40  Kan.  173;  s.  c.  19  Pac.  719;  10 
Am.  St.  175;  2  L.  R.  A.  110.  The 
reasoning  of  the  court  is  interest- 
ing:— "The  object  of  this  ordinance, 
and  the  danger  apprehended  and  to 
be  avoided  by  its  enactment,  as  ex- 
pressed by  its  terms,  is  to  prevent 
the  calling  together  of  a  large  or 
unusual  crowd  of  people  on  any  of 
the  streets,  avenues  or  alleys  of  the 
city  of  Wellington.  Then  the  ques- 
tion is  this:  Is  a  street  parade  with 
music  or  singing  legally  objection- 
able in  itself?  or  does  it  threaten  the 
public  peace  or  the  good  order  of 
the  community?  This  ordinance  pre- 
vents any  number  of  the  people  of 
the  state  attached  to  one  of  the  sev- 
eral political  parties  from  marching 
together  with  their  party  banners 
and  inspiring  music,  up  and  down 
the  principal  streets,  without  the 
written  consent  of  some  municipal 
officer.  The  Masonic  and  Odd  Fel- 
lows organizations  must  first  obtain 
consent  before  their  charitable  steps 
desecrate  the  sacred  streets.  Even 
the  Sunday-school  children  can  not 
assemble  at  some  central  point  in 
the  city  and  keep  step  to  the  music 


of  the  band  as  they  march  to  the 
grove  without  permission  first  had 
and  obtained.  The  Grand  Army  of 
the  Republic  must  be  preceded  in 
its  march  by  the  written  consent  of 
his  honor  the  mayor,  or  march  with- 
out drums  or  fife,  shouts  or  songs. 
It  prevents  a  public  address  upon 
any  subject  being  made  on  the 
streets.  It  prevents  an  unusual  con- 
gregation of  people  on  the  streets 
under  any  circumstances  without 
permission.  The  ordinance  is  framed 
on  the  theory  that  an  unusual  crowd 
or  congregation  of  people  upon  one 
of  the  public  streets  of  a  city  is 
either  of  itself  a  distrubance  of  the 
public  peace,  or  that  it  threatens  the 
good  order  of  the  community.  A 
crowd  of  people  is  one  of  the  most 
ordinary  incidents  of  every-day  life 
in  any  city  of  considerable  size  in 
this  country.  It  is  not  a  fair  esti- 
mate of  the  character  and  habits  of 
the  American  people  to  assume  that 
the  public  peace  is  threatened  when 
numbers  of  them  congregate.  We 
do  not  believe  that  the  legislative 
grant  of  power  to  the  city  council 
can  be  so  construed  as  to  authorize 
the  city  council  to  take  from  the 
people  of  a  city  and  the  surrounding 
country  a  privilege  exercised  by 
them   in   every   locality   throughout 


§    96  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  100 

capable  of  constrnction,  and  must  be  oonstrued  in  accordance  with 
constitutional  principles  and  in  harmony  with  the  general  laws  of 
the  land;  and  any  ordinance  that  violates  any  of  the  recognized 
rights  and  privileges,  or  the  principles  of  legal  and  equitable  rights,  is 
necessarily  void  so  far  forth,  and  void  entirely  if  it  can  not  be  applied 
according  to  its  terms. "'^ 

§  96.  Reasonableness — How  determined. — How  shall  it  be  deter- 
mined whether  or  not  a  by-law  of  a  city  is  unreasonable  ?  There  are 
various  conditions  which  such  a  by-law  should  fulfill.  The  objects, 
for  which  a  corporation  is  created,  and  to  accomplish  which  its  powers 
are  given,  are  usually  definite  and  certain.  No  by-law,  therefore, 
should  be  passed  which  does  not  in  some  degree  look  to  the  accomplish- 
ment of  these  objects.  For  example,  a  power  to  license  certain  em- 
ployments is  generally  granted  to  cities.  This  does  not  mean  that  the 
license  can  be  so  fixed  as  to  prohibit  an  employment  by  reason  of  its 
large  amount ;  nor  that  the  license  shall  be  imposed  solely  for  the  sake 
of  revenue,  for  that  would  be  an  exercise  of  the  power  of  taxation, 
which  power,  to  be  rightfully  exercised,  must  be  distinctly  enumerated 
in  the  charter  or  incorporating  act.  A  by-law  ought  also  to  be  cer- 
tain.^''^  It  should  be  in  harmony  with  common  sense  and  common 
law.^*'^  It  should  not  abridge  rights  or  privileges  conferred  by  the 
general  laws  of  the  state,  unless  express  authority  can  be  pointed  out 
for  it  in  the  charter.     It  is  quite  possible  that  some  things  have  a 

the  land,  to  form  their  processions  Waters   v.   Leech,    3   Ark.    110;    Ex 

and  parade  the  streets  with  banners,  parte  Burnett,  30  Ala.  461;    Austin 

music,  songs  and  shouts.     The  pow-  v.    Murray,    6    Pick.     (Mass.)     121; 

er  to  pass  such  an  ordinance  should  Western   U.    Tel.    Co.   v.    Carew,    15 

be  clear  and  controlling  before  it  can  Mich.  525;    State  v.  Freeman,  38  N. 

be   upheld.     Public   parades  of  this  H.  426;  State  v.  Mayor  &c.,  29  N.  .J. 

character  are  not  unlawful  in  their  L.  170. 

intent,  purpose  and  result;  they  are  '°^  Mayor  &c.  v.  Phelps,  27  Ala.  55; 
not  mala  in  se.  If  they  are  to  be  Piper  v.  Chappell,  14  M.  &  W.  624. 
mala  prohibita  it  ought  to  be  by  "'=  Village  of  Buffalo  v.  Webster, 
some  general  law  and  not  by  local  10  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  99;  Bush  v.  Sea- 
regulation."  bury,  8  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  418;  City  of 
'<*"Frazee's  Case,  63  Mich.  396;  s.  Bowling  Green  v.  Carson,  10  Bush 
c.  30  N.  W.  72;  6  Am.  St.  310.  See  (Ky.)  64;  Le  Claire  v.  City  of  Dav- 
also,  Davies  v.  Morgan,  1  Cromp.  &  enport,  13  Iowa  210;  City  of  St. 
J.  587;  Chamberlain  of  London  v.  Louis  v.  Weber,  44  Mo.  547;  City  of 
Compton,  7  D.  &  R.  597;  Clark  v.  Bloomington  v.  Wahl,  46  111.  489; 
Le  Cren,  9  B.  &  C.  52;  Gosling  v.  Bethune  v.  Hughes,  28  Ga.  560;  Kip 
Veley,  12  Q.  B.  328;  Dunham  v.  Trus-  v.  Mayor  &c.,  26  N.  J.  L.  298.  See 
tees  &c.,  5  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  462;  Mayor  Cooley  Const.  Lim.  245,  note,  and 
&c.  V.  Winfield,  8  Humph.  (Tenn.)  the  cases  cited. 
707;  Hayden  v.  Noyes,  5  Conn.  391; 


101  THE    CHARTER.  §    96 

greater  tendency  to  produce  danger  and  disorder  in  the  cities  than  in 
smaller  towns  and  in  rural  places.  This  may  justify  reasonable  pre- 
cautionary measures,  but  nothing  further;  and  no  inference  can  ex- 
tend beyond  the  scope  of  powers  granted  for  such  a  purpose,  and  no 
grant  of  absolute  discretion  to  suppress  lawful  action  altogether  can 
be  granted  at  all.  That  which  is  an  actual  nuisance  can  be  suppressed 
just  so  far  as  it  is  noxious,  and  its  noxious  character  is  the  test  of  its 
wrongfulness.  There  may  be  substances,  like  some  explosives,  which 
are  dangerous  in  cities  under  all  circumstances,  and  made  dangerous 
by  municipal  conditions ;  but  most  dangerous  things  are  not  so  differ- 
ent in  cities  as  to  require  more  than  increased  or  qualified  safeguards ; 
and  to  suppress  things  not  absolutely  dangerous  as  an  easy  way  of  get- 
ting rid  of  the  trouble  of  regulating  them  is  not  a  process  tolerated 
under  free  institutions.  Eegulation,  and  not  prohibition,  unless  un- 
der clear  authority  of  the  charter,  and  in  cases  where  it  is  not  oppres- 
sive, is  the  extent  of  municipal  power.^"^ 

"^Frazee's  Case,  63  Mich.  396;   s.  c.  30  N.  W.  72;  6  Am.  St.  310.     See 
chapter  14,  post,  on  Ordinances. 


CHAPTER  IV. 


AMENDMENT^  EEPEAL  AND  FORFEITURE  OF  CHARTER. 


Section 

97.  The    power    of    the    state    to 

amend,  repeal  or  modify  the 
charters  of  municipal  corpo- 
rations. 

98.  The  charter  of  a  municipal  cor- 

poration not  within  the  rule 
of  the  Dartmouth  College 
ease. 

99.  Construction   of   repealing  and 

amendatory  acts — (a)  Gen- 
eral principles. 

100.  (b)    Statutes    in    pari    materia 

construed  together  —  Repeal 
by  implication. 

101.  Municipal  charter  not  repealed 

by  subsequent  general  law 
unless  intent  to  repeal  is 
clear. 

102.  The  same  subject  continued. 

103.  Instances  of  repeal  of  charter 

by  general  acts. 

104.  Repeal  and  amendment  of  char- 

ter by  subsequent  amend- 
ment of  state  constitution. 

105.  Repeal  of  general  laws  by  en- 

actment of  municipal  charter. 

106.  Repeal  of  general  laws  by  mu- 

nicipal ordinance. 

107.  The  same  subject  continued. 

108.  Construction      of     amendatory 

and  repealing  acts  made  ap- 
plicable only  to  cities  of  a 
certain  class. 

109.  Effect  of   legislation   upon   the 


Section 

charter  of  a  city  organized 
under  special  law,  and  not  by 
its  acceptance  thereof  subject 
to  the  general  law. 

110.  Miscellaneous   instances   of   ef- 

fective repealing  and  amend- 
atory acts. 

111.  The  same  subject  continued. 

112.  What  is  an  amendment  or  re- 

peal of  a  municipal  charter? 

113.  Repeal— Effect  of. 

114.  Acceptance  of  amendment. 
Manner  of  acceptance. 
Constitutional     limitations     on 

power  of  legislature  to  amend 
or  repeal  municipal  charters 
—  (a)   In  general. 

(b)  Special  legislation. 

(c)  Vested  rights — Impairment 
of  obligation  of  contracts — 
Recognition  by  constitution. 

(d)  Title  of  amendatory  or  re- 
pealing acts. 

The  same  subject  continued. 

121.  Forfeiture  of  charter   in   Eng- 

land. 

122.  The  same  subject  continued. 

123.  Instances  of  forfeiture  of  char- 

ter under  English  law.^ 

124.  The  charter  of  a  municipal  cor- 

poration in  the  United  States 
can  not  be  forfeited  by  judi- 
cial action. 

125.  The  same  subject  continued. 


115. 
116. 


117. 
118. 


119. 


120. 


§  97.  The  power  of  the  state  to  amend,  repeal  or  modify  the  char- 
ters of  municipal  corporations. — The  charter  of  a  strictly  public 
corporation  is  granted  for  purposes  of  the  local  government  of  the 
district  incorporated.     The  powers  conferred  by  this  charter  are  not 

(102) 


103 


AMENDMENT^   REPEAL   AND    FORFEITURE    OF    CHARTER. 


§  97 


vested  rights  as  against  the  state,  but,  being  wholly  political,  exist  only 
during  the  will  of  the  legislature;  otherwise,  as  was  declared  in  an 
Indiana  case,  there  would  be  numberless  petty  governments  existing 
within  the  state,  forming  a  part  of  it,  but  independent  of  the  control 
of  the  sovereign  power.  Such  powers  may  at  any  time  be  repealed 
or  abrogated  by  the  legislature,  either  by  general  law  operating  upon 
the  whole  state,  or  by  special  act  altering  the  powers  of  the  corpora- 
tion.^ For  the  same  reasons  the  state  has  power  to  amend  or  modify 
municipal  charters  at  its  will ;  and  it  may  be  stated  as  a  general  propo- 
sition, that  the  legislature  of  the  state  has  full  power  to  amend,  repeal 
or  modify  the  charters  of  the  municipal  corporations  within  the 
boundaries  of  the  state,  subject  only  to  constitutional  limitations  of 
that  power.-    As  is  said  by  Judge  Cooley,  restraints  on  the  legislative 


^  Sloan  V.  State,  8  Blackf.   (Ind.) 
361. 

=  Meriwether  v.  Garrett,  102  U.  S. 
472;  Barnes  v.  District  of  Columbia, 
91  U.  S.  540;  Kennedy  v.  City  of  Sac- 
ramento, 19  Fed.  580;  s.  c.  5  Am.  & 
Eng.  Corp.  Cas.  553;  Commissioners 
&c.  V.  Albany  Co.,  92  U.  S.  307;  Gi- 
rard  v.  Philadelphia,  7  Wall.  1;  Town 
of  East  Hartford  v.  Hartford  Bridge 
Co.,  10  How.  511;  Piqiia  Branch  &c. 
V.  Knoop,  16  How.  369;  Aspinwall  v. 
Commissioners  &c.,  22  How.  364; 
Cobb  v.  Kingman,  15  Mass.  197;  Ber- 
lin V.  Gorham,  34  N.  H.  266;  Town 
of  Granby  v.  Thurston,  23  Conn. 
416;  Inhabitants  &c.  v.  North  Yar- 
mouth, 34  Maine  411;  Inhabitants 
&c.  V.  Skillings,  45  Maine  133; 
Demarest  v.  Mayor  &c.,  74  N.  Y.  161; 
People  V.  Tweed,  63  N.  Y.  202;  Peo- 
ple V.  Pinckney,  32  N.  Y.  377;  Peo- 
ple V.  Draper,  15  N.  Y.  532;  David- 
son V.  Mayor  &c.,  27  How.  Pr.  (N. 
Y.)  342;  Gray  v.  City  of  Brooklyn,  2 
Abb.  App.  Dec.  (N.  Y.)  267;  People 
V.  Morris,  13  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  325; 
Crook  v.  People,  106  111.  237;  s.  c.  5 
Am.  &  Eng.  Corp.  Cas.  460;  True  v. 
Davis,  133  111.  522;  s.  c.  22  N.  E. 
410;  6  L.  R.  A.  266;  Guild  v.  City 
of  Chicago,  82  111.  472;  People  v. 
Power,  25  111.  187 ;  Robertson  v.  City 
of  Rockford,  21  111.  451;  Trustees  of 
Schools  V.  Tatman,  13  111.  27;  Rich- 


land Co.  V.  Lawrence  Co.,  12  111.  1; 
Town  of  Marietta  v.  Fearing,  4  Ohio 
427;  Scovill  v.  City  of  Cleveland,  1 
Ohio  St.  126;  City  of  San  Francisco 
V.  Canavan,  42  Cal.  541;  People  v. 
Burr,  13  Cal.  343;  Philadelphia  v. 
Fox,  64  Pa.  St.  169;  City  of  Reading 
V.  Keppleman,  61  Pa.  St.  233;  Sloan  v. 
State,  8  Blackf.  (Ind.)  361;  Eichels 
V.  Evansville  &c.  R.  Co.,  78  Ind.  261; 
s.  c.  41  Am.  R.  561;  City  of  Indian- 
apolis V.  Indianapolis  Gas  &c.  Co., 
66  Ind.  396;  Roberts'  Case,  51  Mich. 
548;  s.  c.  17  N.  W.  50;  Smith  v.  Vil- 
lage of  Adrian,  1  Mich.  495;  Lynch 
V.  Lafland,  4  Coldw.  (Tenn.)  96; 
Daniel  v.  Mayor  &c.,  11  Humph. 
(Tenn.)  582;  Buckner  v.  Gordon,  81 
Ky.  665;  s.  c.  4  Am.  &  Eng.  Corp. 
Cas.  395;  Boyd  v.  Chambers,  78  Ky. 
140;  State  v.  Troth,  34  N.  J.  L.  377, 
379;  President  &c.  v.  Society  &c.,  24 
N.  J.  L.  385;  State  v.  Branin,  23  N. 
J.  L.  484;  Mayor  &c.  v.  Jersey  City 
&c.  R.  Co.,  20  N.  J.  Eq.  360;  Wash- 
burn V.  City  of  Oshkosh,  60  Wis. 
453;  s.  c.  19  N.  W.  364;  Weeks  v. 
City  of  Milwaukee,  10  Wis.  242; 
Carpenter  v.  People,  8  Colo.  116;  s. 
c.  5  Pac.  828;  7  Am.  &  Eng.  Corp. 
Cas.  110;  City  of  Clinton  v.  Cedar 
Rapids  &c.  R.  Co.,  24  Iowa  455;  City 
of  Little  Rock  v.  Parish.  36  Ark. 
166;  State  v.  Jennings,  27  Ark.  419; 
State   v.    Mayor   &c.,   R.    M.    Charl. 


§    98  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  104 

power  of  control  must  be  found  in  the  constitution  of  the  state,  or 
they  must  rest  alone  in  the  legislative  discretion.^  Where  the  legis- 
lature by  a  general  statute  reserves  the  right  to  amend  or  repeal  the 
charters  of  municipal  corporations,  the  exercise  of  such  power  will  not 
be  questioned.* 

§  98.  The  charter  of  a  municipal  corporation  not  within  the  rule 
of  the  Dartmouth  College  case. — Municipal  corporations  do  not,  of 
course,  come  within  the  rule  of  the  Dartmouth  College  case,**  by 
which  the  charters  of  private  corporations  were  declared  to  be  con- 
tracts, and  as  such  protected  by  the  constitutional  prohibition  of 
laws  impairing  the  obligation  of  contracts.  This  is  one  of  the  funda- 
mental differences  between  strictly  public  and  other  corporations. 
This  difference  and  the  reasons  therefor  are  thus  stated  by  Judge 
Pearson:  "The  substantial  distinction  is  this:  Some  corporations 
are  created  by  the  mere  will  of  the  legislature,  there  being  no  other 
party  interested  or  concerned.  To  this  party  a  portion  of  the  power 
of  the  legislature  is  delegated,  to  be  exercised  for  the  general  good,  and 
subject  at  all  times  to  be  modified,  changed  or  annulled.  Other  cor- 
porations are  the  result  of  contract.  The  legislature  is  not  the  only 
party  interested;  for,  although  it  has  a  public  purpose  to  be  accom- 
plished, it  chooses  to  do  it  by  the  instrumentality  of  a  third  party. 

(Ga.)  250;  Police  Jury  v.  Shreve-  Jessup,  15  Wall.  454,  458;  Railroad 
port,  5  La.  An.  661;  City  of  New  Co.  v.  Maine,  96  U.  S.  499,  510;  Rail- 
Orleans  v.  Hoyle,  23  La.  An.  740;  In  road  Co.  v.  Georgia,  98  U.  S.  359, 
re  Hinkle,  31  Kan.  712;  s.  c.  3  Pac.  365;  Hoge  v.  Railroad  Co.,  99  U.  S. 
531;  4  Am.  &  Eng.  Corp.  Cas.  369;  348,  353;  Sinking  Fund  Cases,  99  U. 
State  v.  Mayor  &c.,  24  Ala.  701;  City  S.  700,  720;  Greenwood  v.  Freight 
of  St.  Louis  v.  Cafferata,  24  Mo.  94;  Co.,  105  U.  S.  13,  21;  Close  v.  Glen- 
City  of  St.  Louis  V.  Allen,  13  Mo.  wood  Cemetery,  107  U.  S.  466,  476; 
400;  City  of  St.  Louis  v.  Russell,  9  s.  c.  2  S.  Ct.  267;  Spring  Valley  Wa- 
Mo.  507;  State  v.  Cowan,  29  Mo.  330;  ter  Works  v.  Schottler,  110  U.  S.  347, 
Wallace  v.  Trustees  &c.,  84  N.  C.  352;  s.  c.  4  S.  Ct.  48;  Louisville  Gas 
164;  Mills  v.  Williams,  11  Ired.  (N.  Co.  v.  Citizens'  &c.  Co.,  115  U.  S. 
C.)  558;  Langworthy  v.  City  of  Du-  683,  696;  s.  c.  6  S.  Ct.  365;  Gibbs  v. 
buque,  16  Iowa  271;  Howard  v.  Mc-  Consolidated  Gas  Co.,  130  U.  S.  396, 
Diarmid,  26  Ark.  100;  Bradshaw  v.  408;  s.  c.  9  S.  Ct.  553;  Sioux  City  R. 
City  of  Omaha,  1  Neb.  16;  Kuhn  v.  Co.  v.  Sioux  City,  138  U.  S.  98,  108; 
Board  of  Education,  4  W.  Va.  499;  s.  c.  11  S.  Ct.  226;  Louisville  Water 
Hess  V.  Pegg,  7  Nev.  23;  Groff  v.  Co.  v.  Clark,  143  U.  S.  1,  12;  s.  c.  12 
Mayor  &c.,  44  Md.  180;  Mayor  &c.  v.  S.  Ct.  346.  Under  constitution  of 
Sehner,  37  Md.  180;  Blessing  v.  City  North  Carolina,  as  amended  in  1875, 
of  Galveston,  42  Tex.  641.  the  legislature  has  power  to  amend 

^  Cooley     Const.     Lim.     229.     See  the   charter   of   a   city:    Harriss   v. 

also,  §§  57,  63,  64,  69,  70.  78,  79,  ante.  Wright,  121  N.  C.  172;  s.  c.  28  S.  E. 

*  Covington  v.  Kentucky,  173  U.  S.  269. 
231;  s.  c.  19  S.  Ct.  383;  Tomlinson  v.        *a  4  wheat.  518. 


105 


AMENDMENT,   REPEAL   AND    FORFEITURE    OF    CHARTER. 


99 


These  two  parties  make  a  contract.  The  legislature  for  and  in  con- 
sideration of  certain  labor  and  outlay  of  money  confers  upon  the  party 
of  the  second  part  the  privilege  of  being  a  corporation  with  certain 
powers  and  capacities.  The  expectation  of  benefit  to  the  public  is 
the  moving  consideration  on  one  side;  that  of  expected  remuner- 
ation for  the  outlay  is  the  consideration  on  the  other.  It  is  a  contract, 
and  therefore  can  not  be  modified,  changed  or  annulled  without  the 
consent  of  both  parties."^ 

§  99.  Construction  of  repealing  and  amendatory  acts — (a)  General 
principles. — The  great  principle  controlling  the  construction  of  re- 
pealing and  amendatory  acts,  as  of  all  other  statutes,  is  that  the  inten- 
tion of  the  legislature  must  be  ascertained  and  carried  into  efEect. 
In  addition  to  this  fundamental  principle,  it  is  also  to  be  constantly 
borne  in  mind  in  construing  these  acts,  that  the  courts  require  the 
clearest  expression  of  the  intention  on  the  part  of  the  legislature  to 
repeal  or  alter  existing  laws.  Where  the  two  statutes  can  be  so  con- 
strued as  to  allow  both  to  stand,  the  courts  will  always  adopt  such 
a  construction.  In  order  to  effect  repeal  the  later  statute  must  either 
expressly  repeal  the  former,  or  its  provisions  must  be  so  entirely 
repugnant  to  those  of  the  earlier  statute  that  by  no  reasonable  con- 


's Mills  V.  Williams,  11  Ired.  (N. 
C.)  558;  Cooley  Const.  Lim.  334- 
337.  See  §  97,  ante.  It  is  con- 
ceded learning  that  the  charter  of 
a  municipal  corporation  is  not  a 
contract.  In  order  to  obviate  the 
difBculties  arising  from  the  fact 
that  the  charters  of  private  corpora- 
tions are  contracts,  and  as  such  in- 
violable, many  of  the  states  have 
constitutional  provisions  and  gen- 
eral statutes  reserving  the  right  of 
amendment  and  repeal  of  such  char- 
ters: 1  Beach  Priv.  Corp.,  §  36,  and 
cases  cited.  "In  consequence  of  the 
decision  in  that  case  (Dartmouth 
College  Case,  4  Wheat.  518),  a  gen- 
eral law  was  spread  upon  the  statute 
book  of  nearly  all,  if  not  quite  all, 
the  states  of  the  Union,  reserving  to 
the  legislature  power  to  alter  or 
modify  all  such  charters  as  should 
be  thereafter  granted,  according  to 
its  will  and  pleasure:"  "Legislative 
Power  to  Amend  Charters,"  by  Wm. 
L.  Royall,  Esq.,  11  Am.  L.  Reg.   (N. 


S.)  1,  where  several  phases  of  the 
exercise  of  this  power  are  discussed. 
Such  constitutional  and  statutory 
reservations  are  unnecessary  in  the 
case  of  strictly  public  corporations. 
As  was  said  by  Justice  Field  in 
an  important  case,  considering 
the  effect  of  legislation  by  which 
the  municipal  government  of  Mem- 
phis vi^as  abolished: — "There  is  no 
contract  between  the  state  and  the 
public  that  the  charter  of  a  city 
shall  not  at  all  times  be  subject  to 
legislative  control.  All  persons 
who  deal  with  such  bodies  are  con- 
clusively presumed  to  act  upon 
knowledge  of  the  power  of  the  legis- 
lature. There  is  no  such  thing  as  a 
vested  right  held  by  any  individual 
in  the  grant  of  legislative  power  to 
them:  Meriwether  v.  Garrett,  102  U. 
S.  472.  See  also,  an  article  by  H. 
Campbell  Black,  Esq.,  on  "Legisla- 
tion Impairing  the  Obligation  of 
Contracts,"  in  25  Am.  L.  Reg.  (N. 
S.)  81,  83. 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS. 


lOG 


striiction  can  the  two  acts  stand  together,  as  the  law  does  not  favor 
repeals  by  implication.^ 

§  100.  (b)  Statutes  in  pari  materia  construed  together — Repeal 
by  implication. — An  excellent  illustration  of  the  rule  is  found  in  a 
Maryland  case,  where  an  amendment  to  the  charter  of  the  city  of 
Cumberland  prohibited  the  mayor  and  common  council  from  pledging 


^  Cape  Girardeau  Co.  Court  v.  Hill, 
118  U.  S.  68;  s.  c.  6  S.  Ct.  951;  Mc- 
Cool  V.  Smith,  1  Black  459;  United 
States  V.  Twenty-five  Cases  of 
Cloths,  Crabbe  356;  Henderson's  To- 
bacco, 11  Wall.  652;  Snell  v.  Bridge- 
water  &c.  Co.,  24  Pick.  (Mass.)  296; 
Goddard  v.  City  of  Boston,  20  Pick. 
(Mass.)  407;  Towle  v.  Marrett,  3 
Maine  22;  Attorney-General  v.  Brown, 
1  Wis.  513 ;  Attorney-General  v.  Rail- 
road Companies,  35  Wis.  425;  City 
of  Janesville  v.  Markoe,  18  Wis.  350; 
In  re  Henry  Street,  123  Pa.  St.  346; 
s.  c.  16  Atl.  785;  McFate's  Appeal, 
105  Pa.  St.  323;  Kilgore  v.  Common- 
wealth, 94  Pa.  St.  495;  Rounds  v. 
Waymart,  81  Pa.  St.  395;  Erie  v. 
Bootz,  72  Pa.  St.  196;  McKenna  v. 
Edmundstone,  91  N.  Y.  231;  People 
V.  Quigg,  59  N.  Y.  83;  Covington  v. 
City  of  East  St.  Louis,  78  111.  548; 
City  of  East  St.  Louis  v.  Maxwell, 
99  111.  439;  State  v.  Williamson,  44 
N.  J.  L.  165;  Naylor  v.  Field,  29  N. 
J.  L.  287;  Water  Works  Co.  v.  Burk- 
hart,  41  Ind.  364;  Blain  v.  Bailey,  25 
Ind.  165;  Hirn  v.  State.  1  Ohio  St. 
15,  20;  Cass  v.  Dillon,  2  Ohio  St. 
607;  State  v.  Mayor  &c.,  14  Ohio  St. 
472;  Dodge  v.  Gridley,  10  Ohio  173; 
Clark  V.  City  of  Davenport,  14  Iowa 
494;  State  v.  Berry,  12  Iowa  58; 
Chesapeake  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Hoard,  16 
W.  Va.  270;  Ex  parte  Schmidt,  24  S. 
C.  363;  McGruder  v.  State,  83  Ga. 
616;  s.  c.  10  S.  E.  281;  Greeley  v. 
City  of  Jacksonville,  17  Fla.  174; 
City  of  New  Orleans  v.  Southern 
Bank,  15  La.  An.  89;  Swann  v.  Buck, 
40  Miss.  268;  People  v.  Hanrahan,  75 
Mich.  611;  s.  c.  42  N.  W.  1124;  4  L. 
R.   A.   751;    Connors  v.   Carp   River 


Iron  Co.,  54  Mich.  168;  s.  c.  19  N.  W. 
938;  In  re  Ryan,  45  Mich.  173;  s.  c. 
7  N.  W.  819;  Ayeridge  v.  Social  Cir- 
cle Com'rs,  60  Ga.  404;  People  v. 
Londoner,  13  Colo.  303.  See  also, 
cases  cited  in  preceding  note;  1  Dil- 
lon Munic.  Corp.,  §§  86,  87;  15  Am. 
&  Eng.  Encyc.  of  Law  974,  975,  tit. 
Municipal  Corporations;  Annotated 
Case  by  M.  D.  Ewell,  Esq.,  18  Am. 
L.  Reg.  (N.  S.)  20,  25,  containing  a 
full  citation  of  cases  upon  the  gen- 
eral subject  of  repeals  by  implica- 
tion. Mich.  Act  of  1899,  No.  154,  is 
not  inconsistent  with  Grand  Rapids 
Charter  Act  of  1893,  No.  206:  Board 
&c.  V.  Board  &c.,  124  Mich.  491;  s.  c. 
83  N.  W.  209.  An  act  of  New  Jer- 
sey entitled  "An  act  concerning 
cities"  does  not  apply  to  "incorpo- 
rated towns":  Day  v.  City  of  Morris- 
town,  63  N.  J.  L.  353;  s.  c.  43  Atl. 
1098.  Power  given  to  a  city  to  im- 
prison certain  designated  classes  of 
persons  is  a  delegation  of  power  to 
pass  prohibitory  penal  ordinances 
where,  for  a  violation,  imprison- 
ment is  to  follow:  City  of  New  Or- 
leans V.  Collins,  52  La.  An.  973;  s.  c. 
27  So.  532.  Construction  of  Mass. 
St.  1892,  ch.  419,  in  reference  to  per- 
mits for  buildings:  Greene  v.  Dam- 
rell,  175  Mass.  394;  s.  c.  56  N.  E.  707. 
Kansas  City  charter  construed  in 
reference  to  revenues:  Pryor  v.  City 
of  Kansas  City,  153  Mo.  135;  s.  c.  54 
S.  W.  499.  Construction  of  Oakland 
City,  Cal.,  city  charter  under  consti- 
tution: People  V.  City  of  Oakland, 
123  Cal.  145;  s.  c.  55  Pac.  772.  Mo. 
Rev.  St.  1889,  §  1880,  construed  in 
City  of  Kansas  City  v.  Stegmiller, 
151  Mo.  189;  s.  c.  52  S.  W.  723. 


107  AMENDMENT,    REPEAL   AND    FORFEITURE    OF    CHARTER.       §    101 

the  credit  of  the  city  for  any  sum  exceeding  $10,000  without  first 
suhmittinjj  the  question  to  the  voters  after  notice,  and  a  subsequent 
statute  authorized  those  officers  to  issue  bonds  for  the  purpose  of 
raising  money  to  build  a  certain  bridge.  The  courts  decided  that 
there  was  no  repugnancy  between  the  amendment  and  the  subsequent 
act,  and  that  the^  exercise  of  the  new  power  must  be  subject  to  the 
proviso  previously  annexed  to  the  effective  part  of  the  charter.  It  was 
declared  in  the  opinion  that  where  two  laws  only  so  far  differ  as  that 
by  any  other  construction  they  may  both  stand,  the  rule  "leges  post- 
eriores  priores  contrarias  abrogant"  does  not  apply,  and  that  the  later 
law  is  no  repeal  of  the  earlier  act.'^  As  is  said  by  Judge  Cooley :  "Ee- 
peals  by  implication  are  not  favored,  and  the  repugnancy  between 
two  statutes  should  be  very  clear  to  warrant  a  court  in  holding  that 
the  later  in  time  repeals  the  other  when  it  does  not  in  terms  do  so. 
This  rule  has  peculiar  force  in  the  case  of  laws  of  special  and  local 
application,  which  are  never  to  be  deemed  repealed  by  general  legis- 
lation except  upon  the  most  unequivocal  manifestation  of  intent  to 
that  effect."^ 

§  101.  Municipal  charter  not  repealed  by  subsequent  general  law 
unless  intent  to  repeal  is  clear. — As  the  charter  of  a  municipal  cor- 
poration is  a  special  act,  a  general  law  passed  subsequent  to  the 
charter  will  not  repeal  the  provisions  of  the  charter  either  by  impli- 
cation or  by  a  general  clause  repealing  all  acts  contrary  to  its  pro- 
visions, unless  the  intent  of  the  legislature  to  effect  such  repeal  is 
clear. '^  For  example,  a  city  in  California  adopted  in  its  charter  the 
methods  of  the  general  revenue  act,  at  that  time  in  force,  for  col- 
lecting and  assessing  the  municipal  taxes,  and  when  that  general 
revenue  act  was  repealed  and  a  general  law  regulating  the  creation 
and  government  of  municipal  corporations  and  containing  provisions 
for  the  assessment  and  collection  of  the  city  taxes  was  passed,  the 
courts  held  that  the  provisions  of  the  charter  were  not  repealed  by 

'Mayor  &c.  v.  Magruder,  34  Md.  Salle,  12  111.  339;  City  of  East  St. 
381.  Subsequent  laws  do  not  repeal  Louis  v.  Maxwell,  99  111.  439;  Hay- 
former  ones  by  containing  different  wood  v.  Mayor  &c.,  12  Ga.  404;  May- 
provisions;  they  must  be  contrary:  or  v.  Inman,  57  Ga.  370;  McGarty 
Bond  v.  Hiestand,  20  La.  An.  139.  v.    Deming,   51   Conn.   422;    City   of 

>*  Cooley  Const.  Lim.  183;   18  Am.  Harrisburg  v.  Sheck,  104  Pa.  St.  53; 

L.  Reg.  (N.  S.)  20,  25.  In    re   Egypt    Street,    2    Grant   Cas. 

^  State  v.  Branin,  23  N.  J.  L.  484;  (Pa.)  455;  In  re  Commissioners  &c., 

State  v.  Mayor  &c.,  3  N.  J.  L.  57;  50  N.  Y.  493;    People  v.  Clunie,  70 

State  v.  Common  Council  &c.,  36  N.  Cal.  504;   s.  c.  11  Pac.  775;   Bond  v. 

J.  L.  198;   State  v.  Mayor  &c.,  29  N.  Hiestand,    20    La.    An.    139;    Mayor 

J.  L.  170;  Tierney  v.  Dodge,  9  Minn.  &c.  v.  Magruder,  34'  Md.  381;   Ham- 

166;    President  &c.  v.  County  of  La  mond  v.  Haines,  25  Md.  541. 


§    103  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  108 

the  passage  of  the  subsequent  legislation,  and  that  the  municipality 
should  continue  to  assess  and  collect  its  taxes  according  to  the  meth- 
ods prescribed  in  its  charter.^" 

§  102.  The  same  subject  continued. — Where  the  two  statutes  are 
so  inconsistent  that  they  can  not  be  construed  to  stand  together,  the 
usual  principles  governing  the  construction  of  statutes  must  be  ap- 
plied in  order  to  ascertain  whether  it  was  the  intention  of  the  legisla- 
ture that  the  charter  should  be  superseded  by  the  general  statute, 
or  whether  the  charter  is  excepted  from  the  operation  of  the  general 
law.  In  order  to  arrive  at  the  intention  of  the  legislature,  the  char- 
ter and  the  general  act  must  be  considered  in  the  light  of  the  general 
legislation  on  the  subject,  and  each  provision  of  the  charter  or  the 
general  statute  must  be  read  with  reference  to  the  other  provisions.^^ 

§  103.  Instances  of  repeal  of  charter  by  general  acts. — Thus,  an 
act  of  the  New  Jersey  legislature  which  in  terms  applied  to  all  cities 
was  construed  to  apply  to  all,  and  to  repeal  all  inconsistent  charter 
provisions,  because  the  constitution  of  that  state  prohibited  special 
legislation,  and  if  any  city  were  excepted  from  the  operation  of  the 
act  in  question,  it  would  be  a  special  law  and  unconstitutional. 
Therefore,  ut  res  magis  valeat  quam  pereat,  the  interpretation  which 
validated  the  law  was  adopted. ^^  And  so^,  where  a  chapter  of  a  Min- 
nesota statute  provided  that  every  village  incorporated  under  the 
general  statutes  should  thereafter  be  governed  according  to  the  pro- 

>"  People  V.  Clunie,  70  Cal.  504;  s.  198;  State  v.  Spaude,  37  Minn.  322; 
c.  11  Pac.  775.  In  New  Jersey  a  s.  c.  34  N.  W.  164;  Holland  v.  Mayor 
similar  case  arose,  in  which  the  &c.,  11  Md.  186;  City  of  Janesville 
same  principle  was  upheld  and  a  v.  Markoe,  18  Wis.  350;  Powell  v. 
provision  in  a  city  charter  concern-  City  of  Parkersburg,  28  W.  Va.  698; 
ing  taxation  was  declared  to  remain  Board  &c.  v.  Davies,  1  Wash.  290; 
in  force  notwithstanding  the  pas-  s.  c.  24  Pac.  540;  Thomason  v.  Ash- 
sage  of  a  subsequent  general  act  worth,  73  Cal.  73;  s.  c.  14  Pac.  615; 
regulating  that  subject:  State  v.  Eichels  v.  Evansville  &c.  R.  Co.,  78 
Branin,  23  N.  J.  L.  484.  See  also,  Ind.  261;  1  Dillon  Munic.  Corp.,  §  87. 
last  note  to  preceding  section,  and  As  an  illustration  of  the  doctrine  of 
§  86,  ante,  as  to  effect  of  amendment  the  text  in  a  Maryland  case,  the 
of  charter  upon  existing  ordinances,  definition    in    a   later   statute   of   a 

"  State  V.  City  of  Camden,  50  N.  J.  term    used    in    an   earlier   law   was 

L.  87;  s.  c.  11  Atl.  137;  New  Bedford  considered  by  the  courts  in  constru- 

&c.  R.  Co.  V.  Achushnet  &c.  R.  Co.,  ing   the   prior   statute:    Holland   v, 

143   Mass.   200;    s.   c.   9   N.   B.   536;  Mayor   &c.,    11    Md.    186.     See    also. 

Board  &c.  v.  Leavitt,  4  N.  M.  37;  s.  §  82,  ante. 

c.  12  Pac.  759;  Moran  v.  Long  Island         "  State  v.  City  of  Camden,  50  N.  J. 

City,   101   N.   Y.   439;    s.   c.   5   N.  E.  L.  87;  s.  c.  11  Atl.  137. 
80;    Smith    v.    Kernochen,    7    How. 


109  AMENDMENT,    REPEAL   AND    FORFEITURE    OF    CHARTER.       §    104 

visions  of  that  chapter,  to  the  end  that  uniformity  of  village  govern- 
ment and  equal  privileges  to  all  might  be  secured,  it  was  held  that 
in  view  of  this  expressed  intention,  and  the  fact  that  the  general 
statutes  contained  no  provision  as  to  village  government,  the  section 
applied  to  all  villages  incorporated  under  any  general  law  of  the 
state.^'^ 

§  104.  Repeal  and  amendment  of  charter  by  subsequent  amend- 
ment of  state  constitution. — In  this  case  as  in  other  cases  of  repeal, 
the  intention  of  the  legislature  is  the  point  to  be  considered,  but  with 
the  qualification  that  the  courts  incline  strongly  to  declare  the  charter 
provisions  void  if  there  be  any  inconsistency,  and  do  not  go  so  far 
in  their  efforts  to  reconcile  the  two  laws.  This,  of  course,  is  due 
to  the  greater  weight  of  the  constitution  as  the  organic  law  of  the 
state.  Thus,  in  a  California  decision,  the  provisions  of  a  city  charter 
referring  to  streets  were  considered  to  have  been  repealed  by  the 
enactment  of  a  new  state  constitution  containing  provisions  thought 
by  the  court  inconsistent  with  the  charter  provisions.^*  And  so, 
where  the  charter  of  the  city  of  East  St.  Louis  contained  a  limitation 
on  the  power  of  taxation  for  the  payment  of  bonded  indebtedness,  that 
limitation  was  held  to  be  abrogated  by  an  inconsistent  provision  of 
a  state  constitution  subsequently  adopted.^^ 

^^  State  v.  Spaude,  37  Minn.  322;  existing  corporations  are  authorized 
s.  c.  34  N.  W.  164.  Laws  N.  M.,  to  adopt  its  provisions  as  to  govern- 
1884,  chs.  37,  39,  relating  to  the  in-  ment  and  classification:  Board  &c. 
corporation,  disincorporation  and  v.  Davies,  1  Wash.  290;  s.  c.  24  Pac. 
reincorporation  of  cities,  are  in  540.  In  the  last  cited  case  it  was 
pari  materia,  and  must  be  read  to-  declared,  in  accordance  with  the  doc- 
gether,  and  be  taken  as  part  of  the  trine  of  the  text^  that  where  two 
same  act;  and  their  joint  effect  is  to  statutes  embracing  the  same  sub- 
continue  the  existence  of  municipal  ject-matter  are  passed  at  the  same 
corporations  created  under  the  act  session  of  the  legislature,  they 
of  February  11,  18^0,  entitled  "An  should  be  construed  as  one  act  if 
act  for  the  incorporation  of  cities,"  possible,  but  if  in  irreconcilable 
and  to  enable  them,  if  they  choose,  conflict  the  later  statute  should  pre- 
either  to  reincorporate  under  the  vail.  Minn.  Gen.  Laws,  1885,  ch.  145, 
provisions  of  ch.  39,  laws  1884,  §  2,  applies  to  all  villages  previously 
or  to  dissolve  their  corporation  ab-  governed  by  general  laws:  Flynn  v. 
solutely:  Board  &c.  v.  Leavitt,  4  N.  Little  Falls  &c.  Co.,  74  Minn.  180;  s. 
M.  37;  s.  c.  12  Pac.  759.     Act  Wash.,  c.  78  N.  W.  106. 

March  27,  1890,  providing  for  the  or-  "  Donahue  v.  Graham,  61  Cal.  276. 

ganization     of     municipal     corpora-  ^^  East  St.  Louis  v.  Amy,  120  U.  S. 

tions,  affects  existing  corporations,  600;  s.  c.  7  S.  Ct.  739;  Public  School 

since  by   its  terms  it  provides  for  Trustees  v.  Taylor,  30  N.  J.  Eq.  618; 

corporations  attempted  to  be  organ-  Mayor  &c.  v.  Dechert,  32  Md.  369. 
ized  under  a  previous  void  act,  and 


§    105  PUBLIC    COHPOKATIONS.  IIO' 

§  105.  Repeal  of  general  laws  by  enactment  of  municipal  char- 
ter.— The  principles  considered  iu  the  preceding  sections  ninst  be 
applied  in  considering  the  question  whether  the  enactment  of  a 
municipal  charter  repeals  the  provisions  of  a  prior  general  law.  The 
intention  of  the  legislature  to  repeal  the  general  law  by  the  enactment 
of  the  charter  must  be  clear  and  beyond  uncertainty.  The  rule  that 
repeals  by  implication  are  not  favored  is  strictly  applied  in  this 
relation.^^  The  ordinances  of  a  municipal  corporation,  if  authorized 
by  its  charter,  have  the  same  effect  within  its  limits  and  with  respect 
to  persons  upon  whom  they  lawfully  operate  that  an  act  of  the  legis- 
lature has  upon  the  people  at  large. ^'^  Consequently,  where  an  or- 
dinance authorized  by  the  charter  of  the  municipality  is  in  apparent 
or  real  conflict  with  a  general  law,  the  same  principles  must  be 
applied  in  deciding  whether  the  general  law  and  the  ordinance  can 
stand  together,  or  whether  they  are  fatally  inconsistent;  as,  where 
the  provision  of  the  charter  itself  is  in  question.  When  the  constitu- 
tion authorizes  cities  to  frame  their  own  charters  and  make  regula- 
tions subject  to  and  not  in  conflict  with  general  law  the  latter  is 
paramount.^^  A  charter  which  provides  that,  after  its  ratification 
and  adoption,  it  shall  supersede  all  laws  of  the  state,  makes  the 
charter  paramount  to  all  general  laws  in  conflict  therewith.^''  Where 
the  constitution  provides  that  a  city  may  frame  and  amend  its  char- 
ter, such  special  charter  and  its  amendments  supersede  general  stat- 
utes that  conflict  in  so  far  as  mere  municipal  regulations  are  con- 
cerned.^" Where  a  city  is  organized  under  a  special  charter  the  gen- 
eral law  is  inapplicable.^^  Upon  the  division  of  a  corporation  the 
old  corporation  retains  the  title  to  the  property,  unless  there  is  a  stat- 
utory provision  to  the  contrary.^" 

^^  Ex   parte   Garza,    28   Tex.   App.  be   found   in   the   chapter   on   Ordi- 

381;  s.  c.  13  S.  W.  779;   19  Am.  St.  nances  and  By-Laws,  post. 

845;    State   v.    Clarke,    54    Mo.    17;  ^*  Tacoma  Gas  &c.  Co.  v.  City  of 

State  V.  De  Bar,  58  Mo.  395;  Village  Tacoma,  14  Wash.  288;  s.  c.  44  Pac. 

of   St.   Johnsbury  v.  Thompson,   59  655. 

Vt.    300;    State   v.   Young,    17   Kan.  i'' Kansas   City  v.   Ward,   134   Mo. 

414;   State  v.  Mills,  34  N.  J.  L.  177;  172;  s.  c.  35  S.  W.  600. 

Seibold   v.   People,   86    111.    33.     See  =°  City  of  Kansas  City  v.  Marsh  Oil 

also,  §§  77,  94,  ante.  Co.,  140  Mo.  458;   s.  c.  41  S.  W.  943. 

"Village  of  St.  Johnsbury  v.  =^' City  of  Kansas  v.  Zahner,  73 
Thompson,  59  Vt.  300;  Des  Moines  Mo.  App.  396.  Act  of  Cal.,  March  8, 
Gas  Co.  V.  City  of  Des  Moines,  44  1897,  does  not  apply  to  San  Fran- 
Iowa  505,  508;  s.  c.  24  Am.  R.  756.  cisco:  Popper  v.  Broderick,  123  Cal. 
This  is  conceded  learning.  The  456;  s.  c.  56  Pac.  53. 
cases  supporting  the   doctrine   will  "  Inhabitants  &c.  v.  Mayor  &c.,  55 

N.  J.  Eq.  505;  s.  c.  37  Atl.  63. 


Ill  AMENDMENT,    REPEAL    AND    FORFEITURE    OF    CTIARTER.       §    lOG 

§  106.    Repeal   of   general   laws  by  municipal   ordinance. — In   a 

Vermont  case  there  is  a  strong  and  interesting  presentation  of  the 
learning  on  this  point.  A  general  law  of  the  state  of  Vermont 
authorized  the  selectmen  of  villages  to  license  vietualing-honses. 
With  this  law  in  force  the  village  of  St.  Johnsbury  was  incorporated 
by  act  of  the  legislature  with  a  charter  authorizing  the  village  to 
pass  by-laws  regulating  the  licensing  of  victualing-houses.  Under 
this  charter  the  village  adopted  a  by-law  authorizing  its  trustees  to 
license  victualing-shops.  The  validity  of  the  by-law  was  called  into 
question,  and  in  the  opinion  of  the  court  it  was  said :  "The  by-laws 
of  municipal  corporations,  when  authorized  by  the  charter,  have  the 
same  effect  within  its  limits,  and  with  respect  to  persons  upon  whom 
they  lawfully  operate,  that  an  act  of  the  legislature  has  upon  the 
people  at  large. -^  So  if  the  by-law  is  authorized  by  the  charter  it 
has  the  effect  of  a  special  law  of  the  legislature  within  the  limits 
of  the  village,  and  supersedes  the  general  law  upon  the  subject  of 
victualing-houses  therein;  for  the  charter  giving  the  village  power 
to  pass  the  by-law  inconsistent  with,  and  repugnant  to,  the  general 
law,  by  necessary  implication  operated  to  repeal  the  general  law, 
within  the  territorial  limits  of  the  village,  on  the  principle  that  pro- 
visions of  different  statutes  which  are  in  conflict  with  one  another 
can  not  stand  together,  and  in  the  absence  of  anything  showing  a 
different  intent  on  the  part  of  the  legislature,  general  legislation  upon 
a  particular  subject  must  give  way  to  later  inconsistent  special  legis- 
lation upon  the  same  subject."^* 

§  107.  The  same  subject  continued. — An  interesting  application 
of  the  principles  discussed  in  the  last  section  is  to  be  found  in  the 
efforts  of  various  municipalities  to  license  houses  of  prostitution, 
where  such  houses  are  prohibited  by  the  general  criminal  statutes 
of  the  state.  In  a  recent  Texas  case  this  question  arose. ^^  By  its 
charter  the  city  of  San  Antonio,  which  was  incorporated  by  special 
act  of  the  legislature,  was  empowered  inter  alia  to  suppress  and  re- 

"^  Village     of     St.     Johnsbury     v.  under  a  law  authorizing  it  to  tax  the 

Thompson,  59  Vt.  300.  sale   of  liquor  may  be   required   to 

^1   Dillon  Munic.  Corp.,   §   88;    4  pay  an   additional   license   under  a 

Kent  Com.  466,  note;    In  re  Snell,  city  ordinance  authorized  by  a  char- 

58  Vt.  207;  s.  c.  1  Atl.  566;  State  v.  ter  granted  after  the  county  license 

Mayor  &c.,  33  N.  J.  L.  57;   State  v.  was   issued:    City   of   Elk   Point   v. 

Clarke,  25  N.  J.  L.  54;    Daviess  v.  Vaughn,  1  Dak.  113;   s.  c.  46  N.  W. 

Fairbairn,  3   How.  636;    In  re  God-  577.     See  §  88,  ante, 

dard,  16  Pick.  (Mass.)  504;  State  v.  '=  Ex   parte    Garza,    28   Tex.   App. 

Clarke,  54  Mo.  17;  Mark  v.  State,  97  381;   s.  c.  13  S.  W.  779;   19  Am.  St. 

N.  Y.  572.     One  licensed  by  a  county  845. 


§    108  PUBLIC    CORPOEATIONS,  112 

strain  disorderly  houses,  bawdy-houses  and  houses  of  prostitution,  to 
enact  ordinances  to  restrain  and  punish  prostitutes  and  to  prevent 
and  punish  the  keeping  of  houses  of  prostitution  within  the  city. 
Under  these  powers  the  city  council  passed  an  ordinance  licensing 
houses  of  prostitution  within  the  city.  At  the  time  of  the  passage 
of  the  ordinance  houses  of  prostitution  were  prohibited  by  the  penal 
code  of  the  state.  It  was  claimed  on  the  one  hand  that  the  ordinance 
was  void  as  being  repugnant  to  a  general  law  of  the  state,  while  on 
the  other  hand  it  was  contended  that  by  the  passage  of  the  charter 
provisions  authorizing  the  city  to  restrain,  regulate  and  suppress  such 
establishments,  the  general  law  was,  although  not  expressly,  still  by 
necessary  implication,  repealed.  The  former  view  was  upheld  by 
the  courts,  and  in  the  opinion  it  was  said:  "If  it  was  the  intention 
of  the  legislature  to  repeal  this  general  law  within  the  corporate 
limits  of  said  city,  it  is  reasonable  to  presume  that  such  intention 
would  have  been  plainly  and  expressly  declared,  and  not  left  to  be 
implied  merely.  It  is  reasonable  to  presume  that  if  it  had  been  in- 
tended to  grant  the  power  to  license  such  houses,  the  legislature 
would,  as  it  did  in  the  charter  of  the  city  of  Waco,  have  expressly 
granted  such  power.  That  such  was  not  the  legislative  intent  is  also, 
and  to  our  minds  very  cogently,  shown  by  the  fact  that  the  power  to 
license  other  occupations  was  expressly  conferred  upon  the  city."^^ 

§  108.  Construction  of  amendatory  and  repealing  acts  made  ap- 
plicable only  to  cities  of  a  certain  class. — The  provisions  of  amenda- 
tory and  repealing  statutes  are  sometimes  made  applicable  in  terms 
only  to  cities  of  a  certain  grade  or  class.  In  construing  these  acts 
the  question  often  arises  as  to  whether  they  take  effect,  ipso  facto, 
upon  the  city  reaching  the  required  population,  or  whether  it  is  neces- 
sary for  the  city  to  comply  with  the  statutory  formalities  required 
in  order  to  formally  raise  the  city  from  the  lower  to  the  higher  grade 

-•'  Ex  parte  Garza,  28  Tex.  App.  St.  Louis  to  suppress  bawdy-houses, 
381;  s.  c.  13  S.  W.  779;  19  Am.  St.  while  by  an  amendment  the  city  was 
845.  The  opinion  also  refers  to  the  further  empowered  to  regulate  and 
Missouri  case  on  the  same  subject,  suppress  these  resorts.  In  another 
where  it  was  held  that  the  power  to  Missouri  decision  it  was  held  that  a 
regulate  included  the  power  to  li-  special  act  of  the  legislature  ex- 
cense:  State  v.  Clarke,  54  Mo.  17.  pressly  conferring  upon  the  city  of 
See  also,  State  v.  De  Bar,  58  Mo.  St.  Louis  the  power  to  permit  beer 
395;  Smith  v.  City  of  Madison,  7  saloons  to  remain  open  on  Sunday 
Ind.  86;  City  of  Burlington  v.  Law-  operated  within  the  city  limits  a  re- 
rence,  42  Iowa  681.  But  it  is  to  be  peal  of  the  general  statute  prohibit- 
noted,  as  is  remarked  in  the  opinion,  ing  such  act:  State  v.  Binder,  38 
that  in  the  Missouri  case  the  origi-  Mo.  451. 
nal   charter  authorized   the  city  of 


113  AMENDMENT^    REPEAL   AND    FORFEITURE    OF    CHARTER.       §    109 

before  the  acts  take  effect.  In  a  recent  Utah  case,  where  certain 
sections  of  a  statute  amendatory  of  city  charters  were  by  express 
terms  made  applicable  to  cities  having  a  population  of  over  twenty 
thousand,  and  pointed  out  a  manner  in  which  the  number  of  in- 
habitants of  a  given  city  might  be  determined,  the  court  nevertheless 
enforced  the  act  by  taking  judicial  notice  of  the  population  as  shown 
by  the  last  decennial  census  without  anything  being  done  on  the  part 
of  the  city.^^  On  the  other  hand,  under  the  Ohio  statute  providing 
that  "existing  corporations  organized  as  cities  of  the  second  class 
shall  remain  such  until  they  become  cities  of  the  first  class,"  a  mere 
increase  of  population  has  been  held  not  to  advance  such  cities  from 
the  second  to  the  first  class,  but  to  accomplish  that  end  the  pro- 
visions of  the  statute  must  be  complied  with.^^ 

§  109.  Effect  of  legislation  upon  the  charter  of  a  city  organized 
under  special  lav^r,  and  not  by  its  acceptance  thereof  subject  to  the 
general  law. — Where  it  is  provided,  as  is  frequently  the  case,  that  a 
city  organized  by  special  act  may  elect  to  become  subject  to  a  subse- 
quent general  law  providing  for  the  creation  of  municipalities 
throughout  the  state,  and  any  city  refuses  to  make  such  election  and 
remains  subject  to  its  original  special  charter,  legislation  affecting 
cities  organized  under  the  general  law  does  not  effect  an  amendment 
or  repeal  of  the  provisions  of  that  special  charter.  So  the  city  of 
Wilkesbarre,  never  having  accepted  the  provisions  of  the  Pennsylvania 
statute  regulating  the  government  of  cities,  and  making  the  petition 
of  a  majority  of  the  lot-owners  a  condition  precedent  to  the  pavement 
of  a  street,  was  held  to  be  not  subject  thereto,  but  to  be  governed  by 
its   own   charter,   which   did   not   require   such   petition.^^     And   in 

"People  v.  Page,  6  Utah  353;  s.  e.  ^Beaumont  v.  City  of  Wilkes- 
23  Pac.  761;  29  Am.  &  Eng.  Corp.  barre,  142  Pa.  St.  198;  s.  c.  21  Atl. 
Cas.  57.  See  also,  §  48,  ante.  The  888.  And  in  construing  the  same 
courts  will  in  general  take  judicial  general  statute^  it  was  held  accord- 
notice  of  the  population  of  a  city  ingly  that  the  statute  in  question, 
as  ascertained  by  the  federal  cen-  the  act  of  May  23,  1874  (P.  L.  Pa. 
sus:  State  v.  Herrmann,  75  Mo.  340;  231),  and  the  supplemental  act  of 
State  V.  Anderson,  44  Ohio  St.  247;  April  11,  1876  (P.  L.  21),  establish- 
s.  c.  6  N.  E.  571;  City  of  Topeka  v.  ing  a  uniform  and  general  system  of 
Gillett,  32  Kan.  431;  s.  c.  4  Pac.  800.  government  for  all   cities,   was  not 

^  State  V.  Wall,  47  Ohio  St.  499;  designed  to  repeal  any  municipal 
s.  c.  24  N.  E.  897.  Amendment  of  charter  previously  created  by  spe- 
charters  of  cities  of  over  100,000  cial  enactment,  and  a  city  which 
population  in  Missouri, — see  City  of  has  not  accepted  the  act  is  not  sub- 
Kansas  City  V.  Stegmiller,  151  Mo.  ject  to  its  provisions:  In  re  Henry 
189;  s.  c.  52  S.  W.  723.  St.,  123  Pa.  St.  346;  s.  c.  16  Atl.  785. 

1  Smith — 8 


§  no 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS. 


114 


Colorado  and  California  similar  rulings  were  made  even  in  the  case 
of  constitutional  provisions  affecting  cities  organized  under  the  gen- 
eral law.^" 

§  110.  Miscellaneous  instances  of  effective  repealing  and  amenda- 
tory acts. — Where  a  repealing  or  amendatory  act  expressly  declares 
that  the  act  shall  apply  to  all  cities  and  towns  of  the  state,  of  course 
those  charters  of  cities  and  towns  within  the  state  which  are  incon- 
sistent with  the  provisions  of  the  act  are  thereby  repealed  or  altered, 
as  the  intention  of  the  legislature  to  efEect  such  repeal  or  amendment 
is  expressly  indicated.^^     Where  the  earlier  and  later  legislation  are 


^°  The  constitution  of  Colorado, 
article  14,  §  13,  authorized  the 
general  assembly  to  provide  by  gen- 
eral laws  for  organization  and  clas- 
sification of  cities  and  towns,  and  to 
define  by  general  laws  the  powers  of 
each  class^  so  that  all  of  the  same 
class  shall  possess  the  same  powers, 
etc.  Section  14  provided  that  the 
general  assembly  should  make  pro- 
vision by  general  law  whereby  any 
city  incorporated  by  special  law 
might  elect  to  become  subject  to  the 
general  law.  The  city  of  Denver 
never  elected  to  be  reincorporated 
under  the  general  laws;  but,  on  the 
contrary,  its  charter  was  often 
amended.  It  was  decided  that  the 
constitution,  article  7,  §  12,  pro- 
viding that  the  general  assembly 
shall  by  general  law  designate  the 
courts  and  judges  by  whom  election 
contests  shall  be  tried^  did  not  in 
effect  repeal  an  existing  provision  in 
the  Denver  city  charter  authorizing 
the  city  council  to  determine  con- 
tests as  to  the  election  of  mayor, 
nor  did  it  invalidate  a  subsequent 
amendment  to  such  provision:  Peo- 
ple V.  Londoner,  13  Colo.  303;  s.  c.  22' 
Pac.  764;  6  L.  R.  A.  444;  Carpenter 
V.  People,  8  Colo.  116;  s.  c.  5  Pac. 
828;  7  Am.  &  Eng.  Corp.  Cas.  110. 
The  complaint  in  an  action  by  a 
California  city  organized  under  a 
special  charter  was  according  to  the 
form  prescribed  by  a  section  of  the 
charter.     There  was  nothing  to  in- 


dicate that  such  section  had  been 
repealed  or  modified  prior  to  the 
adoption  of  the  constitution  of  Cal- 
ifornia of  1879,  or  that  the  city  as  a 
corporation  ever  reorganized  under 
the  act  of  1883  (acts  Cal.  1883,  p. 
235),  providing  for  the  organization 
of  cities  under  general  laws.  The 
court  held  that  the  complaint  was 
not  obnoxious  to  the  constitution 
of  California  of  1879,  article  11,  §  6, 
providing  that  "corporations  for 
municipal  purposes  shall  not  be  cre- 
ated by  special  laws;  but  the  legis- 
lature, by  general  laws,  shall  pro- 
vide for  the  incorporation,  organiza- 
tion and  classification  in  proportion 
to  population  of  cities,  towns,"  etc.: 
City  of  Stockton  v.  Western  &c.  Ins. 
Co.,  73  Cal.  621;  s.  c.  15  Pac.  314. 

^^  Thus  a  clause  in  an  act  declaring 
that  "this  act  shall  apply  to  all  cities 
and  towns  in  this  state,  anything  in 
their  charters  to  the  contrary  not- 
withstanding," makes  the  act  oper- 
ative in  those  cities  whose  charters 
have  contrary  provisions:  In  re 
House  Resolution  Relating  to  House 
Bill  No.  116,  12  Colo.  289;  s.  c.  21 
Pac.  484;  In  re  Senate  Resolution 
Relating  to  Senate  Bill  No.  1,  12 
Colo.  290;  s.  c.  21  Pac.  484.  Also  it 
has  been  decided  that  laws  of 
Utah,  1888,  ch.  48,  article  20,  §  5, 
providing  that  the  sections  there- 
of specifying  the  number  of  wards, 
and  the  officers  to  be  elected,  in 
cities  of  certain  classes,  shall  apply 


115  AMENDMENT,    REPEAL   AND    FORFEITURE    OF    CHARTER.       §    111 

obviously  and  fatally  inconsistent,  the  later  act  repeals  the  former. 
Thus,  a  Texas  statute  which  incorporated  the  town  of  Henderson, 
with  limits  one  mile  square,  the  court-house  being  in  the  center,  was 
impliedly  repealed  by  a  subsequent  act  incorporating  the  same  town, 
with  limits  extending  "one-half  mile  in  every  direction  from  the 
court-house."^-  In  the  famous  cases  in  which  the  members  of  the 
board  of  aldermen  of  New  York,  known  as  the  "boodle"  aldermen, 
were  indicted  for  receiving  bribes  in  connection  with  the  purchase 
by  Jacob  Sharp  of  the  franchise  to  operate  a  street  railway  through 
Broadway,  the  charter  of  the  city  provided  a  penalty  in  the  case  of 
municipal  officials  for  the  crime  of  receiving  bribes.  A  provision 
of  the  penal  code  adopted  after  the  passage  of  that  charter  provision 
imposed  a  greater  penalty  upon  the  same  offense.  The  provision  of 
the  penal  code  was  held  to  supersede  and  repeal  the  charter  pro- 
vision.^^ 

§  111.  The  same  subject  continued. — In  general  it  may  be  stated 
that  where  a  question  arises  as  to  whether  the  provisions  of  a  munici- 
jial  charter  are  repealed  by  subsequent  legislation,  the  intention  of  the 
legislature  must  be  ascertained  according  to  the  general  rules  govern- 
ing the  construction  of  statutes,  subject  to  the  special  limitations  in- 
dicated in  the  preceding  sections;  and  where,  either  expressly  or  by 
clear  and  necessary  implication,  the  intention  of  the  legislature  to 
amend  or  repeal  the  provisions  of  the  charter  is  apparent,  such  amend- 
ment or  repeal  is  effected.^* 

to  cities  already  organized,  effects  270,  providing  for  the  preservation 
an  amendment  of  the  charters  of  of  the  public  health,  etc.,  being  gen- 
such  cities,  though  the  act  contains  eral  in  its  application,  repeals  and 
no  repealing  clause:  People  v.  Page,  supersedes  the  provisions  of  a  vil- 
6  Utah  353;  s.  c.  23  Pac.  761.  See  lage  charter  relating  to  the  same 
also,  Trustees  «S:c.  v.  Keeting,  4  subject:  People  v.  Daley,  37  Hun  (N. 
Denio  (N.  Y.)  341;  Bank  v.  Bridges,  Y.)  461.  The  provision  of  the  city 
30  N.  J.  L.  112;  Coe  v.  Meriden,  45  charter  of  Oakland,  granted  in  1854, 
Conn.  155;  Tierney  v.  Dodge,  9  giving  the  common  council  exclusive 
Minn.  166.  jurisdiction    to    determine    an    elec- 

^^Buford  V.  State,  72  Texas  182;  s.  tion  contest  for  the  office  of  council- 

c.  10  S.  W.  401.  man,    was    impliedly    repealed    by 

3^  People  V.  O'Neil,  109  N.  Y.  251;  Code  Civil  Proc.  Cal.,  §  1111  et  seq., 

s.  c.  16  N.  E.  68;   People  v.  Jaehne,  providing  that  any  elector  of  a  coun- 

103  N.  Y.  182;  s.  c.  8  N.  E.  374.  ty  or  city,  or  any  political  subdivi- 

=*Buford  V.   State,  72  Texas  182;  sion    of    either,    may    contest    for 

s.  c.  10  S.  W.  401;    State  v.  Sever-  causes  therein  stated,  and  that  such 

ance,  55  Mo.  378;  State  v.  Miller,  30  contest  must  be  determined  by  a  spe- 

N.  J.  L.  368;    s.  c.  86  Am.  D.  188;  cial   session  of  the  superior  court: 

Allen  V.  People,  84  111.  502,  and  cases  McGivney  v.  Pierce,  87  Cal.  124;    s. 

already  cited.     N.  Y.  Laws  1885,  ch.  c.  25  Pac.  269.     The  construction  of 


112 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS. 


116 


§  112.    What  is  an  amendment  or  repeal  of  a  municipal  charter? — 

The  constitution  of  the  state  sonietinies  prescribes  specific  methods 
according  to  which  the  amendment  or  repeal  of  municipal  charters 
may  be  effected.  Under  these  constitutional  provisions  it  is  necessary 
to  determine  whether  legislative  or  other  action  is  an  amendment 
or  a  repeal  of  the  charter  within  the  meaning  of  the  statute.  In 
Missouri  it  has  been  decided  that  an  ordinance  extending  the  limits 
of  a  city,  the  boundaries  of  which  had  been  originally  defined  by  its 
charter,  was  an  amendment  to  the  charter.^^  But  an  act  of  the  legis- 
lature, conferring  upon  a  city  powers  additional  to  what  it  already 
had  under  its  charter,  was  regarded  in  an  Oregon  case  as  supplemental 
to  the  charter,  and  not  as  an  amendment  or  revision  of  it,  within  that 
provision  of  the  constitution  which  provides  that  when  an  act  is 
revised,  or  a  section  amended,  the  act  or  section  so  revised  or  amended 
shall  be  set  forth  at  full  length.^**  The  charter  of  the  city  of  New 
York  originally  provided  that  the  aldermen  of  that  city  should  sit 
as  judges  of  the  court  of  general  sessions;  and  it  was  held  that  an  act 
depriving  the  aldermen  of  that  right  was  an  act  amending  the  charter, 
and,  ^s  such,  required  a  vote  of  two-thirds  of  the  members  elected 
to  each  branch  of  the  legislature.  Such  an  act  passed  without  that 
vote  was  declared  void.^^ 


municipal  ordinances  is  governed  by 
the  same  rules  that  are  applied  to 
statutes  in  similar  cases:  State  v. 
Mayor  &c.,  40  N.  J.  L.  257;  s.  c.  an- 
notated 18  Am.  L.  Reg.  (N.  S.)  20. 

^^  The  constitution  of  Missouri, 
article  9,  §  16,  provides  that  any  city 
having  a  population  of  one  hundred 
thousand  may  frame  a  charter  for 
its  own  government,  which  must  be 
approved  by  four-sevenths  of  the 
qualified  voters,  and  which,  when 
"so  adopted,  may  be  amended  by  a 
proposal  therefor  made  by  the  law- 
making authorities  of  such  city, 
.  .  .  and  accepted  by  three-fifths 
of  the  qualified  voters  of  such  city, 
.  .  .  and  not  otherwise."  Kan- 
sas City  adopted  such  a  charter,  one 
of  whose  provisions  defined  the  ter- 
ritorial limits  of  the  city.  It  was 
held  that  an  ordinance  to  extend 
such  limits  was  an  amendment  to 
the  charter,  and  must  be  accepted  by 
three-fifths    of    the    voters,    as    re- 


quired by  the  constitution.  And,  al- 
though the  same  section  of  the  con- 
stitution further  provided  that 
"such  charter  shall  always  be  .  .  . 
subject  to  the  constitution  and  laws 
of  this  state,"  this  was  decided  to 
confer  no  authority  on  the  legisla- 
ture to  authorize  amendments  to 
the  charter  otherwise  than  as  pro- 
vided by  the  constitution;  and 
hence  act  of  Missouri,  March  10, 
1887,  providing  that  the  territorial 
limits  of  such  a  city  may  be  ex- 
tended by  ordinance,  was  held  to  be 
void  so  far  as  it  proposes  to  dis- 
pense with  the  assent  of  three-fifths 
of  the  qualified  voters  of  the  city  to 
such  ordinance:  City  of  Westport  v. 
Kansas  City,  103  Mo.  141;  s.  c.  15  S. 
W.  68. 

3"  Sheridan  v.  Salem,  14  Or.  328; 
s.  c.  12  Pac.  925. 

==^Purdy  V.  People,  4  Hill  (N.  Y.) 
384. 


117  AMENDMENT,    REPEAL    AND    FORFEITURE   OF    CHARTER.       §    113 

§  113.  Eepeal — Effect  of. — Where  a  charter  is  repealed  and  a  new 
one  granted  for  the  same  territory,  property  and  corporators,  and 
the  property  of  the  okl  corporation  passes  to  the  new  without  con- 
sideration, the  new  corporation  becomes  responsible  for  the  debts 
of  the  old.^**  The  express  repeal  of  an  existing  charter  does  not  re- 
vive the  original  charter,  but  the  municipality  ceases.  The  repeal 
of  the  charter  suspends  the  statute  of  limitations  until  the  corporation 
is  organized  under  a  new  charter  and  takes  benefits  from  the  property 
of  the  old  corporation.^*^  An  amendment,  unless  otherwise  provided 
by  law,  takes  effect  on  its  approval.  *° 

§  114.  Acceptance  of  amendment. — The  legislature  has,  in  the 
absence  of  constitutional  limitations  to  the  contrary,  the  power  to 
impose  an  amendment  of  the  charter  without  the  consent  of  the 
inhabitants  of  the  municipality,  as  it  has  the  power  to  impose  the 
original  charter  without  such  consent  ;*^  but  it  is  frequently  provided 
that  an  amendment  of  the  charter  shall  not  become  a  law  until  the 
municipal  government  or  the  inhabitants  of  the  municipality  shall, 
in  a  manner  indicated  by  the  statute,  signify  their  acceptance  of  the 
amendment.'*-  The  provision  of  a  state  constitution  that  new  char- 
ters or  amendments  thereto  shall  be  sumbitted  for  ratification  to  the 
voters  of  the  city  whose  charter  it  is  proposed  to  change  is  not  in 
violation  of  the  constitution  of  the  United  States,  article  4,  sec- 
tion 4.^3 

^  Broadfoot    v.    City    of    Fayette-  charter,  "whenever  in  the  judgment 

ville,  124  N.  C.  478;    s.  c.  32   S.  E.  of  the  board  of  aldermen"  an  amend- 

804.  ment  became  necessary  or  desirable. 

^^  State      V.      Village      of      Reads  The   act  prescribed   the   manner   of 

(Minn.),   78   N.   W.   883;    Broadfoot  proposing  and  voting  upon  amend- 

V.    City    of   Fayetteville,    124    N.   C.  ments,    and    further    provided    that 

478;  s.  c.  32  S.  E.  804.  "no  amendments  shall  be  proposed 

*"  City  of  Kansas  City  v.  Steg-  or  submitted  by  any  board  of  alder- 
miller,  151  Mo.  189;  s.  c.  52  S.  W.  men  which  shall  contravene,  or  be 
723.  repugnant    to,    the    constitution    or 

*^  See  §§  56,  72,  77,  78,  ante.  statute    laws    of    this    state."     The 

"  Attorney-General  v.  Shepard,  62  constitutionality  of  this  law  is  dis- 

N.  H.  383;   In  re  Henry  Street,  123  cussed    by   a    correspondent   of   the 

Pa.  St.  346;   s.  c.  16  Atl.  785;    Lar-  Central   Law   Journal,   who  arrives 

gen  V.  State,  76  Texas  323;   s.  c.  13  at  the  conclusion  that  it  is  not  ob- 

S.  W.   161;    State  v.  Mayor  &c.,   73  noxious  to  the  maxim  which  forbids 

Mo.    435;    Foote   v.   City  of  Cincin-  a   delegation    of   legislative   author- 

nati,  11  Ohio  408;  Mayor  &c.  v.  Fin-  ity:    2  Cent.  L.  Jour.  33.     See  also, 

ney,  54  Ga.  317;   §§  53,  77,  78,  ante.  People  v.  Bagley,  85  Cal.  343;   s.  c. 

The  legislature  of  Texas  passed  an  24  Pac.  716;  and  §§  43,  48  ante, 
act  empowering   "any   incorporated         *'  Hopkins  v.   City   of   Duluth,   81 

town    or    city"    to    amend    its    own  Minn.  189;  s.  c.  83  N.  W.  536. 


§    115  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  118 

§  115.  Manner  of  acceptance. — Where  this  acceptance  is  made  a 
condition  of  tlie  amendment,  it  must  be  signified  according  to  the 
method  prescribed  by  the  statute  in  order  to  validate  the  amendment. 
Thus  in  Ohio  it  was  provided  that  an  amendment  to  a  city  charter 
should  take  effect  when  adopted  "by  a  majority  of  the  voters  of  the 
city."  The  city  and  the  township  were  coterminous,  but  different 
qualifications  for  voters  were  in  force  in  the  two  corporations.  The 
vote  on  the  acceptance  of  the  amendment  was  held  at  the  township 
polls;  and  the  courts  declared  that  the  election  was  void  and  the 
amendment  ineffectual,  on  the  ground  that  the  statutory  provision 
contemplated  a  vote  at  the  city  polls.**  A  substantial  compliance 
with  the  requirements  of  the  statute  is,  however,  sufficient.*^  When 
no  provision  is  made  by  the  amending  act  for  the  assent  of  the  munici- 
pality or  its  citizens,  it  is  proper  for  the  court  to  infer  that  assent 
from  such  acts  of  the  citizens  as  show  their  willingness  to  become 
subject  to  the  amendment.*'^ 

§  116.  Constitutional  limitations  on  power  of  legislature  to  amend 
or  repeal  municipal  charters — (a)  In  general. — It  has  been  already 
stated  that  the  sole  restrictions  on  the  power  of  the  legislature  to 
amend,  repeal  or  alter  the  charters  of  municipal  corporations  are  to 
be  found  in  the  constitutions  of  the  United  States  and  of  the  several 
states.  These  restrictions  are  the  same  that  are  imposed  on  other 
forms  of  legislation,  and  they  are  the  sole  restraints  on  the  legislative 
power  of  control  of  municipal  corporations,  except  the  power  of 
public  opinion  and  the  power  of  the  people,  expressed  through  their 
votes.  As  is  said  by  Judge  Cooley:  "If  the  legislative  action  in 
these  cases  operates  injuriously  to  the  municipalities  or  to  individuals, 

"  Foote  V.  City  of  Cincinnati,  11  torney-General  v.  Shepard,  62  N.  H. 

Oliio  408.  383.     See    also,    Winn    v.    Board    of 

*^Thus,     where     Laws     of     New  Park  Com'rs,  12  Ky.  L.  339;  s.  c.  14 

Hampshire,  1881,  ch.  255,  §§  1,  3,  11,  S.  W.  421;  §§  49,  54,  56,  88,  89,  ante, 

provided  that  an  amendment  of  the  ""'  Taylor  v.  Commissioners  &c.,  2 

charter     of     the     city     of     Concord  Jones  Eq.  (N.  C.)  141.     In  this  case' 

should  not  become  a  law  unless  the  the  assent  of  the  city  of  New  Berne 

city  government  or  the  inhabitants  to    an    amendment    of    its    charter 

of  the   city  should   by   "a   majority  was  inferred   from   the  election   by 

vote  of  the  legal  voters  present  and  its  citizens  of  legislators  who  made 

voting  thereon  by  ballot  determine  the  adoption  of  the  amendment  an 

to  adopt  the  same;"  and  at  a  meet-  issue    in    their    canvass,    and    were 

ing  of  the  board  of  aldermen  six  of  elected  as  favoring  the  amendment, 

the    seven    members    were    present.  See   also,   §    78,   ante.       Failure   of 

three  of  whom  voted  in  the  affirma-  clerk  to  record  amendment  does  not 

five  on  the  question  and  three  re-  affect  the  validity  thereof:   State  v. 

fused  to  vote,  it  was  held  that  the  Doherty,  16  Wash.  382;  s.  c.  47  Pac. 

amendment  was  legally  passed:  At-  958;  58  Am.  St.  39. 


119  AMENDMENT,    TvEPEAL   AXD    FORFEITURE    OF    CHARTER.       §    117 

the  remedy  is  not  with  the  courts.  The  courts  have  no  power  to  in- 
terfere, and  the  people  must  be  looked  to  to  right  through  the  ballot- 
box  all  these  wrongs."*^  In  considering  whether  an  act  amending 
or  repealing  a  municipal  charter  is  constitutional  or  unconstitutional, 
the  same  criteria  are  to  be  applied  as  in  considering  other  legislation. 
If  such  an  act  impairs  the  obligation  of  a  contract ;  if  it  deprives  any 
person  of  his  private  property  without  due  process  of  law;  in  short, 
if  it  violates  any  provision  of  the  federal  constitution  or  of  the  con- 
stitution of  the  state  by  the  legislature  of  which  it  is  enacted,  it  is 
unconstitutional  and  void,  as  all  other  legislation  would  under  like 
circumstances  be  unconstitutional  and  void. 

§  117.  (b)  Special  legislation. — It  is  prescribed  by  the  constitu- 
tions of  several  of  the  states  that  no  special  or  local  law  shall  be 
enacted  affecting  municipal  corporations.  This  prohibition  has  been 
held  in  New  Jersey  to  apply  to  a  law  altering  the  ward  limits  of  a 
city  and  changing  the  time  of  election  of  certain  of  the  municipal 
officers.'*^  The  Pennsylvania  constitution  prohibits  the  passage  of 
any  law  creating,  renewing  or  extending  the  charter  of  more  than  one 
corporation.  An  act  enlarging  the  powers  of  several  municipal  cor- 
porations v/as  not  considered  unconstitutional  under  this  prohibi- 
tion.*^ In  Ohio  and  Kansas,  statutes  extending  or  defining  the  cor- 
porate limits  of  the  municipality  have  been  declared  to  be  within  the 
constitutional  prohibition  of  special  acts.^''  A  curious  instance  of 
an  attempt  to  evade  this  prohibition  is  to  be  found  in  an  Ohio  statute 
which  allowed  certain  privileges  to  cities  having  at  the  last  federal 
census  a  population  of  sixteen  thousand  five  hundred  and  twelve. 
The  city  of  Akron  was  the  only  city  in  the  state  to  which  the  federal 
census  had  given  that  exact  figure  of  population,  and  the  statute  was 

*"  Cooley  Const.  Lim.  (6th  ed.)  230.  city  charter  may,  in  New  Jersey,  be 

**  State  v.  Mayor  &c.,  40  N.  J.  L.  repealed  by  a  special  act:    State  v. 

550;  s.  c.  29  Am.  R.  266.     Under  the  Steen,    43    N.    J.    L.    542.     See   also, 

same  prohibition   it  has  been  held  §  44,  ante. 

that  where  a  general  statute  is  en-  ^*  Moers   v.    City    of   Reading,    21 

acted,  applying  to  all  cities  in  the  Pa.  St.  188. 

state,   all   special   laws  inconsistent  ^''  State  v.   City  of  Cincinnati,   20 

therewith  are  repealed  by  the  gen-  Ohio    St.    18;     Wyandotte    City    v. 

eral  repealing  clause  of  the  statute,  Wood,  5  Kan.  603;   City  of  Topeka 

as  otherwise  the  statute  would  not  v.  Gillett,  32  Kan.  431;   s.  c.  4  Pac. 

apply  to  all  cities  and  would,  there-  800;    23   Am.   L.   Reg.    (N.   S.)    778, 

fore,  be  unconstitutional  as  special  and    a   valuable    note    (p.    785)    by 

local    legislation    affecting    munici-  Frank    P.    Pritchard,    Esq.,    on    the 

palities:    State  v.  City  Council  &c.,  general   topic   of   local   and   special 

50  N.  J.  L.  87;  s.  c.  11  Atl.  137;   17  legislation. 
Am.  &  Eng.  Corp.  Cas.  638.     But  a 


§    118  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  120 

very    properly    declared    unconstitutional    as    being    special    legisla- 
tion.-" 

§  118.  (c)  Vested  rights — Impairment  of  obligation  of  con- 
tracts— Recognition  by  constitution. — Where  the  amendatory  or  re- 
pealing acts  aliect  vested  rights  of  creditors,  the  right  of  private 
property,  or  the  obligation  of  contracts,  they  must  be  closely  inspected 
to  see  that  they  are  not  avoided  by  the  restrictions  imposed  by  the 
constitution  of  the  United  States  and  of  the  several  states  upon  such 
legislation.  For  a  detailed  statement  of  the  learning  on  these  diffi- 
cult and  obscure  points,  reference  is  made  to  a  subsequent  chapter.^^ 
As  was  declared  in  a  Texas  case,  the  repeal  of  a  municipal  charter 
can  not  deprive  of  their  vested  rights  those  to  whom  the  municipality 
is  under  obligation. ^^  But  if  the  constitution  makes  mention  of  a 
municipal  corporation  and  recognizes  it  as  such,  it  is  not  thereby 
secured  against  legislative  control.^*  And  it  has  been  held  in  numer- 
ous cases  in  Indiana  that  a  provision  in  the  state  constitution  con- 
tinuing in  existence  certain  municipal  corporations  until  their  char- 
acters were  "modified"  or  "repealed"  by  the  legislature  did  not  pro- 
hibit amendments  to  charters  so  as  to  enlarge  territorially  or  other- 
wise the  jurisdiction  of  the  corporate  authorities.^^  Eepeal  of  the 
old  charter  by  the  adoption  of  a  new  one,  providing  that  all  existing 
laws,  resolutions  and  ordinances  should  remain  in  force  until  repealed 
or  modified,  continues  in  force  only  such  as  are  in  consonance  with  the 
new  charter.^''  All  rights,  liens  and  liabilities  under  the  old  charter 
continue  under  the  new  as  existing  at  the  time  the  new  charter  goes 
into  effect. ^'^  Where  an  original  contract  has  been  impaired  by  an 
amendment  to  the  charter,  the  corporation  only  has  a  right  to  corn- 
plain.^^  Where  a  charter  reserved  the  power  to  amend  by  the  legis- 
lature, and  subsequently  by  an  act  of  the  legislature  certain  reservoir 
property  was  exempted  from  city,  county  and  state  taxes,  and  subse- 
quently another  statute  was  passed  subjecting  the  property  thereto- 
fore exempt  to  taxation,  it  was  held  that  subjecting  the  property  to 
taxation  was  not  in  violation  of  the  federal  constitution  in  relation 
to  impairing  the  obligation  of  contracts:  the  legislation  did  not  con- 
stitute a  contract. ^^ 

"  State  V.  Anderson,  44  Ohio  St.  ^^  Baader  v.  Town  of  Cullman,  115 

247;  s.  c.  6  N.  E.  571.  Ala.  539;  s.  c.  22  So.  19. 

°^  See  chapter  on  Legislative  Con-  "  Board  &c.  v.  Mason  &c.  Co.,  100 

trol,  post.  Ky.  48;  s.  c.  18  Ky.  L.  543;  37  S.  W. 

'^='  Morris  v.  State,  62  Tex.  728.  290. 

=^  Mayor  &c.  v.  State,  15  Md.  376;  =' O'Phinney      v.       Trustees      &c. 

s.  c.  74  Am.  D.  572.  (Md.),  42  Atl.  58. 

"  Wiley    V.    Corporation    of   Bluff-  ^'■'  Covington   v.   Kentucky,   173   U. 

ton,  111  Ind.  152;  s.  c.  12  N.  E.  165,  S.  231;  s.  c.  19  S.  Ct.  383. 
and  cases  there  cited. 


121  AMENDMENT,    REPEAL   AND    FORFEITURE   OF    CHARTER.       §    119 

§  119.  (d)  Title  of  amendatory  or  repealing  acts. — The  constitu- 
tions of  many  states  provide  tlial  no  statute  sluill  embrace  more  than 
one  object,  which  shall  be  clearly  expressed  in  its  title.  Legislative 
acts  amending  or  repealing  municipal  charters  are,  of  course,  obnox- 
ious, along  with  other  legislation,  to  this  provision.  The  object  of  such 
provision  is,  of  course,  to  enable  legislators  to  see  at  a  glance  the 
general  scope  of  the  act  which  they  are  called  upon  to  pass,  and  thus 
to  prevent  the  passage  of  vicious  legislation  through  the  inattention 
of  the  law-giving  body.  It  is  evident  that  this  object  will  be  at- 
tained if  the  title  of  the  act  is  sufhciently  particular  to  show  the 
general  object  and  effect  of  the  statute,  even  though  details  may  be 
omitted  from  the  title.  This  is  well  illustrated  by  a  Minnesota  case. 
The  constitution  of  Minnesota  contained  such  a  provision.  A  special 
law  entitled  "An  act  to  define  the  boundaries  of  and  establish  a 
municipal  government  for  the  city  of  Duluth,"  by  repealing  a  former 
act  extinguished  a  village  organization  and  annexed  its  territory  to 
the  city.  The  constitutionality  of  the  act  was  attacked  on  the  ground 
that  its  title  did  not  comply  with  the  constitutional  requirement.  The 
courts  upheld  the  statute,  and  in  the  opinion  it  was  said:  "It  would 
be  impracticable  to  require  all  these  minor  subjects  to  be  expressed 
in  the  title:  all  that  is  required  is  that  they  and  the  provisions  in 
respect  to  them  shall  be  germane  to  the  subject  expressed  in  the  title ; 
such  as  have  a  just  and  proper  reference  thereto;  such  as  by  the 
nature  of  the  subject  indicated  are  manifestly  appropriate  in  that 
connection.  It  could  not  be  required  that  every  other  law  repealed 
by  implication  because  of  repugnancy  or  inconsistency  shall  be  men- 
tioned in  the  title  of  the  new  act.""*^ 

§  120.  The  same  subject  continued. — The  constitution  of  Wiscon- 
sin provides  that  local  and  private  acts  "shall  not  embrace  more  than 
one  subject  and  that  shall  be  expressed  in  the  title.''  It  has  been 
decided  in  that  state  that  amendments  to  the  charter  of  the  city  of 
IMilwaukee  are  not  local  or  private  acts  within  the  meaning  of  the 
constitutional  provision.®^  But  under  a  similar  provision  in  the 
constitution  of  Illinois  it  was  held  that  a  statute  entitled  "An  act 
to  repeal  certain  acts  therein  named,"  by  which  the  previous  acts  of 
incorporation  of  a  city  were  repealed,  and  the  former  city  reincor- 
porated into  a  town,  was  unconstitutional,  on  the  ground  that  the 
repealing  portion  of  the  act  was  alone  designated  by  the  title,  and 

^  State  V.  Gallagher,  42  Minn.  449;     193;  McGurn  v.  Board  of  Education, 
s.  c.  44  N.  W.  529;   State  v.  County     133  111.  122;  s.  c.  24  N.  E.  529. 
Com'rs  &c.,  23  Fla.  483;   s.  c.  3  So.         "^Thompson  v.  City  of  Milwaukee, 

69  Wis.  492;  s.  c.  34  N.  W.  402. 


§    121  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  .  123 

that  the  subsequent  clauses  were  not  designated  in  the  title  according 
to  the  requirement  of  the  constitution.^"  .In  an  Iowa  case  a  stat- 
ute entitled  "An  act  to  amend  the  act  to  incorporate  the  city  of 
Muscatine,"  extended  the  limits  of  that  city,  which  limits  had  been 
defined  by  the  original  act  of  incorporation.  The  courts  held  that 
the  object  of  the  statute  was  sufficiently  set  forth  in  its  title  and  that 
the  act  was  not  unconstitutional.®^  The  constitution  of  Georgia  con- 
tained a  clause  providing  that  no  law  or  ordinance  should  be  passed 
"which  refers  to  more  than  one  subject-matter  or  contains  matter 
different  from  what  is  expressed  in  the  title  thereof."  A  subsequent 
statute  entitled  "An  act  to  prescribe  the  manner  of  incorporating 
towns  and  villages,"  which  contained  a  clause  amending  existing  char- 
ters, was  held  to  be  void,  as  not  complying  with  the  constitutional  re- 
quirement."* 

§  121.  Forfeiture  of  charter  in  England. — The  charter  of  an 
English  municipal  corporation  can  be  declared  forfeited  by  the  courts 
for  misuser  or  non-user  on  the  part  of  the  corporation  of  the  pro- 
visions of  its  charter."^  This  forfeiture  of  charter  and  consequent 
dissolution  of  the  municipality  is  accomplished  by  quo  warranto 
and  scire  facias  proceedings,  as  in  the  case  of  private  corporations. 
The  former  proceeding  is  in  form  a  criminal  but  in  its  essence  a  civil 
proceeding,  and  was  originally  used  where  there  was  a  defect  in 
incorporation  whereby  the  municipality  had  merely  a  de  facto  cor- 
porate existence  and  could  not  legally  exercise  its  powers.  In  later 
times,  however,  it  was  used  not  only  as  an  appropriate  means  for 
testing  the  right  to  exercise  corporate  franchises,  but  also  as  the 
proper  remedy  for  the  abuse  thereof.  The  writ  of  scire  facias,  on  the 
other  hand,  is  properly  used  where  the  municipality  is  properly  in- 
corporated, but  has  misused  or  non-used  its  franchises.®" 

"-  People  V.  Mellen,  32  111.  181.  corporating  the  city  of  Brunswick 
"^  Morford  v.  Unger,  8  Iowa  82.  and  for  other  purposes"  therein 
In  the  same  state  a  statute  entitled  mentioned  was  also  declared  uncon- 
an  amendment  to  a  municipal  char-  stitutional  and  void  on  the  same 
ter  was  declared  void  as  containing  ground.  See  also,  1  Dillon  Munic. 
objects  not  mentioned  in  the  title:  Corp.  (4th  ed.),  §  51,  where  many- 
Williamson  v.  City  of  Keokuk,  44  cases  on  this  point  are  collected. 
Iowa  88.  "=  Willcock  Corp.  325. 

"*  Ayeridge   v.   Commissioners,   60        ""  For  a  discussion  of  this  subject 

Ga.    404.     See    also,    Brieswick    v.  and     of     the     authorities     relating 

Mayor    &c.,    51    Ga.    639,    where    a  thereto,     with     especial     reference, 

statute  entitled  "An  act  to  consoli-  however,    to    private    corporations, 

date  and  amend  the  several  acts  in-  see  1  Beach  Priv.  Corp.,  §  53. 


123  AMENDMENT,    HKPKAL    AND    F0K1M!;ITIJI{E   OF    CIIAKTKR.       §    123 

§  122.  The  same  subject  continued. — The  Englisli  dootrinc  that 
the  charters  of  uuinieipal  as  well  as  of  private  corporations  are  liable 
to  forfeiture  b}-  quo  warranto  and  scire  facias"  proceedings  arises  from 
the  fact  that  there  is  an  implied  condition  upon  the  grant  of  any 
charter,  public  or  private,  that  the  franchises  thereof  shall  not  be 
neglected  or  abused.*''^  It  is  conceded  that  this  doctrine  applies  to 
private  corporations  in  this  country.*^**  But  as  will  be  shown  in  the 
succeeding  sections,  the  charters  of  municipal  corporations  can  not 
in  the  United  States  be  declared  forfeited  by  the  courts  for  any 
cause. 

§  123.    Instances  of  forfeiture  of  charter  under  English  law. — 

The  boroughs  and  cities  of  England  had  always  been  the  centers  of 
intellectual  activity,  and  consequently  of  restiveness,  under  the  at- 
tempted tyranny  of  the  Tudors  and  the  Stuarts.  When  Charles  II 
was  restored  to  the  throne  he  took  measures  to  quell  the  rebellious 
cities,  and  notably  the  great  capital  of  London,  by  attacking  the  char- 
ters which  were  the  source  of  their  independence.  A  servile  judiciary 
subserved  his  aims,  and  on  frivolous  grounds  the  charter  of  London 
was  declared  forfeited. ®®  The  charter  was  only  restored  to  the  city 
upon  conditions  w^hich  virtually  vested  in  the  crown  the  power  of 
appointing  the  municipal  officers.     London  was  not  alone  in   this 

^"1   Dillon    Munic.    Corp.,    §    165;  People   v.    Kingston   &c.   Road   Co., 

citing  Bl.   Com.   485;    2   K^d   Corp.  23  Wend.   (N.  Y.)   193;  s.  c.  35  Am. 

447;  Willcock  Corp.  325;  Taylors  of  D.    551    and    note;     State    v.    Com- 

Ipswich  v.  Sherring,  1  Rol.  4,  5;  Rex  mercial  Bank,  13  Sm.  &  M.   (Miss.) 

V.   Grosvenor,   7   Mod.   198;    Smith's  569;  s.  c.  53  Am.  D.  106;  Chesapeake 

Case,    4    Mod.    53,    55,    58;    Rex    v.  &c.   Canal  Co.   v.   Baltimore  &c.  R. 

Saunders,  3  East  119;  Mayor  &c.  v.  Co.,  4  Gill  &  J.   (Md.)   1;   People  v. 

Henley,  2  CI.  &  P.  331;   Rex  v.  In-  President  &c.,  9  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  351; 

habitants  &c.,   13  East  220;    Priest-  Penobscot  &c.  Corp.  v.  Lamson,  16 

ley  V.  Foulds,  2  Scott  N.  R.  205,  225;  Maine  224;   Commonwealth  v.  Com- 

Attorney-General   v.   Corporation  of  mercial    Bank   &c.,    28    Pa.    St.    383. 

Shrewsbury,  6  Beav.  220.     Where  it  The  exercise  of  this  power  in  this 

is  clear  that  the  object  of  the  quo  country  is  exclusively  vested  in  the 

warranto     against     an     individual  courts;    because   a   legislature    can 

member  of  the  corporation  is  to  call  not,    as   a   rule,    declare    a    private 

in  question  the  validity  of  the  char-  charter    forfeited:     1    Beach    Priv. 

ter  granted  to  it  by  the  crown,  the  Corp.,  §  45,  and  cases  cited, 
court  will  refuse  it:  Reg.  v.  Taylor,         ''°  1  Dillon  Munic.  Corp.,  §  8;   cit- 

11  A.  &  E.  949.    The  writ  will  not,  ing  Rex  v.  Mayor  &c.,  Mich.  33  Car. 

however,  be  refused  merely  because  2;  s.  c.  2  Show.  262.     See  also,  Pull- 

the  granting  it  may  or  even  will  dis-  ing,  Laws  &c.  of  London,  14;    Nor- 

solve  the  corporation:  Rex  v.  White,  ton  Comm.  on  Hist.  &c  of  London, 

5  A.  &  E.  613;  Rex  v.  Parry,  6  A.  &  book  1,  ch.  10;  The  Lease  of  the  City 

E.  810,  820.  of  London,  8  How.  State  Trials  1340. 

^1  Beach  Priv.  Corp.,  §  45;  citing 


§    124  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  124 

predicament.  Jud^e  Dillon  states  that  eighty-one  quo  warranto  in- 
formations were  lirought  against  English  municipal  corporations  by 
Charles  II  and  James  II.  These  efforts  of  tyranny  extended  to  the 
American  colonies,  which  were  at  that  early  time  vigorous  in  their 
opposition  to  unconstitutional  despotism.  The  charters  of  Massa- 
chusetts, of  Rhode  Island  and  of  Connecticut  were  abrogated.  But 
after  the  revolution  these  wrongs  were  righted,  and  the  charters  of 
all  corporations  forfeited  during  the  reigns  of  Charles  II  and  James 
II  were  restored  by  act  of  parliament. '^° 

§  124,  The  charter  of  a  municipal  corporation  in  the  United 
States  can  not  be  forfeited  by  judicial  action. — The  English  law  al- 
lowing the  forfeiture  of  municipal  charters  by  quo  warranto  and 
scire  facias  proceedings  has  no  place  in  the  American  system  of  juris- 
prudence. The  power  to  dissolve  a  municipal  corporation  is  vested 
wholly  and  exclusively  in  the  legislative  branch  of  our  government.''^ 
This  distinction  seems  to  arise  from  the  fact  that  the  English  munic- 
ipal corporation  was,  in  the  incipiency  of  its  existence  as  a  corpora- 
tion, a  body  of  burgesses  within  the  borough — a  close  corporation 
which  controlled  the  town  but  was  not  itself  the  town.  This  charter 
of  this  close  corporation,  in  many  respects  conducted  for  private  ad- 
vantage although  performing  at  the  same  time  the  function  of  a 
governing  body  over  the  town  or  city,  was  considered  to  be  subject 
to  forfeiture  for  wilful  misuser  or  non-user  in  regard  to  matters 
which  went  to  the  essence  of  the  contract  between  it  and  the  crown, 
just  as  a  private  corporation  is  subject  to  such  forfeiture.  The  same 
tacit  condition  was  considered  to  be  annexed  to  the  charters  of  these 
corporations  that  is  annexed,  as  is  everywhere  conceded,  to  the  char- 
ters of  private  corporations;  that  is,  that  the  corporation  shall  be 
subject  to  dissolution,  by  forfeiture  of  its  charter  effected  through 
regular  judicial  proceedings,  for  wilful  misuser  or  non-user  of  the 
franchises  of  that  charter. 

§  125.  The  same  subject  continued. — But  in  the  United  States 
our  municipalities   are   free   from   any   such  vestige   of   an   earlier 

™1    Dillon   Munic.    Corp.,    §    8;    2  Mass.  460;  Attorney-General  v.  City 

Chandl.  Com.  Debs.  316;   1  Stephen  of  Salem,  103  Mass.  138;   Buford  v. 

English   Const,   ch.   7,   p.   455;    Ma-  State,   72   Tex.   182;    s.   c.   10   S.   W. 

caulay  Hist,  of  Eng.,  vol.  3,  ch.  15.  401;    Harris  v.  Nesbit,  24  Ala.  398. 

^^  Mobile  V.  United  States,  116  U.  Non-user  of  corporate  powers  is  not 

S.  289;  s.  c.  6  S.  Ct.  398;  Meriwether  a  forfeiture  of  corporate  existence: 

V.  Garrett,  102  U.  S.  472;   Welch  v.  State  v.  Stevens,  21  Kan.  210;  s.  c. 

Ste.  Genevieve,  1  Dillon  130;   Attor-  (annotated)  18  Am.  L.  Reg.  (N.  S.) 

ney-General  v.   City  of  Boston,   123  43,  46. 


125  AMENDMENT,    REPEAL   AND    FORFEITURE    OF    CHARTER.       §    125 

stage  of  development.  The  American  municipal  corporation  is 
simply  and  purely  a  strictly  public  corporation.  It  is  a  corporation 
of  citizens,  for  citizens  and  by  citizens.  Its*  sole  object  is  local  gov- 
ernment. Being  maintained,  therefore,  only  for  the  public  advan- 
tage, it  is  manifestly  unjust  and  even  impossible  that  the  charters 
of  our  municipal  corporations  should  be  forfeited  by  judicial  pro- 
ceedings. To  give  such  a  power  to  the  judiciary  would  be  to  make 
them  co-ordinate  with  the  legislature  in  their  control  of  local  gov- 
ernment and  local  legislation.  The  illegal  acts  of  municipal  officials 
can  be  avoided  and  enjoined  by  various  methods  of  judicial  procedure, 
but  the  charter  itself  being  the  creature  of  the  legislature  can  be  de- 
stroyed only  by  the  same  power  that  created.  We  have  seen  that  the 
power  of  the  legislature  over  municipal  charters  is  unlimited  except 
by  constitutional  limitations  and  by  the  power  of  the  ballot-box. 
We  may  further  add  that  this  power  of  control  has  no  rival,  and  that 
neither  the  judicial  nor  the  executive  departments  of  our  govern- 
ment can  create  nor  destroy  a  municipality,  which  is  a  subdivision 
of  the  state  government.  There  are  to  the  knowledge  of  the  writer 
no  cases  in  which  this  exclusive  control  of  the  legislature  has  been 
successfully  questioned."^ 

"See,   upon   this   point,   1   Dillon  collaterally:  §§  57,  80,  ante.    The  ef- 

Munic.  Corp.,  §  168;  2  Dillon  Munic.  feet  of   dissolution   of   corporations 

Corp.,   §   896;    State  v.   Stevens,   21  by   legislative   action   will   be   fully 

Kan.  210;  s.  c.  (annotated)   18  Am.  treated   in   the   subsequent  chapter 

L.  Reg.   (N.  S.)   43,  46.     Regularity  on  Partition  and  Dissolution, 
of  incorporation  can  not  be  attacked 


CHAPTER    V. 


MEMBERSHIP    AND    CITIZENSHIP PERSONAL    LIABILITY    OF    MEMBERS 

OF    THE    CORPORATION. 


Section 

126.  Definitions  —   Membership   — 
Citizenship. 

Qualifications  for  membership 
in  English  municipal  corpo- 
rations. 

The  same  subject  continued. 

Qualifications  for  membership 
in  American  municipal  cor- 
porations. 

130.  Citizenship  in  England. 

131.  The  same  subject  continued. 
Citizenship      in      the      United 

States. 
Natural  citizens. 
The  same  subject  continued. 

135.  Naturalized  citizens. 

136.  The  same  subject  continued. 

137.  Right    of    naturalized    citizens 

to  hold  and  receive  lands. 

The  status  of  Chinese  before 
the  law. 

The  status  of  American  In- 
dians before  the  law. 

Privileges  and  immunities  of 
citizens. 


127. 


128. 
129. 


132. 

133. 
134. 


138. 


139. 


140. 


Section 

141.  The  same  subject  continued. 

142.  Rights  of  citizens. 

143.  The  same  subject  continued. 

144.  Personal   liability   of   members 

of  the  corporation. 

145.  The   same   subject  continued — 

Russell  V.  The  Men  of  Devon. 

146.  Personal   liability   of   members 

of  public  quasi-corporations 
in  New  England. 

147.  The  same  subject  continued. 

148.  Beardsley   v.    Smith — (a)    The 

reason  for  the  New  England 
doctrine  of  personal  liability 
of  members. 

149.  (b)  The  doctrine  in  England. 

150.  (c)   The  doctrine  in  Massachu- 

setts and  Maine. 

151.  (d)   The  doctrine  in  Connecti- 

cut. 

152.  Limitations  upon  the  personal 

liability  of  members  of  New 
England  public  quasi-corpo- 
rations. 


§  126.    Definitions  —  Membership  —  Citizenship. — ^Membership    is 

the  state  of  being  a  member.^  Citizenship  is  the  state  of  being  vested 
with  the  rights  and  privileges  of  a  citizen.-  A  member  is  an  individ- 
ual of  a  community  or  society.  Every  citizen  is  a  member  of  the 
state  or  body  politic.  So  the  individuals  of  a  club,  a  corporation,  or 
confederacy,  are  called  its  members.^  A  citizen  is  strictly  a  member 
of  a  commonwealth  (civitas),  possessing  all  the  rights  which  can  be 
enjoyed  or  exercised  under  its  fundamental  laws.'*  A  citizen  is  the 
native  of  a  city,  or  an  inhabitant  who  enjoys  the  freedom  and  privi- 
leges of  the  city  in  which  he  resides;  the  freeman  of  a  city,  as  dis- 


'  Webster  Diet. 
*  Webster  Diet. 


"  Webster  Diet. 

^Burrill  Law  Diet.  (2d  ed.). 


(120) 


127  MEMBERSHIP    AND    CITIZENSHIP.  §    127 

tinguishcd  from  a  foreigner,  or  one  not  entitled  to  its  franchises; 
in  tlie  United  States,  a  person,  native  or  naturalized,  who  has  the 
privilege  of  exercising  tlie  elective  franchise,  or  the  qualifications 
which  enable  him  to  vote  for  rulers,  and  to  purchase  and  hold  real 
estate;^  any  person  who,  under  the  constitution  and  laws  of  the 
United  States,  has  a  right  to  vote  for  public  officers,  and  who  is 
qualified  to  fill  offices  in  the  gift  of  the  people;®  a  free  inhabitant, 
born  within  the  United  States,  or  naturalized  under  the  laws  of 
congress.'^ 

§  127.  Qualifications  for  membership  in  English  municipal  cor- 
porations.— Before  the  passage  of  the  statute  known  as  the  Munici- 
2>al  Corporations  Act  of  1883,  the  qualifications  for  members  or  officers 
of  municipal  corporations  depended  upon  the  charter,  usage  or  by- 
laws of  the  particular  corporation :  the  usual  qualifications  being  that 
the  person  claiming  to  be  admitted  to  the  freedom  of  the  corporate 
town  should  be  the  son  of  a  freeman,  or  should  have  served  an  ap- 
prenticeship to  a  freeman,  or — in  some  instances — married  his  daugh- 
ter, or  acquired  the  privilege  by  gift  or  franchise.'^  But  this  was 
changed  by  the  said  act  of  1882,  and  under  it  no  person  is  entitled 
to  be  enrolled  as  a  burgess  unless  he  is  qualified  as  follows:  (a)  Is 
of  full  age;^  and  (b)  is  on  the  15th  of  July  in  any  year,  and  has 
been  during  the  whole  of  the  then  last  preceding  twelve  months,  in 
occupation,  joint  or  several,^"  of  any  house,^^  warehouse,  counting- 
house,  shop  or  other  building,^^  in  this  act  referred  to  as  qualifying 
property^^  in  the  borough. 

^Webster  Diet.  S.  459;   Reg.  v.  Mayor  &c.,  9  Ad.  & 

«3  Story  on  Const.  1687  (Isted.).  El.  670;  Rex  v.  Sefton,  Russ.  &  Ry. 

^2  Kent  Com.  258,  note.  202;    In  re  Evans,  9  Ad.  &  El.  679. 

*1  Dillon  Munic.  Corp.   (4th  ed.),  Where  a  burgess  occupies  a  "house,"' 

§  36,  note.  and    is    described    as    occupying    a 

®  It  should  seem  from  these  words  "counting-house,"  his  name  must  be 

that   it  is   sufficient   if   the   person  expunged    from    the    burgess    roll: 

seeking  to  be  enrolled  were  of  full  Reg.  v.  Mayor  &c.,  44  L.  J.  Q.  B.  82. 

age  at  the  time  of  the  revision  of  In  cases  where  a  house  is  let  out  to 

the    lists.     But    see    Hargreaves    v.  separate   tenants,   and   each   tenant 

Hopper,  L.  R.  1  C.  P.  D.  195.  has  complete  control  over  his  por- 

"  A  joint  occupation  gives  the  mu-  tion,  see  Rex  v.  Trapshaw,  1  Leach 

nicipal  franchise:  Reg.  v.  Mayor  &c.,  (4th    ed.)     427;     Rex    v.    Bailey,    1 

L.  R.  4  Q.  B.  114.  Mood.   C.   C.   23;    Rex  v.   Carroll,   1 

^^  This  may  include  part  of  a  Leach  (4th  ed.)  237;  Reg.  v.  Mayor 
house,  when  separately  occupied:  &c.,  9  Ad.  &  El.  670;  Cook  v.  Hum- 
Municipal  Corporations  Act  of  1882,  ber,  11  C.  B.  (N.  S.)  33;  s.  c.  31  L. 
§  31.  J.  C.  P.  73;    Wilson  v.  Roberts,  11 

^=See  Powell  v.  Parmer,  18  C.  B.  C.  B.  (N.  S.)  50;  s.  c.  31  L.  J.  C.  P. 

(N.  S.)  168;  Powell  v.  Boraston,  18  78. 

C.  B.  (N.  S.)  175;  Re  Creek,  3  B.  &  '"  This  property  need  not  be  the 


§  128 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS. 


128 


§  128.  The  same  subject  continued. — This  statute  further  pro- 
vides that  no  person  shall  be  entitled  to  be  enrolled  as  a  burgess 
unless  he  "(a)  has  during  the  whole  of  those  twelve  months  resided 
in  the  borough  or  within  seven  miles  thereof;^'*  and  (b)  has  been 
rated^^  in  respect  of  the  qualifying  property  to  all  poor  rates  made 
during  those  twelve  months  for  the  parish  wherein  the  property  is 
situate;  and  (c)  has  on  or  before  the  twentieth  of  the  same  July 
paid^''  all  such  rates,^^  including  borough  rates  (if  any),  as  have  be- 
come payable  by  him  in  respect  of  the  qualifying  property^*  up  to 
the  then  last  preceding  fifth  of  January."  Every  person  so  qualified 
shall  be  entitled  to  be  enrolled  as  a  burgess,  unless  he  "(a)  is  an 
alien;  or  (b)  has  within  the  twelve  months  aforesaid  received  union 
or  parochial  relief  or  other  alms;  or  (c)  is  disentitled  under  any  act 
of  parliament.^' ^^ 

§  129.  Qualifications  for  membership  in  American  municipal  cor- 
porations.— The  question  whether  a  person  is  a  member  of  a  public 
corporation,  strict  or  quasi,  is  in  this  country  determined  by  the  resi- 
dence of  the  person  in  question.    If  he  lives  within  the  limits  of  the 


same  during  the  twelve  months: 
See  §  33,  Rawlinson  Municipal  Cor- 
porations Act  of  1882  (8th  ed.),  p. 
118. 

"  As  to  the  mode  in  which  this 
distance  is  to  be  measured,  see  Raw- 
linson Municipal  Corporations  Act 
of  1882  (8th  ed.),  §  231. 

'^  It  is  now  established  that,  in  or- 
der to  constitute  a  good  rating,  the 
name  of  the  party  intended  to  be 
charged  must  appear  on  the  rate: 
Moss  V.  Overseers  of  St.  Michael,  7 
Man.  &  G.  72.  See  also.  Lord  Mans- 
field's reasons  in  the  judgment  in 
Rex  v.  St.  Luke's  Hospital,  2  Burr. 
1053,  1063;  and  the  cases  collected 
on  this  subject  in  Elliott  Regis- 
tration ("2d  ed.)  190;  and  Rex  "v 
Tripp,  M.  T.  1836;  Glover  Corp.  693. 

^^  Payment  by  another  person  act- 
ing as  a  volunteer,  and  without  any 
authority  from  the  person  liable,  is 
not  sufficient:  Reg.  v.  Mayor  &c.,  10 
Ad.  &  El.  66.  But  where  the  pay- 
ment is  made  by  the  landlord  in 
consequence    of    an    agreement    be- 


tween him  and  the  tenant,  by  which 
the  tenant  was  to  pay  additional 
rent  in  respect  thereof,  such  pay- 
ment is  sufficient:  Wright  v.  Town 
Clerk  of  Stockport,  5  Man.  &  G.  33; 
Moger  V.  Escott,  L.  R.  7  C.  P.  158; 
Cook  V.  Luckett,  2  C.  B.  168;  Hughes 
V.  Overseers  of  Chatham,  5  Man.  & 
G.  54.  The  decisions  on  settlement 
cases  accord  with  this  view:  Rex  v. 
Axmouth,  8  East  383;  Rex  v.  Oake- 
hampton,  Burr.  S.  C.  5;  Rex  v. 
Bridgewater,  3  T.  R.  550. 

"  See  Rawlinson  Municipal  Cor- 
porations Act  of  1882  (8th  ed.),  §§ 
144,  197.  The  non-payment  of  an  il- 
legal rate  does  not  disqualify  the 
party:  Reg.  v.  Mayor  &c.,  7  Q.  B. 
908.  As  to  the  payments  of  compo- 
sitions for  poor-rate  under  local 
acts,  see  Reg.  v.  Mayor  &c.,  20  L. 
J.  Q.  B.  281. 

''  See  Flatcher  v.  Boodle,  18  C.  B. 
(N.  S.)   152. 

'"  Municipal  Corporations  Act  of 
1882,  §  9. 


129  MEMBERSHIP    AND    CITIZENSHIP.  §    130 

corporation  he  is  considered  a  member  of  the  corporation;  if  he  lives 
without  those  limits  he  is  not  a  member.  The  decision  of  the  ques- 
tion is  not  affected  by  the  wishes  either  of  the  person  or  of  the  cor- 
poration. In  the  case  of  private  corporations  the  question  is  of 
course  decided  in  an  entirely  different  manner:  one  who  holds  stock 
in  the  corporation  is  considered  a  member.-*' 

§  130.  Citizenship  in  Engiand. — Natural  citizenship  is  created  in 
England  by  birth  within  the  allegiance  of  the  king.  By  a  statute 
of  the  reign  of  Edward  III-^  it  was  provided  that  children  "which 
henceforth  shall  te  born  out  of  ligeance  of  the  king,  whose  fathers 
and  mothers  at  the  time  of  their  birth  be  and  shall  be  at  the  faith 
and  ligeance  of  the  king  of  England,  shall  have  and  enjoy  the  same 
benefit  and  advantage,  to  have  and  bear  inheritance  within  the  same 
ligeance  as  the  other  inheritors  aforesaid  in  time  to  come,  so  also 
that  the  mothers  of  such  children  passed  the  sea  by  the  license  and 
will  of  their  husbands."  The  question  whether  this  statute  was  in- 
troductory of  a  new  rule  or  simply  declaratory  of  the  previous  law 
was  considered  in  a  New  York  case,  and  the  conclusion  was  reached, 
"that  it  is  perhaps  not  easy  to  determine  from  the  statute,  itself, 
taken  in  connection  with  its  history,  whether  it  was  in  truth  an  ena- 
bling or  a  declaratory  act."--  Judge  Selden,  however,  continued  his 
consideration  of  the  question  by  saying:  "Principles,  however,  have 
since  the  statute  been  thoroughly  settled,  which  is  my  view  and  deci- 
sion of  the  question.  The  subject  of  alienage  was  very  elaborately 
examined  in  Calvin's  Case.^^  Among  the  principles  settled  in  that 
case  and  which  have  remained  unquestioned  since  are  these:  (1) 
That  natural  allegiance  does  not  depend  upon  locality  or  place;  that 
it  is  purely  mental  in  its  nature,  and  can  not,  therefore,  be  confined 

^"Oakes  v.  Hill,  10  Pick.   (Mass.)  a  citizen  there   (if  possessed  of  ttie 

333,  346 j    Overseers  of  Poor  &c.  v.  requisite    qualifications    as   to    age, 

Sears,    22    Pick.    (Mass.)    122,    130.  etc.,  and  if  tie  remains  the  requisite 

"In  all  quasi-corporations,  as  cities,  length  of  time),  whatever  may  be 

towns,     parishes,     school     districts,  the  desire  of  himself  or  the  town." 

membership  is  constituted  by  living  See  also,  Dillon  Munic.  Corp.    (4th 

within   certain   limits:"   Per   Shaw,  ed.),  chs.  2  and  3;   People  v.  Cana- 

C.   J.,   in   Overseers  of  Poor  &c.  v.  day,  73  N.  C.  198;   s.  c.  21  Am.  R. 

Sears,    22    Pick.    (Mass.)    122,    130;  465. 

Hill   V.    City   of   Boston,    122    Mass.  "  25  Edw.  Ill,  ch.  2. 

344,   356;    s.  c.   23   Am.  R.   332.     In  "  Ludlam  v.  Ludlam,  26  N.  Y.  356, 

Oakes  v.  Hill,  10  Pick.   (Mass.)  333,  363. 

346,  Judge  Morgan  says: — "When  a  "7  Co.  1;  6  James  I. 
man  moves  into  a  town  he  becomes 

1  Smith — 9 


§    131  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  130 

within  any  certain  boundaries;  or,  to  use  the  language  of  Coke,  that 
'ligeance,  and  faith  and  truth,  which  are  her  members  and  parts,  are 
qualities  of  the  mind  and  soul  of  man,  and  can  not  be  circumscribed 
within  the  predicament  of  ubi.'  (Page  76.)  (2)  That  it  is  not  suffi- 
cient, in  a  plea  of  alienage,  to  aver  that  the  plaintiif  was  born  out  of 
the  kingdom  or  out  of  the  jurisdiction  of  the  king,  but  every  such 
plea  must  aver  that  the  plaintiff  is  not  of  the  allegiance  of  the  king; 
and  judgment  was  given  for  the  plaintiif  in  Calvin's  Case  'for  that 
the  plea  in  this  case  doth  not  refer  faith  or  liegeance  to  the  king 
indefinitely  and  generally,  but  limiteth  and  restraineth  faith  and 
liegeance  to  the  kingdom.'  (Id.,  p.  10a.)  (3)  That  allegiance  and 
protection — namely,  the  rights  and  the  duties  of  citizenship — are 
reciprocal,  the  one  being  the  consideration  for  the  other.  (Id.,  p.  6a.) 
(4)  That  a  British  subject,  although  residing  abroad,  still  owes 
allegiance  to  the  king  of  England."^* 

§  131.  The  same  subject  continued. — From  liis  consideration  of 
the  cases  and  authorities  the  learned  judge  finally  reaches  the  con- 
clusion "that  the  children  of  English  parents,  though  born  abroad, 
are  nevertheless  regarded  by  the  common  law  as  natural-born  citizens 
of  England.''  He  continues:  "Now  upon  what  ground  can  allegi- 
ance in  such  cases  be  claimed  ?  If  natural  allegiance  or  allegiance  by 
birth  does  not  depend  upon  boundaries  or  place,  as  Calvin's  Case 
asserts,  upon  what  does  it  depend?  There  can  be  but  one  answer  to 
the  question.  It  is  impossible  to  suggest  any  other  ground  for  the 
obligation  than  that  of  parentage.  It  must,  I  apprehend,  be  trans- 
mitted from  the  parents  to  the  child  or  it  could  not  exist.  This  being 
then  the  nature  of  permanent  allegiance,  it  follows  that  the  king  of 
England  may  properly  claim  allegiance  from  the  children  of  liis  sub- 
jects wherever  born.  If,  then,  the  child  of  English  parents,  though 
born  abroad,  is,  subditus  natus,  a  born  subject  of  the  king,  he  must 
also  be  a  born  citizen  of  the  kingdom.  Allegiance  and  citizenship 
are,  as  we  have  seen,  correlative  terms,  the  one  being  the  considera- 
tion of  the  other.  So  long,  therefore,  as  the  parents  continue  to  owe 
allegiance  to  the  crown  of  England,  so  long  will  their  children,  by 
the  rules  of  common  law,  whethei  born  within  or  without  the  king- 

=*  Brooke    Abridgment,    tit.    Den-  29,  §  4,  p.  698;   Liidlam  v.  Ludlam, 

izen,    21;    Roy    v.    Eaton,    Litt.    23;  26  N.  Y.  356,  364.    The  learned  judge 

Collingwood   v.   Pace,    1   Vent.    413,  continued   his   collation   and   analo- 

422;  1  Jenk.  Cent.,  case  2;  Bacon  v.  gies    of    authorities,     referring    to 

Bacon,  3  Cro.  Car.  601 ;  2  Phillimore  Cobbledike's  Case,  cited  in  Calvin's 

Int.  Law  4;    Halleck  Int.  Law,  ch.  Case,  p.  9b. 


131  IHEMBERSIIIP    AND    ClTIZJ.XSllir.  §    133 

clom,  owe  similar  allegiance,  and  bo  entitled   to  the  corresponding 
rights  of  citizenship. "-•''' 

§  132.  Citizenship  in  the  United  States. — There  are  in  the  United 
States  two  classes  of  citizens — natural  and  naturalized  citizens.  Citi- 
zenship of  the  former  class  is  created  by  the  birth  of  the  citizen 
within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  United  States.  Citizenship  of  the  latter 
class  is  created  by  the  performance  of  certain  requirements  defined 
by  statute.  The  naturalized  citizen  is  from  the  time  of  naturaliza- 
tion a  full-tledged  citizen,  entitled  to  all  the  rights,  privileges  and 
immunities  of  a  natural  citizen,  saving  certain  disabilities  which 
relate  back  to  the  period  during  which  he  was  an  alien.  It  is  conceded 
learning  that  birth  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  United  States 
creates  natural  citizenship  whether  the  parents  of  the  citizen  are 
aliens  or  citizens.^"  To  this  rule  the  aboriginal  Indians  of  this  coun- 
try furnish  an  exception  that  is,  however,  only  apparent.  A  child  of 
Indian  parents  born  in  this  country  is  not  considered  to  have  been 
born  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  United  States,  and  is  not  therefore 
a  citizen.^^ 

§  133.  Natural  citizens. — Where  a  person  is  born  within  the  juris- 
diction of  the  United  States  he  is  a  natural  citizen.^^  Likewise  a 
person  Ijorn  in  a  foreign  country  and  out  of  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
United  States  is  a  citizen  of  the  United  States  if  at  the  time  of  his 
birth  his  father  was  a  citizen  thereof."^ 

^  Ludlam  v.  Ludlam,  26  N.  Y.  356,  lar  case,  the  question  whether  one 

365.  born  out  of  the  United  States  is  a 

-■^  Lynch  v.  Clark,  1  Sandf.  Ch.  (N.  citizen  is  to  be  determined  by  the 

Y.)    584;    In  re  Loolt   Tin   Sing,   21  common  law  as  it  existed,  irrespect- 

Fed.  905;   s.  c.  17  Chic.  Leg.  N.  57.  ive  of  English  statutes,  at  the  adop- 

In  the  latter  case  a  child  born  in  tion  of  the  federal  constitution.     It 

the  United  States  of  alien  Chinese  was  accordingly  held  that  where  a 

parents  was  declared  to  be  an  Amer-  citizen  of  the  United  States  went  to 

ican  citizen.     See  §  138,  post.  Peru  at  the  age  of  eighteen  years. 

"  See  post,  §  139.  with  the  intention  of  indefinite  con- 

^  Fourteenth     Amend,     to     Fed.  tinuance   there   for  the   purpose   of 

Const.;  In  re  Look  Tin  Sing,  21  Fed.  trading,    but   took    no    steps   to    be 

905;  s.  c.  17  Chic.  Leg.  N.  57;  Lynch  naturalized  in   Peru  or  to  indicate 

V.  Clarke,  1  Sandf.  Ch.  (N.  Y.)  583,  an  intention  or  a  permanent  change 

639.  of  domicile,  otherwise  than  as  be- 

^U.  S.  Rev.  Stat.,  §  1993;  Ludlam  fore  stated,  his  child,  born  to  him  in 

V.  Ludlam,  26  N.  Y.  356;  Inhabitants  Peru  of  a  wife  a  native  of  that  coun- 

&c.  V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  58  Maine  353.  try,  is  a  citizen  of  the  United  States: 

In   the  absence  of  any  law  of  the  Ludlam  v.  Ludlam,  26  N.  Y.  356. 
United  States  governing  the  particu- 


§  134 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS. 


133 


§  134.  The  same  subject  continued. — Where  a  citizen  of  the 
United  States  marries  an  alien  woman  who  might  be  naturalized, 
she  becomes  a  citizen  f^  and  if  the  husband  is  naturalized  after  mar- 
riage, the  wife  becomes  a  citizen."^  In  cases  where  a  citizen  leaves 
this  country  and  either  takes  with  him  a  son  born  in  the  United  States 
or  has  one  born  abroad,  and  either  the  father  or  son  elects  to  and  does 
become  a  subject  of  the  country  to  which  they  have  emigrated,  they 
both  become  aliens,  and  neither  one  can  inherit  real  property  in  the 
United  States.^^ 

§  135.  Naturalized  citizens. — In  the  United  States  citizenship 
may  be  acquired  by  naturalization.^^  Under  the  United  States  stat- 
utes an  applicant  for  admission  to  citizenship  must  possess  certain 
qualifications  and  comply  with  certain  rules  before  he  is  entitled  to 
admission  to  citizenship.^* 


=<•  U.  S.  Rev.  Stat.,  §  1996. 

'1 10  U.  S.  Stat,  at  Large,  p.  604, 
§  2;  Kelly  v.  Owen,  7  Wall.  496; 
Burton  v.  Burton,  1  Keyes  (N.  Y.) 
359;  White  v.  White.  2  Met.  (Ky.) 
385. 

^'^  Shanks  v.  Dupont.  3  Peters  242; 
Jackson  v.  White,  20  Johns.  jN.  Y.) 
313;  Orser  v.  Hoag,  3  Hill  (N.  Y.) 
79;  Kilham  v.  Ward,  2  Mass.  236. 
The  division  of  an  empire  works  no 
forfeiture  of  previously  vested  prop- 
erty rights:  Kelly  v.  Harrison,  2 
Johns.  Cas.  (N.  Y.)  29;  Jackson  v. 
Lunn,  3  Johns.  Cas.  (N.  Y.)  109!  A 
person  born  in  the  United  States 
who  left  the  country  before  the  dec- 
laration of  independence  and  never 
returned  became  thereby  an  alien, 
and  incapable  of  subsequently  tak- 
ing land  by  descent:  Inglis  v.  Sail- 
ors' Snug  Harbor,  3  Peters  121.  See 
also,  Fairfax  v.  Hunter,  7  Cranch 
603;  Jackson  v.  Burns,  3  Binn. 
(Pa.)  75;  Orr  v.  Hodgson,  4  Wheat. 
453;  Blight  v.  Rochester,  7  Wheat. 
535. 

^^  Congress  controls  exclusively 
the  rules  which  govern  naturaliza- 
tion: Houston  V.  Moore,  5  Wheat.  1. 
As  to  the  time  when  the  power  of 
naturalization  takes  effect,  see  Chi- 
rac V.  Chirac,  2  Wheat.  259;  United 
States  V.  Villato,  2  Dallas  370. 


^  These  requirements  are  defined 
by  statute  as  follows:  —  (1)  "Any 
alien,  except  Chinese,  may  be  natu- 
ralized and  become  a  citizen  of  the 
United  States  on  the  following  con- 
ditions:— The  applicant  shall  de- 
clare on  oath  or  affirmation  before 
some  state  court  of  record,  having 
a  seal  and  clerk,  and  having  com- 
mon-law jurisdiction,  or  before  a 
United  States  district  or  circuit 
court,  or  before  a  clerk  of  any  of 
the  said  courts,  two  years  at  least 
before  his  admission,  that  it  is  his 
intention  to  become  a  citizen  of  the 
United  States,  and  to  renounce  for- 
ever his  allegiance  to  his  own  sov- 
ereignty, which  must  be  in  peace 
with  the  United  States  at  the  time. 

(2)  At  his  final  admission  to  citizen- 
ship he  shall  declare  on  oath  or  af- 
firmation before  some  of  the  courts 
aforesaid  that  he  will  support  the 
United  States  constitution,  and  that 
he  renounces  all  allegiance  to  any 
foreign  sovereign,  and  especially  to 
his  own,  whereof  he  was  subject  be- 
fore his  application  for  citizenship. 

(3)  He  must  prove  by  at  least  two 
witnesses  who  are  citizens  that  he 
has  resided  within  the  United  States 
five  years  at  least  and  within  the 
state  or  territory  where  the  court  is 
located  at  least  one  year;  that  dur- 


133 


MEMBERSHIP    AXD    CITIZENSHIP. 


136 


§  136.  The  same  subject  continued. — Congress  has  made  special 
provisions  by  which  alien  seamen  may  become  naturalized  citizens. 
Under  the  act  he  must  first  declare  his  intention  of  becoming  a  citi- 
zen before  the  proper  court,  and  then  serve  three  years  on  a  United 
States  merchant  vcssel.^^  A  clerk  has  no  power  to  admit  a  person 
to  citizenship:  the  admission  must  be  granted  by  the  court,  as 
it  is  a  judicial  act.^*^  But  the  applicant  may  make  his  declaration 
of  intention  to  become  a  citizen  before  the  recording  officer  of  a  court 
of  record,  and  it  is  properly  receivable  by  the  clerk,  as  he  acts  in  that 
capacity  ministerially  and  not  judicially.^'^ 


ing  that  time  he  has  been  a  good 
moral  person,  attached  to  the  prin- 
ciples of  this  government,  and  is 
well  disposed  in  this  regard.  (4) 
He  must  renounce  all  titles  to  no- 
bility, if  he  has  any.  (5)  Any  alien 
(except  a  Chinese)  who  is  a  minor, 
who  shall  have  resided  within  the 
United  States  three  years  next  pre- 
ceding his  arriving  at  his  majority, 
and  who  shall  continue  to  reside 
therein  at  the  time  of  making  appli- 
cation for  citizenship,  may,  after 
reaching  his  majority,  and  having 
resided  in  the  United  States  at  least 
five  years,  including  the  three  years 
of  his  minority,  be  given  citizenship 
without  any  preliminary  declara- 
tion. (6)  Any  alien  (except  a  Chi- 
nese) who  is  twenty-one  years  of 
age  or  over,  enlisting  in  the  armies 
of  the  United  States,  either  in  the 
regular  or  volunteer,  and  who  shall 
be  honorably  discharged  therefrom, 
can  be  admitted  to  citizenship  with- 
out the  preliminary  declaration  of 
his  intentions,  but  he  must  prove 
one  year's  residence  in  the  United 
States.  (7)  The  children  of  parents 
duly  naturalized,  being  under  the 
age  of  twenty-one  years  at  the  time 
of  such  naturalization,  shall,  if  re- 
siding in  the  United  States,  be  con- 
sidered as  citizens.  (8)  If  an  alien 
who  shall  have  declared  his  inten- 
tions shall  die  before  he  is  actually 
naturalized,  his  widow  and  children 


shall  be  considered  citizens  on  tak- 
ing the  oath  prescribed  by  law.  (9) 
No  alien  who  shall  be  a  citizen,  deni- 
zen or  subject  of  any  country,  state 
or  sovereign  with  whom  the  United 
States  shall  be  at  war  at  the  time  of 
his  application  shall  be  then  ad- 
mitted to  be  a  citizen  of  the  United 
States:  U.  S.  Rev.  Stat.,  tit.  30. 

=^  Act  of  congress  of  1872,  §  29;  17 
Stat,  at  Large  268. 

^"McCarthy  v.  Marsh,  5  N.  Y.  263; 
The  Acorn,  2  Abb.  434;  Clark's  Case, 
18  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  444. 

^^  Butterworth's  Case,  1  Woodb.  & 
M.  323;  State  v.  Whittemore,  50  N. 
H.  245;  Ex  parte  Cregg,  2  Curtis  98. 
As  to  naturalization  of  a  married 
woman  without  her  husband's  con- 
sent, see  Priest  v.  Cummings,  16 
Wend.  (N.  Y.)  617.  The  necessary 
witnesses  must  be  present  in  court 
and  examined  there  openly  and  pub- 
licly; and  affidavits  taken  outside  of 
the  court  as  to  the  applicant's  char- 
acter and  residence  are  not  admissi- 
ble: In  re ,  An  Alien,  7  Hill  (N. 

Y.)  137.  Where  a  father  becomes 
naturalized,  and  at  that  time  has  a 
son  residing  in  the  United  States, 
but  who  is  a  minor,  the  son  becomes 
a  citizen  by  reason  of  his  father's 
naturalization:  State  v.  Penney,  10 
Ark.  621.  For  the  privileges  and 
immunities  to  which  a  naturalized 
person  is  entitled,  see  2  Kent  Com. 
66. 


§  137 


PUBLIC    CORrORATIONS. 


134 


§  137.  Right  of  naturalized  citizens  to  hold  and  receive  lands. — 
Where  a  person  becomes  naturalized  he  has  the  same  right  as  a  natu- 
ral-born citizen  to  hold,  inherit  and  receive  lands,  but  the  capacity 
tp  take  by  descent  must  exist  at  the  time  the  descent  happens.^ ^ 
Where  an  alien,  having  acquired  lands  -by  purchase,  is  afterward 
naturalized  before  office  found,  his  title  becomes  thereby  confirmed, 
so  that  he  may  hold  even  as  against  the  state.  Otherwise  where  his 
claim  is  by  descent.^® 


^  People  v.  Conklin,  2  Hill  (N.  Y.) 
67;  Heeney  v.  Trustees  &c.,  33  Barb. 
(N.  Y.)  360;  Vaux  v.  Nesbit,  1  McC. 
Ch.  (S.  C.)  352.  M.,  an  American 
citizen,  died  seized  of  certain  lands 
in  1779,  leaving  no  lawful  issue  and 
no  blood  relatives,  save  such  as  were 
aliens.  By  his  will  he  devised  all 
his  real  estate  to  his  wife,  also  an 
American  citizen,  to  hold  during  her 
life,  remainder  to  his  two  sisters 
and  seven  nephews  and  nieces,  as 
tenants  in  common,  in  fee;  empow- 
ering his  executors  to  sell  the  lands 
after  his  wife's  death,  and  divide 
the  proceeds  equally  among  the 
devisees  in  remainder.  The  will 
further  provided  that  in  case  any  of 
the  devisees  in  remainder  died,  be- 
fore such  division,  leaving  lawful 
issue,  the  latter  .should  take  the 
share  to  which  the  parents,  if  living, 
would  have  been  entitled.  The  dev- 
isees in  remainder  all  died  aliens 
prior  to  September,  1828,  one  of 
them  (a  nephew)  leaving  a  son 
named  E.  E.,  who  became  natural- 
ized September  3,  1828.  The  widow 
died  in  1832.  In  ejectment  by  the 
people  claiming  the  lands  devised  on 
the  ground  of  their  having  escheated 
to  the  state,  it  was  held  that  E.  E, 
took  no  interest  in  them,  either  as 
devisee  or  heir,  which  could  avail 
him  as  against  the  plaintiffs,  and 
that  the  latter  were  entitled  to  re- 
cover. The  fee  was  not  in  abey- 
ance during  the  life  of  the  widow, 
but  the  remainder  vested  in  interest 
on  the  death   of  the  testator;    and 


though  the  devisees  in  remainder 
died  before  they  were  entitled  to  the 
possession,  their  estate  would  have 
descended  had  they  left  heirs  ca- 
pable of  inheriting:  People  v.  Conk- 
lin, 2  Hill  (N.  Y.)  67.  Judge 
Bronson,  in  his  opinion,  says: — "Al- 
though the  devisees  in  remainder 
were  aliens,  they  could  take  lands 
by  purchase,  which  includes  a  title 
by  devise  and  any  other  form  of  ac- 
quiring the  land  by  purchase;"  and 
cites  as  supporting  his  view,  Fairfax 
V.  Hunter,  7  Cranch  603,  619;  Vaux 
V.  Nesbit,  1  McC.  Ch.  (S.  C.)  352;  1 
Powell  Dev.  (ed.  1838)  259.  The 
learned  judge  further  says: — "The 
statute  of  1830  will  not  help  E.  E. 
because  it  was  passed  since  the 
death  of  M.;"  and  cites  Jackson  v. 
Green,  7  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  333;  Jack- 
son V.  Fitzsimmons,  10  Wend.  (N. 
Y.)  9.  And  see  People  v.  Irvin,  21^ 
Wend.  (N.  Y.)  128. 

^^  People  V.  Conklin,  2  Hill  (N.  Y.) 
66.  See  also,  Fairfax  v.  Hunter,  7 
Cranch  603;  Bradstreet  v.  Supervis- 
ors, 13  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  546;  Lareau 
V.  Davignon,  5  Abb.  Pr.  (N.  S.)  (N. 
Y.)  367;  Overingv.  Russell,  32  Barb. 
(N.  Y.)'263;  Munro  v.  Merchant,  28 
N.  Y.  9;  Wadsworth  v.  Wadsworth, 
12  N.  Y.  376;  Scanlan  v.  Wright,  13 
Pick.  (Mass.)  523;  Wilbur  v.  Tobey. 
16  Pick.  (Mass.)  177;  Foss  v.  Crisp, 
20  Pick.  (Mass.)  121;  Smith  v. 
Zaner,  4  Ala.  99.  The  naturaliza- 
tion must  be  complete:  McDaniel  v. 
Richards,  1  McC.  (S.  C.)  187. 


135  MEMBERSHIP    AND    CITIZENSHIP.  §    138 

§  138.  The  status  of  Chinese  before  the  law. — The  Chinese  form 
an  exception  to  our  naturalization  laws.  A  Chinese  person,  not  born 
in  this  country,  can  not  become  a  citizen  of  the  United  States  by- 
naturalization.'*"  A  Chinese,  however,  if  born  within  the  limits  of 
this  country,  even  though  of  alien  parents,  is  a  citizen  of  the  United 
States  and  of  the  state  wherein  he  resides.  This  question  was  de- 
cided by  Justice  Field. *^  The  learned  judge  held  that  birth 
within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  United  States  conferred  citizenship; 
that  this  rule  was  in  force,  except  as  to  Africans  and  their  descend- 
ants, before  the  passage  of  the  fourteenth  amendment,  which  was 
intended  to  abolish  that  exception.*^  In  this  respect  the  Chinese 
share  that  privilege  which  our  laws  bestow  on  all  persons  born  witliin 
cur  dominion,  except  in  the  case  of  aboriginals  of  our  country. 

§  139.    The   status   of  American   Indians   before   the   law. — The 

status  of  American  Indians  in  this  country  is  anomalous.  Although 
born  within  the  limits  of  the  United  States  and  subject  to  taxation 
and  the  other  burdens  of  citizenship,  they  are  yet  debarred  from 
enjoying  any  of  its  privileges.  They  are  not  considered  to  be  within 
the  fourteenth  amendment  of  the  federal  constitution,  which  pro- 
vides that  "all  persons  born  and  naturalized  in  the  United  States 
and  subject  to  the  jurisdiction  thereof  are  citizens  of  the  United 
States  and  of  the  state  wherein  they  reside."*^     The  Indian  tribes 

*°  In  re  Ah  Yup,  5  Sawyer  155.  See  right  of  citizens  of  the  United  States 

also,  the  United   States  statutes  of  to    vote    shall    not    be    denied    or 

1882   and   1884,   restricting   Chinese  abridged  by  the  United  States  or  by 

immigration.  any  state  on  account  of  race,  color 

"  In   re   Look   Tin   Sing,   21   Fed.  or  previous  condition  of  servitude." 

905;  s.  c.  17  Chic.  Leg.  N.  57.  The  court  denied  his  right  to  vote  on 

"  It  is  to  be  noted,  however,  that  the  ground  that  he  was  not  subject 

the  children  of  Chinese  ambassadors  to    the    jurisdiction    of   the    United 

or   persons   otherwise   employed    in  States   within   the   meaning   of   the 

the  service  of  the  Chinese  govern-  fourteenth  amendment,  and  was  not, 

ment  are  not  citizens,  though  born  therefore,   a   citizen   of   the   United 

in  this  country.     This  results  from  States.     It  was  held  that  an  Indian 

the  familiar  rule  that  the  residence  is   a   resident  alien   in  a  condition 

of  an   ambassador   is   considered   a  similar  to  that  of  the  children  of 

part  of  his  own  country:  In  re  Look  foreign  ministers  born  in  this  coun- 

Tin  Sing,  21  Fed.  905;  s.  c.  17  Chic,  try;  that  the  Indian  owes  allegiance 

Leg.  N.  57.  to  his  tribe  and  not  to  our  govern- 

^^Elk  V.  Wilkins,  112  U.  S.  94;   s.  ment,  and  that  he  can  become  a  citi- 

c.    5    S.    Ct.    41.     Here    an    Indian  zen    only    by    naturalization    or    by 

claimed  the  right  to  vote  under  the  treaty.     From   this   opinion   Justice 

clause  of  the  fourteenth  amendment  Harlan  and  Justice  Woods  dissented, 

quoted  in  the  text,  and  also  under  contending    that    the     Indian     was 

the  fifteenth  amendment,  that  "the  within    the    purview    of    the    four- 


140 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS. 


136 


are  regarded  as  alien  peoples  living  within  our  boundaries,  but  not 
of  us.  And  it  is  also  held  that  the  consent  of  the  United  States  is 
necessary  in  order  to  enable  the  members  of  any  tribe  to  become 
citizens  of  the  United  States  by  naturalization.  They  can  not  become 
naturalized  citizens  of  their  own  motion  without  such  consent,  which 
must  be  expressed  by  treaty  or  statute.^'* 

§  140.  Privileges  and  immunities  of  citizens. — ^Although  a  full 
discussion  of  the  rights,  privileges  and  immunities  of  citizens  of  the 
United  States,  as  secured  by  the  federal  constitution  and  the  consti- 
tutions of  the  several  states,  and  defined  by  judicial-  interpretation 
of  those  constitutional  provisions,  is  obviously  beyond  the  scope  and 
plan  of  this  work,  it  will  be  well  to  indicate  briefly  the  fundamental 
principles  upon  which  these  rights,  privileges  and  immunities  depend. 
"The  citizens  of  each  state  shall  be  entitled  to  all  the  privileges  and 
immunities  of  citizens  of  the  several  states."*^    "Although  the  precise 


teenth  and  fifteenth  amendments. 
See  also,  Crow  Dog's  Case,  109  U.  S. 
556;  s.  c.  3  S.  Ct.  396;  Cherokees  v. 
Georgia,  5  Peters  1;  New  York  In- 
dians' Case,  5  Wall.  761;  Hastings  v. 
Farmer,  4  N.  Y.  293;  Pells  v.  Web- 
quish,  129  Mass.  469. 

"Wilson  V.  Wall,  6  Wall.  83,  and 
cases  cited  in  preceding  note. 

*^  Const,  of  United  States,  art.  4, 
§  2.  Judge  Washington  discusses 
this  provision  as  follows: — "What 
are  the  privileges  and  immunities  of 
citizens  in  the  several  states?  We 
feel  no  hesitation  in  confining  these 
expressions  to  those  privileges  and 
immunities  which  are  in  their  nature 
fundamental,  which  belong  of  right 
to  the  citizens  of  all  free  govern- 
ments, and  which  have  at  all  times 
been  enjoyed  by  the  citizens  of  the 
several  states  which  compose  this 
Union,  from  the  time  of  their  be- 
coming free,  independent  and  sov- 
ereign. What  these  fundamental 
principles  are,  it  would  perhaps  be 
more  tedious  than  difficult  to  enum- 
erate. They  may,  however,  be  all 
comprehended  under  the  following 
general  heads: — Protection  by  the 
government,  the  enjoyment  of  life 
and   liberty,   with   the   right  to   ac- 


quire and  possess  property  of  every 
kind,  and  to  pursue  and  obtain  hap- 
piness and  safety,  subject,  never- 
theless, to  such  restraints  as  the 
government  may  justly  prescribe  for 
the  general  good  of  the  whole.  The 
right  of  a  citizen  of  one  state  to 
pass  through  or  to  reside  in  any 
other  state,  for  purposes  of  trade, 
agriculture,  professional  pursuits, 
or  otherwise;  to  claim  the  benefit  of 
the  writ  of  habeas  corpus;  to  insti- 
tute and  maintain  actions  of  every 
kind  in  the  courts  of  the  state;  to 
take,  hold  and  dispose  of  property, 
either  real  or  personal;  and  an  ex- 
emption from  higher  taxes  or  impo- 
sitions than  are  paid  by  the  citizens 
of  the  other  state, — may  be  men- 
tioned as  some  of  the  particular 
privileges  and  immunities  of  citi- 
zens which  are  clearly  embraced  by 
the  general  description  of  privileges 
deemed  to  be  fundamental;  to  which 
may  be  added  the  elective  franchise, 
as  regulated  and  established  by  the 
laws  or  constitution  of  the  state  in 
which  it  is  to  be  exercised.  These, 
and  many  others  which  might  be 
mentioned,  are,  strictly  speaking, 
privileges  and  immunities,  and  the 
enjoyment  of  them  by  the  citizens 


137 


MEMBERSHIP   AND    CITIZENSHIP. 


141 


meaning  of  'privileges  and  immunities'  is  not  very  conclusively  set- 
tled as  yet,  it  appears  to  be  conceded  that  the  constitution  secures  in 
each  state  to  the  citizens  of  all  other  states  the  right  to  remove  to 
and  carry  on  business  therein;  the  right,  by  the  usual  modes,  to 
acquire  and  hold  property,  and  to  protect  and  clef  end  the  same  in  law ; 
the  right  to  the  usual  remedies  for  the  collection  of  debts  and  the 
enforcement  of  other  personal  rights;  and  the  right  to  be  exempt  in 
property  and  person  from  taxes  or  burdens  which  the  property  or 
persons  of  citizens  of  the  same  state  are  not  subject  to."*° 

§  141.  The  same  subject  continued. — "No  state  shall  make  or  en- 
force any  law  which  shall  abridge  the  privileges  or  immunities  of 
citizens  of  the  United  States,  or  deprive  any  person  of  life,  liberty 
or  property  without  due  process  of  law,  or  deny  to  any  person  within 
its  jurisdiction  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws."*^    But  it  is  an  un- 


of  each  state  in  every  other  state 
was  manifestly  calculated  (to  use 
the  expression  of  the  preamble  of 
the  corresponding  provision  in  the 
old  articles  of  confederation)  'the 
better  to  secure  and  perpetuate  mu- 
tual friendship  and  intercourse 
among  the  people  of  the  different 
states  of  the  Union:'"  Corfield  v. 
Coryell,  4  Wash.  C.  C.  371,  380.  The 
supreme  court  prefers  to  decide  each 
case  as  it  comes  up,  and  will  not  de- 
fine and  describe  those  privileges  in 
a  general  classification:  Conner  v. 
Elliott,  18  How.  591;  McCready  v. 
Virginia,  94  U.  S.  391;  Ward  v. 
Maryland,  12  Wall.  418.  See  also. 
United  States  v.  Cruikshank,  92  U. 
S.  542;  Kimmish  v.  Ball,  129  U.  S. 
217;  s.  c.  9  S.  Ct.  277;  Lemmon  v. 
People,  20  N.  Y.  562;  People  v.  Im- 
lay,  20  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  68;  Robinson 
V.  Oceanic  &c.  Co.,  112  N.  Y.  315;  s. 
c.  19  N.  E.  625;  2  L.  R.  A.  636; 
Haney  v.  Marshall,  9  Md.  194;  Peti- 
tion of  Bliss,  63  N.  H.  135;  State  v. 
Lancaster,  63  N.  H.  267;  State  v. 
Fosdick,  21  La.  An.  434;  State  v. 
Oilman,  33  W.  Va.  146;  s.  c.  10  S.  E. 
283;  6  L.  R.  A.  847;  Crandall  v. 
State,  10  Conn.  339,  340;  State  v. 
Medbury,  3  R.  I.  138;  People  v. 
Thurber,    13     111.    554;     Cincinnati 


&c.  Assur.  Co.  V.  Rosenthal,  55  111. 
85;  Jeffersonville  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Hen- 
dricks, 41  Ind.  48;  People  v.  Phippin, 
70  Mich.  6;  s.  c.  37  N.  W.  888;  Fire 
Department  v.  Helfenstein,  16  Wis. 
136;  People  v.  Coleman,  4  Cal.  46; 
Bradwell  v.  State,  16  Wall.  130; 
Bartemeyer  v.  Iowa,  18  Wall.  129; 
Fire  Department  v.  Noble,  3  E.  D. 
Smith  (N.  Y.)  441;  Amy  v.  Smith, 
1  Litt.  (Ky.)  326;  Campbell  v.  Mor- 
ris, 3  Har.  &  McH.  (Md.)  535,  554; 
Slaughter  v.  Commonwealth,  13 
Graft.  (Va.)  767;  Commonwealth  v. 
Towles,  5  Leigh  (Va.)  743;  Slaugh- 
ter-House  Cases,  16  Wall.  36. 

*'"' Cooley  Const.  Lim.  (6th  ed.) 
490;  citing  Corfield  v.  Coryell,  4 
Wash.  C.  C.  371,  380;  Campbell  v. 
Morris,  3  Har.  &  McH.  (Md.)  535, 
554;  Crandall  v.  State,  10  Conn.  339; 
Oliver  v.  Washington  Mills,  11  Allen 
(Mass.)    268. 

"Const,  of  United  States,  14th 
Amend.  As  laid  down  by  Judge 
Cooley: — "The  line  of  distinction 
between  the  privileges  and  immuni- 
ties of  citizens  of  the  United  States 
and  those  of  citizens  of  the  several 
states  must  be  traced  along  the 
boundaries  of  their  respective 
spheres  of  action,  and  the  two 
classes  must  be  as  different  in  their 


§  141 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS. 


138 


doubted  fact  that  many  rights  and  privileges  depend  upon  actual 
residence;  and  a  statute  which  allows  process  by  attachment  against 
a  non-resident  debtor,  even  though  such  process  is  not  admissible 
against  a  resident,  does  not  violate  the  constitutional  provisions.*^ 


nature  as  are  the  functions  of  the 
respective  governments.  A  citizen 
of  the  United  States,  as  such,  has 
the  right  to  participate  in  foreign 
and  interstate  commerce,  to  have 
the  benefit  of  the  postal  laws,  to 
make  use  in  common  with  others  of 
the  navigable  waters  of  the  United 
States,  and  to  pass  from  state  to 
state,  and  into  foreign  countries,  be- 
cause over  all  these  subjects  the  ju- 
risdiction of  the  United  States  ex- 
tends, and  they  are  covered  by  its 
laws:  Story  on  Const.  (4th  ed.), 
§  1937.  These,  therefore,  are  among 
the  privileges  of  citizens  of  the 
United  States.  So  every  citizen 
may  petition  the  federal  authorities 
which  are  set  over  him  in  respect  to 
any  matter  of  public  concern;  may 
examine  the  public  records  of  the 
federal  jurisdiction;  may  visit  the 
seat  of  government  without  being 
subjected  to  the  payment  of  a  tax 
for  the  privilege:  Crandall  v.  Ne- 
vada, 6  Wall.  35;  may  be  purchaser 
of  the  public  lands  on  the  same 
terms  with  others;  may  participate 
in  the  government  if  he  comes  with- 
in the  condition  of  .suffrage,  and 
may  demandlthe  care  and  protection 
of  the  United  States  when  on  the 
high  seas  or  within  the  jurisdiction 
of  a  foreign  government:  Slaughter- 
House  Cases,  16  Wall.  36.  The  priv- 
ileges suggest  the  immunities. 
Wherever  it  is  the  duty  of  the 
United  States  to  give  protection  to  a 
citizen  against  any  harm,  incon- 
venience or  deprivation,  the  citizen 
is  entitled  to  an  immunity  which 
pertains  to  federal  citizenship.  One 
very  plain  and  unquestionable  im- 
munity is  exemption  from  any  tax, 


burden  or  imposition  under  state 
laws,  as  a  condition  to  the  enjoy- 
ment of  any  right  or  privilege  under 
the  laws  of  the  United  States.  A 
state,  therefore,  can  not  require  one 
to  pay  a  tax  as  importer,  under  the 
laws  of  congress,  of  foreign  mer- 
chandise: Ward  V.  Maryland,  12 
Wall.  163;  nor  impose  a  tax  upon 
travelers  passing  by  public  convey- 
ances out  of  the  state:  Crandall  v. 
Nevada,  6  Wall.  35;  nor  impose  con- 
ditions to  the  right  of  citizens  of 
other  states  to  sue  its  citizens  in  the 
federal  courts:  Insurance  Co.  v. 
Morse,  20  Wall.  445.  These  in- 
stances sufficiently  indicate  the  gen- 
eral rule.  Whatever  one  may  claim 
as  of  right  under  the  constitution 
and  laws  of  the  United  States  by 
virtue  of  its  citizenship  is  a  privi- 
lege of  a  citizen  of  the  United 
States.  Whatever  the  constitution 
and  laws  of  the  United  States  entitle 
him  to  exemption  from,  he  may 
claim  an  immunity  in  respect  to: 
Slaughter-House  Cases,  16  Wall.  36. 
And  such  a  right  or  privilege  is 
abridged  whenever  the  state  law  in- 
terferes with  any  legitimate  opera- 
tion of  the  federal  authority  which 
concerns  his  interest,  whether  it  be 
an  authority  actively  exerted,  or 
resting  only  in  the  express  or  im- 
plied command  or  assurance  of  the 
federal  constitution  or  laws:"  Coo- 
ley  Princ.  Const.  Law  246.  See 
United  States  v.  Reese,  92  U.  S.  214 
United  States  v.  Cruikshank,  92  U 
S.  542;  Hall  v.  De  Cuir,  95  U.  S.  485 
Kirkland  v.  Hotchkiss,  100  U.  S.  491 
*' State  V.  Medbury,  3  R.  I.  138 
Campbell  v.  Morris,  3  H.  &  McH 
(Md.)  535. 


139 


MEMBERSHIP    AXD    CITIZEXSIIIP. 


§  14^ 


§  142.  Rights  of  citizens. — The  fourteenth  amendment  to  the  con- 
stitution hay  f;everal  objects,  and  among  others  it  declares  the  inviola- 
bility of  the  public  debt  of  the  United  States,  and  forbids  the  United 
States  or  any  other  state  assuming  or  paying  any  debt  or  obligation 
incurred  in  aid  of  insurrection  or  rebellion  against  the  United  States, 
or  any  claim  for  the  loss  or  emancipation  of  any  slave.  It  also  dis- 
qualifies from  holding  federal  or  state  offices  certain  persons  who 
shall  have  engaged  in  insurrection  or  rebellion  against  the  United 
States  or  given  aid  or  comfort  to  the  enemies  thereof.*''  This  amend- 
ment does  not  profess  to  secure  the  benefit  of  the  same  laws  and  the 
same  remedies  to  all  persons  in  the  United  States.  But  great  diversi- 
ties may  and  do  exist  in  these  respects  in  difEerent  states.  All  that 
a  person  can  demand  under  the  last  clause  of  section  1  of  the  four- 
teenth amendment  is  that  he  shall  have  the  same  protection  under 
the  laws  as  is  given  to  other  classes  and  persons  under  like  circum- 
stances in  the  same  place. ^° 


^'•Cooley  Const.  Lim.  (6th  ed.)  14. 
Judge  Field  says  of  this  amend- 
ment:— "That  amendment  was  un- 
doubtedly proposed  for  the  purpose 
of  fully  protecting  the  newly-made 
citizens  of  the  African  race  in  the 
enjoyment  of  their  freedom,  and  to 
prevent  discriminating  state  legisla- 
tion against  them.  The  generality 
of  the  language  used  necessarily  ex- 
tends its  provisions  to  all  persons  of 
every  race  and  color.  Previously  to 
its  adoption  the  civil  rights  act  had 
been  passed,  which  declared  that 
citizens  of  the  United  States  of  ev- 
ery race  and  color,  without  regard 
to  any  previous  condition  of  slavery 
or  involuntary  servitude,  except  as 
a  punishment  for  crime,  should  have 
the  same  rights  in  every  state  and 
territory  to  make  and  enforce  con- 
tracts, to  sue,  be  parties  and  give 
evidence,  to  inherit,  purchase,  lease, 
sell,  own  and  convey  real  and  per- 
sonal property,  and  to  full  and  equal 
benefit  of  all  laws  and  proceedings 
for  the  security  of  person  and  prop- 
erty, as  is  enjoyed  by  white  citizens, 
and  should  be  subject  to  like  punish- 
ment, pains  and  penalties,  and  to 
none  other.     The  validity  of  this  act 


was  questioned  in  many  quarters, 
and  complaints  were  made  that,  not- 
withstanding the  abolition  of  slav- 
ery and  involuntary  servitude,  the 
freedmen  were  in  some  portions  of 
the  country  subjected  to  disabilities 
from  which  others  were  exempt. 
There  were  also  complaints  of  the 
existence  in  certain  sections  of  the 
southern  states  of  a  feeling  of  en- 
mity growing  out  of  the  collisions 
of  the  war  toward  citizens  of  the 
north.  Whether  these  complaints 
had  any  just  foundation  is  imma- 
terial; they  were  believed  by  many 
to  be  well  founded;  and  to  prevent 
any  possible  legislation  hostile  to 
any  class  from  the  causes  men- 
tioned, and  to  obviate  objections  to 
legislation  similar  to  that  embodied 
in  the  civil  rights  act,  the  four- 
teenth amendment  was  adopted. 
This  is  manifest  from  the  discus- 
sions in  congress  with  reference  to 
it.  There  was  no  diversity  of  opin- 
ion as  to  its  object  between  those 
who  favored  and  those  who  opposed 
its  adoption:"  San  Mateo  County  v. 
Southern  &c.  R.  Co.,  13  Fed.  722. 

^°  Hayes  v.  Missouri,  120  U.  S.  68; 
s.  c.  7  S.  Ct.  350;  Missouri  v.  Lewis, 


§    143  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  140 

§  143.  The  same  subject  continued. — On  this  subject  Judge 
Strong  says:  "A  state  acts  by  its  legislative,  its  executive  or  its  judi- 
cial authorities.  It  can  act  in  no  other  way.  The  constitutional  pro- 
vision, therefore,  must  mean  that  no  agency  of  the  state,  or  of  the 
ofhcers  or  agents  by  whom  its  powers  are  executed,  shall  deny  to  any 
person  within  its  jurisdiction  the  equal  protection  of  its  laws.  Who- 
ever by  virtue  of  public  position  under  a  state  government  deprives 
another  of  property,  life  or  liberty  without  due  process  of  law,  or 
denies  or  takes  away  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws,  violates  the 
constitutional  inhibition;  and  as  he  acts  in  the  name  of  and  for  the 
state,  and  is  clothed  with  the  state's  authority,  his  act  is  that  of  the 
state.  This  must  be  so,  or  the  constitutional  prohibition  has  no  mean- 
ing."^^  It  is  declared  by  the  fifteenth  amendment  to  the  constitu- 
tion of  the  United  States  that  the  rights  of  citizens  of  the  United 
States  shall  not  be  abridged  or  denied  by  any  state,  or  by  the  United 
States,  on  account  of  previous  condition  of  servitude,  color  or  race.^^ 

§  144.  Personal  liability  of  members  of  the  corporation. — At  com- 
mon law  and  under  the  statutes  of  all  our  states  save  those  of  New 
England,  the  members  of  municipal  corporations  are  not  personally 
liable  for  the  debts  of  the  municipality.  As  is  said  by  Mr.  Justice 
Field  in  the  case  in  which  the  creditors  of  the  city  of  Memphis  en- 

101  U.  S.  22.     For  taxation  of  rail-  678;   s.  c.  7  S.  Ct.  656,  763;   United 

roads  as  a  class,  see  Kentucky  R.  R.  States  v.  Harris,  106  U.  S.  629;  s.  c. 

Tax  Cases,  115  U.  S.  321;   s.  c.  6  S.  1  S.  Ct.  601. 

Ct.  57.  "  As  to  these  amendments,  see 
"Ex  parte  Virginia,  100  U.  S.  339.  Story  on  Const.  (4th  ed.),  chs.  46, 
This  view  was  approved  in  Neal  v.  47,  48,  and  appendix  to  vol.  2. 
Delaware,  103  U.  S.  370,  397.  The  Women  are  not  entitled  to  vote  by 
fourteenth  amendment  does  not,  reason  of  the  new  amendments: 
says  Judge  Bradley,  "invest  con-  Minor  v.  Happersett,  21  Wall.  162; 
gress  with  power  to  legislate  upon  Bradwell  v.  State,  16  Wall.  130.  See 
subjects  which  are  within  the  do-  also,  note  1  in  Cooley  Const.  Lim. 
main  of  state  legislation,  but  to  pro-  (6th  ed.)  15.  The  fourteenth 
vide  modes  of  relief  against  state  amendment  gave  colored  persons  the 
legislation  or  state  actions  of  the  right  to  be  protected  from  unfriend- 
kind  referred  to.  It  does  not  au-  ly  legislation  solely  on  account  of 
thorize  congress  to  create  a  code  of  their  color,  the  rights  of  citizenship, 
municipal  law  for  the  regulation  of  and  exemption  from  legislation 
private  rights;  but  to  provide  modes  which  might  lessen  their  rights, 
of  redress  against  the  operation  of  tend  to  reduce  them  to  the  condition 
state  laws  and  the  action  of  state  of  a  subject  race,  or  lower  them  in 
officers,  executive  and  judicial,  when  civic  society:  Ex  parte  Virginia,  100 
these  are  subversive  of  the  funda-  U.  S.  370;  Virginia  v.  Rives,  100  U. 
mental  rights  specified  in  the  amend-  S.  313;  Strauder  v.  West  Virginia, 
ment:"  Civil  Rights  Cases,  109  U.  S.  100  U.  S.  303;  Neal  v.  Delaware,  103 
3;  s.  c.  3  S.  Ct.  18.  On  this  see  U.  S.  370. 
also,  Baldwin  v.  Franks,  120  U.  S. 


141  MEMBERSHIP    AND    CITIZENSHIP.  §    145 

deavored  to  satisfy  the  debts  of  the  corporation  out  of  the  private 
property  of  its  citizens:"^    "In  no  state  of  the  Union,  outside  of  New 
England,  does  the  doctrine  obtain  tliat  the  private  proj^erty  of  indi- 
viduals within  the  limits  of  a  municipal  corporation  can  be  reached 
by  its  creditors  and  subjected  to  the  payment  of  their  demands.     In 
Massachusetts  and  Connecticut,  and  perhaps  in  other  states  in  New 
England,  the  individual  liability  of  the  inhabitants  of  towns,  parishes 
and  cities  for  the  debts  of  the  latter  is  maintained,  and  executions 
upon  judgments  issued  against  them  can  be  enforced  against  the 
private  property  of  the  inhabitants.     But  this  doctrine  is  admitted 
b\^  the  courts  of  those  states  to  be  peculiar  to  their  jurisprudence, 
and  an  exception  to  the  rule  elsewhere  prevailing.     Elsewhere  the 
private  property  of  the  inhabitants  of  a  municipal  body  can  not  be 
subjected  to  the  payment  of  its  debts  except  by  way  of  taxation;  but 
taxes,  as  we  have  already  said,  can  only  be  levied  by  legislative 
authority.     The  power  of  taxation  is  not  one  of  the  functions  of  the 
judiciary;  and  whatever  authority  the  states  may,  under  their  consti- 
tutions, confer  upon  special  tribunals  of  their  own,  the  federal  courts 
can  not  by  reason  of  it  take  any  additional  powers  which  are  not  judi- 
cial.    In  Eees  v.  City  of  Watertown,^^  from  which  we  iiave  already 
quoted,  the  power  asserted  by  the  decree  was  claimed  by  counsel,  but 
was  rejected  by  the  court.    'Assume,'  said  the  court,  'that  the  plaintitf 
is  entitled  to  the  payment  of  his  judgment,  and  that  the  defendant 
neglects  its  duty  in  refusing  to  raise  the  amount  by  taxation,  it  does 
not  follow  that  the  court  may  order  the  amount  to  be  made  from  the 
private  estate  of  one  of  its  citizens.     This  summary  proceeding  would 
involve  a  violation  of  the  rights  of  the  latter.     He  has  never  been 
heard  in  court.     He  has  had  no  opportunity  to  establish  a  defense 
to  the  debt  itself,  or,  if  the  judgment  is  valid,  to  show  that  his  prop- 
erty is  not  liable  to  its  payment.     It  is  well  settled  that  legislative  ex- 
emptions from  taxation  are  valid,  that  such  exemptions  may  be  per- 
petual in  their  duration,  and  that  they  are,  in  some  cases,  beyond 
legislative  interference.     The  proceeding  supposed  would  violate  the 
fundamental  principle  contained  in  chapter  twenty -ninth  of  Magna 
Charta,  and  embodied  in  the  constitution  of  the  United  States,  that 
no  man  shall  be  deprived  of  his  property  without  due  process  of  law ; 
that  is,  he  must  be  served  with  notice  of  the  proceeding  and  have  a 
day  in  court  to  make  his  defense.' " 

§  145.    The  same  subject  continued — Russell  v.  The  Men  of  Devon. 

— This  doctrine  that  the  members  of  a  municipal  corporation  are  not 
personally  liable  for  its  debts  is  of  early  authority.     In  the  famous 

«'  Meriwether  v.  Garrett,  102  U.  S.        "  19  Wall.  116,  122. 
472,  519. 


§    146  PUBLIC    COKI'ORATIONS.  142 

English  ease  of  Russell  v.  The  ]\Ien  of  Devon,^^  where  the  plaintiff 
brought  suit  against  the  inhabitants  of  the  county  of  Devon  for  neg- 
ligence on  the  part  of  the  county  for  allowing  a  public  bridge  to  re- 
main in  a  dangerous  condition,  through  which  the  plaintiff  sustained 
injury,  it  was  decided  that,  as  the  county  possessed  no  public  fund 
out  of  which  the  judgment,  if  recovered,  could  be  satisfied,  the  action 
could  not  be  maintained.  The  court  refused  to  sanction  the  doctrine 
of  the  personal  liability  of  the  inhabitants  of  the  county,  on  the 
ground  that,  if  that  doctrine  were  enforced,  the  judgment  might  be 
satisfied  out  of  the  private  property  of  one  or  more  of  the  inhabit- 
ants, and  that  the  persons  whose  property  had  been  applied  in  satis- 
faction of  the  judgment  would  have  no  remedy  over  against  the  other 
inhabitants  except  by  an  impracticable  multiplicity  of  actions.  The 
doctrine  of  this  case  has  been  followed  in  the  American  cases;  and, 
as  has  been  said,  the  members  of  a  municipal  corporation  are  person- 
ally liable  for  its  debts  nowhere  in  this  country  outside  of  New 
England. °'' 

§  146.  Personal  liability  of  members  of  public  quasi-corporations  in 
New  England. — By  a  curious  and  unique  custom  the  members  of  pub- 
lic quasi-corporations  in  New  England  are  held  to  be  personally  liable 
for  the  debts  of  the  corporation;  and  a  judgment  obtained  against 
the  public  quasi-corporation  can  be  satisfied  out  of  the  private  prop- 
erty of  any  of  its  members. ^'^  The  reason  for  this  peculiar  practice 
seems  to  have  been  that  judgments  against  these  quasi-corporations 
could  not  be  satisfied  out  of  any  corporate  fund,  as  no  such  fund  ex- 

5^2  T.  R.  667.  Boston,  122  Mass.  344;   s.  c.  23  Am. 

"^Cooley  Const.  Lim.  300;  1  Dillon  R.    332;    Adams    v.    President    &c., 

Munic.    Corp.    (4t]i    ed.)    §    962,    n.;  1  Greenl.    (Maine)    361;    Fernald  v. 

Meriwether  v.  Garrett,  102  U.  S.  472;  Lewis,  6  Maine  264;   Beers  v.  Bots- 

Rees  v.  City  of  Watertown,  19  Wall,  ford,  3  Day   (Conn.)   159;   Puller  v. 

107,  116;    Symonds  v.  Clay  Co.,   71  Hampton,  5  Conn.  416;    Atwater  v. 

111.  355;    North  Lebanon  v.  Arnold,  Inhabitants   &c.,    6    Conn.    223;    Mc- 

47  Pa.  St.  488;    Flori  v.  City  of  St.  Cloud  v.  Selby,  10  Conn.  390;  Union 

Louis,  69  Mo.  341;   Kincaid  v.  Har-  v.   Crawford,  19   Conn.   331;    Cooley 

din  Co.,  53  Iowa  430;   s.  c.  5  N.  W.  Const.   Lim.    297.     In   Maine   it  has 

589;    Miller  v.  McWilliams,  50  Ala.  been  decided  that  a  statute  provid- 

427.  ing  that  judgments  against  the  town 

"  Beardsley    v.    Smith,    16    Conn,  may  be   collected   from  the  private 

368;    Merchants'    Bank    v.    Cook,    4  property  of  members  of  the  town  is 

Pick.  (Mass.)  405;  Riddle  v.  Propri-  not  in  contravention  of  the  constitu- 

etors  &c.,  7  Mass.  187;   Inhabitants  tional  prohibition  against  the  taking 

&c.  V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  14  Mass.  216;  of    private    property    without    due 

Chase    v.    President    &c.,    19     Pick,  process  of  law:  Eames  v.  Savage,  77 

(Mass.)    564;    Gaskill   v.    Dudley,    6  Maine  212. 
Met.    (Mass.)    546;    Hill  v.   City  of 


143  MEMBERSHIP   AND    CITIZENSHIP.  §    147 

isted,  and  therefore  it  was  necessary  to  resort  to  the  private  prop- 
erty of  the  members  of  the  corporation.  This  private  property  could 
be  reached  either  by  taxation  or  execution,  and  in  the  New  England 
states  the  inconvenient  and  unjust  system  of  levying  execution  on 
private  property  in  order  to  satisfy  judgments  against  the  corpora- 
tion has  been  adopted.^ ^ 

§  147.  The  same  subject  continued. — In  the  other  states  of  the 
Union  judgments  rendered  against  public  quasi-corporations  which, 
have  no  corporate  fund  out  of  which  to  satisfy  judgments  are  satis- 
fied by  taxation  of  the  members  of  the  corporation  instead  of  by  exe- 
cution. As  is  said  by  Judge  Cooley :  "So  far  as  this  rule  [that  is,  that 
members  of  a  public  quasi-corporation  are  personally  liable  for  its 
debts]  rests  upon  the  reason  that  these  organizations  have  no  common 
fund,  and  that  no  other  mode  exists  by  which  demands  against  them 
can  be  enforced,  it  can  not  be  considered  applicable  in  those  states 
where  express  provision  is  made  by  law  for  compulsory  taxation 
to  satisfy  any  judgment  recovered  against  the  corporate  body — the 
duty  of  levying  the  tax  being  imposed  upon  some  officer  who  may  be 
compelled  by  mandamus  to  perform  it.  Nor  has  any  usage,  so  far  as 
we  are  aware,  grown  up  in  any  of  the  newer  states  like  that  which' 
had  so  early  an  origin  in  New  England.  More  just,  convenient  and 
inexpensive  modes  of  enforcing  such  demands  have  been  established 
by  statute,  and  the  rules  concerning  them  are  conformed  more  closely 
to  those  which  are  established  for  other  corporations."^^ 

§  148.  Beardsley  v.  Smith — (a)  The  reason  for  the  New  England 
doctrine  of  personal  liability  of  members. — In  this  leading  case^° 
the  learning  relating  to  this  peculiar  custom  of  New  England  is  so 
clearly  stated  in  the  opinion  by  Judge  Church  in  the  supreme  court  of 
errors  of  Connecticut  that  we  quote  his  words  at  length:  "We  know 
that  the  relation  in  which  members  of  municipal  corporations  in  this 
state  have  been  supposed  to  stand  in  respect  to  the  corporation  itself  as 
well  as  to  its  creditors  has  elsewhere  been  considered  in  some  respects 
peculiar.  We  have  treated  them  for  some  purposes  as  parties  to  cor- 
porate proceedings,  and  their  individuality  has  not  been  considered 
as  merged  in  their  corporate  connection.  Though  corporators,  they 
have  been  holden  to  be  parties  to  suits  by  or  against  the  corporation 
and  individually  liable  for  its  debts.     Heretofore  this  has  not  been 

="  See  post,  §  148,  where  the  rea-  =''  Cooley  Const.  Lim.  300,  301. 

sons   for   the   custom   are   fully   set  *"  Beardsley    v.    Smith,    16    Conn, 

forth  in  the  opinion  in  Beardsley  v.  375. 
Smith,  16  Conn.  368,  375. 


§    149  PUBLIC    COKPOKATIONS,  144 

doubted  as  to  the  inhabitants  of  towns,  located  ecclesiastical  societies 
and  school  districts.  From  a  recurrence  to  the  history  of  the  law  on 
this  subject,  we  are  persuaded  that  the  principle  and  usage  here  rec- 
ognized and  followed  in  regard  to  the  liability  of  the  inhabitants  of 
towns  and  other  communities  were  very  early  adopted  by  our  ances- 
tors; and  whether  they  were  considered  as  a  part  of  the  common  law 
of  England,  or  originated  here  as  necessary  to  our  state  of  society, 
it  is  not  very  material  to  inquire.  We  think,  however,  that  the  prin- 
ciple is  not  of  domestic  origin,  but  to  some  extent  was  operative  and 
applied  in  the  mother  country,  especially  in  cases  where  a  statute 
fixed  a  liability  upon  a  municipality  which  had  no  corporate  funds. 
The  same  reason  and  necessity  for  the  application  of  such  a  principle 
and  practice  existed  in  both  countries.  Such  corporations  are  of  a 
public  and  political  character;  they  exercise  a  portion  of  the  govern- 
ing power  of  the  state.  Statutes  impose  upon  them  important  public 
duties.  In  the  performance  of  these  they  must  contract  debts  and 
liabilities  which  can  only  be  discharged  by  a  resort  to  individuals, 
either  by  taxation  or  execution.  Taxation  in  most  cases  can  only  be 
the  result  of  the  voluntary  action  of  the  corporation,  dependent  upon 
the  contingent  will  of  a  majority  of  the  corporators  and  upon  their 
tardy  and  uncertain  action.  It  affords  no  security  to  creditors,  be- 
cause they  have  no  power  over  it.  Such  reasons  as  these  probably 
operated  with  our  ancestors  in  adopting  the  more  efficient  and  cer- 
tain remedy  by  execution  which  has  been  resorted  to  in  the  present 
case,  and  which  they  had  seen  to  some  extent  in  operation  in  the 
countries  whose  laws  were  their  inheritance.  The  plaintiff  would 
apply  to  these  municipal  or  quasi-corporations  the  close  principles 
applicable  to  private  corporations.  But  inasmuch  as  they  are  not, 
strictly  speaking,  corporations,  but  only  municipal  bodies  without 
pecuniary  funds,  it  will  not  do  to  apply  to  them  literally  and  in  all 
cases  the  law  of  corporations."^^ 

§  149.  (b)  The  doctrine  in  England. — The  individual  liability  of 
the  members  of  quasi-corporations,  though  not  expressly  adjudged, 
was  very  distinctly  recognized  in  the  case  of  Eussell  v.  The  Men  of 
Devon.''-  It  was  alluded  to  as  a  known  principle  in  the  case  of  The 
Attorney-General  v.  The  Mayor  &c.  of  Exeter,*'^  applicable  as  well  to 
cities  as  to  hundreds  and  parishes.  That  the  rated  inhabitants  of  an 
English  parish  are  considered  as  the  real  parties  to  suits  against  the 
parish  is  now  supposed  to  be  well  settled ;  and  it  was  so  decided  in 

•    «'  Citing  Inhabitants  &c.  v.  Wood,        '=  2  T.  R.  667.     See  ante,  §  145. 
13  Mass.  192.  «' 2  Russ.  45;  s.  c.  26  Rev.  Rep.  2. 


145  MEMBERSHIP    AND    CITIZEXSIIIP.  §    150 

the  cases  of  The  King  v.  The  Inhabitants  of  AYoburn***  and  The 
King  V.  The  Inliabitants  of  Hardwick;"^  and  in  support  of  tliis 
principle  reference  was  made  to  the  form  of  the  proceedings,  as  that 
they  were  "against  the  inhabitants,"  etc. 

§  150.  (c)  Doctrine  in  Massachusetts  and  Maine. — In  the  state  of 
Massachusetts,  the  individual  responsibility  of  the  inhabitants  of 
towns  for  town  debts  has  long  been  established.  Distinguished  coun- 
sel in  the  case  of  The  President  &c.  of  the  Merchants'  Bank  v.  Cook,®^ 
referring  to  municipal  bodies,  says:  "For  a  century  past  the  practical 
construction  of  the  bar  has  been  that,  in  an  action  by  or  against  a 
corporation,  a  member  of  the  corporation  is  a  party  to  the  suit." 
In  several  other  cases  in  that  state  the  same  principle  is  repeated.. 
In  the  case  of  Eiddle  v.  The  Proprietors  of  the  Locks  and  Canals 
on  Merrimack  Eiver,®'''  Parsons,  C.  J.,  in  an  allusion  to  tliis  private 
responsibility  of  corporators,  remarks:  "And  the  sound  reason  is 
that,  having  no  corporate  fund  and  no  legal  means  of  obtaining  one, 
each  corporator  is  liable  to  satisfy  any  judgment  obtained  against 
the  corporation."  So  in  The  Inhabitants  of  Brewer  v.  The  Inhabi- 
tants of  New  Gloucester,^*  the  court  says :  "As  the  law  provides  that, 
when  judgment  is  recovered  against  the  inhabitants  of  a  towTi,  exe- 
cution may  be  levied  upon  the  property  of  any  inhabitant,  each 
inhabitant  must  be  considered  as  a  party."  In  the  case  above  referred 
to  of  President  &c.  v.  Cook,  Parker,  C.  J.,  expresses  the  opinion  of 
the  court  upon  this  point  thus :  "Towns,  parishes,  precincts,  etc., 
are  but  a  collection  of  individuals  with  certain  corporate  powers  for 
political  and  civil  purposes,  without  any  corporate  fund  from  which 
a  judgment  can  be  satisfied;  but  each  member  of  the  community  is 
liable  in  his  person  and  estate  to  the  execution  which  may  issue 
against  the  body;  each  individual,  therefore,  may  be  well  thought 
to  be  a  party  to  a  suit  brought  against  them  by  their  collective  name. 
In  regard  to  banks,  turnpike  and  other  corporations  the  case  is  dif- 
ferent." The  counsel  concerned  in  the  case  of  Mower  v.  The  Inhabi- 
tants of  Leicester,'''^  without  contradiction  speak  of  the  practice  of 
subjecting  individuals  as  one  of  daily  occurrence.  The  law  on  this 
subject  was  very  much  considered  in  the  case  of  Chase  v.  The  Presi- 
dent &c.  of  the  Merrimack  Bank,^*'  and  was  applied  and  enforced 
against  the  members  of  a  territorial  parish.  "The  question  is,"  said 
the  court,  "whether  on  an  execution  against  a  town  or  parish  the 

"10  East  395.  ««^  14  Mass.  216. 

«'  11  East  578.  *^  9  Mass.  247. 

=M  Pick.  (Mass.)  405.  ^"19  Pick.  (Mass.)  564. 

"  7  Mass.  169,  187. 

1  Smith — 10 


§    151  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  146 

body  or  estate  of  any  inhabitant  may  be  lawfully  taken  to  satisfy  it. 
This  question  seems  to  have  been  settled  in  the  affirmative  by  a  series 
of  decisions,  and  ought  no  longer  to  be  considered  an  open  question." 
The  state  of  Maine  when  separated  from  Massachusetts  retained 
most  of  its  laws  and  usages  as  they  had  been  recognized  in  the  parent 
state,  and  among  others  the  one  in  question.  In  Adams  v.  President 
&c.  of  Wiscasset  Bank/^  Mellen,  C.  J.,  says :  "It  is  well  known  that 
all  judgments  against  quasi-corporations  may  be  satisfied  out  of  the 
property  of  any  individual  inhabitant." 

§  151.  (d)  The  doctrine  in  Connecticut. — "The  courts  of  this 
state  from  a  time  beyond  the  memory  of  any  living  lawyer  have  sanc- 
tioned and  carried  out  this  usage  as  one  of  common-law  obligation; 
and  it  has  been  applied,  not  to  towns  only,  but  also,  by  legal  analogy, 
to  territorial  ecclesiastical  societies  and  school  districts.  The  forms 
of  our  process  against  these  communities  have  always  corresponded 
with  this  view  of  the  law.  The  writs  have  issued  against  the  inhabit- 
ants of  towns,  societies  and  districts  as  parties.  As  early  in  the  his- 
tory of  our  jurisprudence  as  1705,  a  statute  was  enacted  authorizing 
communities  such  as  towns,  societies,  etc.,  to  prosecute  and  defend 
suits,  and  for  this  purpose  to  appear  either  by  themselves,  agents  or 
attorneys.  If  the  inhabitants  were  not  then  considered  as  parties 
individually  and  liable  to  the  consequences  of  judgments  against 
such  communities  as  parties,  there  would  have  been  a  glaring  impro- 
priety in  permitting  them  to  appear  and  defend  by  themselves ;  but  if 
parties,  such  a  right  was  necessary  and  indispensable.  Of  course 
this  privilege  has  been  and  may  be  exercised. '^^  Our  statute  provid- 
ing for  the  collection  of  taxes  enacts  that  the  treasurer  of  the  state 
shall  direct  his  warrant  to  the  collectors  of  the  state  tax  in  the  several 
towns.  If  neither  this  nor  the  further  proceedings  against  the  col- 
lectors and  the  selectmen  authorized  by  the  statute  shall  enforce  the 
collection  of  the  tax,  the  law  directs  that  then  the  treasurer  shall 
issue  his  execution  against  the  inhabitants  of  such  town.  Such  an 
execution  may  be  levied  upon  the  estate  of  the  inhabitants;  and  this 
provision  of  the  law  was  not  considered  as  introducing  a  new  princi- 
ple or  enforcing  a  novel  remedy,  but  as  being  only  in  conformity 
with  the  well-known  usage  in  other  cases.  The  levy  of  an  execution 
under  this  statute  produced  the  case  of  Beers  v.  Botsford.'^^  There 
the  execution  which  had  been  issued  against  the  town  of  Newton  by 
the  treasurer  of  the  state  had  been  levied  upon  the  property  of  the 
plaintiff,  an  inhabitant  of  that  town,  and  he  had  thus  been  compelled 

"1  Greenl.  (Maine)  361.  "3  Day  (Conn.)  159. 

"  1  Swift  System  227. 


147  MEMBERSHIP   AND    CITIZENSHIP.  §    151 

to  pay  the  balance  of  a  state  tax  due  from  the  town.  He  sued  the  town 
of  Newton  for  the  recovery  of  the  money  so  paid  by  him.  The  most 
distinguished  professional  gentlemen^  in  the  state  were  engaged  as 
counsel  in  that  case;  and  it  did  not  occur,  either  to  them  or  to  the 
court,  that  the  plaintiff's  property  had  been  taken  without  right;  on 
the  contrary,  the  case  proceeded  throughout  on  the  conceded  principle 
of  our  common  law  that  the  levy  was  properly  made  upon  the  estate 
of  the  plaintiff.  And  without  this  the  plaintiff  could  not  have  recov- 
ered of  the  town,  but  must  have  resorted  to  his  action  against  the 
officer  for  his  illegal  and  void  levy.  In  Fuller  v.  The  Town  of 
Hampton,^*  Peters,  J.,  remarked  that  if  costs  are  recovered  against 
a  town  the  writ  of  execution  to  collect  them  must  have  been  issued 
against  the  property  of  the  inhabitants  of  the  town;  and  this  is 
the  invariable  practice.  The  case  of  Atwater  v.  The  Inhabitants 
&c.  of  Woodbridge''^  also  grew  out  of  this  ancient  usage.  The 
ecclesiastical  society  of  Bethany  had  been  taxed  by  the  town  of 
Woodbridge  for  its  money  at  interest,  and  the  warrant  for  the  col- 
lection of  the  tax  had  been  levied  upon  the  property  of  the  plaintiff 
and  the  tax  had  thus  been  collected  of  him,  who  was  an  inhabitant 
of  the  located  society  of  Bethany.  Brainard,  J..,  who  drew  up  the 
opinion  of  the  court,  referring  to  this  proceeding  said:  'This  prac- 
tice with'  regard  to  towns  has  prevailed  in  New  England,  so  far  as 
I  have  been  able  to  investigate  the  subject,  from  an  early  period — 
from  its  first  settlement; — a  practice  brought  by  our  forefathers 
from  England,  which  had  there  obtained  in  corporations  similar  to 
the  towns  incorporated  in  New  England.'  It  will  here  be  seen  that 
the  principle  is  considered  as  applicable  to  territorial  societies  as  to 
towns,  because  the  object  to  be  attained  was  the  same  in  both — 'that 
the  town  or  society  should  be  brought  to  a  sense  of  duty  and  make 
provision  for  payment  and  indemnity;' — a  very  good  reason  and 
very  applicable  to  the  case  we  are  considering.  The  law  on  this 
subject  was  more  distinctly  brought  out  and  considered  by  this  court 
in  the  late  case  of  McLoud  v.  Selby,'^®  in  which  this  well-known 
practice,  as  it  has  been  applied  to  towns  and  ecclesiastical  societies, 
was  extended  and  sanctioned  as  to  school  districts;  'else  it  would  be 
breaking  in  upon  the  analogies  of  the  law.'  'They  are  communities 
for  different  purposes,  but  essentially  of  the  same  character.'  And 
no  doubt  can  remain,  since  the  decision  of  this  case,  but  that  the 
real  principle  of  all  the  cases  on  this  subject  has  been  and  is  that  the 
inhabitants  of  quasi-corporations  are  parties  individually  as  well  as 
in  their  corporate  capacities  to  all  actions  in  which  the  corporation 

"  5  Conn.  416.  '°  10  Conn.  390. 

"  6  Conn.  223. 


§    153  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  148 

is  a  party.     And  to  the  same  effect  is  the  language  of  the  elementary 
writcrs."'^^ 

g  152.  Limitations  upon  the  personal  liability  of  members  of  New 
England  public  quasi-corporations. — It  may  be  noted  here,  although 
the  subject  will  be  more  thoroughly  discussed  in  a  subsequent  por- 
tion of  this  work,  that  while  the  members  of  these  New  England 
public  quasi-corporations  are  personally  liable  for  the  debts  of  the 
corporation,  still  this  liability  is  much  curtailed  by  the  doctrine, 
which  is  well  settled,  that  these  corporations,  like  counties  and  other 
quasi-corporations,  are  not  liable  for  torts,  unless  a  statute  expressly 
creates  such  liability. '^^  This  rule  is,  however,  subject  to  limitation 
in  the  ease  of  New  England  public  quasi-corporations.  It  is  not 
applicable  in  cases  where  the  injury  arises  from  a  neglect  of  special 
duties  or  the  abuse  of  special  authorities,  imposed  or  conferred  upon 
the  town  with  its  consent  or  at  its  request.'^^ 

"Beardsley    v.    Smith,    16    Conn.  v.  President  &c.,  1  Greenl.   (Maine) 

368;    2   Kent   Com.    221;    Angell   &  361;  Mitchell  v.  Rockland,  52  Maine 

Ames  Corp.  374;   1  Swift  Digest  72,  118;    Frazer  v.  Lewiston,  76  Maine 

794;    5    Dane    Abr.    158;    2    Dillon  531;    Farnum  v.   Concord,   2   N.   H. 

Munic.     Corp.,     §     962,    n.;     Cooley  392;  Eastman  v.  Meredith,  36  N.  H. 

Const.  Lim.  297-300.     Judge  Cooley  284;   s.  c.  72  Am.  D.  302;   Baxter  v. 

cites    and    approves    Beardsley    v.  Winoonski  Turnpike  Co.,  22  Vt.  114; 

Smith,  supra,  and  quotes  at  length  Bray  v.  Wallingford,  20  Conn.  416; 

the  opinion  of  Judge  Church.  Beardsley  v.   Smith,  16  Conn.  368; 

'^  See     chapter     on     Torts,     post;  Cooley    Const.    Lim.    30;     2    Dillon 

Mower  v.   Inhabitants  &c.,  9   Mass.  Munic.  Corp.,  §§  962-965. 
247;    s.  c.  6  Am.  D.  63;    Bigelow  v.        "*  Bigelow  v.  Inhabitants,  14  Gray 

Inhabitants,    14   Gray    (Mass.)    541;  (Mass.)    541;   Eastman  v.  Meredith, 

Hill   V.    City   of   Boston,    122    Mass.  36  N.  H.  284;  Hill  v.  City  of  Boston, 

344,  351;  s.  c.  23  Am.  R.  332;  Adams  122  Mass.  344;  s.  c.  23  Am.  R.  332. 


CHAPTEE  VI. 


OFFICERS   AND   AGENTS. 


Section 

153.  Legislative  power  to  create  of- 

ficers and  agents. 

154.  Legislative  control  over  officers 

and  agents. 

155.  Who  are  officers? 

156.  Conduct  of  elections — Construc- 

tion of  election  statutes. 

157.  Miscellaneous  instances  of  the 

construction   of   election   stat- 
utes. 

158.  Validity     of    election — General 

principles. 

159.  The  same  subject  continued — 

Illustrations. 

160.  English  rule  as  to  majority. 

161.  Election  by  ballot. 

162.  Election  by  city  council. 

163.  Election  by  definite  bodies  gen- 

erally— Majority  and  plurality. 

164.  The   same  subject  continued — 

Quorum  majority. 

165.  Informal  ballot. 

166.  Tenure  of  office. 

167.  Tenure    of    office    where    city 

passes  from  one  class  to   an- 
other. 

168.  Power    to    hold    over — English 

and  American  rules. 

169.  The  same  subject  continued. 

170.  Appointment  of  officers. 

171.  Validity  of  appointment. 

172.  Appointment   by   de   facto   offi- 

cers. 

173.  Compensation     of     officers — In 

general. 

174.  The   same   subject  continued — 

Failure  of  corporate  funds. 

175.  The   same   subject  continued — 

Illustrations. 


Section 

176.  Miscellaneous  instances. 

177.  Extra  compensation. 

178.  Compensation  of  attorneys. 

179.  The  same  subject  continued. 

180.  Compensation — Power  of  legis- 

lature to  control. 

181.  Compensation    in    case    of    re- 

moval. 

182.  Qualifications  for  office-holding. 

183.  Official  oath. 

184.  The  same  subject  continued. 

185.  Duties  of  officers. 

186.  Powers  of  mayor. 

187.  The   same  subject  continued — 

Statutory  provisions. 

188.  The  same   subject  continued — 

Miscellaneous  powers. 

189.  Miscellaneous  instances  of  pow- 

ers of  municipal  officers. 

190.  De  facto  officers — General  state- 

ment. 

191.  The   same   subject  continued — 

Color  of  title. 

192.  Incumbent    of    an    unconstitu- 

tional office. 

193.  Possession  of  office  by  de  facto 

officer. 

194.  Rights    and    liabilities    of    de 

facto  officers. 

195.  Resignation    by    acceptance    of 

incompatible  office. 

196.  Acceptance  and  withdrawal  of 

resignation. 

197.  Removal  of  officers  and  agents 

— How  effected. 

198.  Causes     for     removal — English 

and  American  rules. 

199.  Preferring  of  charges. 


(149) 


153 


PUBLIC    CORPORATION'S. 


150 


re- 


re- 


Section 

200.  Power    of    corporation    to 

move  officers  and  agents. 

201.  The  same  subject  continued. 

202.  Notice    of    proceeding    to 

move. 

203.  The  same  subject  continued. 

204.  By  whom  discharged. 

205.  All    persons    charged    with    no- 

tice of  duties  and   powers  of 
municipal  agents. 


Section 

206.  Liability  of  officers  to  the  cor- 

poration. 

207.  Instances  of  fraudulent  acts  of 

municipal  agents. 

208.  Liability  of  corporation  to  of- 

ficers. 

209.  Indictment    of    municipal    offi- 

cers. 


§  153.  Legislative  power  to  create  officers  and  agents. — The  au- 
thority that  makes  the  laws  has  a  large  discretion  in  determining 
the  means  through  which  they  shall  be  executed ;  and  the  performance 
of  many  duties  for  which  they  may  provide  by  law  may  be  referred 
either  to  the  chief  executive  of  the  state,  or,  at  their  option,  to  any 
other  executive  or  ministerial  officer,  or  even  to  a  person  specially 
named  for  the  duty.^  Whatever  power  or  duty  is  expressly  given  to, 
or  imposed  upon,  the  executive  department,  is  altogether  free  from 
the  interference  of  the  other  branches  of  the  government.  Especially 
is  this  the  case  where  the  subject  is  committed  to  the  discretion  of 
the  chief  executive  officer,  either  by  the  constitution  or  by  the  laws. 
So  long  as  the  power  is  vested  in  him  it  is  to  be  by  him  exercised, 
and  no  other  branch  of  the  government  can  control  its  exercise,  and 
from  those  duties  which  the  constitution  requires  of  him  he  can  not 
be  excused  by  law.^     But  other  powers  or  duties  the  executive  can 


^  Cooley  Const.  Lim.  (6th  ed.),  ch. 
5,  p.  133;  Bridges  v.  Shallcross,  6  W. 
Va.  562;  People  v.  Osborne,  7  Colo. 
605. 

^  Attorney-General  v.  Brown,  1 
Wis.  513.  The  legislature  may  ap- 
point a  state  board  if  the  constitu- 
tion does  not  expressly  empower  the 
governor  to  do  so:  People  v.  Free- 
man, 80  Cal.  233;  s.  c.  22  Pac.  173. 
See  also,  State  v.  Covington,  29 
Ohio  St.  102;  Biggs  v.  McBride,  17 
Or.  640;  s.  c.  21  Pac.  878;  5  L.  R.  A. 
115;  Hovey  v.  State,  119  Ind.  386;  s. 
c.  21  N.  E.  890.  It  is  not  unconsti- 
tutional to  allow  the  governor  to 
supply  temporary  vacancies  in  of- 
fices which,  under  the  constitution, 
are  elective:  Sprague  v.  Brown,  40 
Wis.  612.     If  the  governor  has  the 


power  to  appoint,  with  the  consent 
of  the  senate,  and  to  remove,  he 
may  remove  without  such  consent: 
Harman  v.  Harwood,  58  Md.  1;  Lane 
V.  Commonwealth,  103  Pa.  St.  481. 
As  to  discretionary  powers,  see  Coo- 
ley  Const.  Lim.  (6th  ed.)  54,  55.  An 
appointment  to  office  was  said,  in 
Taylor  v.  Commonwealth,  3  J.  J. 
Marsh.  (Ky.)  401,  to  be  intrinsically 
an  executive  act.  Where  an  office 
is  elective,  the  legislature  can  not 
fill  it  by  appointment  or  by  extend- 
ing the  term  of  the  incumbent:  Peo- 
ple V.  McKinney,  52  N.  Y.  374;  Peo- 
ple V.  Bull,  46  N.  Y.  57;  Devoy  v. 
Mayor  &c.,  35  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  264;  s. 
c.  22  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  226;  People 
V.  Blake,  49  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  9;  People 
v.  Raymond,  37  N.  Y.  428;  People  v. 


151  OFFICERS    AND   AGENTS.  §    154 

not  exercise  or  assume,  except  by  legislative  authority,  and  the  power 
which  in  its  discretion  it  confers  it  may  also  in  its  discretion  with- 
hold or  confide  to  other  hands. ^ 

§  154.  Legislative  control  over  officers  and  agents. — Although,  by 
their  constitution,  the  people  have  delegated  the  exercise  of  sovereign 
powers  to  the  several  departments,  they  have  not  thereby  divested 
themselves  of  the  sovereignty:  they  retain  in  their  own  hands,  so 
far  as  they  have  thought  it  needful  to  do  so,  a  power  to  control  the 
governments  they  create,  and  the  three  departments  dre  responsible 
to  and  subject  to  be  ordered,  directed,  changed  or  abolished  by  them. 
But  this  control  and  direction  must  be  exercised  in  the  legitimate 
mode  previously  agreed  upon.'*  The  maxim  which  lies  at  the  founda- 
tion of  our  government  is  that  all  political  power  originates  with  the 
people.  But  since  the  organization  of  government  it  can  not  be 
claimed  that  either  the  legislative,  executive  or  judicial  powers,  either 
wholly  or  in  part,  can  be  exercised  by  them.  By  the  institution  of 
government  the  people  surrender  the  exercise  of  all  the  sovereign 
functions  of  government  to  agents  chosen  by  themselves,  who  at  least 
theoretically  represent  the  supreme  will  of  their  constituents.  Thus 
all  power  possessed  by  the  people  themselves  is  given  and  centered 
in  their  chosen  representatives.^ 

§  155.  Who  are  officers? — It  is  sometimes  difficult  to  determine 
who  is  an  officer  and  entitled  to  the  rights  and  privileges  pertaining 
to  an  office.  The  distinction  between  an  officer  and  employe  is  not 
always  well  defined.  In  general  it  may  be  stated  that  a  person  elected 
or  appointed,  whose  duties  are  fixed  by  statute  or  ordinance,  is  an 
officer.^     Neither  is  it  at  all  times  apparent  whether  an  officer  is 

Albertson,  55  N.  Y.  50;  State  v.  Gold-  "^  The  employment  of  a  person  as 

stucker,    40    Wis.    124;    Opinion    of  superintendent  of  water-works  does 

Justices,  117  Mass.  603.  not  make  him  an  officer  in  the  ab- 

^  Cooley  Const.  Lim.  (6th  ed.),  ch.  sence  of  an  ordinance  or  resolution 

5,   p.   134.     "In   deciding  this   ques-  creating  the  office  and  specifying  his 

tion  [as  to  the  authority  of  the  gov-  duties:    Town  of  Salem  v.   McClin- 

ernor],  recurrence  must  be  had  to  tock,  16  Ind.  App.  656;  s.  c.  46  N.  E. 

the  constitution:"  Field  v.  People,  3  39;  59  Am.  St.  330.     Operators  of  an 

111.  79,  80.  ambulance    under    a    contract   with 

*  Cooley  Const.  Lim.  (6th  ed.),  ch.  the  city,  who  are  required  by  con- 

17,  p.  747.  tract  to  answer  all  calls   from  the 

'  Gibson  v.  Mason,  5  Nev.  283,  291.  city  dispensary,  and  are  under  the 

See   Luther   v.   Borden,   7   How.   1;  direction  of  the  dispensary  surgeon, 

Koehler  v.  Hill,  60  Iowa  543;  s.  c.  14  are  not  municipal  agents,  and  are 

N.  W.  738;   15  N.  W.  609;   State  v.  personally  liable  for  the   negligent 

Tufly,  19  Nev.  391;  s.  c.  12  Pac,  835;  acts  of  the  driver:   Green  v.  Eden, 

3  Am.  St.  895.  24  Ind.  App.  583;  s.  c.  56  N.  E.  240. 


§    156  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  152 

a  public  or  state  oflficer,  or  a  municipal  officer.  He  may  be  appointed 
by  the  municipality,  and  yet  the  functions,  duties,  etc.,  pertaining 
to  the  office  be  such  as  to  make  him  a  state  officer.^  Nor  does  the 
payment  of  liis  salary  by  the  city  necessarily  make  him  a  municipal 
officer.®  A  statute  which  d^efines  and  enumerates  village  officers,  and 
regulates  their  choice  and  term  of  office,  applies  to  all  villages, 
whether  they  exist  under  general  law  or  special  charter.^ 

§  156.    Conduct  of  elections — Construction  of  election  statutes. — 

The  statutes  of  the  different  states  point  out  specifically  the  mode 
in  which  elections  shall  be  conducted;  but,  although  there  are  great 
diversities  of  detail,  the  same  general  principles  govern  them  all. 
Election  statutes  are  to  be  tested  like  other  statutes,  but  with  a 
leaning  to  liberality  in  view  of  the  great  public  purposes  which  they 
accomplish;  and  except  where  they  specifically  provide  that  a  thing 
shall  be  done  in  the  manner  indicated,  and  not  otherwise,  their  pro- 
visions designed  merely  for  the  information  and  guidance  of  the 
officers  must  be  regarded  as  directory  only,  and  the  election  will  not 
be  defeated  by  a  failure  to  comply  with  them,  provided  the  irregular- 
ity has  not  hindered  any  who  were  entitled  from  exercising  the  right 
of  suffrage,  or  rendered  doubtful  the  evidences  from  which  the  result 
was  to  be  declared.^" 

Commissioner  of  jurors  under  Great-  of  New  York,  32  N.  Y.  S.  34;  s.  c. 

er  New  York  charter  is  not  the  head  84  Hun  (N.  Y.)  50. 

of  a  department,  but  is  a  city  of-  *  In  re  Board  of  Health  &c.,  60  N. 

ficer:    People  v.  Welde,  59  N.  Y.  S.  Y.  S.  27;   s.  c.  43  App.  Div.   (N.  Y.) 

1030.     New     York     and     Brooklyn  236. 

bridge    commissioners    held    to    be  "  Cooley  Const.  Lim.  (6th  ed.),  ch. 

local  and  not  state  officers:   People  17,  pp.  776,  777;   People  v.  Cook,  14 

v.  Nixon,  158  N.  Y.  221;   s.  c.  52  N.  Barb.   (N.  Y.)   259;   s.  c.  8  N.  Y.  67. 

E.   1117.     Commissioners   appointed  See  also,  Clifton  v.  Cook,  7  Ala.  114; 

to  construct  a  bridge  over  East  river  Dishon  v.  Smith,  10  Iowa  212 ;  Attor- 

are    municipal    officers:     People    v.  ney-General  v.  Ely,  4  Wis.  420;  Peo- 

Van  Wyck,  59  N.  Y.  S.  134.     A  city  pie  v.  Higgins,  3  Mich.  233;  Piatt  v. 

justice  of  the  peace  is  a  city  officer:  People,  29  111.  54;  Board  &c.  v.  Peo- 

Hulaniski  v.  City  of  Ogden  City,  20  pie,  65  111.  360;   State  v.  Stumpf,  21 

Utah  233;  s.  c.  57  Pac.  876.  Wis.    579;    Sprague    v.    Norway,    31 

'Policemen  are  public  or  state  of-  Cal.  173;   Howard  v.  Shields,  16  Ohio 

fleers,   although   appointed   through  St.  184;  Sheppard's  Election  Case,  82 

the  instrumentality  of  a  municipal  Pa.    St.    295;     Wheelock's    Election 

corporation:     Everill    v.    Swan,    17  Case,  82  Pa.  St.  297;  State  v.  O'Day, 

Utah  514;  s.  c.  55  Pac.  681.  69  Iowa  368;  s.  c.  28  N.  W.  642.     All 

^  A   person   holding   office   by   ap-  votes  received  after  the  polls  should 

pointment  of  court  is  not  a  city  of-  be  closed  are  illegal:  Varney  v.  Jus- 

ficer,  though  his  salary  is  paid  by  tice,  86  Ky.  596;    s.  c.  6  S.  W.  457. 

the  city  treasurer:    O'Brien  v.  City  Where  a  city  council  passes  an  ordi- 


153 


OFFICERS    AXn    AGENTS. 


157 


§  157.  Miscellaneous  instances  of  the  construction  of  election 
statutes. — Where  a  city  council  i«  the  sole  judge  of  the  election  and 
qualifications  of  its  members,  it  can  not,  after  having  seated  a  member 
on  investigation,  at  a  subsequent  meeting  order  a  second  investiga- 
tion. Certiorari  may  issue  in  such  case  without  waiting  for  the 
report  and  final  order.^^  If  there  is  a  tie  in  the  election  for  mayor 
between  the  incumbent  and  another  candidate,  and  the  city  council 
fails  to  choose  one  of  them  for  mayor  by  lot,  as  required  by  the  city 
charter,  equity  will  not  interfere  to  restrain  the  incumbent  from 


nance  redistricting  the  city  into 
wards,  a  special  election  thereunder 
is  specifically  prohibited  by  the  re- 
vised statutes  of  Ohio;  and  hence, 
where  a  special  election  is  at- 
tempted to  be  held  for  the  selection 
of  members  of  the  council  under 
such  ordinance,  such  special  election 
is  inoperative,  and  persons  holding 
seats  in  the  council  by  virtue  of 
certificates  based  upon  such  special 
election  may  be  ousted  by  quo  war- 
ranto: State  V.  Kearns,  47  Ohio  St. 
566;  s.  c.  25  N.  E.  1027.  A  town 
was  incorporated  by  a  special  act, 
its  managers  to  consist  of  five  trus- 
tees, to  be  elected.  It  was  held  that 
a  subsequent  general  act,  repealing 
all  inconsistent  provisions  in  earlier 
acts,  and  fixing  a  day  for  the  election 
of  all  town  officers,  made  that  day 
the  day  on  which  the  five  trustees 
should  be  elected:  Kelly  v.  Gahn, 
112  111.  23.  Where  a  statute  provid- 
ing for  an  election  by  the  inhabit- 
ants within  the  boundaries  of  a 
proposed  municipal  corporation,  at 
which  the  question  of  incorporation 
shall  be  submitted  to  the  people, 
fails  to  provide  for  any  census  or 
enumeration  of  the  people  prelimi- 
nary to  such  proceedings,  a  failure 
to  make  such  enumeration  will  not 
affect  the  validity  of  the  election, 
where  the  board  of  county  commis- 
sioners make  a  record  in  their  pro- 
ceedings declaring  the  number  of 
inhabitants:  Smith  v.  Board  &c.,  45 
Fed.  725.     Testimony  of  the  village 


clerk  that  the  names  contained  in 
the  petition  for  the  election  repre- 
sented a  majority  of  the  taxpayers 
of  the  village,  as  contained  in  the 
last  assessment  roll,  is  sufficient 
proof  that  the  petitioners  repre- 
sented a  majority  of  the  taxpayers: 
People  V.  Bird,  55  Hun  (N.  Y.)  610; 
s.  c.  8  N.  Y.  S.  801.  The  laws  of 
Minnesota  of  1885,  as  amended  by 
laws  of  1887,  designating  the  second 
Tuesday  of  March  as  the  day  upon 
which  the  city  council  of  St.  Paul 
shall  elect  a  corporation "  attorney, 
absolutely  prohibit  an  election 
upon  a  day  antecedent  to  that  speci- 
fied: State  V.  Murray,  41  Minn.  123; 
s.  c.  42  N.  W.  858. 

"  State  V.  Council  &c.,  47  N.  J.  L. 
64;  s.  c.  54  Am.  R.  117.  The  laws 
of  the  state  of  Michigan,  1887,  No. 
208,  providing  for  the  correction  of 
frauds  and  mistakes  in  the  canvass 
and  returns  made  by  inspectors  of 
elections,  does  not  apply  in  the  case 
of  elections  for  aldermen  for  the 
city  of  Detroit;  and  an  application 
for  an  investigation  of  the  returns 
of  such  election  should  be  made  to 
the  board  of  aldermen:  the  city 
charter,  as  amended  in  1887,  provid- 
ing that  the  board  of  aldermen  shall 
be  the  judges  of  the  election  and 
qualifications  of  its  own  members, 
and  shall  have  power  to  determine 
contested  elections  to  said  board: 
Naumann  v.  Board  &c.,  73  Mich. 
252;  s.  c.  41N.  W.  267. 


157 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS. 


154 


exercising  the  functions  of  the  office.^^  When  once  the  polls  are  closed 
in  accordance  with  the  law  they  can  not  be  legally  reopened  and  votes 
received.^ ^  The  mere  fact  that  the  number  of  officers  to  be  elected 
to  fill  vacancies  was  not  determined  prior  to  the  election  does  not 
make  the  election  void.^*     Where  the  charter  provides  that  the  board 


^=Huels  V.  Hahn,  75  Wis.  468;  s. 
c.  44  N.  W.  507. 

i^The  Virginia  code  of  1887,  §  5, 
subd.  16,  provides  that  the  word 
"city"  shall  be  construed  to  mean  a 
town  containing  a  population  of  five 
thousand  or  more,  and  having  a  cor- 
poration or  hustings  court.  It  was 
held  that  §  1016,  providing  that  of- 
ficers provided  for  in  the  "charter 
of  the  several  cities  shall  be  elected 
or  appointed-  as  the  charters  may 
prescribe:  provided,  that  the  coun- 
cilmen  ...  of  each  ward  of  a 
city  shall  be  chosen  by  the  qualified 
voters  of  such  ward,"  does  not  apply 
to  a  town  which  has  less  than  five 
thousand  population,  and  no  corpo- 
ration or  hustings  court:  Roche  v. 
Jones,  87  Va.  484;  s.  c.  12  S.  E.  965. 
The  act  of  Pennsylvania,  passed 
March  20,  1862,  provided  for  the 
election  of  six  supervisors  by  the 
qualified  voters  of  Hempfield  town- 
ship at  the  first  succeeding  election, 
and  made  it  the  duty  of  such  super- 
visors to  then  divide  the  township 
into  six  districts,  giving  each  dis- 
trict a  supervisor.  The  court  de- 
cided that  this  act  repealed  by  im- 
plication the  act  of  February  26, 
1853,  authorizing  the  election  of  one 
supervisor  each  by  two  particular 
districts,  and  of  two  by  the  third; 
and  that  each  district  of  the  town- 
ship was  entitled  to  one  supervisor, 
who  was  to  be  elected,  however,  by 
the  voters  of  the  whole  township: 
Martz  V.  Long,  110  Pa.  St.  502;  s.  c. 
sub  nom.  In  re  Martz's  Election,  1 
Atl.  419. 

"  An  election  of  five  town  council- 
men  of  North  Providence,  R.  I.,  un- 
der Pub.  St.  R.  I.,  ch.  37,  §  1,  provid- 
ing   that    there    shall    be    annually 


elected  in  each  town  not  less  than 
three  nor  more  than  seven  council- 
men,  is  not  void  by  reason  of  the 
voters'  failing  to  determine,  in  ad- 
vance of  the  election  at  the  annual 
meeting,  the  precise  number  to  be 
elected,  as  required  by  §  6;  the  num- 
ber of  five  having  been  fixed  upon  in 
1874,  and  that  number  having  ever 
since  remained  unchanged,  but  no 
formal  vote  on  the  point  having 
been  taken  except  in  1875,  1878  and 
1882,  the  number  being  considered 
as  having  been  fixed  by  common  ac- 
quiescence or  consent:  State  v.  An- 
drews, 15  R.  I.  394;  s.  c.  6  Atl.  596. 
Where  the  vacancy  in  the  office  of 
township  supervisor,  caused  by  res- 
ignation, has  not  been  filled  by  ap- 
pointment, as  prescribed  by  Comp. 
St.  Neb.,  ch.  26,  §  103,  (1)  by  the 
town  board;  (2)  where  the  offices 
of  the  town  board  are  all  vacant,  by 
the  township  clerk;  (3)  where  there 
be  no  township  clerk,  by  the  county 
clerk, — the  same  may  be  filled  by 
election  at  a  special  town  meeting, 
when  properly  convened,  under 
Comp.  St.  Neb.,  ch.  18,  providing 
that  electors  at  special  town  meet- 
ings, when  properly  convened,  shall 
have  power  to  fill  vacancies  in  any 
of  the  town  offices  when  the  same 
shall  not  have  already  been  filled  by 
appointment:  State  v.  Taylor,  26 
Neb.  580;  s.  c.  42  N.  W.  729.  The 
acts  of  Virginia,  1883-4,  §  12,  amend- 
ing the  charter  of  the  city  of  Ports- 
mouth, and  providing  that  the  city 
council  shall  judge  by  a  majority 
vote  of  the  qualifications  of  its 
members,  has  application  only 
where  a  seat  is  contested:  Jobson  v. 
Bridges,  84  Va.  298;  s.  c.  5  S.  E.  529. 


» 


155  OFFICERS    AND   AGENTS.  §    158 

of  aldermen  shall  be  the  final  judge  of  the  election  and  qualification 
of  its  members,  the  election  contest  can  not  be  tried  by  any  other 
tribunal.^''' 

§  158.  Validity  of  election — General  principles. — In  Judge  Coo- 
ley's  admirable  work  on  Constitutional  Limitations  it  is  said  that 
it  is  a  little  dillicult  at  times  to  adopt  the  true  mean  between  those 
things  which  should,  and  those  which  should  not,  defeat  an  election ; 
for  while,  on  the  one  hand,  the  laws  should  seek  to  secure  the  due 
expression  of  his  will  by  every  legal  voter,  and  guard  against  any 
irregularities  or  misconduct  that  may  tend  to  prevent  it,  so,  on  the 
other  hand,  it  is  to  be  borne  in  mind  that  charges  of  irregularity  or 
misconduct  are  easily  made,  and  that  the  danger  from  throwing  elec- 
tions open  to  be  set  aside  or  controlled  by  oral  evidence  is  perhaps 
as  great  as  any  in  our  system.  An  election  honestly  conducted  under 
the  forms  of  law  ought  generally  to  stand,  notwithstanding  the  in- 
dividual electors  may  have  been  deprived  of  their  votes,  or  unquali- 
fied voters  allowed  to  participate.^*^  The  admission  of  illegal  votes 
at  an  election  will  not  necessarily  defeat  it,  but  to  warrant  its  being 
set  aside  on  that  ground  it  should  appear  that  the  result  would  have 
been  different  had  they  been  excluded.^^ 

§  159.  The  same  subject  continued — Illustrations. — An  erroneous 
recital  in  the  proclamation  of  a  clause  as  part  of  the  act,  which  clause 
was  stricken  out  before  the  passage  of  the  act,  will  not  invalidate 
the  election,  the  date  and  title  of  the  act  being  properly  given,  and 
it  not  appearing  that  the  result  of  the  election  was  in  any  way  affected 

»=Cate  V.  Martin,  69  N.  H.  610;  s.  Ark.    549.     In    England    candidates 

c.  45  Atl.  644;  People  v.  Hanshaw,  60  are  nominated  and  known  prior  to 

Mich.  200;  s.  c.  26  N.  W.  879;  1  Am.  election  day,  and  the  system  of  vot- 

St.  498.  ing  was  known  as  open  voting,  and 

^^  Cooley  Const.  Lim.  (6th  ed.),  ch.  some  cases  there  favor  the  proposi- 

17,  p.  785.  See  also,  People  v.  Village  tion  that  votes  which  were  cast  for 

of  Highland  Park,  88  Mich.  653;   s.  a  disqualified  person  are  not  good, 

c.  50  N.  W.  660.  and  the  other  candidate  is  elected: 

"Inhabitants   &c.    v.    Stearns,    21  Reg.  v.  Ledgard,  8  Ad.  &  El.   535; 

Pick.    (Mass.)    148;    Trustees  &c.  v.  Rawlinson  Corp.  (5th  ed.)  64,  note; 

Gibbs,  2  Cush.  (Mass.)  39;  Ex  parte  Reg.  v.  Councillors  of  Derby,  7  Ad. 

Murphy,  7  Cow.    (N.  Y.)    153;    Jud-  &  El.  419;   Reg.  v.  Hiorns,  7  Ad.  & 

kins  V.  Hill,  50  N.  H.  140;    State  v.  El.  960.     But  if  the  voter  is  ignorant 

Rogers,  86  N.  C.  357;  Shields  v.  Mc-  of    his    candidate's    disqualification, 

Gregor,  91  Mo.  534;  s.  c.  4  S.  W.  266;  the  vote  is  counted  in  determining 

People  V.  Cicotte,  16  Mich.  283;  Tar-  whether  an  opposing  candidate  has 

box  V.  Sughrue,  36  Kan.  225;  s.  c.  12  a  majority:  Reg.  v.  Mayor  &c.,  L.  R. 

Pac.    935;    Swepston    v.    Barton,    39  3  Q.  B.  629. 


159 


PUBLIC    CORrOEATlONS. 


156 


by  the  error,^*  Although  the  statute  requires  that  notice  shall  state 
the  number  of  inhabitants  within  the  boundaries  of  the  proposed 
corporation  as  ascertained  by  the  board  of  commissioners,  a  failure 
to  do  so  is  a  mere  irregularity,  which  can  not  prejudice  a  non-resident 
property-owner  and  will  not  affect  the  validity  of  the  election.^'' 
Where  the  statute  provides  for  the  calling  of  an  election  of  officers 


1*  In  re  Cleveland,  51  N.  J.  L.  319; 
s.  c.  18  Atl.  67.  The  New  York  laws 
of  1871,  creating  the  board  of  water 
commissioners  of  the  village  of  Dun- 
kirk, and  granting  them  specific 
powers,  creates  a  new  office  within 
the  meaning  of  the  constitution  of 
New  York,  art.  10,  §  2,  which  pro- 
vides that  all  city,  town  and  village 
officers  for  whose  election  or  ap- 
pointment the  constitution  makes  no 
provision,  shall  be  elected  by  the 
city,  etc.,  or  some  authority  thereof, 
and  all  other  officers  for  whose  elec- 
tion or  appointment  the  constitu- 
tion makes  no  provision,  and  all 
officers  whose  offices  shall  there- 
after be  created  by  law,  shall 
be  elected  by  the  people  or 
appointed  in  such  manner  as  the 
legislature  may  direct,  and  is  not 
unconstitutional  because  it  names 
the  persons  who  are  to  constitute 
the  commission:  Hequembourg  v. 
City  of  Dunkirk,  2  N.  Y.  S.  447.  Un- 
der the  laws  of  Pennsylvania  of 
1874,  §  208,  providing  that  cases  of 
contested  elections  of  the  fourth 
class  (embracing  municipal  council- 
men)  shall  be  tried  and  determined 
by  the  court  of  quarter  sessions,  and 
laws  of  Pennsylvania  of  1887,  p. 
204,  providing  that  "each  branch  of 
councils  shall  judge  of  the  qualifica- 
tions of  its  members,  and  contested 
elections  shall  be  determined  by  the 
courts  of  law,"  the  court  of  quarter 
sessions  has  no  jurisdiction  to  pass 
upon  the  qualification  of  a  council- 
man, but  only  upon  the  regularity 
of  the  election:  Auchenbach  v.  Sei- 
bert,  120  Pa.  St.  159;  s.  c.  13  Atl. 
558.     The  charter  of  the  city  of  A., 


§  22  (Sess.  Acts  Oreg.  1889,  p.  240), 
provides  that  the  council  shall  be 
the  judge  of  the  qualifications  of  its 
members,  and,  in  case  of  a  contest 
between  two  persons  claiming  to 
have  been  elected  thereto,  must  de- 
termine the  same,  subject  to  the  re- 
view of  any  court  of  competent  jur- 
isdiction. The  court  decided  that 
this  is  not  exclusive  of  the  jurisdic- 
tion of  the  circuit  courts,  under  the 
general  statutes  of  the  state,  to  de- 
termine such  contests  in  the  first 
instance:  State  v.  Kraft,  18  Or.  550; 
s.  c.  23  Pac.  663.  See  also,  State  v. 
Muggins,  Harp.  L.  (S.  C.)  94;  State 
V.  Deliesseline,  1  McC.  (S.  C.)  52; 
Grier  v.  Shackleford,  3  Brev.  (S.  C.) 
491;  State  v.  Cockrell,  2  Rich.  L. 
(S.  C.)  6. 

"  Smith  V.  Board  &c.,  45  Fed.  725. 
The  laws  of  New  Hampshire  provide 
that  "city  councils  shall  have  power 
to  provide  for  the  appointment  or 
election  of  all  necessary  officers  for 
the  good  government  of  the  city, 
not  otherwise  provided  for."  It  was 
decided  that  a  city  council  has  no 
right  to  determine  when  a  board  of 
assessors  shall  exercise  their  power 
to  choose  one  of  their  number  as 
clerk  of  the  board:  Weeks  v.  Den- 
nett, 62  N.  H.  2;  holding  also,  that 
a  notice  of  an  election  to  determine 
the  question  of  incorporation,  signed 
by  the  county  auditor,  who  is  ex 
officio  clerk  of  the  board  of  commis- 
sioners, and  in  which  it  appears 
that  the  election  was  ordered  by  the 
board,  is  a  sufficient  compliance 
with  the  provision  of  the  statute 
that  such  notice  shall  be  given  by 
the  board  of  commissioners. 


157 


OFFICEUS    AM)    A(!I:NTS. 


IGO 


upon  a  petition  signed  by  a  majority  of  the  electors  voting  at  the  last 
general  election  then  next  preceding,  as  appears  from  the  poll-list, 
the  petition  must  be  signed  by  a  majority  of  the  electors  appearing 
on  the  poll-list.^°  An  election  at  a  time  not  fixed  for  such  pui-pose 
by  the  law  is  void,  and  a  person  previously  appointed  to  fill  the 
vacancy  will  hold  over  under  the  appointment,  though  voted  for  and 
declared  elected  at  the  illegal  election.-^  But  where  no  time  for 
election  of  officers  is  fixed  by  law  the  mayor  and  council  may  do  so."^ 
A  town  does  not  lose  its  corporate  existence  by  a  failure  to  elect 
officers.^^ 

§  160.  English  rule  as  to  majority. — Although  it  is  clear  that,  in 
the  absence  of  any  special  provision  to  the  contrary,  the  corporate 
body  are  bound  by  the  acts  not  only  of  the  major  part  of  them,  but 
by  the  major  part  of  those  who  are  present  at  a  regularly  convened 
corporate  meeting,  yet  where  the  corporate  body  consists  of  a  definite 
number,  and  it  is  provided  that  an  act  shall  be  done  by  the  body 
for  the  time  being,  or  a  major  part  of  them,  a  majority  of  the  whole 
must  meet  for  the  purpose;  and  if  the  body  be  so  reduced  that 
a  majority  of  the  whole  definite  number  no  longer  remains,  the  act 
can  not  be  done  unless  permitted  by  the  charter  or  by  usage.^* 


=°Bush  v.  State,  100  Wis.  549;  s. 
c.  76  N.  W.  606. 

^^  Lyman  v.  Commonwealth  (Ky.), 
55  S.  W.  686;  State  v.  Winter,  148 
Ind.  177;  s.  c.  47  N.  E.  462;  Sibbald 
V.  Buekell  (N.  J.),  36  Atl.  1032. 

"  State  v.  Hoff  (Tex.  Civ.  App),  29 
S.  W.  672. 

'^  State  v.  Hoff  (Tex.  Civ.  App),  29 
S.  W.  672. 

-*Rex  v.  Hoyte,  6  T.  R.  430;  Rex 
V,  Bellringer,  4  T.  R.  810,  and  the 
cases  there  cited.  But  a  majority 
of  those  present,  when  legally  as- 
sembled, will  bind  the  rest:  Rex  v. 
Miller,  6  T.  R.  268.  See  also.  Rex  v. 
Monday,  Cowper  530,  538;  Rex  v. 
Devonshire,  1  B.  &  C.  609;  Rex  v. 
Bower,  1  B.  &  C.  492.  See  further,  as 
to  plurality  and  majority  rule  at  pop- 
ular elections,  the  chapter  on  Meet- 
ings and  Elections,  post,  and  the 
rules  governing  elections  by  definite 


bodies,  §§  164,  165,  post;  Rex  v.  May, 
4  B.  &  Ad.  843;  Rex  v.  Greet,  8  B.  & 
C.  363;  Rex  v.  Headley,  7  B.  &  C. 
496;  Cotton  v.  Davies,  1  Str.  53;  Old- 
know  v.  Wainwright,  2  Burr.  1017; 
s.  c.  1  W.  Bl.  229;  Reg.  v.  Overseers 
of  Christ  Church,  7  E.  &  B.  409. 
Where  an  election  of  four  council- 
ors had  taken  place  on  the  first  of 
November,  three  of  whom  were  to 
supply  ordinary  vacancies,  and  the 
fourth  an  extraordinary  vacancy, 
but  no  distinction  had  been  made 
between  them,  either  in  the  notice 
of  election,  the  voting  papers  or  in 
the  publishing  of  the  names  of  the 
four  persons  elected,  such  election 
was  held  to  be  irregular  and  void: 
Reg.  V.  Rowley,  3  Q.  B.  143;  s.  c.  in 
the  exchequer  chamber,  6  Q.  B.  668. 
See  also,  Reg.  v.  Rippon,  L.  R.  1  Q. 
B.  D.  217;  Reg.  v.  Mayor  &c.,  7  Ad. 
&  El.  963. 


§  161 


PUBLIC    COPtl'OlJATIONS. 


158 


§  161.  Election  by  ballot. — The  mode  of  voting  in  this  country, 
at  all  general  elections,  is  almost  universally  by  ballot.-'^  "A  ballot 
may  be  defined  to  be  a  piece  of  paper  or  other  suitable  material,  with 
the  name  written  or  printed  upon  it  of  the  person  to  be  voted  for; 
and  where  the  suffrages  are  given  in  this  form,  each  of  the  electors 
in  person  deposits  such  a  vote  in  the  box  or  other  receptacle  provided 
for  the  purpose  and  kept  by  the  proper  officers."^^ 


»Cooley  Const.  Lim.  (6th  ed.),  ch. 
17,  p.  760. 

=^Cush.  Leg.  Assemb.,  §  103.  "In 
this  country,  ancT  indeed  in  every 
country  where  officers  are  elective, 
different  modes  have  been  adopted 
for  the  electors  to  signify  their 
choice.  The  most  common  modes 
have  been  either  by  voting  viva  voce, 
— that  is,  by  the  elector  openly  nam- 
ing the  person  he  designates  for  the 
office, — or  by  ballot,  which  is  depos- 
iting in  a  box  provided  for  the  pur- 
pose a  paper  on  which  is  the  name 
of  the  person  he  intends  for  the  of- 
fice. The  principal  object  of  this 
last  mode  is  to  enable  the  elector  to 
express  his  opinion  secretly,  without 
being  subject  to  being  overawed  or 
to  any  ill  will  or  prosecution  on  ac- 
count of  his  vote  for  either  of  his 
candidates  who  may  be  before  the 
public.  The  method  of  voting  by 
tablets  in  Rome  was  an  example  of 
this  manner  of  voting.  There  cer- 
tain officers  appointed  for  that  pur- 
pose, called  "diribitores,"  delivered  to 
each  voter  as  many  tablets  as  there 
were  candidates,  one  of  whose  names 
was  written  upon  every  tablet. 
The  voter  put  into  a  chest  prepared 
for  that  purpose  which  of  these  tab- 
lets he  pleased,  and  they  were  after- 
wards taken  out  and  counted.  Cicero 
defines  tablets  to  be  little  billets,  in 
which  the  people  brought  their 
suffrages.  The  clause  in  the  con- 
stitution directing  the  election  of 
the  several  state  officers  was  un- 
doubtedly intended  to  provide  that 
the  election  should  be  made  by  this 
mode  of  voting  to  the  exclusion  of 


any  other.  In  this  mode  the  free- 
men can  individually  express  their 
choice  without  being  under  the  ne- 
cessity of  publicly  declaring  the  ob- 
ject of  their  choice;  their  collective 
voice  can  be  easily  ascertained,  and 
the  evidence  of  it  transmitted  to  the 
place  where  their  votes  are  to  be 
counted,  and  the  result  declared 
with  as  little  inconvenience  as  pos- 
sible: Temple  v.  Mead,  4  Vt.  535, 
541.  In  the  case  last  cited,  and  in 
Henshaw  v.  Poster,  9  Pick.  (Mass.) 
312,  it  was  held  that  a  printed  ballot 
complies  with  a  constitutional  pro- 
vision which  requires  all  ballots  for 
certain  state  officers  to  be  "fairly 
written."  Common  lines  on  ruled 
paper  do  not  render  the  election 
void:  People  v.  Kilduff,  15  111.  492. 
But  where  the  law  prohibits  "any 
device  or  mark"  by  which  a  ticket 
may  be  distinguished,  a  dotted  line 
under  the  title  of  an  office  for  which 
no  candidate  is  named  is  sufficient 
to  condemn  the  whole  ballot:  Steele 
V.  Calhoun,  61  Miss.  556.  See  also, 
Druliner  v.  State,  29  Ind.  308;  Mill- 
holland  v.  Bryant,  39  Ind.  363.  A 
different  method  from  the  one  usu- 
ally in  force  in  printing  the  names 
of  officers  will  not  make  the  ballot 
void:  Coffey  v.  Edmonds,  58  Cal. 
521;  Owens  v.  State,  64  Tex.  500. 
The  board  of  aldermen  having  no 
power  to  elect  except  by  ballot,  no 
action  by  them  ratifying  their 
previous  action  can  make  such  elec- 
tion valid:  Lawrence  v.  Ingersoll,  88 
Tenn.  52;  s.  c.  12  S.  W.  422.  A  pro- 
vision of  the  rules  of  the  council, 
that  officers  whose  salaries  are  pay- 


159 


OFFICERS    AXD   AGENTS. 


1G3 


§  162.    Election  by  city  council. — Under  the  laws  or  constitution 

of  some  states  the  council  or  city  government  has  the  power  to  elect 
officers  or  fill  vacancies  by  vote.^^     Where  city  ordinances  require 


able  from  the  city  treasury  shall  be 
elected  by  ballot,  applies  only  to 
elective  officers  to  be  chosen  by  the 
council  under  the  charter,  and  not 
to  subordinate  appointees  whose 
compensation  is  fixed  by  the  mayor 
and  aldermen:  Williams  v.  City  of 
Gloucester,  148  Mass.  256;  s.  c.  19  N. 
E.  348.  A  city  council  was  empow- 
ered to  appoint,  in  joint  convention, 
a  prosecuting  attorney.  No  mode 
was  prescribed,  and  there  was  no 
power  of  removal.  The  convention 
balloted,  and  A.  received  a  majority 
of  the  votes  cast.  It  was  held  that 
A.'s  title  to  the  office  was  not  af- 
fected by  the  fact  that  a  resolution 
declaring  him  elected  was  lost,  and 
that  a  resolution  declared  the  ballot 
void  by  reason  of  errors  which  did 
not  in  fact  exist,  and  that  another 
resolution  declared  another  person 
elected  (Park,  C.  J.,  dissenting): 
State  V.  Barbour,  53  Conn.  76;  s.  c. 
22  Atl.  686;  55  Am.  R.  65. 

^  Under  the  charter  of  the  city  of 
Knoxville,  the  board  of  mayor  and 
aldermen  is  composed  of  a  mayor 
and  nine  aldermen.  By  section  4 
the  mayor  can  not  vote,  except 
in  case  of  a  tie.  Section  5  pro- 
vides that  a  majority  of  the  board 
shall  form  a  quorum.  An  or- 
dinance provides  that  any  vacancy 
on  the  board  of  education  shall  be 
filled  by  an  election  by  the  mayor 
and  aldermen.  At  such  an  election 
eight  of  the  aldermen  and  the  mayor 
were  present.  Complainant  re- 
ceived four  voteSj  there  were  three 
scattering  votes  and  one  blank.  The 
mayor  did  not  vote,  but  declared 
complainant  elected.  It  was  held 
that  a  majority  of  the  eight  alder- 
men present  was  necessary  to  elect 
complainant,  and  the  blank  vote 
must  be  counted  to  show  that  he  did 


not  receive  such  majority.  Nor  was 
the  action  of  the  mayor,  in  declaring 
complainant  elected,  equivalent  to  a 
vote  for  him:  Lawrence  v.  Ingersoll, 
88  Tenn.  52;  s.  c.  12  S.  W.  422.  See 
this  case  cited  and  compared  with 
other  authorities  in  §§  164,  165,  post. 
An  election  ordered  by  officers  de 
facto  is  held  a  good  election:  State 
V.  Goowin,  69  Tex.  55;  s.  c.  5  S.  W. 
678.  A  common  council,  constituted 
as  it  will  be  when  a  term  of  office 
about  to  expire  shall  end,  and  hav- 
ing authority  to  appoint  the  succes- 
sor of  the  incumbent,  may  lawfully 
make  such  appointment  before  the 
expiration  of  the  current  term: 
Horan  v.  Lane,  53  N.  J.  L.  275;  s.  c. 
sub  nom.  State  v.  Lane,  21  Atl.  302, 
where  it  is  also  held  that  when  a 
statute  empowers  the  council  to  ap- 
point to  a  certain  office,  an  ordi- 
nance of  the  council  which.  If  en- 
forced against  succeeding  councils, 
would  defeat  or  materially  impair 
their  power  of  appointment,  is  void. 
Under  the  charter  of  the  city  of 
Hartford,  providing  that  the  com- 
mon council  should  appoint  a  prose- 
cuting attorney,  but  giving  no  direc- 
tion as  to  the  mode  of  appointment, 
the  council  met,  and  a  member 
moved  that  the  convention  proceed 
to  ballot  for  a  prosecuting  attorney, 
which  motion  prevailed.  A  ballot 
was  taken,  giving  relator  a  majority 
of  votes.  The  result  having  been 
announced,  another  member  offered 
a  resolution  declaring  relator 
elected,  which  was  lost.  Two  reso- 
lutions were  then  offered  and  passed, 
one  declaring  the  ballot  for  relator 
null  and  void  by  reason  of  errors  in 
the  same,  and  the  other  declaring 
defendant  elected  to  the  office.  It 
was  held  that  the  relator  was  elected 
when  the  result  of  the  first  ballot 


163 


PUBLIC    CORPOEATIONS. 


160 


that  its  city  solicitor  shall  be  chosen  by  a  concurrent  vote  of  both 
branches  of  the  city  council,  he  can  not  be  legally  chosen  unless  by 
a  concurrent  vote;  and  the  fact  that  the  record  untruly  states  that 
a  vote  was  in  concurrence,  when  it  also  states  facts  showing  that  it 
was  not,  does  not  show  a  valid  election.-^  Where,  by  the  city  charter, 
the  mayor  is  allowed  a  casting  vote  in  the  city  council,  in  accordance 
with  the  statute  of  Maine,  his  act  is  sufficiently  formal  for  that 
purpose  if  he  determines  and  declares  which  of  two  candidates  is 
elected,  although  he  may  not  go  through  the  formality  of  casting  a 
ballot.2o 


§  163.  Election  by  definite  bodies  generally — Majority  and  plu- 
rality.— When  an  election  is  to  be  made  by  a  definite  body  of  electors, 
as  by  a  board  of  aldermen  or  common  council,  the  authorities  are 
not  in  accord  as  to  whether  a  majority  is  requisite  to  elect  a  candidate 
or  whether  a  mere  plurality  is  sufficient.  On  the  one  hand  it  is 
asserted  by  the  supreme  court  of  Tennessee  to  be  "well  settled"  and 
"not  open  to  controversy"  that  in  such  cases  a  majority  is  necessary.^" 


was  announced,  there  being  no  error 
therein,  and  the  convention  had  no 
power  afterwards  to  deprive  him  of 
the  office  (Park,  C.  J.,  dissenting): 
State  V.  Barbour,  53  Conn.  76;  s.  c. 
22  Atl.  686;  55  Am.  R.  65.  The  elec- 
tion of  an  assessor  by  the  board  of 
aldermen  at  a  legal  meeting  can  not 
be  reconsidered  at  an  adjourned 
session,  and  another  person  elected 
in  his  place:  State  v.  Phillips,  79 
Maine  506;  s.  c.  11  Atl.  274. 

^  Saunders  v.  Lawrence,  141  Mass. 
380.  Since  the  Illinois  act  of  1875, 
providing  a  new  mode  for  the  assess- 
ment and  collection  of  taxes,  and  au- 
thorizing the  appointment  of  a  city 
tax  commissioner,  is  unconstitu- 
tional and  void,  an  ordinance,  under 
which  such  a  city  tax  commissioner 
was  elected,  is  void,  and  incapable 
of  conferring  any  rights  upon  him: 
McGrath  v.  City  of  Chicago,  24  111. 
App.  19.  A  common  council,  being 
the  sole  judges  of  the  election  of  its 
members,  may,  upon  a  contest  re- 
specting the  election  of  one  of  its 
members,  appoint  a  committee  to 
take   testimony,   and   to   report  the 


facts  and  the  evidence  to  the  coun- 
cil: Salmon  v.  Haynes,  50  N.  J.  L. 
97;  s.  c.  11  Atl.  151. 

^  Small  V.  Orne,  79  Maine  78;  s.  c. 
8  Atl.  152.  See  the  sections  on  Pre- 
siding Officers  in  the  chapter  on 
Public  Boards,  post.  The  charter 
of  the  city  of  Cohoes  provides  that 
"the  mayor  and  aldermen  of  the 
city  shall  constitute  the  common 
council  thereof,"  and  that  the  com- 
mon council  "shall  be  judge  of 
the  election  and  qualification  of  its 
own  members."  It  was  held  that 
the  common  council  was  not  the 
judge  of  the  election  of  mayor,  he 
not  being  one  of  their  "own"  mem- 
bers within  the  spirit  or  intent  of 
the  charter:  Garside  v.  City  of  Co- 
hoes, 12  N.  Y.  S.  192;  s.  c.  58  Hun 
(N.  Y.)  605.  Under  the  general  law 
of  Illinois  there  is  no  office  of  city 
marshal  in  the  absence  of  an  ordi- 
nance creating  it:  People  v.  Blair, 
82  111.  App.  570. 

^^  Lawrence  v.  Ingersoll,  88  Tenn. 
52;  s.  c.  12  S.  W.  422;  6  L.  R.  A.  308; 
17  Am.  St.  870;  citing  Dillon  Munic. 
Corp.,    §    282    (wherein    the   author 


161 


OFFICEKS    A\D   AGENTS. 


§  IG-i 


On  the  other  hand,  it  was  held  by  the  supreme  court  of  Michigan 
in  a  recent  case  that  "in  this  country  it  is  generally  understood  that, 
in  the  absence  of  any  statutory  provision  expressly  requiring  more, 
a  plurality  of  the  votes  cast  will  elect.  It  is  only  in  cases  where  the 
statute  so  provides  that  a  majority  of  all  the  votes  cast  is  necessary 
to  the  choice  of  an  officer."^^  This  is  the  only  case,  so  far  as  the 
author's  examination  has  enabled  him  to  discover,  where  it  has  been 
distinctly  decided  that  a  candidate  may  be  chosen  by  a  definite  body 
without  receiving  more  votes  than  all  of  his  competitors  combined. 

§  164.  The  same  subject  continued — Quorum  majority. — Assum- 
ing that  a  majority  is  necessary  to  elect,  shall  it  be  (1)  a  majority 
of  those  present — provided  they  constitute  a  quorum,  (3)  a  majority 
of  the  quorum  voting,  or  (3)  simply  a  majority  of  those,  however 
few,  who  vote  ?  According  to  the  Tennessee  case  cited  in  the  preceding 
section,  a  majority  of  those  who  are  present  must  concur  to  do  any 
valid  act,  including  the  election  of  officers. ^^  In  respect  to  the  second 
and  third  questions,  some  of  the  courts  draw  a  distinction  between 
elections  and  ordinary  business  of  the  board.^^     And  the  rule  requir- 


says  a  majority  must  concur  to  do 
any  valid  act),  and  6  Am.  &  Eng. 
Encyc.  of  Law  331.  Turney,  C.  J., 
dissented.  He  does  not  affirm,  how- 
ever, ttiat  a  plurality  is  sufficient, 
but  differs  from  the  majority  of  the 
court  on  another  ground,  to  be  no- 
ticed in  the  following  section.  Al- 
though the  court  deemed  this  to  be 
the  settled  common-law  rule,  the  in- 
trinsic value  of  the  case  is  seriously 
impaired  by  the  fact  that  the  char- 
ter provided  for  the  transaction  of 
business  only  by  a  majority  of  a 
quorum,  and  gave  the  mayor  a  right 
to  vote  when  a  majority  thereof 
could  not  decide,  "thereby  conclu- 
sively showing,"  said  the  court, 
"that  a  majority  must  concur  or 
there  is  no  result:"    Idem,  p.  62. 

"Conrad  v.  Stone,  78  Mich.  635, 
639;  s.  c.  44  N.  W.  333.  In  this  case 
there  were  three  candidates,  and,  of 
a  board  of  sixteen  members  present, 
eight  voted  for  one,  seven  for  an- 
other, and  one  for  the  third.  The 
first  was  declared  elected. 
1  Smith — 11 


'^Lawrence  v.  Ingersoll,  88  Tenn. 
52;  s.  c.  12  S.  W.  422;  6  L.  R.  A.  308; 
17  Am.  St.  870,  where  a  blank  ballot 
was  not  counted  as  a  vote,  Turney, 
C.  J.,  dissenting.  The  court  quotes 
from  Dillon  Munic.  Corp.,  §  217,  in 
support  of  its  conclusion;  and  the 
same  section  is  also  quoted  in  Rush- 
ville  Gas  Co.  v.  City  of  Rushville, 
121  Ind.  206,  210;  s.  c.  23  N.  E.  72;  6 
L.  R.  A.  315;  16  Am.  St.  388,  to  sus- 
tain exactly  the  opposite  contention. 
The  latter  case  related  to  business 
of  the  body,  not  an  election,  and  is 
cited  with  other  authorities  in  the 
chapter  on  Public  Boards,  post. 

=^  State  V.  Green,  37  Ohio  St.  227; 
Launtz  v.  People,  113  111.  137,  143; 
Oldknow  V.  Wainwright  (or  Rex  v. 
Foxcraft),  2  Burr.  1017;  Gosling  v. 
Veley,  4  H.  L.  Cas.  679.  These  cases 
decide  that  if  a  quorum  be  present 
the  majority  can  not  defeat  an  elec- 
tion by  refraining  from  voting,  al- 
though they  might  by  such  conduct 
block  the  business  proceedings  of  a 
meeting. 


165 


PUBLIC    CORrORATIONS. 


162 


ing  only  a  majority  of  those  actually  voting  for  a  candidate  is  de- 
clared by  a  decided  preponderance  of  authority.^*  Those  who  refrain 
from  voting  are  conclusively  presumed  to  acquiesce  in  the  action  of 
those  who  do,  and  even  an  express  protest  on  the  ground  that  a  quo- 
rum has  not  voted  is  unavailing.^^ 

§  165.  Informal  ballot. — An  interesting  point  regarding  an  "in- 
formal ballot,"  so  called,  was  determined  in  a  recent  case  by  the 
supreme  court  of  Michigan.  A  statute  provided  for  the  election  by 
ballot  of  a  school  examiner  on  a  certain  day  by  the  chairman  of  the 
board  of  school  inspectors.  At  a  meeting  convened  for  that  purpose 
five  informal  ballots  were  taken,  with  the  same  result,  and  at  a  sub- 
sequent meeting  on  the  same  day  a  candidate  was  formally  elected. 
It  was  decided  that  the  person  who  had  a  plurality  on  the  informal 
ballots  was  duly  chosen.  The  court  said:  "When  the  law  requires 
certain  persons  to  be  elected  by  ballot,  there  is  and  can  be  no  such 
thing  as  an  'informal  ballot.'  All  ballots  cast  under  statutory  re- 
quirements are  formal  and  final  if  there  is  an  election,  and  can  not 
be  repeated.  Informal  ballots  are  sometimes  taken  in  a  caucus  or 
in  a  nominating  convention,  but  they  have  no  place  in  an  election 
required  by  law  for  the  election  of  officers."^^ 


^Launtz  v.  People,  113  111.  137, 
143  (extending  the  rule  to  a  vote  on 
the  approval  of  the  bond  of  the  offi- 
cer thus  elected) ;  Booker  v.  Young, 
12  Gratt.  (Va.)  303  (private  corpo- 
ration); Attorney-General  v.  Shep- 
ard,  62  N.  H.  383  (where  it  was  held 
not  necessary  for  a  quorum  to  vote 
in  any  case).  See  also,  cases  cited  in 
preceding  note,  and  Rushville  Gas 
Co.  V.  City  of  Rushville,  121  Ind. 
206,  210;  s.  c.  23  N.  E.  72;  16  Am. 
St.  388;  6  L.  R.  A.  315.  State  v. 
Dillon,  125  Ind.  65;  s.  c.  25  N.  E. 
136,  holds  that  if  a  candidate  re- 
ceives a  majority  of  those  voting, 
which  is  less  than  a  majority  of 
those  present,  but  is  a  majority  of 
the  number  necessary  to  constitute  a 
quorum,  it  is  sufficient.  -  -  -  It  is 
competent  for  a  council  to  adopt  a 
rule  that  a  majority  of  those  elect- 
ed, and  voting,  may  choose  a  candi- 
date: Morton  v.  Youngerman,  89 
Ky.  505;  s.  c.  12  S.  W.  944. 


« Gosling  V.  Veley,  4  H.  L.  Cas. 
679;  Willcock  Munic.  Corp.,  §  546; 
State  V.  Green,  37  Ohio  St.  227.  In 
Conrad  v.  Stone,  78  Mich.  635;  s.  c. 
44  N.  W.  333,  it  is  stated  as  a  gen- 
eral rule  that  a  plurality  suffices  to 
elect.  In  the  cases  cited  in  the  pre- 
ceding note,  a  majority  of  those  vot- 
ing, though  less  than  a  quorum,  sat- 
isfies the  law.  All  actually  voted  in 
the  former  case,  and  in  none  of  the 
latter  cases  were  there  more  than 
two  candidates  competing.  Suppose 
there  are  three  or  more  candidates — 
Quaere:  May  a  plurality  (that  is,  less 
than  a  majority)  of  less  than  a 
quorum  of  votes  elect,  a  quorum  be- 
ing present? 

^"Conrad  v.  Stone,  78  Mich.  635;  s. 
c.  44  N.  W.  333,  holding  also  that  it 
was  not  necessary  for  the  chairman 
to  declare  the  candidate  elected;  on 
which  point  see  also.  State  v.  Bar- 
bour, 53  Conn.  76;  s.  c.  22  Atl.  686; 
55  Am.  R.  65. 


163 


OFFICERS    AND    AGENTS. 


1G6 


§  166.  Tenure  of  office. — The  term  of  office  for  which  an  officer 
is  elected  to  serve  is,  as  a  general  rule,  fixed  by  the  ordinance  or 
law  under  which  he  is  elected  or  appointed.^^     Where  a  statute  pro- 


"  The  New  York  City  consolida- 
tion act  of  1882  says  that  clerks  of 
the  district  courts  "shall  hold  office 
for  the  term  of  six  years  from  the 
date  of  appointment."  It  was  held 
to  include  the  case  of  a  clerk  ap- 
pointed to  fill  a  vacancy  caused  by 
the  resignation  of  a  clerk  during  his 
six  years:  People  v.  Breen,  53  N.  Y. 
Super.  167  (Truax,  J.,  dissenting). 
The  revised  statutes  of  Ohio,  re- 
lating to  municipal  corporations, 
provide  that  members  of  the  council 
in  office  shall,  unless  a  vacancy  soon- 
er occurs,  serve  until  the  end  of 
their  respective  terms.  Section  8  pro- 
vides that  any  person  holding  an  of- 
fice or  public  trust  shall  continue 
therein  until  his  successor  is  elected, 
or  appointed,  and  qualified.  It  was 
decided  that  members  of  the  coun- 
cil were  entitled  to  hold  over  under 
this  section:  State  v.  Kearns,  47 
Ohio  St.  566;  s.  c.  25  N.  E.  1027.  The 
New  Jersey  statute  of  1886,  by 
which  the  term  of  office  of  the  mem- 
bers of  the  city  council,  etc.,  is  made 
three  years,  does  not  apply  to  the 
alderman  of  Atlantic  City,  who  is  ex 
officio  a  member  of  the  common 
council,  and  elected  annually:  State 
V.  Gouldey,  52  N.  J.  L.  62;  s.  c.  18 
Atl.  695.  See  also,  State  v.  Haynes, 
50  N.  J.  L.  97;  s.  c.  11  Atl.  151;  Job- 
son  V.  Bridges,  84  Va.  298;  s.  c.  5  S. 
E.  529.  The  Michigan  statute  of 
1889,  entitled  "An  act  to  amend  §  4 
of  Act  No.  282  of  the  local  acts  of 
1877,  entitled  'An  act  to  revise  the 
charter  of  the  city  of  Grand  Rap- 
ids,' "  provides  "that  the  elective  of- 
ficers now  holding  ofllce  within  that 
part  of  the  said  city  comprised  of 
the  third,  eighth,  ninth  and  tenth 
wards,  as  created  by  this  act,  shall 
continue  to  hold  the  oflSces  for  which 
they  were  respectively  elected,  and 


to  discharge  the  duties  of  said  of- 
fices for  the  whole  of  the  territory 
for  which  they  were  elected  until 
the  officers  are  duly  elected  and 
qualified,  as  provided  by  the  city 
charter  at  the  annual  charter  elec- 
tion on  the  first  Monday  of  April,  A. 
D.  1890,  and  after  said  date  the  sev- 
eral aldermen  whose  terms  of  office 
shall  not  have  expired  shall  only  rep- 
resent the  territory  within  the  ward 
in  which  they  shall  then  respective- 
ly reside,  and  at  said  annual  charter 
election  in  1890  aldermen  and  other 
ward  officers  shall  be  elected  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  provisions  of  the 
charter  of  said  city  and  the  require- 
ments of  this  act."  It  was  decided 
that  the  provision  for  the  aldermen 
to  continue  in  the  office  to  which 
they  were  elected,  in  the  wards  in 
which  they  reside,  until  such  se- 
lected term  expires,  is  not  an  ap- 
pointment of  city  officers  by  the  leg- 
islature, and  that  sufficient  provi- 
sion is  made  for  the  election  of  al- 
dermen in  the  new  wards:  Stow  v. 
Common  Council,  79  Mich.  595;  s.  c. 
44  N.  W.  1047.  A  superintendent  is 
not  rendered  an  agent  of  the  city  by 
an  ordinance  which  provides  that 
"he  shall  continue  in  office  until  re- 
moval, or  until  a  successor  be  chos- 
en:" Prince  v.  City  of  Lynn,  149 
Mass.  193;  s.  c.  21  N.  E.  296.  One 
elected  under  a  statute  which  fixes 
the  term  of  office  at  a  longer  period 
than  the  constitution  allows  can  not 
exercise  the  duties  of  such  office  for 
any  period:  State  v.  Alter,  5  Ohio  C. 
C.  253.  When  the  term  of  an  officer 
is  not  fixed  by  law  an  appointment 
for  a  specified  time  is  a  contract 
when  accepted:  Hardy  v.  City  of 
Orange,  61  N.  J.  L.  620;  s.  c.  42  Atl. 
581;  Chase  v.  City  of  Lowell,  7  Gray 
(Mass.)  33;  Horan  v.  Board  &c.,  58 


§  166 


PUBLIC    COKPORATIOXS, 


1C4 


vides  that,  before  the  election  of  town  councilmen,  the  number  to 
be  elected  shall  be  determined,  an  informal  acceptance  of  five  as  the 
number  to  serve,  accepted  by  common  consent  through  several  years, 
will  be  deemed  as  valid  a  determination  of  the  number  of  councilmen 
to  serve  in  that  capacity  as  a  decision  by  formal  vote  of  the  electors.^^ 
The  constitution  of  Colorado  provides  that  every  person  holding  a 
civil  otBce  in  a  municipality  shall,  unless  removed  according  to  law, 
exercise  the  duties  of  such  office  until  his  successor  is  duly  qualified. 
It  was  held  that  where  a  candidate  for  mayor  is  by  the  proper  can- 
vassing board  declared  elected,  files  his  oath  and  enters  upon  the 
discharge  of  his  official  duties,  the  outgoing  mayor  vacating  the 
office  without  objection,  the  court  may,  on  the  election  being  con- 
tested and  adjudged  illegal,  order  him  to  yield  the   office  to  the 


N.  J.  L.  533;  s.  c.  33  Atl.  944.  Where 
policemen  may  be  appointed  for  a 
probationary  term  it  does  not  apply 
to  the  chief  of  police:  State  v.  Val- 
lins,  140  Mo.  523;  s.  c.  41  S.  W.  887. 
As  to  appointment  of  auditors  by 
comptroller  under  Greater  New 
York  charter,  see  McDonald  v.  City 
of  New  York,  59  N.  Y.  S.  16;  s.  c. 
42  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  263. 

^^  Metcalf  v.  Andrews  (R.  I.) ,  7  Atl. 
4.  In  this  case  a  city  charter  pro- 
vided that  certain  officers,  including 
the  city  treasurer,  should  be  ap- 
pointed by  the  common  council,  to 
continue  in  office  until  the  office 
should  be  declared  vacant^  or  an- 
other person  should  be  appointed  to 
succeed  him,  and  that  the  city 
treasurer  should,  before  entering  on 
his  duties,  give  bond  with  sureties 
for  the  faithful  performance  of  his 
duties.  S.  was  appointed  treasurer 
in  January,  1867,  and  continued 
in  office  until  January,  1875.  He 
gave  bond,  with  sureties,  in  con- 
formity with  the  city  charter.  In 
an  action  on  the  bond,  the  sure- 
ties pleaded  that,  by  the  rules  and 
usages  of  the  common  council,  all 
the  officers  appointed  by  it,  includ- 
ing the  city  treasurer,  were  ap- 
pointed for  one  year,  subject  to 
removal  at  pleasure,  and,  when 
not  reappointed  at  the  expiration  of 


the  term,  were  suffered  to  hold  over 
at  pleasure;  and  that  they  executed 
the  bond  with  a  knowledge  of  the 
said  rules  and  usages  of  the  com- 
mon council^  and  on  assurances, 
made  by  the  common  council  and 
the  plaintiffs,  that  they  would  be 
bound  as  such  only  for  the  term  of 
one  year.  The  court  held  that  the 
provisions  of  the  charter  as  to  the 
mode  of  appointment  and  term  of 
office  must  be  strictly  followed,  and 
this  plea  presented  no  defense:  City 
of  Newark  v.  Stout,  52  N.  J.  L.  35; 
s.  c.  18  Atl.  943.  Incumbents  super- 
seded by  councilmen  elected  under 
or  by  virtue  of  void  proceedings  are 
entitled  to  be  restored  by  due  proc- 
ess of  law;  but  the  legal  organiza- 
tion of  the  city,  and  the  acts  of  the 
councilmen  de  facto,  within  the  pur- 
view of  the  statutes,  will  be  recog- 
nized and  upheld:  State  v.  Gray,  23 
Neb.  365;  s.  c.  36  N.  W.  577.  Per- 
sons who  are  acting  as  town  officers 
under  an  incorporation  which  is 
void  because  of  a  pre-existing  valid 
charter  will  be  ousted  on  proceed- 
ings in  quo  warranto,  when  the 
boundaries  of  the  districts  from 
which  they  were  elected  are  not  co- 
terminous with  those  prescribed  in 
the  original  charter:  Harness  v. 
State,  76  Tex.  566;  s.  c.  13  S.  W.  535. 


165 


OFFICERS   AND    AGENTS. 


167 


president  of  the  board  of  supervisors;  since  a  Colorado  statute  pro- 
vides that  in  case  of  a  vacancy  in  the  office  of  mayor  the  president 
of  the  board  of  supervisors  shall  act.^" 

§  167.  Tenure  of  office  where  city  passes  from  one  class  to  an- 
other.— When,  under  a  statute,  cities  are  divided  into  classes,  and  no 
provision  is  made  by  the  statute  for  the  election  of  new  officers,  the 
officers  in  office  at  the  time  of  the  passing  of  the  statute  remain  in 
office  until  new  officers  are  elected  and  qualified.*" 


^"  Londoner  V.  People,  15  Colo.  557; 
s.  c.  26  Pac.  135.  Brooklyn  city 
charter  1888,  tit.  3,  §  4,  provides 
that  persons  appointed  to  certain 
city  offices  "shall  severally  execute 
a  bond  to  the  corporation  in  such 
penalty  and  with  such  sureties  as 
the  common  council  may  require, 
conditioned  for  the  faithful  per- 
formance of  their  respective  duties. 
.  .  .  Such  sureties  shall  qualify 
in  such  form  as  the  common  council 
shall  prescribe;  and  the  bonds  there- 
by required,  after  having  been  fully 
approved,  shall  be  filed  in  the  office 
of  the  city  clerk,  .  .  .  before 
any  of  the  officers  required  to  exe- 
cute the  same  shall  enter  upon  the 
duties  of  their  respective  offices." 
City  Ordinances,  tit.  9,  §  2,  provides 
that  "the  clerk  of  the  common  coun- 
cil shall  also  indorse  and  certify  on 
each  bond,  before  the  same  shall  be 
filed,  the  resolution  of  the  common 
council  approving  the  same,  and  at 
the  time  of  such  approval."  1  Rev. 
St.  N.  Y.  (8th  ed.),  p.  397,  §  9,  pro- 
vides that  every  officer  shall  hold 
over  after  "his  term  of  office  shall 
have  expired,  until  a  successor  in 
such  office  shall  be  duly  qualified." 
It  was  decided  that  an  incumbent  of 
one  of  the  enumerated  offices  is  en- 
titled to  hold  over  after  the  expira- 
tion of  his  term  of  office,  and  to 
draw  the  salary  therefor,  until  the 
bond  is  approved  and  filed  as  re- 
quired by  the  city  charter  and  ordi- 
nances, and  an  approval  by  a  justice 
of   the   supreme    court  is   not   suffi- 


cient: De  Lacey  v.  City  of  Brooklyn, 
12  N.  Y.  S.  540.  Under  New  York 
constitution,  art.  10,  §  5,  see  Peo- 
ple V.  Board  &c.,  59  N.  Y.  S.  476; 
s.  c.  42  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  510.  Under 
Neb.  laws  of  1897,  p.  54,  ch.  10,  §  102, 
where  the  mayor-elect  is  ineligible 
the  president  of  the  council  becomes 
entitled  to  the  office  and  not  the 
former  mayor:  State  v.  Moores.  56 
Neb.  1;  s.  c.  76  N.  W.  530.  The  term 
of  an  officer  in  a  city  under  the  gen- 
eral law  of  Illinois  whose  term  is 
not  fixed  by  the  ordinance  creating 
the  office,  is  two  years,  unless 
changed  by  ordinance  during  the 
time:  People  v.  Blair,  82  111.  App. 
570.  The  Vt.  act  of  1896,  p.  169,  §  278, 
repeals  all  prior  acts  inconsist- 
ent therewith,  and  the  latter  act  de- 
termines the  term  of  the  chief  of  po- 
lice: Smith  V.  Cosgrove,  71  Vt.  196; 
s.  c.  44  Atl.  73. 

■">  Under  the  laws  of  Kansas,  1885, 
after  a  city  of  the  third  class  is  or- 
ganized into  a  city  of  the  second 
class,  the  mayor  is  to  be  elected  on 
the  first  Tuesday  of  April  of  each 
odd-numbered  year,  and  a  vacancy 
must  be  filled  at  a  special  election 
called  and  held  for  that  purpose,  as 
provided  by  ordinance;  and  where 
no  one  is  elected  mayor  of  such  a 
city,  after  its  organization,  on  the 
first  Tuesday  of  April  of  an  odd- 
numbered  year,  and  no  special  elec- 
tion is  called  by  ordinance,  the  may- 
or of  the  city  of  the  third  class  will 
hold  over:  Moser  v.  Shamleffer,  39 
Kan.  635;  s.  c.  18  Pac.  956.     When  a 


168 


PUBLIC    COnrORATIONS. 


1G6 


§  168.  Power  to  hold  over — English  and  American  rules. — For- 
merly in  England  the  law  was  well  settled  that  the  term  of  olKce  of 
the  mayor  or  other  head  officer  was  annual  and  expired  at  the  end 
of  the  year,  and  that  he  could  not  hold  over  until  his  successor  was 
provided,  unless  there  was  a  special  provision  in  the  statute  to  that 
effect."*^  But  the  American  courts  have  not  adhered  to  the  strict 
English  rule,  but  have  decided  that  the  chief  officer,  unless  the  legis- 


city  of  the  third  class  is  made  a  city 
of  the  second  class,  under  the  Kan- 
sas statute,  the  city  officers  continue 
until  new  officers  are  elected  and 
qualified:  Ritchie  v.  City  of  South 
Topeka,  38  Kan.  368;  s.  c.  16  Pac. 
332.  The  Pennsylvania  act  of  1889, 
relating  to  the  division  of  the  cities 
of  the  state  into  three  classes  in  ac- 
cordance with  their  population,  pro- 
vides (§2)  that  at  the  election  oc- 
curring not  less  than  one  month 
after  a  city  has  changed  classes  "the 
proper  officers  shall  be  elected  to 
which  the  city  shall  become  entitled 
under  the  change  in  classification; 
and  upon  the  first  Monday  next  suc- 
ceeding thereto  the  terms  of  all  offi- 
cers of  said  city  then  in  office,  whose 
offices  are  superseded  by  reason 
thereof,  shall  cease  and  determine." 
The  court  decided  that,  where  a  city 
passed  from  the  third  into  the  sec- 
ond class,  it  was  entitled  to  such 
new  officers  as  were  provided  for  in 
cities  of  the  second  class  which  did 
not  exist  in  cities  of  the  third  class 
only,  and  the  terms  of  such  of  its 
existing  officers  only  as  were  abol- 
ished in  cities  of  the  second  class  ex- 
pired; and  where  the  city  had  twen- 
ty-six councilmen  under  the  third 
class,  and  was  entitled  to  but  thir- 
teen under  the  second  class,  and  the 
terms  of  thirteen  of  such  council- 
men  would  expire  during  the  cur- 
rent year,  it  was  not  necessary  to 
elect  new  councilmen,  as  all  the  old 
members  held  over  for  their  respect- 
ive terms:  Commonwealth  v.  Wy- 
man,  137  Pa.  St.  508;  s.  c.  21  Atl. 
389.     The  Pennsylvania  act  of  1887, 


dividing  the  cities  of  the  state  into 
seven  classes,  and  providing  that  in 
the  fourth  to  the  seventh  classes  the 
persons  then  in  office  should  hold 
for  the  terms  for  which  they  were 
elected,  except  as  otherwise  pro- 
vided, the  provisions  of  the  charter 
of  a  city  of  the  fifth  class  for  the 
election  and  installation  of  members 
of  the  council  apply  until  the  terms 
of  all  the  members  then  in  office  ex- 
pire, at  which  time  the  provisions  of 
the  act  of  1887,  in  relation  thereto, 
will  take  effect;  and  the  provisions 
that  the  councils  then  in  office 
should  hold  until  their  "successors" 
should  be  installed,  according  to  tlie 
act,  and  that  at  the  first  election 
under  the  act  the  members  should 
be  chosen,  etc.,  do  not  show  a  con- 
trary intention;  there  being  a  pro- 
vision that  the  terms  of  members  in 
cities  of  the  fourth  class  should 
cease  at  the  end  of  that  municipal 
year:  Appeal  of  Ayars,  122  Pa.  St. 
266;  s.  c.  16  Atl.  356.  See  also,  Pitts- 
burgh's Petition,  138  Pa.  St.  401;  s. 
c.  21  Atl.  757,  759,  761. 

"Rex  V.  Hearle,  1  Str.  626,  627; 
Rex  V.  Thornton,  4  East  308;  Rex  v. 
Atkins,  3  Mod.  3,  12;  Mayor  of  Dur- 
ham's Case,  1  Sid.  33;  Foot  v. 
Prowse.  1  Str.  625;  s.  c.  3  Bro.  167, 
169;  Glover  Corp.  173.  Some  char- 
ters provided  that  the  chief  officer 
should  hold  office  until  his  successor 
was  provided,  although  his  original 
term  of  office  was  only  one  year: 
Rex  V.  Philips,  1  Str.  394.  For  the 
manner  in  which  this  was  changed, 
see  9  Anne,  ch.  20,  §  8. 


167 


OFFICERS    AND   AGENTS. 


169 


lative  intent  to  the  contrary  is  apparent,  holds  over  until  his  succes- 
sor is  appointed.'*-  The  reorganization  of  a  city  under  the  general 
incorporation  law  is  an  abrogation  of  its  former  charter,  and  deter- 
mines the  tenure  of  all  ollicers  under  it,  except  such  as  are  within  the 
saving  clause  of  the  general  law.*^ 

§  169.  The  same  subject  continued. — In  this  country  it  is  gener- 
ally held  that  an  annual  officer  of  whatever  grade,  especially  if  his 
duties  consist  in  the  safe-keeping  and  current  management  of  prop- 
erty committed  to  his  custody,  holds  over  until  the  appointment  and 
qualification  of  another  in  his  place.     That  conclusion  was  reached 


*-2  Kent  Com.  238;  Elmendorf  v. 
Mayor  &c.,  25  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  693; 
Slee  v.  Bloom,  5  Johns.  Ch.  (N.  Y.) 
366,  378;  People  v.  Runkle,  9  Johns. 
(N.  Y.)  147.  By  the  general  mu- 
nicipal incorporation  act  of  Cali- 
fornia, 1883,  it  is  provided  that  offi- 
cers chosen  at  a  special  election  to 
be  held  within  two  weeks  after  the 
vote  in  favor  of  reorganization  shall 
hold  their  respective  offices  only  un- 
til the  next  general  municipal  elec- 
tions. By  §  752  it  is  provided  that 
all  elective  officers  of  cities  of  the 
fifth  class  shall  be  chosen  at  a  gen- 
eral municipal  election  to  be  held 
therein  in  each  odd-numbered  year; 
the  marshal,  assessor,  etc.,  to  hold 
office  for  two  years,  and  the  trustees 
for  four  years;  but  there  is  a  fur- 
ther proviso  that  the  first  board  of 
trustees  elected  under  the  provision 
of  this  act  shall  so  classify  them- 
selves by  lot  that  three  of  their 
number  shall  go  out  of  office  at 
the  expiration  of  two  years,  and 
two  at  the  expiration  of  four 
years.  It  was  decided  that  the 
elective  officers,  except  members  of 
the  board  of  trustees,  are  to  hold  of- 
fice for  two  years,  and  they  for  four 
years,  and  that  an  election  must  be 
held  every  two  years:  Ruggles  v. 
Board  of  Trustees  &c.,  88  Cal.  430; 
s.  c.  26  Pac.  520.  The  New  York 
consolidation  act,  1882,  provides 
that  the  terms  of  all  officers,  when- 
soever actually  appointed,  shall  com- 


mence on  the  1st  day  of  May  in  the 
year  in  which  the  terms  of  office  of 
their  predecessors  shall  expire;  but 
the  commissioner  of  public  works  to 
be  appointed  on  the  expiration  of 
the  term  of  the  present  incumbent 
in  December,  1884,  shall  hold  from 
the  1st  day  of  May  succeeding  such 
month.  It  was  held  that  it  was 
clearly  the  intention  that  the  com- 
missioner's term  should  begin  May 
1,  1885,  and  it  was  immaterial  that 
the  termination  of  his  predecessor's 
term  was  erroneously  stated  to  be  in 
December,  1884:  People  v.  Barrett, 
8  N.  Y.  S.  677. 

'"McGrath  v.  City  of  Chicago,  24 
111.  App.  19.  Where,  upon  the  re- 
vision of  a  city  charter,  the  term  and 
mode  of  election  to  a  city  office  are 
omitted,  though  the  office  is  con- 
tinued in  existence,  the  then  incum- 
bent rightfully  in  possession  holds 
over  until  superseded  by  proper  leg- 
islative action:  State  v.  Simon,  20 
Or.  365;  s.  c.  26  Pac.  170.  A  certifi- 
cate issued  by  the  recorder  of  the 
board  of  aldermen,  which  is  not  au- 
thorized by  law,  notifying  complain- 
ant of  his  election,  and  signed  "by 
order  of  the  board,"  is  no  evidence 
of  ratification  of  previous  invalid 
action:  Lawrence  v.  Ingersoll,  88 
Tenn.  52;  s.  c.  12  S.  W.  422;  17  Am. 
St.  870;  6  L.  R.  A.  308.  See  also. 
State  V.  George,  23  Fla.  585;  s.  c, 
3  So.  81. 


170 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS. 


168 


upon  a  review  of  the  authorities  by  the  supreme  court  of  California 
in  1865,  Avhere  the  doctrine  was  placed  upon  considerations  of  public 
convenience  and  necessity,''*  And  the  court  of  appeals  of  Maryland, 
in  a  comparatively  recent  case,  makes  the  following  comprehensive 
statement :  "Unless  there  is  some  clearly  expressed  and  positive  pro- 
hibition which,  by  its  terms,  operates  as  an  ouster,  the  person  filling 
the  office  should  continue  to  discharge  those  duties  until  a  successor 
is  qualified,  no  matter  whether  the  office  is  created  by  the  constitution, 
by  an  act  of  the  general  assembly,  or  by  a  municipal  ordinance.  Ubi 
eadem  est  ratio,  eadem  est  lex."*^  The  same  rule  obtains  in  many 
other  jurisdictions.**' 

§  170.  Appointment  of  oflSicers. — Where  a  city  council  is  author- 
ized to  elect  officers,  and  no  particular  mode  of  election  is  prescribed, 
it  may  appoint  them  by  resolution,*^  and  has  complete  control  over 


«  People  V.  Oulton,  28  Cal.  44.  In 
that  case  the  office  of  state  librarian 
was  in  contention,  but  the  remarks 
of  the  court  show  that  the  rule 
would  certainly  be  applied  to  subor- 
dinate officers  of  a  municipal  cor- 
poration. It  is  often  expressly  de- 
clared by  statute  that  an  incumbent 
shall  hold  over. 

«Robb  v.  Carter,  65  Md.  321,  335; 
s.  c.  4  Atl.  282  (where  a  city  solici- 
tor, appointed  under  ordinance,  held 
over) ;  Thomas  v.  Owens,  4  Md.  189; 
Marshall  v.  Harwood,  5  Md.  423; 
Sansbury  v.  Middleton,  11  Md.  296. 

«  School  Dist.  V.  Atherton,  12  Met. 
(Mass.)  105;  Dow  v.  Bullock,  13 
Gray  (Mass.)  136;  Chandlery.  Brad- 
ish,  23  Vt.  416;  Kreidler  v.  State,  24 
Ohio  St.  22;  Stewart  v.  State,  4  Ind. 
396;  State  v.  Harrison,  113  Ind.  434; 
s.  c.  16  N.  E.  384;  People  v.  Town  of 
Fairbury,  51  111.  149;  People  v.  Fer- 
ris, 16  Hun  (N.  Y.)  219;  Cordiell  v. 
Frizell,  1  Nev.  130;  State  v.  Wells,  8 
Nev.  105;  Ex  parte  Lawhorne,  18 
Gratt.  (Va.)  85;  Wheeling  v.  Black, 
25  W.  Va.  266;  People  v.  Reid,  11 
Colo.  138;  s.  c.  17  Pac.  302;  Moser  v. 
Shamleffer,  39  Kan.  635;  s.  c.  18 
Pac.  956;  Wier  v.  Bush.  4  Litt.  (Ky.) 
429.  For  a  construction  of  statutes 
relating  to  the  holding  over  of  offi- 


cers, see  cases  cited  in  Throop  Pub- 
lic Officers,  §  325  et  seq.;  Mechem 
Public  Offices  and  Officers,  §  398  et 
seq.  Where  municipal  officers  are 
elected  or  appointed  for  a  fixed  term 
they  hold  over  until  the  election  or 
appointment  and  qualification  of 
their  successors:  People  v.  Blair,  82 
111.  App.  570.  While  a  mayor  holds 
over  after  his  term  by  reason  of  no 
election  of  a  successor  there  is  no 
vacancy:  State  v.  Wright,  56  Ohio 
St.  540;  s.  c.  47  N.  E.  569. 

^'  People  V.  Bedell,  2  Hill  (N.  Y.) 
196;  Commonwealth  v.  City  of  Pitts- 
burg, 14  Pa.  St.  177;  Low  v.  Com- 
missioners of  Pilotage,  R.  M.  Charl. 
(Ga.)  302;  State  v.  Mayor  &c.,  46  N. 
J.  L.  140;  Russell  v.  City  of  Chicago, 
22  111.  283;  Wilder  v.  City  of  Chicago, 
26  111.  182.  Where  the  charter  pro- 
vides that  the  mayor  and  aldermen 
shall  constitute  the  council,  and  that 
in  case  of  a  tie  the  presiding  officer 
may  vote,  an  ordinance  requiring  a 
majority  to  appoint  to  a  city  office, 
and  10  out  of  12  are  present  and  6 
vote  for  the  appointment,  it  is  not  a 
tie  and  the  mayor  is  not  entitled  to 
a  vote:  In  re  Dudley  53  N.  Y.  S.  742; 
s.  c.  33  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  465. 
Where,  by  charter,  a  board  was  cre- 
ated, the  members  of  which  were  to 


169 


OFFICERS    AND   AGEN'TS. 


170 


all  oflficcs  and  officers  existing  under  by-laws,  unless  specially  re- 
stricted by  law.''®     Where  the  statute  provides  for  the  appointment  of 


be  appointed  by  the  mayor,  who  was 
to  be  ex  officio  a  member  and  author- 
ized to  preside  at  all  meetings  when 
present,  and  which  board  was  au- 
thorized to  appoint  a  street  commis- 
sioner, it  was  held  that  an  election  of 
such  commissioner  at  a  meeting  of 
such  board,  when  the  mayor  was 
presiding,  on  a  motion  declined  to 
be  put  by  the  mayor,  but  put  by  a 
member  and  carried,  was  void:  State 
V.  Lashar,  71  Conn.  540;  s.  c.  42  Atl. 
636. 

'*  People  V.  Conover,  17  N.  Y.  64; 
People  V.  Mayor  &c.,  5  Barb.  (N.  Y.) 
43;  Samis  v.  King,  40  Conn.  298; 
Wadraven  v.  Memphis,  4  Coldw. 
(Tenn.)  431;  City  of  Madison  v. 
Korbly,  32  Ind.  74,  79;  Ball  v.  Fagg, 
67  Mo.  481.  The  acts  of  artificial  per- 
sons afford  the  same  presumptions 
as  the  acts  of  natural  persons:  Chief 
Justice  Story,  in  President  &c. 
(Bank)  v.  Dandridge,  12  "Wheat.  64, 
70,  and  cases  there  cited.  The  con- 
stitution of  Virginia  providing  that 
all  city,  village  and  town  officers 
whose  election  or  appointment  is  not 
provided  for  by  the  constitution  shall 
be  elected  by  the  electors  of  such 
cities,  towns  and  villages,  or  ap- 
pointed by  such  authorities  as  the 
general  assembly  shall  designate,  is 
merely  enabling,  and  does  not  pro- 
hibit the  legislature  on  incorporat- 
ing a  town  from  appointing  officers 
until  an  election  is  held:  Roche  v. 
Jones,  87  Va.  484;  s.  c.  12  S.  E.  965. 
The  public  laws  of  Rhode  Island, 
1890,  providing  for  the  appointment 
by  the  mayor  of  Providence,  in  Feb- 
ruary, 1891,  and  triennially  there- 
after, of  a  commissioner  of  public 
works,  and  requiring  that  the  com- 
missioner "now  in  office  and  those 
hereafter  to  be  appointed"  should 
have  control  of  the  city  engineering 
department,   and    should   appoint   a 


city  engineer  on  the  first  Monday  in 
May  of  each  year,  abolished  the  then- 
existing  office  of  city  engineer  after 
the  first  Monday  in  May,  1890,  and 
did  not  provide  for  an  additional 
city  engineer  to  be  connected  with 
the  board  of  public  works:  Gray  v. 
Granger,  17  R.  I.  201;  s.  c.  21  Atl. 
342.  Laws  of  New  York,  1888,  ch. 
214,  tit.  3,  §  2,  provides  for  the  ap- 
pointment of  city  officers,  and  de- 
clares that^  if  the  council  shall  fail 
to  appoint  any  such  officer  within 
three  weeks  after  any  vacancy  oc- 
curs, it  shall  be  the  duty  of  the  may- 
or, immediately  on  the  expiration  of 
said  three  weeks,  to  appoint  such  of- 
ficer and  fill  such  vacancy.  It  was 
held,  where  the  city  engineer  re- 
signed, that  after  the  expiration  of 
three  weeks  the  power  of  the  council 
to  fill  such  vacancy  ceased:  People 
V.  Merrick,  16  N.  Y.  S.  246;  s.  c.  61 
Hun  (N.  Y.)  396.  A  municipal 
board  having  been  abolished  by  a 
special  act  and  its  duties  transferred 
to  a  new  one,  the  members  of  the 
old  board  can  not  enjoin  the  appoint- 
ment of  the  members  of  the  new 
board  on  the  ground  that  the  special 
act  is  unconstitutional:  Reemelin  v. 
Mosby,  47  Ohio  St.  570;  s.  c.  26  N. 
E.  717.  The  public  laws  of  Rhode 
Island,  1890,  which  provide  that  "the 
town  councils  of  the  several  towns 
throughout  the  state,  and  the  may- 
ors of  the  several  cities,  except  the 
city  of  Providence,  shall  each  elect 
an  inspector  of  buildings,  who  shall 
be  paid  such  amount  for  his  serv- 
ices as  shall  be  determined  by  the 
town  or  city  council  electing  him," 
require  such  inspectors  to  be  ap- 
pointed by  the  mayors,  and  not  by 
the  city  councils,  of  the  cities  of 
Pawtucket,  Woonsocket  and  New- 
port: In  re  Building  Inspectors,  17  R. 
I.  819 ;  s.  c.  21  Atl.  913.  The  charter  of 


§  m 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS. 


170 


such  village  officers  as  shall  be  provided  for  by  ordinance,  a  village 
ordinance  creating  the  office  of  deputy  marshal  is  legal.*® 

§  171.  Validity  of  appointment. — The  appointment  of  a  person  to 
a  city  office  by  a  mayor  under  a  law  which  requires  confirmation  by 
the  council  gives  the  appointee  no  right  to  the  office  without  such 
confirmation  by  the  proper  and  legal  city  council.^"  Where  a  statute 
empowers  the  council  of  a  city  to  appoint  to  a  certain  office,  an 
ordinance  providing  that  the  council  shall  elect,  every  three  years, 
a  fit  person  to  such  office,  who  shall  hold  his  office  for  the  term  of 
three  years,  and  until  his  successor  is  elected,  is  void,  as  impairing 
the  power  of  appointment  of  succeeding  councils.^^  Where  officers 
are  to  be  appointed  by  the  mayor  to  hold  at  the  pleasure  of  the  ap- 


Los  Angeles  ( Act  Cal.,  Jan.  31, 1889 ) , 
directing  the  city  council  to  ap- 
point as  a  depositary  of  the  public 
moneys  the  bank  offering  the  high- 
est rate  of  interest  therefor,  and  the 
treasurer  to  deposit  the  city  funds 
there  daily,  is  void,  being  inconsist- 
ent with  that  provision  of  the  con- 
stitution of  California  which  pro- 
vides that  the  legislature  shall  not 
delegate  to  any  private  corporation, 
company  or  individual  the  right  to 
interfere  with  or  control  any  county, 
city  or  municipal  money,  and  that 
the  public  moneys  shall  be  deposited 
with  the  treasurer,  and  that  making 
any  profit  out  of  such  moneys  shall 
be  a  felony;  and  also  with  the  penal 
code  of  California,  punishing  by  im- 
prisonment the  misappropriation  of 
public  moneys  by  the  person  charged 
with  keeping  them:  Yarnell  v.  City 
of  Los  Angeles,  87  Cal.  603;  s.  c.  25 
Pac.  767. 

^''Kriseler  v.  Le  Valley,  122  Mich. 
576;  s.  c.  81  N.  W.  580. 

="  People  V.  Weber,  89  111.  347.  Un- 
der an  ordinance  providing  for  the 
annual  appointment  of  a  gas  in- 
spector by  the  city  council,  an  ap- 
pointment to  such  office  "subject  to 
the  further  orders  of  the  council" 
is  invalid:  King  v.  City  of  Buffalo, 
10  N.  Y.  564;  s.  c.  57  Hun  (N.  Y.) 
586. 


"Horan  v.  Lane,  53  N.  J.  L.  275; 
s.  c.  sub  nom.  State  v.  Lane,  21  Atl. 
302.  Proceedings  had  under  the  act 
of  New  Jersey,  approved  April  6, 
1889,  providing  for  an  election  to 
determine  whether  the  mayor  of  a 
city  shall  have  the  power  to  appoint 
certain  officers,  are  not  invalidated 
by  a  misrecital  of  some  of  the  pro- 
visions of  the  act  in  the  proclama- 
tion of  an  election;  the  act  not  re- 
quiring their  insertion  in  the  proc- 
lamation, and  there  being  nothing  to 
show  that  the  error  affected  the  re- 
sult of  the  election:  In  re  Cleveland, 
52  N.  J.  L.  188;  s.  c.  19  Atl.  17.  The 
record  of  the  appointment  of  a  vil- 
lage marshal  was  read  and  approved 
by  the  board  of  trustees,  as  being  in 
accordance  with  the  facts.  The  va- 
lidity of  his  appointment  was  ques- 
tioned because  the  record  was  inter- 
lined. It  was  held  that  the  inter- 
lineation was  immaterial:  Brophy  v. 
Hyatt,  10  Colo.  223;  s.  c.  15  Pac.  399. 
The  appointment  by  a  city  council  of 
a  member  thereof  to  an  office  which 
the  statutes  of  Ohio  make  a  mem- 
ber of  council  ineligible  to  fill,  and 
his  acceptance  thereof,  do  not 
work  an  abandonment  of  his  office 
as  councilman,  for  the  appointment 
to  the  second  office  is  absolutely 
void:  State  v.  Kearns,  47  Ohio  St. 
566;  s.  c.  25  N.  E.  1027. 


171  OFFICERS    AND   AGENTS.  §    172 

pointing  power  no  confirmation  is  required. °^  Where  an  officer  is 
appointed  by  the  mayor  and  the  appointment  is  confirmed  by  the  coun- 
cil under  the  provisions  of  the  charter,  the  confirmation  exhausts  the 
power  of  the  council.^^  The  power  to  appoint  heads  of  departments 
is  an  executive  power,  where  the  business  of  a  city  is  administered 
through  departments.^*  Where  no  record  was  kept  of  an  appointment, 
no  commission  or  writing  issued  to  the  appointee,  and  no  services  per- 
formed, a  new  board  need  not  recognize  the  appointment.^^ 

§  172.  Appointments  by  de  facto  officers. — Whether  an  appoint- 
ment to  oHice  by  one  who  is  himself  only  a  de  facto  officer  gives  a  good 
title  to  the  appointee  is  not  settled.  In  England,  where  a  town 
burgess  was  appointed  by  a  de  facto  mayor,  and  the  latter  was  ousted 
upon  a  quo  warranto,  the  judgment  was  held  conclusive  in  a  like 
proceeding  against  the  former.'^*'  In  North  Carolina  and  Ohio  such 
appointments  are  brought  within  the  general  rule  touching  the  va- 
lidity of  acts  of  de  facto  officers  in  which  the  public  have  an  interest, 
and  the  appointee  continues  to  hold  the  office  after  the  ouster  of 
his  superior.^''  The  supreme  court  of  New  York,  on  the  other  hand, 
has  held  that  a  judgment  in  an  action  in  the  nature  of  a  quo  war- 
ranto, whereby  an  officer  is  ousted  and  his  contestant  declared  en- 
titled, is  evidence  in  favor  of  an  appointee  of  the  latter  against  one 
who  derives  title  from  the  former.^" 

§  173.  Compensation  of  officers — In  general. — It  is  a  general  rule 
of  law  that  a  corporation  is  liable  to  its  officers  for  their  salaries 

^^  State  V.  Doherty,  16  "Wash.  382;  imperative,    although    an    applicant 

s  c.  47  Pac.  958.  was  under  30  when  the  charter  took 

^'  State  V.  Wadhams,  64  Minn.  318;  effect,  and  at  that  time  was  eligible: 

s.  c.  67  N.  W.  64.  People  v.  Scannell,  62  N.  Y.  S.  1064; 

^Attorney-General  v.  Varnum,  167  s.  c.  49  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  244. 

Mass.  477;  s.  c.  46  N.  E.  1.  =°Rex  v.  Lisle,  Andr.  163;   s.  c.  ^ 

==  People  v.  Keller,  61  N.  Y.  S.  746.  Str.   1090.     See  also.  Rex  v.  Mayor 

Board  of  health  of  Woburn,  Mass.,  &c.,  5  T.  R.   66;    Rex  v.  Grimes,  5 

is  appointed  by  the  mayor,  without  Burr.   2598;    Rex  v.  Hebden,  Andr. 

confirmation    of    the    city    council:  389. 

Doherty  V.  Buchanan,  173  Mass.  338;  "People  v.  Staton,  73  N.  C.  546; 

s.  c.  53  N.  E.  878.     Where  a  charter  State  v.  Ailing,  12  Ohio  16;  State  v. 

requires  a  certificate  of  appointment  Jacobs,  17  Ohio  143.     See  also,  Mal- 

to  a  city  office  to  be  made  by  the  lett  v.   Uncle   Sam  &c.   Co.,   1   Nev. 

council,  a  certificate  by  the  mayor  is  188;  Brady  v.  Howe,  50  Miss.  607. 

not  in   compliance  with   such  char-  ^^  People  v.   Anthony,   6   Hun    (N. 

ter:  In  re  Dudley.  53  N.  Y.  S.  742;  s.  Y.)  142.     See  also.  People  v.  Murray, 

c.  33  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  465.     Where  73  N.  Y.  535;  and  a  dictum,  contra. 

a  charter  limits  the  appointment  of  by  Bronson,  J.,  in  People  v.  Stevens, 

firemen  to  those  under  30  years  it  is  5  Hill  (N.  Y.)  616. 


173 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS. 


173 


when  the  work  has  actually  been  done;  but  it  is  highly  necessary 
that  great  care  should  be  exercised  in  appointing  or  electing  the 
officers  to  their  positions,  as  the  least  omission  or  technicality  may 
be  fatal  to  their  appointment  or  election,  in  which  event  they  have 
no  right  to  comj^ensation.^''     The  salary  of  an  official  may  be  reduced 


^'An  act  passed  in  Pennsylvania 
May  23,  1874  (P.  L.  252),  provided 
that  the  city  comptroller  "shall  have 
the  supervision  and  control  of  the 
fiscal  concerns  of  all  departments, 
bureaus  and  officers  of  the  city  and 
school  districts.  ...  He  shall  be 
paid  a  fixed  yearly  salary."  The 
school  district  of  Baston  did  not  ac- 
cept this  act,  but  continued  to  act 
under  a  special  law.  It  had  poWer 
to  appoint  an  auditor  to  the  school 
accounts.  The  city  comptroller  au- 
dited the  school  accounts,  the  school 
board  having  passed  a  resolution 
that  it  was  his  duty  as  city  comp- 
troller to  do  so.  It  was  decided  that, 
not  having  been  appointed  auditor 
by  the  school  district,  he  could  not 
recover  compensation  for  such  serv- 
ices: Rothrock  v.  School  District, 
133  Pa.  St.  487;  s.  c.  19  Atl.  483;  25 
W.  N.  C.  (Pa.)  510.  Under  the  gen- 
eral statutes  of  Colorado,  §  3326, 
which  provides  for  annual  appropri- 
ation bills  by  the  city  councils  of 
municipalities,  and  that  the  objects 
and  purposes  for  which  an  appropri- 
ation is  made  shall  be  specified,  an 
appropriation  bill  by  the  city  of 
Leadville,  which  recites  a  total  ap- 
propriation of  a  certain  amount,  sub- 
divided into  appropriations  for  the 
following  specific  objects  or  pur- 
poses,— to  wit,  "salary  fund," 
"streets,"  "fire,"  "gas,"  "Interest," 
and  "contingent  expenses," — is  a 
sufficient  compliance  with  the  stat- 
ute to  entitle  a  street  commissioner 
duly  elected,  whose  salary  is  fixed  by 
ordinance  or  resolution  of  the  city 
council,  to  resort  to  the  salary  fund 
for  payment  of  his  salary;  and  it  is 
not  necessary  that  the  bill  should 
specify    each    particular   office,    and 


the  exact  sum  to  be  paid  the  incum- 
bent thereof:  City  of  Leadville  v. 
Matthews,  10  Colo.  125;  s.  c.  14  Pac. 
112.  A  laborer  in  the  employ  of  a 
city,  who  was  dismissed  and  after- 
wards reinstated,  under  laws  of 
N.  Y.,  1887,  ch.  464,  providing  for 
preference  of  honorably  discharged 
Union  soldiers  as  employes  upon 
public  works,  etc.,  can  not  recover 
from  the  city  wages  for  the  time  be- 
tween his  removal  and  reinstate- 
ment, where  his  position  was 
filled  by  another,  who  performed  the 
duties  thereof,  and  was  paid  there- 
for by  the  city:  Higgins  v.  City  of 
New  York,  131  N.  Y.  128;  s.  c.  30  N. 
E.  44;  reversing  s.  c.  14  N.  Y.  S. 
554;  60  Hun  (N.  Y.)  578  (mem.); 
and  following  Terhune  v.  Mayor  &c., 
88  N.  Y.  248;  and  adhering  to  the 
general  rule  that  payment  to  a  de 
facto  officer  is  a  defense  to  an  ac- 
tion brought  by  the  de  jure  officer  to 
recover  the  same  salary.  See  also, 
Hagan  v.  City  of  Brooklyn,  126  N. 
Y.  643;  s.  c.  27  N.  E.  265;  and  for  a 
contrary  view,  State  v.  Carr,  129 
Ind.  44;  s.  c.  28  N.  E.  88;  and  a  criti- 
cism of  the  prevailing  rule  by  Mr. 
Freeman  in  a  note  to  Andrews  v. 
Portland,  79  Maine  484;  s.  c.  10  Atl. 
458,  in  10  Am.  St.  284.  Where  a  con- 
testant recovers  a  public  office  from 
the  incumbent,  he  is  also  entitled  to 
recover  from  the  latter  the  salary 
received  by  him  during  the  term 
which  belonged  to  the  former:  Kil- 
lion  V.  Van  Patten,  42  Kan.  295;  s. 
c.  22  Pac.  382.  See  also.  State  v. 
Holmes,  43  La.  An.  1185;  s.  c.  10  So. 
172.  But  it  must  be  shown  that  the 
incumbent  actually  received  the  sal- 
ary: Merritt  V.  Hinton,  55  Ark.  12;  s. 
c.  17  S.  W.  270.      The  clerk  of  the  city 


173 


OFi'ICKl^S    AM)    ACiENTS. 


173 


durincT    his    term    of    office/'"     But    an    officer    can    not    be    com- 


and  county  of  New  York,  having  been 
designated  by  that  title  for  years 
before  the  passage  of  laws  of  N.  Y., 
1857,  ch.  628,  is  the  city  clerk  with- 
in the  provision  of  §  23  of  that  act, 
that  bonds  taken  pursuant  thereto 
by  excise  commissioners,  from  appli- 
cants for  licenses,  shall,  in  cities,  be 
filed  "in  the  city  clerk's  office;"  and 
such  clerk  is  therefore  entitled,  for 
filing  each  such  bond,  to  the  fee  of 
six  cents  allowed  him  by  Code  Civil 
Proc.  N.  Y.,  §  3304,  for  filing  any  pa- 
per required  by  law  to  be  filed  in  his 
office  other  than  is  expressly  pro- 
vided for,  no  special  fee  being  pre- 
scribed therefor  by  any  statute: 
People  V.  Giegerich,  14  N.  Y.  S.  263. 
Policemen  appointed  without  au- 
thority can  not  recover  compensa- 
tion: Foster  v.  City  of  Wilmington, 
8  Houst.  (Del.)  415;  s.  c.  32  Atl. 
348.  An  act  granting  certain  cities 
power  to  fix  the  compensation  of 
mayors  and  limiting  the  salary  to 
the  amount  so  fixed  is  not  self- 
executory,  and  if  no  ordinance  is 
passed  is  of  no  effect:  State  v.  din- 
ger, 109  Iowa  669;  s.  c.  80  N.  W. 
1060.  It  is  a  fundamental  rule  that 
a  man  can  not  be  judge  in  his  own 
case;  and  an  alderman  can  not, 
therefore,  determine  his  own  com- 
pensation: McFarland  v.  Gordon,  70 
Vt.  455;  s.  c.  41  Atl.  507.  The  Min- 
nesota laws  of  1891,  ch.  6,  §  11,  abro- 
gated the  authority,  under  the  char- 
ter of  St.  Paul,  to  compensate  for 
legal  services  rendered  by  one  not  a 
member  of  the  regular  legal  depart- 
ment: Horn  V.  City  of  St.  Paul,  80 
Minn.  369;  s.  c.  83  N.  W.  388.  Com- 
pensation voted  councilmen,  where 
there  is  no  provision  of  law  for  such 
compensation,  is  a  misappropriation 
of  public  funds:  In  re  Borough  of 
Dickson  City  (Com.  PI.),  2  Lack. 
Leg.  N.  (Pa.)  133.  Where  elective  of- 
ficers  receive   salary   as   prescribed 


by  charter  an  ordinance  providing 
for  compensation  of  councilmen  is 
invalid  in  the  absence  of  charter  au- 
thority: Bardsley  v.  Sternberg,  17 
Wash.  243;  s.  c.  49  Pac.  499. 

""  Harvey  v.  Commissioners  &c.,  32 
Kan.  159;  s.  c.  4  Pac.  153;  Hoboken 
V.  Gear,  27  N.  J.  L.  265.  Unless 
prohibited  by  the  constitution: 
Douglas  Co.  V.  Timme,  32  Neb. 
272;  s.  c.  49  N.  W.  266.  Municipal 
officers,  such  as  policemen,  are  not 
public  officers  within  a  constitu- 
tional provision  that  no  law  shall  in- 
crease or  diminish  the  salary  or 
emoluments  of  a  public  officer  after 
his  election  or  appointment:  Rus- 
sell V.  Williamsport,  9  Pa.  Co.  Ct. 
129.  See  further,  for  a  construction 
of  such  provisions,  State  v.  Blox- 
ham,  26  Fla.  407;  s.  c.  7  So.  873; 
Kirkwood  v.  Soto,  87  Cal.  394;  s.  c. 
25  Pac.  488;  Wren  v.  Luzerne  Co.,  9 
Pa.  Co.  Ct.  22;  s.  c.  6  Kulp  (Pa.) 
37;  Guldin  v.  Schuylkill  Co.  (Pa. 
C.  P.),  48  Phila.  Leg.  Int.  197. 
Where  the  power  to  appoint  exists 
the  power  to  reduce  the  salary  of  the 
appointee  for  future  services  exists 
in  the  absence  of  a  constitutional  or 
statutory  prohibition:  Wilson  v. 
City  of  New  York,  65  N.  Y.  S.  328; 
s.  c.  31  Misc.  (N.  Y.)  693.  The  con- 
stitution of  1870,  Illinois,  prohibits 
a  change  of  salary  during  the  term 
of  office:  Stodler  v.  Fahey,  87  111. 
App.  411;  and  see  City  of  Louis- 
ville V.  Wilson,  99  Ky.  598;  s.  c.  36 
S.  W.  944.  In  Illinois  an  officer's 
salary  can  neither  be  increased  nor 
diminished  during  the  term  for 
which  he  was  elected  or  appointed, 
and  an  ordinance  reducing  the  sal- 
ary does  not  take  effect  until  his 
term  expires:  City  of  Roodhouse  v. 
Johnson,  57  111.  App.  73.  But  where 
the  law  provides  that  the  salary  of 
an  officer  shall  not  be  diminished 
during  the  term  for  which  he  was 


174 


PUBLIC    COlil'OllATIONS. 


174 


pelled  to  take  less  compensation  for  his  services  than  that  fixed  by 
statute."^ 

§  174.    The  same  subject  continued — Failure  of  corporate  funds. — 

If  no  salary  is  attached  to  an  oflice  in  a  municipal  corporation,  the 
corporation  is  not  liable,  as  the  officers  are  deemed  to  have  been  famil- 
iar with  the  law  or  ordinance  creating  the  office  when  they  accepted 
the  position,  and  there  is  no  implied  contract  for  compensation. ^^ 
Where  an  officer  accepts  the  amount  of  compensation,  his  acceptance 
of  that  sum  estops  him  from  claiming  more/'^     If  the  salary  of  an 


elected,  it  may  be  changed  before 
the  commencement  of  his  term: 
Wesch  V.  Common  Council  &c.,  107 
Mich.  149;  s.  c.  64  N.  W.  1051.  Such 
statute  does  not  apply  to  an  officer 
or  employe  having  no  fixed  term: 
City  of  Lexington  v.  Rennick,  20 
Ky.  L.  1924;  s.  c.  50  S.  W.  1106.  The 
city  council  of  the  city  of  Chicago 
may,  by  ordinance,  fix  the  term  of 
office  of  an  officer,  not  exceeding  two 
years,  when  it  has  power  to  appoint 
such  officer,  ^nd  may  fix  the  salary 
of  such  official  in  the  annual  appro- 
priation bill  for  one  year,  and  for 
each  year  thereafter,  but,  having 
once  fixed  the  salary  for  the  year  it 
can  not  increase  or  diminish  such 
salary  during  the  year:  Turner  v. 
City  of  Chicago,  76  111.  App.  649. 
That  it  can  not  be  changed  during 
his  term,  see  Meissner  v.  Boyle,  20 
Utah  316;  s.  c.  58  Pac.  1110.  It  has 
been  held,  however,  that  where  the 
law  provides  that  the  city  council, 
in  February  of  each  year,  shall  fix 
the  compensation  of  an  employe  for 
the  ensuing  year  and  that  it  shall 
not  be  changed  during  such  year,  a 
contract  by  such  officer,  made  with 
the  mayor,  for  a  different  compen- 
sation, is  invalid:  Rettinghouse  v. 
City  of  Ashland,  106  Wis.  595;  s.  c. 
82  N.  W.  555. 

"People  V.  Board  of  Police,  75  N. 
Y.  38;  People  v.  French,  91  N.  Y. 
265;  Kehn  v.  State,  93  N.  Y.  291. 
Under  the  Vermont  act  of  1884, 
No.    12,    §    2,    which    provides   that 


highway  taxes  shall  be  collected  by 
the  town  collector  when  there  are 
no  street  commissioners,  the  tax 
bills  were  not  given  by  the  town  to 
plaintiff,  who  was  first  constable  and 
ex  officio  collector,  but  were  col- 
lected by  the  town  treasurer.  It 
was  held  that  where  the  declaration 
in  a  suit  for  the  fees  for  such  col- 
lection claimed  no  agreement  for 
fees  as  collector,  as  provided  by  R. 
L.  Vt.,  §  2724,  nor  alleged  any  serv- 
ices rendered,  the  town  was  not  li- 
able therefor,  and  a  subsequent 
promise  to  pay  such  fees  would  be 
without  consideration:  Woodward 
V.  Town  of  Rutland,  61  Vt.  316;  s.  c. 
17  Atl.  797. 

^-  Locke  V.  Central  City,  4  Colo.  65 ; 
City  of  Brazil  v.  McBride,  69  Ind. 
244;  Doolan  v.  City  of  Manitowoc, 
48  Wis.  312;  s.  c.  4  N.  W.  475;  Jones 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  8  M.  &  W.  605;  Askin 
v.  London  &c.,  1  Up.  Can.  Q.  B.  292; 
Pringle  and  McDonald,  In  re,  10  Up. 
Can.  Q.  B.  254;  Reg.  v.  Cumberlege. 
36  L.  T.  (N.  S.)  700. 

"=■'  Hobbs  V.  City  of  Yonkers,  102  N. 
Y.  13;  s.  c.  5  N.  E.  778;  Mclnery  v. 
City  of  Galveston,  58  Tex.  334.  If 
an  officer  renders  a  bill  purporting 
to  cover  the  whole  of  his  services, 
but  really  for  less  than  he  is  en- 
titled to,  and  it  is  allowed  and  paid, 
he  is  debarred  from  recovering  more 
in  the  absence  of  surprise,  accident 
or  mistake  of  fact:  O'Hara  v.  Town 
of  Park  River,  1  N.  D.  279;  s.  c.  47 
N.   W.   380.     It  has  been   held   that 


175 


OFFICERS   AND   AGENTS. 


§  174 


official  is  prescribed  by  an  ordinance  or  by  law  as  being  payable  in 
a  certain  manner  or  out  of  certain  assessments  or  taxes,  and  such 
assessments  or  taxes  have  not  been  collected,  and  the  corporation  is 
not  guilty  of  negligence  in  not  collecting  them,  the  corporation  is 
not  liable  for  the  salary  until  they  have  been  collected.^* 


the  acceptance  of  less  than  the  sal- 
ary fixed  by  law  operates  as  an  es- 
toppel from  claiming  the  residue: 
Hobbs  V.  City  of  Yonkers,  102  N.  Y. 
13;  s.  c.  5  N.  E.  778;  O'Hara  v. 
Town  of  Park  River,  1  N.  D.  279;  s. 
c.  47  N.  W.  380;  De  Boest  v.  Gam- 
bell,  35  Or.  368;  s.  c.  58  Pac.  72,  353; 
Mclnery  v.  City  of  Galveston,  58 
Tex.  334.  But  see  Kehn  v.  State,  93 
N.  Y.  291;  Clark  v.  State,  142 
N.  Y.  101;  s.  c.  36  N.  E.  817.  A 
statute  authorizing  a  city  to  agree 
with  an  officer  for  a  salary  less  than 
that  fixed  by  law  is  constitutional 
(see  Pub.  L.  N.  J.,  p.  161,  2  Gen.  St., 
p.  2123,  §  8):  Tice  v.  City  of  New 
Brunswick,  64  N.  J.  L.  399;  s.  c.  45 
Atl.  781.  A  police  matron  appointed 
by  ordinance  at  a  fixed  salary  can 
not  recover  the  statutory  salary 
fixed  for  such  officer:  Daniels  v.  City 
of  Des  Moines,  108  Iowa  484;  s.  c. 
79  N.  W.  269.  An  agreement  to 
take  less  salary  than  is  provided  by 
law  is  valid  and  enforceable:  Tice  v. 
City  of  New  Brunswick,  64  N.  J.  L. 
399;  s.  c.  45  Atl.  781. 

"*  Andrews  v.  United  States,  2 
Story  202;  People  v.  Supervisors,  1 
Hill  (N.  Y.)  362;  Baker  v.  City  of 
Utica,  19  N.  Y.  326;  Gumming  v. 
Mayor  &c.,  11  Paige  (N.  Y.)  596; 
Smith  V.  Commonwealth,  41  Pa,  St. 
335;  Jersey  City  v.  Quaife,  26  N. 
J.  L.  63;  United  States  v.  Brown, 
9  How.  486;  McClung  v.  St.  Paul,  14 
Minn.  420.  The  charter  of  the  city 
of  Buffalo  provided  that  the  comp- 
troller should,  on  or  before  the  1st 
day  of  April  in  each  year,  furnish 
to  the  council  a  financial  statement 
for  the  current  year,  together  with 
an  estimate  of  the  current  expenses 
of  each  department.     Heads  of  de- 


partments were  also  required  to  fur- 
nish estimates  of  the  amounts  re- 
quired by  their  respective  depart- 
ments for  the  current  year.  The 
council  might  amend  such  estimates, 
and  were  required  to  pass  upon 
them  not  later  than  May  1st.  The 
expenditures  of  each  department 
were  required  to  be  kept  within  the 
estimates  made  for  it;  each  office  or 
purpose  being  debited  with  the 
whole  sum  appropriated,  and  cred- 
ited with  the  salaries  and  other 
fixed  sums  to  be  paid  therefrom,  and 
"the  other  expenditures"  were  not 
to  exceed  the  remainder  of  the  esti- 
mate. Contracts  for  amounts  ex- 
ceeding such  remainder  should  not 
bind  the  city  as  to  the  excess.  The 
mayor  fixed  the  salary  of  the  secre- 
tary of  the  civil  service  commission 
at  $600  per  annum,  payable  monthly, 
but  the  council  only  appropriated 
$50  for  the  expenses  of  the  commis- 
sion for  the  whole  year.  After  pay- 
ing all  the  fixed  expenses  of  the  may- 
or's department,  a  balance  remained 
to  its  credit  of  less  than  the  amount 
of  salary  due  the  secretary.  It  was 
held  that  the  latter  could  recover 
the  $50  appropriated  for  the  ex- 
penses of  the  commission  and  the 
unexpended  balance  to  the  credit  of 
the  mayor's  fund,  but  no  more:  Kip 
V.  City  of  Buffalo,  7  N.  Y.  S.  685;  s. 
c.  27  N.  Y.  St.  52.  But  a  superin- 
tendent employed  by  a  village  for 
the  erection  of  a  public  building 
can  not  recover  his  salary  if  the 
statutory  certificate  that  the  money 
necessary  was  in  the  village  treas- 
ury was  not  issued  by  the  village 
clerk:  Drott  v.  Riverside,  4  Ohio  C. 
C.  312. 


§  175 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS. 


176 


§  175.  The  same  subject  continued — Illustrations. — Where  a  stat- 
ute requires  the  appointment  of  a  town  collector  pro  tempore  to  be 
made  by  writing  under  the  hands  of  the  selectmen,  it  is  not  satisfied 
by  a  writing  signed  with  the  names  of  all  by  one  selectman,  in  the 
absence  of  the  others,  and  with  no  other  authority  than  that  which 
is  implied  by  their  having  agreed  that  the  party  should  be  appointed ; 
and  a  collector  thus  appointed  can  not  maintain  an  action  against 
the  town  for  compensation  for  his  services  in  collecting  the  taxes."^ 
Where  the  recorder  of  a  city  is  vested  under  the  code  of  the  state 
with  concurrent  jurisdiction  with  justices  of  the  peace  of  all  actions, 
civil  and  criminal,  arising  within  the  corporate  limits  of  the  city, 
and  it  is  provided  that  he  shall  receive  such  fees  for  his  services  as  may 
be  allowed  by  law  to  justices  of  the  peace  for  like  services,  except  that 
for  his  services  in  criminal  prosecutions  for  violations  of  ordinances 
he  shall  be  entitled  to  recive  only  such  monthly  salary  as  the  board  of 
trustees  shall  by  ordinance  prescribe,  he  is  vested  with  a  dual  juris- 
diction as  recorder  and  justice,  and  the  fines  he  receives  for  violations 
of  the  penal  code  are  to  be  paid  over  to  the  county  treasurer,  and  he 


"■"^Phelon  v.  Granville,  140  Mass. 
386;  s.  c.  5  N.  E.  269.  A  city  charter 
provided  that  the  mayor's  compen- 
sation should  be  $2,400  per  annum, 
and  might  be  changed,  but  not  dur- 
ing his  term  of  office.  It  was  de- 
cided that  an  ordinance  declaring 
that,  after  the  expiration  of  the  ex- 
isting term,  the  mayor  should  serve 
without  compensation,  was  void,  and 
that  a  mayor  elected  with  knowl- 
edge of  the  ordinance  could  claim  a 
salary,  even  though  as  an  induce- 
ment to  his  election  he  had  said 
that  he  would  serve  without  com- 
pensation: State  V.  Mayor  &c.,  15 
Lea  (Tenn.)  697;  s.  c.  54  Am.  R. 
427.  A  statute  making  no  provision 
for  the  payment  of  a  school  agent,  a 
promise  on  the  part  of  the  town  to 
pay  for  his  services  is  not  implied 
from  the  fact  of  his  election  and  the 
rendition  of  service:  Talbot  v.  In- 
habitants &c.,  76  Maine  415.  The 
aqueduct  commissioners  of  the  city 
of  New  York  have  power  under  the 
New  York  statute  to  employ  and  dis- 


miss inspectors  of  the  work  of  con- 
structing the  aqueduct,  but  have  no 
power  to  suspend  such  an  inspector 
without  pay,  there  being  no  provi- 
sion in  the  statute  for  such  suspen- 
sion; and  an  inspector  may  recover 
pay  for  the  time  during  which  he 
was  so  suspended:  Mullen  v.  Mayor 
&c.,  12  N.  Y.  S.  269;  s.  c.  34  N.  Y.  St. 
913;  following  Gregory  v.  Mayor  &c., 
113  N.  Y.  416;  s.  c.  21  N.  E.  119.  And 
although  the  New  York  statute  au- 
thorizes the  aqueduct  commission- 
ers of  New  York  city  to  suspend 
without  pay  an  inspector  of  the  work 
of  constructing  the  aqueduct,  and 
also  authorizes  them  to  appoint  and 
fix  the  compensation  of  inspectors, 
such  an  inspector,  who  was  sus- 
pended, is  estopped  from  claiming 
his  pay  where  he  signed  a  writing 
which  recited  his  appointment,  and 
provided  that,  if  he  should  at  any 
time  be  suspended,  his  pay  should 
cease:  Phelan  v.  City  of  New  York, 
14  N.  Y.  S.  785;  s.  c.  38  N.  Y.  St.  805. 


177 


OFFICERS    AND   AGENTS. 


176 


must  be  paid  for  liis  services  as  in  the  case  of  justices.®"  If  the  com- 
pensation of  an  ollicer  is  not  fixed  by  the  laws  of  the  state,  his  services, 
if  of  a  strictly  official  nature,  must  be  gratuitous.*'^  It  was  decided  in 
an  Iowa  case  that  where  the  mayor  of  an  incorporated  town  was  in- 
vested by  the  code  of  that  state  with  the  jurisdiction  of  justices  of  the 
peace  in  criminal  cases,  which  did  not,  however,  make  any  provision 
for  compensation,  he  was  not  entitled  to  recover  from  the  county  the 
reasonable  value  of  his  services  in  the  hearing  and  trial  of  a  criminal 
case  in  which,  the  prosecution  failed.''^ 

§  176.  Miscellaneous  instances. — One  who  is  appointed  a  member 
of  a  committee  to  superintend  the  construction  of  water-works  for  a 
city,  because  of  his  knowledge  and  experience  as  a  civil  engineer,  is 
not  such  a  public  officer  as  to  preclude  him  from  recovering  com- 
pensation for  the  services  rendered  under  such  appointment,  where 
no  compensation  therefor  has  previously  been  specifically  provided.^^ 


«« Prince  v.  City  of  Fresno,  88  Cal. 
407;  s.  c.  26  Pac.  606.  Under  the 
New  York  act,  passed  February  27, 
1883,  entitled  "An  act  to  supply  the 
city  of  Schenectady  with  water," 
and  providing  for  the  appointment 
of  three  commissioners,  who,  "for 
the  first  year  after  the  commence- 
ment of  the  construction  of  water- 
works as  hereinafter  prescribed, 
shall  each  receive  such  salary  as 
the  common  council  shall  fix,  .  .  . 
which  shall  not  exceed  $500,"  and 
empowering  them  to  adopt  and  re- 
port any  feasible  plan  for  the  works, 
"embracing  the  purchase  of  any 
water-works,"  the  commissioners 
are  entitled  to  compensation  for  the 
adoption  and  the  recommendation 
to  the  council  of  a  plan  for  purchas- 
ing works  and  for  their  control  and 
management  of  the  works  after  the 
purchase:  Schermerhorn  v.  City  of 
Schenectady,  3  N.  Y.  S.  435;  s.  c.  50 
Hun  (N.  Y.)  331. 

"Boyden  v.  Brookline,  8  Vt.  284; 
Langdon  v.  Town  of  Castleton,  30 
Vt.  285;  City  of  Central  v.  Sears,  2 
Colo.  588;  Locke  v.  Central  City,  4 
Colo.  65. 

°*  Rowland  v.  Wright  Co.,  82  Iowa 
1  Smith — 12 


164;  s.  c.  47  N.  W.  1086,  two  judges 
dissenting. 

«'  City  of  Ellsworth  v,  Rossiter,  46 
Kan.  237;  s.  c.  26  Pac.  674.  See 
also,  Bunn  v.  People,  45  111.  397; 
Butler  V.  Regents  &c.,  32  Wis.  124, 
131;  State  v.  Wilson,  29  Ohio  St. 
347,  349.  In  the  absence  of  any 
statutory  authority  for  the  suspen- 
sion of  an  assistant  engineer  in  the 
department  of  public  works  of  the 
city  of  New  York,  appointed  under 
laws  of  N.  Y.  1882,  at  a  certain  sal- 
ary per  year,  he  may  recover  such 
salary  for  the  time  during  which  he 
is  so  suspended  and  is  not  allowed 
to  render  service:  Morley  v.  City  of 
New  York,  12  N.  Y.  S.  609;  s.  c.  35 
N.  Y.  St.  262;  Lethbridge  v.  Mayor 
&c.,  15  N.  Y.  S.  562;  s.  c.  39  N.  Y.  St. 
385,  where  a  clerk  in  a  city  depart- 
ment maintained  an  action  under 
similar  circumstances.  A  city  hav- 
ing a  treasurer  duly  appointed  and 
qualified  under  the  general  act  of 
incorporation  can  not  defeat  his 
right  to  commissions  for  disburse- 
ment of  the  municipal  funds  by  plac- 
ing them  in  the  hands  of  the  mayor 
for  disbursement:  Beard  v.  City  of 
Decatur,  64  Tex.  7;  s.  c.  53  Am.  R. 


177 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS. 


178 


If  there  is  an  omission  in  a  village  charter  to  make  provision  for 
compensation  to  members  of  a  certain  board,  and  it  is  apparent  that 
such  omission  was  intentional,  the  members  can  not  recover  any 
compensation^"  Where  an  inspector,  under  suspension  without  pay, 
executes  a  written  agreement  with  aqueduct  commissioners  which 
recites  his  previous  appointment,  and  thereby  agrees  that  if  he  is 
suspended  or  discharged  for  any  cause  whatever  while  in  the  employ 
of  such  commission,  his  pay  as  such  inspector  shall  cease  from  and 
after  the  time  of  such  suspension,  subject  to  the  direction  of  the  com- 
missioners, he  is  estopped  from  claiming  the  invalidity  of  the  agree- 
ment as  to  any  period  of  suspension  which  follows  its  execution. '^^ 

§  177.  Extra  compensation. — It  has  long  been  a  fixed  rule  of  law 
that  one  who  accepts  a  public  office  which  has  a  definite  salary  at- 
tached to  it  must  perform  all  the  duties  of  the  office  without  extra 
compensation,  and  even  if  after  he  enters  into  office  his  duties  are 
increased  he  can  not  compel  payment  of  extra  compensation.'^-    Where 


735.  A  selectman,  overseer  of  the 
poor  and  town  agent,  secured  a  pen- 
sion for  one  of  the  town's  paupers, 
and  appropriated  the  amount  re- 
ceived, in  pursuance  of  a  previous 
agreement  with  the  pauper,  to  the 
settlement  of  the  town's  claim 
against  the  latter  for  support.  This 
amount  the  pauper  subsequently  re- 
covered from  the  selectman  by  suit. 
It  was  held  that  the  selectman  was 
not  entitled  to  compensation  from 
the  town  for  the  expenses  incurred 
by  him  in  this  suit:  White  v.  In- 
habitants &c.,  77  Maine  396.  A  per- 
son having  a  fixed  salary,  certain 
continuous  duties  not  menial  &c.,  is 
a  public  officer:  People  v.  Keller,  61 
N.  Y.  S.  746. 

70  Perry  v.  Cheboygan,  55  Mich. 
250;  s.  c.  21  N.  W.  333.  Under  the 
Vermont  statute  which  provides 
that  auditors  shall  not  allow  any 
claim  for  personal  services  except 
when  compensation  is  fixed  by  law 
or  by  vote  of  the  town,  a  tax-lister 
can  recover  only  such  compensation 
as  the  town  votes  him:  Barnes  v. 
Town  of  Bakersfield,  57  Vt.  375. 
Chapter  52  of  New  York  laws  of 
1880,  amending  the  charter  of  New 


York  City,  fixes  at  $3,000  the  salaries 
of  "the  clerks  of  the  police  courts." 
This  provision  has  been  held  not  to 
include  the  clerk's  assistant:  Cre- 
gier  V.  Mayor  &c.,  11  Daly  (N.  Y.) 
171. 

'"■  Emmitt  v.  City  of  New  York,  13 
N.  Y.  S.  887;  s.  c.  38  N.  Y.  St.  355. 

"  People  V.  Vilas,  36  N.  Y.  459,  and 
cases  cited;  Mayor  &c.  v.  Kelly,  98 
N.  Y.  467;  Board  &c.  v.  Clark,  92  N. 
Y.  391;  Board  &c.  v.  Quick,  99  N. 
Y.  138;  s.  c.  1  N.  E.  533;  Board  &c. 
V.  Johnson,  127  Ind.  238;  s.  c.  26  N. 
E.  821;  Pierie  v.  Philadelphia,  139 
Pa.  St.  573;  s.  c.  21  Atl.  90;  Nuckolls 
Co.  V.  Peebler  (Neb.),  91  N.  W.  289. 
Right  of  salaried  officer  of  a  public 
corporation  to  claim  extra  compen- 
sation on  the  ground  that  the  duties 
of  his  office  have  been  increased  or 
new  duties  added  since  his  salary 
was  fixed, — see  People  v.  Supervi- 
sors, 1  Hill  (N.  Y.)  362;  Wendell  v. 
City  of  Brooklyn,  29  Barb.  (N.  Y.) 
204;  Palmer  v.  Mayor  &c.,  2  Sandf. 
(N.  Y.)  318.  See  also,  Andrews  v. 
Pratt,  44  Cal.  309.  Right  of  officer 
to  recover  when  duty  performed  is 
outside  of  his  regular  official  duty, — 
see  Bright  v.  Supervisors,  18  Johns. 
(N.  Y.)  242;  Mallory  v.  Supervisors, 


179 


OFFICERS   AND   AGENTS. 


177 


an  officer's  fees  are  fixed  for  an  actual  day's  work,  and  liis  duties 
embrace  the  work  of  two  or  more  departments,  he  can  not  re- 
cover further  compensation  than  the  amount  fixed  by  statute.''' 
Where  a  constitutional  provision  forbids  a  municipality  to  pay  or 
grant  any  extra  compensation  to  a  public  officer,  or  to  increase  his 
compensation  during  his  continuance  in  office,  it  has  been  decided 
that  a  city  council,  the  members  of  which  receive  no  regular  pay, 
has  no  right  to  vote  compensation  to  members  for  sjiecial  services 
performed  as  a  committee."*  Where  the  statute  provides  that  me- 
chanics, workmen  and  laborers  of  a  municipal  incorporation,  or  for  a 
contractor  of  the  corporation,  shall  receive  the  prevailing  wages,  such 
statute  has  no  reference  to  an  appointee  who  receives  a  regular 
salary.''^     When  an  officer's  compensation  is  fixed,  and  the  law  pro- 


2  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  531;  People  v.  Super- 
visors, 12  Wend.   (N.  Y.)  257. 

"  Under  the  Indiana  statute  of 
1879,  providing  that  the  per  diem  of 
township  trustees  for  each  actual 
day's  service  shall  be  $2,  to  be  paid 
out  of  the  township  fund,  and  that 
for  services  as  overseer  of  the  poor 
he  shall  be  paid  out  of  the  county 
treasury,  one  who  is  the  duly  elected 
township  trustee,  and  has  been  paid 
$2  per  day  out  of  the  township  fund 
for  his  services,  can  not  claim  a 
further  compensation  out  of  the 
county  treasury,  for  the  same  time, 
for  services  as  overseer  of  the  poor: 
Board  &c.  v.  Templeton,  116  Ind. 
369;  s.  c.  19  N.  E.  183.  If  extra 
services  are  performed  by  direction 
of  the  proper  authorities,  having  no 
connection  with  the  duties  of  the  of- 
fice, the  officer  may  be  allowed  com- 
pensation therefor:  United  States  v. 
Austin,  2  Cliff.  325 ;  United  States  v. 
Chassell,  6  Blatchf.  421.  In  case  of 
an  emergency  which  involves  the 
corporate  existence  it  is  within  the 
power  of  the  mayor  and  council  to 
employ  counsel  to  protect  its  inter- 
ests: Rice  V.  Gwinn  (Idaho),  49  Pac. 
412.  Employment  of  assistant  coun- 
sel several  times  by  the  judiciary 
committee  of  the  council,  which  was 
approved  and  ratified  by  the  council, 
does  not  establish  a  custom  binding 


on  the  city  where  an  ordinance  pro- 
vides that  such  employment  shall  be 
at  the  discretion  of  the  mayor  or 
council:  Caswell  v.  City  of  Mar- 
shalltown,  101  Iowa  598;  s.  c.  70  N. 
W.  717. 

■*  Garvie  v.  City  of  Hartford,  54 
Conn.  440;  s.  c.  7  Atl.  723.  Where 
a  statute  fixes  the  city  treasurer's 
salary,  and  says  that  he  shall  not 
receive  "any  other  fee  or  reward 
whatever,"  he  can  claim  nothing  for 
collections  of  county  taxes  which  it 
is  made  his  duty  to  collect  as  such 
officer:  City  of  Poughlieepsie  v. 
Wiltsie,  36  Hun  (N.  Y.)  270.  But 
when  the  functions  of  two  appoint- 
ments or  offices  are  separate  and  dis- 
tinct, one  person  may  be  entitled  to 
recover  compensation  for  both:  Mar- 
vin V.  United  States,  44  Fed.  405. 

"  Rock  V.  City  of  New  Yorlt,  63  N. 
Y.  S.  825.  To  the  same  effect  is 
Bock  V.  City  of  New  York,  64  N.  Y. 
S.  777;  s.  c.  31  Misc.  (N.  Y.) 
55.  The  New  York  laws  of  1897, 
ch.  415,  applies  to  laborers,  mechan- 
ics and  workmen  of  municipalities 
engaged  on  public  works,  as  well  as 
employes  of  contractors  with  the 
city  to  do  like  work :  McAvoy  v.  City 
of  New  York,  65  N.  Y.  S.  274;  s.  c. 
52  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  485.  The  right 
of  an  employe  to  receive  the  pre- 
vailing rate  of  wages  given  by  stat- 


§    177  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  180 

vides  that  no  other  compensation  shall  be  allowed,  he  is  not  entitled 
to  interest  on  public  funds  deposited  by  him  in  a  bank,  either  as 
compensation,  or  for  care  of  public  fund,  or  liability  for  losses.''® 
Where  the  charter  provides  that  in  case  of  the  absence  of  the  mayor, 
the  president  of  the  council,  or  speaker  of  the  house  of  delegates,  if 
the  former  be  absent,  shall  perform  the  duties  of  mayor  and  receive 
the  same  compensation  as  the  mayor  while  so  acting,  it  does  not  mean 
that  the  salary  shall  accrue  to  the  acting  officer  during  the  interim 
and  does  not  mean  that  any  absence  of  the  mayor  shall  cause  a  re- 
duction in  his  salary.''^  In  the  absence  of  express  or  implied  author- 
ity, and  where  the  expenditures  of  a  member  of  the  council  are  not 
necessarily  essential  for  municipal  purposes,  the  council  has  no  legal 
warrant  to  authorize  payment.'^®  Knowledge  of  the  mayor  and  alder- 
men that  an  officer  is  performing  certain  services  does  not  entitle 
him  to  compensation  beyond  that  fixed  by  the  ordinances.''^  The  evi- 
dence must  clearly  show  that  one  claiming  a  salary  larger  than  hereto- 
fore received  is  entitled  to  such  advance.^"  In  a  suit  by  an  employe  to 
recover  notarial  fees,  in  addition  to  his  regular  salary,  the  burden  of 
proof  that  such  services  as  notary  were  voluntary  is  on  the  defend- 
ant.*^ "Where  an  officer  receives  an  annual  salary  he  is  not  entitled 
to  pay  for  extra  services  rendered  on  Sunday  in  the  absence  of  a 
statute  allowing  it.*^ 

ute  is  not  a  vested  right  and  may  be  failing  to  keep  him  employed.     He 

repealed,  and  after  such  repeal  the  is  not  an  officer,  though  appointed 

right   to    recover   prevailing   wages  by  resolution,  and  is  not  entitled  to 

for  services  rendered  prior  thereto  pay    for   time    he    does    not    work: 

in  an  action  brought  thereafter  will  White  v.  City  of  Alameda,  124  Cal. 

not  be  sustained:    Bock  v.   City  of  95;  s.  c.  56  Pac.  795. 

New  York,  64  N.  Y.  S.  777;   s.  c.  31  ^^  Village  of  Glenville  v.  Englehart, 

Misc.    (N.    Y.)    55.     A    person    who  19  Ohio  C.  C.  285. 

is  in  the   performance  of  labor  in  "Bates  v.  City  of  St.  Louis,  153 

lieu    of    his    poll-tax    is    a    laborer  Mo.  18;  s.  c.  54  S.  W.  439. 

of   the   city   and    comes   under   the  ''^  James    v.    City    of    Seattle,    22 

relationship    of   employer   and    em-  Wash.  654;  s.  c.  62  Pac.  84. 

ploye:    City  of  Winfield  v.   Peeden,  "Clark  v.  City  of  Portsmouth,  68 

8  Kan.  App.  671;   s.  c.  57  Pac.  131.  N.  H.  263;  s.  c.  44  Atl.  388. 

Unless  a  person  is  hired  as  a  me-  *"  State  v.  Brittin,  52  La.  An.  94; 

chanic  and  does  mechanic's  work,  he  s,  c.  26  So.  753. 

is  not  to  be  regarded  as  such  and  *^  Merzbach  v.  City  of  New  York, 

entitled  to  the  benefits  of  New  York  163  N.  Y.  16;  s.  c.  57  N.  E.  96. 

laws    of    1894,    ch.    622,    regarding  ""  Tyrrell  v.  City  of  New  York,  159 

wages  of  mechanics:    McCunney  v.  N.  Y.  239;  s.  c.  53  N.  E.  1111.     The 

City  of  New  York,  58  N.  Y.  S.  138;  general  rule  is  that  officers  on  sal- 

s.  c.  40  App.  Div.    (N.  Y.)   482.     A  ary  are  not  entitled  to  charge  for 

driver   of   a   street  wagon   and   en-  services:  O'Sullivan  v.  City  of  New 

gaged  in  the  care  of  the  city's  horses  Orleans,  49  La.  An.  616;  s.  c.  21  So. 

can  not  recover  from  the  city  for  854.    As  to  extra  allowance  to  com- 


181 


OFFICERS    AND   AGENTS. 


178 


§  178.  Compensation  of  attorneys. — A  public  corporation,  unless 
restrained  by  its  charter,  has  the  power  to  employ  attorneys  to  con- 
duct and  carry  on  such  legal  business  as  comes  within  its  corporate 
capacity;*^  and  it  is  bound  to  pay  for  such  services.^*  Likewise  such 
corporation  may  employ  extra  counsel  to  prosecute  or  defend  certain 
suits  or  to  do  certain  legal  work  either  in  conjunction  with  the  city 
solicitor  or  alone.®^  Where  a  charter  gives  power  to  a  municipal 
corporation  to  employ  an  attorney  when  necessary,  and  a  subsequent 
chapter  provides  for  a  law  department,  and  a  chief  officer  to  be  called 
the  attorney  and  counsel,  with  a  salary,  the  department  to  have 
charge  of  and  conduct  all  the  law  business  of  the  corporation,  the 
subsequent  chapter  is  an  implied  repeal  of  the  power  to  employ  an 
attorney  under  the  charter.®^  The  retaining  of  extra  counsel  must 
be  authorized  by  the  corporation.^'^ 


missioners  of  estimate  and  assess- 
ment under  charter  of  Greater  New 
York,  see  In  re  Board  of  Street 
Opening  &c.,  53  N.  Y.  S.  354;  s.  c.  33 
App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  137.  Hostlers  only 
under  N.  Y.  laws  of  1894,  ch.  368,  are 
entitled  to  extra  pay:  Tyrrell  v.  City 
of  New  York,  159  N.  Y.  239;  s.  c.  53 
N.  E.  1111.  Where  a  person  is  il- 
legally discharged  and  is  reinstated 
he  can  not  recover  costs  and  counsel 
fees  in  addition  to  his  salary: 
O'Hara  v.  City  of  New  York,  59  N. 
Y.  S.  36;  s.  c.  28  Misc.  (N.  Y.)  258. 
Where  a  city  officer,  acting  under  a 
salary,  is  vested  with  the  powers  of 
a  justice  of  the  peace  he  is  not  en- 
titled to  justice  fees:  Johnson  v. 
State,  94  Tenn.  499;  s.  c.  29  S.  W. 
963.  A  police  officer  on  a  salary  is 
not  entitled  to  the  fees  of  a  con- 
stable, although  he  has  the  powers 
vested  in  him  as  a  constable:  John- 
son V.  State,  94  Tenn.  499;  s.  c.  29 
S.  W.  963. 

''State  V.  Mayor  &c.,  40  N.  J.  L. 
186;  Smith  v.  Mayor  &c.,  13  Cal.  531. 

"  Langdon  v.  Town  of  Castleton, 
30  Vt.  285. 

«Hugg  V.  City  Council  &c.,  29  N. 
J.  Eq.  6.  See  also,  Curtis  v.  Gowan, 
34  111.  App.  516. 

^^  Lyddy  v.  Long  Island  City,  104 
N.  Y.  218;  s.  c.  10  N.  E.  155.     Where 


an  action  was  brought  by  a  city  at- 
torney to  recover  for  services  per- 
formed for  the  city,  it  was  decided 
that  the  preparation  of  a  digest  or 
a  codification  of  the  laws  applicable 
to  such  city  was  within  the  line  of 
his  duty  as  laid  down  by  the  city 
charter,  which  provided  that  he' 
"should  do  all  and  every  professional 
act  incident  to  the  office  which 
might  be  required  of  him"  by  the 
officers  of  said  city:  Hays  v.  City  of 
Oil  City  (Pa.),  11  Atl.  63. 

"  City  of  Memphis  v.  Adams,  9 
Heisk.  (Tenn.)  518;  s.  c.  24  Am.  R. 
331;  Clarke  v.  Lyon  Co.,  8  Nev.  181; 
City  of  Memphis  v.  Brown,  20  Wall. 
289,  321.  See  Roper  v.  Town  of 
Laurinburg,  90  N.  C.  427;  Water- 
bury  V.  City  of  Laredo,  60  Tex.  519. 
See  also,  Hornblower  v.  Duden,  35 
Cal.  664,  666;  Clough  v.  Hart,  8  Kan. 
487.  Compensation  of  city  attorney, 
—see  Orton  v.  State,  12  Wis.  509; 
Carroll  v.  City  of  St.  Louis,  12  Mo. 
444;  Dillon  Munic.  Corp.  (4th  ed.), 
chapter  on  Corporate  Officers.  Where 
the  mayor  may  be  employed  as  at- 
torney and  counsel, — see  Mayor  &c. 
V.  Muzzy,  33  Mich.  61;  s.  c.  20  Am.  R. 
670.  If  a  county  attorney  goes  be- 
yond the  limits  of  his  county  with 
the  consent  and  at  the  instance  of 
the   county   board,   he   may   recover 


§  1"9 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS. 


183 


§  179.  The  same  subject  continued. — The  duties  and  compensation 
of  attorneys  are  generally  regulated  or  fixed  by  statute  or  ordinance. 
And  a  state  statute  which,  without  limitation,  gave  the  city  attorney 
of  a  city  fees  for  the  trial  of  cases,  was  held  in  a  Connecticut  case 
not  to  be  restricted  in  its  application  to  cases  tried  in  the  city  courts.^^ 
Where  a  city  has  power  to  allow  its  attorney  "fees,"  it  may  also 
allow  him  a  commission  on  all  sums  of  money  collected  for  the  city; 
and  under  an  ordinance  authorizing  such  allowance,  no  distinction 
can  be  taken  between  collections  in  civil  and  in  criminal  cases.^^ 
When  it  is  forbidden  by  statute  to  increase  the  compensation  of  the 
attorney  for  the  city  during  his  term  of  otlfice,  the  fact  that  the  city 
advances  from  the  second  to  the  first  class  during  the  attorney's 
term  of  office  does  not  abrogate  the  statutory  prohibition.^" 


reasonable  compensation  in  addition 
to  his  salary:  Commissioners  &c.  v. 
Brewer,  9  Kan.  307;  White  v.  Polk 
Co.,  17  Iowa  413;  Butler  v.  Board 
&c.,  15  Kan.  178;  Huffman  v.  Board 
&c.,  23  Kan.  281. 

^' Smith  V.  City  of  Waterbury,  54 
Conn.  174;  s.  c.  7  Atl.  17.  In  the 
last  cited  case  it  was  held  that  the 
words  "continuance  in  office,"  in  the 
constitution  of  Connecticut,  amend- 
ment 24,  prohibiting  the  legislature 
from  increasing  the  salai'y  of  any 
public  officer  during  his  "continu- 
ance in  office,"  mean  continuing  of- 
fice under  one  appointment;  and  the 
act  of  1881,  providing  that  "the  city 
attorney  [of  Waterbury]  shall  be 
entitled  to  fees  for  his  services  in 
cases  tried  for  the  city,"  is  not  un- 
constitutional, so  far  as  it  affects 
that  officer  upon  his  re-appointment 
to  that  position  in  1881,  at  the  expi- 
ration of  his  former  term.  And  also 
that  a  statute  giving  a  city  attorney 
fees  for  "cases  tried  for  said  city" 
is  not  restricted  in  application  to 
technical  "cases"  in  courts  of  justice, 
but  applies  also  to  a  trial  of  certain 
matters  for  the  city  before  a  rail- 
road commission. 

^^  City  of  Austin  v.  Johns,  62  Tex. 
179.  Under  an  ordinance  which 
gives  a  city  attorney  ten  per  cent, 
on  all  sums  of  money  collected  for 


the  city,  such  percentage  is  not  re- 
stricted to  sums  which  the  attorney 
actually  assisted  to  collect:  City  of 
Austin  V.  Walton,  68  Tex.  507;  s.  c.5 
S.  W.  70,  where  it  was  also  decided 
that  an  ordinance  which  gives  a 
city  attorney  ten  per  cent,  of  all 
sums  of  money  collected  for  the  city 
is  not  repugnant  to  a  subsequent 
ordinance  giving  him  a  salary  and 
fees  in  addition  in  specified  cases, 
and  is  not  impliedly  repealed  there- 
by. -  -  -  A  city  ordinance,  passed 
in  1880,  gave  the  city  attorney  a  sal- 
ary in  lieu  of  all  other  compensa- 
tion. A  subsequent  statute  gave  him 
fees  for  the  trial  of  cases.  It  was 
held  that  the  compensation  given  by 
the  statute,  not  being  in  terms  in 
lieu  of  all  other  compensation,  was 
cumulative,  and  that  the  city  attor- 
ney was  entitled  both  to  the  salary 
given  by  the  ordinance  and  the  trial 
fees  given  by  the  statute:  Smith  v. 
City  of  Waterbury,  54  Conn.  174; 
s.  c.  7  Atl.  17. 

^  Under  an  Arkansas  statute  which 
provided  that  a  city  council  should 
not  increase  the  salary  of  a  city  of- 
ficer during  his  term  in  office,  when 
the  council  of  a  city  of  the  second 
class  had  fixed  the  salary  of  the 
city  attorney,  it  could  not,  after  be- 
coming a  city  of  the  first  class,  in- 
crease his  salary  during  his  term  in 


1S3 


OFFICERS    AND   AGENTS. 


180 


§  180.  Compensation — Power  of  legislature  to  control. — The  state 
legislature,  ex(-e})t  as  restrained  by  the  eonstitution,  has  the  power 
to  increase,  diminish,  or  cut  off  entirely,  the  salary  of  an  official.''^ 
Likewise  the  legislature  may  increase  the  duties  without  enhancing 
the  compensation,  or  may  diminish  the  compensation  without  lessen- 
ing the  duties.^^ 


office:   Barnes  v.  Williams,  53  Ark. 
205;  s.  c.  13  S.  W.  845. 

''^Swann  v.  Buck,  40  Miss.  268; 
Connor  v.  Mayor  &c.,  5  N.  Y.  285; 
affirming  s.  c.  2  Sandf.  (N.  Y.)  355;^- 
People  V.  Morrell,  21  Wend.  (N.  Y.) 
563;  People  v.  Warner,  7  Hill  (N. 
Y.)  81;  s.  c.  2  Denio  (N,  Y.)  272; 
Phillips  V.  Mayor  &c.,  1  Hilt.  (N. 
Y.)  483;  Smith  v.  New  York,  37  N. 
Y.  518;  Butler  v.  Pennsylvania,  10 
How.  402;  Cooley  Const.  Lim.  276; 
People  V.  Mahaney,  13  Mich.  481; 
Bird  V.  Wasco  Co.,  3  Or.  282;  Oregon 
V,  Pyle,  1  Or.  149;  Coffin  v.  State,  7 
Ind.  157;  Turpen  v.  County  Com'rs, 
7  Ind.  172;  Cowdin  v.  Huff,  10  Ind. 
83;  Bryan  v.  Cattell,  15  Iowa  538, 
553,  per  Wright,  C.  J.;  Cotton  v. 
Ellis,  7  Jones  L,  (N.  C.)  545;  Hoke 
V.  Henderson,  4  Dev.  (N.  C.)  1.  Po- 
lice officers  of  cities  are  not  within 
the  constitutional  provision  forbid- 
ding legislation  to  change  the  com- 
pensation of  public  officers  while  in 
office:  Mangam  v.  Brooklyn,  98  N. 
Y.  585;  s.  c.  50  Am.  R.  705.  An  offi- 
cer who  held  over,  and  discharged 
his  official  duties  until  his  succes- 
sor qualified,  was  held  to  be  en- 
titled to  pay  for  his  services,  al- 
though there  was  no  such  provision 
of  law:  Robb  v.  Carter,  65  Md.  321; 
s.  c.  4  Atl.  282.  Held  that  city  attor- 
ney of  New  Orleans,  in  office  at  the 
adoption  of  the  new  constitution  of 
1898,  was  limited  to  salary  under 
constitution  and  laws  of  1879:  State 
V.  Brittin,  52  La.  An.  94;  s.  c.  26 
So.  753.  Construction  of  Madison 
city  charter  in  reference  to  payment 
of  salary  of  surveyor:  Kollock  v. 
Dodge,  105  Wis.  187;   s.  c.  80  N.  W. 


608.  Officers  have  no  vested  rights 
in  future  unearned  compensation: 
In  re  Wilkins  Place,  54  N.  Y.  S.  65. 
Services  rendered  outside  the  city 
but  for  the  city  create  a  liability: 
Quigg  V.  Evans,  121  Cal.  546;  s.  c.  53 
Pac.  1093. 

»' State  V.  Davis,  44  Mo.  129;  Hyde 
V.  State,  52  Miss.  665;  Wilcox  v.  Rod- 
man, 46  Mo.  322;  Sharpe  v.  Robert- 
son, 5  Graft.  (Va.)  518.  The  Califor- 
nia statute  of  1883  provided  that 
marshals  of  cities  of  the  sixth  class 
should  receive  a  compensation  to  be 
fixed  by  ordinance  by  the  board  of 
trustees;  also  prescribed  the  mar- 
shal's duties,  and  provided  that  he 
should,  for  service  of  any  process, 
receive  the  same  fees  as  constables. 
The  court  decided  that  the  compen- 
sation fixed  by  the  trustees  under 
the  statute  was  for  all  duties  im- 
posed on  the  marshal:  Mundell  v. 
City  of  Pasadena,  87  Cal.  520;  s.  c. 
25  Pac.  1061.  Under  the  New  York 
statute  authorizing  the  aqueduct 
commissioners  of  the  city  of  New 
York  to  appoint  and  fix  the  compen- 
sation of  inspectors  of  the  work  of 
constructing  the  aqueduct,  the  com- 
missioners have  no  power  to  sus- 
pend such  an  inspector  without  pay, 
there  being  no  provision  in  the  stat- 
ute for  such  suspension;  and  an  in- 
spector may  recover  pay  for  the 
time  during  which  he  was  so  sus- 
pended: Emmitt  v.  City  of  New 
York,  13  N.  Y.  S.  887;  s.  c.  38  N.  Y. 
St.  355;  following  Mullen  v.  Mayor 
&c.,  12  N.  Y.  S.  269;  s.  c.  34  N.  Y.  St. 
913.  Under  the  California  statute 
of  1883,  municipal  corporations  are 
divided  into  classes,  and  by  che  same 


§    181  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  184 

§  181.  Compensation  in  case  of  removal. — Where  an  officer  was 
illegally  removed  from  office  and  was  reinstated,  and  was  at  all  times 
ready  and  willing  to  discharge  his  duties,  he  is  entitled  to  compensa- 
tion for  the  time  he  was  kept  from  his  duties."^  And  where  an 
officer  is  subject  to  civil  service  law,  is  illegally  reduced  in  rank  and 
salary,  and  is  reinstated,  he  is  entitled  to  his  original  salary,  the 
compensation  being  an  incident  to  the  office.^*  Where,  after  his 
term  expired,  an  officer  continued  to  render  services  with  knowledge 
of  the  city  council,  the  members  of  which  expressed  satisfaction, 
and  when  his  bill  for  services  was  presented,  made  no  objection,  there 
is  an  implied  promise  to  pay.^^  Where  two  cities  consolidate,  an  em- 
ploye of  one  of  the  cities,  who  occupied  a  subordinate  position,  and 
who  does  not  apply  for  reinstatement  under  the  charter  of  consolida- 
tion, and  performs  no  services  thereunder,  is  not  entitled  to  a  salary  for 
the  time  after  the  consolidation.^^  An  appointee  unlawfully  removed, 
who  has  made  no  complaint  to  the  mayor  or  council  and  no  attempt 
to  secure  reinstatement,  can  not  recover  salary  for  the  period  when 
no  services  were  rendered.®^  It  has  been  held,  however,  that  an  un- 
lawful removal  creates  no  vacancy ;  and  where  no  one  else  is  appointed 
to  the  position  and  paid  for  performing  the  duties,  the  salary  may  be 
recovered.''^  After  the  removal  of  a  city  officer  and  the  filling  of  his 
place  by  another,  to  whom  the  salary  has  been  paid,  such  officer  can 
not  maintain  suit  for  salary  accruing  after  the  removal  until  he 
has  been  declared  entitled  to  the  office  in  a  direct  proceeding  for  that 
purpose.®^ 

act  the  board  of  trustees  of  cities  of  '^  Buck  v.  City  of  Eureka,  124  Cal. 

the  fifth  and  sixth  classes  are  au-  61;  s.  c.  56  Pac.  612. 

thorized  to  fix  by  ordinance  the  com-  '"  Quinhard  v.  City  of  New  York, 

pensation  of  city  marshals.     In  an  64  N.  Y.  S.  904,  51  App.  Div,  (N.  Y.) 

action  by  the  marshal  of  a  city  (of  233. 

the  sixth  class)  to  recover  for  serv-  ^^  Byrnes  v.  City  of   St.   Paul,   78 

ices  rendered,  the  complaint  failed  Minn.  205;   s.  c.  80  N.  W.  959.     Cf. 

to  state  that  the  board  of  trustees  Hagan  v.  City  of  Brooklyn.  126  N. 

of  such   city  had   passed  any   ordi-  Y.  643;  s.  c.  27  N.  E.  265;  Phillips  v. 

nance  fixing  the  compensation  of  the  City  of  Boston,  150  Mass.  491;   s.  c. 

marshal,  or  to  state  to  what  class  of  23  N.  E.  202;  Bernard  v.  City  of  Ho- 

municipal  corporations  such  city  be-  boken,  27  N.  J.  L.  413. 

longed.     It    was    decided    that    the  "*  O'Hara  v.  City  of  New  York,  62 

complaint  was  demurrable:    Pritch-  N.  Y.  S.  146;  s.  c.  46  App.  Div.   (N. 

ett  v.  Stanislaus  Co.,  73  Cal.  310;  s.  Y.)  518. 

c.  14  Pac.  795.  "*  Gorley  v.  City  of  Louisville,  20 

'5  O'Hara  v.  City  of  New  York,  59  Ky.  L.  602;  s.  c.  47  S.  W.  263.     The 

N.  Y.  S.  36;   s.  c.  28  Misc.   (N.  Y.)  general   rule    is   that   compensation 

258.  ceases    with    removal    from    oflice: 

"People  v.   Feitner,   63   N.   Y.   S.  State  v.  Williams,  6  S.  D.  119;  s.  c. 

209;  s.  c.  49  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  101.  60  N.  W.  410. 


185 


OFFICERS    AND    AGENTS. 


182 


§  182.  Qualifications  for  office-holding. — Where  neither  by  consti- 
tutiou  nor  by  statute  are  the  qualifications  for  office  prescribed,  any 
one  is  eligible  who  possesses  the  elective  franchise.  It  may  happen, 
therefore,  that  one  may  be  an  officer  who  is  not  a  citizen  of  the  United 
States;  for  in  a  number  of  the  states  aliens,  who  have  declared  their 
intention  to  become  citizens,  and  have  the  qualification  of  residence, 
are  given  the  franchise.*""  The  state  constitution  or  statutes  gen- 
erally lay  down  the  qualifications  of  officers.*"*  Eligibility  to  office 
belongs  not  exclusively  or  specially  to  electors  enjoying  the  right  of 
suffrage  :  it  belongs  equally  to  all  persons  whomsoever  are  not  excluded 
by  the  constitution,*"-  and  can  not  be  changed  by  any  ordinance  or 
acts  of  the  corporation.*"^     If  the  statute  provides  that  the  accept- 


""  McCarthy    v.    Froelke,    63    Ind. 
507. 

"'State  V.  Murray,  28  Wis.  96; 
State  V.  Smith,  14  Wis.  497;  Wheat 
V.  Smith,  50  Ark.  266;  s.  c.  7  S.  W. 
161;  Hannon  v.  Grizzard,  89  N.  C. 
115.  Cf.  Darrow  v.  People,  8  Colo.  417; 
s.  c.  8  Pac.  661;  People  v.  Hamilton, 
24  111.  App.  609.  If  a  person  already 
holding  an  office  is  elected  or  ap- 
pointed to  another  incompatible 
with  the  one  which  he  holds,  and  he 
accepts  and  qualifies  to  the  second, 
such  acceptance  and  qualification  op- 
erate, ipso  facto,  as  a  resignation  of 
the  former  office:  State  v.  Brink- 
erhoff,  66  Tex.  45;  s.  c.  17  S.  W.  109. 
Cf.  Attorney-General  v.  Marston,  66 
N.  H.  485;  s.  c.  22  Atl.  560;  People 
V.  Hanifan,  96  111.  420;  King  v.  Tiz- 
zard,  9  B.  &  C.  418;  Milward  v. 
Thatcher,  2  T.  R.  87.  See  De  Turk 
V.  Commonwealth,  12  Pa.  St.  151; 
s.  c.  18  Atl.  757;  Cotton  v.  Phillips, 
56  N.  H.  220.  Sometimes  it  is  pro- 
vided that  no  person  shall  hold  two 
lucrative  offices,  or  offices  in  two  de- 
partments of  the  government,  at  the 
same  time:  Davenport  v.  Mayor  &c., 
67  N.  Y.  456;  People  v.  Brooklyn 
Common  Council,  77  N.  Y.  503;  s.  c. 
33  Am.  R.  659;  Re  Corliss,  11  R.  I. 
638;  Dailey  V.  State,  8  Blackf.  (Ind.) 
329;  Rodman  v.  Harcourt,  4  B.  Mon. 
(Ky.)  224,  499;  State  v.  De  Gress, 
53  Tex.  387;  State  v.  Clarke,  3  Nev. 


566;  People  v.  Leonard,  73  Cal.  230; 
s.  c.  14  Pac.  853;  Creighton  v.  Piper, 
14  Ind.  182;  Kerr  v.  Jones,  19  Ind. 
351;  Howard  v.  Shoemaker,  35  Ind. 
Ill;  State  v.  Kirk,  44  Ind.  401;  Foltz 
V.  Kerlin,  105  Ind.  221;  s.  c.  4  N.  E. 
439;  5  N.  E.  672;  People  v.  Whit- 
man, 10  Cal.  38;  People  v.  Sander- 
son, 30  Cal.  160;  Crawford  v.  Dun- 
bar, 52  Cal.  36;  Hoglan  v.  Carpen- 
ter, 4  Bush  (Ky.)  89.  Women  may 
be  school  officers  in  Massachusetts; 
115  Mass.  602;  also  in  Iowa:  Huff  v. 
Cook,  44  Iowa  639. 

'"-  Barker  v.  People,  3  Cow.  (N.  Y.) 
686,  703.  See  State  v.  George,  23 
Fla.  585;  s.  c.  3  So.  81. 

'"^People  V.  Phillips,  1  Denio  (N. 
Y.)  388;  Petty  v.  Looker,  21  N.  Y. 
267;  Commonwealth  v.  Woelper,  3  S. 
&  R.  (Pa.)  29;  Rex  v.  Spencer,  3 
Burr.  1827;  Newling  v.  Francis,  3  T. 
R.  189;  Rex  v.  Bumstead,  2  B.  &  Ad. 
699;  Rex  v.  Chitty,  5  Ad.  &  El.  609; 
Rex  V.  Weymouth,  7  Mod.  373. 
Where  the  charter  of  a  city  provides 
that  the  mayor,  recorder  and  alder- 
men, when  assembled,  shall  consti- 
tute the  common  council,  and  fur- 
ther provides  that  the  common  coun- 
cil shall  be  judge  of  the  election  and 
qualification  of  its  members,  this 
power  extends  to  the  election  and 
qualification  of  the  mayor;  and  be- 
ing conclusive,  the  court  will  not 
grant  a  quo  warranto  after  the  coun- 


183 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS. 


186 


ance  by  an  officer  of  another  office  shall  cause  the  first  office  to  become 
vacant,  the  acceptance  disqualifies  such  officer  from  further  acting 
in  his  original  capacity,  and  without  a  judicial  determination.^'** 
Where  the  law  provides  that  no  person  shall  be  eligible  to  the  office 
of  alderman  unless  he  shall  have  been  a  resident  of  his  ward  for  at 
least  one  year  preceding  such  election,  it  means  one  year  next  pre- 
ceding the  election. ^°^ 

§  183.  Official  oath. — Public  officers  are  usually  required  by  stat- 
ute to  take  an  oath  before  entering  upon  the  duties  of  the  office. ^''^ 
Where  the  form  is  prescribed  by  law  it  should  be  substantially  fol- 
lowed; a  literal  adherence  is  not  necessary,^'^^  but  a  material  variation 
cil  has  taken  action:  Dafoe  v.  Har-     55  Pac.  913.  Where  a  charter  requires 


Shaw,  60  Mich.  200;  s.  c.  26  N.  W. 
879.  When  the  government  of  a  city 
or  town  is  controlled  by  the  gen- 
eral municipal  incorporation  act  of 
Florida,  neither  six  months'  resi- 
dence nor  registration  is  requisite 
to  eligibility  to  office  in  such  city  or 
town,  in  the  absence  of  any  consti- 
tutional or  statutory  provision  to 
that  effect:  State  v.  George,  23  Fla. 
585;  s.  c.  3  So.  81.  The  legislature 
incorporating  a  town  may  appoint 
the  officers  to  exercise  their  func- 
tions until  a  regular  election,  not- 
withstanding the  constitution  pro- 
vides that  town  officers  shall  be 
elected  by  the  electors  of  such 
towns:  Roche  v.  Jones,  87  Va.  484; 
s.  c.  12  S.  B.  965.  Where  the  law 
provides  that  no  person  shall  be 
elected  to  a  city  office  who  is  at  the 
time  in  arrears  in  his  city  taxes,  a 
person  who  pays  his  arrears  at  9 
o'clock  on  the  morning  of  the  elec- 
tion is  not  disqualified:  State  v. 
Berkeley,  140  Mo.  184;  s.  c.  41  S. 
W.  732.  But  not  so  if  not  paid  until 
after  election:  State  v.  Page,  140 
Mo.  501;  s.  c.  41  S.  W.  963.  One 
who  owns  and  pays  taxes  on  person- 
alty and  who  owns  realty,  but  is  not 
liable  for  taxes  for  the  current  year 
by  reason  of  acquirement  since  the 
date  of  assessment,  is  eligible  for 
mayor  under  a  statute  requiring  the 
mayor  to  be  a  taxpaying  freeholder: 
Mayer  v.  Sweeney,  22  Mont.  103 ;    s.  c. 


a  residence  of  three  years  in  the  city 
as  a  condition  to  eligibility,  one 
who  has  resided  three  years  in  ter- 
ritory annexed  to  the  city  is  eligible: 
Gibson  v.  Wood,  20  Ky.  L.  1547;  s.  c. 
49  S.  W.  768.  That  an  officer  elected 
has  qualified  is  not  to  be  presumed, 
but  must  be  shown:  O'Connor  v. 
City  of  Fond  du  Lac,  101  Wis.  83 ;  s. 
c.  76  N.  W.  1116.  In  the  absence  of 
a  statute  a  person  may  hold  two  of- 
fices: Santa  Ana  Water  Co.  v.  Town 
of  San  Buena  Ventura,  65  Fed.  323. 
A  nonresident  of  state  can  not  hold 
office:  Barker  v.  Southern  Const. 
Co.,  20  Ky.  L.  796;  s.  c.  47  S.  W.  608. 
Oath  must  be  filed  with  the  clerk  of 
the  village  under  N.  Y.  laws  of  1892, 
ch.  687,  §  3,  instead  of  with  the  clerk 
of  the  county:  In  re  Board  of  Health 
&c.,  60  N.  Y.  S.  27;  s.  c.  43  App.  Div. 

(N.  Y.)  236. 

>"*  Oliver  v.   Mayor  &c.,   63   N.   J. 

L.  96;    s.  c.  42  Atl.  782;    Bishop  v. 

State,  149   Ind.   223;    s.  c.  48  N.  E. 

1038;    39  L.  R.  A.  278;    63  Am.   St. 

270. 
^"^Dowty    V.    Pittwood,    23    Mont. 

113;  s.  c.  57  Pac.  727. 

"» The  subject  of  Official  Bonds  is 

discussed  in  a  special  chapter,  post. 
^"^  State  V.  City  of  Trenton,  35  N. 

J  L.  485 ;  Bassett  v.  Den,  17  N.  J.  L. 

432;  Tide  Water  Canal  Co.  v.  Arch- 
er, 9  Gill  &  J.  (Md.)  479;  Hankins  v. 

Calloway,  88  111.  155, 


187 


OFFICERS   AND   AGENTS, 


§  184 


will  invalidate  the  oath.^"^  It  need  not  be  in  writing  or  subscribed 
unleas  the  statute  expressly  so  provides.^"''  The  odieer  who  is  re- 
quired to  administer  the  oath  can  not  lawfully  refuse,  to  do  so  on 
account  of  the  ineligibility  of  the  person  elected.^^" 

§  184.  The  same  subject  continued — According  to  the  weight  of 
authority  in  this  country,  statutory  provisions  fixing  the  time  within 
which  an  official  oath  must  be  taken  are  construed  to  be  directory; 
and  a  delay  does  not  ipso  facto  vacate  the  office,  provided  the  oath 
is  taken  before  the  office  is  declared  vacant  by  judicial  proceedings.^^^ 
But  a  contrary  doctrine  is  declared  in  several  cases,  holding  that 
such  statutes  are  not  directory  where  the  delay  is  caused  by  neglect 
or  refusal.^ ^^  A  statute  requiring  an  oath  to  be  administered  by  a 
particular  officer  was  decided  in  New  York  to  be  directory,  and  it  was 
held  that  the  oath  might  be  taken  before  any  officer  authorized  by  a 
general  statute.  ^^^ 

§  185.  Duties  of  officers. — As  a  rule,  the  duties  of  officers  are  fixed 
by  the  ordinance  or  statute  creating  them;  but  in  a  New  York  case^^^ 


^•^  State  V.  City  of  Trenton,  35  N. 
J.  L.  485;  Bowler  v.  Perrin,  47  Mich. 
154;  s.  c.  10  N.  W.  180;  Chapman  v. 
Clark,  49  Mich.  305;  s.  c.  13  N.  W. 
601;  Bohlman  v.  Railway  Co.,  40 
Wis.  157.  An  oath  "faithfully  to 
discharge  their  duties"  does  not  ful- 
fill a  prescribed  form  to  discharge 
their  duties  "impartially,  and  to  the 
test  of  their  judgment":  In  re  Cam- 
bria Street,  75  Pa.  St.  357.  See,  for 
other  defects  pronounced  merely 
formal,  Horton  v.  Parsons,  37  Hun 
(N.  Y.)  42,  a  strong  case;  Colman  v. 
Shattuck,  62  N.  Y.  348;  People  v. 
Stowell,  9  Abb.  N.  C.  (N.  Y.)  456; 
Hoagland  v.  Culvert,  20  N.  J.  L.  387; 
People  V.  Perkins,  85  Cal.  509;  s.  c. 
26  Pac.  245;  Bassett  v.  Den,  17  N.  J. 
L.  432.  And  for  evidence  that  the 
oath  has  been  taken,  Halbeck  v. 
Mayor  &c.,  10  Abb.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  439; 
Harwood  v.  Marshall,  9  Md.  83; 
Scammon  v.  Scammon,  28  N.  H.  419; 
State  V.  Green,  15  N.  J.  L.  88. 

^'**  Davis  V.  Berger,  54  Mich.  652; 
s.  c.  20  N.  W.  629. 

""People  V.  Dean,  3  Wend.  (N.  Y.) 
438,  case  of  an  infant.  See  also. 
Miller  v.  Supervisors,  25  Cal.  93. 


"^Throop  Public  Officers,  §  173, 
and  numerous  cases  there  cited. 

"-Throop  Public  Officers,  §§  173, 
174,  175;  citing  (on  p.  188)  State  v, 
Matheny,  7  Kan.  327;  Courser  v. 
Powers,  34  Vt.  517,  where  a  justice 
of  the  peace,  sued  for  an  arrest, 
could  not  justify  unless  he  had  tak- 
en the  oath  of  office  before  the  ar- 
rest, although  he  took  it  on  the  same 
day.  The  oath  need  not  be  taken 
while  a  contest  is  pending  to  deter- 
mine who  is  legally  entitled  to  the 
office:  Mechem  Public  Offices  and 
Officers,  §  262;  citing  People  v.  Pot- 
ter, 63  Cal.  127;  Pearson  v.  Wilson, 
57  Miss.  848. 

"='Ex  parte  Heath,  3  Hill  (N.  Y.) 
42;  Canniff  v.  Mayor  &c.,  4  E.  D. 
Smith  (N.  Y.)  430.  See  also,  State 
v.  Stanley,  66  N.  C.  59;  and  contra, 
Rex  V.  Ellis,  9  East  252,  note;  s.  c.  2 
Str.  994.  But  irregularities  of  this 
nature  do  not  prevent  the  applica- 
tion of  the  rule  validating  acts  of  de 
facto  officers:  State  v.  Perkins,  24  N. 
J.  L.  409. 

"'  People  V.  Cook,  14  Barb.  (N.  Y.) 
259;  s.  c.  8  N.  Y.  67. 


§  1S6 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS. 


188 


it  was  held  that  "statutes  directing  the  mode  of  proceeding  hy  public 
officers  are  directory,  and  are  not  regarded  as  essential  to  the  validity 
of  the  proceedings  themselves  unless  it  be  so  declared  in  the  statute." 
Where  from  the  nature  of  the  office  the  officer  is  called  upon  to  exer- 
cise duties  involving  judgment  and  discretion,  he  can  not  delegate 
his  power.^^^  Where  all  the  legitimate  lights  for  ascertaining  the 
meaning  of  the  constitution  have  been  made  use  of,  it  may  still  hap- 
pen that  the  construction  remains  a  matter  of  doubt;  and  in  such  a 
case  every  one  called  upon  to  act,  where,  in  his  opinion,  the  proposed 
action  would  be  of  doubtful  constitutionality,  is  bound  upon  the  doubt 
alone  to  abstain  from  acting/^^  It  is  frequently  provided  by  statute 
that  the  incumbents  of  certain  municipal  offices  shall  not  be  in  any 
manner  interested  in  contracts  for  which  the  corporation  is  liable: 
these  statutes  are  generally  strictly  construed.^^'^ 

§  186.    Powers  of  mayor. — The  mayor  is  the  chief  officer  or  execu- 
tive magistrate  of  the  corporation,  and  his  powers  depend  entirely 


"=  The  duty  to  examine  and  pass 
upon  resolutions  and  ordinances  of 
the  common  council,  and  determine 
whether  they  shall  be  approved, 
imposed  by  the  city  charter  on  the 
mayor,  is  a  duty  calling  for  the  ex- 
ercise of  his  judgment  and  expe- 
rience, and  can  not  be  delegated  to 
the  mayor's  clerk:  Lyth  v.  City  of 
Buffalo,  48  Hun  (N.  Y.)  175.  The 
mayor  of  Hudson,  not  being  one  of 
the  officials  designated  in  laws  of 
New  York  of  1890,  was  not  obliged 
to  take  the  test  oath  required  of 
such  officials  by  §  3  of  the  same  act: 
People  v.  Gregg,  13  N.  Y.  S.  114;  s. 
c.  59  Hun   (N.  Y.)   107. 

"«Cooley  Const.  Lim.  (6th  ed.), 
ch.  4,  p.  88.  The  revised  statutes  of 
Indiana  make  it  the  duty  of  a  town- 
ship trustee  to  grant  temporary  re- 
lief to  one,  not  an  inhabitant  of  the 
township,  who  is  sick  or  in  distress, 
and  without  money  or  friends,  etc. 
It  was  decided  that  the  trustee  is 
not  precluded  from  acting  by  the 
fact  that  such  a  person  has  been  re- 
ceived into  a  house  from  charitable 
motives,  and  has  been  and  is  being 
cared  for:  Board  &c.  v.  Jennings, 
104  Ind.  108;  s.  c.  3  N.  B.  619.     The 


fact  that  a  supervisor,  at  the  request 
of  citizens  of  the  town,  built  a  side- 
walk at  the  expense  of  the  town, 
did  not  impose  on  him  any  duty  to 
repair  as  an  individual;  that  duty 
rested  upon  the  persons  who  di- 
rected him  to  build  the  walk: 
Langdon  v.  Chartiers  Tp.,  131  Pa.  St. 
77;  s.  c.  18  Atl.  930;  25  W.  N.  C. 
(Pa.)  202. 

"'  The  New  York  acts  of  1882  de- 
clare that  no  clerk  in  the  employ  of 
New  York  City  shall  become  inter- 
ested in  the  performance  of  any  con- 
tract, work  or  business,  the  price  of 
which  is  payable  by  the  city.  It  was 
held  that  a  clerk  could  not  become  a 
lecturer  in  an  evening  school  under 
an  appointment  from  the  board  of 
education:  McAdam  v.  Mayor  &c.,  36 
Hun  (N.  Y.)  340.  New  York  laws 
of  1882  prohibit  an  officer  of  the  cor- 
poration of  New  York  from  being 
interested  in  the  performance  of 
any  work  to  be  paid  for  from  the 
city  treasury.  It  was  held  that  an 
examiner  in  lunacy  could  not  be  a 
sanitary  inspector  in  the  vaccinat- 
ing corps:  Fitch  v.  Mayor  &c.,  40 
Hun  (N.  Y.)  512. 


189 


OFFICEIiS    AND   AGENTS. 


186 


upon  the  provisions  of  the  charter  or  constituent  act  of  the  corpora- 
tion and  valid  by-laws  passed  in  pursuance  thereof;"^  and  although 
his  duties  are  primarily  executive  and  administrative,  judicial  duties 
are  often  superadded  to  those  which  properly  appertain  to  the  office 
of  mayor ;  and  he  is  invested  by  legislative  enactment  with  the  author- 
ity to  administer  not  only  the  ordinances  of  the  corporation,  but  also 
judicially  to  administer  the  laws  of  the  state."® 

Munic.   Corp.    (4th   ed.) 


Corp.    (4th    ed.) 
Wallace,  12  Ind. 


'"  Dillon 
291. 

''"  Dillon  Munic. 
291,  292;  Waldo  v 
569.  See  also.  Slater  v.  Wood,  9 
Bosw.  (N.  Y.)  15;  Morrison  v.  Mc- 
Donald, 21  Maine  550;  Respublica  v. 
Dallas.  3  Yeates  (Pa.)  300;  State  v. 
Wilmington,  3  Harr.  (Del.)  294; 
Shafer  v.  Mumma,  17  Md.  331; 
Luehrman  v.  Taxing  District,  2  Lea 
(Tenn.)  425;  Reynolds  v.  Baldwin,  1 
La.  An.  162;  Howard  v.  Shoemaker, 
35  Ind.  Ill;  Gulick  v.  New,  14  Ind. 
93;  Prell  v.  McDonald,  7  Kan.  426; 
Martindale  v.  Palmer,  52  Ind.  411. 
The  power  to  take  general  affidavits 
vested  in  justices  of  the  peace  by 
the  Arkansas  statutes  (Mansf.  Dig., 
§  2918)  may  be  exercised  by  the 
mayors  of  incorporated  towns  within 
the  limits  of  their  corporations,  by 
virtue  of  the  statute  (Mansf.  Dig., 
§  797)  which  confers  upon  such 
mayors  "all  the  powers  and  jurisdic- 
tion of  a  justice  of  the  peace  in  all 
matters,  civil  and  criminal,  arising 
under  the  laws  of  the  state,  to  all  in- 
tents and  purposes."  Such  mayor 
may  consequently  take  an  affidavit 
to  be  used  in  prosecuting  an  appeal 
from  a  judgment  of  the  county  court 
to  the  circuit  court:  Robinson  v. 
Benton  Co.,  49  Ark.  49;  s.  c.  4  S.  W. 
195.  When  the  mayor  has  judicial 
authority  to  conduct  criminal  ex- 
aminations he  is  not  personally  li- 
able in  damages  for  refusal  to  pro- 
ceed with  an  examination  until  the 
following  day.  and  to  accept  bail, 
and  for  directing  that  the  accused  be 
locked  up  until  the  following  day: 


Hommert  v.  Gleason,  14  N.  Y.  S.  568. 
If  he  has  acquired  complete  jurisdic- 
tion he  enjoys  the  same  immunity 
from  personal  liability  for  subse- 
quent excesses  of  authority  that  is 
accorded  to  the  judges  of  courts  gen- 
erally: State  V.  Wolever,  127  Ind. 
306;  s.  c.  26  N.  E.  762.  For  the  his- 
tory and  nature  of  office  of  mayor, 
see  Dillon  Munic.  Corp.  (4th  ed.), 
§§  13.  174,  253,  260,  271,  331,  428; 
Norton  Com.  90,  402,  403;  Pull- 
ing Laws,  Customs  &c.  of  London,  eh. 
2,  16  m;  2  Bouvier  Law  Diet.  150;  i 
Jacobs  Law  Diet.  264,  265;  2  Toml. 
Law  Diet.  540;  Fletcher  v.  City  of 
Lowell,  15  Gray  (Mass.)  103;  Ela  v. 
Smith,  5  Gray  (Mass.)  121;  Nichols 
V.  Boston,  98  Mass.  39;  Cochran  v. 
McCleary,  22  Iowa  75,  82.  Under 
the  code  of  Iowa,  §  506,  providing 
that  "the  mayor  of  each  city  or  in- 
corporated town  shall  be  a  magis- 
trate or  conservator  of  the  peace, 
and,  within  the  same,  have  the  jur- 
isdiction of  a  justice  of  the  peace  in 
all  matters  civil  and  criminal; 
.  .  .  but  the  criminal  jurisdiction 
shall  be  coextensive  with  the  county 
in  which  such  city  or  town  is  situ- 
ated," it  was  held  that  the  mayor  is 
given  the  same  jurisdiction  in  civil 
cases  as  a  justice  of  the  peace;  and, 
therefore,  his  jurisdiction  extends 
to  a  case  brought  before  him  by  a 
resident  of  his  incorporated  town 
against  a  resident  of  the  county,  but 
not  of  the  corporation  nor  of  the 
township  in  which  it  is  situated,  by 
a  notice  served  on  the  defendant 
within  his  township,  but  outside  the 
limits  of  the  corporation,  and  of  the 


187 


PUBLIC    COKI'OUATIONS. 


lyo 


§  187.    The  same  subject  continued — Statutory  provisions. — It  is 

often  provided  by  statute  that  the  duties  of  the  mayor  shall  fall,  iu 
his  absence,  upon  the  president  of  the  council  or  a  similar  officer.^^* 
The  New  York  statute,  authorizing  the  mayor  of  each  city  to  prescribe 
civil  service  rules  and  to  employ  suitable  persons  to  make  inquiries 
and  examinations  and  prescribe  their  duties,  gives  the  mayor  povrer 
to  designate  a  secretary  for  the  civil  service  commission  appointed 
by  him  under  the  act  and  to  fix  his  salary.  ^^^  The  mayor  and  city 
council  of  a  Nebraska  city  have  power  to  compromise  claims  against 
the  city  arising  under  a  contract  to  erect  a  system  of  water-works  for 
the  city.^"^     The  mayor  may  administer  oaths  to  city  officers;  and 


township  wherein  it  is  situated: 
Weber  v.  Hamilton,  72  Iowa  577;  s. 
c.  34  N.  W.  424. 

^-"  Upon  an  issue  as  to  title  to  a 
municipal  office,  the  power  of  ap- 
pointment to  which  is  vested  in  the 
mayor,  proof  of  appointment  by  the 
president  of  the  council,  who  is  au- 
thorized to  act  as  mayor  in  certain 
cases,  is  not  sufficient  without  show- 
ing the  facts  upon  which  the  right 
to  exercise  such  power  depends: 
State  V.  Board  of  Health  (N.  J.),  8 
Atl.  509.  Where  the  charter  pro- 
vides that  in  case  of  the  absence  of 
the  mayor  from  the  city  another  of- 
ficer shall  act  in  his  place,  only  such 
an  absence  as  will  render  the  mayor 
unable  to  perfom  his  duties  is  in- 
tended: Mayor  &c.  v.  Moran,  46 
Mich.  213;  s.  c.  9  N.  W.  252.  Under 
a  provision  in  the  charter  of  Jersey 
City  authorizing  the  president  of 
the  council  to  act  as  mayor  In  the 
absence  of  the  latter  from  the  city, 
except  in  making  certain  appoint- 
ments, the  president  may  issue  a 
proclamation  as  mayor  pro  tempore, 
submitting  the  adoption  of  the  act 
to  the  voters  of  the  city,  that  power 
being  vested  in  the  mayor  by  said 
act:  In  re  Cleveland,  51  N.  J.  L.  319; 
s.  c.  18  Atl.  67.  The  New  Jersey 
statute,  approved  1889,  authorizes 
the  mayors  of  the  cities  of  the  state 
to  appoint  the  principal  municipal 
officers,  in  case  the  act  should  be  ac- 
cepted at  a  popular  election,  and  au- 


thorizes the  respective  mayors  of 
the  cities,  by  proclamation,  to  call 
such  election.  It  was  decided  that 
in  case  the  mayor  was  absent,  and 
the  charter,  in  such  contingency, 
vested  the  powers  of  the  mayoralty 
in  a  specified  officer,  such  officer 
could  proclaim  the  election:  In  re 
Cleveland,  52  N.  J.  L.  188;  s.  c.  19 
Atl.  17.  See  also^  In  re  Cleveland, 
51  N.  J.  L.  319;  s.  c.  18  Atl.  67. 

'■'  Kip  V.  City  of  Buffalo,  7  N.  Y.  S. 
685;  s.  c.  27  N.  Y.  St.  52.  A  mayor, 
supposing  that  he  had  power  to 
make  an  ad  interim  appointment  of 
a  city  officer,  attempted  to  exercise 
that  power,  and  that  alone.  But  it 
was  held  that,  if  he  did  not  have  the 
power  which  he  attempted  to  exer- 
cise, the  appointment  could  not  be 
deemed  an  appointment  for  a  full 
term,  which  the  mayor  had  the  pow- 
er, but  not  the  intention  to  make: 
People  V.  Hall,  104  N.  Y.  170;  s.  c. 
10  N.  E.  135. 

"-  State  V.  Martin,  27  Neb.  441 ;  s. 
c.  43  N.  W.  244.  The  mayor  of  a 
city  of  the  first  class  does  not  have 
the  authority  to  suspend  the  city  en- 
gmeer  under  compiled  laws  of  Kan- 
sas, ch.  18,  defining  the  powers  of 
mayors  of  such  cities  and  vesting 
such  authority  in  the  corporation 
itself:  Metsker  v.  Neally,  41  Kan. 
122;  s.  c.  21  Pac.  206.  Under  the 
general  statutes  of  New  Hampshire, 
ch.  42,  §  3,  mayors  of  cities  are  au- 
thorized to  administer  oaths  to  al- 


191 


OFFICERS    AND   AGENTS. 


188 


under  the  New  York  statute  he  may  appoint  municipal  officers  inde- 
pendently of  the  board  of  aldermen. ^-^ 

§  188.  The  same  subject  continued — Miscellaneous  powers. — Un- 
der authority  to  preserve  the  public  peace  the  mayor  may  resist  the 
lawful  police  force  when  they  are  attempting  to  commit  an  unlawful 
act,  and  may  call  to  his  aid  a  rival  body  of  police.^^*  Where  both  by 
charter  and  ordinance  the  mayor  is  vested  with  certain  executive 
power,  it  is  not  abridged  by  an  ordinance  confiding  authority  in  the 
particular  case  to  another  official  also;^^''  and  if  the  law  requires  that 
a  certain  fact  "be  made  to  appear  to"  the  mayor  as  a  condition  pre- 
cedent to  action  by  him,  his  judgment  is  conclusive  and  protects  him 
from  civil  liability.^^''  In  Louisiana  the  supreme  court  sustained  a 
suit  by  the  mayor  in  his  official  capacity  to  restrain  a  contemplated 
violation  of  the  charter  by  other  municipal  officers.     "We  can  not 


dermen  and  common  councilmen, 
and  by  ch.  40,  §  2,  all  provisions  of 
the  statutes  relating  to  selectmen 
and  town  clerks  of  towns  are  con- 
strued to  apply  to  mayors,  alder- 
men and  city  clerks  of  cities;  and, 
the  former  being  authorized  by 
statute  to  administer  oaths  to  all 
town  officers,  the  mayor  of  a  city 
has  that  authority  in  relation  to  city 
officers:  Drew  v.  Morrill,  62  N.  H. 
23. 

^=3  The  laws  of  New  York  of  1884, 
ch.  43,  §  1,  entitled  "An  act  to  center 
responsibility  in  the  municipal  gov- 
ernment of  the  city  of  New  York," 
which  provides  that  all  the  appoint- 
ments to  office  in  the  city  of  New 
York  previously  made  by  the  mayor, 
and  confirmed  by  the  board  of  alder- 
men, shall  thereafter  be  made  by  the 
mayor  without  such  confirmation, 
applies  to  excise  commissioners  in 
New  York,  the  power  to  appoint 
whom  was  previously  vested  in  the 
mayor,  subject  to  confirmation  by 
the  aldermen,  although  they  may  be, 
in  a  technical  sense,  state  officers: 
People  V.  Andrews,  104  N.  Y.  570;  s. 
c.  12  N  E.  274.  The  charter  of  the 
city  of  Minneapolis  (Sp.  L.  of  Minn. 
1881.  ch.  76,  subch.  4,  §  5,  subd.  11) 
authorized  the  city  council  by  ordi- 


nances "to  erect  lamps,  and  to  pro- 
vide for  lighting  of  the  city,"  and 
"to  cre'ate,  alter  and  extend  lamp 
districts."  And  it  was  held  that  the 
power  so  conferred  requires  the  ex- 
ercise of  judgment  and  discretion, 
and  can  not  be  delegated  to  a  com- 
mittee of  the  council,  so  that  the 
determination  of  the  committee  will 
be  final,  either  as  to  establishing 
new  lamps  or  discontinuing  those 
already  established:  Minneapolis 
Gas-Light  Co.  v.  City  of  Minneapo- 
lis, 36  Minn.  159;  s.  c.  30  N.  W.  450. 
See  further,  as  to  delegation  of  pow- 
ers, the  chapter  on  Public  Boards, 
post. 

^^'  Slater  v.  Wood,  9  Bosw.  (N.  Y.) 
15. 

^-^  Pedrick  v.  Bailey,  12  Gray 
(Mass.)  161.  A  city  can  not  by  or- 
dinance confer  a  greater  power  upon 
its  mayor  than  that  given  by  char- 
ter: Union  Depot  &  R.  Co.  v.  Smith, 
16  Colo.  361;  s.  c.  27  Pac.  329. 

""Ela  V.  Smith,  5  Gray  (Mass.) 
121.  He  may  order  the  abatement 
of  a  public  nuisance:  Henderson  v. 
Mayor,  3  La.  563;  and  notice  to  him 
of  a  nuisance  on  city  property  is  no- 
tice to  the  city:  Nichols  v.  Boston, 
98  Mass.  39. 


189 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS. 


192 


prescribe  to  him,"  said  the  court,  "the  course  which  he  is  to  pursue 
in  the  discharge  of  his  official  duties.  The  power  to  see  the  charter 
faithfully  executed  being  given  to  him,  the  selection  of  the  means 
necessar}^  to  its  exercise  is  left  to  his  discretion,  and  we  can  not  inter- 
fere with  them  if  they  violate  no  law."^^''  Authority  conferred  upon 
the  mayor  to  punish  summarily  infractions  of  police  regulations  is 
not  an  encroachment  upon  the  judicial  power  vested  elsewhere  by 
the  constitution.^-* 

§  189.    Miscellaneous  instances  of  powers  of  municipal  officers. — 

At  the  common  law,  in  addition  to  suits  by  individuals  and  corpora- 


"^  Genois  v.  Lockett,  13  La.  545, 
which  is  questionable  law,  according 
to  Judge  Dillon:  Dillon  Munic. 
Corp.  (4th  ed.),  §  208.  That  public 
officers  need  not  be  expressly  au- 
thorized to  bring  suit,  but  that  their 
capacity  to  sue  is  commensurate 
with  their  public  trusts  and  duties, 
see  Auditor-General  v.  Lake  George 
&c.  R.  Co.,  82  Mich.  426,  429;  s.c.46N. 
W.  730;  citing  Supervisor  v.  Stimson, 
4  Hill  (N.  Y.)  136;  Overseers  v. 
Overseers,  18  Johns.  (N,  Y.)  407; 
Todd  V.  Birdsall,  1  Cow.  (N.  Y.) 
260;  Berrien  Co.  Treasurer  v.  Bun- 
bury,  45  Mich.  79;  s.  c.  7  N.  W.  704. 
The  execution  of  an  appeal  bond  by 
a  mayor  on  behalf  of  a  city  is  not 
incidental  to  the  power  to  prosecute 
appeals,  and  therefore  does  not  bind 
the  city:  Mayor  &c.  v.  Railroad  Co., 
21  Md.  50. 

""Shafer  v.  Mumma,  17  Md.  331. 
Cf.  Waldo  V.  Wallace,  12  Ind.  569; 
Howard  v.  Shoemaker,  35  Ind.  Ill; 
Morrison  v.  McDonald,  21  Maine 
550;  Prell  v.  McDonald,  7  Kan.  426. 
Where  the  city  council  exceeds  its 
power  by  the  appropriation  of  mon- 
ey to  pay  the  salary  of  an  officer 
having  no  legal  existence,  the  mayor 
may  refuse  to  sign  treasury  war- 
rants for  his  services  while  acting 
as  such  officer:  Ward  v.  Cook,  78  111. 
App.  111.  Where  a  license  is  re- 
quired to  be  granted  and  signed  by 
the  mayor  he  has  no  discretion  in 
the  matter:  In  re  O'Rourke,  30  N. 
Y.    S.    375;    s.    c.    62    N.    Y.    St.    74. 


Where  the  mayor  is  in  the  city,  but 
absent  from  a  meeting,  the  power 
of  the  council  is  to  choose  a  tempo- 
rary chairman,  only  to  preside,  who 
has  not  the  power  of  a  mayor:  Peo- 
ple V.  Blair,  82  111.  App.  570.  Where 
a  city  is  divided  into  districts  and 
resident  physicians  appointed  in 
each  under  a  provision  of  the  char- 
ter which  requires  the  physicians  so 
appointed  to  be  residents  of  the  dis- 
trict in  which  they  are  appointed, 
the  mayor  has  no  right  to  assign 
such  physicians  to  other  districts: 
People  V.  Leavy,  59  N.  Y.  S.  408;  s. 
c.  28  Misc.  (N.  Y.)  246.  The  mayor 
can  not  grant  the  exclusive  right  to 
sell  intoxicating  liquors  within  the 
corporate  limits:  Fletcher  v.  Col- 
lins, 111  Ga.  253;  s.  c.  36  S.  E.  646. 
Where  electric  light  has  been  fur- 
nished the  city  and  the  city  council 
has  audited  the  claims  and  ordered 
warrants  therefor,  it  is  the  duty  of 
the  mayor  to  sign  the  orders,  al- 
though the  contract  may  have  been 
invalid:  Frederick  v.  People,  83  111. 
App.  89.  The  mayor  may  decide  a 
tie  vote  of  the  council:  Smedley  v. 
Kirby,  120  Mich.  253;  s.  c.  79  N.  W. 
187;  but  is  not  counted  in  deter- 
mining a  quorum:  People  v.  Brush, 
31  N.  Y.  S.  586;  s.  c.  83  Hun  (N.  Y.) 
613.  A  city  attorney  has  no  right 
to  bind  a  city  by  an  agreement  that 
certain  suits  shall  abide  the  result 
of  other  suits:  Fidelity  Trust  &c. 
Co.  V.  City  of  Louisville,  174  U.  S. 
429;  s.  c.  19  S.  Ct.  875. 


193 


OFFICERS    AND   AGENTS. 


§  189 


tions,  there  are  some  collective  bodies,  which,  although  not  strictly 
corporations,  have  been  invested  by  law  with  certain  corporate  powers, 
and  may  sue  in  respect  to  the  matters  specially  committed  to  their 
charge;  and  in  general,  all  public  officers,  although  not  expressly  au- 
thorized by  statute,  have  a  capacity  to  sue  commensurate  with  their 
public  trusts  and  duties.^^**  A  town  treasurer  has  no  power  to  con- 
vey real  estate  in  behalf  of  the  town,  unless  expressly  authorized 
by  vote,  and  a  note  given  in  payment  of  such  unauthorized  deed 
is  without  consideration  and  void.^^°  Councilmen  of  a  town  ap- 
pointed by  its  charter,  who  enter  upon  and  perform  the  duties  of 
their  office,  are  de  facto  officers,  and,  though  the  charter  be  uncon- 
stitutional, their  acts  in  levying  a  license  tax,  as  authorized  by  it, 
are  binding.^^^ 


"°  Supervisor  v.  Stimson,4Hill  (N. 
Y.)  136;  Overseers  &c.  v.  Overseers 
&c.,  15  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  436;  Todd  v. 
Birdsall,  1  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  260,  and 
cases  cited  in  note.  See  also.  Palm- 
er V.  Vandenbergh,  3  Wend.  (N.  Y.) 
193;  Silver  v.  Cummings,  7  Wend. 
(N.  Y.)  181;  Avery  v.  Slack,  19 
Wend.  (N.  Y.)  50;  Dillon  Munic. 
Corp.  (4tli  ed.),  §  237. 

""Inhabitants  &c.  v.  Tripp,  81 
Maine  24;  s.  c.  16  Atl.  327.  Town 
selectmen  have  no  right  to  inquire 
into  the  legality  of  the  vote  of  a 
school  district  to  raise  money;  they 
have  only  to  assess  the  tax  voted, 
and  may  be  compelled  to  do  so  by 
mandamus:  School  District  v.  Carr, 
63  N.  H.  201.  The  laws  of  New 
York  of  1886,  ch.  335,  annexing  the 
town  of  New  Lots  to  the  city  of 
Brooklyn,  authorized  the  mayor  and 
other  officers  of  the  city  to  purchase 
the  property  and  franchises  of  a 
water  company  incorporated  in  the 
town,  at  such  price  as  might  be 
agreed  upon  by  such  officers  and  the 
company,  and,  if  they  should  be  un- 
able to  agree  upon  a  price,  power  to 
acquire  the  property  and  franchises 
by  right  of  eminent  domain  was  giv- 
en the  city  "within  two  years  here- 
after." No  agreement  was  made  for 
the  purchase  of  the  property,  and 
1  Smith — 13 


no  proceedings  were  taken  to  ac- 
quire title  to  it  within  two  years 
after  the  passage  of  the  act.  But  it 
was  held  that  the  power  of  the  offi- 
cers named  to  buy  expired  with  the 
two  years  to  which  the  right  to  take 
by  eminent  domain  was  limited: 
Ziegler  v.  Chapin,  13  N.  Y.  S.  783; 
s.  c.  126  N.  Y.  342;  27  N.  E.  471. 

"^  Roche  V.  Jones,  87  Va.  484;  s.  c, 
12  S.  E.  965.  The  board  of  estimate 
and  apportionment  of  New  York  City 
have  no  power  to  transfer  money  to 
pay  clerks  employed  by  the  commis- 
sioners of  accounts,  the  appropria- 
tion for  their  payment  having  been 
stricken  off  from  the  provisional 
estimate:  Bird  v.  Mayor  &c.,  33  Hun 
(N.  Y.)  396.  Where  a  county  physi- 
cian refuses  to  treat  a  person  in 
urgent  need  of  medical  attendance, 
a  township  trustee  has  authority  to 
employ  another,  and  his  declara- 
tions concerning  payment  are  com- 
petent: Washburn  v.  Board  &c.,  104 
Ind.  321;  s.  c.  3  N.  E.  757;  54  Am. 
R.  332.  A  department  of  the  city 
government  which  has  permitted 
another  department  to  use  buildings 
can  not  resume  possession  of  them 
against  the  will  of  the  department 
occupying  them:  New  York  Health 
Department  v.  Van  Cott,  51  N.  Y. 
Super.  413.    Where  a  party,  before 


190 


PUBLIC    COErORATIONS. 


194 


§  190.  De  facto  officers — General  statement. — The  leading  modern 
case  wherein  de  facto  oflicers  are  defined  and  the  general  rules  relat- 
ing to  their  acts  succinctly  stated  and  supported  by  a  vast  array  of 
authorities,  in  an  opinion  of  great  intrinsic  weight,  is  State  v.  Car- 
roll,^^-  decided  by  the  supreme  court  of  errors  of  Connecticut.  Chief 
Justice  Butler  summarizes  the  law  as  follows:  An  officer  de  facto  is 
one  whose  acts,  though  not  those  of  a  lawful  officer,  the  law,  upon  prin- 
ciples of  policy  and  justice,  will  hold  valid,  sO'  far  as  they  involve  the 
interests  of  the  public  and  third  persons,  where  the  duties  of  the 
office  were  exercised:  First,  without  a  known  appointment  or  elec- 
tion, but  under  such  circumstances  of  reputation  or  acquiescence  as 
were  calculated  to  induce  people  without  inquiry  to  submit  to  or  in- 
voke his  action,  supposing  him  to  be  the  officer  he  assumed  to  be. 
Second,  under  color  of  a  known  and  valid  appointment  or  election, 
but  where  the  officer  has  failed  to  conform  to  some  precedent  re- 
quirement or  condition;  as,  to  take  an  oath,  give  a  bond,  or  the  like. 
Third,  under  color  of  a  known  election  or  appointment,  void  because 
the  officer  was  not  eligible,  or  because  there  was  a  want  of  power 
in  the  electing  or  appointing  body,  or  by  reason  of  some  defect  or 


the  expiration  of  the  time  for  an  ap- 
peal from  a  judgment  in  favor  of  a 
municipal  corporation,  proposes  to 
compromise  with  the  council  by  pay- 
ing one-half  of  such  judgment  and 
costs,  such  council  does  not  exceed 
its  powers  by  settling  with  such 
party  in  the  manner  proposed:  Ag- 
new  V.  Brail,  124  111.  312;  s.  c.  16  N. 
E.  230.  The  laws  of  New  Jersey  of 
1888,  p.  366,  provide  that  "the  board 
of  aldermen,  common  council,  .  .  . 
township  committee,  ...  or 
other  board,  body  or  department 
of  any  municipal  corporation  in 
this  state  having  the  charge  or  con- 
trol of  the  water  supply  of  such  mu- 
nicipal corporation,"  may  make  a 
contract  for  obtaining  or  furnishing 
a  supply  of  water  for  extinguishing 
fires  and  other  proper  purposes; 
and  that  "any  such  contract 
and  agreement,  when  so  made, 
shall  be  a  valid  and  lawful 
contract  of  such  municipal  cor- 
poration." And  it  was  held  that 
under  this  act  the  township  com- 
mittee may  make  a  contract  with  a 


water  company  for  a  supply  of  wa- 
ter, and  order  the  levy  of  a  tax  to 
pay  therefor:  State  v.  Inhabitants 
&c.,  52  N.  J.  L.  483;  s.  c.  19  Atl.  966. 
Duties  of  tax  commissioners  under 
charter  of  Greater  New  York  not 
limited  to  the  boroughs  from  which 
they  are  selected:  People  v.  Feitner, 
156  N.  Y.  694;  s.  c.  51  N.  E.  1093. 
Construction  of  New  Orleans  char- 
ter in  relation  to  municipal  officers 
and  vacancies:  State  v.  City  of  New 
Orleans,  51  La.  An.  99;  s.  c.  24  So. 
620.  What  constitutes  a  confidential 
relation  under  New  York  laws  of 
1898,  ch.  184:  People  v.  Scannell,  56 
N.  Y.  S.  117.  Construction  of  statute 
of  Maryland  in  relation  to  visitors 
to  jail:  Field  v.  Malsten,  88  Md.  691; 
s.  c.  41  Atl.  1087.  Construction  of 
California  act  of  March  7,  1881,  p. 
54,  in  relation  to  supervisors  and 
malfeasance  in  oflSce:  Fitch  v.  Board 
&c.,  122  Cal.  285;  s.  c.  54  Pac.  901. 
Construction  of  New  York  laws  of 
1897,  ch.  414,  368:  People  v.  New- 
brand,  60  N.  Y.  S.  588. 

1=^38  Conn.  449;  s.  c.  9  Am.  R.  409. 


195  OFnCERS    AND   AGENTS.  §    191 

irregularity  in  its  exercise,  such  ineligibility,  want  of  power,  or  defect 
being  unknown  to  the  public.  Fourth,  under  color  of  an  election 
or  appointment  by  or  pursuant  to  a  public,  unconstitutional  law, 
before  the  same  is  adjudged  to  be  such.^^^  A  de  facto  officer  is  one 
whose  title  is  not  good  in  law,  but  who  is  in  fact  in  the  unobstructed 
possession  of  an  office  and  discharging  its  duties  in  full  view  of  the 
public,  in  such  manner  and  under  such  circumstances  as  not  to  pre- 
sent the  appearance  of  an  intruder  or  usurper.^^*  Whether  one  was 
or  was  not  a  de  facto  officer  at  the  time  when  he  assumed  to  perform 
duties  belonging  to  a  public  office  is  a  mixed  question  of  law  and 
fact.^^^  Where  there  is  no  ordinance  providing  for  the  election  or 
appointment  of  a  city  marshal,  as  required  by  statute,  a  person  claim- 
ing to  act  as  such  is  neitlier  an  officer  de  jure  nor  de  facto  ;^^®  there 
can  neither  be  a  de  jure  or  de  facto  officer  where  there  is  no  office  to 
fill."^ 

§  191.  The  same  subject  continued — Color  of  title. — It  was  for- 
merly deemed  essential  to  the  validity  of  the  acts  of  an  officer  de  facto 
that  he  should  be  in  possession  under  color  of  title  by  an  election 
or  appointment  ;^^^  but  although  that  rule  is  still  maintained  by 
some  of  the  authorities,^^"  the  later  tendency  is  toward  more  liberal 

"3  State  V.  Carroll,  38  Conn.  449;  Norton  v.  Shelby  Co.,  118  U.  S.  425; 

s.  c.  9  Am.  R.  409,  sustaining  a  con-  s.  c.  6  S.  Ct.  1121. 

victlon  for  crime  in  a  court  presided  ^^^  Ward  v.  Cook,  78  111.  App.  Ill; 

over  by  a  de  facto  judge.     The  acts  Norton  v.  Shelby  Co.,  118  U.  S.  425; 

done  must  be  such  as  an  officer  de  s.  c.  6  S.  Ct.  1121. 

jure  might  lawfully  do:    Shelby  v.  '^  Rex  v.  Lisle,  2  Str.  1090;   s.  c. 

Alcorn,  36  Miss.  273;  s.  c.  72  Am.  D.  Andr.  163. 

169.  See  also,  generally,  on  the  sub-  "*  Cocke  v.  Halsey,  16  Pet.  71; 
ject  of  de  facto  officers,  Throop  Pub-  Fitchburg  R.  Co.  v.  Grand  Junction 
lie  Officers,  ch.  27,  and  Mechem  Pub-  &c.  R.  Co.,  1  Allen  (Mass.)  552; 
lie  Offices  and  Officers,  ch.  8.  Brown  v.  Lunt,  37  Maine  423;  Hoop- 
la Waite  V.  City  of  Santa  Cruz,  89  er  v.  Goodwin,  48  Maine  79;  Carle- 
Fed.  619,  627;  Petersilea  v.  Stone,  ton  v.  People,  10  Mich.  250;  Doug- 
119  Mass.  465;  Johns  v.  People,  25  lass  v.  Wickwire,  19  Conn.  489; 
Mich.  499;  Attorney-General  v.  State  v.  Brennan's  Liquors,  25  Conn. 
Crocker,  138  Mass.  214;  Hamlin  v.  278;  Town  of  Plymouth  v.  Painter, 
Kassafer,  15  Or.  456;  s.  c.  15  Pac.  17  Conn.  585;  Elliott  v.  Willis,  1  Al- 
778;  State  v.  Vfilliams,  5  Wis.  308;  len  (Mass.)  461;  People  v.  Albert- 
Magneau  v.  City  of  Fremont,  30  son,  8  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  363;  People 
Neb.  843;  s.  c.  47  N.  W.  280.  v.  Collins,  7  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  549;  Mc- 
"^Waite  V.  City  of  Santa  Cruz,  89  Instry  v.  Tanner,  9  Johns.  (N.  Y.) 
Fed.  619,  627;  State  v.  Taylor,  108  135;  Rochester  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Clarke 
N.  C.  196;  s.  c.  12  S.  E.  1005;  United  Nat'l  Bank,  60  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  234; 
States  V.  Alexander,  46  Fed.  728.  '  Wilcox  v.  Smith,  5  Wend.  (N.  Y.) 
"8  Ward  V.  Cook,  78  111.  App.  Ill;  281;  Commissioners  v.  McDaniel,  7 


§    192  PUBLIC    CORPOEATIONS.  196 

views  in  favor  of  the  public.  "Third  persons,  from  the  nature  of 
the  case,  can  not  always  investigate  the  right  of  one  assuming  to  hold 
an  important  office,  even  so  far  as  to  see  that  he  has  color  of  title  to  it 
by  virtue  of  some  appointment  or  election.  If  they  see  him  publicly 
exercising  its  authority,  if  they  ascertain  that  this  is  generally  ac- 
quiesced in,  they  are  entitled  to  treat  him  as  such  officer,  and,  if  they 
employ  him  as  such,  should  not  be  subjected  to  the  danger  of  having 
his  acts  collaterally  called  in  question."^*"  While  the  acts  of  a  mere 
usurper  or  intruder  without  color  of  right  are  utterly  void,^*^  such 
a  person  may,  by  public  acquiescence,  gain  sufficient  color  of  author- 
ity to  support  him  as  an  officer  de  facto. ^'*- 

§  192.  Incumbent  of  an  unconstitutional  office. — It  is  no  impeach- 
ment of  the  acts  of  an  officer  who  is  otherwise  de  facto  that  his 
appointment  or  election  is  unconstitutional;  as,  for  instance,  where 
he  is  appointed  in  violation  of  a  constitution  providing  for  his  elec- 
tion. ^*^  But  where  no  office  legally  exists,  there  can  be  no  de  facto 
officer.  This  qualification  of  the  rule  was  declared  in  an  elaborate 
opinion  by  Mr.  Justice  Field  of  the  supreme  court  of  the  United 
States,  and  an  unconstitutional  act  creating  an  office  "is,  in  legal 
contemplation,  as  inoperative  as  though  it  had  never  been  passed.""* 

Jones  L.  (N.  C.)  107;  McGargell  v.  See  also.   Leach  v.   People,   122   111. 

Hazleton  Coal  Co.,  4  W.  &  S.   (Pa.)  420;  s.  c.  12  N.  E.  726;  Meagher  v. 

424;    Gregg  Tp.  v.  Jamison,  55  Pa.  Storey  Co.,  5  Nev.  244;  Lambert  v. 

St.    468;    Aulanier    v.    Governor,    1  People,  76  N.  Y.  220;  State  v.  Bloom, 

Tex.  653.  17    Wis.    521;    Cole   v.   Black   River 

""Per  Devens,  J.,  in  Petersilea  v.  Falls,  57  Wis.  110;  s.  c.  14  N.  W. 
Stone,  119  Mass.  465,  467.  See  also,  906;  Ex  parte  Strang,  21  Ohio  St. 
People  V.  Staton,  73  N.  C.  546;  State  610;  State  v.  Carroll,  38  Conn.  449; 
V.  Carroll,  38  Conn.  449;  s.  c.  9  Am.  s.  c.  9  Am.  R.  409. 
R.  409;  People  v.  Peabody,  6  Abb.  "*  Norton  v.  Shelby  Co.,  118  U.  S. 
Pr.  (N.  Y.)  228,  233;  s.  c.  15  425,  442;  s.  c.  6  S.  Ct.  1121.  Mr. 
How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  470;  Throop  Public  Justice  Field  says  that  the  last  para- 
Agents,  §  624;  "Who  is  a  de  facto  Of-  graph  of  Chief  Justice  Butler's  defl- 
ficer?"  11  L.  R.  A.  105.  nition    (§   190,  ante)   "refers  not  to 

"'State  V.  Taylor,  108  N.  C.  196;  the    unconstitutionality    of    the   act 

s.  c.  12  S.  E.  1005;   12  L.  R.  A.  202;  creating  the  office,  but  to  the  uncon- 

McCraw  V.  Williams,  33  Graft.  (Va.)  stitutionality   of  the  act  by   which 

510;   Hooper  v.  Goodwin,  48  Maine  the  officer  is  appointed."     See  also, 

79,  80;  Tucker  v.  Aiken,  7  N.  H.  113;  Ex  parte  Reilly,  85  Cal.  632;  s.  c.  24 

Hamlin  v.  Kassafer,  15  Or.  456;  s.  c.  Pac.  807;  People  v.  Toal,  85  Cal.  333; 

15  Pac.  778;  3  Am.  St.  176.  s.  c.  24  Pac.  603;   "Acts  of  de  facto 

"^  State  v.  Carroll,  38  Conn.  449;  Councils"     in     chapter     on     Public 

s.  c.  9  Am.  R.  409;   Mechem  Public  Boards,  post.  Cf.  Donough  v.  Dewey, 

Offices  and  Officers,  §§  319,  321.  82   Mich.    309;    s.   c.    46   N.   W.    782, 

"^  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Langlade  where  it  was  held  that  if  a  law  pro- 
Co.,  56  Wis.  614;  s.  c.  44  N.  W.  844.  viding  for  two  school  inspectors  was 


197 


OFFICERS    AND   AGENTS. 


193 


And  the  same  rule  is  applied  where  an  office  is  abolished  by  statute: 
thenceforth  there  can  be  no  de  facto  incumbent. ^^'^  An  officer  elected 
under  an  unconstitutional  law,  where  the  interests  of  the  public  or 
a  third  party  arc  concerned,  is  an  officer  de  facto  J*" 

§  193.  Possession  of  office  by  de  facto  officer. — In  order  to  confer 
validity  on  the  acts  of  a  de  facto  officer  he  must  be  in  possession 
and  control  of  the  office.  There  can  not  be  a  joint  occupancy  by  two 
persons  of  a  single  otiice  ;^'*^  and  if  both  are  assuming  to  act  officially, 
the  one  who  is  destitute  of  legal  title  can  perform  no  valid  act.^** 
Where  each  of  two  rival  claimants  held  possession  for  three  days, 
the  court  decided  that  neither  could  sustain  the  character  of  an 
officer  de  facto.^*^ 

§  194.  Rights  and  liabilities  of  de  facto  officers. — An  officer  de 
facto  can  neither  maintain  nor  defend  suits  in  his  official  capacity  for 
his  own  benefit.  When  he  sets  up  a  title  by  virtue  of  his  office  he  must 
show  an  unquestionable  right. ^^°    An  infant  is  not  justified  in  serving 


unconstitutional  because  only  one 
was  authorized,  the  acts  of  both  in- 
cumbents would  be  valid  until  the 
law  should  be  declared  unconstitu- 
tional. 

"'^  Long  V.  Mayor  &c.,  81  N.  Y.  425; 
Ex  parte  Snyder,  64  Mo.  58;  Conway 
V.  St.  Louis,  9  Mo.  App.  488;  In  re 
Hinlde,  31  Kan.  712;  s.  c.  3  Pac.  531; 
Yorty  V.  Paine,  62  Wis.  154;  s.  c.  22 
N.  W.  137;  Burt  v.  Winona  &c.  R. 
Co.,  31  Minn.  472;  s.  c.  18  N.  W.  285, 
289;  Leach  v.  People,  122  111.  420; 
s.  c.  12  N.  E.  726.  But  cf.  State  v. 
Farrier,  47  N.  J.  L.  383. 

""State  V.  Carroll,  38  Conn.  449; 
Taylor  v.  Skrine,  3  Brev.  (S.  C.) 
516;  Cocke  v.  Halsey,  16  Peters  71; 
People  V.  White,  24  Wend.  (N.  Y.) 
520;  Carleton  v.  People,  10  Mich. 
250;  Clark  v.  Commonwealth,  29  Pa. 
St.  129;  Commonwealth  v.  McCombs, 
56  Pa.  St.  436.  The  signing  and  de- 
livery of  bonds  of  officers  de  facto 
are,  as  to  third  persons,  as  valid  as 
if  they  were  officers  de  jure:  Waite 
V.  City  of  Santa  Cruz,  89  Fed.  619. 

"'  Boardman  v.  Halliday,  10  Paige 
(N.  Y.)  223,  232.  See  also,  Throop 
Public  Officers,  §  641;  Mechem  Pub- 


lic Offices  and  Officers,  §§  322,  323; 
Morgan  v.  Quackenbush,  22  Barb. 
(N.  Y.)  72,  80;  Hamlin  v.  Kassafer, 
15  Or.  456;  s.  c.  15  Pac.  778;  3  Am. 
St.  176. 

"« State  V.  Blossom,  19  Nev.  312; 
s.  c.  10  Pac.  430;  Auditors  v.  Benoit, 
20  Mich.  176;  Cronin  v.  Stoddard,  97 
N.  Y.  271. 

"*  Conover  v.  Devlin,  15  How.  Pr. 
(N.  Y.)  470.  See  also,  Braidy  v. 
Theritt,  17  Kan.  468;  Runion  v.  Lat- 
imer, 6  S.  C.  126;  Ex  parte  Norris,  8 
S.  C.  408;  Ex  parte  Smith,  8  S.  C. 
495. 

''^^  Adams  v.  Tator,  42  Hun  (N.  Y.) 
384;    Dolan  v.  Mayor  &c.,  68  N.  Y. 
274;     Venable     v.     Curd,     2     Head 
(Tenn.)   582;   Shepherd  v.  Staten,  5 
Heisk.    (Tenn.)    79;    Riddle  v.   Bed- 
ford   Co.,    7    S.    &    R.     (Pa.)     386 
People  V.   Nostrand,   46   N.   Y.   375 
Dillon  V.  Myers,  Bright.   (Pa.)  426 
Fowler  v.  Bebee,  9  Mass.  231;  Ham 
lin  V.  Dingman,  5  Lans.  (N.  Y.)  61 
Kimball  v.  Alcorn,  45  Miss.  151;  Peo 
pie  V.  White,  24  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  520 
Patterson    v.    Miller,    2    Met.    (Ky.) 
493;   People  v.  Hopson,  1  Denio  (N. 
Y.)  574;  People  v.  Weber,  86  111.  283; 


195 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS. 


198 


process  as  a  constable.'"  Actual  incumbency,  merely,  gives  a  public 
officer  no  right  to  recover  salary  or  fees  either  by  suit  against  the  mu- 
nicipality or  against  private  persons  ;^^^  nor  can  be  bring  a  suit  in  his 
official  title  for  pecuniary  penalties.^^^ 

§  195.  Resignation  by  acceptance  of  incompatible  office. — Where 
a  person  holds  an  office  which  he  is  at  liberty  to  relinquish  at  his  own 
pleasure,  the  acceptance  of  another  and  incompatible  office  vacates 
the  first  office,^^*  and  it  requires  no  legal  proceedings  to  effect  this 
result.^^^  If  a  person  be  elected  simultaneously  to  two  incompatible 
offices,  by  qualifying  for  either  he  signifies  his  refusal  of  the  other.^^^ 
But  where  the  officer  is  holding  over  by  law  until  his  successor  is 
chosen,  it  seems  that  he  may  continue  the  exercise  of  the  first  without 
prejudice  to  the  second;^"   and  where  the  acceptance  of  the  last 


s.  c.  89  111.  347;  Nichols  v.  MacLean, 
101  N.  Y.  526;  s.  c.  5  N.  E.  347;  Mil- 
ler V.  Callaway,  32  Ark.  666;  Olm- 
sted v.  Dennis,  77  N.  Y.  378;  Keyser 
V.  McKissan,  2  Rawle  (Pa.)  139. 
But  he  will  be  protected  in  public 
expenditures  for  lawful  purposes: 
McCracken  v.  Soucy,  29  111.  App.  619. 

'^' Green  v.  Burke,  23  Wend.  (N. 
Y.)  490.  See  also,  Short  v.  Symmes, 
150  Mass.  298;  s.  c.  23  N.  E.  42;  Col- 
burn  V.  Ellis,  5  Mass.  427;  Cum- 
mings  V.  Clark,  15  Vt.  653;  Courser 
v.  Powers,  34  Vt.  517;  Johnston  v. 
Wilson,  2  N.  H.  202;  Pearce  v.  Hawk- 
Ins,  2  Swan  (Tenn.)  87;  People  v. 
Weber,  86  111.  283;  s.  c.  89  111.  347; 
Miller  v.  Callaway,  32  Ark.  666;  Pat- 
terson v.  Miller,  2  Met.  (Ky.)  493; 
Rodman  v.  Harcourt,  4  B.  Mon. 
(Ky.)  224. 

"^Dolan  v.  Mayor,  68  N.  Y.  274; 
s.  c.  23  Am.  R.  168;  People  v.  Hop- 
son,  1  Denio  (N.  Y.)  574;  Mayfield 
V.  Moore,  53  111.  428;  McCue  v.  Wa- 
pello Co.,  56  Iowa  698;  s.  c.  10  N.  W. 
248;  Prescott  v.  Hayes,  42  N.  H.  56; 
Riddle  v.  Bedford  Co.,  7  S.  &  R. 
(Pa.)  386;  City  of  Philadelphia  v. 
Given,  60  Pa.  St.  136;  Dolliver  v. 
Parks,  136  Mass.  499.  He  can  not 
recover,  for  instance,  if  he  omitted 
to  take  the  oath  required  by  statute: 


Thomas  v.  Owens,  4  Md.  189;  City  of 
Philadelphia  v.  Given,  60  Pa.  St.  136. 

"^  Gould  V.  Glass,  19  Barb.  (N.  Y.) 
179;  Supervisor  v.  Stimson,  4  Hill 
(N.  Y.)  136;  Horton  v.  Parsons,  37 
Hun  (N.  Y.)  42;  People  v.  Nostrand, 
46  N.  Y.  375. 

^"People  V.  Nostrand,  46  N.  Y. 
375;  People  v.  Carrique,  2  Hill  (N. 
Y.)  93;  Magie  v.  Stoddard,  25  Conn. 
565;  State  Bank  v.  Curran,  10  Ark. 
142;  Pooler  v.  Reed,  73  Maine  129; 
Stubbs  V.  Lee,  64  Maine  195;  State 
V.  Goff,  15  R.  I.  505;  s.  c.  9  Atl.  226; 
People  V.  Hanifan,  96  111.  420;  Foltz 
V.  Kerlin,  105  Ind.  221;  s.  c.  4  N.  E. 
439;  5  N.  E.  672;  State  v.  West,  33 
La.  An.  1261;  Kenney  v.  Goergen,  36 
Minn.  190;  s.  c.  31  N.  W.  210;  State 
V.  Brinkerhoff,  66  Tex.  45;  s.  c.  17 
S.  W.  109. 

^=^=  State  V.  Buttz,  9  S.  C.  156,  and 
cases  cited  in  the  preceding  note. 

^^^  Cotton  V.  Phillips,  56  N.  H.  220. 
Formerly,  in  England,  in  the  case  of 
incompatible  offices,  the  incumbent 
was  held  to  retain  the  superior,  but 
such  is  not  now  the  rule:  Rex  v. 
Jones,  1  B.  &  Ad.  677;  Milward  v. 
Thatcher,  2  T.  R.  81;  Rex  v.  Tiz- 
zard,  9  B.  &  C.  418;  Com.  Dig.,  tit. 
Officer,  K.  5. 

^"  State  V.  Somers,  96  N.  C.  467;  s. 
c.  2  S.  E.  161. 


199 


OFFICEKS    AND   AGENTS. 


§  196 


office  is  made  compulsory,  under  a  penalty,'^®  or  in  case  of  ineligibil- 
ity to  occupy  the  same/ •'*'■'  there  is  no  implied  abandonment  of  the  first 
office.  "Where  one  office  is  not  subordinate  to  the  other,"  said  the  court 
of  common  pleas  of  New  York,  "nor  the  relations  of  the  one  to  the 
other  such  as  are  inconsistent  and  repugnant,  there  is  not  that  incom- 
patibility from  which  the  law  declares  that  the  acceptance  of  the  one 
is  the  vacation  of  the  other.  The  force  of  the  word  in  its  application 
to  this  matter  is  that  from  the  nature  and  relations  to  each  other 
of  the  two  places,  they  ought  not  to  be  held  by  the  same  person, 
from  the  contrariety  and  antagonism  which  would  result  in  the  at- 
tempt by  one  person  to  faithfully  and  impartially  discharge  the  duties 
of  one,  toward  the  incumbent  of  the  other."^*^° 

§  196.  Acceptance  and  withdrawal  of  resignation. — At  common 
law  it  was  an  indictable  offense  for  one  to  refuse  an  office  in  a  public 
corporation  to  which  he  had  been  duly  elected.^*^^  This  principle 
has  been  applied  by  the  English  and  several  American  authorities 
so  as  to  render  a  resignation  of  such  an  officer  after  entering  upon  his 
office ^''^  wholly  ineffective  without  the  express  or  implied  assent  of 
the  appointing  power.^^^  But  the  rule  is  not  settled:  many  authori- 
ties holding  that  the  office  becomes  ipso  facto  vacant  when  a  resigna- 
tion is  transmitted  and  received.^'''*  Where  such  is  the  law,  a  resig- 
nation is  as  irrevocable  as  an  appointment,  and  if  it  be  unconditional 


^^'^  Goettman  v.  Mayor  &c.,  6  Hun 
(N.  Y.)  132.  Cf.  Hartford  Tp.  v. 
Bennett,  10  Ohio  St.  441. 

"«  State  v.  Kearns,  47  Ohio  St.  566; 
s.  c.  25  N.  E.  1027. 

""People  V.  Green,  5  Daly  (N.  Y.) 
254;  s.  c.  46  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  168. 
See  also,  for  a  collection  of  English 
and  American  rulings  on  incompati- 
bility, Throop  Public  Officers,  §  35 
et  seq. 

"^  State  V.  Ferguson,  31  N.  J.  L. 
107;  Com.  Dig.,  tit.  Officer,  B.  1.  See 
also,  Edwards  v.  United  States,  13 
Otto  471;  Dillon  Munic.  Corp.  (4th 
ed.),  §  223. 

^^-  There  can  be  no  resignation  by 
one  who  has  not  qualified:  Miller  v. 
Supervisors,  25  Cal.  93;  Reg.  v.  Bliz- 
ard,  L.  R.  2  Q.  B.  55.  See  also.  In  re 
Corliss,  11  R.  I.  638. 

"'Reg.  V.  Lane.  2  Ld.  Raym.  1304; 
Edwards  v.  United  States,  13  Otto 
471.    Cf.  United  States  v.  Wright,  1 


McLean  509;  Van  Orsdall  v.  Hazard, 
3  Hill  (N.  Y.)  243  (where  Cowen, 
J.,  said  it  is  entirely  clear  that  the 
resignation  may  be  either  in  writing 
or  by  parol,  express,  or  even  by  impli- 
cation, so  that  there  be  an  intent  to 
resign  on  one  side  and  an  accept- 
ance on  the  other) ;  State  v.  Fergu- 
son, 31  N.  J.  L.  107;  Hoke  v.  Hen- 
derson, 4  Dev.  (N.  C.)  1,  29;  State 
V.  Clayton,  27  Kan.  442;  Rogers  v. 
Slonaker,  32  Kan.  191;  s.  c.  4  Pac. 
138;  City  of  Waycross  v.  Youmans, 
85  Ga.  708;  s.  c.  11  S.  E.  865;  State 
v.  Boecker,  56  Mo.  17. 

"'Olmsted  v.  Dennis,  77  N.  Y.  378; 
citing  Gilbert  v.  Luce,  11  Barb.  (N. 
Y.)  91;  People  v.  Porter,  6  Cal.  26; 
State  V.  Hauss,  43  Ind.  105;  Leech 
V.  State,  78  Ind.  570;  Gates  v.  Dela- 
ware Co.,  12  Iowa  405;  State  v. 
Clarke,  3  Nev.  566;  Conner  v.  Mayor, 
2  Sandf.  (N.  Y.)  355;  s.  c.  5  N.  Y. 
285,  295. 


§  197 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS. 


200 


it  can  not  be  withdrawn. ^*^^  But  a  prospective  resignation  may  be 
withdrawn  with  the  consent  of  the  authority  accepting  where  no  new 
rights  have  intervened.^'"* 


§  197.  Removal  of  officers  and  agents — How  effected. — The  power 
of  a  corporation  to  remove  its  officers  depends  greatly  upon  the  tenure 
of  office  of  such  officers;  as,  where  the  power  of  removal  is  discre- 
tionary, they  may  be  removed  without  notice  or  hearing;  but  if  their 
term  of  office  is  during  good  behavior,  or  where  the  removal  can  only 
be  for  for  certain  causes,  they  can  not  be  removed  except  after  notice 
and  hearing.^'*'^  The  power  to  remove  is  incidental  to  a  corporation 
at  large,  and  unless  delegated  to  a  select  body  or  part,  it  must  be 
exercised  by  the  whole  corporation.^®^    In  the  absence  of  a  constitu- 


"5  State  V.  Fitts,  49  Ala.  402;  Gates 
V.  Delaware  Co.,  12  Iowa  405;  Bunt- 
ing V.  Willis,  27  Gratt.  (Va.)  144; 
State  V.  Hauss,  43  Ind.  105;  Pace  v. 
People,  50  111.  432. 

^""Biddle  v.  Willard,  10  Ind.  62, 
66;  State  v.  Clayton;  27  Kan.  442; 
s  c.  41  Am.  R.  418.  See  also,  Throop 
Public  Officers,  ch.  17. 

^"People  V.  New  York,  82  N.  Y. 
491;  Queen  v.  Governors  &c.,  8  Ad. 
&  El.  632;  Rex  v.  Oxford,  2  Salk, 
428;  Bagg's  Case,  11  Coke  93  (b) ; 
In  re  Ramshay,  83  Eng.  Com.  Law 
174,  189;  Rex  v.  Coventry,  1  Ld. 
Raym.  391;  Rex  v.  Mayor  &c.,  1  Lev. 
291;  Dr.  Gaskin's  Case,  8  T.  R.  209; 
Willcock  Munich.  Corp.  253,  254;  2 
Kyd  Corp.  58,  59;  Rex  v.  Andover,  1 
Ld.  Raym.  710;  Field  v.  Common- 
wealth, 32  Pa.  St.  478;  In  re  Hen- 
nen,  13  Peters  230.  For  removal, 
where  duration  of  term  is  not  fixed, 
see  People  v.  Comptroller  &c.,  20 
Wend.  (N.  Y.)  595;  People  v.  Nich- 
ols, 79  N.  Y.  582;  Field  v.  Girard 
College,  54  Pa.  St.  233;  Common- 
wealth V.  Sutherland,  3  S.  &  R. 
(Pa.)  145;  State  v.  City  of  St.  Louis, 
90  Mo.  19;  s.  c.  1  S.  W.  757;  State 
V.  Doherty,  25  La.  An.  119;  s.  c. 
13  Am.  R.  131;  Page  v.  Hardin,  8 
B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  648;  City  of  Madi- 
son V.  Korbly,  32  Ind.  74;  Stadler  v. 
Detroit,    13    Mich.    346.     The    New 


York  statutes  of  1887  and  1888  pro- 
vided that  conductors  on  the  Brook- 
lyn bridge,  who  were  soldiers  in  the 
war  of  the  rebellion,  and  honorably 
discharged,  must  be  notified  of  all 
charges  against  them  before  being 
removed  from  their  positions.  It 
was  held,  on  mandamus  to  reinstate 
such  a  soldier,  who  had  been  re- 
moved from  such  position  as  con- 
ductor without  a  hearing,  that,  as  he 
was  entitled  to  a  hearing  without  re- 
gard to  the  merits  of  his  case,  an  or- 
der for  a  bill  of  particulars  was  un- 
necessary, and  should  be  reversed: 
People  V.  Howell,  13  N.  Y.  S.  217;  s. 
c.  37  N.  Y.  St.  181.  The  charter  of 
the  city  of  Jacksonville  provided 
that  no  officer  could  be  i^emoved  by 
the  city  council  without  first  being 
heard  in  his  defense.  It  was  de- 
cided that  the  hearing  must  be  had 
before  the  city  council  itself,  and 
not  before  one  of  its  committees: 
City  of  Jacksonville  v.  Allen,  25  111. 
App.  54.  A  board  of  police  com- 
missioners is  not  guilty  of  an  arbi- 
trary and  unwarrantable  exercise  of 
authority  in  suspending  an  officer 
pending  a  trial  before  the  board  on 
charges  which,  if  true,  would  in- 
volve his  disrhissal:  State  v.  St. 
Louis  Police  Comm.,  16  Mo.  App.  48. 
"'-  State  V.  Common  Council  &c., 
25  N.  J.  L.  536;  Fane's  Case,  1  Doug. 


201 


OFFICERS    AND   AGENTS. 


tional  restriction  a  statute  may  shorten  the  term  of  an  oOice  before  the 
expiration  of  the  time  for  which  a  person  has  been  elected. ^^^  And  so 
the  term  of  office  may  be  shortened  by  an  amendment  to  the  char- 
ter abolishing  the  office,  and  placing  the  duties  upon  other  officers.^^" 
The  notion  that  an  appointment  for  a  term,  under  an  ordinance 
providing  that  the  officer  shall  be  removable  for  cause,  without  more, 
is  a  contract  that  the  office  shall  be  kept  up  for  the  term  irrespective 
of  the  public  welfare,  can  not  be  sustained.^'' ^  A  board  of  public 
works  established  under  the  discretionary  power  conferred  by  statute 
may  be  abolished  at  any  time.^'^^  But  the  abolishing  of  an  office 
is  a  matter  about  which  courts  will  examine  as  to  the  good  faith  of 
the  action.^'^^  While  the  power  which  creates  an  office  can  abolish 
it  at  pleasure,  yet  where  an  officer  is  appointed  to  hold  dur- 
ing good  behavior  and  an  ordinance  is  passed  abolishing  the  office, 
but  before  it  takes  effect  a  new  ordinance  is  passed  reviving  the  office 
and  another  person  is  appointed  to  the  office,  the  first  incumbent 
will  hold.i^*^ 


149,  153;  Lord  Bruce's  Case,  2  Str. 
819;  Rex  v.  Richardson,  1  Burr.  517; 
Rex  v.  Taylor.  3  Salk.  231;  Rex  v. 
Lyme  Regis,  1  Doug.  149,  153;  2 
Kyd  Corp.  56;  Grant  Corp.  240,  241; 
Glover  Corp.  329.  Where  the  pre- 
ferring of  charges  and  an  opportu- 
nity to  be  heard  are  required  by 
law,  summary  action  is  void:  Pratt 
V.  Board  &c.,  15  Utah  1;  s.  c.  49 
Pac.  747.  The  N.  Y.  act  of  1898, 
ch.  186,  §  3,  prohibiting  removals 
from  office  without  an  opportunity 
for  defense  applies  to  the  city  of 
New  York:  People  v.  Dalton,  53  N. 
Y.  S.  291.  On  investigation  of  the 
police  commissioners  against  a  po- 
liceman he  has  no  right  to  complain 
that  his  witnesses  were  not  sworn 
where  their  testimony  is  received 
and  given  the  same  consideration  as . 
if  sworn:  People  v.  Moss,  56  N.  Y.  S. 
1032;  s.  c.  38  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  630. 
Under  New  Jersey  act  of  1897,  the 
council  can  not  declare  an  office  va- 
cant without  a  hearing  on  notice  if 
practicable,  and  proof  of  facts  legal- 
ly authorizing  such  action:  Krueger 
v.  Council  &c.,  64  N.  J.  L.  523;  s.  c. 
45  Atl.  780.     An  inspector  of  water 


supply  held  not  to  be  a  clerk  and 
entitled  to  a  hearing,  although  he 
may  perform  some  clerical  duties: 
People  V.  Dalton,  159  N.  Y.  235;  s.  c. 
53  N.  E.  1113. 

^""Collins  V.  Russell,  107  Ga.  423; 
s.  c.  33  S.  E.  444. 

^'"Donaghy  v.  Macy,  167  Mass. 
178;  s.  c.  43  N.  E.  87;  People  v. 
Davie,  114  Cal.  363;  s.  c.  46  Pac.  150. 

'"  Butcher  v.  City  of  Camden,  29  N. 
J.  Eq.  478;  Love  v.  Mayor  &c.,  46 
N.  J.  L.  456;  Mayor  &c.  v.  Gear,  27 
N.  J.  L.  265;  City  Council  v.  Swee- 
ney, 44  Ga.  463;  Waldraven  v. 
Mayor  &c.,  4  Coldw.  (Tenn.)  431; 
Marden  v.  Portsmouth,  59  N.  H.  18; 
City  of  Brazil  v.  McBride,  69  Ind. 
244,  256;  Conner  v.  Mayor  &c.,  2 
Sandf.  (N.  Y.)  355;  City  of  Pales- 
tine V.  West  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  37  S. 
W.  783. 

"-  Board  &c.  v.  Brawner,  100  Ky. 
166;  s.  c.  37  S.  W.  950;  38  S.  W.  497. 

"^  People  V.  La  Grange,  40  N.  Y.  S. 
1026;  s.  c.  7  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  311. 

"^Silvey  v.  Boyle,  20  Utah  205;  s. 
c.  57  Pac.  880.  The  fire  commis- 
sioner may  properly,  on  economic 
grounds,  abolish  a  position  held  by 


198 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS. 


202 


§  198.    Causes  for  removal — English  and  American  rules. — It  is 

said  in  Kyd  on  Corporations^'^^  tliat  "the  offenses  for  which  a  corpo- 
rator may  be  disfranchised,  or  a  corporate  officer  removed,  have  been 
distributed  into  three  distinct  classes:  First,  such  as  relate  merely 
to  his  corporate  or  official  character  and  amount  to  breaches  of  the 
condition  tacitly  or  expressly  annexed  to  his  franchise  or  office. ^'^® 
Secondly,  such  as  have  no  immediate  relation  to  his  corporate  or 
official  character,  but  are  in  themselves  of  so  infamous  a  nature  as 
to  render  the  offender  unfit  to  enjoy  any  public  franchise;  such  as 
perjury,  forgery,  etc.  x'knd  thirdly,  offenses  of  a  mixed  nature,  being 
not  only  against  his  corporate  or  official  duty,  but  also  indictable  at 
common  law."^'^'' 


employes  under  him:  People  v. 
Scannell,  62  N.  Y.  S.  1064;  s.  c.  49 
App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  244.  The  adop- 
tion by  a  city  of  the  general  law  for 
the  incorporation  of  cities  abolishes 
eo  instanti  the  office  of  city  mar- 
shal: People  V.  Blair,  82  111.  App. 
570.  An  office  of  the  state  can  not 
be  abolished  by  the  city:  Marquis  v. 
City  of  Santa  Ana,  103  Cal.  661;  s. 
c.  37  Pac.  650. 

^"  2  Kyd  Corp.  62. 

"spagg's  Case,  11  Coke  93,  98a. 

"'Rex  V.  Carlisle,  Fortesc.  200;  s. 
c.  11  Mod.  379.  As  to  rescind- 
ing an  invalid  amotion,  see  Reg. 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  28  L.  T.  (N.  S.) 
629.  For  amotion  and  disfranchise- 
ment, see  2  Kent  Com.  278,  297;  and 
Angell  &  Ames  Corp.,  ch.  12  (where 
the  doctrine  of  the  English  decisions 
is  presented  and  earlier  cases 
cited) ;  Richards  v.  Clarksburg,  30 
W.  Va.  491;  s.  c.  4  S.  B.  774.  Dis- 
franchisement destroys  and  takes 
away  the  franchise  or  right  of  being 
a  member  of  a  corporation:  Will- 
cock  Munic.  Corp.  245-276;  Grant 
Corp.  250,  263;  2  Kyd  Corp.  50-94; 
Glover  Corp.,  ch.  16,  pp.  327,  328. 
Under  the  code  of  West  Virginia, 
which  provides  that  "all  the  corpo- 
rate powers  of  the  corporation  shall 
be  exercised"  by  the  common  coun- 


cils of  towns  or  villages  to  which 
said  chapter  applies,  the  power  of 
amotion  of  officers  for  misconduct, 
which  at  common  law  is  vested  in 
the  "corporation  at  large,"  is  con- 
ferred on  such  councils:  Richards  v. 
Clarksburg,  30  W.  Va.  491;  s.  c.  4 
S.  E.  774.  The  revised  statutes  of 
Indiana  confer  express  authority 
upon  the  common  council  of  a  city 
to  expel  or  remove,  by  a  two-thirds 
vote,  any  member  thereof,  or  any 
officer  of  the  corporation,  whether 
elected  or  appointed,  and  require 
the  council  to  make  provision  as  to 
the  mode  in  which  charges  shall  be 
preferred  and  heard.  Section  4265 
Burns  R.  S.  1901  provides  that  the 
common  council  shall  be  authorized, 
through  a  committee,  to  investigate 
the  books  and  papers,  together  with 
all  matters  pertaining  to  the  man- 
agement of  the  water-works,  and,  in 
case  of  neglect  of  duty  or  malfeas- 
ance on  the  part  of  any  officer  con- 
nected therewith,  to  remove  the  of- 
fender. And  it  was  held  that  a 
court  of  equity  has  no  jurisdiction 
to  restrain  the  council  of  a  city 
from  proceeding  to  investigate 
charges  preferred  against  trustees 
of  the  water-works  in  the  mode 
provided  by  the  by-laws  and  ordi- 
nances of  the  city:  Muhler  v.  Hede- 


203 


OFFICERS    AXD   AGENTS. 


199 


§  199.  Preferring  of  charges. — Sometimes  the  grounds  for  re- 
moval are  stated  in  the  constitution  as  misconduct  and  malfeasance 
in  office,"®  but  most  usually  they  are  specified  in  the  statute,"®  but 
may  be  embodied  in  the  charter.^^**  The  removal  of  an  officer  from 
his  office  being  a  judicial  act,^**^  it  is  necessary  that  formal  charges 
be  made  in  order  that  the  officer  charged  may  know  the  grounds  of 
accusation  and  be  prepared  to  meet  them  if  he  can.^^-    The  grounds 


kin,  119  Ind.  481;  s.  c.  20  N.  E.  700. 
Acts  of  an  officer,  after  his  suspen- 
sion, in  seeking  and  accepting  other 
employment,  are  not  admissible 
against  him  to  show  that  he  under- 
stood, when  he  received  notice  of 
suspension,  that  he  was  discharged: 
Morley  v.  Mayor  &c.,  12  N.  Y.  S. 
609;  s.  c.  58  Hun  (N.  Y.)  610. 

^"  Where  the  constitution  provides 
that  officers  not  subject  to  impeach- 
ment shall  be  subject  to  removal  for 
misconduct  and  malfeasance  in  of- 
fice in  such  manner  as  provided  by 
law,  and  the  statute  is  silent  on  the 
subject  of  causes  for  removal,  the 
only  grounds  for  removal  are  those 
specified  in  the  constitution:  Board 
&c.  V.  People,  13  Colo.  App.  553;  s. 
c.  59  Pac.  72. 

^"^  Where  the  law  provides  that  a 
village  officer  shall  not  be  interested 
in  contracts  with  the  village,  and 
he  admits  the  violation,  he  should 
be  removed.  It  is  not  a  defense 
that  he  received  no  more  on  the 
contract  than  other  contractors  and 
acted  in  good  faith:  In  re  Smith,  63 
N.  Y.  S.  1018;  s.  c.  48  App.  Div.  (N. 
Y.)  634.  A  person  in  office  when  a 
law  goes  into  effect  prohibiting  an 
officer  becoming  interested  in  a  con- 
tract, who  does  not  deny  knowledge 
of  the  law,  and  knew  of  similar 
provisions  in  a  previous  law,  does 
not  show  good  faith:  In  re  Smith, 
63  N.  Y.  S.  1018;  s.  c.  48  App.  Div. 
(N.  Y.)   634. 

*^  Where  the  charter  authorizes 
the  removal  of  officers  for  incapac- 
ity,  or  other  just  cause,   an   officer 


may  be  removed,  notwithstanding 
there  is  no  ordinance  prescribing 
the  mode  of  removal,  if  the  action  of 
the  council  is  in  proper  form:  State 
V.  Smith,  72  Conn.  572;  s.  c.  45  Atl. 
355. 

'''  People  V.  Board  &c.,  39  N.  Y.  S. 
607;  s.  c.  4  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  399. 
A  village  trustee  who  prefers 
charges  against  an  officer  is  not  com- 
petent to  sit  as  a  member  of  the 
board  on  a  hearing  of  the  charges: 
People  V.  Board  &c.,  39  N.  Y.  S.  607; 
s.  c.  4  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  399.  But 
see  State  v.  Common  Council  &c., 
90  Wis.  612;  s.  c.  64  N.  W.  304. 

^*-  In  stating  a  ground  for  removal 
the  facts  should  be  alleged  to  have 
been  wilfully  done:  State  v.  Mayor 
&c.,  10  Wash.  4;  s.  c.  38  Pac.  761. 
Where  a  charter  provides  that  the 
mayor  may  remove  for  cause  which 
he  may  deem  sufficient,  and  the  rea- 
son assigned  was  "the  good  of  the 
service,"  it  is  sufficient  as  a  matter 
of  law:  Ayers  v.  Hatch,  175  Mass. 
489;  s.  c.  56  N.  E.  612.  In  formal 
pleading  this  statement  would  be 
quite  insufficient,  as  it  is  but  a 
mere  conclusion  and  conveys  no  in- 
formation to  the  officer  charged. 
Formal  charges  for  removal  by  a 
municipal  board  are  essential  in 
Tennessee:  Hayden  v.  City  Council 
&c.,  100  Tenn.  582;  s.  c.  47  S.  W. 
182.  Where  an  officer  goes  to  trial 
on  charges  not  sufficiently  specific 
he  waives  the  question  of  suffi- 
ciency: State  V.  Kirkwood,  15  Wash. 
298;  s.  c.  46  Pac.  331. 


300 


PUBLIC    COEPOllATIONS. 


204 


which  have  been  hohl  siifTieient  for  the  removal  of  an  officer  are  many 
and  can  not  be  enumerated  in  detail.^ "^ 

§  200.    Power  of  corporation  to  remove  officers  and  agents. — One 

of  the  common-hiw  incidents  of  all  corporations  is  the  power  to  re- 
move a  corporate  officer  from  his  office  for  just  and  reasonable 
cause. ^^*     The    leading   case    on    this    subject   is    Eex   v.    Richard- 


^^^  An  inspector  of  buildings  wtio 
entered  a  saloon  and  committed  an 
assault  was  held  to  be  properly  re- 
moved: People  v.  Brady,  62  N.  Y.  S. 
603;  s.  c.  48  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  128. 
Where  a  collector  of  city  revenues 
was  removed  for  incompetency,  the 
removal  will  not  be  disturbed  where 
such  officer  offered  no  explanation 
of  his  inability  to  balance  his  books 
and  could  not  add  correctly  his  col- 
lections: People  V.  Coler,  159  N.  Y. 
569;  s.  c.  54  N.  E.  1094.  Where  a 
board  of  trustees  is  made  exclusive- 
ly the  judge  of  the  qualifications  of 
its  members,  the  refusal  of  the  may- 
or to  recognize  certain  members, 
the  permitting  of  persons  not  mem- 
bers to  sit  and  vote,  the  casting  of 
a  vote  by  the  mayor  when  not  au- 
thorized, are  not  grounds  of  removal, 
since  the  right  of  appeal  from  any 
ruling  or  decision  exists:  Board  &c. 
V.  People,  13  Colo.  App.  553;  s.  c.  59 
Pac.  72.  Prosecution  and  convic- 
tion for  misdemeanor  in  a  court  of 
competent  jurisdiction  is  essential 
as  a  ground  of  removal:  Board  &c. 
V.  People,  13  Colo.  553;  s.  c.  59  Pac. 
72.  It  is  misfeasance  and  malfeas- 
ance in  a  city  attorney  to  stipulate 
not  to  appeal  a  case  and  report  to 
the  council  that  he  had  done  noth- 
ing to  prevent  an  appeal:  People  v. 
Common  Council  &c.,  33  N.  Y.  S. 
165;  s.  c.  85  Hun  (N.  Y.)  601.  It  is 
not  malconduct  for  an  officer  to 
strike  a  person  with  a  pistol  and  no 
cause  for  removal:  .Johnson  v.  City 
Council  &c.,  11  Tex.  Civ.  App.  469; 
s.  c.  33  S.  W.  150.  Where  the  mayor 
solicited  and  collected  from  the 
heads  of  departments  large  sums  of 


money  to  reimburse  himself  for 
campaign  expenses  it  is  ground  for 
removal:  State  v.  Common  Council 
&c.,  90  Wis.  612;  s.  c.  64  N.  W.  304. 
Town  officers  having  power  to  re- 
quire an  additional  bond  of  an  offi- 
cer appointed  to  fill  a  vacancy  have 
power  to  declare  the  office  vacant 
upon  the  appointee  refusing  to  give 
bond  as  required:  Lyman  v.  Com- 
monwealth (Ky.),  55  S.  W.  686. 
Under  a  charge  against  a  member  of 
a  municipal  board  of  asking  for  a 
bribe  he  can  not  be  removed  for 
merely  failing  to  disclose  to  the 
council  that  a  bribe  had  been  offered 
him:  Hayden  v.  City  Council  &c., 
100  Tenn.  582;  s.  c.  47  S.  W.  182. 
The  removal  of  a  collector  of  city 
revenues  will  not  be  disturbed 
where  he  was  unable  to  balance  his 
books  and  could  not  add  correctly 
his  collections  and  made  no  expla- 
nation of  his  inability:  People  v. 
Coler,  57  N.  Y.  S.  636;  s.  c.  40  App. 
Div.  (N.  Y.)  65;  s.  c.  aff'd  159  N.  Y. 
569;  54  N.  E.  1094. 

'"'Dillon  Munic.  Corp.  (4th  ed.), 
§  212;  Richards  v.  Clarksburg,  30 
W.  Va.  491;  s.  c.  4  S.  E.  774;  State 
V.  Judges,  35  La.  An.  1075;  Ellison 
V.  Aldermen  &c.,  89  N.  C.  125;  Rex 
V.  Richardson,  1  Burr.  517;  Rex  v. 
Mayor  &c.,  2  Burr.  738;  Rex  v.  May- 
or &c.,  2  Burr.  723;  Lord  Bruce's 
Case,  2  Str.  819;  Jay's  Case,  1  Vent. 
302;  Rex  v.  Lyme  Regis,  1  Doug. 
149,  153;  Rex  v.  Ponsonby,  1  Ves. 
Jr.  1;  Rex  v.  Taylor,  3  Salk.  231; 
Rex  V.  Tidderley.  1  Sid.  14,  per 
Hale,  C.  B.;  2  Kyd  Corp.  50-94, 
where  the  old  cases  are  digested; 
Rex  V.  Chalke,  1  Ld.  Raym.  225;    1 


205 


OFFICKRS    AND    AOEXTS. 


201 


son,'"''''  ill  which  it  was  decided  that  a  corporation,  in  the  absence  of  an 
express  grant  of  authority,  had  the  incidental  power  to  make  a  by- 
hnv  to  remove  ollicers  for  just  cause.^**"  Where  the  charter  of  a  mu- 
nicipal corporation  gives  lo  the  common  council  express  power  to 
"expel  a  member  for  disorderly  conduct,"  the  right  to  expel  depends 
upon  the  construction  of  the  words  "disorderly  conduct."^**^ 

§  201.  The  same  subject  continued. — The  revised  statute  of  Mis- 
souri which  revised  the  city  charter  of  Sedalia  provided  that  the 
mayor  should  have  power,  with  the  consent  of  the  board  of  aldermen, 
to  remove  from  office  any  person  holding  office,  created  by  charter 
or  ordinance,  for  cause.  It  was  held  that  this  statute  was  not  repealed 
by  a  subsequent  statute  which  provided  for  the  removal  from 
office  of  persons  who  failed  to  devote  their  time  to  their  duties,  or 
who  were  guilty  of  wilful  or  fraudulent  violation  of  duty;  and  in  an 
action  for  wrongful  ouster  from  office,  it  was  held  not  error  to  permit 
plaintiff  to  strike  out  an  allegation  as  to  the  power  of  defendant  mayor 
and  aldermen  to  remove  for  cause  the  incumbent  of  an  office  created 
by  charter  or  ordinance,  as  the  state  of  facts  on  which  the  action 
was  based  remained  unaltered.^ ^^     Where  a  charter  prohibits  a  sal- 


Roll.  Rep.  409;  s.  c.  3  Bulst.  189; 
Willcock  Munic.  Corp.  246;  Grant 
Corp.  240;  2  Kent  Com.  297. 

^=  1  Burr.  517. 

^^«  Dillon  Munic.  Corp.  (4tli  ed.), 
§  251.  The  Massachusetts  statutes 
of  1885  provide  that  subordinates 
of  the  various  city  boards  of  Bos- 
ton may  be  removed  by  the  board 
"for  such  cause  as  they  may  deem 
sufRcient,  and  shall  assign  in  their 
order  for  removal."  The  court  de- 
cided that  it  does  not  require  that  a 
subordinate  shall  be  given  a  hearing 
before  the  board,  on  charges  pre- 
ferred against  him,  before  he  can  be 
removed:  O'Dowd  v.  City  of  Boston. 
149  Mass.  443;  s.  c.  21  N.  E.  949. 
Charter  power  of  removal,  at  any 
time,  without  cause,  of  a  police 
patrol  appointed  for  a  year, — see 
City  of  Chicago  v.  Edwards,  58  111. 
252. 

'*'  State  v.  Common  Council  &c., 
25  N.  J.  L.  536.  For  power  to 
punish  for  contempt  in  England,  see 
Doyle  V.  Falconer,  L.  R.  1  P.  C.  328; 


Speaker  v.  Glass,  L.  R.  3  P.  C.  560. 
Power  of  courts  in  United  States  to 
punish  for  contempt:  Burr's  Trial, 
355;  Ex  parte  Kearney,  7  Wheat. 
38;  United  States  v.  Hudson,  7 
Cranch  32.  Power  of  congress:  12 
U.  S.  Stats,  at  Large  333;  11  U.  S. 
Stats,  at  Large  155.  See  also,  Kil- 
bourn  v.  Thompson,  103  U.  S.  168. 

'^''Manker  v.  Paulhaber,  94  Mo. 
430;  s.  c.  6  S.  W.  372.  The  Missouri 
constitution  of  1875  provided  that 
all  laws  in  force  at  the  adoption  of 
the  constitution,  and  not  inconsist- 
ent therewith,  should  remain  in 
force  until  altered  or  repealed  by 
the  general  assembly.  It  was  ac- 
cordingly decided  in  the  case  last 
cited  that  the  act  of  March  18,  1873, 
as  amended  by  an  act  of  1875,  revis- 
ing the  charter  of  the  city  of  Se- 
dalia, and  providing  for  the  removal 
of  city  officers  by  the  mayor  and 
board  of  aldermen  for  cause,  is  not 
repugnant  to  said  constitution  of 
1875,  regarding  the  duties  of  per- 
sons holding  offices  of  trust  or  profit. 


§  202 


PUBLIC    COllPORATIONS. 


206 


aried  officer  from  holding  any  other  public  office  during  his  incum- 
bency, the  acceptance  of  a  commission  in  the  United  States  army 
operates  as  a  forfeiture  of  the  office  notwithstanding  a  resolution  of 
the  council  to  the  contrary. ^^^ 

§  202.  Notice  of  proceeding  to  remove. — Before  an  officer  whose 
tenure  of  otlice  is  not  discretionary  can  be  removed,  he  is  entitled  to 
a  personal  notice  of  the  proceeding  against  him;  which  notice  must 
contain  the  fact  that  a  proceeding  to  amove  is  intended,  and  the 
time  when  and  place  where  the  trial  body  will  meet.^'*"     The  charges 

and  the  power  of  the  general  as-  tion:  State  v.  Kearns,  47  Ohio  St. 
sembly  to  provide  for  their  removal  566;  s.  c.  25  N.  B.  1027.  Where  the 
for  violation  or  neglect  of  official  charter  provided  for  the  appoint- 
duty.  Implied  power  of  removal  ment  of  an  officer  at  a  specified 
for  cause  by  appointing  power:  meeting  who  should  hold  his  office 
Willard's  Appeal,  4  R.  I.  595,  597,  for  one  year  and  until  his  successor 
per  Ames,  C.  J.  In  an  action  for  was  appointed,  a  successor  can  not 
damages  for  wrongful  removal  from  be  appointed  at  a  subsequent  meet- 
office  by  the  mayor  and  aldermen  of  ing:  State  v.  Alexander,  107  Iowa 
a  city,  the  refusal  by  the  court  to  177;   s.  c.  77  N.  W.  841.     A  statute 


permit  defendants  to  read  the  pro- 
visions of  the  city  charter  giving 
them  authority  to  remove  for  cause 
is  erroneous:  Manker  v.  Faulhaber, 
94  Mo.  430;  s.  c.  6  S.  W.  372.  The 
consolidation  act  of  New  York  pro- 
vides that  the  heads  of  all  the  de- 


providing  for  filling  the  vacancy  in 
an  entire  board  of  trustees  by  the 
county  court  appointing  a  board 
does  not  conflict  with  an  amendment 
authorizing  the  county  judge  to  fill 
a  vacancy  in  the  board,  and  the  lat- 
ter   does    not    repeal    the    former: 


partments  of  New  York  City  may  be  Lewis  v.  Town  of  Brandenburg,  20 

removed  by  the  mayor,  after  oppor-  Ky.  L.  1011;   s.  c.  47  S.  W.  862;    48 

tunity  to  be  heard.     It  was  decided  S.  W.  978. 

that  the  violation  of  the  provision         ^'^  People  v.  Drake,  60  N.  Y.  S.  309 ; 

in  the  act  that  no  head  of  the  de-  s.  c.  43  App.  Div.   (N.  Y.)  325;  Peo- 

partment    shall    become    interested  pie  v.  Duane,  121  N.  Y.  367;  s.  c.  24 

directly    or   indirectly    in    the   pur-  N.  E.   845;    State  v.    Mayor  &c.,  63 

chase  of  real  estate  by  the  corpora-  N.  J.  L.  96;  s.  c.  42  Atl.  782;  Kerr 

tion  constitutes  sufficient  cause  for  v.   Jones,   19   Ind.   351;    Rowland  v. 

removal  by  the  mayor,  and  it  is  im-  Mayor  &c.,  83  N.  Y.  372;   People  v. 

material  that  the  act  also  contains  a  Nostrand,   46   N.  Y,  375;    People  v. 

provision    for    the    punishment    of  Common  Council  &c.,  77  N.  Y.  503; 

such  offense:    People  v.  Mayor  &c.,  State  v.  Allen,  21  Ind.  516. 


5  N.  Y.  S.  538;  s.  c.  52  Hun  (N.  Y.) 
483.  Where  judgment  of  ouster  is 
pronounced  against  persons  holding 


^^  People  V.  Benevolent  Society,  24 
How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  216;  People  v. 
Nichols,  79  N.  Y.  582;  In  re  Nichols, 


seats  in  a  city  council,  and  they  are  6  Abb.  N.  C.   (N.  Y.)    474;   s.  c.  57 

ousted    therefrom    on    the    ground  How.    Pr.    (N.    Y.)    395;    People   v. 

that    the    wards    from    which    they  Commissioners  &c.,  106  N.  Y.  64;  s. 

claim  to  have  been  elected  had  no  c.  12  N.  E.   641;    Commonwealth  v. 

legal  existence,  such  ouster  does  not  Pennsylvania  Benef.  Institute,  2  S. 

create     vacancies     in     the     council  &  R.  (Pa.)  141;  Society  v.  Vandyke, 

which  may  be  filled  by  a  special  elec-  2    Whart.     (Pa.)     309;     Delacey    v. 


207 


OFFICERS    AND   AGENTS. 


§    203 


must  be  specially  stated  with  substantial  certainty  ;^®^  and  the  accused 
must  be  given  time  to  produce  his  testimony  and  present  his  answer, 
and  is  entitled  to  be  represented  by  counsel  and  to  cross-examine  the 
witnesses  against  him.^"- 

§  203.  The  same  subject  continued. — WTien  the  charge  is  not  ad- 
mitted it  must  be  examined  and  proved.  ^"^  Before  an  officer  can  be 
ousted  by  authority  other  than  the  appointing  power,  he  is  entitled 
to  a  hearing,  for  the  reason  that  the  question  whether  he  shall  be 
ousted  is  a  judicial  one,  and  a  decision  given  without  affording  him 
time  and  opportunity  to  be  heard  is  ineffectual.^"*  Where  the  charge 
stated  does  not  justify  the  removal,  or  where  the  removal  is  erroneous, 
the  officer  is  entitled  to  be  restored  by  mandamus.^"^ 


Neuse  &c.  Co.,  1  Hawks  (N.  C.)  274; 
Southern  Plank  R.  Co.  v.  Hixon,  5 
Ind.  165;  Innes  v.  Wylie,  1  C.  &  K. 
257;  Queen  v.  Saddlers'  Co.,  10  H. 
L.  Cas.  404;  State  v.  Bryce,  7  Ohio 
(pt.  2,  82)  414,  416;  Rex  v.  Rich- 
ardson, 1  Burr.  517;  Rex  v.  Liver- 
pool, 2  Burr.  723;  Rex  v.  Doncaster, 
2  Burr.  738.  See  King  v.  Harris,  1 
B.  &  Ad.  936;  Exeter  v.  Clyde,  4 
Mod.  33;  Bagg's  Case,  11  Coke  93a; 
Rex  V.  Wilton,  5  Mod.  257;  Willcock 
Munic.  Corp.  264,  265;  Reg.  v.  Bail- 
iffs &c.,  2  Ld.  Raym.  1240.  When  no- 
tice may-  be  dispensed  with, — see 
Dillon  Munic.  Corp.  (4th  ed.),  §  254. 

^^1  Bagg's  Case,  11  Co.  93a;  s.  c. 
1  Roll.  224;  Tompert  v.  Lithgow,  1 
Bush  (Ky.)  176;  Willcock  Munic. 
Corp.  267;  Glover  Corp.  334;  Rex  v. 
Lyme  Regis,  1  Doug.  177. 

^''-  Murdock  v.  Academy,  12  Pick. 
(Mass.)  244;  State  v.  Bryce,  7  Ohio 
(pt.  2,  82)  414;  Rex  v.  Chalke,  1  Ld. 
Raym.  225;  Rex  v.  Derby,  Cas.  temp. 
Hardw.  154;  Rex  v.  Richardson,  1 
Burr.  517;  Rex  v.  Liverpool,  2  Burr. 
723.  Under  §  95  of  the  charter  of 
Greater  New  York  it  is  not  neces- 
sary to  give  notice  to  remove  offi- 
cials whose  terms  have  expired: 
People  V.  Feitner,  51  N.  Y.  S.  1094; 
s.  c.  30  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  241;  s.  c. 
affirmed  156  N.  Y.  694;  51  N.  E. 
1093.  A  removal  is  not  effective  un- 
til the  person  removed  has  been  no- 


tified: Kriseler  v.  Le  Valley,  122 
Mich.  576;  s.  c.  81  N.  W.  580.  No- 
tice by  a  village  clerk  of  removal 
by  the  village  president  is  not  suf- 
ficient: Kriseler  v.  Le  Valley,  122 
Mich.  576;  s.  c.  81  N.  W.  580. 

193  Murdock  v.  Academy,  12  Pick. 
(Mass.)  244;  Willcock  Munic.  Corp. 
267;  Glover  Corp.  334;  Harman  v. 
Tappenden,  1  East  555;  Rex  v.  Fa- 
versham,  8  T.  R.  352. 

''"Board  &c.  v.  Johnson,  124  Ind. 
145;  s.  c.  24  N.  E.  148;  19  Am.  St.  88; 
Dullam  V.  Willson,  53  Mich.  392;  s. 
c.  19  N.  W.  112;  51  Am.  R.  128;  Peo- 
ple V.  Freese,  83  Cal.  453;  s.  c.  23 
Pac.  378;  Williams  v.  Bagot,  3  B.  & 
C.  772;  Page  v.  Hardin,  8  B.  Mon. 
(Ky.)  648.  The  power  to  oust  an 
officer  rightfully  in  office  is  essen- 
tially a  judicial  one,  except  where 
it  is  exercised  by  the  appointing 
power:  State  v.  Harrison,  113  Ind. 
434;  s.  c.  16  N.  E.  384;  3  Am.  St. 
663. 

"» State  V.  Jersey  City,  25  N.  J.  L. 
536;  Commonwealth  v.  German  So- 
ciety, 15  Pa.  St.  251;  City  of  Madi- 
son V.  Korbly,  32  Ind.  74;  Reg.  v. 
Ispwich,  2  Ld.  Raym.  1232.  Equity 
will  not  enjoin  the  corporate  au- 
thorities from  making  an  unlawful 
removal  or  appointing  a  successor: 
Dillon  Munic.  Corp.  (4th  ed.),  ch. 
21  and  §  847;  Delahanty  v.  Warner, 
75  111.  185;  s.  c.  20  Am.  R.  237.    One 


204 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS. 


208 


§  204.  By  whom  discharged. —  (a)  By  city  council. — As  a  rule 
an  office  created  by  the  city  council  may  be  abolished  by  it  in  the 
absence  of  constitutional  or  statutory  restrictions.^^"  When  the  stat- 
ute provides  that  the  council  shall  appoint  a  certain  officer  to  continue 
in  office  during  its  pleasure  it  is  within  the  power  of  the  council  to 
remove  such  officer  summarily  at  any  time  without  notice  or  charges 
j)referred.^°^  If  the  right  of  removal  is  given  by  the  charter  to  the 
council  the  right  is  not  taken  away  by  fixing  the  term  of  office  by  ordi- 
nance at  one  year.^''*  And  where  the  council  is  authorized  from  time 
to  time  to  elect  and  appoint  an  officer  he  may  be  removed  and  his 
successor  appointed  at  pleasure.  ^^®  But  where  an  officer  is  removable 
by  the  city  council  his  removal  by  a  committee  of  such  council  is 
not  effective  until  ratified  by  the  council:  the  power  can  not  be 
delegated.''^*'  If  the  power  of  removal  is  in  the  council  a  member 
is  not  disqualified  by  reason  of  his  having  preferred  charges  against 
the  officer.-"^     But  where  the  statute  declares  that  an  office  may  be 


who  has  been  duly  elected,  quali- 
fied and  inducted  into  office  as  a 
city  alderman  can  not  be  summarily 
removed,  by  resolution  of  the  board, 
upon  a  charge  of  disqualification, 
without  notice  and  without  hearing 
or  investigation  of  any  kind:  Board 
&c.  V.  Darrow,  13  Colo.  460;  s.  c. 
22  Pac.  784.  Where  the  sufficiency 
of  an  explanation  rests  entirely  with 
the  removal  officer,  after  a  full  hear- 
ing his  action  will  not  be  disturbed 
on  appeal:  People  v.  Brady,  62  N. 
Y.  S.  603;  s.  c.  48  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.) 
128.  As  to  the  effect  of  the  con- 
solidation of  New  York  with  por- 
tion of  Queens  County  in  relation  to 
policemen,  see  People  v.  York,  53  N. 
Y.  S.  947;  s.  c.  33  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.) 
573.  As  to  commissioner  of  city 
works,  see  People  v.  Dalton,  53  N. 
Y.  S.  1060;  s.  c.  34  App.  Div.  (N. 
Y.)  6;  In  re  Fuller,  53  N.  Y.  S.  1090; 
s.  c.  33  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  617.  As 
to  wages  after  consolidation,  where 
no  services  were  rendered  there- 
after, see  Ford  v.  City  of  New  York, 
56  N.  Y.  S.  4;  s.  c.  26  Misc.  (N.  Y.) 
292.  In  order  to  maintain  a  suit 
for  his  salary  by  a  person  who  was 
illegally  removed  from  his  office  it 
is  not  necessary  to  be  reinstated  by 


mandamus:  Morgan  v.  City  of  Den- 
ver, 14  Colo.  App.  147;  s.  c.  59  Pac. 
619.  A  petition  for  reinstatement 
which  does  not  state  the  nature  of 
petitioner's  duties,  but  merely  al- 
leges that  he  is  a  regular  clerk  so 
as  to  be  entitled  to  a  hearing,  is  not 
sufficient:  People  v.  Dalton,  159  N. 
Y.  235;  s.  c.  53  N.  B.  1113.  Where 
a  policeman  is  remanded  to  patrol 
duty  and  waits  two  years  before  be- 
ginning proceedings  for  restoration, 
he  is  guilty  of  laches  and  will  not  be 
heard:  People  v.  Moss,  58  N.  Y.  S. 
1051;  s.  c.  42  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  196. 
Petition  for  reinstatement  under  N. 
Y.  laws  of  1898,  ch.  186,  must  state 
that  petitioner's  position  was  classi- 
fied as  competitive:  People  v.  Dal- 
ton, 159  N.  Y.  235;  s.  c.  53  N.  E. 
1113. 

^"•^  Goodwin  v.  State,  142  Ind.  117; 
s.  c.  41  N.  E.  359. 

"'  Town  of  Davis  v.  Miller,  47  W. 
Va.  413;  s.  c.  35  S.  E.  6. 

^"^  Mathis  V.  Rose,  64  N.  J.  L.  45;  s. 
c.  44  Atl.  875. 

^™' Mathis  V.  Rose,  64  N.  J.  L.  45;  s. 
c.  44  Atl.  875. 

"'^  People    V.    Tracy,    54    N.    Y.    S. 
1070;  s.  c.  35  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  265. 

-"'  People  V.  Common  Council  &c., 


209 


OFFICERS   AND   AGENTS. 


§  204 


declared  vacant  by  the  common  council  for  a  failure  to  give  IjoikI  the 
failure  of  itself  is  not  a  vacation :  there  must  be  action  by  the  coun- 
cil.-"- (b)  By  the  mayor. — Necessarily  the  power  of  the  mayor  to  xe- 
move  an  officer  is  more  restricted  than  that  of  the  council.  Where  a 
charter  provision  authorizes  the  mayor  and  council  to  remove  an 
officer  for  cause  the  mayor  alone  can  not  do  so.-"^  A  statute  granting 
a  mayor  the  right  to  appoint  and  remove  officers  does  not  apply  to 
assistants  who  are  employed  in  departments  and  who  are  employed  by 
the  chief.-"*  In  the  absence  of  a  law  authorizing  it  the  mayor  can 
not  remove  without  cause  an  officer,  though  appointed  by  him,  when 
the  term  is  a  fixed  and  definite  one.^**^  (c)  By  head  of  department, 
bureau,  etc. — Sometimes  the  power  of  removal,  and  particularly  of 
those  who  occupy  a  confidential  relationship,  is  given  to  the  chief  of 
the  department. -°^ 


33  N.  Y.  S.  165;  s.  c.  85  Hun  (N.  Y.) 
601. 

="=  Kriseler  v.  Le  Valley,  122  Mich. 
576;  s.  c.  81  N.  W.  580.  Under  Spo- 
kane charter  the  majority  of  the 
city  council,  after  recommendation 
of  the  mayor,  may  remove  a  mem- 
ber of  the  board  of  health  without 
preferring  charges:  Kimball  v.  Olm- 
sted, 20  Wash.  629;  s.  c.  56  Pac.  377. 
A  vacancy  of  the  office  of  city  mar- 
shal in  a  city  of  the  second  class 
must  be  tilled  by  the  city  in  Arkan- 
sas: Payne  v.  Rittman,  66  Ark.  201; 
s.  c.  49  S.  W.  814. 

'"^  State  V.  Donovan,  89  Maine  448; 
s.  c.  36  Atl.  982.  Power  of  removal 
by  mayor  and  council  under  Mass. 
laws  of  1896,  ch.  415,  and  laws  of 
1897,  ch.  95,  construed:  Attorney- 
General  V.  Cahill,  169  Mass.  18;  s. 
c.  47  N.  E.  433. 

^-^  Peters  v.  Bell,  51  La.  An.  1621; 
s.  c.  26  So.  442. 

205  Field  V.  Malster,  88  Md.  691;  s. 
c.  41  Atl.  1087.  The  removal  of  an 
officer  by  the  mayor,  under  the  stat- 
ute, takes  effect  at  once  and  de- 
prives the  officer  removed  of  his 
right  to  discharge  further  the  func- 
tions of  the  office,  though  his  action 
may  be  subsequently  reviewed  by 
the  council:  Heffran  v.  Hutchins, 
1  Smith — 14 


160  111.  550;  s.  c.  43  N.  B.  709. 
Power  to  appoint  does  not  include 
power  to  remove:  People  v.  McAl- 
lister, 10  Utah  357;  s.  c.  37  Pac.  578. 
For  construction  of  charter  of 
Greater  New  York  and  laws  as  to 
the  power  of  the  mayor  to  make  re- 
movals, see  People  v.  Van  Wyck, 
159  N.  Y.  509;  s.  c.  54  N.  E.  31;  Peo- 
ple V.  Nixon,  158  N.  Y.  221;  s.  c.  52 
N.  E.  1117;  People  v.  Van  Wyck,  54 
N.  Y.  S.  675;  s.  c.  34  App.  Div.  (N. 
Y.)  573.  Power  of  removal  under 
Mich.  St.  (Ann.),  §  653:  Attorney- 
General  V.  Common  Council  &c.,  112 
Mich.  145;  s.  c.  70  N.  W.  450.  Pow- 
er of  removal  under  Neb.  Comp.  St., 
ch.  13a,  §§  21,  28:  Stahlhut  v. 
Bauer,  51  Neb.  64;  s.  c.  70  N.  W. 
496.  Under  laws  of  S.  D.  1890,  ch. 
37,  the  power  of  the  mayor  to  re- 
move officers  appointed  by  him  is 
absolute:  State  v.  Williams,  6  S. 
Dak.  119;  s.  c.  60  N.  W.  410. 

-'^  As  to  power  of  removal  by 
heads  of  departments  under  charter 
of  Greater  New  York,  see  People  v. 
Brady,  59  N.  Y.  S.  322;  s.  c.  43  App. 
Div.  (N.  Y.)  60.  The  decision  of 
the  commissioner  of  public  works  in 
dismissing  an  employe  on  charges 
preferred  will  not  be  reversed  on 
appeal   where   the   evidence   before 


§  205 


PUBLIC    CORrORATIONS. 


210 


§  205.  All  persons  charged  with  notice  of  duties  and  powers  of 
municipal  agents. — The  statutes  prescribe  the  powers  and  duties  of 
officers  and  agents  of  a  public  corporation;  and  all  persons  dealing 
with  them  are  charged  with  the  knowledge  of  the  nature  of  these 
duties  and  the  extent  of  these  powers.^"'^ 

§  206.  Liability  of  officers  to  the  corporations. — Public  officers 
elected  pursuant  to  statute  by  a  municipal  corporation  are  not  the 
servants  or  agents  of  the  corporation  in  such  a  sense  as  will  enable 
the  corporation,  in  the  absence  of  a  statute  giving  the  remedy,  to 


the  commissioner  is  sufficient  to 
sustain  his  action:  People  v.  Dalton, 
65  N.  Y.  S.  426;  s.  c.  52  App.  Div. 
(N.  Y.)  627.  A  person  who  is  the 
head  of  a  bureau  simply  and  not  the 
head  of  a  department  has  no  right 
to  remove  or  appoint  his  subordi- 
nates: Morgan  v.  City  of  Denver,  14 
Colo.  App.  147;  s.  c.  59  Pac.  619. 
The  removal  of  police  commission- 
ers by  the  supreme  court  where  they 
acted  in  good  faith  and  without  in- 
tention to  violate  law  is  in  the  dis- 
cretion of  the  court:  In  re  Rupp,  53 
N.  Y.  S.  927;  s.  c.  33  App.  Div.  (N. 
Y.)  468. 

207  -pijg  pioyd  Acceptances,  7  Wall. 
666;  Merchants'  Bank  v.  Bergen 
Co.,  115  U.  S.  384;  Hodges  v.  Buffalo, 
2  Den.  (N.  Y.)  110;  Cornell  v.  Town 
of  Guilford,  1  Den.  (N.  Y.)  510; 
McDonald  v.  Mayor  &c.,  68  N.  Y.  23; 
Schumm  v.  Seymour,  24  N.  J.  Eq. 
143;  Lowell  Sav.  Bank  v.  Inhabi- 
tants «S:c.,  8  Allen  (Mass.)  109; 
Perkinson  v.  St.  Louis,  4  Mo.  App. 
322;  Craycraft  v.  Selvage,  10  Bush 
(Ky.)  696;  Cleveland  v.  State  Bank, 
16  Ohio  St.  236;  s.  c.  88  Am.  D.  445; 
Chicago  v.  Shober  &c.  Co.,  6  Bradw. 
(111.)  560;  Alton  v.  Mulledy,  21  111. 
76;  Pine  Civil  Tp.  v.  Huber  Mfg. 
Co.,  83  Ind.  121;  Summers  v.  Board 
&c.,  103  Ind.  262;  s.  c.  2  N.  E.  725; 
Axt  V.  Jackson  School  Tp.,  90  Ind. 
101;  Reeve  School  Tp.  v.  Dodson,  98 
Ind.  497;  Platter  v.  Board  «S:c.,  103 
Ind.  360;  s.  c.  2  N.  E.  544;  Bloom- 
ington  School  Tp.  v.  National  School 


Furnishing  Co.,  107  Ind.  43;  s.  c.  7 
N.  E.  760;  Barton  v.  Sweptson,  44 
Ark.  437;  Dorsey  Co.  v.  Whitehead, 
47  Ark.  205;  s.  c.  1  S.  W.  97;  Wal- 
lace V.  Mayor  &c.,  29  Cal.  180;  Sutro 
V.  Pettit,  74  Cal.  332;  s.  c.  16  Pac. 
7;  5  Am.  St.  442.  See  also,  White- 
side V.  United  States,  93  U.  S.  247; 
Harshman  v.  Bates  Co.,  92  U.  S.  569; 
McClure  v.  Oxford  Tp.,  94  U.  S.  429; 
South  Ottawa  v.  Perkins,  94  U.  S. 
260;  Lewis  v.  City  of  Shreveport, 
108  U.  S.  282;  s.  c.  2  S.  Ct.  634;  Dix- 
on Co.  V.  Field,  111  U.  S.  83;  s.  c.  4 
S.  Ct.  315;  Carroll  Co.  v.  Smith, 
111  U.  S.  556;  s.  c.  4  S.  Ct.  539;  Post 
V.  Kendall  Co.,  105  U.  S.  667;  Da- 
viess Co.  V.  Dickinson,  117  U.  S. 
657;  s.  c.  6  S.  Ct.  897;  Mayor  &c.  v. 
Ray.  19  Wall.  468;  Vincent  v.  In- 
habitants, 12  Cush.  (Mass.)  103;  Dill 
V.  Inhabitants,  7  Met.  (Mass.)  438; 
Spaulding  v.  City  of  Lowell,  23 
Pick.  (Mass.)  71;  Bridgeport  v. 
Housatonic  R.  Co.,  15  Conn.  475; 
Donovan  v.  Mayor  &c.,  33  N.  Y.  291; 
McDonald  v.  Mayor  &c.,  68  N.  Y.  23; 
s.  c.  23  Am.  R.  144;  Overseer  &c.  v. 
Overseers  &c.,  18  Johns.  (N.  Y.) 
382;  Davies  v.  New  York  &c.  Co.,  48 
N.  Y.  Supr.  Ct.  492 ;  Appleby  v.  May- 
or &c.,  15  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  428; 
Peterson  v.  Mayor  «S:c.,  17  N.  Y.  449; 
Ottoman  Cahvey  Co.  v.  City  of  Phila- 
delphia (Pa.),  13  Am.  &  Eng.  Corp. 
Cas.  524;  Livingston  v.  Pippin,  31 
Ala.  542;  People  v.  Baraga  Tp.,  39 
Mich.  554;  Neely  v.  Yorkville,  10 
S.  C.  141. 


211  OFFICERS    AND   AGENTS.  §    207 

maintain  actions  against  such  officers  for  negligence  in  the  discharge 
of  their  official  duty.^"^  When  an  officer  who  is  about  to  enter  upon 
the  discharge  of  his  duties  for  a  second  term  makes  a  report  to,  or 
a  settlement  with,  the  proper  authorities,  from  which  it  appears  that 
he  has  on  hand  at  the  close  of  his  first  term  a  certain  sum  of  money, 
such  settlement  is,  in  the  opinion  of  many  of  the  courts,  conclusive 
upon  him,  if  the  officers  with  whom  the  settlement  is  made  acted  in 
good  faith  and  have  no  knowledge  that  the  sum  of  money  which  he 
reports  is  not  actually  in  his  hands.-*^'* 

§  207.  Instances  of  fraudulent  acts  of  municipal  agents. — Munici- 
pal officers  and  agents  are  held  to  a  strict  accountability  in  their  deal- 
ings with  or  on  behalf  of  the  corporation,  and  will  be  held  personally 
liable  in  case  of  injury  arising  either  to  the  corporation  or  a  third 
party  out  of  any  tortious  act  in  their  official  capacity.  If  a  member 
of  a  municipal  board  authorized  to  select  and  purchase  a  site  for  pub- 
lic purposes  agrees  with  a  third  person  to  inform  the  latter  of  the 
site  selected  by  such  board,  and  that  the  latter  shall  thereupon 
purchase  such  site,  and  then  sell  it  to  the  hoard  at  a  profit,  and  the 
agreement  is  carried  out  through  the  aid  of  the  officer,  and  the 
municipality  is  thereby  made  to  pay  a  higher  price  for  the  property 
than  it  could  have  been  purchased  for  from  the  original  owner,  an 
action  can  be  sustained  against  the  officer  and  his  confederate  for 
the  amount  of  profit  realized  by  them.^^*^ 

2»8  Dillon  Munic.   Corp.    (4tli  ed.),  37  Am.  R.  229;    State  v.  Grammer, 

§  236;  Wilson  v.  Mayor  &c.,  1  Denio  29    Ind.    530;    Baker   v.    Preston,    1 

(N.  Y.)    595;    Minor  v.  Bank,  1  Pe-  Gilm.  (Va.)  235;  Morley  v.  Town  of 

ters  46,  69;   Inhabitants  &c.  v.  Cha-  Metamora,  78  111.  394;   s.  c.  20  Am. 

pin,  132  Mass.  470;   Inhabitants  &c,  R.    266;    Roper   v.    Trustees  &c.,    91 

v.  Fiske,  8  Cush.   (Mass.)   264,  266;  111.  518;  s.  c.  33  Am.  R.  60;  City  of 

Dewey,  J.,  in  White  v.  Inhabitants  Chicago  v.  Gage,  95  111.  593;  s.  c.  35 

&c.,  10  Met.  (Mass.)  108;  Trafton  v.  Am.   R.   182;    Cawley  v.   People,  95 

Alfred,  15  Me.  258;   Inhabitants  &c.  111.249. 

v.   Hazzard,  12   Cush.    (Mass.)   112;         ^^"City  of  Boston  v.  Simmons,  150 

Commonwealth  v.  Genther,  17  S.  &  Mass.  461;  s.  c.  23  N.  E.  210;  15  Am. 

R.    (Pa.)    135.     Whether   municipal  St.  230;  Walker  v.  Osgood,  98  Mass. 

councilors  are  liable  to  the  corpora-  348;    Cutter  v.  Demmon,  111  Mass. 

tion  for  misappropriating  its  funds,  474;    Rice  v.  Wood,   113   Mass.   133, 

— see  Municipality  of  East  Missouri  135;   s.  c.  18  Am.  R.  459;  Adams  v. 

v.  Horseman,  16  Up.  Can.  Q.  B.  576.  Paige,    7    Pick.     (Mass.)     542,    550; 

For  payment   of   money   on   illegal  United  States  v.  State  Bank,  96  U. 

order  or  resolution,  see  Daniels  v.  S.    30,    35;    Emery    v.    Hapgood,    7 

Municipal  Council  &c.,  10  Up.  Can.  Gray   (Mass.)    55,  58;    s.  c.  66  Am. 

Q.  B.  478.  D.   459.     All   who   aid   in   the   com- 

^'^  Boone    Co.    v.    Jones,    54    Iowa  mission    of    a    tort    are   joint    tort- 

699;  s.  c.  2  N«.  W.  987;  7  N.  W.  155;  feasors,  and,  as  such,  jointly  liable 


§  208 


PUBLIC    CORPORATION'S. 


212 


§  208.  Liability  of  corporation  to  officers. — Corporations  are  in 
general  liable  for  their  officers'  salaries  while  they  continue  in  office, 
and  if  they  improperly  remove  them,  they  still  remain  liable.- ^^ 
A  highway  surveyor,  however,  can  not  recover  from  the  town  an 
amount  expended  by  him  in  excess  of  the  tax  committed  to  him.^^^ 
And  it  has  been  decided  that  a  municipal  officer  who  is  kept  out  of 
his  office  and  has  not  performed  his  duties  can  not  maintain  an  ac- 
tion against  the  city  to  recover  the  fees  accruing  from  the  office.^ ^^ 


for  the  result  of  their  act:  Creed  v. 
Hartmann,  29  N.  Y.  591;  s.  c.  86  Am. 
D.  341;  Klauder  v.  McGrath,  35  Pa. 
St.  128;  s.  c.  78  Am.  D.  329;  Moir  v. 
Hopkins,  16  111.  313;  s.  c.  63  Am.  D. 
312.  Defendants,  who  are  mem- 
bers of  the  town  council,  with  oth- 
ers, entered  into  a  bond  in  a  certain 
sum  for  the  purpose  of  building  a 
court-house  in  the  town.  After- 
wards the  town  council,  of  which 
defendants  were  members,  illegally 
appropriated  $1,000  of  the  town 
funds  to  aid  in  building  the  court- 
house, a  portion  of  which  sum  was 
immediately  paid  over.  The  court 
held  that  the  defendants  were  li- 
able for  the  amount  thus  paid,  in 
an  action  brought  by  the  taxpay- 
ers for  its  recovery:  Russell  v.  Tate, 
52  Ark.  541;  s.  c.  13  S.  W.  130.  The 
laws  of  New  York,  1881,  ch.  531. 
provide  that  municipal  officers  "and 
other  persons  acting  for  or  on  be- 
half of  any  town,  county,  village  or 
municipal  corporation"  may  be  en- 
joined, in  a  suit  by  taxpayers,  from 
committing  any  illegal  official  act, 
or  from  committing  waste  or  in- 
jury to  any  property,  funds  or  es- 
tate of  such  town,  etc.  It  was  held 
that  an  action  will  lie  against  city 
officers  to  prevent  them  from  com- 
promising for  a  nominal  sum  a  final 
judgment  in  favor  of  the  city 
against  persons  for  violation  of  the 
excise  law,  the  proceeds  of  which  be- 
long to  the  poor  fund.  And  in  such 
action  the  judgment  debtors,  who 
are  alleged  to  be  acting  in  collusion 
with  the  officers,  are  properly  joined 


as  defendants:  Standart  v.  Burtis, 
46  Hun  (N.  Y.)  82.  The  Missouri 
statute  making  town,  city,  state 
and  county  officers  liable,  etc.,  for 
converting  public  moneys  to  their 
own  use,  embraces  township  offi- 
cers: State  V.  Cleveland,  80  Mo. 
108.  Town  officers  who,  in  con- 
structing a  ditch,  act  according  to 
their  best  judgment,  refraining  from 
unnecessary  injury,  are  not  liable 
for  errors  of  judgment  in  choosing 
the  location  or  method  of  construc- 
tion: Smith  V.  Gould,  61  Wis.  31;  s. 
c.  20  N.  W.  369.  Town  bonds  were 
delivered  by  the  town  to  a  railroad 
company  in  exchange  for  its  stock. 
A.  received  them  as  president  of  the 
company  and  sold  them  for  the  com- 
pany. A,  was  also  town  supervisor. 
The  court  held  that  as  he  acted  for 
the  company,  he  was  not  liable  to  an 
action  by  the  town  for  having  sold 
them  to  bona  fide  purchasers,  know- 
ing them  to  be  invalid:  Farnham  v. 
Benedict,  39  Hun  (N.  Y.)  22. 

="^Stadler  v.  City  of  Detroit,  13 
Mich.  346;  Shaw  v.  Mayor  &c.,  19 
Ga.  468.  Where  overseers  of  the 
poor  procure  supplies  on  their  own 
credit,  instead  of  following  the  pro- 
cedure laid  down  in  the  statute, 
they  are  not  precluded  from  charg- 
ing the  same  to  the  town,  and  de- 
manding that  the  account  be 
audited  by  the  town  board  of  audit: 
Osterhoudt  v.  Rigney,  98  N.  Y.  222. 

='-  Cloud  v.  Town  of  Norwich,  57 
Vt.  448. 

="Dolan  V.  Mayor  &c.,  68  N.  Y. 
274,  279;   Commissioners  &c.  v.  An- 


213 


OFFICEGS    AND   AGENTS. 


209 


§  209.  Indictment  of  municipal  officers. — Provision  is  generally 
made  by  statute  for  the  indictment  of  municipal  officers  for  wilful 
misfeasance  or  nonfeasance  in  their  official  capacity.  Thus  in  North 
Carolina  "a  public  officer  intrusted  with  definite  powers  to  be  exer- 
cised for  the  benefit  of  the  community,  who  wickedly  abuses  them  or 
fraudulently  exceeds  them,  is  punishable  by  indictment."-^*  And  it 
has  been  held  in  the  state  of  Tennessee  that  the  mayor  and  aldermen 
may  be  indicted  for  neglecting  to  keep  the  streets  of  a  city  or  town 
in  reasonable  repair.-^^ 


derson,  20  Kan.  298.  See  also,  Ter- 
hune  V.  Mayor  &c.,  88  N.  Y.  247;  Mc- 
Veany  v.  Mayor  &c.,  80  N.  Y.  185; 
Steubenville  v.  Gulp,  38  Ohio  St.  18; 
Auditors  &c.  v.  Benoit,  20  Mich.  176. 
But  where  an  officer's  removal  was 
reversed  on  certiorari,  he  was  en- 
titled to  recover  for  the  time  dur- 
ing which  he  was  deprived  of  his  of- 
fice, without  deduction  for  wages 
earned  in  another  capacity.  This  is 
because  there  is  no  contract  in  favor 
of  the  officer  as  there  is  in  the  ordi- 
nary relation  of  master  and  servant. 
He  receives  his  salary  as  an  inci- 
dent to  his  office:  Fitzsimmons  v. 
City  of  Brooklyn,  102  N.  Y.  536;  s. 
c.  7  N.  E.  787;  and  Andrews  v.  Port- 
land, 79  Maine  484;  s.  c.  10  Atl.  458, 
to  the  same  point,  although  the  sal- 
ary had  been  paid  to  a  de  facto  in- 
cumbent. Such  is  also  the  rule  in 
California:  People  v.  Oulton,  28  Cal. 
44;  People  v.  Potter,  63  Cal.  127; 
People  V.  Smyth,  28  Cal.  21; 
Meagher  v.  Storey  Co.,  5  Nev.  244; 
Carroll  v.  Siebenthaler,  37  Cal.  193. 
Courts  of  equity  will  not,  as  a  rule, 
enjoin  the  payment  of  the  salary  to 
the  incumbent  pending  a  contest: 
Field  V.  Commonwealth,  32  Pa.  St. 
478;  Ex  parte  Ramshay,  83  Eng.  C. 
L.  174;  Queen  v.  Mayor  &c.,  8  Ad.  & 
El.  633.  Persons  who  are  neither 
officers  de  jure  nor  de  facto  can  not 
recover  the  salary  of  an  oflScer: 
Samis  v.  King,  40  Conn.  298. 

="  State   V.    Glasgow,    N.    C.    Conf. 
386,    387;    State   v.    Justices   &c.,    4 


Hawks  (N.  C.)  194.  See  also.  State 
v.  Fishblate,  83  N.  C.  654;  State  v. 
Commissioners  &c.,  2  N.  C.  Law  617; 
Paris  V.  People,  27  111.  73.  The 
Illinois  statutes  make  it  a  criminal 
offense  for  a  town  officer  to  with- 
hold the  town  records  from  the 
county  clerk's  oflJce,  on  the  discon- 
tinuance of  the  township  system  in 
the  county.  But  it  was  held  that 
the  indictment  need  not  state  the 
manner  in  which  the  town  office 
was  abolished,  and  that  it  was  not 
necessary  to  a  conviction  that  a  de- 
mand should  have  been  made  on  the 
officer  for  the  records  withheld: 
Baysinger  v.  People,  115  111.  419;  s. 
c.  5  N.  E.  375. 

-^=^Hill  V.  State,  4  Sneed  (Tenn.) 
443.  See  also,  Phillips  v.  Common- 
wealth, 44  Pa.  St.  197.  The  mayor 
and  aldermen  of  a  city  are  indict- 
able for  any  wilful  or  negligent  fail- 
ure to  discharge  the  duties  devolved 
upon  them  by  the  city  charter. 
They  can  not  with  impunity  arbi- 
trarily refuse  to  exercise  the  pow- 
ers with  which  they  are  invested, 
nor  can  they  wilfully  prevent  them 
from  being  exercised.  But  they 
constitute  a  part  of  a  city  govern- 
ment distinct  from  the  board  of 
audit  and  finance  of  the  city,  and 
the  two  can  not  be  jointly  indicted 
for  refusal  or  failure  to  perform 
their  duties  under  the  charter: 
State  V.  Hall,  97  N.  C.  474;  s.  c.  1  S. 
E.  683.  For  requisites  of  indict- 
ment   for    non-performance    of    ofl5- 


§    209  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  314 

cial   duty,   see   the   case   last  cited;  345.     One  who  procures  himself  to 

also  3  Chitty  Crim.  Law  586,  606;  be    sworn    into    a    public    office    to 

State  V.  Mayor,  11  Humph.   (Tenn.)  which  he  knows  he  has  no  title  is 

217;    People    v.    Wattles,    13    Mich,  indictable  at  common  law:  Scarlet's 

446;  State  v.  Com'rs,  4  Dev.  (N.  C.)  Case,  12  Coke  98. 


CHAPTEE  VII. 


PERSONAL   LIABILITY   OF   OFFICERS    AND   AGENTS. 


Section 

210.  Liability     on     contracts  —  Pre- 

sumption against  liability. 

211.  The   same   subject  continued — 

Negotiable  instruments. 

212.  The   same   subject   continued — 

Excess    of    authority,    fraud, 
etc. 

213.  Exemption    from    liability    for 

legislative  acts. 

214.  The   foregoing  rule  qualified — 

Breach  of  trust. 

215.  Liability     of     judicial     officers 

considered. 


Section 

216.  Quasi-judicial   officers — Corrupt 

motive. 

217.  Liability  of  ministerial  officers. 

218.  The  same  subject  continued. 

219.  No  personal  liability  for  strict- 

ly public  acts. 

220.  Default  of  subordinates. 

221.  Ejection  of  member  of  council 

by  order  of  mayor. 

222.  Negligence      of      recorder      of 

deeds. 

223.  The  same  subject  continued. 

224.  Liability  of  assessor  of  taxes. 


§  210.    Liability  on  contracts — Presumption  against  liability. — 

Upon  considerations  of  public  iDolicy  a  distinction  has  been  estab- 
lished between  the  personal  liability  of  public  agents  on  contracts 
made  in  behalf  of  their  principal,  and  that  of  private  agents  under 
like  circumstances.  It  is  presumed  that  persons  dealing  with  public 
officers  do  not  rely  upon  their  individual  credit ;  and  in  order  to  make 
them  personally  liable  there  must  be  a  clear  intent  to  that  effect.^    It 


'Willett  V.  Young,  82  Iowa  292;  s. 
c.  47  N.  W.  990;  11  L.  R.  A.  115 
(where  trustees  of  a  township  were 
held  not  liable  on  an  order  directed 
to  the  town  clerk  to  be  paid  out  of 
township  funds,  and  signed  by 
them  with  the  word  "trustees" 
added  to  their  signatures,  as  it  was 
manifest  from  the  whole  instrument 
that  there  was  no  intention  to  as- 
sume liability;  nor  would  the  inva- 
lidity of  the  order  given  for  prop- 
erty purchased  for  the  township  af- 
fect the  case) ;  Huthsing  v.  Bous- 
quet,  7  Fed.  833  (where  supervisors 
offered     a     reward     beyond     their 


power;  but  as  the  offer  as  published 
clearly  appeared  to  be  intended  as 
official,  they  were  held  not  liable  as 
individuals) ;  Hodgson  v.  Dexter,  1 
Cranch  345  (a  leading  case  by  Chief 
Justice  Marshall);  Knight  v.  Clark, 
48  N.  J.  L.  22;  s.  c.  2  Atl.  780;  57 
Am.  R.  534;  Cutler  v.  Inhabitants 
&c.,  121  Mass.  588;  Jones  v.  Le 
Tombe,  3  Dallas  384;  Crowell  v. 
Crispin,  4  Daly  (N.  Y.)  100;  Fox  v. 
Drake,  8  Cowen  (N.  Y.)  191;  Bel- 
knap V.  Reinhart,  2  Wend.  (N.  Y.) 
375;  s.  c.  20  Am.  D.  621;  Walker  v. 
Swartwout,  12  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  444; 
s.  c.  7  Am.  D.  334;  Osborne  v.  Kerr, 


(215) 


311 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIO>:S. 


216 


makes  no  difference  whether  the  contract  be  written,  by  parol,  or 
sealed.^  But  where  it  is  evident  that  the  officer  intended  to  pledge 
his  private  responsibility  he  is  liable.^ 

§  211.  The  same  subject  continued — Negotiable  instruments. — 
A  public  agent  is  not  personally  liable  on  negotiable  instruments 
executed  by  him  in  his  official  capacity;  but  in  the  absence  of  intent 
to  the  contrary  evident  on  the  face  of  the  instrument  the  presump- 
tion is  that  the  agent  acts  in  his  private  character,  and  is  therefore 
individually  liable  ;"*  that  is,  the  distinction  between  public  and  pri- 
vate agents  in  respect  of  personal  liability  on  contracts  has  teen  said 
not  to  apply  to  negotiable  paper;  and  where  a  note  is  signed  by  an 
agent  in  his  own  name,  the  addition  of  his  official  title  will  not  free 
him  from  responsibility  if  the  body  of  the  obligation  purports  to  bind 
him  personally.^     There  are  cases,  however,  which  have  taken  what 


12  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  179;  Rathbon  v. 
Budlong,  15  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  1;  Mott 
v.  Hicks,  1  Cowen  (N.  Y.)  513;  s.  c. 

13  Am.  D.  550;  Sheffield  v.  Watson, 
3  Cai.  (N.  Y.)  69;  Bronson  v.  Wool- 
sey,  17  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  46;  Brown 
V.  Austin,  1  Mass.  208;  s.  c.  2  Am.  D. 
11;  Tippets  v.  Walker,  4  Mass.  595, 
597;  Bainbridge  v.  Downie,  6  Mass. 
253;  Dawes  v.  Jackson,  9  Mass.  464; 
Freeman  v.  Otis,  9  Mass.  260;  s.  c. 
6  Am.  D.  66;  Comer  v.  Bankhead, 
70  Ala.  493;  Wallis  v.  Johnson 
School  Tp.,  75  Ind.  368;  Perrin  v. 
Lyman,  32  Ind.  16;  McClenticks  v. 
Bryant,  1  Mo.  598;  s.  c.  14  Am.  D. 
310;  Tutt  V.  Hobbs,  17  Mo.  486; 
Lyon  v.  Irish,  58  Mich.  518;  s.  c.  25 
N.  W.  502;  Stinchfield  v.  Little,  1 
Me.  231;  s.  c.  10  Am.  D.  65;  Ber- 
nard V.  Torrance,  5  Gill  &  J.  (Md.) 
383.  It  has  been  said,  however, 
that  this  rule  in  regard  to  public 
officers  does  not  apply  in  favor  of 
the  officers  of  a  municipal  corpora- 
tion, which  is  capable  of  making 
contracts  for  itself  and  is  liable 
to  be  sued  thereon:  Simonds  v. 
Heard,  23  Pick.  (Mass.)  120;  Hall 
v.  Cockrell,  28  Ala.  507.  And  see 
City  of  Providence  v.  Miller,  11  R. 
I.  272;  s.  c.  23  Am.  R.  453. 

'  Hodgson    V.    Dexter,    1    Cranch 


345;  Knight  v.  Clark,  48  N.  J.  L. 
22;  s.  c.  2  Atl.  780;  57  Am.  R.  534; 
Unwin  v.  Wolseley,  1  T.  R.  674; 
Walker  v.  Swartwout,  12  Johns.  (N. 
Y.)  444;  s.  c.  7  Am.  D.  334. 

^  Simonds  v.  Heard,  23  Pick. 
(Mass.)  120;  s.  c.  34  Am.  D.  41;  Og- 
den  V.  Raymond,  22  Conn.  379;  s. 
c.  58  Am.  D.  429;  Bayliss  v.  Pearson, 
15  Iowa  279;  Wing  v.  Click,  56  Iowa 
473;  s.  c.  9  N.  W.  384;  37  Am.  R. 
142,  n.;  Trustees  &c.  v.  Rautenberg, 
88  111.  219;  Ross  v.  Brown,  74  Maine 
352;  Fowler  v.  Atkinson,  6  Minn. 
578;  Sheffield  v.  Watson,  3  Cai.  (N. 
Y.)  69;  Gill  v.  Brown,  12  Johns.  (N. 
Y.)  385;  Exchange  Bank  v.  Lewis 
Co.,  28  W.  Va.  273;  City  of  Provi- 
dence V.  Miller,  11  R.  I.  272;  s.  c.  23 
Am.  R.  453;  Horsley  v.  Bell,  1  Bro. 
C.  C.  101,  n. 

*  Story  Agency,  §  306;  1  Daniel 
Neg.  Inst.,  §  445;  Tiedeman  Comm. 
Paper,  §  137;  Mechem  Public  Offices 
and  Officers,  §  821  et  seq. 

°  Trustees  &c.  v.  Rautenberg,  88 
111.  219;  Fowler  v.  Atkinson,  6  Minn. 
578;  Wing  v.  Click,  56  Iowa  473;  s. 
c.  9  N.  W.  384;  37  Am.  R.  142,  n.; 
Exchange  Bank  v.  Lewis  Co.,  28  W. 
Va.  273;  Ross  v.  Brown,  74  Maine 
352;  Bayliss  v.  Pearson,  15  Iowa 
279;   American  Ins.  Co.  v.  Stratton, 


217 


PERSONAL    LIABILITY    OF    OFFICERS    AND   AGENTS, 


§  213 


is  termed  by  a  standard  text-writer"  "a  praiseworthy  step"  in  holding 
that  the  official  designation  is  not  a  mere  descriptio  persona?,  but 
indicates  an  intent  to  charge  the  corporation.'^  Whether  parol  evi- 
dence is  admissible  to  show  that  a  note  containing  a  promise,  indi- 
vidual in  form,  but  executed  officially,  was  intended  to  bind  the 
corporation,  is  a  question  not  settled.  It  was  held  in  Iowa  that 
extrinsic  evidence  could  not  be  resorted  to  in  such  a  case;"  but  in 
Minnesota  and  Missouri  the  prevailing  rule  in  cases  of  private  agency 
is  applied,  and  the  ambiguity  may  be  explained.^ 

§  212.  The  same  subject  continued — Excess  of  authority,  fraud, 
etc. — The  rule  that  all  persons  are  bound  to  know  the  law  precludes 
them  from  alleging  ignorance  of  the  limits  and  extent  of  authority 
conferred  on  a  public  officer  ;^°  which  is  no  more  than  saying  that 
the  latter  does  not  ordinarily  warrant  the  validity  of  his  contracts; 
but  his  express  representations  of  matter  of  fact  relating  to  his  agency 
are  binding  upon  him;^^  and  he  must  answer  for  fraudulent  conceal- 
ments or  misstatements  of  such  facts.  ^^  So  he  may,  by  denying  his 
59  Iowa  6%;  s.  c.  13  N.  W.  763;  For-     10  Mo.  App.  338.     See  Second  Nat. 


cey  V.  Caldwell  (Pa.),  9  Atl.  466.  Cf. 
Lyon  v.  Adamson,  7  Iowa  509; 
Baker  v.  Chambles,  4  Greene  (Iowa) 
428. 

^  Tiedeman  Comm.  Paper,  §  137. 

^  School  Town  of  Monticello  v. 
Kendall,  72  Ind.  91;  s.  c.  37  Am.  R. 
139;  Moral  School  Tp.  v.  Harrison, 
74  Ind.  93;  Andrews  v.  Estes,  11 
Maine  267;  Wallis  v.  Johnson  School 
Tp.,  75  Ind.  368.  See  also,  Knight 
V.  Clark,  48  N.  J.  L.  22;  s.  c.  2  Atl. 
780;  57  Am.  R.  534  (case  of  a  sealed 
note);  Sanborn  v.  Neal,  4  Minn.  126; 
s.  c.  77  Am.  D.  502;  Dugan  v.  United 
States,  3  Wheat.  172;  Balcombe  v. 
Northrup,  9  Minn.  172;  Hodges  v. 
Runyan,  30  Mo.  491;  McGee  v.  Lara- 
more,  50  Mo.  425. 

*  American  Ins.  Co.  v.  Stratton,  59 
Iowa  696;  s.  c.  13  N.  W.  763. 

"Sanborn  v.  Neal,  4  Minn.  126; 
s.  c.  77  Am.  D.  502;  McClellan  v. 
Reynolds,  49  Mo.  312.  See  also,  Pratt 
V.  Baupre,  13  Minn.  187;  Musser 
V.  Johnson,  42  Mo.  74;  s.  c.  97  Am. 
D.  316;  Shuetze  v.  Bailey,  40  Mo. 
69;  Washington  Gas  Co.  v.  Semi- 
nary, 52  Mo.  480;  Klosterman  v. 
Loos,  58  Mo.  290;  Turner  v.  Thomas, 


Bank  v.   Midland  &c.  Co.,  155   Ind. 
581;  s.  c.  58  N.  E.  833. 

"Lee  v.  Munroe,  7  Cranch  366; 
The  Floyd  Acceptances,  7  Wall.  666, 
680;  Whiteside  v.  United  States,  93 
U.  S.  247;  Hull  v.  Marshall  Co.,  12 
Iowa  142;  Clark  v.  City  of  Des 
Moines,  19  Iowa  199;  s.  c.  87  Am.  D. 
423;  Newman  v.  Sylvester,  42  Ind. 
112;  Mayor  &c.  v.  Eschbach,  18  Md. 
276,  283;  Mayor  &c.  v.  Reynolds,  20 
Md.  1;  s.  c.  83  Am.  D.  535;  State  v. 
Hays,  52  Mo.  578;  State  v.  Bank  &c., 
45  Mo.  528;  People  v.  Bank,  24  Wend. 
(N.  Y.)  431;  Delafleld  v.  Illinois,  26 
Wend.  (N.  Y.)  192;  Silliman  v. 
Fredericksburg  &c.  R.  Co.,  27  Gratt. 
(Va.)  119;  State  v.  Hastings,  10 
Wis.  518.     See  also,  §  205,  ante. 

"  Belisle  v.  Clark,  49  Ala.  98;  Jefts 
V.  York,  10  Cush.  (Mass.)  392;  Bart- 
lett  V.  Tucker,  104  Mass.  336;  s.  c.  6 
Am.  R.  240;  Kroeger  v.  Pitcairn,  101 
Pa.  St.  311;  s.  c.  47  Am.  R.  718;  Bank 
&c.  V.  Wray,  4  Strob.  (S.  C.)  87;  s. 
c.  51  Am.  D.  659;  McCurdy  v.  Rog- 
ers, 21  Wis.  199;  s.  c.  91  Am.  D.  468. 

"Smout  V.  Ilbery,  10  M.  &  W.  1; 
Bank  &c.  v.  Wray,  4  Strob.  (S.  C.) 
87;  s.  c.  51  Am.  D.  659;   Kroeger  v. 


§    213  PUBLIC    COKrOHATIONS.  218 

agency,  estop  himself  from  subsequently  asserting  it  to  avoid  liabil- 
ity ;^^  and  the  obligation  may  be  enforced  against  him  where  his  prin- 
cipal is  a  legal  niyth.^*  To  hold  an  officer  liable  for  conspiracy  to 
defraud  the  city  it  must  be  shown  that  he  was  a  party  to  the  con- 
spiracy, or  had  knowledge,  or  reason  to  know  that  certain  bills  paid 
were  wrong.^^  Where  the  charter  provides  that  if  any  city  officer 
shall  commit  any  fraud  on  the  city  he  shall  be  guilty  of  a  misde- 
meanor, an  indictment  charging  the  approval  of  certain  unauthorized 
bills,  knowing  no  contract  had  been  made,  and  that  the  acts  were 
in  violation  of  law  and  were  done  with  intent  to  commit  a  fraud  on 
the  city,  is  not  sufficient  without  charging  that  the  bills  approved 
created  a  charge  against  the  city.^*'  Where  acts  of  officers  are  done 
under  color,  and  in  excess,  of  authority,  and  in  consequence  the  city 
and  plaintiff  suffer  injury,  recovery  may  be  had  against  them  in 
their  official  capacity,  and  as  individuals,  although  sued  only  as 
officers.  ^^  A  suit  alleging  a  conspiracy  to  defraud  between  the  mayor 
and  a  street  commissioner  has  been  sustained.  ^^ 

§  213.  Exemption  from  liability  for  legislative  acts. — It  is  a  well- 
settled  and  salutary  rule  that  the  motives  of  the  individual  members 
of  a  legislative  assembly  in  voting  for  a  particular  law  can  not  be 
inquired  into  and  its  supporters  made  personally  liable  upon  an  alle- 
gation that  they  acted  maliciously  towards  the  person  aggrieved  by 
the  passage  of  the  law.  Whenever  the  officers  of  a  municipal  corpo- 
ration are  vested  with  legislative  powers,  they  hold  and  exercise 
them  for  the  public  good,  and  are  clothed  with  all  the  immunities 
of  government,  and  are  exempt  from  all  liability  for  their  mistaken 
use.^"  Thus  where  a  mayor  sought  to  recover  damages  from  the 
aldermen  of  a  town  by  reason  of  an  ordinance  by  which  they  "un- 
lawfully and  maliciously  deprived  him  of  his  legal  rights,  fees, 
privileges  and  emoluments,  and  of  his  office  of  mayor,"  a  demurrer 
was  sustained  although  the  defendants  might  have  exceeded  the  meas- 
ure of  their  authority  in  passing  the  ordinance  in  question.  ^°    Mem- 

Pitcairn,  101  Pa.  St.  311;  s.  c.  47  Am.  ^^  Saxe  v.   City  of  Burlington,   70 

R.  718.  Vt.  448;  s.  c.  41  Atl.  438. 

^^^  Freeman  v.  Otis,  9  Mass.  272;  s.  "County    Com'rs   v.    Duckett,    20 

c.  6  Am.  D.  66;  McClenticks  v.  Bry-  Md.    469;    Borough    of    Freeport    v. 

ant,  1  Mo.  598.  Marks,    59    Pa.    St.    253.     See    also, 

"Blakely  v.  Bennecke,  59  Mo.  193.  Cooley  Torts  (2d  ed.)  443. 

^^  Feeley  v.  Wurster,   54  N.  Y.   S.  -"  Jones   v.    Loving,    55    Miss.    109. 

1060;  s.  c.  25  Misc.  (N.  Y.)  544.  "If   they    exceeded    their   authority, 

^'^  People  V.  Kane,  161  N.  Y.  380;  s.  it  was  a  brutuni  fulmen,  and  could 

c.  55  N.  E.  946.  not  for  one  moment  have  deprived 

"  Mock  V.  City  of  Santa  Rosa,  126  the  plaintiff  of  any  privileges,  emol- 

Cal.  330;  s.  c.  58  Pac.  826.  uments  or  fees  of  his  office.     If  he 


219  PERSONAL    LIABILITY    OF    OrFICERS    AXD   AGENTS.  §    214 

bers  of  a  coimcil  are  not  liable  officially  or  individually  for  voting 
to  repeal  an  ordinance.-^ 

§  214.    The  foregoing  rule  qualified — Breach  of  trust. — But  if  the 

conduct  of  members  of  a  municipal  legislative  board  amounts  to  a 
breach  of  trust,  or  a  conversion  of  trust  money  belonging  to  the 
municipality,  they  are  personally  liable  for  tort.  A  declaration  in 
an  action  by  a  city  against  a  former  chairman  of  its  water  board  and 
another  person  alleged  that  the  board  was  authorized  to  buy  land 
for  the  city  for  a  reservoir;  that  the  chairman,  of  whose  position, 
knowledge  and  authority  the  other  defendant  had  knowledge,  knew 
and  shared  in  determining  the  action  of  the  board  regarding  the 
purchase;  that  both  together,  taking  advantage  of  this  and  intending 
to  defraud  the  city,  corruptly  agreed  that  the  chairman  should  im- 
part to  the  other  the  doings  of  the  board  in  selecting  the  land  and 
the  parcel  it  considered  fit  for  a  reservoir  site,  whereupon  such  other 
was  to  become  the  purchaser  thereof;  that  the  board  should  after- 
wards buy  it  at  an  advanced  price  from  him  and  that  the  profits 
should  be  divided  between  them ;  that  in  pursuance  of  this  agreement 
the  chairman  revealed  the  particular  lot  thought  suitable  by  the 
board  to  the  other,  who  thereupon  bought  it,,  and  the  board,  infiu- 
enced  by  the  chairman,  subsequently  purchased  it  from  him  at  an 
advance ;  and  that  the  two  divided  the  profits  of  the  transaction.  A 
demurrer  was  overruled  on  the  ground  that  a  good  cause  of  action 
was  disclosed  against  both  defendants  for  the  injury  sustained  by 
the  city.^"  The  aldermen  of  a  town,  having  executed  a  bond  binding 
themselves  to  build  within  the  corporate  limits  a  court-house  to  be 
given  to  the  county,  illegally  voted  an  appropriation  of  a  sum  out 
of  the  municipal  funds  to  aid  in  such  building,  which  was  immedi- 
ately paid  by  the  treasurer  on  the  order  of  the  mayor.  It  was  held 
that  the  taking  of  the  money  by  the  defendants  was  the  conversion 
of  a  trust  fund  for  which  they  were  liable.^^  Where  a  treasurer 
collected  a  tax,  which  was  levied  to  pay  certain  warrants,  and  di- 
verted the  money,  the  remedy  is  against  the  officer  and  not  the  city.-* 

chose  voluntarily  to  yield  obedience  "  City  of  Boston  v.  Simmons,  150 

to  a  void  law,  it  was  his  own  folly,  Mass.  461;  s.  c.  23  N.  E.  210. 

for  which  the  courts  can  afford  him  -^  Russell    v.    Tate,    52    Ark.    541 ; 

no     relief     by     awarding     damages  s.  c.  13  S.  W.  130. 

against   the  individuals   voting   for  "  Schulenberg  &c.   Co.  v.   City  of 

the  ordinance."  See  also,  McCrea  v.  East  St.  Louis,  63  111.  App.  214;  s.  c. 

Chahoon,  54  Hun   (N.  Y.)   577;   s.  c.  166  111.   232;    46  N.  E.  728;    City  of 

8  N.  Y.  S.  88.  Springfield  v.  Edwards,  84  111.  626; 

"'  Winbish  v.  Hamilton,  47  La.  An.  City  of  East  St.  Louis  v.  Flannigan, 

246;  s.  c.  16  So.  856.  26  111.  App.  449. 


§    315  PUBLIC    CORrOKATIONS.  230 

An  officer  of  the  city  who  has  in  good  faith  paid  interest  coupons 
and  turned  them  over  to  the  city  is  entitled  to  credit  therefor.-'* 

§  215.  Liability  of  judicial  officers  considered. — As  long  ago  as  in 
the  time  of  Lord  Coke  it  was  said :  "Such  as  are  by  law  made  judges 
of  another  shall  not  be  criminally  accused  or  made  liable  to  an  action 
for  what  they  do  as  judges;"-**  and  the  principles  which  should  gov- 
ern such  actions  have  been  settled  by  a  vast  number  of  cases,  although 
their  application  is  sometimes  difficult.  Where  there  is  no  jurisdic- 
tion at  all  there  is  no  judge,^'  and  the  protection  extends  only  to 
judicial  decisions  or  acts  of  a  judicial  character  and  not  to  mere 
administrative  acts.  But  where  the  court,  though  of  limited  juris- 
diction, has,  in  a  given  case,  jurisdiction  of  the  subject-matter^**  and 
of  the  person  interested,  a  judicial  officer  is  not  civilly  liable  for  an 
erroneous  decision,  however  gross  the  error  may  have  been  or  how- 
ever bad  the  motive  which  inspired  it.''*  Thus,  where  the  mayor  of 
a  city  had  the  same  jurisdiction  as  justices  of  the  peace  he  was  held 
not  liable  to  a  civil  action  for  false  imprisonment  for  "corruptly  and 
maliciously"  retaining  jurisdiction  and  imposing  a  fine  and  imprison- 
ment in  default  of  payment,  after  the  defendant  had  upon  proper 
affidavit  moved  for  a  change  of  venue,  the  statute  requiring  him  to 
grant  the  motion  under  such  circumstances.^" 

^°  City  of  Huron  v.  Meyers,  13  S.  14;   Throop  Public  Officers,  in  loco; 

D.  420;  s.  c.  83  N.  W.  553.  Mechem  Public  Offices  and  Officers, 
=«  Floyd  V.  Barker,  12  Coke  23.  §  619  et  seq.;  and  particularly  State 
='Perkin  v.  Proctor,  2  Wils.  382;  v.  Wolever,  127  Ind.  306;   s.  c.  26  N. 

Marshalsea  Case,  10  Coke  68-76.  E.  762,  where  the  subject  of  im- 
^*'  By  which  is  not  meant  simply  munity  of  judicial  officers  from  pri- 
jurisdiction  of  the  particular  case  vate  suits  is  fully  discussed.  "A 
then  occupying  the  attention  of  the  judicial  act  is  one  which  involves 
court,  but  jurisdiction  of  the  class  the  exercise  of  a  discretion,  in  which 
of  cases  to  which  the  particular  case  something  has  to  be  heard  and  de- 
belongs:  Jackson  v.  Smith,  120  Ind.  cided.  A  ministerial  act  is  one 
520,  522;  s.  c.  22  N.  E.  431;  Yates  v.  which  the  law  points  out  as  neces- 
Lansing,  5  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  282.  sary  to  be  done  under  the  circum- 
^Gwynne  v.  Pool,  Lutw.  290,  297;  stances  without  leaving  any  choice 
Bradley  v.  Fisher,  13  Wall.  335;  of  alternative  courses:"  Clerk  & 
Kress  v.  State,  65  Ind.  106;  Elmore  Lindsell  Torts  574.  The  act  of  a 
v.  Overton,  104  Ind.  548;   s.  c.  4  N.  mayor  in  issuing  a  warrant  of  arrest 

E.  197;  54  Am.  R.  343;  Pratt  v.  Gard-  for  the  violation  of  an  illegal  and 
ner,  2  Cush.  (Mass.)  63;  Allec  v.  void  ordinance  is  judicial  and  gives 
Reece,  39  Fed.  341 ;  s.  c.  40  Alb.  L.  J.  no  cause  of  action  against  him,  or 
226;  Little  v.  Moore,  4  N.  J.  L.  74;  the  officer  executing  it,  or  the  city 
Clark  V.  Holdridge,  58  Barb.  (N.  itself:  Trammell  v.  Town  of  Rus- 
Y.)  61;  Dyer  v.  Smith,  12  Conn.  384.  sellville,  34  Ark.  105. 

There  is  an  interesting  and  instruc-  ""  "The  ruling  on  such  a  motion  is 
tive  discussion  in  Cooley  Torts,  ch.     a  judicial   act:"   State   v.   Wolever, 


221 


PEHSONAL   LIABILITY   OF   OFFICERS    AND   AGExN'TS,  §    210 


§  216.  ftuasi-judicial  officers — Corrupt  motive. — Tliere  are  various 
duties  involving  the  exercise  of  judgment  and  discretion  which  never- 
theless are  on  the  border-line  between  those  of  a  strictly  judicial 
and  those  of  a  ministerial  nature.  In  such  cases  the  rule  is  laid  down 
in  many  decisions  that  the  test  of  personal  liability  for  error  in  their 
performance  is  that  of  honest  or  corrupt  motive.^^    Thus,  a  superiu- 


127  Ind.  306;  s.  c.  2G  N.  E.  762.  The 
reader  will  find,  by  consulting  the 
authorities  and  text-writers  cited  in 
this  section,  that  the  principles  here 
enunciated  are  of  general  applica- 
tion; and  as  the  proceedings  of  mu- 
nicipal courts  furnish  no  peculiari- 
ties or  exceptions,  the  author  does 
not  deem  it  expedient  to  enter  into  a 
more  minute  consideration  of  the 
topic.  See  also,  Hommert  v.  Glea- 
son,  38  N.  Y.  St.  342;  s.  c.  14  N.  Y. 
S.  568,  which  is  almost  identical 
with  the  case  cited  above;  Bell  v. 
McKinney,  63  Miss.  187;  Johnston 
V.  Moorman,  80  Va.  131;  Merwin  v. 
Rogers,  28  N.  Y.  St.  404;  s.  c.  7  N. 
Y.  S.  633;  Burns' v.  Norton,  59  Hun 
(N.  Y.)  616;  Going  v.  Dinwiddle,  86 
Cal.  633;  s.  c.  25  Pac.  129;  the  lead- 
ing case  of  Lange  v.  Benedict,  73  N. 
Y.  12;  the  title  on  "False  Imprison- 
ment," in  7  Am.  &  Eng.  Encyc.  Law 
661  et  seq.;  and  an  article  by  Ar- 
thur Biddle,  Esq.,  on  "Liability  of 
Officers  Acting  in  a  Judicial  Ca- 
pacity," 15  Am.  Law  Rev.  427  (July, 
1881). 

^'^Cooley  Torts  (2d  ed.)  482;  Lin- 
ford  V.  Fitzroy,  13  Q.  B.  240;  Kemp 
V.  Neville,  10  C.  B.  (N.  S.)  523;  s.  c. 
31  L.  J.  C.  P.  158;  7  Jur.  (N.  S.) 
913;  4  L.  T.  640;  10  W.  R.  6;  Davis 
V.  Capper,  10  B.  &  C.  28;  Burley  v. 
Bethune,  1  Marsh.  220;  Ashby  v. 
White,  2  Ld.  Raym.  938;  s.  c.  6  Mod. 
45;  1  Salk.  19;  Pruden  v.  Love.  67 
Ga.  190;  Donahoe  v.  Richards,  38 
Maine  379;  s.  c.  61  Am.  D.  256; 
Downing  v.  Herrick,  47  Maine  462; 
Bevard  v.  Hoffman,  18  Md.  479;  s.  c. 
81  Am.  D.  618;  Friend  v.  Hamill,  34 
Md.    298;    Elbin   v.    Wilson,   33    Md. 


135;  Raynsford  v.  Phelps,  43  Mich. 
342;  s.  c.  5  N.  W.  403;  38  Am.  R. 
189;  McCormick  v.  Burt,  95  111.  263; 
s.  c.  35  Am.  R.  163;  Billings  v.  Laf- 
ferty,  31  111.  318;  Garfield  v.  Doug- 
lass, 22  111.  100;  Drift  v.  Snodgrass, 
66  Mo.  286;  s.  c.  27  Am.  R.  343;  Ed- 
wards V.  Ferguson,  73  Mo.  686;  Pike 
V.  Megoun,  44  Mo.  491;  Reed  v.  Con- 
way, 20  Mo.  22;  Henderson  v.  Smith, 
26  W.  Va.  829;  s.  c.  53  Am.  R.  139; 
Keenan  v.  Cook,  12  R.  I.  52;  Ramsey 
V.  Riley,  13  Ohio  157;  Gregory  v. 
Small,  39  Ohio  St.  346;  Stewart  v. 
Southard,  17  Ohio  402;  Wilson  v. 
Marsh,  34  Vt.  352;  Hitch  v.  Lam- 
bright,  66  Ga.  228;  Spitznogle  v. 
Ward,  64  Ind.  30;  Morrison  v.  Mc- 
Farland,  51  Ind.  206;  State  v.  Robb, 
17  Ind.  536;  McOsker  v.  Burrell,  55 
Ind.  425;  Morgan  v.  Dudley,  18  B. 
Mon.  (Ky.)  693;  Bullitt  v.  Clement, 
16  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  193;  Chrisman  v. 
Bruce,  1  Duv.  (Ky.)  63;  Miller  v. 
Rucker,  1  Bush  (Ky.)  135;  Gregory 
V.  Brown,  4  Bibb  (Ky.)  28;  McCord 
V.  High,  24  Iowa  336;  Howe  v.  Ma- 
son, 14  Iowa  510;  Macklot  v.  City  of 
Davenport,  17  Iowa  379;  Muscatine 
&c.  R.  Co.  V.  Horton,  38  Iowa  33; 
Wheeler  v.  Patterson,  1  N.  H.  88; 
Adams  v.  Richardson,  43  N.  H.  212; 
Hannon  v.  Grizzard,  96  N.  C.  293;  s. 
c.  2  S.  E.  600;  Wilkes  v.  Dinsman, 
7  How.  (N.  Y.)  39;  Jenkins  v.  Wald- 
ron,  11  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  114;  Millard 
V.  .Jenkins,  9  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  298; 
Wickware  v.  Bryan,  11  Wend.  (N. 
Y.)  545;  Tompkins  v.  Sands,  8 
Wend.  (N.  Y.)  462;  Goetcheus  v. 
Matthewson,  61  N.  Y.  420;  Peavey  v. 
Robbins,  3  Jones  L.  (N.  C.)  339; 
Moran  v.  Rennard,  3  Brewst.   (Pa.) 


217 


PUBLIC    COItrORATlONS. 


tendent  of  schools  is  not  liable  for  a  mere  mistake  in  his  decision  on 
the  subject  of  licensing  a  teacher  ;^^  but  an  action  lies  if  he  refuses 
a  license  from  corrupt  or  malicious  motives  ;^^  and  the  same  rules 
control  liability  for  dismissing  a  teacher.^*  In  Connecticut  it  was 
held  that  proof  of  actual  malicious  intent  would  .sustain  an  action 
against  a  wharfmaster  for  ordering  the  removal  of  a  vessel  from  a 
dock.^^ 

§  217.  Liability  of  ministerial  officers. — A  ministerial  officer  is 
under  constant  obligation  to  discharge  the  duties  of  his  office  with 
reasonable  skill  and  care,  and  if  he  fails  in  these  and  damage  ensues 
to  one  specially  interested  in  the  discharge  of  such  duties  he  becomes 
liable.^ "^     Conversely,  as  it  is  the  duty  of  a  purely  ministerial  officer 


601;  Weckerly  v.  Geyer,  11  S.  &  R. 
(Pa.)  35;  Rail  v.  Potts,  8  Humph. 
(Tenn.)  225;  McTeer  v.  Lebow,  85 
Tenn.  121;  s.  c.  2  S.  W.  18;  Throop 
Public  Officers,  §  722;  Mechem  Public 
Offices  and  Officers,  §  640;  Bishop 
Non-Contract  Law,  §  789. 

^2  Stewart  v.  Southard,  17  Ohio 
402;  s.  c,  49  Am.  D.  463;  Donahoe  v. 
Richards,  38  Maine  376;  s.  c.  61  Am. 
D.  256. 

^'Elmore  v.  Overton,  104  Ind.  548; 
s.  c.  4  N.  E.  197;  54  Am.  R.  343;  Bur- 
ton v,  Fulton,  49  Pa.  St,  151. 

3*  Gregory  v.  Small,  39  Ohio  St. 
346;  Morrison  v.  McFarland,  51  Ind. 
206;  McCormick  v.  Burt,  95  111.  263; 
s.  c.  35  Am.  R.  163;  Dritt  v.  Snod- 
grass,  66  Mo.  286;  s.  c.  27  Am.  R.  343. 

^  Gregory  v.  Brooks,  37  Conn.  365. 

''Olmsted  v.  Dennis,  77  N.  Y.  378; 
Rowning  v.  Goodchild,  2  W.  Bl.  906; 
Ashby  V.  White,  2  Ld,  Raym.  938; 
Lane  v.  Cotton,  1  Salk.  17;  Fergu- 
son V.  Earl  of  Kinnoull,  9  CI.  &  F. 
251;  Amy  v.  Supervisors,  11  Wall. 
136;  Henly  v.  Mayor  &c.,  5  Bing.  91; 
Sawyer  v.  Corse,  17  Gratt.  (Va.) 
230;  s.  c.  94  Am.  D.  445;  Lyon  v. 
Goree,  15  Ala.  360;  Briggs  v.  Cole- 
man, 51  Ala.  561;  Eslava  v.  Jones, 
83  Ala.  139;  s.  c.  3  So.  317;  Bassett 
V.  Fish,  12  Hun  (N.  Y.)  209;  Piercy 
v.  Averill,  37  Hun  (N.  Y.)  360;  Bart- 
lett   V.   Crozier,   15   Johns.    (N.   Y.) 


250;  Shepherd  v.  Lincoln,  17  Wend. 
(N.  Y.)  250;  Jenner  v.  Joliffe,  9 
Johns.  (N.  Y.)  381;  Bailey  v.  Mayor 
&c.,  3  Hill  (N.  Y.)  531;  Adsit  v. 
Brady,  4  Hill  (N.  Y.)  630;  s.  c.  38 
Am.  D.  669;  Wilson  v.  Mayor,  1 
Denio  (N.  Y.)  595;  s.  c.  43  Am.  D. 
719;  Hickok  v.  Trustees  &c.,  15  Barb. 
(N.  Y.)  427;  Robinson  v.  Chamber- 
lain, 34  N.  Y.  389;  s.  c.  90  Am.  D. 
713;  Smith  v.  Wright,  24  Barb.  (N. 
Y.)  170;  Fish  v.  Dodge,  38  Barb.  (N. 
Y.)  163;  Hutson  v.  Mayor,  9  N.  Y. 
163;  Hicks  v.  Dorn,  42  N.  Y.  47; 
Hover  v.  Barkhoof,  44  N.  Y.  113; 
Bennett  v.  Whitney,  94  N.  Y.  302; 
Woolley  V.  Baldwin,  101  N.  Y.  688; 
s.  c.  5  N.  E.  573;  Clark  v.  Miller,  54 
N.  Y.  528;  McCarthy  v.  City  of  Syra- 
cuse, 46  N.  Y.  194;  Keith  v.  Howard, 
24  Pick.  (Mass.)  292;  Conway  v. 
Russell,  151  Mass.  581;  s.  c.  24  N.  E. 
1026;  Williams  v.  Powell,  101  Mass. 
467;  Nowell  v.  Wright,  3  Allen 
(Mass.)  166;  Raynsford  v.  Phelps, 
43  Mich.  342;  s.  c.  5  N.  W.  403;  38 
Am.  R.  189;  McGuire  v.  Galligan, 
57  Mich.  38;  s.  c.  23  N.  W.  479; 
Grider  v.  Tally,  77  Ala.  422;  s.  c. 
54  Am.  R.  65;  Choteau  v.  Rowse,  56 
Mo.  65;  St.  Joseph  &c.  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Leland,  90  Mo.  177;  s.  c.  2  S.  W.  431; 
59  Am.  R.  9;  Rounds  v.  Mansfield, 
38  Maine  586;  Stevens  v.  Dud- 
ley,  56   Vt.   158;    County   Com'rs  v 


223 


PERSONAL    LIABILITY    OF   OFFICERS   AND    AGENTS. 


218 


to  do,  not  reason  whv,^'  he  incurs  no  liability  for  injuries  suffered 
without  negligence  or  corrupt  intent  on  his  part.^®  A  judicial  or 
quasi-judicial  officer  may  also  have  ministerial  functions  to  perform; 
and  in  respect  of  these,  the  absolute  protection  commonly  afforded 
to  officers  in  the  exercise  of  judicial  or  legislative  functions  does  not 
extend.^"  Where  a  city  is  liable  to  an  abutting  property  owner  for 
damages  sustained  by  street  grading  the  officers  who  participate  are 
also  liable  as  co-trespassers.*" 

§  218.  The  same  subject  continued. — A  ministerial  act  has  been 
defined  to  be  "official  action,  the  result  of  performing  a  certain  and 
specific  duty,  arising  from  fixed  and  designated  facts  ;"*^  and  again, 
as  "one  which  a  person  performs  in  a  given  state  of  facts,  in  a  pre- 
scribed manner,  in  obedience  to  the  mandate  of  legal  authority,  with- 
out regard  to,  or  the  exercise  of,  his  own  judgment  upon  the  propri- 
ety of  the  act  done."*^     Owing  to  the  multitude  and  complexity  of 


Duckett,  20  Md.  468;  County  Com'rs 
V.  Baker,  44  Md.  1;  Hayes  v.  Porter, 
22  Maine  371;  Long  v.  Long,  57  Iowa 
497;  s.  c.  10  N.  W.  875;  McCord  v. 
High,  24  Iowa  336;  Kolb  v.  O'Brien, 
86  111.  210;  Dilcher  v.  Raap,  73  111. 
266;  Governor  v.  Dodd,  81  111.  162; 
McClure  v.  Hill,  36  Ark.  268;  Collins 
v.  McDaniel,  66  Ga.  203.  Allen  v. 
Commonwealth,  83  Va.  94;  s.  c.  1  S. 
E.  607,  holds  that  where  a  duty  is  of 
such  a  character  as  to  leave  no  mar- 
gin whatever  for  the  exercise  of 
judgment  the  law  must  be  obeyed  to 
the  very  letter.  -  -  -  The  repeal  of 
the  law  making  officers  civilly  and 
criminally  liable  for  neglect  of  duty 
does  not  affect  the  common-law  ac- 
tion for  neglect  of  duty:  Hanlon  v. 
Partridge,  69  N.  H.  88;  s.  c.  44  Atl. 
807;  Donovan  v.  Partridge,  69  N. 
H.  88;  s.  c.  44  Atl.  807;  Gallagher  v. 
Partridge,  69  N.  H.  88;  s.  c.  44  Atl. 
807. 

''"Mechem  Public  Offices  and  Offi- 
cers, §  661. 

^'^  Sage  V.  Laurain,  19  Mich.  137; 
Highway  Com'rs  v.  Ely,  54  Mich. 
173,  175.  In  such  cases  he  can  not, 
under  any  principle  of  law,  be  made 


a  trespasser:  Harding  v.  Woodcock, 
137  U.  S.  43;  s.  c.  11  S.  Ct.  6. 

^"Grider  v.  Tally,  77  Ala.  422;  s. 
c.  54  Am.  R.  65;  Thompson  v.  Holt, 
52  Ala.  491;  People  v.  Provines,  34 
Cal.  520;  People  v.  Bush,  40  Cal.  344; 
Throop  Public  Officers,  §  539. 

'"Rives  V.  City  of  Columbia,  80 
Mo.  App.  173.  But  this  rule  was  not 
applied  where  a  barge  was  hired  by 
the  commissioner  of  public  works 
for  the  use  of  the  city  and  the  barge 
was  sunk  from  improper  loading: 
Interstate  &c.  Co.  v.  City  of  New  Or- 
leans, 52  La.  An.  1859;  s.  c.  28  So. 
310.  In  the  absence  of  evidence 
that  a  city  marshal  knew  of  the  un- 
healthy condition  of  a  cell  in  which 
he  placed  a  prisoner  and  that  he  had 
control  of  the  cells  he  is  not  liable 
for  injuries:  Bishop  v.  Lucy,  21  Tex. 
Civ.  App.  326;  s.  c.  50  S.  W.  1029. 

^^Grider  v.  Tally,  77  Ala.  422;  s.  c. 
54  Am.  R.  65. 

'-  Flournoy  v.  City  of  Jefferson- 
ville,  17  Ind.  169.  See  also.  Ex  parte 
Batesville  &c.  R.  Co.,  39  Ark.  82; 
Pennington  v.  Streight,  54  Ind.  376; 
Evans  v.  Etheridge,  96  N.  C.  42;  s. 
c.  1  S.  E.  633.  And  further  defini- 
tions  in   State  v.   Johnson,   4   Wall. 


§    219  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  324 

the  duties  annexed  to  public  offices,  the  courts  in  many  instances 
find  considerable  difficulty  in  determining  whether  a  particular  act 
is  judicial  or  ministerial.  It  is  held  in  some  states  that  highway  offi- 
cers charged  by  statute  with  the  duty  of  keeping  highways  in  repair, 
and  provided  with  funds  for  that  purpose,  act  in  a  ministerial  ca- 
pacity, and  are  liable  for  injuries  suffered  by  their  neglect. '*•''  The 
board  of  street  commissioners  of  a  Wisconsin  city,  disregarding  the 
requirement  of  the  charter  that  all  work  for  the  city  should  be  let 
by  contract,  resolved  that  the  work  of  repairing  and  reconstructing 
a  bridge  should  be  done  by  themselves  under  the  supervision  of  their 
committee  and  the  superintendent  appointed  by  them.  The  court 
decided  that  although  they  were  not  amenable  to  any  one  for  their 
adoption  of  plans  and  specifications,  yet  in  the  execution  of  the  work 
they  were  mere  ministerial  officers  and  not  judicial  or  legislative,  and 
accordingly  they  were  liable  to  third  persons  for  negligence  or  mis- 
feasance.** 

§  219.  No  personal  liability  for  strictly  public  acts. — An  officer 
can  not  be  subjected  to  a  private  action  for  neglect  of  a  duty  to  be 
discharged  exclusively  for  the  benefit  of  the  public  even  by  a  person 
specially  injured  thereby,  and  though  the  act  was  wilful  and  mali- 
cious.*^ *'He  must  show  the  wrong  which  he  specially  suffers,"  said 
Judge  Cooley,  "and  damage  alone  does  not  constitute  a  wrong."*** 
Thus  in  the  case  last  cited,  where  a  county  supervisor  approved  the 
bond  of  a  treasurer  knowing  him  to  be  in  default,  but  not  disclosing 
the  fact  to  the  surety,  no  right  of  action  accrued  to  the  latter.*'^     And 

475,  498;    Sullivan   v.   Shanklin,   63  360,   holding  the  mayor  and  alder- 
Cal.  247,  251;  Morton  v.  Comptroller-  men  of  a  city  liable;  Hines  v.  Lock- 
General,  4  S.  C.  430,  474;    Commis-  port,  50  N.  Y.  236;  Weed  v.  Ballston 
sioner  v.  Smith,  5  Tex.  471;  Arberry  Spa,  76  N.  Y.  329;   Pomfrey  v.  Vil- 
v.   Beavers,   6   Tex.   457;    Raines   v.  lage  of  Saratoga  Springs,  104  N.  Y. 
Simpson,  50  Tex.  495;   s.  c.  32  Am.  459;    s.   c.   11   N.   E.   43;    McCord  v. 
R.  609;  Clerk  &  Lindsell  Torts  574.  High,     24     Iowa     336;     Tearney    v. 
« Bennett   v.    Whitney,    94    N.    Y.  Smith,  86  111.  391 ;  Bostwick  v.  Bar- 
302;  People  v.  Town  Auditors,  75  N.  low,  14  Hun  (N.  Y.)  177. 
Y.  316;  People  v.  Town  Auditors,  74  *"  Robinson  v.  Rohr,  73  Wis.  436;  s. 
N.  Y.  310;  Warren  v.  Clement,  24  Hun  c.  40  N.  W.  668;  9  Am.  St.  810. 
(N.  Y.)  472;  Hover  v.  Barkhoof,  44  •=  Held  v.   Bagwell,  58   Iowa  139; 
N.  Y.  113;  Adsit  v.  Brady,  4  Hill  (N.  s.  c.  12  N.  W.  226. 
Y.)  630;  s.  c.  40  Am.  D.  305;  Robin-  ^"Cooley  Torts  (2d  ed.)  449. 
son  V.  Chamberlain,  34  N.  Y.  389;  s.  *' Held  v.  Bagwell,  58  Iowa  139;  s. 
c.  90  Am.  D.  713;  Babcock  V.  Gifford,  c.    12    N.    W.    226.     If   a    policeman 
29    Hun    (N.    Y.)    186;    Lament    v.  were  to  neglect  his  duty  to  preserve 
Haight,  44  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  1;  Gar-  the    peace     and     protect    property, 
linghouse  v.  Jacobs,  29  N.  Y.  297;  whereby   some   person   was   injured 
Piercy  v.   Averill,   37   Hun    (N.   Y.)  by  violence  or  his  house  robbed,  it  is 


225  PEESOXAL    LIABILITY    OF    OFFICERS    AND   AGENTS.  §    220 

where  the  charter  of  a  city  required  that  certain  work  should  be 
awarded  by  the  aldermen  to  the  lowest  bidder,  but  those  officers,  in 
violation  of  their  duty,  gave  the  contract  to  one  whose  bid  was  higher 
than  the  plaintiff's,  the  latter  being  in  fact  the  lowest,  it  was  ad- 
Judged  that  the  aldermen  were  not  liable,  their  duty  being  of  an 
essentially  public  nature.*®  The  same  is  true,  also,  of  the  official 
act  of  a  highway  commissioner  in  improperly  opening  or  discontinu- 
ing a  road  to  the  prejudice  of  an  individual,*^  and  the  neglect  of  a 
quarantine  officer  to  take  ordinary  precautions  to  prevent  the  spread 
of  contagion.^*' 

§  220.  Default  of  subordinates. — Public  officers  or  agents  engaged 
in  the  public  service,  or  acting  for  public  objects,  whether  their  ap- 
pointment emanates  from  particular  public  bodies  or  is  derived  from 
general  laws,  and  whether  those  objects  are  of  a  local  or  general 
nature,  are  not  responsible  for  the  misfeasances  or  positive  wrongs, 
or  for  the  nonfeasance  or  negligence  or  omissions  of  duty,  of  the 
subagents  or  servants  or  other  persons  properly  employed  by  and  un- 
der them  in  the  discharge  of  their  official  duties. ^^  But  the  principal 
is  liable  if  he  directs  or  authorizes  the  wrong,^-  or  fails  to  require 
his  deputies  to  observe  statutory  regulations,^^  or  if  he  neglects  to 
superintend  properly  the  discharge  of  their  duties,^*  or  negligently 

clear  that  there  is  no  private  rem-  462;  Robertson  v.  Sichel,  127  U.  S. 

edy  against  the  officer:  Cooley  Torts  507;    s.  c.  8   S.  Ct.  1286.     See  also, 

(2d  ed.)  448;  Shearman  &  Redf.  Neg.  Holliday  v.  St.  Leonard,  11  C.  B.  (N. 

(5th  ed.),  §  316.  S.)   192;   Duncan  v.  Findlater,  6  CI. 

**East  River  &c.  Co.  v.  Donnelly,  &  F.  894;  Humphreys  v.  Hears,  1  M. 
93  N.  Y.  557.  See  also,  Strong  v.  &  R.  187;  Sutton  v.  Clarke,  6  Taunt. 
Campbell,  11  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  135;  Mar-  29,  34;  Harris  v.  Baker,  4  M.  &  S. 
tin  v.  Mayor  &c.,  1  Hill  (N.  Y.)  545;  27;  Hall  v.  Smith,  2  Bing.  156;  Don- 
Butler  V.  Kent,  19  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  ovan  v.  McAlpin,  85  N.  Y.  185;  s.  c. 
223;  Ashby  v.  White,  1  Salk.  19.  39  Am.  R.  649;  Finch  v.  Board  &c., 

"  Sage  V.  Laurain,  19  Mich.  137.  30  Ohio  St.  37;  s.  c.  27  Am.  R.  414. 

™  Cooley  Torts    (2d  ed.)    450;    cit-  =*- Ely  v.  Parsons,  55  Conn.  83 ;  s.  c. 

ing  City  of  Freeport  v.  Isbell,  83  111.  10  Atl.  499;   Tracy  v.  Cloyd,  10  W. 

440;  White  v.  Marshfield,  48  Vt.  20;  Va.  19. 

Brinkmeyer   v.   City   of   Bvansville,  ^^  Bishop  v.  Williamson,  11  Maine 

29    Ind.    187;    Ogg   v.    Lansing,    35  495,   where   a  postmaster  was  held 

Iowa   495;    Western   College   &c.   v.  liable  for  the  default  of  one  whom 

Cleveland,  12  Ohio  St.  375;   Hill  v.  he  allowed  to  have  the  care  of  the 

Charlotte,  72  N.  C.  55;  s.  c.  21  Am.  mails  without  being  sworn  accord- 

R.  451;  City  of  Pontiac  v.  Carter,  32  ing  to  law. 

Mich.  164.  =*  Dunlop  v.  Munroe,  7  Cranch  242; 

"Story  Agency   (9th  ed.),  §  319;  Schroyer  v.  Lynch,   8  Watts    (Pa.) 

Story  Bailments   (9th  ed.),   §§  461,  453;  Ford  v.  Parker,  4  Ohio  St.  576. 
1  Smith — 15 


§    231  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  226 

employs  or  retains  unfit  or  improper  pcrsons.^^  There  is  also  an 
important  distinction  to  the  effect  that  if  the  inferior  or  subagent 
holds  not  an  office  known  to  the  law,  but  his  appointment  is  private 
and  discretionary  with  the  officer,  the  latter  is  responsible  for  his 
acts.^^  This  is  illustrated  in  a  recent  Connecticut  case,  where  a 
selectman,  for  the  purpose  of  cleaning  a  highway  obstructed  by  the 
growth  of  trees  and  shrubbery,  directed  a  laborer  employed  by  him 
"to  cut  the  brush  and  the  trees  and  make  the  road  passable."  No 
trees  were  pointed  out  and  no  limits  given,  nor  any  expression  of 
judgment  of  the  selectman,  but  the  matter  was  left  to  the 
judgment  and  discretion  of  the  laborer,  who,  in  good  faith,  cut  down 
some  trees  on  the  land  of  an  adjoining  owner,  the  removal  of  which 
was  not  necessary.  The  selectman  was  held  liable  for  the  damage.^'^ 
So,  also,  an  officer  is  liable  for  the  defaults  of  his  private  servant  or 
agent  within  the  scope  of  his  employment  ;^^  and  ministerial  officers 
generally,  who  are  charged  with  the  performance  of  duties  to  indi- 
viduals, as  distinguished  from  purely  public  duties,  are  subject  to 
the  rule  of  respondeat  superior. ^^ 

§  221.    Ejection  of  member  of  council  by  order  of  mayor. — A 

statute  provided  that  the  mayor  should  be  ex  officio  president  of  the 
council  and  preside  at  its  meetings,  and  he  was  also  authorized  by 
an  ordinance  "to  preserve  order  and  decorum  and  to  decide  all  ques- 
tions of  order,  subject  to  an  appeal  to  the  council."  An  alderman's 
behavior  was  insulting  and  disorderly,  but  did  not  threaten  personal 

^^  Wiggins  V.   Hathaway,   6   Barb.        ^^  Mechem  Public  Offices  and  Offi- 

(N.  Y.)    632;    Schroyer  v.  Lynch,  8  cers,  §  802. 

Watts   (Pa.)   453.     See  also,  Throop        '^'' Such  as  recorders  of  deeds:  Van 

Public  Officers,  §  592.  Schaick  v.  Sigel,  60  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.) 

^*  The    distinction    is    more    fully  122.     See  also,  Smith  v.  Holmes,  54 

stated  in  a  note  to  the  case  of  Wil-  Mich.  104;  s.  c.  19  N.  W.  767.    Clerks 

son  V.  Peverly,  1  Am.  L.  Cas.   (5th  of  courts:   McNutt  v.  Livingston,  7 

ed.),   top    p.    785.     In    Shepherd    v.  Sm.  &  M.   (Miss.)    641;   Snedicor  v. 

Lincoln,   17  Wend.    (N.  Y.)    250,   it  Davis,  17  Ala.  472.     Sheriffs:   Mech- 

was  held,  Cowen,  J.,  delivering  the  em  Public  Offices  and  Officers,  §  798. 

opinion,    that    a    superintendent    of  A  register  of  deeds  is  liable  for  the 

repairs  on  the  canals  of  the  state  penalty  imposed  by  statute  for  the 

is  personally  liable  in  an  action  on  issue  of  a  marriage  license  without 

the  case  for  damages  sustained  by  reasonable  inquiry  as  to  the  age  of 

an    individual    through    the    negli-  the  parties,  if  either  is  under  eight- 

gence  of  workmen  employed  in  mak-  een,  where  a  blank  license  signed  by 

ing  repairs.  him  is  filled  up  by  a  person  specially 

^^  Ely  v.  Parsons,  55  Conn.  83;   s.  deputized  by  him  for  the  purpose, 

c.    10    Atl.    499.     See    also.    County  though    the   deputy   made    inquiry: 

Com'rs  V.  Duvall,  54  Md.  351.  Cole  v.  Laws,  108  N.  C.  185;  s.  c.  12 

S.  E.  985. 


227  PERSONAL    LIABILITY    OF    OFFICERS    AND   AGENTS.  §    221 

injury  nor  arrest  the  progress  of  business,  and,  failing  to  observe  the 
mayor's  admonition,  he  was  conducted  out  of  the  council  chamber  by 
the  chief  of  police  under  an  order  from  the  mayor.  The  court  held 
that  the  obstreperous  member  was  entitled  to  an  action  for  damages 
against  both  the  mayor  and  chief  of  police.*"^  "The  ordinance  is 
only  declaratory  of  the  common  law,*'  said  the  court;  "it  neither  in 
terms  nor  spirit  increases  or  extends  the  duties  or  powers  usually 
pertaining  to  the  position  [of  the  president  of  the  council].  What 
then  are  such  duties  and  powers  according  to  the  general  usages  of 
deliberative  bodies?  They  comprise  the  duty  and  power  to  preserve 
order  and  decorum  during  the  deliberations  of  the  body.  It  is  .said 
to  be  the  privilege  of  any  member,  and  the  special  duty  of  the  pre- 
siding officer,  to  take  notice  of  any  offense  during  deliberation,  and 
to  call  the  attention  of  the  assembly  to  it.  In  such  cases  the  presi- 
dent declares  to  the  assembly  that  a  member  named  is  guilty  of  irreg- 
ular or  improper  conduct,  and  specifies  it.  When  it  has  been  stated 
by  the  president,  the  member  is  entitled  to  be  heard  in  exculpation.*'^ 
*  *  *  When  the  president  has  called  an  offending  member  to  order, 
and  stated  the  matter  of  the  offense  to  the  house,  it  seems  that  he  has 
discharged  his  duty  and  exhausted  his  power  in  the  premises.  He 
ther-eby  transmits  the  further  disposition  of  the  matter  to  the  house. 
The  power  to  punish  is  not  among  his  prerogatives;  that  belongs 
exclusively  to  the  house,  and  he  can  never  exercise  it  save  as  it  is 
expressly  ordered  by  the  house.  If  he  has  other  powers,  the  fact 
has  escaped  the  recognition  of  writers.  *  *  *  j£  noise  or  tumult  in 
the  house,  breaches  of  good  order  and  decorum  in  the  course  of  pro- 
ceeding, or  an  exhibition  of  disrespect  and  contempt  for  the  president, 
would  justify  a  forcible  exclusion  by  him  of  an  offending  member, 
it  can  not  be  that  the  history  of  proceedings  in  deliberative  bodies 
would  furnish  no  instance  of  the  assumption  of  such  power."*'^ 

*"  Thompson  v.  Whipple,   54  Ark.  der   that  a  member   be   excluded:" 

203;  s.  c.  15  S.  W.  604.  Thompson  v.  Whipple,  54  Ark.  203; 

^^  "Delicacy    and    custom    require  s.  c.  15  S.  W.  604. 
that  he  wlthdrav/  in  order  that  the        "  "It  is  said  that  the  power  of  the 

matter  may  be  fully  discussed  and  speaker  is  well  stated  by  Mr.  Speak- 

considered,  free  from  any  restraints  er   Lenthall,   who,   when   Charles   I 

of  his  presence.     If  a  sense  of  pro-  came    into   the   house   of   commons 

priety    does    not   constrain    him    to  and  asked  him  whether  any  of  Ave 

withdraw,  the  house  may  order  that  members  that  he  came  to  apprehend 

he  do  so;  but  his  failure  to  do  it  is  were  in  the  house,  whether  he  saw 

a  matter  for  the  action  of  the  house,  them,  and  where  they  were,  replied: 

If  the  member  disregards  its  order,  'May  it  please  Your  Majesty,  I  have 

the  president  may  enforce  it.     Thus  neither   eyes  to   see   nor   tongue   to 

far,  and  no  farther,  can  we  find  that  speak  in  this  place  but  as  the  house 

the   president   is  authorized   to   or-  is  pleased  to  direct,  whose  servant  I 


222 


PUBLIC    CORrORATIONS. 


228 


§  222.  Negligence  of  recorder  of  deeds. — Where  a  recorder  of 
deeds  is  employed  by  the  owner  of  land  to  make  a  search  of  title,  he 
is  not  liable  for  an  error  to  one  who  lends  money  on  the  faith  of  it 
and  loses  it,  at  least  in  the  absence  of  knowledge  that  it  was  to  be 
used  for  procuring  a  loan.''^  He  is  undoubtedly  liable  for  damage 
resulting  from  an  erroneous  record  of  a  conveyance,  although  it  be 
the  negligence  of  a  deputy;®*  but  who  is  entitled  to  sue,  and  the 
measure  of  damages,  are  often  very  nice  and  difficult  questions;  the 
decisions  are  conflicting,  and  depend  more  or  less  on  the  language 
of  the  statutes.  While  some  courts  hold  that  a  grantee's  title  is 
valid,  notwithstanding  defective  record,  if  he  has  filed  his  deed  for 
record,®'^  others  decide  that  all  persons  may  rely  upon  the  record 
actually  made,  and  that  the  negligence  of  the  recorder  is,  in  effect, 
imputed  to  tlie  one  who  employed  him,  when  the  rights  of  third  par- 
ties are  concerned.®*' 


am.' "  Idem,  p.  206.  But  it  was  con- 
ceded that  the  president  might  or- 
der an  arrest  to  prevent  an  injury 
being  done  to  another  member  with- 
out waiting  for  the  action  of  the 
house,  as  that  would  be  no  more 
than  any  other  person  would  be  jus- 
tified in  doing  anywhere:  Idem,  p. 
207.  Parsons  v.  Brainard,  17  Wend. 
(N.  Y.)  522,  was  controlled  by  a  New 
York  statute,  and  is  without  force 
out  of  that  state.  It  was  there  held 
that  the  presiding  officer  of  a  town 
meeting,  with  statute  authority  to 
maintain  order,  may  make  a  valid 
order  for  the  removal  of  a  disorderly 
person,  though  no  violence  was 
threatened.  A  verdict  for  fifty 
cents  damages  was  reversed. 

"^  Day  V.  Reynolds,  23  Hun  (N.  Y.) 
131.  Cf.  Savings  Bank  v.  Ward,  100 
U.  S.  195,  and  the  dissenting  opinion. 

•^Van  Schaick  v.  Sigel,  60  How. 
Pr.  (N.  Y.)  122. 

•"^Merrick  v.  Wallace,  19  111.  486, 
497;  Polk  v.  Cosgrove,  4  Biss.  437; 
Riggs  V.  Boylan,  4  Biss.  445;  Gar- 
rard v.  Davis,  53  Mo.  322;  Minis  v. 
Minis,  35  Ala.  23. 

'^  Frost  V.  Beekman,  1  Johns.  Ch. 
(N.  Y.)  285,  298;  s.  c.  reversed,  but 


not  on  this  ground,  Beekman  v. 
Frost,  18  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  544;  New 
York  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  White,  17  N. 
Y.  469;  Chamberlain  v.  Bell,  7  Cal. 
292;  Shepherd  v.  Burkhalter,  13  Ga. 
443;  Miller  v.  Bradford,  12  Iowa  14; 
Brydon  v.  Campbell,  40  Md.  331; 
Barnard  v.  Campau,  29  Mich.  162; 
Barrett  v.  Shaubhut,  5  Minn.  323; 
Terrell  v.  Andrew  Co.,  44  Mo.  309; 
Hester's  Lessee  v.  Fortner,  2  Binn. 
(Pa.)  40;  Lally  v.  Holland,  1  Swan 
(Tenn.)  396;  Jennings'  Lessee  v. 
Wood,  20  Ohio  261;  Baldwin  v. 
Marshall,  2  Humph.  (Tenn.)  116; 
Sanger  v.  Craigije,  10  Vt.  555; 
Cooley  Torts  (2d  ed.)  454;  Throop 
Public  Officers,  §  742.  On  the  ques- 
tion of  proximate  cause  of  an  injury 
to  a  second  grantee  by  reason  of  the 
negligence  of  the  recorder  combined 
with  the  fraudulent  act  of  the  grant- 
or (a  point  which  Judge  Cooley 
leaves  unsolved — Cooley  Torts  455 
456),  cf.  Beach  Contrib.  Neg.  (2d 
ed.),  §  32,  p.  38,  n.  3,  and  cases  there 
cited,  with  Alexander  v.  Town  of 
Newcastle,  115  Ind.  51;  s.  c.  17  N. 
E.  200,  cited  in  Beach  Contrib.  Neg. 
(2d  ed.),  §  245,  p.  325.  And  see 
Wharton  Neg.,  §  134. 


229  PERSONAL    LIABILITY    OF    OFFICERS    AND   AGENTS.  §    223 

§  223. "  The  same  subject  continued. — Where  the  error  consists  in 
omitting  to  index  or  in  indexing  incorrectly,  the  decisions  are  also 
at  variance.  In  some  of  them  the  index  is  deemed  a  mere  collateral 
convenience  for  the  benefit  of  the  recorder,  an  error  in  which  does 
not  prejudice  the  grantee's  title. ^^  But  where  the  statute  requires 
the  index  to  give  information  of  the  contents  of  the  deed,  the  record 
is  not  constructive  notice  of  anything  which  is  not  disclosed  by  the 
index.''^ 

§  224.  Liability  of  assessor  of  taxes. — Tax  assessors  are  not  liable 
for  innocent  mistake  when  acting  within  the  scope  of  their  author- 
ity;*^^ but  they  must  be  careful  not  to  assume  a  jurisdiction  which  the 
law  does  not  confer  upon  them:  if  they  decide  upon  the  rights  of 
others  in  cases  which  the  law  has  not  confided  to  their  judgment, 
they  are  liable  to  the  same  extent  as  if  they  possessed  no  official  char- 
acter whatever.  In  the  leading  ease  in  New  York  it  was  held  that 
an  action  could  be  maintained  by  a  bank  to  recover  a  tax  levied  under 
an  assessment  upon  its  capital  stock  contrary  to  a  statute  which 
provided,  instead,  for  the  taxation  of  the  stockholders.  "The  dis- 
tinction," said  Chief  Justice  Church,  "is  between  an  erroneous  and 
an  illegal  assessment.  The  former  is  where  the  officers  have  power 
to  act,  but  err  in  the  exercise  of  the  power;  the  latter  where  they 
have  no  power  to  act  at  all,  and  it  does  not  aid  them  to  decide  that 
they  have."^**  In  assessing  property  not  taxable,  or  in  deciding  er- 
roneously as  to  a  taxable  inhabitant,  they  act  ministerially  and  not 

"  Schell  V.  Stein,  76  Pa.  St.  398;  mira,  53  N.  Y.  49;  rev'g  s.  c.  6  Lans. 

Bishop  V.  Schneider,  46  Mo.  472;   s.  (N.  Y.)   116;   Dorn  v.  Backer,  61  N. 

c.  2  Am.  R.  533;  Commissioners  &c.  Y.  261;   reversing  s.  c.  61  Barb.   (N. 

V.  Babcock,  5  Or.  472;  Curtis  v.  Ly-  Y.)   597;    Hilton  v.  Fonda,  86  N.  Y. 

man,  24  Vt.  338.  339.     See  also,  Mygatt  v.  Washburn, 

^'^Reeder    v.    State.    98    Ind.    114;  15  N.  Y.  316;  Whitney  v.  Thomas,  23 

Gwynn  v.  Turner,  18  Iowa  1;  Breed  N.  Y.  281;  Chegaray  v.  Jenkins,  5  N. 

V.   Conley,   14    Iowa   269;    Scoles   v.  Y.    376;     Weaver    v.    Devendorf,    3 

Wilsey,  11  Iowa  261.  Denio  (N.  Y.)  117;  Prosser  v.  Secor, 

^^  National  Bank  &c.  v.  City  of  El-  5  Barb.    (N.  Y.)    607;   Swift  v.  City 

mira,  53  N.  Y.  49;   reversing  s.  c.  6  of  Poughkeepsie,  37  N.  Y.  511;  Haley 

Lans.    (N.   Y.)    116;    and   reviewing  v.  Whitney,  53  Hun  (N.  Y.)   119;  s. 

the   New   York   cases;    Williams   v.  c.  6  N.  Y.  S.  342.     It  was  said  in  Ap- 

Weaver,  75  N.  Y.  30;   s.  c.  affirmed,  gar  v.  Hayward,  110  N.  Y.  225;  s.  c. 

100  U.  S.  547;  Robinson  v.  Rowland,  18  N.  E.  85,  that  if  assessors  had  no 

26   Hun    (N.   Y.)    501;    Ford  v.   Mc-  jurisdiction   to    make   a   certain    in- 

Gregor,   20   Nev.   446;    s.   c.   23   Pac.  crease   which   they   did   make,   they 

508;  McDaniell  v.  Tebbetts,  60  N.  H.  would    not   be    liable    for    property 

497;  Cooley  Taxation  553;  Wilson  v.  taken  to  pay  the  tax,  but  only  for 

Marsh,  34  Vt.  352;  Odiorne  v.  Rand,  the   difference   between   the   correct 

59  N.  H.  504.  and  erroneous  tax. 

'"  National  Bank  &c.  v.  City  of  El- 


224 


PUBLIC    COIirORATIONS. 


330 


judicially.''^  On  the  other  hand,  if  they  have  jurisdiction  both  of  the 
person  taxed  and  of  the  subject-matter,  there  is  no  individual  lia- 
bility, however  erroneous  or  unequal  the  tax  may  be,  provided  they 
act  in  good  faith. ^-  Thus  where  the  statute  required  an  assess- 
ment upon  the  market  value  of  certain  shares  of  stock,  and  it  was 
made  upon  the  par  value,  there  was  no  remedy  against  the  assessors.''^ 
It  was  held  in  New  York  that  an  assessor,  in  determining  the  value 
of  property,  is  protected  irrespective  of  motive;^*  but  it  is  believed 
that  the  prevailing  rule  makes  him  liable  for  a  malicious  overesti- 
mate.'^^ 


"Ford  v.  McGregor,  20  Nev.  446; 
s.  c.  23  Pac.  508. 

"  Williams  v.  Weaver,  75  N.  Y.  30; 
s.  c.  affirmed,  100  U,  S.  547;  Bal- 
lerino  v.  Mason,  83  Cal.  447;  s.  c.  23 
Pac.  530,  quoting  from  Chief  Justice 
Taney's  opinion  in  Kendall  v.  Stokes, 
3  How.  87,  98;  Apgar  v.  Hay  ward, 
110  N.  Y.  225;  s.  c.  18  N.  E.  85. 

"Williams  v.  Weaver,  75  N.  Y.  30; 
s.  c.  affirmed,  100  U.  S.  547.  See 
also,  an  excellent  case,  Robinson  v. 
Rowland,  26  Hun  (N.  Y.)  501. 

"  Weaver  v.  Devendorf,  3  Denio 
(N.  Y.)  117.  But  see  Apgar  v.  Hay- 
ward.  110  N.  Y.  225,  232;  s.  c.  18  N. 
E.  85. 

"^'^  Parkinson  v.  Parker,  48  Iowa 
667,  669;  Ballerino  v.  Mason,  83  Cal. 


447;  s.  c.  23  Pac.  530,  where,  how- 
ever, the  court  held  that  an  aver- 
ment that  the  defendant  "wilfully 
and  against  law"  assessed  property 
too  high  was  not  an  allegation  of 
malice  or  of  intent  to  wrong  or  in- 
jure the  owner.  They  are  exempt 
by  statute  in  Massachusetts  except 
for  want  of  integrity  (Pub.  Stat,  of 
Mass.,  p.  113,  §  94);  but  formerly  in 
that  state  the  rule  was  more  severe 
than  that  adopted  elsewhere:  Gage 
V.  Currier,  4  Pick.  (Mass.)  399;  Taft 
V.  Wood,  14  Pick.  (Mass.)  362;  Lit- 
tle V.  Merrill,  10  Pick.  (Mass.)  543. 
Assessors  are  not  liable  for  an  unin- 
tentional omission  to  tax  a  person, 
whereby  he  loses  his  vote:  Griffin  v. 
Rising,  11  Met.  (Mass.)  339. 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

THE  LIABILITY  OF  THE  CORPORATION  FOR  THE  ACTS  OP  ITS  OFFICERS 

AND    AGENTS. 


Section 

225.  Introductory. 

226.  Liability     ex     contractu  —  Re- 

quirements for  valid  con- 
tracts. 

227.  Contracts  within  scope  of  pow- 

ers of  corporation. 

228.  The  same  subject  continued. 

229.  The  doctrine  of  ultra  vires  ap- 

plied with  greater  strictness 
to  public  than  to  private 
corporations. 

The  reason  for  the  rule. 

Municipal  bonds  void  when 
ultra  vires. 

The  same  subject  continued. 

Ultra  vires — How   modified  by 
estoppel. 
234.  The  same   subject  continued — 
Hitchcock  V.  Galveston. 

Irregularity  in  exercise  of 
power. 

Ultra  vires — How  modified  by 
the  doctrine  of  implied  con- 
tract— General  principles. 

The  same  subject  continued. 

Illustrations  of  the  doctrine  of 
implied  contracts. 

The  same  subject  continued. 

Liability  of  the  corporation  to 
repay  taxes  illegally  col- 
lected. 

241.  The   same   subject  continued — 

Restrictions. 

242.  Illegality  of  assessment. 

243.  Actual  receipt  of  taxes  by  the 

corporation. 

244.  Compulsory  payment  of  taxes. 

245.  The  same  subject  continued. 

246.  Illustrations  of  the  rule. 


230 
231 

232 
233 


235. 


236. 


237 
238 

239 
240 


Section 

247.  The  same  subject  continued. 

248.  The  doctrine  of  the  federal  su- 

preme court  considered. 

249.  The  same  subject  continued. 

250.  Contracts  within  the  scope  of 

powers  of  officer  or  agent. 

251.  The   same   subject  continued — 

Clark  V.  Des  Moines. 

252.  All    persons    contracting    with 

strictly  public  corporations 
charged  with  knowledge  of 
scope  of  powers  of  officer  or 
agent. 

253.  The  same  subject  continued. 

254.  Liability  of  corporation  for  act 

of  its  officers  or  agents  in 
violation  of  law. 

255.  The  same  subject  continued. 

256.  Effect  of  representation  of  of- 

ficer or  agent  as  to  authority. 

257.  The  same  subject  continued. 

258.  Ratification  of  contracts. 

259.  The  same  subject  continued. 

260.  Ratification  by  authorized  offi- 

cers necessary. 

261.  Manner  of  ratification. 

262.  Manner    of    execution    of    con- 

tracts by  officers  and  agents. 

263.  The  same  subject  continued. 

264.  Contracts  by  ordinance  or  reso- 

lution. 

265.  Signature  of  contract. 

266.  The  same  subject  continued. 

267.  Liability    ex    delicto — (a)     In 

general. 

268.  (b)    Discretionary  and  legisla- 

tive acts. 

269.  (c)     The    same    subject    con- 

tinued. 


(231) 


§    225  PUBLIC    CORPORATIOiVS,  232 

Section  Section 

270.  (d)   Ministerial  acts.  272.  The     rule     applied     to     public 

271.  (e)      Public     as     contradistin-  quasi-corporations. 

guished  from  private  duties.     273.  Conclusion. 

§  225.  Introductory. — A  municipal  corporation,  like  other  corpo- 
rations, can  of  course  act  only  through  its  agents.  Every  liability 
of  such  a  corporation  is  in  a  sense  a  liability  for  the  acts  of  its  offi- 
cers or  agents.  A  more  detailed  statement  of  the  different  classes 
of  liabilities  incident  to  municipal  corporations  will  be  found  in  the 
subsequent  chapters  of  this  work.  It  is  the  writer's  purpose  in  this 
chapter  to  consider  the  liability  of  the  corporation  for  the  acts  of  its 
officers  and  agents  with  special  reference  to  the  powers  and  authority 
of  those  agents,  and  the  extent  to  which  the  municipality  is  bound 
by  those  acts.  The  liability  of  the  corporation  is  naturally  considered 
under  two  heads:  every  liability  is  either  a  liability  ex  contractu 
or  a  liability  ex  delicto ;  in  other  words,  the  act  of  the  officer  or  agent 
by  which  the  municipality  is  sought  to  be  bound  is  claimed  to  be 
either  a  contract  or  a  tort.  The  principles  governing  these  two 
classes  of  liability,  though  similar  in  many  respects,  differ  materially 
in  others;  and  in  considering  any  specific  question  of  liability  we 
must  first  inquire  whether  that  liability  arises  from  contract  or  from 
tort,  before  we  attempt  to  decide  whether  the  corporation  is  bound  by 
the  acts  of  its  officer  or  agent. 

§  226.  Liability  ex  contractu — ^Requirements  for  valid  con- 
tracts.— A  municipal  corporation  is  liable,  just  as  is  a  private  corpo- 
ration or  a  natural  free  person,  upon  contracts  properly  assumed  by 
the  corporation.  There  may  be  said  to  be  three  requirements  neces- 
sary for  a  valid  and  enforceable  contract  by  a  municipal  corporation. 
In  the  first  place  the  contract  must  be  within  the  scope  of  the  powers 
of  the  corporation ;  that  is  to  say,  the  corporation  must  be  authorized, 
either  expressly  or  impliedly  by  its  charter  or  other  statute  by  virtue 
of  which  it  has  come  into  existence,  to  make  such  a  contract.  In 
the  second  place  the  contract  must  be  made  by  the  proper  officers  or 
agents.  The  officers  or  agents  through  whom  the  corporation  acts 
in  assuming  the  contract  liability  must  be  within  the  authorized  scope 
of  their  powers  in  making  the  contract  on  behalf  of  the  municipality. 
Finally,  if  the  manner  in  which  the  municipal  corporation  must 
make  its  contracts  is  expressly  and  imperatively  prescribed  by  manda- 
tory statutes,  the  contract  must  be  made  according  to  the  manner  pre- 
scribed by  law  in  order  to  be  valid. ^     If  these  requirements  are  ob- 

^  See  post,  ch.  18,  where  these  different  requirements  are  discussed 

in  detail. 


233 


THE    LIABILITY    OF    THE    CORPORATION. 


227 


served  the  municipal  corporation  is  liable  to  private  persons  upon  its 
contracts  to  the  same  extent  as  a  private  corporation  or  a  natural 
person.  The  constitutional  prohibition  of  laws  impairing  the  obli- 
gation of  contracts  applies  in  favor  of  private  creditors  of  the  munici- 
pality, whether  they  be  corporations  or  persons,  maintaining  inviola- 
ble the  rights  of  these  creditors  against  any  subsequent  legislation.- 

§  227.    Contracts   within   scope   of   powers   of   corporation. — The 

municipal  corporation  being  an  artificial  person  and  deriving  its 
existence  and  power  to  act  solely  from  the  express  or  implied  provi- 
sions of  its  charter  or  other  creating  statute,  it  can  not  make  a  valid 
contract  which  is  wholly  beyond  the  scope  of  its  powers.  Conse- 
quently no  officer  or  agent  can  make  a  binding  contract  on  behalf 
of  the  municipal  corporation,  if  such  contract  is  wholly  beyond  the 
express  or  implied  powers  of  the  corporation.^     It  now  seems  well- 


2  Wolff  V.  New  Orleans,  103  U.  S. 
358;  Meriwether  v.  Garrett,  102  U. 
S.  472.  The  proposition  in  the  text 
is  of  course  conceded  learning,  and 
it  is  needless  to  quote  in  this  con- 
nection more  of  the  great  number  of 
cases  which  establish  the  doctrine. 

^  Daviess  Co.  v.  Dickinson,  117  U. 
S.  657;  s.  c.  6  S.  Ct.  897;  Hayes  v. 
Holly  Springs,  114  U.  S.  120;  s.  c.  5 
S.  Ct.  785;  Lewis  v.  City  of  Shreve- 
port,  108  U.  S.  282;  s.  c.  2  S. 
Ct.  634;  East  Oakland  Tp.  v.  Skin- 
ner, 94  U.  S.  255;  Marsh  v.  Fulton 
Co.,  10  Wall.  676;  Thomas  v.  City  of 
Richmond,  12  Wall.  349;  City  of 
Leavenworth  v.  Rankin,  2  Kan.  358; 
Bogart  V.  Lamotte  Tp.,  79  Mich.  294; 
s.  c.  44  N.  W.  612;  Reus  v.  City  of 
Grand  Rapids,  73  Mich.  237;  s.  c.  41 
N.  W.  263;  Newbery  v.  Fox,  37  Minn. 
141;  s.  c.  33  N.  W.  333;  5  Am.  St. 
830;  Burchfield  v.  City  of  New  Or- 
leans, 42  La.  An.  235;  s.  c.  7  So. 
448;  Gurley  v.  City  of  New  Or- 
leans, 41  La.  An.  75;  s.  c.  5  So.  659; 
Laycock  v.  City  of  Baton  Rouge,  35 
La.  An.  475;  Seibrecht  v.  City  of 
New  Orleans,  12  La.  An.  496;  Spauld- 
ing  V.  City  of  Lowell,  23  Pick. 
(Mass.)  71;  Loker  v.  Inhabitants 
&c.,  13  Pick.  (Mass.)  343;  Mayor  &c. 
V.  Musgrave,  48  Md.  272;   Stidger  v. 


City  of  Red  Oak,  64  Iowa  465;  s.  c. 
20  N.  W.  762;  State  v.  Severs,  86  N. 
C.  588;  City  of  Fort  Wayne  v.  Lehr, 
88  Ind.  62;  Covington  &c.  R.  Co.  v. 
Mayor  &c.,  85  Ga.  367;  s.  c.  11  S.  E. 
663;  City  of  Eufaula  v.  McNab,  67 
Ala.  588;  New  Jersey  &c.  Co.  v.  Fire 
Com'rs,  34  N.  J.  Eq.  117;  Sutro  v. 
Pettit,  74  Cal.  332;  s.  c.  16  Pac.  7;  5 
Am.  St.  442;  Miners  Ditch  Co.  v. 
Zellerbach,  37  Cal.  543;  Agawam 
Bank  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  128  Mass. 
503;  Atlantic  City  &c.  'Co.  v.  Read,  50 
N.  J.  L.  665;  s.  c.  15  Atl.  10;  Prince 
V.  City  of  Quincy,  105  111.  138; 
Trustees  &c.  v.  Hohn,  82  Ky.  1 ;  City 
of  Cleveland  v.  State  Bank  &c.,  16 
Ohio  St.  236;  Shipman  v.  State,  42 
Wis.  377,  381;  Syracuse  W.  Co.  v. 
City  of  Syracuse,  116  N.  Y.  167;  s.  c. 
22  N.  E.  381;  Lyddy  v.  Long  Island 
City,  104  N.  Y.  218;  s.  c.  10  N.  E. 
155;  Moore  v.  Mayor  &c.,  73  N.  Y. 
238;  McDonald  v.  Mayor  &c.,  68  N. 
Y.  23;  Buffett  v.  Troy  &c.  R.  Co.,  40 
N.  Y.  168;  Donovan  v.  Mayor  &c.,  33 
N.  Y.  291;  Mayor  &c.  v.  Cunliff,  2  N. 
Y.  165;  Halstead  v.  Mayor  &c.,  3  N. 
Y.  430;  Appeal  of  Whelen,  108  Pa.  St, 
162;  Barley's  Appeal,  103  Pa.  St. 
273;  Maupin  v.  Franklin  Co.,  67  Mo. 
327;  Cheeney  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  60 
Mo.  53;  City  of  Bridgeport  v.  Hous- 


§    228  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  234 

established  law  that  where  the  contract  is  properly  ultra  vires, — that 
is  to  say,  where  it  is  wholly  beyond  the  express  or  implied  powers  of 
the  corporation, — it  is  absolutely  void, , and  can  not  be  ratified  by 
performance  or  by  acceptance  of  benefit  thereunder.  As  is  said  in  a 
recent  California  case,  neither  the  doctrine  of  estoppel  or  of  ratifica- 
tion nor  of  bona  fide  holding  can  be  invoked  to  support  such  a  con- 
tract.* 

§  228.  The  same  subject  continued. — There  is,  however,  much 
conflict  in  the  cases  bearing  on  this  point.  The  great  preponderance 
of  authority  is  undoubtedly  in  favor  of  the  doctrine  of  our  text,  but 
in  many  cases  the  judges  seem  to  have  allowed  their  desire  to  prevent 
the  defeat  of  substantial  justice  by  the  interposition  of  the  technical 
defense  of  ultra  vires  to  obscure  their  judgment  in  deciding  the  legal 
rights  of  the  parties.  Thus,  in  a  case  in  which  the  city  of  St. 
Louis  sued  to  recover  upon  a  contract,  which  the  court  acknowledged 
to  be  void,  but  under  which  the  defendant  had  enjoyed  benefits,  it 
was  held  that  the  defendant  was  estopped  from  impeaching  the 
validity  of  the  contract.  The  decision  was  also  placed  upon  the  doubt- 
ful ground  that  a  contract  made  by  a  municipal  corporation,  although 
ultra  vires,  was  yet  not  illegal  if  not  prohibited  by  its  charter;  and 
that  while  the  corporation  might  successfully  set  up  the  plea  of  ultra 
vires  if  sued  upon  such  a  contract,  still  the  party  contracting  with 
the  corporation  could  not  set  up  that  plea  against  the  corporation 
after  receiving  and  retaining  benefits  under  the  contract.  The  deci- 
sion may  be  justified  on  the  ground  of  estoppel  under  the  particular 
facts  of  the  ease;  but  the  general  doctrine  laid  down  that  a  city  may 
recover  upon  an  ultra  vires  contract  unless  such  contract  is  expressly 
prohibited  by  law,  is  certainly  dangerously  broad.  The  concluding 
sentence  of  the  decision  seems  to  indicate  the  real  ground  of  the 
decision:  "In  ruling  thus  we  give  no  sanction  to  a  municipal  corpo- 
ration leaving  the  narrow  pathway  marked  out  by  its  charter,  nor  do 
we  intimate  that  we  would  enforce  an  ultra  vires  contract  if  execu- 

atonic  R.  Co.,  15  Conn.  475;    Clark  cent  cases  in  the  different  states,  by 

V.  City  of  Des  Moines,  19  Iowa  199;  consulting   which   other   authorities 

Lincoln  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  75  Maine  in  the  reports  of  that  state  may  be 

141;    Mitchell  v.  City  of  Rockland,  ascertained. 

45  Maine  496;   Driftwood  &c.  Co.  v.         *  Sutro  v.  Petti t,  74  Cal.  332;  s.  c. 

Board  &c.,  72   Ind.  226.     The  cases  16  Pac.  7;  5  Am.  St.  442.     And  this 

above  cited  are  but  a  few  of  a  great  doctrine  has  the  high  authority  of 

number  which  support  the  proposi-  Judge  Dillon:  1  Dillon  Munic.  Corp., 

tion  of  the  text.    The  writer  has  en-  §  457;   2  Dillon  Munic.  Corp.,  §  935. 

deavored  to  cite  the  leading  and  re-  See  cases  cited  in  preceding  note. 


235  THE    LIABILITY   OF    THE    CORPORATION.  §    229 

tory;  we  merely  hold  that  good  morals  and  even-handed  justice  de- 
mand that  the  defendant  should  disgorge."^ 

§  229.  The  doctrine  of  ultra  vires  applied  with  greater  strictness 
to  public  than  to  private  corporations. — In  a  Minnesota  case,**  a 
contract  for  grading  the  streets  was  made  by  the  officers  of  a  town 
in  the  first  instance,  although  the  charter  required  that  the  duty  to 
make  the  improvement  should  he  first  imposed  upon  the  adjacent 
proprietors.  In  a  well-considered  opinion  the  contract  was  adjudged 
ultra  vires  and  void.  The  court  said:  "The  doctrine  of  ultra  vires 
has  with  good  reason  been  applied  with  greater  strictness  to  munici- 
pal bodies  than  to  private  corporations,  and  in  general  a  municipality 
is  not  estopped  from  denying  the  validity  of  a  contract  made  by  its 
officers  when  there  has  been  no  authority  for  making  such  a  con- 
tract.'^ A  different  rule  of  law  would  in  effect  vastly  enlarge  the 
powers  of  public  agents  to  bind  a  municipality  by  contracts  not  only 
unauthorized  but  prohibited  by  the  law.  It  would  tend  to  nullify 
the  limitations  and  restrictions  imposed  with  respect  to  the  powers 
of  such  agents,  and  to  a  dangerous  extent  expose  the  public  to  the 
very  evils  and  abuses  which  such  limitations  are  designed  to  prevent."^ 

§  230.  The  reason  for  the  rule. — The  reason  for  the  stringent 
application  of  the  doctrine  of  ultra  vires  to  strictly  public  corpora- 
tions is  well  stated  by  Judge  Cooley:  "The  powers  conferred  upon 
municipalities  must  be  considered  with  reference  to  the  object  of 
their  creation,  namely,  as  agencies  of  the  state  in  local  government. 
The  state  can  create  them  for  no  other  purpose,  and  it  can  confer 
powers  of  government  to  no  other  end,  without  at  once  coming  into 
conflict  with  the  constitutional  maxim  that  legislative  power  can  not 
be  delegated,  or  with  other  maxims  designed  to  confine  all  the  agen- 

°  City  of  St.  Louis  v.  Davidson,  102  icy    is    void,    notwithstanding    the 

Mo.  149;  s.  c.  14  S.  W.  825;  22  Am.  fact  that  the  city  has  received  some 

St.  764.  benefits  thereunder. 

"Newbery  v.  Fox,  37  Minn.  141;  s.  ®  See   to   the    same   effect,    Burch- 

c.  33  N.  W.  333;  5  Am.  St.  830.  field  v.  City  of  New  Orleans,  42  La. 

■'Citing   Mayor   v.    Ray,    19    Wall.  An.  235;   s.  c.  7  So.  448;    Gurley  v. 

468;    Brady  v.  Mayor  &c.,  20  N.  Y.  City  of  New  Orleans,  41  La.  An.  75; 

312;   Hague  v.  City  of  Philadelphia,  s.  c.  5  So.  659;  Rens  v.  City  of  Grand 

48  Pa.  St.  527;  1  Dillon  Munic.  Corp.,  Rapids,  73  Mich.  237;  s.  c.  41  N.  W. 

§  457;    Nash  v.  City  of  St.  Paul,  8  263;  Bogart  v.  Lamotte  Tp.,  79  Mich. 

Minn.  172.     In  Covington  &c.  R.  Co.  294;  s.  c.  44  N.  W.  612;  Sutro  v.  Pet- 

V.  Mayor  &c.,  85  Ga.  367;  s.  e.  11  S.  tit,   74  Cal.  332;    s.  c.  16  Pac.  7;    5 

E.  663,  it  is  decided  that  a  contract  Am.  St.  442;  and  cases  cited  in  pre- 

entered  into  by  a  city  outside  of  its  ceding  sections, 
powers  and  contrary  to  public  pol- 


§    831  PUBLIC    COKl'ORATIONS.  236 

cies  of  government  to  the  exercise  of  their  proper  functions;  and 
wherever  the  municipality  shall  attempt  to  exercise  powers  not  within 
the  proper  province  of  local  self-government,  whether  the  right  to 
do  so  be  claimed  under  express  legislative  grant  or  by  implication 
from  the  charter,  the  act  must  be  considered  as  altogether  ultra  vires 
and  therefore  void."^ 

§  231.  Municipal  bonds  void  when  ultra  vires. — An  interesting 
instance  of  the  application  of  the  preceding  doctrines  is  found  in 
a  California  case  already  cited.^°  The  legislature  of  that  state  au- 
thorized the  board  of  supervisors  of  the  county  of  San  Luis  Obispo 
to  issue  bonds  "not  exceeding  in  the  aggregate  the  sum  of  forty  thou- 
sand dollars"  for  the  purpose  of  erecting  a  court-house.  By  some 
means  bonds  to  the  amount  of  forty-two  thousand  dollars  were  issued. 
Under  the  California  statutes  such  bonds  could  be  legal  only  by 
virtue  of  the  express  authority  of  the  legislature.  The  court  held 
that  the  action  of  the  supervisors  in  issuing  the  bonds  in  excess  of 
forty  thousand  dollars  did  not  bind  the  county,  as  the  county  had  no 
power  to  issue  bonds  without  legislative  sanction ;  that  the  bonds  were 
absolutely  void.  "It  is  quite  probable,"  said  the  opinion  of  the  court, 
"that  the  respondents  paid  full  par  value  for  these  bonds  and  that 
they  will  lose  their  money,"  but  "those  who  contract  with  a  municipal 
corporation  are  bound  to  know  the  extent  of  the  power  of  its  officers. ^^_ 
Eespondents  would  have  discovered  the  worthlessness  of  the  bonds 
upon  the  slightest  inquiry.  At  all  events,  hard  cases  can  not  be 
allowed  to  make  bad  law.  An  overissue  of  twenty  thousand  dollars 
would  have  been  no  less  valid  than  the  overissue  of  two  thousand 
dollars,  and  any  other  rule  would  put  the  people  of  a  county  in  the 
complete  power  of  careless  or  unscrupulous  public  officers." ^^ 

§  232.  The  same  subject  continued. — The  supreme  court  of  the 
United  States  has,  however,  decided,  where  municipal  bonds  are  by 

»Cooley  Const.  Lim.  (6th  ed.)  ^=  Sutro  v.  Pettit,  74  Cal.  332;  s.  c. 
261.  And  Judge  Dillon  says:— "The  16  Pac.  7;  5  Am.  St.  442,  445.  In  the 
history  of  the  workings  of  munici-  same  case  the  board  of  supervisors 
pal  bodies  has  demonstrated  the  attempted  to  correct  their  error  by 
salutary  nature  of  this  principle,  ordering  the  bonds  to  be  redeemed, 
and  that  it  is  the  part  of  true  wis-  The  court  very  justly  held  this  tp  be 
dom  to  keep  the  corporate  wings  brutum  fulmen,  saying: — "The  char- 
clipped  down  to  the  lawful  stand-  acter  of  one  void  act  of  public  offi- 
ard:"  1  Dillon  Munic.  Corp.,  §  457.  cers  can  not  be  changed  by  a  second 

^^  Sutro  v.  Pettit,  74  Cal.  332;  s.  c.  void  act  of  the  same  officers  declar- 

16  Pac.  7;  5  Am.  St.  442.  ing  the  first  act  to  be  valid." 

"  Citing  Wallace  v.  Mayor  &c.,  29 
Cal.  180. 


237  THE    LIABILITY    OF    TIIK    CORPORATION.  §    233 

virtue  of  misrepresentations  contained  in  the  bonds  themselves  ap- 
parently valid,  and  are  sold  to  bona  fide  purchasers,  and  the  purchase 
price  received  and  appropriated  by  the  city,  that  the  city  is  liable 
to  the  purchasers  for  the  price  paid  for  the  bonds  upon  an  implied 
contract  to  restore  money  illegally  obtained.^^  But  the  doctrine  of 
the  case  cited  in  the  preceding  section^*  has  often  been  sustained, 
and  under  the  circumstances  of  the  individual  case  it  has  been  decided 
in  several  instances  in  Massachusetts  that  the  holders  of  void  munici- 
pal bonds  were  without  remedy.^° 

§  233.  intra  vires — How  modified  by  estoppel. — The  foregoing 
principles  are  to  be  applied  cautiously,  however;  and  it  does  not  al- 
ways follow  from  the  fact  that  the  municipality  has  undertaken  an 
ultra  vires  act,  that  the  other  contracting  party  is  without  remedy 
for  the  corporation's  default.  As  has  been  before  indicated,  the 
courts  are  reluctant  to  apply  the  hard  doctrine  of  ultra  vires,  and 
have  to  some  extent  used  the  same  expedients  to  evade  that  doctrine 
which  have  in  the  case  of  private  corporations  so  far  restricted  its 
application.  The  doctrine  of  estoppel  is  frequently  invoked  against 
the  plea  of  ultra  vires.  Thus,  to  use  the  words  of  Judge  Dillon, 
"where  an  act  in  its  external  aspect  is  within  the  general  powers 
of  the  corporation,  and  is  only  unauthorized  because  it  is  done  with 
a  secret  unauthorized  intent,  the  defense  of  ultra  vires  will  not  pre- 
vail against  a  stranger  who  in  good  faith  dealt  with  it  without  notice 
of  such  intent." i« 

§  234.    The  same  subject  continued — Hitchcock  v.   Galveston. — 

A  notable  instance  is  to  be  found  in  a  case  in  the  federal  supreme 

"Louisiana  v.  Wood,  102  U.  S.  294.  void  bonds  than  are  the  state  courts 
So  also,  in  a  Wisconsin  case,  the  — possibly  because  the  federal  tri- 
same  doctrine  was  upheld,  and  it  bunal  feels  less  keenly  the  local  dan- 
was  also  decided  that  it  was  not  gers  of  allowing  careless  or  un- 
necessary under  those  circumstances  scrupulous  public  officers  to  trifle 
for  the  holders  to  offer  to  return  with  the  financial  obligations  of  the 
the  bonds  before  bringing  action:  corporations  whose  servants  they 
Paul  V.  City  of  Kenosha,  22  Wis.  266.  are,  and  consequently  is  more  at  lib- 

"  Sutro  V.  Pettit,  74  Cal.  332;  s.  c.  erty  to  exercise  the  natural  feeling 

16  Pac.  7;  5  Am.  St.  442.  of    pity    for    the    bondholders    who 

'^  Agawam  Nat'l  Bank  v.   Inhabi-  have    become    the    victims    of    that 

tants  &c.,   128  Mass.   503;    Railroad  carelessness  or  unscrupulousness. 
Nat'l   Bank   v.   City   of   Lowell.   109         ^^  2  Dillon  Munic.  Corp.,  §  936;  cit- 

Mass.  214.  See  chapter  on  Bonds  and  ing  5  Am.  L.  Rev.   (Jan.  1871)  272, 

Coupons,    post.     It   will   be   noticed  which,    says   the    distinguished    au- 

that  the  supreme  court  of  the  United  thor,    sums    up    the    result    of    the 

States  is  more  lenient  towards  bona-  English  cases  to  that  date  substan- 

fide  holders  for  value  of  irregular  or  tially  in  the  language  of  the  text. 


§    234  PUBLIC    COIU'OHATIOXS.  238 

court,"  where  the  city  of  Galveston  contracted  with  certain  parties 
to  pave  its  streets.  This  was  within  the  scope  of  the  powers  of  the 
corporation,  but  a  clause  in  the  contract  provided  for  the  issue  of 
negotiable  municipal  bonds  in  payment  for  the  contract,  which  was 
ultra  vires  the  corporation.  The  contractors  proceeded  with  the 
work,  and  when  partially  completed  brought  action  against  the  city 
on  the  contract.  The  plea  of  ultra  vires  was  set  up  and  sustained 
in  the  trial  court,  but  overruled  in  the  supreme  court.  The  grounds 
of  the  decision  were  stated  by  Mr.  Justice  Strong  as  follows:  "They 
[the  plaintiff  contractors]  are  not  suing  upon  the  bonds,  and  it 
is  not  necessary  for  their  success  that  they  should  assert  the  validity 
of  those  instruments.  It  is  enough  for  them  that  the  city  council 
have  power  to  enter  into  a  contract  for  the  improvement  of  the  side- 
walks; that  such  a  contract  was  made  with  them;  that  under  it  they 
have  proceeded  to  furnish  materials  and  do  work  as  well  as  assume 
liabilities;  that  the  city  has  received  and  now  enjoys  the  benefit  of 
what  they  have  done  and  furnished;  that  for  these  things  the  city 
promised  to  pay,  and  that  after  receiving  the  benefit  of  the  contract 
the  city  has  broken  it.  It  matters  not  that  the  promise  was  to  pay 
in  a  manner  not  authorized  by  law.  If  payments  can  not  be  made 
in  bonds  because  their  issue  is  ultra  vires,  it  would  be  sanctioning 
rank  injustice  to  hold  that  payment  need  not  be  made  at  all.  Such 
is  not  the  law.  The  contract  between  the  parties  is  in  force,  so  far 
as  it  is  lawful.  There  may  be  a  difference  between  the  case  of  an 
engagement  made  by  a  corporation  to  do  an  act  expressly  prohibited 
by  its  charter  or  some  other  law  and  a  case  of  where  legislative  power 
to  do  the  act  has  not  been  granted.  Such  a  distinction  is  asserted 
in  some  decisions.  But  the  present  is  not  a  case  in  which  the  issue 
of  bonds  was  prohibited  by  any  statute.  At  most  the  issue  was 
unauthorized;  at  most  there  was  a  defect  of  power.  The  promise  to 
give  bonds  to  the  plaintiffs  in  payment  of  what  they  undertook  to 
do  was  therefore  at  furthest  only  ultra  vires;  and  in  such  a  case, 
though  specific  performance  of  an  engagement  to  do  a  thing  trans- 
gressive  of  its  corporate  power  may  not  be  enforced,  the  corporation 
can  be  held  liable  on  its  contract.  Having  received  benefits  at  the 
expense  of  the  other  contracting  party,  it  can  not  object  that  it  was 
not  empowered  to  perform  what  it  promised  in  return  in  the  mode 
in  which  it  promised  to  perform.  This  was  directly  ruled  in  The 
State  Board  of  Agriculture  v.  The  Citizens  Street  Eailway  Com- 
pany. ^^     There  it  was  held  that  'although  there  may  be  a  defect  of 

"  Hitchcock  v.  Galveston,  96  U.  S.        ^'  47  Ind.  407. 
341. 


239  THE    LIABILITY    OF    THE    CORPORATION^.  §    235 

power  in  a  corporation  to  make  a  contract,  yet  if  a  contract  made 
by  it  is  not  in  violation  of  its  charter  or  of  any  statute  prohibiting 
it,  and  the  corporation  has  by  its  promise  induced  a  party,  relying 
on  the  promise  and  in  execution  of  the  contract,  to  expend  money 
■  and  perform  his  part  thereof,  the  corporation  is  liable  on  the  con- 
tract.' "1^ 

§  235.  Irregularity  in  exercise  of  power. — And  in  pursuance  of 
the  same  policy  the  courts  have  held  that  where  the  officers  of  the 
municipal  corporation  enter  into  contract  which  is  within  the  scope 
of  the  powers  of  the  corporation,  but  do  so  in  an  irregular  manner, 
the  corporation  is  estopped  from  setting  up  ultra  vires  against  one 
who  has  contracted  in  good  faith.^''  And  in  an  Illinois  case  it  was 
decided  that  where  a  municipal  corporation  enters  upon  a  contract 
in  reliance  upon  a  power  which  it  is  subsequently  discovered  not 
to  possess,  it  will  not  be  relieved  of  its  obligation  if  that  obligation 
can  be  satisfied  by  -the  exercise  of  a  power  which  it  lawfully  pos- 
sesses.^^ 

§  236.  Ultra  vires — How  modified  by  the  doctrine  of  implied  con- 
tract— General  principles. — The  elementary  principle  that  the  law 
presumes  a  contract  to  restore  to  the  rightful  owner  property  ob- 
tained through  fraud  or.  mistake  is  applied  to  municipal  corporations 
with  effects  that  greatly  modify  and  ameliorate  the  doctrine  of  ultra 
vires.  "This  doctrine  of  implied  municipal  liability  applies  to  cases 
where  money  or  other  property  of  a  party  is  received  under  such  cir- 
cumstances that  the  general  law,  independent  of  express  contract, 
imposes  the  obligation  upon  the  city  to  do  justice  with  respect  to  the 

*®  Hitchcock  v.  Galveston,  96  U.  S.  the   city   was   based   upon   the   con- 

341;    citing  Alleghany   City   v.   Mc-  tract,  and  the  court  did  not  decide 

Clurkin,   14   Pa.   St.    81;    Maher   v.  the  question  of  the  validity  of  the 

City  of  Chicago,  38  111.  266;   Oneida  bonds.     The  arguments  of  the  opin- 

Bank  v.  Ontario  Bank,  21  N.  Y.  490;  ion  quoted  in  the  text  were  consid- 

Argenti   v.    San   Francisco,   16   Cal.  ered   applicable   even   if   the   bonds 

255;    Silver  Lake  Bank  v.  North,  4  were  conceded  to  be  illegal  and  void. 

Johns.  Ch.    (N.  Y.)    370.     The  deci-  It  will  be  noted  that  the  conclusions 

sion  of  the  lower  court  in  this  case  of  this  case  are  close  in  principle  to 

(Hitchcock  V.  Galveston)    was  sup-  City  of  St.  Louis  v.  Davidson,  102 

ported,  in  the  opinion  of  the  court.  Mo.  149;   s.  c.  14  S.  W.  825,  already 

by   Tensas  &c.   Jury  v.   Britton,   15  cited    and    considered.     See    to    the 

Wall.  566,  and  Mayor  &c.  v.  Ray,  19  same  effect,  East  St.  Louis  v.  East 

Wall.  468,  where  it  was  held  that  a  St.  Louis  Gas  &c.  Co.,  98  111.  415. 
municipality  has  inherently  no  im-         ^^  Moore  v.  Mayor  &c.,  73  N.  Y.  238. 
plied  power  to  issue  bonds.     But  in        "  Maher  v.  City  of  Chicago,  38  111. 

the  Galveston   case  the  liability  of  266. 


§    237  PUBLIC    COKPOKATIONS.  -  240 

same."--  These  words  of  Chief  Justice  Field  indicate  the  great 
breadth  and  vagueness  of  the  doctrine  and  the  consequent  great 
difficulty  in  its  application  to  individuals.  There  are  few  subjects 
in  the  law  of  public  corporations  in  which  it  is  more  difficult  to  lay 
down  general  principles  from  the  adjudications.  The  general  prin- 
ciple of  the  liability  of  corporations  on  an  implied  contract,  where 
the  law  presumes  a  contract  to  restore  money  or  property  obtained 
by  mistake  or  without  authority  of  law,  is  supported  by  a  vast  num- 
ber of  authorities.^^  The  difficulty  is  to  determine  under  what 
circumstances  the  general  rule  applies. 

§  237.  The  same  subject  continued. — The  law  must  be  determined 
from  the  circumstances  of  each  case,  and  generalities  will  be  little 
more  than  indications  of  the  trend  of  the  decisions.  The  result  of 
this  state  of  things  is  that  which  always  follows  when  the  law  is  in 
the  breast  of  each  judge.  There  is  great  and  irreconcilable  conflict 
in  the  cases.  A  few  general  rules  are  laid  down,  however,  by  Chief 
Justice  Field  which  may  be  studied  with  advantage.  "If  the  city 
obtain  money  of  another  by  mistake  or  without  authority  of  law, 
it  is  her  duty  to  refund  it — not  from  any  contract  entered  into  by 
her  on  the  subject,  but  from  the  general  obligation  to  do  justice 
which  binds  all  persons,  whether  natural  or  artificial.  If  the  city 
obtain  other  property  which  does  not  belong  to  her  it  is  her  duty 
to  restore  it;  or,  if  used  by  her,  to  refund  an  equivalent  to  the  true 
owner  from  the  like  general  obligation ;  the  law,  which  always  intends 
justice,  implies  a  promise.  In  reference  to  money  or  other  property, 
it  is  not  difficult  to  determine  in  any  particular  case  whether  a  lia- 
bility with  respect  to  the  same  has  attached  to  the  city.  The  money 
must  have  gone  into  her  treasury  or  been  appropriated  by  her;  and 
when  it  is  property  other  than  money  it  must  have  been  used  by  her 
or  be  under  her  control.     But  with  reference  to  services  rendered  the 

2^  Argenti  V.  City  of  San  Francisco,  s.     c.     10     Atl.     809;      Board     &c. 

16  Cal.  255.  v.  Springfield,  63   III.  66;    Town  of 

=^  Chapman  V.  Douglass  Co.,  107  U.  Canaan   v.    Derush,   47   N.   H.   212; 

S.  348;  s.  c.  2  S.  Ct.  62;  Louisiana  v.  State    Board    &c.    v.    Aberdeen,    56 

Wood,  102  U.  S.  294;    Mayor  &c.  v.  Miss.  518;   Herman  v.  City  of  Crete, 

Ray,    19    Wall.    468;    President   &c.  9  Neb.  350;  s.  c.  2  N.  W.  722;  District 

(Bank)  v.  Dandridge,  12  Wheat.  64,  Tp.  &c.  v.  District  Tp.  &c.,  11  Iowa 

74;  Hitchcock  v.  Galveston,  96  U.  S.  506;  Morville  v.  American  Tract  So- 

341;  Albany  City  Nat'l  Bank  v.  City  ciety,  123  Mass.  129;  Brown  v.  City 

of  Albany,  92  N.  Y.  363;   Moore  v.  of  Atchison,  39  Kan.  37;  s.  c.  17  Pac. 

Mayor  &c.,  73  N.  Y.  238;  Peterson  v.  465;  City  of  Bryan  v.  Page,  51  Tex. 

Mayor   &c.,   17   N.  Y.   449;    Bank  v.  532;  Town  of  Lemington  v.  Blodgett, 

Patterson,  7  Cranch  299;   Taylor  v.  37  Vt.  215;  Magill  v.  Kauffman,  4  S. 

Lambertville,     43     N.J.     Bq.     107;  &  R.  (Pa.)  317. 


241  THE   LIABILITY    OP    THE    CORPORATION.  §    238 

case  is  different.  Then  acceptance  must  be  evidenced  by  ordinance 
to  that  effect.  If  not  originally  authorized,  no  liability  can  attach 
upon  any  ground  of  implied  contract.  The  acceptance  upon  which 
alone  the  obligation  to  pay  could  arise  would  be  wanting.  As  a  gen- 
eral rule,  undoubtedly  a  city  corporation  is  only  liable  upon  express 
contracts  authorized  by  ordinance.  The  exceptions  relate  to  liabili- 
ties from  the  use  of  money  or  other  property  which  does  not  belong 
to  her  or  to  liabilities  springing  from  the  neglect  of  duties  imposed 
by. the  charter  from  which  injuries  to  parties  are  produced.  There 
are  limitations  even  to  these  exceptions  in  many  instances ;  as,  where 
money  or  property  is  received  in  disregard  of  positive  prohibitions; 
as,  for  example,  the  city  would  not  be  liable  for  moneys  received 
upon  the  issuance  of  bills  of  credit,  as  this  would  be  in  effect  to 
support  a  proceeding  in  direct  contravention  of  the  inhibition  of 
the  charter."-* 

§  238.  Illustrations  of  the  doctrine  of  implied  contracts. — In  an 
Illinois  case  the  municipal  corporation  was  bound  by  its  charter  to 
support  its  paupers.  An  action  was  brought  by  a  person  who  had 
furnished  necessaries  to  a  pauper,  after  having  applied  to  the  munici- 
pal authorities  for  relief,  which  was  refused.  The  city  was  held 
liable  under  an  implied  contract  to  remunerate  the  person  who  had 
thus  performed  what  was  the  duty  of  the  city.^^  The  cases  in  which 
said  doctrine  is  more  frequently  applied  arise  where  the  city  has 
obtained  through  mistake  or  fraud  money  or  other  property,  and  an 
implied  contract  to  return  the  property  thus  obtained  is  presumed 
by  the  law.  So  in  a  famous  series  of  California  cases,  known  as  the 
"City  Slip  Cases,"  where  the  municipal  officers  conveyed  real  estate 
by  virtue  of  an  ordinance  which  was  void,  it  was  held  that  the  sales 
were  absolutely  void ;  that  no  title  passed  to  the  supposed  purchasers, 
and  that  the  corporation  was  liable  in  an  action  brought  by  them  to 
recover  the  purchase-money,  although  that  money  had  already  been 
appropriated  for  municipal  purposes.^^ 

'^  Argenti  v.  City  of  San  Francisco,  made  repeated  applications  to  the 

16  Cal.  255.  city  authorities  for  relief,  which  was 

-^  Seagraves  v.  Alton,  13  111.  366.  refused.     If  Reeves  was  a  pauper  in 

In  the  opinion  it  was  said  by  the  fact,  the  plaintiff  by  continuing  to 

court: — "In    the    present    case    the  maintain    him    pursued    the    course 

evidence    tended   to   the   conclusion  that    humanity    prompted    and    the 

that  Reeves  was  a  pauper  and  prop-  law  approved,  and  he  ought  to  be  re- 

erly  chargeable  to  the  corporation,  munerated." 

It    also    clearly    appeared    that   the  "'^  Pimental   v.    San   Francisco,   21 

plaintiff,  with  whom  Reeves  resided,  Cal.  351;   Grogan  v.  San  Francisco, 
1  Smith — 16 


§    239  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  243 

§  239.  The  same  subject  continued. — In  an  interesting  case 
in  the  federal  supreme  court  a  Nebraska  county  purchased  certain 
lands  for  a  poor  farm,  and  paid  for  the  same  partly  in  cash  and  partly 
in  promissory  notes.  It  was  subsequently  decided  by  the  state  courts 
that  the  promissory  notes  were  ultra  vires  and  void.  Suit  was  brought 
that  the  sum  due  on  account  of  the  purchase  price  should  be  paid 
or  that  the  county  should  reconvey  the  lands.  The  supreme  court 
held  that  the  contract  was  void  only  so  far  as  the  mode  of  payment 
was  concerned,  and  that  the  county  was  liable  for  the  balance  due 
on  account  of  the  purchase  price,  and  decreed  that  that  balance 
should  be  paid  within  a  reasonable  time  or  the  property  reconveyed 
to  the  rightful  owners.^^  The  courts  have  frequently  decided,  in 
accordance  with  the  maxim  that  "he  who  seeks  equity  must  do  equity,'* 
that  a  municipal  corporation  which  seeks  to  be  relieved  from  a  con- 
tract must,  if  it  has  received  benefits  under  that  contract,  restore 
the  benefits  it  has  received  before  its  prayer  will  be  granted. ^^ 

§  240.  Liability  of  the  corporation  to  repay  taxes  illegally  col- 
lected.— A  liability  on  an  implied  contract  arises  under  proper  cir- 
cumstances where  the  municipal  corporation  has  collected  and  re- 
ceived illegal  taxes.  The  principles  upon  which  this  liability  is 
based  are  clearly  the  same  as  those  which  have  been  discussed  in  the 
preceding  sections.  The  law  presumes  a  contract  on  the  part  of 
the  corporation  to  repay  the  taxes  to  the  rightful  owner,  if  the  con- 
ditions are  such  that  the  municipality  has  not  equitably  a  right  to 
retain  the  money  collected  as  taxes. ^^     The  money  thus  received  is 

18  Cal.  590;  McCracken  v.  San  of  implied  contracts  will  be  more 
Francisco,  16  Cal.  591.  In  a  New  fully  discussed  in  the  chapter  on 
York  case  sewers  were  furnished  Contracts.  As  has  been  indicated, 
under  an  unauthorized  contract,  the  cases  are  conflicting,  and  it  is 
The  courts  held  that  the  contractor  perhaps  impossible  to  lay  down  gen- 
could  not  recover  on  the  express  con-  eral  rules  on  the  subject  to  which 
tract,  but  indicated  in  a  dictum  that  many  exceptions  are  not  to  be  found, 
"if,  as  alleged,  the  city  has  obtained  ^  National  Bank  «S:c.  v.  Elmira,  53 
his  property  without  authority,  but  N.  Y.  49;  Bank  &c.  v.  Mayor  &c.,  43 
has  used  and  received  the  avails  of  N.  Y.  184;  Grand  Rapids  v.  Blakely, 
it,  it  would  seem  that  independently  40  Mich.  367;  Tuttle  v.  Everett,  51 
of  the  express  contract  an  implied  Miss.  27;  Douglasville  v.  Jones,  62 
contract  would  arise  to  make  com-  Ga.  423;  Lamborn  v.  County  Com'rs, 
pensation:"  Nelson  v.  Mayor  &c.,  63  97  U.  S.  181;  Union  Pacific  R.  Co.  v. 
N.  Y.  535.  Commissioners    &c.,    98    U.    S.    541; 

"Chapman  v.  Douglass  Co.,  107  U.  Phelps  v.  Mayor  &c..  112  N.  Y.  216; 

S.  348;  s.  c.  2  S.  Ct.  62.  s.  c.  19  N.  E.  408;  Ege  v.  Koontz,  3 

=«  Turner  v.  Cruzen,  70  Iowa  202;  Pa.   St.  109;    Town  of  Princeton  v. 

s.  c.  30  N.  W.  483;  Lucas  v.  Hunt,  5  Vierling,  40  Ind.  340;   Riker  v.  Jer- 

Ohio  St.  488.     The  difficult  subject  sey  City,  38  N.  J.  L.  225;  Haines  v. 


243  THE    LIABILITY    OF    THE    CORPORATION.  §    241 

considered  in  law  to  be  money  had  and  received  for  the  rightful 
owners,  the  taxpayers,  and  can  be  recovered  by  them  in  an  action  in 
assumpsit  on  this  common-law  liability  independently  of  the  statutory 
provisions  on  the  subject  that  are  in  force  in  several  of  the  states. 

§  241.  The  same  subject  continued — Restrictions. — It  is  mani- 
fest, however,  that  a  loose  application  of  the  doctrine  enunciated  in 
the  preceding  section  would  be  fraught  with  grave  damage  to  the 
corporation.  If  the  town,  city  or  other  strictly  public  corporation 
could  be  held  liable  to  repay  all  taxes  irregularly  collected,  even  if 
paid  voluntarily,  it  is  evident  that  great  public  inconvenience  would 
ensue.  Such  a  condition  of  things  would  afEord  unlimited  opportu- 
nity to  demagogues  to  appeal  to  the  natural  avarice  of  mankind. 
Actions  would  be  brought  to  recover  taxes,  necessary  and  legal  in 
their  essentials,  but  collected  irregularly  or  by  virtue  of  legislation 
in  which  some  technical  defect  could  be  found.  The  administration 
of  government  would  be  seriously  impeded,  and  the  just  and  equitable 
principle  of  the  common  law  would  be  distorted  into  an  instrument 
of  injustice.  The  courts  have  therefore  wisely  hedged  about  the 
application  of  the  doctrine  with  stringent  rules.  These  rules  are  stated 
by  Judge  Dillon  with  his  usual  succinctness  and  clearness:  "Ac- 
tions against  a  municipal  corporation  to  recover  back  money  upon  the 
ground  of  the  illegality  of  the  tax  or  assessment  are  upon  principle 
and  the  weight  of  authority  maintainable  when,  and  in  general  only 
when  (if  there  be  no  statute  enlarging  the  liability),  the  following 
requisites  coexist:  1.  The  authority  to  levy  the  tax  or  to  levy  it 
upon  the  property  in  question  must  be  wholly  wanting,  or  the  tax 
itself  wholly  unauthorized,  in  which  case  the  assessment  is  not  simply 

School  Dist.,  41  Maine  246;  Cook  v.  covered  back.     And  the  fact  that  the 

City  of  Boston,  9  Allen  (Mass.)  393.  party  at  the  time  of  making  the  pay- 

The  liability  of  the  corporation  for  ment  files  a  written  protest  does  not 

the  repayment  of  taxes  illegally  col-  make  the  payment  involuntary.    But 

lected  exists  under  the  proper  condi-  where  a  party  not  liable  to  taxation 

tions  at  common  law  independent  of  is  called  upon  peremptorily  to  pay 

statute,  and  has  been  recognized  by  upon   such  a   warrant,   and   he   can 

the    supreme    court    of    the    United  save  himself  and  his  property  in  no 

States.     "Where  a  party  pays  an  il-  other  way  than  by  paying  the  illegal 

legal  demand  with  a  full  knowledge  demand,  he  may  give  notice  that  he 

of  all  the  facts  which  render  such  so  pays  it  by  duress  and  not  vohm- 

demand  illegal  without  an  immedi-  tarily,  and  by  showing  that  he  is  not 

ate  and  urgent  necessity  therefor,  or  liable  recover  it  back  as  money  had 

unless  to  release  his  person  or  prop-  and  received:"  Union  Pacific  R.  Co. 

erty   from   detention   or  to  prevent  v.  Commissioners  &c.,  98  U.  S.  541; 

an  immediate  seizure  of  his  person  cited  and  quoted  in  2  Dillon  Munic. 

or  property,  such  payment  must  be  Corp.,  §  947. 
deemed  voluntary,  and  can  not  be  re- 


§    242  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  244 

irregular  but  absolutely  void.  2.  The  money  sued  for  must  have 
been  actually  received  by  the  defendant  corporation  and  received  by 
it  for  its  own  use  and  not  as  an  agent  or  instrument  to  assess  and 
collect  money  for  the  benefit  of  the  state  or  other  public  corporation 
or  person.  And  3.  The  payment  by  the  plaintiff  must  have  been 
made  upon  compulsion;  as,  for  example,  to  prevent  the  immediate 
seizure  of  his  goods  or  the  arrest  of  the  person,  and  not  voluntarily. 
Unless  these  conditions  concur,  paying  under  protest  will  not,  without 
statutory  aid,  give  a  right  of  recovery."^^ 

§  242.  Illegality  of  assessment. — According  to  the  first  rule  laid 
down  in  the  preceding  section,  the  assessment  must  be  absolutely 
void  and  not  merely  irregular  in  order  to  justify  a  recovery  by  the 
taxpayer  of  the  money  paid  in  as  taxes.  Thus,  where  property  ex- 
empt by  law  from  taxation  is  illegally  taxed,  the  assessment  is  void 
and  the  money  may  be  reeovered.^^  And  in  accordance  with  this 
principle  it  has  been  held  in  several  cases  that  where  the  corporation 
levies  an  assessment  upon  property  for  street  improvement  and  the 
like,  and  the  assessment  is  void  in  law,  the  sum  paid  under  the 
assessment  can  be  recovered.^^  This  rule  is  also  applied  when  the 
corporation  levies  an  assessment  and  afterwards  fails  to  carry  out 
the  improvement  for  which  the  assessment  was  levied.^^  In  con- 
formity with  the  general  policy  of  the  law  in  restricting  the  applica- 
tion of  the  doctrine  under  consideration,  it  is  conceded  learning  that 
the  assessment  is  considered  prima  facie  valid,  and  the  burden  of  proof 
of  its  illegality  is  thrown  upon  the  person  attempting  to  recover 
money  paid  under  that  assessment.^* 

§  243.  Actual  receipt  of  taxes  by  the  corporation. — The  second 
restrictive  rule  prescribed  by  Judge  Dillon  is  well  illustrated  in  a 
Massachusetts  case.  The  taxpayers  of  a  town  paid  a  sum  of  money 
under  a  void  assessment  in  order  to  build  a  schoolhouse.  This 
money  was  paid  by  the  treasurer  of  the  town  to  a  building  committee 

^°  2  Dillon  Munic.  Corp.,  §  940.  on  its  face,  the  payment  of  the  as- 

^*  City  of  Indianapolis  v.  McAvoy,  sessment,  being  a  mere  mistake  of 

86  Ind.  587.  law,   is  not  such  a   payment  as  to 

•^^  Taylor    v.    People,    66    111.    322;  justify  a  recovery:  Phelps  v.  Mayor 

Bradford  v.  City  of  Chicago,  25  111.  &c.,  112  N.  Y.  216;  s.  c.  19  N.  B.  408. 

411;   Diefenthaler  v.  Mayor  &c..  Ill  '''Bradford  v.  City  of  Chicago,  25 

N.  Y.  331;  s.  c.  19  N.  E.  48;  Peyser  111.    411;    Valentine   v.    City   of    St. 

V.  Mayor  &c.,  70  N.  Y.  497;    Mayor  Paul,  34  Minn.  446;    s.  c.  26  N.  W. 

&c.  v.  O'Callaghan,  41  N.  J.  L.  349.  457. 

But  it  is  held  in  a  New  York  case  '*  Town  of  Douglasville  v.  Johns, 

that  when  the  assessment  is  made  62  Ga.  423;   and  cases  cited  in  pre- 

under  an   ordinance   which   is  void  ceding  sections. 


245  THE   LIABILITY    OF    THE    CORPORATION.  §    244 

of  the  school  district.  A  taxpayer  brought  action  against  the  school 
district  and  recovered  his  proportionate  share  of  the  money  from  the 
school  district,  although  the  town  had  levied  the  assessment."'''*  It 
is  indeed  obvious  where  the  corporation  exercises  only  a  naked  agency, 
and  pays  over  the  money  collected  to  a  third  person,  natural  or 
artificial,  that  the  actual  beneficiary  is  liable  in  an  action  brought 
to  recover  the  money  so  paid.  This  principle  is,  however,  applied 
with  discretion,  and  the  money  must  be  actually  paid  over  to  the 
third  person  before  the  corporation  can  claim  exemption  under  the 
rule.  Thus,  where  the  city  of  Grand  Eapids  illegally  collected  a 
tax  for  street  improvement,  and  an  action  was  brought  to  recover  the 
money  so  paid,  it  was  claimed  by  the  defendant  that  the  fund  was  not 
for  city  use  and  that  the  city  was  not  therefore  liable.  The  court 
held  very  properly  that  the  plea  was  untenable,  saying :  "Where  the 
party  entitled  demands  restoration,  it  is  no  answer  for  the  city  to 
say  it  holds  the  funds  for  somebody  else."^® 

§  244.  Compulsory  payment  of  taxes. — In  order  to  justify  a  re- 
covery by  the  taxpayer,  it  is  not  only  necessary  that  the  assessment 
be  void  and  that  the  corporation  actually  receive  the  money,  but 
it  is  also  necessary  that  the  payment  be  made  involuntarily  and  under 
compulsion.  It  is  by  the  application  of  this  rule  that  these  actions 
are,  if  unsuccessful,  generally  defeated,  and  consequently  there  are 
a  great  number  of  cases  regulating  and  defining  the  application  of 
the  rule.  There  is  considerable  variety  and  some  actual  conflict  in 
the  cases  on  this  subject.  It  is,  however,  upon  the  whole,  well  settled 
that  the  payment  must  be  made  under  direct  and  immediate  compul- 
sion, and  under  such  circumstances  that  the  person  called  upon  to 
pay  the  tax  can  save  himself  or  his  property  only  by  paying  the  illegal 
demand.^''     The  stringent  application  of  this  rule  often  results  in 

^^  Joyner    v.     Inhabitants    &c.,     3  is  believed  that  the  doctrine  of  the 

Cush.  (Mass.)  567.  text  is  also  supported  by  the  follow- 

^^ City  of  Grand  Rapids  v.  Blakely,  ing    cases:    Galveston    City    Co.    v. 

40  Mich.  367.  City    of    Galveston,    56     Tex.    486; 

"  Union  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Commis-  Town  of  Princeton  v.  Vierling,  40 
sioners  &c.,  98  U.  S.  541.  In  this  Ind.  340;  Commissioners  &c.  v.  Na- 
case  the  rule  is  laid  down  by  Chief  tional  Land  Co.,  23  Kan.  196;  Kan- 
Justice  Waite  as  in  the  text.  The  sas  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Commissioners  &c., 
language  of  the  rule  is  taken  from  16  Kan.  587;  Detroit  v.  Martin,  34 
the  decision  of  Chief  Justice  Shaw  Mich.  170;  Bank  &c.  v.  City  of  New 
in  Preston  v.  City  of  Boston,  12  Pick.  Orleans,  12  La.  An.  421;  Robinson  v. 
(Mass.)  7,  14,  which  is  cited  and  ap-  City  Council  &c.,  2  Rich.  L.  (S.  C.) 
proved  by  Chief  Justice  Waite  in  his  317;  Leonard  v.  City  of  Canton,  35 
opinion.  See  also,  Lamborn  v.  Miss.  189;  Raisler  v.  Mayor  &c.,  66 
County  Com'rs  &c.,  97  U.  S.  181.     It  Ala.  194;  Clarke  v.  Butcher,  9  Cow. 


§    345  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  246 

hardship  in  individual  cases,  but,  for  the  reasons  already  stated,  the 
general  beneficence  of  the  rale  is  undoubted. 

§  245.  The  same  subject  continued. — Under  the  rule  just  laid 
down,  it  will  be  seen  that  it  is  necessary  for  the  payment  to  be  made 
under  compulsion.  Therefore,  if  the  payment  be  voluntary,  and 
made  only  through  ignorance  of  law,  and  not  through  mistake  of 
fact,  the  money  so  paid  can  not  be  recovered  even  if  it  was  paid 
under  an  illegal  assessment. ^^  There  is  some  conflict  in  the  cases 
on  the  question  as  to  what  constitutes  such  compulsion  as  is  necessary 
in  order  to  recover  money  paid  for  illegal  taxes.  The  supreme  court 
of  the  United  States  has  taken  a  rather  extreme  position  on  this 
point,  as  appears  by  a  case  already  cited,  in  which  an  illegal  assess- 
ment had  been  laid  upon  certain  real  estate  of  a  railroad  company, 
and  a  tax  warrant  had  been  issued  for  the  collection  of  the  tax; 
but  the  warrant  had  not  actually  been  levied,  nor  had  any  property 
actually  been  seized  to  satisfy  the  tax.  Under  these  circumstances 
the  company  paid  the  tax  under  protest.  The  court  did  not  con- 
sider this  payment  to  have  been  made  under  the  compulsion  which 
the  law  requires  as  a  prerequisite  to  the  bringing  of  an  action  to 
recover  the  money  so  paid.^®  Chief  Justice  Waite  seems  to  have 
rested  this  decision  on  the  ground  that  it  was  absolutely  necessary 
for  the  payment  to  have  been  made  under  such  circumstances  that 
the  taxpayer  could  have  saved  himself  in  no  other  way  than  by 
paying  the  illegal  demand.  "The  real  question  in  this  case  is,"  he 
says,  "whether  there  was  such  an  immediate  and  urgent  necessity 
for  the  payment  of  the  taxes  in  controversy  as  to  imply  that  they 
were  made  under  compulsion."**' 

§  246.  Illustrations  of  the  rule. — The  hard  doctrine  of  the  federal 
supreme  court  is  in  accordance  with  the  decisions  of  some  of  the 

(N.  Y.)    674;    City  of  Muscatine  v.  s.   c.   11   N.   E.   301;    McCrickart  v. 

Keokuk  &c.  Co.,  45  Iowa  185;   Falls  City  of  Pittsburgh,  88  Pa.  St.  133; 

v.  City  of  Cairo,  58  111.  403;   Harri-  Taylor  v.  Board  &C.,  31  Pa.  St.  73. 

son  v.  City  of  Milwaukee,  49  Wis.  ^  Union  Pacific  R.  Co.  v.  Commis- 

247;  s.  c.  5  N.  W.  326;  Mayor  &c.  v.  sioners  &c.,  98  U.  S.  541;   Emery  v. 

Judah.  5  Leigh  (Va.)  305;  Phelps  v.  City    of     Lowell,     127     Mass.     138; 

Mayor  &c.,  112  N.  Y.  216;  s.  c.  19  N.  Mayor  &c.  v.  Judah,  5  Leigh    (Va.) 

E.   408;    Diefenthaler  v.   Mayor  &c.,  305;    Bank  &c.  v.  Mayor  &c.,   43  N. 

Ill  N.  Y.  331;  s.  c.  19  N.  E.  48;  Bank  Y.  184;  Falls  v.  City  of  Cairo,  58  111. 

&c.     V.      Mayor     &c.,     43     N.     Y.  403.     See   also,   cases   cited   in   pre- 

184;     Bucknall     v.     Story,    46     Cal.  ceding  section. 

589;    Emery  v.  City  of  Lowell,  127  =°  Union  Pacific  R.  Co.  v.  Commis- 

Mass.    138;     Benson    v.    Monroe,    7  sioners  &c.,  98  U.  S.  541. 

Cush.    (Mass.)    125;    Churchman   v.  *"  Union  Pacific  R.  Co.  v.  Commis- 

City  of  Indianapolis,  110  Ind.  259;  sioners  &c.,  98  U.  S.  541. 


247  THE    LIABILITY    OF    THE    CORPORATION.  §    247 

states,  but  its  rigor  is  modified  in  others.  Thus,  in  a  Michigan  ease, 
an  assessment  was  laid  upon  real  estate  under  an  unconstitutional 
statute,  and  the  land  was  to  be  sold  to  satisfy  the  tax.  In  order  to 
avoid  the  threatened  sale  the  owner  paid  the  tax  under  protest. 
Even  under  these  circumstances  the  payment  was  considered  volun- 
tary, and  the  right  of  the  owner  to  recover  the  tax  money  was  denied 
on  the  ground  that  as  the  law  was  unconstitutional  and  void  the 
sale  would  also  have  been  void,  and  would  not  therefore  have  dis- 
turbed the  owner's  title.* ^  As  has  already  been  indicated,  it  is  held 
in  many  cases  that  some  overt  act  towards  collecting  the  tax  must 
have  been  taken  before  the  tax  can  be  considered  to  have  been  paid 
under  such  compulsion  as  the  law  requires.  The  mere  issuing  of 
a  tax  warrant  or  the  mere  threat  to  collect  the  tax  does  not,  according 
to  these  authorities,  create  the  compulsion  required  by  law.*^ 

§  247.  The  same  subject  continued. — As  an  instance  of  a  less 
rigorous  application  of  the  rule  may  be  cited  an  Iowa  case,  where  the 
owner  of  real  estate  paid  without  protest  the  first  instalment  of  an 
illegal  assessment.  His  right  to  recover  the  money  thus  paid  was 
affirmed  by  the  court  on  the  ground  that  no  protest  was  required 
by  the  ordinance.*^  And  in  the  same  state  money  paid  under  pro- 
test for  illegal  taxes  is  considered  as  paid  under  compulsion,  although 
no  active  steps  were  taken  to  enforce  the  payment  of  the  tax.*'*  In 
Mississippi  it  has  been  held  that  if  the  legislation  imposing  the  tax 
is  void,  and  if  the  tax  has  been  paid  to  the  officer  who  appeared  to 
be  authorized  to  collect  it,  the  money  can  be  recovered,  even  if  paid 

"Detroit  v.  Martin,  34  Mich.  170.  be  sustained.     Having  a  knowledge 

See  also,  to  the  same  effect,  Falls  v.  of  all  the  facts  it  is  held  that  he 

City  of  Cairo,  58  111.  403;  Lee  v.  Tern-  must  be  presumed  to  know  the  law, 

pleton,  13  Gray  (Mass.)  476;  Kansas  and  in  the  absence  of  any  fraud  or 

&c.  R.  Co.  v.  Commissioners  &c.,  16  better  knowledge  on  the  part  of  the 

Kan.   587.    In   Lamborn  v.   Commis-  officer  receiving  payment,  he  can  not 

sioners  &c.,  97  U.  S.  181,  the  rule  of  recover  back  money  paid  under  such 

the  text  is  upheld.  The  court  said: —  a  mistake." 

"If  the  legality  of  the  tax  is  merely  "  Union  Pacific  R.  Co.  v.  Commis- 

doubtful,  and  the  validity  of  the  sale  sioners  &c.,  98  U.  S.  541;  Morris  v. 

would  depend  upon  its  legality  ac-  Baltimore,    5    Gill    (Md.)    244;    and 

cording  to  the  law  of  Kansas,  the  cases  cited  in  preceding  section, 

party,   if   he   chooses   to   waive   the  *=*  Robinson  v.  Burlington,  50  Iowa 

other  remedies  given  him  by  law  to  240.     See   also,   Ruggles   v.    City   of 

test  the  validity    of   the   tax,   must  Fond  du  Lac,  53  Wis.  436;  s.  c.  10  N. 

take  his  risk  either  voluntarily  to  W.  565. 

pay  the  tax  and  thus  avoid  the  ques-  ^  Thomas  v.   City   of  Burlington, 

tion,  or  to  let  his  land  be  sold  at  the  69  Iowa  140;  s.  c.  28  N.  W.  480. 
hazard  of  losing  it  if  the  tax  should 


§    248  PUBLIC    CORrORATIONS,  248 

without  protest.*^  The  Kentucky  rule  seems  to  hold  that  money 
paid  under  mistake  of  law,  as  well  as  of  fact,  can  be  recovered.**' 

§  248.    The  doctrine  of  the  federal  supreme  court  considered. — To 

the  mind  of  the  writer,  the  rule  laid  down  in  the  Union  Pacific 
Eailroad  case*'  seems  unnecessarily  harsh.  With  all  deference  to 
the  great  ability  of  that  court,  and  especially  to  the  clear  and  forcible 
intelligence  of  the  justice  who  delivered  the  opinion  in  the  case  under 
consideration,  it  would  seem  that  all  the  useful  objects  of  the  rule 
which  prescribes  that  the  compulsory  payment  of  illegal  taxes  is  an 
essential  requisite  to  the  maintaining  an  action  to  recover  the  money 
so  paid  would  be  attained  by  a  less  rigorous  construction  of  that 
rule.  It  is  difficult  to  perceive  why  it  should  be  necessary  for  the 
taxpayer  to  wait  supinely  until  active  steps  are  taken  to  collect  the 
tax  before  attempting  to  save  his  rights  by  paying  under  protest  the 
sum  demanded,  and  then  testing  in  the  courts  the  validity  of  the 
legislation  purporting  to  impose  the  tax.  Nor,  in  the  opinion  of  the 
writer,  does  the  decision  of  Chief  Justice  Shaw  in  Preston  v.  City  of 
Boston,*®  warrant  the  conclusion  drawn  therefrom  by  Chief  Justice 
Waite.  In  the  Massachusetts  case  it  was  said:  "Where  a  party  not 
liable  to  taxation  is  called  upon  peremptorily  to  pay  upon  such  a 
warrant,  and  he  can  save  himself  and  his  property  in  no  other  way 
than  by  paying  the  illegal  demand,  he  may  give  notice  that  he  so 
pays  it  by  duress  and  not  voluntarily,  and  by  showing  that  he  is  not 
liable,  recover  it  back  as  money  had  and  received."  Says  Chief 
Justice  Waite,  after  quoting  this  passage:  "This,  we  think,  is  the 
true  rule,  b,ut  it  falls  far  short  of  what  is  required  in  tliis  case." 
In  the  Union  Pacific  Eailroad  case,  a  warrant  had  been  issued  to  the 
treasurer  of  the  county,  in  the  nature  of  an  execution  running  against 
the  property  of  the  parties  charged  with  taxes.  By  virtue  of  this 
warrant  the  treasurer  was  authorized  to  seize  and  sell  the  goods 
of  the  company  to  satisfy  the  tax.  It  is  to  be  noted  also  that  the 
railroad  company  had  had  no  opportunity  of  testing  in  court  the 
validity  of  the  tax  act.     Under  these  conditions  the  company  paid 

*^  Tuttle  v.  Everett,  51  Miss.  27.  taxpayer  in  an  action  in  assumpsit 

^^  Louisville   v.    Henning,    1    Bush  on  the  implied  contract:  Ijamborn  v. 

(Ky.)    381.     This  broad  proposition  Commissioners    &c.,    97    U.    S.    181; 

is,  however,  clearly  opposed  to  the  Benson  v.  Monroe,  7  Cush.   (Mass.) 

great    weight    of    authority    in    the  125;  Bucknall  v.  Story,  46  Cal.  589; 

federal  and  state  courts,  which  eon-  Clarke  v.  Butcher,  9  Cow.    (N.  Y.) 

clusively    establish    the    rule    that  674. 

money,  if  paid  under  mistake  of  fact  "  Union  Pacific  R.  Co.  v.  Commis- 

may  be  recovered,  but  if  paid  with-  sioners  &c.,  98  U.  S.  541. 

out  compulsion  under  mere  mistake  *^  12  Pick.  (Mass.)  7,  14. 

of  law  can  not  be  recovered  by  the 


249  THE    l.IABILITY    OF    THE    COKPORATIOX.  §    249 

the  amount  of  the  taxes  to  the  treasurer  under  a  general  protest, 
and  with  notice  that  suit  would  be  commenced  to  recover  back  the 
full  amount  that  was  paid.  The  company  certainly  seems  to  have 
done  everything  that  prudence  and  respect  for  the  laws  could  have 
dictated,  unless  it  was  necessary  for  it  to  wait  until  the  treasurer 
had  actually  seized  its  property.  There  can  be  no  reason  why  its 
inaction  should  have  been  carried  to  that  point.  To  allow  its  prop- 
erty to  be  so  seized  would  have  caused  great  inconvenience  to  the 
company  and  to  the  public,  and  it  can  not  be  the  policy  of  the  law 
to  require  such  useless  and  detrimental  delay  on  its  part. 

§  249.  The  same  subject  continued. — Moreover,  the  action  of  the 
company  seems  to  have  brought  it  within  the  letter  and  the  spirit 
of  the  rule  as  laid  down  by  Chief  Justice  Shaw,  of  Massachusetts. 
The  issuing  of  the  warrant,  it  may  fairly  be  said,  placed  the  railroad 
company  in  such  a  position  that  it  could  save  itself  and  its  property 
in  no  other  way  than  by  paying  the  illegal  demand.  By  its  protest 
it  gave  notice  that  it  so  paid  the  demand  by  duress  and  not  volunta- 
rily, and  by  showing  tliat  it  was  not  liable  it  was  entitled  to  recover 
the  amount  paid  by  it  as  money  had  and  received.  These  considera- 
tions are  strengthened  by  the  fact  that  "there  is  a  strong  tendency 
in  the  later  cases,  both  English  and  American,  to  give  relief  where 
justice  requires  it,  against  a  common  mistake  of  law,  although  there 
may  be  no  element  of  actual  fraud."*^  This  tendency  is  in  the  direc- 
tion of  modifying  the  hidebound  rules  of  the  common  law  and  adapt- 
ing them  to  the  natural  and  equitable  principles  of  justice  dictated 
by  reason.  It  is  believed  by  the  writer  that  the  rigorous  application 
in  the  Union  Pacific  Eailroad  case  of  a  rule  the  general  wisdom  of 
which  is  undoubted  defeats  the  very  objects  of  that  rule,  and,  by 
requiring  of  taxpayers  an  unreasonable  and  useless  delay,  stimtilates 
them  to  evade  the  operation  of  the  statutes,  which  the  rule  is  intended 
to  support. 

§  250.    Contracts  within  the  scope  of  powers  of  officer  or  agent. — 

As  has  already  been  indicated,  the  contract  must  not  only  be  within 

*°  Dillon   Munic.   Corp.,   §   945,   n.,  of  the  general  law  of  the  land  and 

ad   finem;    citing   1   Spence   Equity  one  relating  to  a  matter  of  private 

632,   633;    Bispham  Equity,   §§   185-  right,  the  latter  being  considered  as 

188;    Story    Equity    Juris.,    §    212a,  a    matter    of    fact    rather    than    of 

written  by  Judge  Redfield;    Cooper  law);  Stone  v.  Godfrey,  5  De  G.,  M. 

v.  Phibbs,  L.  R.  2  H.  L.  149;  s.  c.  17  &  G.  76;  In  re  Saxon  Life  Assurance 

Irish  Ch.  R.  73,  79  (noting  luminous  Soc,  2  J.  &  H.  408;  In  re  Condon,  L. 

judgment  of  Lord  Westbury   draw-  R.  9  Ch.  App.  609. 
ing  a  distinction  between  a  mistake 


§    2^51  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  250 

the  scope  of  the  powers  of  the  corporation,  but  it  must  be  within 
the  scope  of  the  powers  of  the  officer  or  agent  by  whom  the  contract 
is  made  on  behalf  of  the  corporation.  In  other  words,  the  contract, 
in  order  to  be  valid,  must  not  only  be  a  contract  which  the  corporation 
is  authorized  expressly  or  impliedly  by  its  charter  or  by  other  legisla- 
tion to  make,  but  the  officer  or  agent  who  makes  the  contract  for  the 
corporation  must  be  properly  authorized  to  make  the  contract.  The 
rule  that  the  doctrine  of  ultra  vires  is  more  stringently  applied  in 
the  case  of  strictly  public  than  in  private  corporations  finds  its  ap- 
plication in  this  class  of  contracts  as  well  as  in  those  contracts  when 
the  question  arises  whether  the  contract  is  ultra  vires  the  corporation. 
We  have  seen  that  the  rule  is  in  force  in  the  case  of  contracts  which 
are  without  the  scope  of  the  powers  of  the  corporation  itself.^"  In 
conformity  to  the  principle  underlying  the  rule,  the  actual  powers  of 
public  officers  or  agents  are  more  closely  scrutinized  than  are  the 
powers  of  agents  of  private  corporations ;  and  acts  within  the  apparent 
scope  of  the  powers  of  public  agents,  but  actually  without  those 
powers,  are  frequently  held  invalid,  when  in  the  case  of  the  agents 
of  a  private  corporation  the  contrary  view  would  be  held  by  the 
courts.  In  general  it  may  be  said  that  the  contract  of  a  public  officer 
or  agent,  if  beyond  the  actual  scope  of  his  powers,  will  not  bind  the 
corporation  unless  the  officer  is  authorized  by  the  corporation  to  rep- 
resent himself  as  duly  empowered  to  make  the  contract.  ^^  The  city 
is  liable  for  acts  of  officers  who  are  engaged  within  the  scope  of  their 
duties,  and  the  fact  that  the  public  may  be  benefited  does  not  make 
it  a  public  function.^^  Officers  who  derive  their  authority  from  the 
city  charter,  while  acting  within  the  scope  of  their  authority,  render 
the  city  liable  for  their  acts.^^ 

§  251.    The  same  subject  continued — Clark  v.  Des  Moines. — An 

excellent  illustration  of  the  rule  is  found  in  an  Iowa  case,^^^  where 
action  was  brought  upon  warrants  or  orders  of  the  city  of  Des  Moines 
by  an  innocent  assignee  of  those  warrants  or  orders.  It  appeared 
that  the  charter  granted  no  express  or  implied  power  to  the  officers 
who  undertook  to  execute  the  warrants  to  issue  negotiable  paper  in 

^°  See  ante,  §  229  et  seq.  48  Md.  272.     See  also,  cases  cited  in 

"  Clark  v.  City  of  Des  Moines,  19  succeeding  section. 

Iowa  199;  s.  c.87Am.D.423,andcases  '=  Missano  v.  Mayor  &c.,  160  N.  Y. 

there  cited;   Siitro  v.  Pettit,  74  Cal.  123;  s.  c.  54  N.  E.  744. 

332;  s.  c.  16  Pac.  7;  5  Am.  St.  442;  ^^  Piatt  v.   City  of  Waterbury,  72 

Newbery  v.  Fox,  37  Minn.  141;  s.  c.  Conn.  531;  s.  c.  45  Atl.  154. 

33  N.  W.  333;  5  Am.  St.  830;  Louis-  "^a  Clark  v.  City  of  Des  Moines,  19 

ville  &c.  R.  Co.  V.  Louisville,  8  Bush  Iowa  199;  s.  c.  87  Am.  D.  423. 

(Ky.)   415;   Mayor  &c.  v.  Musgrave, 


251  THE    LIABILITY   OF    THE    CORPORATION.  §    251 

the  name  and  on  behalf  of  the  corporation.  It  was  held  that  these 
warrants  were  negotiable  paper,  but  that  they  were  void  ab  initio 
from  the  want  of  power  on  the  part  of  the  officers  to  issue  the  paper; 
that  the  bona  fide  holders  of  the  warrants  were  bound  at  their  peril 
to  ascertain  the  nature  and  extent  of  the  powers  of  the  officer  and  of 
the  city;  and  that  the  fact  that  these  warrants  were  in  the  hands  of 
innocent  bona  fide  holders  for  value  could  not  validate  them.  An 
opinion  is  delivered  by  Judge  Dillon,  who  lays  down  the  fundamental 
principles  with  his  usual  perspicuity  and  force:  "The  general  prin- 
ciple of  law  is  well  known  and  definitely  settled  that  the  agents, 
officers,  or  even  city  council,  of  a  municipal  corporation  can  not  bind 
the  corporation  when  they  transcend  their  lawful  and  legitimate 
powers.  This  doctrine  rests  upon  this  reasonable  ground:  The 
body  corporate  is  constituted  of  all  the  inhabitants  within  the  cor- 
porate limits.  The  inhabitants  are  the  corporators.  The  officers 
of  the  corporation,  including  the  legislative  or  governing  body,  are 
merely  the  public  agents  of  the  corporators.  Their  duties  and  powers 
are  prescribed  by  statute.  Every  one,  therefore,  may  know  the  na- 
ture of  these  duties  and  the  extent  of  these  powers.  These  consider- 
ations, as  well  as  the  dangerous  nature  of  the  opposite  doctrine,  dem- 
onstrate the  reasonableness  and  necessity  of  the  rule  that  the  cor- 
poration is  bound  only  when  its  agents,  by  whom  from  the  very 
necessities  of  its  being  it  must  act,  if  it  acts  at  all,  keep  within  the 
limits  of  their  authority.  Not  only  so,  but  such  a  corporation  may 
successfully  interpose  the  plea  of  ultra  vires;  that  is,  set  up  as  a  de- 
fense its  own  want  of  power  under  its  charter  or  constituent  statute 
to  enter  into  a  given  contract  or  to  do  a  given  act  in  violation  or  ex- 
cess of  its  corporate  power  and  authority."^* 

■^  See  also,  Hodges  v.  City  of  Bui-  Cush.  (Mass.)  103;  Stetson  v.  Kemp- 

falo,  2  Denio  (N.  Y.)   110;  Halstead  ton,  13  Mass.  272;  s.  c.  7  Am.  D.  145; 

v.   Mayor,   3   N.   Y.   430;    Martin   v.  Parsons  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  11  Pick. 

Mayor,  1  Hill  (N.  Y.)  545;  Boom  v.  (Mass.)    396;   Hood  v.  Mayor  &c.,  1 

City  of  Utica,  2  Barb.   (N.  Y.)   104;  Allen     (Mass.)     103;     Spaulding    v. 

Cornell  v.  Town  of  Guilford,  1  Denio  City  of  Lowell,  23  Pick.  (Mass.)  71; 

(N.  Y.)   510;   Boyland  v.  Mayor  &c.,  Mitchell    v.    City    of    Rockland,    45 

1  Sandf.  (N.  Y.)  27.     It  is  observed  Maine  496;  s.  c.  66  Am.  D.  252;  An- 

by  the  distinguished  judge  that  the  thony    v.    Inhabitants    &c.,    1    Met. 

cases  asserting  these  principles  are  (Mass.)     284;     Western    College    v. 

numerous    and    uniform,    and    that  City  of  Cleveland,  12  Ohio  St.  375; 

some   of   the   more   important  ones  Board   &c.   v.   Cox,   6   Ind.   403;    In- 

need   only   be   cited;    Mayor   &c.   v.  habitants  &c.  v.   Weir,  9   Ind.   224; 

Cunliff,  2  N.  Y.  165;  Cuyler  v.  Trus-  Smead  v.  Indianapolis  &c.  R.  Co.  11 

tees  &c..  12  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  165;  Dill  Ind.  104;   Brady  v.  Mayor,  20  N.  Y. 

V.   Inhabitants  &c.,   7   Met.    (Mass.)  312;  Appleby  v.  Mayor,  15  How.  Pr. 

438;   Vincent  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  12  (N.  Y.)   428;   Estep  v.  Keokuk  Co., 


352 


rUBLlU    COIM'OKATIONS. 


353 


§  252.    All  persons  contracting  with  strictly  public  corporations 
charged  with  knowledge  of  scope  of  powers  of  officer  or  agent. — 

Since  the  powers  of  public  officers  and  agents  arc  defined  either  by 
the  charter  or  other  constituent  act,  and  since  tliese  statutes  are  open 
to  public  inspection  and  "afford  to  every  person  the  certain  means 
of  ascertaining  the  authority  of  these  officers,"*'''^  "it  is  fundamental," 
says  Judge  Folger,  "that  those  seeking  to  deal  with  a  municipal  cor- 
poration, through  its  officials,  must  take  great  care  to  learn  the  nature 
and  extent  of  their  power  and  authority ."^^ 


18  Iowa  199,  and  cases  cited  by  Cole, 
J.;  Clark  v.  Polk  Co.,  19  Iowa  248. 

^^  Clark  V.  City  of  Des  Moines,  19 
Iowa  199;  s.  c.  87  Am.  D.  423. 

^^  McDonald  v.  Mayor  &c.,  68  N. 
Y.  23;  s.  c.  23  Am.  R.  144;  citing 
Hodges  V.  City  of  Buffalo,  2  Denio 
(N.  Y.)  110;  Cornell  v.  Town  of 
Guilford,  1  Denio  (N.  Y.)  510;  Sav- 
ings Bank  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  8  Al- 
len (Mass.)  109.  In  McDonald  v. 
Mayor  &c.,  supra,  the  plaintiff  sued 
for  the  value  of  materials  furnished 
the  city  of  New  York.  The  defense 
set  up  was  that  plaintiff  had  failed 
to  comply  with  statutory  regula- 
tions providing  that  the  necessity 
for  such  materials  should  be  certi- 
fied to  by  the  head  of  the  depart- 
ment of  public  works  and  the  ex- 
penditure therefor  authorized  by  the 
common  council;  and  further  pro- 
viding that  the  materials  should  be 
furnished  upon  sealed  bids  or  pro- 
posals made  in  compliance  with  pub- 
lic notice  advertised.  The  defense 
was  supported  by  the  court  under 
the  circumstances  of  the  case. 
Judge  Folger's  opinion  is  valuable: 
— "It  is  plain,"  says  he,  "that  if  the 
restrictions  put  upon  municipalities 
by  the  legislature  for  the  purpose 
of  reducing  and  limiting  the  incur- 
ring of  debt  and  the  expenditure  of 
the  public  money  may  be  removed 
upon  the  doctrine  now  contended 
for  (that  is,  that  the  defendant, 
having  appropriated  the  materials 
of  the  plaintiff  and  used  them,  is 
bound  to  deal  justly  and  pay  him 


the  value  of  them),  there  is  no  leg- 
islative remedy  for  the  evils  of  mu- 
nicipal government  which  of  late 
have  excited  so  much  attention  and 
painful  foreboding.  Restrictions 
and  inhibitions  by  statute  are  prac- 
tically of  no  avail  if  they  can  be 
brought  to  naught  by  the  unauthor- 
ized action  of  every  official  of  low- 
est degree,  acquiesced  in  or  not  re- 
pudiated by  his  superiors.  Dono- 
van V.  Mayor  &c.,  33  N.  Y.  291, 
seems  to  be  an  authority  in  point, 
though  the  exact  question  now 
presented  was  not  considered.  And 
incidental  remarks  of  Denio,  J.,  in 
Peterson  v.  Mayor  &c.,  17  N.  Y.  449, 
are  to  the  same  import.  And  see 
Peck  V.  Burr,  10  N.  Y.  294.  The 
views  here  set  forth  are  not  to  be 
extended  beyond  the  facts  of  the 
case.  It  may  be  that  where  a  mu- 
nicipality has  come  into  the  posses- 
sion of  the  money  or  the  property  of 
a  person  without  his  voluntary  in- 
tentional action  concurring  therein, 
the  law  will  fix  a  liability  and  im- 
ply a  promise  to  repay  or  return  it. 
Thus  money  paid  by  mistake,  mon- 
ey collected  for  an  illegal  tax  or  as- 
sessment, property  taken  and  used 
by  an  official  as  that  of  the  city 
when  not  so — in  such  cases  it  may 
be  that  the  statute  will  not  act  as 
an  inhibition.  The  statute  may  not 
be  carried  further  than  its  inten- 
tion, certainly  not  further  than  its 
letter.  Its  purpose  is  to  forbid  and 
prevent  the  making  of  contracts  by 
unauthorized  official  agents  for  sup- 


253 


TTiK  LiABiiJTV  oi'^    riii-:  roui'oi; A  rio>^. 


253 


§  253.  The  same  subject  continued. — 'i'lie  rule  of  the  preceding 
section  i.<  conceded  learning  in  its  general  sense.  There  is,  however, 
difficulty  in  its  application  to  individual  cases.  This  difficulty  lies 
in  deciding  to  what  extent  the  rule  is  modified  by  the  doctrine  of 
estoppel,  of  implied  contracts,  and  of  ratification.  It  may  be  safely 
stated,  however,  that  when  the  authority  of  the  agent  is  statutory, 
and  therefore  a  matter  of  record,  the  rule  is  strictly  applied.^^  Now 
in  general  the  intention  of  the  legislature  in  imposing  the  statutory 
restrictions  on  the  power  of  the  public  officer  must  be  considered, 
and  it  is  a  cardinal  question  whether  the  abrogation  of  the  restric- 
tions in  the  particular  case  under  consideration  wdll  defeat  the  general 
intention  of  the  legislation.  In  other  words,  in  the  opinion  of  the 
writer,  the  question  will  generally  be  best  determined  by  ascertain- 
ing whether  the  particular  case  at  bar  is  of  such  a  nature  that  a 
decision  in  favor  of  the  contracting  party  will  invalidate  the  precau- 
tions imposed  by  the  legislature.  If  so,  the  restriction  should  be 
enforced;  if,  on  the  other  hand,  the  case  is  such  that  a  decision  in 
favor  of  the  plaintiff  will  not  affect  the  general  policy  of  the  charter 
or  other  legislation  as  evidenced  by  the  restrictions  therein  defined. 


plies  for  the  use  of  the  corporation. 
This  opinion  goes  no  further  than 
to  hold  that  where  a  person  makes 
a  contract  with  the  city  of  New 
York  for  supplies  to  it  without  the 
requirements  of  the  charter  being 
observed,  he  may  not  recover  the 
value  thereof  upon  an  implied  li- 
ability." 

=' Clark  V.  City  of  Des  Moines,  19 
Iowa  199;  s.  c.  87  Am.  D.  423;  Dela- 
field  V.  Illinois,  2  Hill  (N.  Y.)  159, 
174;  Hodges  v.  City  of  Buffalo,  2 
Denio  (N.  Y.)  110;  Supervisors  v. 
Bates,  17  N.  Y.  242;  Overseers  &c.  v. 
Overseers  &c.,  15  N.  Y.  341;  Butter- 
field  V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  6  Allen 
(Mass.)  187;  Rossire  v.  City  of  Bos- 
ton, 4  Allen  (Mass.)  57;  Zabriskie 
V.  Cleveland  &c.  R.  Co.,  23  How. 
381;  Chemung  Bank  v.  Supervisors, 
5  Denio  (N.  Y.)  517;  Mayor  &c.  v. 
Eschbach,  18  Md.  276;  Mayor  &c.  v. 
Reynolds,  20  Md.  1;  Marsh  v.  Ful- 
ton Co.,  10  Wall.  676;  Hague  v.  City 
of  Philadelphia,  48  Pa.  St.  527;  Head 
v.  Providence  Ins.  Co.,  2  Cranch  127; 


White  V.  City  of  New  Orleans,  15 
La.  An.  667;  Dey  v.  Mayor  &c.,  19 
N.  J.  Eq.  412;  Butler  v.  City  of 
Charleston,  7  Gray  (Mass.)  12; 
Bladen  v.  Philadelphia,  60  Pa.  St. 
464;  Bonesteel  v.  Mayor  &c.,  22  N.  Y. 
162;  Mayor  &c.  v.  CunlifE,  2  N.  Y. 
165;  Halstead  v.  Mayor,  3  N.  Y.  430; 
Martin  v.  Mayor,  1  Hill  (N.  Y.)  545; 
Boom  V.  City  of  Utica,  2  Barb.  (N. 
Y.)  104;  Cornell  v.  Town  of  Guil- 
ford, 1  Denio  (N.  Y.)  510;  Appleby 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  15  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.) 
428;  McSpedon  v.  Mayor  &c.,  7 
Bosw.  (N.  Y.)  601;  Donovan  v. 
Mayor  &c.,  33  N.  Y.  291;  Smith  v. 
Mayor  &c.,  10  N.  Y.  504;  Miners' 
Ditch  Co.  V.  Zellerbach,  37  Cal.  543; 
Trustees  &c.  v.  Hohn,  82  Ky.  1.  See 
also,  cases  cited  in  preceding  sec- 
tions. For  many  of  the  authorities 
cited  in  this  note  the  writer  is  in- 
debted to  the  exhaustive  brief  of  D. 
J.  Dean,  Esq.,  assistant  counsel  to 
the  corporation  of  the  city  of  New 
York,  in  McDonald  v.  Mayor  &c.,  68 
N.  Y.  23;  s.  c.  23  Am.  R.  144. 


254 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS. 


254 


and  will  also  satisfy  the  nat...al  laws  of  justice  and  equity,  then  the 
corporation  may  be  safely  held  liable.'^*' 

§  254.  Liability  of  corporation  for  act  of  its  officers  or  agents  in 
violation  of  law. — A  contract  made  by  the  officers  or  agents  of  a  pub- 
lic corporation  in  contravention  of  express  law  is,  of  course,  void, 
and  the  corporation  can  not  be  held  liable  therefor.^''  Thus,  where 
a  contract  was  made  by  individual  members  of  the  common  council 
of  a  municipal  corporation  in  a  manner  not  authorized  by  its  charter, 
in  disregard  of  the  forms  therein  directed  to  be  observed  in  the  mak- 

^This  rule  is  not,  so  far  as  the     Code,  Const.  4,  liber  2,  tit.  54;  Ibid., 


writer  has  ascertained,  definitely 
laid  down  in  the  cases.  It  is,  how- 
ever, shadowed  forth  in  many  of  the 
opinions,  and  it  is  believed  that  the 
best-considered  decisions  fall  within 
its  scope. 

™  Fox  v.  City  of  New  Orleans,  12 
I.a.  An.  154,  where  the  action  was 
brought  upon  an  alleged  contract 
between  the  plaintiff  and  defendant. 
This  contract  was  for  filling  in  cer- 
tain city  lots.  The  statute  provid- 
ing that  all  contracts  for  public  or 
other  work  ordered  by  the  munici- 
pality should  be  let  out  to  the  low- 
est bidder  at  auction  was  disre- 
garded, and  the  court  held  that  the 
contract  was  void,  saying: — "No 
action  can  be  maintained  upon  a 
contract  made  in  violation  of  law. 
If  by  overriding  this  statute  munici- 
pal officers  could  saddle  the  city 
with  the  expenses  of  the  contracts 
they  choose  to  make  in  defiance  of 
its  mandates,  the  taxpayers  would 
become  an  easy  prey  to  the  jobbing 
contracts  which  it  was  the  com- 
mendable object  of  the  statute  to  de- 
feat;" citing  Fox  v.  Sloo,  10  La. 
An.  11.  See  also,  Seibrecht  v.  City 
of  New  Orleans,  12  La.  An.  496, 
where  it  is  said  in  the  vernacular  of 
the  civil  law: — "Corporations  pos- 
sess only  jura  minorum.  They 
have  not  the  power  of  contracting 
on  all  subjects  like  persons  of  full 
age  and  sui  juris.  Respublica  mi- 
norum jure  solet,  ideo  que  auxilium, 
restitutionis        implorare        potest. 


Const.  3,  liber  11,  tit.  29;  Ibid., 
Const.  4,  liber  11,  tit.  31."  "A  con- 
tract made  by  a  corporation  which 
is  expressly  prohibited  by  statute  is 
so  far  void  that  the  corporation 
can  not  maintain  an  action  upon  a 
contract  even  though  the  statute 
does  not  in  terms  declare  that  such 
a  contract  shall  be  void,  but  merely 
prescribes  a  penalty  for  making  it. 
Whenever  the  legislature  prohibits 
an  act,  or  declares  that  it  shall  be 
unlawful  to  perform  it,  every  rule 
of  interpretation  must  say  that  the 
legislature  intended  to  interpose  its 
power  to  prevent  the  act,  and  as  one 
of  the  means  of  its  prevention  that 
the  courts  shall  hold  it  void.  This 
is  as  manifest  as  if  the  statute  had 
declared  that  it  should  be  void. 
That  the  legislature  imposes  by  a 
subsequent  section  of  the  act  a  pen- 
alty for  the  violation  of  the  law 
does  not  in  the  remotest  degree  le- 
galize or  give  validity  to  the  con- 
tract. It  but  shows  that  the  general 
assembly  intended  to  adopt  such 
measures  as  should  compel  the  ob- 
servance of  the  law:"  Cincinnati  &c. 
Assurance  Co.  v.  Rosenthal,  55  111. 
85.  See  also,  to  the  same  effect: 
Morgan  v.  Menzies,  60  Cal.  341; 
Zottman  v.  City  of  San  Francisco, 
20  Cal.  96;  City  of  Indianapolis  v. 
Indianapolis  Gas  &c.  Co.,  66  Ind. 
396;  Mayor  &c.  v.  Bowman,  39  Miss. 
671;  McDonald  v.  Mayor  &c.,  68  N. 
Y.  23;  s.  c.  23  Am.  R.  144;  Thomas 
V.  City  of  Richmond,  12  Wall.  349. 


255  THE    LIABILITY    OF    THE    CORrORATION.  §    255 

ing  of  its  contracts,  it  was  decided  that  such  a  contract  was  not  the 
ground  of  any  claim  against  the  corporation;  and  where  the  charter 
required  the  contract  to  1x3  made  by  the  common  council,  a  contract 
made  by  a  special  committee  of  that  body  was  adjudged  to  be  prima- 
rily invalid,  and  it  was  further  decided  that  no  subsequent  action 
of  the  common  council  could  confer  validity  upon  it.^" 

§  255.  The  same  subject  continued. — The  doctrine  of  the  preced- 
ing section  is  so  clearly  and  positively  established  that  attempts 
have  been  made  by  the  courts  so  to  extend  it  as  to  validate  contracts 
which,  although  beyond  the  scope  of  the  powers  of  a  public  corpora- 
tion, are  yet  not  positively  prohibited  by  its  charter  or  other  legisla- 
tion. ■  Thus,  in  a  Missouri  case  already  mentioned,  a  contract  was 
made  by  the  city  of  St.  Louis  for  the  services  of  prisoners  in  its 
workhouse  to  a  private  person.  The  charter  of  the  city  provided 
that  all  persons  in  the  city  workhouse  should  "work  for  the  city 
at  such  labor  as  his  or  her  strength  will  permit,  within  or  without 
said  workhouse,  or  other  place,  not  exceeding  ten  hours  each  work- 
ing day,  and  for  such  work  the  person  so  employed  shall  be  allowed, 
exclusive  of  his  or  her  board,  fifty  cents  per  day  for  each  day's  work" 
on  account  of  the  fine  and  costs  imposed  upon  the  prisoner.  This 
statutory  provision  clearly  did  not  allow,  even  if  it  did  not  prohibit, 
the  hiring  out  of  the  workhouse  prisoners  to  private  persons.  The 
court  held,  however,  that  the  contract,  though  ultra  vires,  was  not 
absolutely  void,  and  that  the  city  could  recover  upon  a  bond  given  by 
a  contractor  to  the  city  to  secure  the  performance  of  a  contract  upon 
his  part,  saying  in  the  opinion :  "It  will  be  observed  that  the  charter 
of  the  city,  while  it  does  not  permit,  yet  does  not  prohibit,  the  making 
of  such  a  contract  as  the  one  before  us ;  so  that  although  the  contract 
is  ultra  vires  the  corporation,  yet  it  is  not  illegal  because  not  pro- 
hibited by  the  charter.  This  is  a  distinction  clearly  marked  out  by 
the  authorities.""^ 

§  256.  Effect  of  representation  of  officer  or  agent  as  to  author- 
ity.— The  general  rule  is  well  settled  that  since  parties  dealing  with 
municipal  corporations  are  charged  with  knowledge  of  the  extent 
of  the  powers  of  the  officers  and  agents  of  these  corporations, 
therefore  a  contract  beyond  the  scope  of  the  powers  of  the 
officer  or  agent  is  not  to  be  enforced  against  the  principal  corpora- 
tion.*'^    But  to  this  rule  there  are  exceptions  due  to  the  application 

""Zottman   v.   City   of   San   Fran-  102  Mo.  149;   s.  c.  14  S.  W.  825;   22 

Cisco,   20   Cal.   96;    City  of  Leaven-  Am.  St.  764. 

worth  v.  Rankin,  2  Kan.  357.  "=  See  ante,  §§  252,  253,  and  cases 

"  City  of   St.   Louis  v.   Davidson,  there    cited.      In    United    States    v. 


§    257  PUBLIC    CORI'OKATIONS.  256 

of  the  rules  of  estoppel.  Thus,  where  the  public  officer  or  agent  is 
charged  with  the  sole  duty  of  ascertaining  whether  a  condition  pre- 
cedent to  the  issuing  of  municipal  bonds  has  been  performed,  the 
recital  in  the  bond  that  such  condition  precedent  has  been  performed 
will  estop  the  corporation  from  setting  uj)  the  defense  of  non-perform- 
ance of  the  condition  precedent  against  an  innocent  purchaser  for 
value  of  the  bonds.^^ 

§  257.  The  same  subject  continued. — The  decisions  on  the  rule 
stated  in  the  last  sentence  arise  chiefly  in  deciding  the  validity  of 
municipal  or  public  bonds,  and  will  be  fully  discussed  in  a  subsequent 
chapter.®*  For  the  present  it  is  sufficient  to  quote  the  rule  as  laid 
down  in  the  supreme  court  of  the  United  States :  "When  legislative 
authority  has  been  given  to  a  municipality  or  to  its  officers  to  sub- 
scribe for  the  stock  of  a  railroad  company  and  to  issue  municipal 
bonds  in  payment,  but  only  on  some  precedent  condition,  such  as  a 
popular  vote  favoring  the  subscription,  and  where  it  may  be  gathered 
from  the  legislative  enactment  that  the  officers  of  the  municipality 
were  invested  with  power  to  decide  whether  the  condition  precedent 
has  been  complied  with,  their  recital  that  it  has  been,  made  in  the 
bonds  issued  by  them  and  held  by  a  bona  fide  purchaser,  is  conclusive 

City  Bank  of  Columbus,  21  How.  and  that  consequently  the  plaintiff 
356,  the  cashier  of  the  defendant  could  not  recover.  "We  think  the 
corporation  wrote  a  letter  stating  safe  rule,"  said  Mr.  Justice  Wayne, 
that  the  bearer  was  authorized  to  "in  all  instances  of  acts  done  by  the 
contract  on  behalf  of  the  bank  for  officers  of  corporate  companies  or  by 
the  transfer  of  money  from  the  east  those  who  have  the  management  of 
to  the  south  or  the  west  for  the  their  business  from  which  contracts 
federal  government.  Acting  upon  are  alleged  to  have  been  made,  is  to 
this  letter  the  then  secretary  of  the  test  that  fact  by  an  inquiry  into  the 
treasury,  Hon.  Thomas  Corwin,  de-  corporate  ability  that  has  been  giv- 
livered  to  the  bearer  a  draft  to  be  en  them  and  to  their  subordinate 
transferred  to  New  Orleans  for  officers  or  which  the  directors  of  the 
$100,000,  which  the  bearer  cashed,  company  can  confer  upon  the  latter 
but  the  proceeds  of  which  he  did  not  to  act  for  them." 
transfer  or  account  for.  The  United  "^  Oregon  v.  Jennings,  119  U.  S. 
States  brought  action  against  the  74;  s.  c.  7  S.  Ct.  124;  Anderson  Coun- 
City  Bank  of  Columbus  to  recover  ty  Com'rs  v.  Beal,  113  U.  S.  227;  s. 
the  sum  advanced  as  aforesaid  upon  c.  5  S.  Ct.  433;  Northern  Bank  &c. 
the  authorization  of  the  cashier  of  v.  Porter  Tp.  Trustees,  110  U.  S. 
the  bank.  It  was  held  that  the  608;  s.  c.  4  S.  Ct.  254;  Town  of  Colo- 
act  was  entirely  beyond  the  scope  of  ma  v.  Eaves,  92  U.  S.  484. 
the  power  of  the  cashier;  that  his  '"See  the  chapter  on  Bonds  and 
representation  concerning  the  power  Coupons, 
of  the  bearer  did  not  bind  the  bank, 


257 


THE    LIABILITY    OF   THE    CORPORATION. 


§  258 


of  the  fact  and  binding  upon  the  municipality,  for  the  recital  is  itself 
a  decision  of  the  fact  by  the  appointed  tribiinal."®^ 

§  258.  Ratification  of  contracts. — A  most  important  distinction 
exists  between  tlie  two  classes  of  ultra  vires  contracts  of  public  corpora- 
tions that  we  have  just  considered.  The  distinction  is  in  respect  of 
the  power  of  the  corporation  to  ratify  by  subsequent  acquiescence, 
active  or  passive,  the  unauthorized  contract.  If  the  contract  be 
wholly  beyond  the  scope  of  the  powers  of  the  corporation  it  is  void 
ab  initio,  and  no  subsequent  acquiescence  can  validate  it.^**  Like 
a  still-born  child,  it  lacks  any  element  of  life  that  may  be  fostered 
into  active  force.  This  strict  rule  is  based  on  the  general  principles 
which  determine  the  validity  or  invalidity  of  ultra  vires  municipal 
contracts.  Eatification  is  a  species  of  estoppel,  and  as  the  contracts 
we  are  considering  are  absolutely  void,  no  principles  of  estoppel  will 
be  allowed  to  control. 

§  259.  The  same  subject  continued. — If,  on  the  other  hand,  the 
contract  itself  be  within  the  scope  of  the  powers  of  the  corporation, 
but  be  unauthorized  only  because  the  officer  or  agent,  while  not  for- 
bidden by  the  law  to  make  the  contract,  was  not  properly  authorized 
to  do  so,  in  that  case  the  contract  may  be  ratified  and  validated  by 
subsequent  assent  of  the  corporation.'''^    Thus,  in  a  Kansas  case,  one 


^  Town  of  Coloma  v.  Eaves,  92  U. 
S.  484.  In  the  opinion  in  that  case, 
Mr.  Justice  Strong  refers  to  the 
statement  by  Judge  Dillon  of  this 
rule  in  his  work  on  Municipal  Cor- 
porations (1  Dillon  Munic.  Corp.. 
§  523),  and  gives  the  rule  in  the 
words  quoted  in  the  text  as  a  re- 
statement of  Judge  Dillon's  proposi- 
tion. 

^  Lewis  v.  City  of  Shreveport,  108 
U.  S.  282;   s.  c.  2  S.  Ct.  634;    Smith 
V.  City  of  Newburgh.  77  N.  Y.  130 
McDonald  v.  Mayor  &c.,  68  N.  Y.  23 
Brady  v.  Mayor  &c.,  20  N.  Y.   312 
Marsh  v.  Fulton  Co.,  10  Wall.  676 
City  of  Shawneetown  v.  Baker,  85 
111.    563;    Hague    v.    City    of    Phila- 
delphia, 48  Pa.  St.  527;    Parsons  v. 
Inhabitants     &c.,     70     Maine     262; 
Bank  v.  Town  of  Statesville,  84  N. 
C.  169.     See  ante,   §§  227,  228,  and 
cases  cited.    An  examination  of  the 

1  Smith — 17 


cases  will  show  that  the  rule  of  the 
text  applies  both  to  cases  where 
the  act  is  from  its  nature  entirely 
beyond  the  charter  powers,  express 
or  implied,  of  the  corporation,  and 
also  to  cases  where  the  officer  or 
agent  acted  wholly  beyond  his  stat- 
utory authority  in  making  the  con- 
tract, so  that  the  act  of  the  officer 
or  agent  is  virtually  in  contraven- 
tion of  the  law. 

"Bank  &c.  v.  Patterson,  7  Cranch 
299;  Supervisors  &c.  v.  Schenck,  5 
Wall.  772;  Moore  v.  City  of  Albany, 
92  N.  Y.  396;  Albany  &c.  Bank 
V.  City  of  Albany,  92  N.  Y. 
363;  Brady  v.  Mayor  &c.,  20 
N.  Y.  312;  Backman  v.  Charlestown, 
42  N.  H.  125;  City  of  Shawneetown 
v.  Baker,  85  111.  563;  Brown  v.  Win- 
terport,  79  Maine  305;  s.  c.  9  Atl. 
844;  People  v.  Common  Council  &c., 
28  Mich.  228;  Dubuque  Female  Col- 


§    260  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  358 

member  of  a  school  board  made  a  contract  for  the  building  of  a  school- 
house.  This  contract  was  a  perfectly  proper  one  in  its  nature,  but 
was  unauthorized  because  made  by  only  one  member  of  the  board. 
The  full  school  board  afterwards  accepted  the  contract,  which  was 
thereby  ratified  and  validated.*'^ 

§  260.  Ratification  by  authorized  officers  necessary. — It  is  obvious 
that  the  officer  or  officers  who  undertake  to  ratify  an  unauthorized 
contract  must  possess  an  authority  which  in  the  beginning  would 
have  enabled  them  properly  to  make  the  original  contract  in  behalf 
of  the  corporation.®''  In  a  leading  case  in  New  York  this  principle 
was  forcibly  enunciated.  By  a  statute  of  the  state  of  Illinois,  certain 
officers  or  agents  of  the  state  were  authorized  to  borrow  money  for 
public  use,  and  for  that  purpose  to  sell  its  bonds  or  public  stocks 
at  not  less  than  their  par  value.  These  officers  sold  the  bonds  at 
par,  to  be  paid  for  in  future  instalments  without  interest,  while  the 
bonds  drew  interest  from  the  time  of  sale.  This  was  held  to  be  a 
sale  below  par,  and  therefore  unauthorized  and  invalid.  It  was  con- 
tended by  the  bondholders  that  the  act  of  the  governor  in  signing  the 
bonds  with  knowledge  of  the  terms  of  sale  operated  as  a  ratification 
of  the  sale.  On  this  point  the  court  said:  "We  are  now  brought 
to  the  inquiry  whether  the  contracts  have  been  ratified  so  as  to  be 
obligatory  upon  the  state  of  Illinois.  I  felt  some  difficulty  on  the 
question  upon  the  argument,  but  after  reflecting  upon  it,  I  am  unable 
to  say  that  there  has  been  a  ratification.  The  appellant  relies  on 
the  fact  that  the  governor,  after  he  knew  of  the  first  contract,  signed 
the  bonds  and  caused  them  to  be  delivered,  and  that  some  of  the  other 
public  officers  of  the  state  acted  under  the  contracts,  drawing  for 
money  and  receiving  payments.  But  the  difficulty  is  that,  the  gov- 
ernor was  no  more  than  an  agent  for  the  state,  and  he  as  well  as  the 
commissioners  acted  under  a  limited  authority;  and  the  same  remark 
is  applicable  to  the  auditor  and  other  public  officers.     None  of  them 

lege  v.   District  Tp.,   13   Iowa   555;  ture  of  public  funds.     A  subsequent 

Lamm  v.  Port  Deposit  &c.  Assn.,  49  assent  by  the  proper  officials  to  such 

Md.  233;   Mills  v.  Gleason,  11  Wis.  expenditure  will,  in  the  absence  of 

470,  493;    Chouteau  v.  City  of  Rox-  express  statutory  prohibition,  ratify 

bury,  7  Gray  (Mass.)   374;   Sullivan  the  expenditure:  See  cases  cited,  su- 

v.  School  Dist.,  39  Kan.  347;  s.  c.  18  pra. 

Pac.   287;    People  v.   Swift,   31   Cal.  "^  Sullivan  v.  School  Dist.,  39  Kan. 

26;    Episcopal    Society    v.    Dedham  347;  s.  c.  18  Pac.  287. 

Episcopal  Church,   1   Pick.    (Mass.)  "» Delafield  v.   Illinois,  2   Hill    (N. 

372;  Topsham  v.  Rogers,  42  Vt.  189.  Y.)    159;    Marsh'  v.    Fulton    Co.,    10 

This    doctrine    frequently    finds    its  Wall.  676;   Hague  v.  City  of  Phila- 

application    in    cases    where    unau-  delphia,  48  Pa.  St.  527. 
thorized  officers  have  made  expendi- 


259  THE    LIABILITY    OP    THE    COHl'ORATION.  §    261 

had  authority  to  make  such  contracts  as  these  were;  and  if  they  could 
not  make  tliem  originally  tliey  could  not  ratify  them.  Katification 
must  come  from  the  principal — the  state  of  Illinois."''" 

§  261.  Manner  of  ratification. — When  a  certain  mode  of  execution 
of  a  contract  is  prescribed  by  statute,  the  act  of  ratification  of  an 
unauthorized  contract  must  comply  with  the  provisions  of  the  statute 
regulating  the  manner  of  entering  into  the  original  contract.''^  This 
rule  is,  however,  to  be  taken  with  the  modification  that  if  the  statu- 
tory method  of  procedure  be  regarded  as  merely  directory  and  not 
mandatory,  then  a  different  method  of  procedure  may  be  allowed  in 
the  act  of  ratification.^^  Thus,  where  the  council  of  the  corporation 
is  empowered  by  the  charter  to  make  certain  contracts  by  ordinance, 
and  the  contract  is  made  by  resolution,  the  subsequent  ratification 
must  be  by  ordinance.  The  mere  use  by  the  corporation  of  unauthor- 
ized improvements,  such  as  school  buildings,  does  not  amount  to  rati- 
fication, unless  the  circumstances  are  such  that  it  would  have  been 
natural  and  proper  to  have  refused  such  use,  or  unless  it  is  proven 
that  the  use  was  after  knowledge  of  the  unauthorized  character  of  the 
improvement.''^ 

§  262.    Manner  of  execution  of  contracts  by  officers  and  agents. — 

Nothing  is  more  certain,  under  the  modern  adjudications,  than  that 
the  methods  prescribed  by  charter  or  other  statute  must  be  observed 
by  the  corporation  in  entering  into  contracts,  if  these  statutory  pro- 
visions are  mandatory  and  intended  by  the  legislature  to  act  as  wise 
restrictions  upon  the  power  of  the  corporation  to  contract.  If,  then, 
there  are  mandatory  and  restrictive  enactments  requiring  the  corpo- 
ration to  contract  only  under  certain  formalities  and  conditions,  then 
contracts  made  by  the  officers  or  agents  of  the  corporation  which  are 
not  executed  according  to  those  statutory  requirements  do  not  bind  the 

'"  Delafield  v.  Illinois,  2  Hill  (N.  644.  It  has  been  held  in  some  cases 
Y.)  159,  175;  citing  People  v.  Phoe-  that  under  the  circumstances  men- 
nix  Bank,  24  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  431.  tioned  in  the  text,  the  subsequent 

"  McCracken  v.  City  of  San  Fran-  ratification  does  not  operate  to  vali- 

cisco,   16  Cal.  591;    Cross  v.  Mayor  date    the    original    contract,    even 

&c.,  18  N.  J.  Eq.  305;   Town  of  Du-  though  the  ratification  be  by  ordi- 

rango  v.  Pennington,  8  Colo.  257;  s.  nance:      See    Newman    v.    Emporia, 

c.  7  Pac.  14.  32   Kan.  456;    s.  c.  4   Pac.   815,  and 

■'^  Cory    v.    Somerset   Freeholders,  cases  cited. 

'44  N.  J.  L.  445;  Brown  v.  Mayor  &c.,  "Wilson  v.  School  Dist,  32  N.  H. 

63  N.  Y.  239;  People  v.  Swift,  31  Cal.  118;    Lane  v.  School  Dist,  10  Met. 

26;  Cross  v.  Mayor  &c.,  18  N.  J.  Eq.  (Mass.)   462;   Davis  v.  School  Dist, 

305;  New  Orleans  v.  Clark,  95  U.  S.  24  Maine  349. 


§  263 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS. 


260 


municipality.'^*  But  where  the  statutory  provisions  prescribing  the 
mode  of  executing  contracts  are  merely  directory  and  are  not  in- 
tended to  be  restrictive  of  the  powers  of  the  corporation  or  its  of- 
ficers to  contract,  then  a  failure  to  comply  with  those  provisions  is 
not  necessarily  fatal. '^^ 

§  263.  The  same  subject  continued. — It  is  frequently  provided  by 
statute  that  all  public  contracts  shall  be  in  writing.  This  being  a 
mandatory  provision  and  restrictive  of  the  power  of  the  corporation 
to  contract,  it  must  be  complied  with,  else  the  contract  is  invalid.'^^ 
And  the  same  rule  applies  in  regard  to  contracts  under  seal.  "The 
ancient  rule  of  the  common  law  that  corporations  could  not  bind 
themselves  by  a  contract  not  under  seal  is  no  longer  efficacious  in 
this  country."'''^     In  this  connection  it  may  be  noted  that  by  the  pro- 


" President  &c.  (Bank)  v.  Dan- 
dridge,  12  Wheat.  64;  Smith  v.  City 
of  Newburgh,  77  N,  Y.  136;  Brady  v. 
Mayor  etc.,  20  N.  Y.  312;  Allen  v.  City 
of  Galveston,  51  Tex.  302;  City  of 
Bryan  v.  Page,  51  Tex.  532;  McBrian 
V.  City  of  Grand  Rapids,  56  Mich. 
95;  s.  c.  22  N.  W.  206;  Argenti  v. 
City  of  San  Francisco,  16  Cal.  255; 
Los  Angeles  Gas  Co.  v.  Toberman, 
61  Cal.  199;  Town  of  Durango  v. 
Pennington,  8  Colo.  257;  s.  c.  7  Pac. 
14;  People  v.  Weber,  89  111.  347; 
Worthington  v.  City  of  Covington, 
82  Ky.  265;  Addis  v.  City  of  Pitts- 
burgh, 85  Pa.  St.  379;  Keeney  v. 
Jersey  City,  47  N.  J.  L.  449;  s.  c.  1 
Atl.  511;  State  v.  City  of  Passaic,  41 
N.  J.  L.  90;  Seibrecht  v.  City  of  New 
Orleans,  12  La.  An.  496;  Mayor  &c. 
v.  Eschbach,  18  Md.  276;  Taft  v. 
Town  of  Pittsford,  28  Vt.  286;  Ful- 
ton V.  City  of  Lincoln,  9  Neb.  358; 
s.  c.  20  n!  W.  724;  Hudson  v.  Mayor 
&c.,  64  Ga.  286;  City  of  Logansport 
v.  Humphrey,  84  Ind.  467;  Gates  v. 
Hancock,  45  N.  H.  528;  Heidelberg 
V.  San  Francois  Co.,  100  Mo.  69;  s. 
c.  12  S.  W.  914;  Niles  Water  Works 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  59  Mich.  311;  s.  c.  26 
N.  W.  525;  Wilhelm  v.  Cedar  Co.,  50 
Iowa  254;  Driftwood  &c.  Co.  v. 
Board  &c.,  72  Ind.  226.  The  general 
principles    enunciated    in    the    text 


will  be  more  fully  illustrated  in  a 
subsequent  portion  of  the  work:  See 
the  chapter  on  Contracts. 

'^Kelley  v.  Mayor  &c.,  4  Hill  (N. 
Y.)  263;  1  Dillon  Munic.  Corp., 
§  449,  and  cases  cited. 

'"  Starkey  v.  City  of  Minneapolis, 
19  Minn.  203;  McDonald  v.  Mayor 
&c.,  68  N.  Y.  23;  Stewart  v.  Cam- 
bridge, 125  Mass.  102. 

"  15  Am.  &  Eng.  Encyc.  of  Law 
1090,  tit.  Municipal  Corporations; 
citing  City  of  Alton  v.  Mulledy,  21 
111.  76;  Wade  v.  New  Berne,  77  N.  C. 
460;  City  of  Selma  v.  Mullen,  46 
Ala.  411;  Town  of  New  Athens  v. 
Thomas,  82  111.  259;  Watson  v.  Ben- 
nett, 12  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  196;  Bank 
&c.  V.  Patterson,  7  Cranch  299;  Sav- 
ings Bank  v.  Davis,  8  Conn.  191; 
Hamilton  v.  Newcastle  &c.  R.  Co.,  9 
Ind.  359;  Peterson  v.  Mayor  &c.,  17 
N.  Y.  449;  Missouri  River  &c.  R.  Co. 
V.  Commissioners  &c.,  12  Kan.  482; 
Fleckner  v.  President  fee,  8  Wheat. 
338;  President  &c.  (Bank)  v.  Dand- 
ridge,  12  Wheat.  64;  Christian 
Church  v.  Johnson,  53  Ind.  273;  Mc- 
Cullough  V.  Talladega  Ins.  Co.,  46 
Ala.  376;  Buckley  v.  Briggs,  30 
Mo.  452;  Whitford  v.  Laidler,  94 
N.  Y.  145;  Sheffield  School  Tp.  v. 
Andress,  56  Ind.  157;  Merrick  v. 
Burlington    &c.    Co.,    11    Iowa    74; 


261 


THE    LIABILITY    OF   THE    CORPORATION. 


§    264 


visions  of  the  ^Municipal  Corporations  Act  of  1882,  every  English 
corporation  shall  continue  to  have  a  common  seal/^  and  certain 
contracts  are  required  to  be  made  under  the  corporate  seal.'^^ 

§  264.  Contracts  by  ordinance  or  resolution. — The  city  council 
being  the  agents  of  the  corporation,  the  acts  of  that  body,  if  intra 
vires  and  regular,  are  of  course  binding  upon  the  corporation ;  and 
a  contract  made  by  ordinance  or  resolution  of  the  council  is,  so  far 
as  regularity  of  execution  is  concerned,  valid  and  binding  in  the 
absence  of  express  statutory  provisions  regulating  the  mode  of  exe- 
cution of  corporate  contracts. ^^  Judge  Story  has  said  on  this  sub- 
ject :  ''The  acts  of  such  a  body  or  board,  evidenced  by  a  written  vote, 
are  as  completely  binding  upon  the  corporation  and  as  complete 
authority  to  their  agents  as  the  utmost  solemn  acts  done  under  the 
corporate  seal."**^  On  the  question  whether  such  a  contract  is  with- 
out the  statute  of  frauds,  there  is  doubt.  A  New  York  case  approves 
the  doctrine  that  a  contract  made  by  ordinance  and  duly  entered  on 
the  official  corporate  minutes,  which  are  signed  by  the  clerk,  is  valid. ^^ 
The  decision  in  this  case  is  at  least  tacitly  approved  by  Judge  Dil- 
lon,^^   and   seems   a   reasonable   adaptation   of   the   law   to   modern 


Trustees  &c.  v.  Moody,  62  Ala.  389. 
See  also,  Draper  v.  Springport,  104 
U.  S.  501. 

'"  Municipal  Corporations  Act  of 
1882,  §  250,  subd.  1. 

'"  The  appointment  by  a  corpora- 
tion of  an  attorney  to  conduct  their 
suits  or  manage  their  affairs  must 
be  under  the  common  seal,  other- 
wise he  can  not  recover  against  the 
corporation  even  though  they  had 
by  resolution  expressly  directed  the 
business  to  be  done:  Arnold  v.  May- 
or &c.,  4  Man.  &  G.  860;  Sutton  v. 
Spectacle  Makers'  Co.,  10  L.  T.  (N. 
S.)  411.  So,  an  agreement  by  a  cor- 
poration with  one  of  its  officers  for 
an  increase  of  the  salary  of  an  of- 
fice retained  by  him  as  compensa- 
tion for  the  loss  of  another  office  of 
which  he  was  deprived  under  the  act 
of  1835,  though  upon  an  executed 
consideration,  is  not  binding  upon 
the  corporation  if  not  under  the 
common  seal:  Reg.  v.  Mayor  &c.,  6 
Q.  B.  433.  See  also.  Cope  v.  Thames 
Haven  Dock  &  R.  Co.,  3  Exch.  841; 


Mayor  &c.  v.  Hardwicke,  L.  R.  9  Ex. 
13.  It  has,  however,  been  held  that 
an  agreement  for  the  use  of  a  dock 
need  not  be  under  seal:  Wells  v. 
Mayor  &c.,  L.  R.  10  C.  P.  402.  See 
Rawlinson  Municipal  Corporations 
Act  (8th  ed.  by  Thomas  Geary) 
100,  n. 

*°  Fleckner  v.  President  &c.,  8 
Wheat.  338;  Over  v.  City  of  Green- 
field, 107  Ind.  231;  s.  c.  5  N.  E.  872; 
Ross  V.  City  of  Madison,  1  Ind.  281; 
People  V.  Board  &c.,  27  Cal.  655; 
Fanning  v.  Gregoire,  16  How.  524; 
Mayor  &c.  v.  Jackson,  1  Doug. 
(Mich.)  106;  Abby  v.  Billups,  35 
Miss.  618;  Clark  v.  Mayor  &c.,  12 
Wheat.  40;  Wade  v.  City  of  New- 
bern,  77  N.  C.  460;  San  Antonio  v. 
Lewis,  9  Tex.  69. 

*'  Fleckner  v.  President  &c.,  8 
Wheat.  338. 

**-  Argus  Co.  V.  Mayor  &c.,  55  N. 
Y.  495.  See  also,  Duncombe  v.  City 
of  Fort  Dodge,  38  Iowa  281. 

"  Dillon  Munic.  Corp.,  §  449. 


§    265  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  262 

methods  of  corporate  governpient  when  the  business  of  the  corpora- 
tion is  conducted  by  a  council ;  but  in  a  North  Carolina  case  a  contract 
made  in  a  similar  matter  was  declared  obnoxious  to  the  objection 
that  it  did  not  comply  with  the  statute  of  frauds.** 

§  265.  Signature  of  contract. — It  frequently  happens  that  the  of- 
ficers or  agents  of  municipal  corporations  in  executing  contracts  on 
behalf  of  the  corporation  sign  their  individual  names  and  affix  their 
individual  seals  instead  of  using  the  corporate  name  and  seal.  The 
preponderance  of  American  authorities  seems  to  establish  the  rule 
that  such  contracts  are  valid  and  binding  upon  the  corporation,  if 
made  by  the  proper  officers  and  intra  vires  the  corporation;  but  that 
they  are  valid  and  binding  only  as  simple  contracts,  and  that  the 
seal  of  the  individual  officer  or  agent  does  not  supply  the  place  of 
the  corporate  seal.*^  There  is  some  conflict  of  opinion,  but  it  is 
believed  that  an  examination  of  the  cases  will  show  this  rule  to  be 
sustained  in  the  United  States.^*' 

§  266.  The  same  subject  continued. — Notwithstanding  the  fact, 
however,  that  the  rule  of  the  preceding  section  prevails,  it  is  far 
safer  for  municipal  contracts  to  be  signed  and  sealed  by  the  proper 
officers  with  the  corporate  name  and  seal.  Thus,  in  a  leading  New 
York  case  cited  by  Judge  Dillon,*'^  a  contract  relating  to  public  mat- 
ters was  made  between  a  committee  appointed  for  that  purpose  by 
the  city  and  a  natural  person.  This  contract  purported  to  be  "be- 
tween .  .  .  ,  a  committee  appointed  by  the  corporation  of  the 
city  of  Albany  for  that  purpose,  of  the  first  part,  and     .     .     .     , 

"*  Wade  V.  City  of  Newbern,  77  N.  "Where  officers  or  agents  of  a  corpo- 

C.  460.  ration    duly    appointed    and    acting 

*"  Parr  v.  President  &c.,  72  N.  Y.  within  the  scope  of  their  authority 
463;  Randall  v.  Van  Vechten,  19  in  executing  an  instrument  in  behalf 
Johns.  (N.  Y.)  60;  Stanton  v.  Camp,  of  the  corporation  sign  their  own 
4  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  274;  Heidelberg  names  and  affix  their  own  seals. 
School  Dist.  V.  Horst,  62  Pa.  St.  301;  such  seals  are  simply  nugatory,  and 
Blanchard  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  102  the  instrument,  according  to  the 
Mass.  343;  Robinson  v.  City  of  St.  weight  of  modern  judicial  opinion, 
Louis,  28  Mo.  488;  Regents  &c.  v.  is  to  be  regarded  as  the  simple  con- 
Detroit  &c.  Soc,  12  Mich.  138;  tract  of  the  corporation  and  will 
Bowen  v.  Morris,  2  Taunt.  374.  But  bind  the  corporation,  and  not  the  in- 
see  contra.  Bank  &c.  v.  Patterson,  7  dividuals  executing  it,  where  the 
Cranch  299;  Fulham  v.  Inhabitants  purpose  to  act  for  the  corporation  is 
&c.,  9  Allen  (Mass.)  1;  City  of  Provi-  manifest  from  the  whole  paper  and 
dence  v.  Miller,  11  R.  I.  272;  Ulam  where  there  are  no  words  evincing 
v.  Boyd,  87  Pa.  St.  477.  an  intention  to  assume  a  personal  li- 

*"  See  1  Dillon  Munic.  Corp.,  §  452,  ability." 
where   the   learned   author   says: —        *^  1  Dillon  Munic.  Corp.,  §  453. 


263  THE    LlABIhlTY    OF    THE    COHJ'ORATIOX.  §    267 

of  the  second  iDart,"  and  was  signed  and  scaled  with  the  individual 
names  and  seals  of  the  persons  composing  tHe  committee.  The  court 
decreed  the  enforcemeiit  of  the  contract,  against  the  corporation,  as 
being  a  public  contract.*^*  But  in  Pennsylvania  under  very  similar 
circumstances  the  committeemen  were  made  personally  liable.^" 

§  267.  Liability  ex  delicto — (a)  In  general. — It  is  wholly  impos- 
sible within  the  limits  of  this  chapter  to  lay  down  with  any  degree 
of  precision  or  minuteness  the  rules  governing  the  liability  of  public 
corporations  for  the  tortious  acts  or  omissions  of  their  officers  and 
agents.  The  rules  governing  the  decision  of  these  questions  will  be 
set  forth  and  discussed  in  detail  in  the  subsequent  chapters.  For  this 
chapter  the  effort  of  the  writer  will  be  to  state  broadly  the  general 
principles  according  to  whicli  the  liability  of  the  corporation  for 
the  torts  of  its  officers  and  agents  is  determined — less  with  a  view 
to  practical  utility  than  to  prepare  the  mind  of  the  reader  for  an  in- 
telligent consideration  of  the  particular  rules  obtaining  in  the  dif- 
ferent classes  of  cases  in  whicli  this  liability  is  sought  to  be  enforced. 
"No  rule  on  this  subject  can  be  so  precisely  stated  as  to  embrace  all 
the  torts  for  which  it  has  been  held  by  some  court  or  another  that 
a  private  action  will  lie  against  a  municipal  corporation."®*' 

§  268.  (b)  Discretionary  and  legislative  acts. — Where  torts  are 
committed  by  the  officers  or  agents  of  the  public  corporation  in  the 
exercise  of  those  discretionary  and  legislative  powers  which  are  dele- 
gated to  them  by  the  legislature ;  when  those  officers  or  agents  in 
exercising  those  powers,  or  by  failure  to  exercise  them,  incidentally 
commit  torts  against  natural  persons  or  private  corporations, — the 
municipality  is  wholly  free  from  liability.®^    The  reason  for  this  rule, 

^'  Randall     v.     Van     Vechten,     19  Lincoln  v.  City  of  Boston,  148  Mass. 

Johns.  (N.  Y.)  59.  578;    s.    c.    20    N.    E.    329;    French 

«^  Ulam  v.  Boyd,  87  Pa.  St.  477.  v.      City     of     Boston,      129      Mass. 

^Conway  v.  City  of  Beaumont,  61  592;    Tainter  v.  City  of  Worcester, 

Tex.  10.  123  Mass.  311;  Pierce  v.  City  of  New 

»' Johnston  v.   District  of   Colum-  Bedford,    129    Mass.    534;    Steele   v. 

bia,  118  U.  S.  19;  s.  c.  6  S.  Ct.  923;  City  of  Boston,  128  Mass.  583;  Ran- 

Trescott  v.  City  of  Waterloo,  26  Fed.  dall  v.  Eastern  &c.  R.  Co.,  106  Mass. 

592;  Seifert  v.  City  of  Brooklyn,  101  276;    Fisher  v.  City  of  Boston,   104 

N.  Y.  136;  s.  c.  4  N.  E.  321;  Cole  v.  Mass.   87;    Hafford  v.   City   of   New 

Medina,  27  Barb.   (N.  Y.)   218;   Wil-  Bedford,     16     Gray      (Mass.)      297; 

son  V.  Mayor  &c.,   1  Denio    (N.  Y.)  Wright  v.  City  Council  &c.,  78  Ga. 

595;  Cain  v.  City  of  Syracuse,  95  N.  241;    Weller  v.   City  of  Burlington, 

Y.  83;  Mills  v.  City  of  Brooklyn,  32  60  Vt.  28;   s.  c.  12  Atl.  215;   Hutch- 

N.  Y.  489;  Griffin  v.  Mayor  &c.,  9  N.  inson   v.   Town   of   Concord,    41   Vt. 

Y.  456;    Whitsett  v.  Union  D.  &  R.  271;    Calwell   v.    City   of   Boone,   51 

Co.,  10  Colo.  243;   s.  c.  15  Pac.  339;  Iowa  687;  s.  c.  2  N.  W.  614;  Schultz 


§    209  PUBLIC    CORrOHATlOXS.  264: 

with  an  outline  of  the  classes  of  acts  which  are  deemed  discretionary 
and  legislative  within  the  protection  of  the  doctrine,  is  clearly  and 
forcibly  stated  by  Judge  Cooley  in  his  work  on  Constitutional  Limita- 
tions.   One  passage  is  quoted  from  that  work  in  the  following  section. 

§  269.  (c)  The  same  subject  continued. — "As  no  state,"  says  this 
eminent  publicist,  "does  or  can  undertake  to  protect  its  people  against 
incidental  injuries  resulting  from  its  adopting  or  failing  to  adopt 
any  proposed  legislative  action,  so  no  similar  injury  resulting  from 
municipal  legislative  action  or  non-action  can  be  made  the  basis  of 
a  legal  claim  against  a  municipal  corporation.  The  justice  or  pro- 
priety of  its  opening  or  discontinuing  a  street,  of  its  paving  or  refus- 
ing to  pave  a  thoroughfare  or  alley,  of  its  erecting  a  proposed  public 
building,  of  its  adopting  one  plan  for  a  public  building  or  work  rather 
than  another;  or  of  the  exercise  of  any  other  discretionary  authority 
committed  to  it  as  a  part  of  the  governmental  machinery  of  the  state, 
is  not  suffered  to  be  brought  in  question  in  an  action  at  law  and  sub- 
mitted to  the  determination  of  court  and  jury.  If,  therefore,  a  city 
temporarily  suspends  useful  legislation;  or  orders  and  constructs 
public  works  from  which  incidental  injury  results  to  individuals;  or 
adopts  unsuitable  or  insufficient  plans  for  public  bridges,  buildings, 
sewers,  or  other  public  works;  or  in  any  other  manner,  through  the 

V.  City  of  Milwaukee,  49  Wis.  254;  Crawford,  64  Tex.  202;  Black  v.  City 

s.  c.  5  N.  W.  342;  City  of  Anderson  of  Columbia,  19  S.  C.  412;    Hill  v. 

V.  East,  117  Ind.  126;  s.  c.  19  N.  E.  Board  &c.,  72  N.  C.  55;  Van  Horn  v. 

726;    Wheeler  v.  City  of  Plymouth,  City  of  Des  Moines,  63  Iowa  447;   s. 

116  Ind.  158;  s.  c.  18  N.  E.  532;  City  c.  19  N.  W.  293;   Preeport  v.  Isbell, 

of  Lafayette  v.  Timberlake,  88  Ind.  83  111.  440;  Miller  v.  City  of  St.  Paul, 

330;  Heller  v.  Mayor  &c.,  53  Mo.  159;  38   Minn.   134;    s.  c.   36  N.  W.   271; 

McKenna  v.  City  of  St.  Louis,  6  Mo.  Mendel  v.  City  of  Wheeling,  28  W. 

App.  320;  Robinson  v.  City  of  Evans-  Va.  233;  Wheeler  v.  City  of  Cincin- 

ville,   87    Ind.   334;    Ray  v.   City   of  nati,  19  Ohio  St.  19;   Greenwood  v. 

Manchester,  46  N.  H.  59;   Altvater  Louisville,  13  Bush  (Ky.)  226;  Jew- 

v.  Mayor  &c.,  31  Md.  462;    Bauman  ett  v.  City  of  New  Haven,  38  Conn, 

v.  City  of  Detroit,  58  Mich.  444;   s.  368;  Torbush  v.  City  of  Norwich,  38 

c.  25  N.  W.  391;   Burford  v.  City  of  Conn.  225;    Howard  v.  City  of  San 

Grand  Rapids,  53  Mich.  98;   s.  c.  18  Francisco,  51  Cal.  52;   Davis  v.  City 

N.  W.  571;   Western  College  v.  City  Council  &c.,  51  Ala.  139;  Lehigh  Co. 

of  Cleveland,  12  Ohio  St.  375;  Frith  v.  Hoffort,  116  Pa.  St.  119;    s.  c.  9 

V,   City  of   Dubuque,   45    Iowa   406;  Atl.  177;  McDade  v.  City  of  Chester, 

City  of  Davenport  v.  Stevenson,  34  117  Pa.  St.  414;    s.  c.   12  Atl.  421; 

Iowa  225;    Swenson  v.  City  of  Lex-  Grant  v.  City  of  Erie,  69  Pa.  St.  420; 

ington,  69  Mo.  157;  Kistner  v.  City  Carr  v.  Northern  Liberties,  35  Pa. 

of  Indianapolis,  100  Ind.  210;  White  St.    324.     See    Cooley    Const.    Lim. 

v.    Corporation    of    Yazoo    City,    27  257;  2  Dillon  Munic.  Corp.,  §  950. 
Miss.   357;    City   of   Fort   Worth   v. 


265  THE    LIABILITY    OF    THE    CORPORATION.  §    270 

exercise  or  failure  to  exercise  its  political  authority,  causes  incidental 
injury  to  individuals,  an  action  will  not  lie  for  such  injury.  The 
reason  is  obvious.  The  maintenance  of  such  an  action  would  transfer 
to  court  and  jury  the  discretion  which  the  law  vests  in  the  munici- 
pality ;  but  transfer  them  not  to  be  exercised  directly  and  finally  but 
indirectly  and  partially  by  the  retroactive  effect  of  punitive  verdicts 
upon  special  complaints."®^ 

§  270.  (d)  Ministerial  acts. — The  converse  of  the  propositions 
laid  down  in  the  two  preceding  sections  is  equally  true  with  those 
propositions;  that  is  to  say,  the  municipal  corporation  is  liable  for 
the  tortious  acts  and  omissions  of  its  officers  or  agents  when  those  acts 
or  omissions  are  violations  of  absolute  and  ministerial  duties.®^  This 
rule  is  well  established  and  rests  upon  the  principle  that  a  municipal 
corporation  is,  like  all  other  persons  natural  or  artificial,  liable  for 
the  proper  performance  of  duties  which  are  not  discretionary  or  legis- 
lative in  their  nature,  but  which  are  absolute  and  ministerial.  This 
doctrine  is,  however,  to  be  modified  by  the  rule  that  this  duty  must, 
even  though  ministerial,  be  not  for  the  public  but  for  the  private 
advantage  of  the  corporation,  as  more  fully  explained  hereafter. 

§  271.    (e)   Public  as  contradistinguished  from  private  duties. — 

The  whole  doctrine  of  the  liability  of  public  corporations  for  the 
torts  of  their  officers  or  agents  is  affected  and  modified  by  the  prin- 
ciple that  the  tortious  act  or  omission  must  be  in  violation  not  of  a 

*=Cooley  Const.  Lim.  253-255.  Wheeling,  19  W.  Va.  323;  Gilluly  v. 

^'Evanston  v.  Gunn,  99  U.  S.  660;  City  of  Madison,  63  "Wis.  518;  s.  c. 
Barnes  v.  District  of  Columbia,  91  24  N.  W.  137;  City  of  Boulder  v. 
U.  S.  540;  City  of  Galveston  v.  Pos-  Niles,  9  Colo.  415;  s.  c.  12  Pac.  632; 
nainsky,  62  Tex.  118;  s.  c.  13  Am.  &  Gilman  v.  Laconia,  55  N.  H.  130; 
Eng.  Corp.  Cas.  484;  Nelson  v.  Vil-  Hewison  v.  City  of  New  Haven,  34 
lage  of  Canisteo,  100  N.  Y.  89;  s.  c.  Conn.  136;  Kiley  v.  City  of  Kansas, 
2  N.  E.  473;  Ehrgott  v.  Mayor  &c.,  87  Mo.  103;  Albrittin  v.  Mayor  &c., 
96  N.  Y.  264;  Noonan  v.  City  of  Al-  60  Ala.  486.  Many  additional  cases 
bany,  79  N.  Y.  470;  Hamilton  v.  could  be  cited  in  support  of  the  doc- 
Mayor  &c.,  52  Ga.  435;  Erie  City  v.  trine  of  the  text,  but  it  is  believed 
Schwingle,  22  Pa.  St.  384;  Sawyer  to  be  useless  to  do  so.  The  proposi- 
v.  Corse,  17  Graft.  (Va.)  230;  Far-  tion  of  the  text  is  indeed  conceded 
quar  v.  City  of  Roseburg,  18  Or.  271;  learning  in  this  country.  Where 
s  c.  22  Pac.  1103;  Bohen  v.  City  of  the  evidence  clearly  shows  that  the 
Waseca,  32  Minn.  176;  s.  c.  19  N.  W.  injury  was  a  ministerial  act  and 
730;  O'Neill  v.  City  of  New  Orleans,  not  governmental,  as  in  the  opera- 
30  La.  An.  220;  McCombs  v.  Town  tion  of  a  quarry,  it  is  proper  to  re- 
Council  &c.,  15  Ohio  474,  476;  Town  fuse  an  instruction  on  the  general 
of  Waltham  v.  Kemper,  55  111.  346;  subject  of  governmental  functions: 
Meares  v.  Commissioners  &c.,  9  Ired.  City  Council  &c.  v.  Owens,  111  Ga. 
L.    (N.   C.)    73;    Wilson   v.   City  of  464;  s.  c.  36  S.  E.  830. 


§    273  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  2GG 

public  but  of  a  private  duty.  The  reason  and  the  essence  of  this 
rule  is  clear  and  easily  to  be  understood,  but  its  application  to  the 
specific  cases  is  often  of  great  difficulty.  The  rule  is  laid  down  in 
a  recent  Texas  case,  and  is  approved  by  courts  as  a  rule,  as  follows: 
"So  far  as  public  corporations  of  any  class  and  however  incorporated 
exercise  powers  conferred  on  them  for  ]3urposes  essentially  public — 
purposes  pertaining  to  the  administration  of  general  laws  made  to  en- 
force the  general  policy  of  the  state — they  should  be  deemed  agencies 
of  the  state,  and  not  subject  to  be  sued  for  any  act  or  omission  occur- 
ring while  in  the  exercise  of  such  power,  unless  by  statute  the  action 
be  given.  In  reference  to  such  matters  they  should  stand  as  does 
sovereignty,  whose  agents  they  are,  subject  to  be  sued  only  when  the 
state  by  statute  declares  they  may  be.  In  so  far,  however,  as  they  exer- 
cise powers  not  of  this  character,  voluntarily  assumed, — powers 
intended  for  the  private  advantage  and  benefit  of  the  locality  and  its 
inhabitants, — there  seems  to  be  no  sufficient  reason  why  they  should  be 
relieved  from  that  liability  to  suit  and  measure  of  actual  damage  to 
which  an  individual  or  private  corporation  exercising  the  same  powers 
for  purposes  essentially  private  would  be  liable.'"^*  Where  officers,  as 
town  selectmen,  are  independent  public  officers  with  duties  prescribed 
by  law,  the  city  is  not  liable  for  their  default  in  the  performance  of 
duties.^^  Where  a  municipality  is  in  the  exercise  of  government  func- 
tions it  is  not  liable  in  damages;  as  where  a  person  is  arrested  by  the 
police  and  confined  in  a  city  prison  and  injured  by  reason  of  improper 
construction  and  maintenance  of  such  prison.^® 

§  272.  (f )  The  rule  applied  to  public  quasi-corporations. — The 
rule  of  non-liability  of  a  public  quasi-corporation  is  illustrated  in  a 
decision  of  the  supreme  court  of  Illinois.  A  drainage  district  en- 
larged its  boundaries,  thus  discharging  more  water  on  the  plaintifii's 
land  than  it  had  a  right  to  do,  and  the  work  was  also  performed  neg- 
ligently. In  declaring  that  there  was  no  corporate  liability  the  court 
said:  "That  a  private  corporation,  formed  by  voluntary  agreement 
for  private  purposes,  is  held  to  respond  in  a  civil  action  for  its  neg- 
ligence or  tort,  goes  without  saying;  and  yet,  in  deciding  the  mooted 
question  at  issue  in  this  case,  it  seems  convenient  to  restate  that 

«*15  Am.  &  Eng.  Encyc.  of  Law  19;  Wakefield  v.  Newport,  62  N.  H. 

1141;  City  of  Galveston  v.  Posnain-  624;  Bdgerly  v.  Concord,  62  N.  H.  8; 

sky.  62  Tex.  118;  s.  c.  13  Am.  &  Eng.  Gross  v.  City  of  Portsmouth,  68  N. 

Corp.  Cas.  484.  H.  266;  s.  c.  33  Atl.  256. 

""^  Felch  V.  Town  of  Weare,  69  N.  ""  Gray  v.  Mayor  &c.,  Ill  Ga.  361 ; 

H.  617;    s.  c.  45  Atl..591.   Cf.  Doolittle  s.  c.  36  S.  E.  792. 
V.  Walpole,  67  N.  H.  554;  s.  c.  38  Atl. 


267  THE    LIABILITV    OK    TIIK    CORl-ORATION,  §    273 

proposition.  So,  also,  it  is  admitted  law  that  mimicipal  corporations 
proper,  such  as  villages,  towns  and  cities,  which  are  incorporated 
by  special  charter  or  voluntarily  organized  under  general  laws,  are 
liable  to  individuals  injured  by  their  negligent  or  tortious  conduct, 
or  that  of  their  agents  and  servants  in  respect  to  corporate  duties. 
In  regard  to  public  involuntary  quasi-corporations  the  rule  is  other- 
wise, and  there  is  no  such  implied  liability  imposed  upon  them. 
These  latter,  such  as  counties,  townships,  school  districts,  road  dis- 
tricts and  other  similar  quasi-corporations,  exist  under  general  laws 
of  the  state  which  apportion  its  territory  into  local  subdivisions  for 
the  purposes  of  civil  and  governmental  administration,  and  impose 
upon  the  people  residing  in  said  several  subdivisions  precise  and 
limited  public  duties  and  clothe  them  with  restricted  corporate  func- 
tions coextensive  with  the  duties  devolved  upon  them.  In  such  or- 
ganizations the  duties  and  their  correlative  powers  are  assumed  in 
invitum,  and  there  is  no  responsibility  to  respond  in  damages  in  a 
civil  action  for  neglect  in  the  performance  of  duties,  unless  such 
action  is  given  by  statute.''^  The  grounds  upon  which  the  liability 
of  a  municipal  corporation  proper  is  usually  placed  are  that  the 
duty  is  voluntarily  assumed  and  is  clear,  specific  and  complete,  and 
that  the  powers  and  means  furnished  for  its  proper  performance  are 
ample  and  adequate.^®  In  such  case  there  is  a  perfect  obligation, 
and  a  consequent  civil  liability,  for  neglect  in  all  cases  of  special 
private  damages.  The  non-liability  of  the  public  quasi-corporation 
unless  liability  is  expressly  declared  is  usually  placed  upon  these 
grounds:  that  the  corporations  are  made  such  nolens  volens;  that 
their  powers  are  limited  and  specific ;  and  that  no  corporate  funds  are 
provided  which  can,  without  express  provision  of  law,  be  appropri- 
ated to  private  indemnification.  Consequently  in  such  the  liability 
is  one  of  imperfect  obligation,  and  no  civil  action  lies  at  the  suit  of 
an  individual  for  non-performance  of  the  duty  imposed.'"*'^ 

§  273.  Conclusion. — The  writer  has  endeavored  in  the  preceding 
sections  to  give  a  very  general  outline  of  the  principles  governing 
the  liability  of  the  corporation  for  the  torts  of  its  officers  and  agents. 
These  rules  are  necessarily  broad  and  general  to  a  degree  which 
perhaps  deprives  them  of  any  considerable  practical  value.  They  will 
serve,  however,  to  show  the  general  trend  of  the  adjudications  in 

"2   Dillon   Munic.   Corp.,   §§   761,  »« Browning  v.  City  of  Springfield, 

762;    Cooley   Const.   Lim.   240,   247;  17  111.  143. 

Hedges   v.    Madison   Co.,    1    Oilman  ^^  Elmore  v.  Drainage  Com'rs,  135 

(111.)     567;     Town    of    Waltham    v.  111.    269;  s.  c.  25  N.  E.  1010;  34  Am. 

Kemper,  55  111.  346.  &  Eng.  Corp.  Cas.  491. 


§    273  PUBLIC    COEPOBATIONS,  368 

this  country  on  the  subject  under  consideration.  As  has  been  re- 
marked by  almost  evei*y  writer  on  this  topic,  it  is  impossible  to  lay 
down  rules  of  greater  definiteness.  The  particular  circumstances  of 
each  case  must  be  carefully  considered  and  the  decisions  relating 
to  the  class  of  torts  to  which  belongs  that  which  forms  the  subject- 
matter  of  the  action  must  be  examined  before  the  law  upon  any 
specific  case  can  be  determined.  The  general  results  of  these  rules 
may  be  stated  to  be  as  follows:  If  the  tort  is  one  for  which  the  mu- 
nicipality is  expressly  made  liable  by  statute,  that  fact  of  course 
concludes  the  liability  of  the  corporation.  If  such  is  not  the  case, 
then  the  tort  must  consist — in  the  case  of  public  corporations  other 
than  public  quasi-corporations — of  the  violation  of  a  private  duty 
imposed  for  private  corporate  advantage;  and  not  of  a  public  or 
governmental  duty  imposed  for  the  benefit  of  the  public  at  large.  In 
the  case  of  public  quasi-corporations,  the  general  rule  is  that  they 
are  liable  only  for  those  torts  for  which  the  statute  expressly  pre- 
scribes that  they  shall  be  liable. 


CHAPTER  IX. 


PUBLIC    BOARDS. 


Section 

274.  Corporate  assemblies  of  the  old 

English  corporations. 

275.  The   same   subject  continued — 

Notice  at  common  law. 

276.  The   same  subject  continued — 

Presence  of  the  mayor. 

277.  Regular    or    stated    meetings — 

Time  for  holding. 

278.  Adjournments. 

279.  Special  meetings. 
Adjourned  meetings. 
Notice  of  special  meetings. 
The   same  subject  continued — 

Specification  of  object  of 
meeting. 

Adjourned  meetings — Time  for 
holding. 

Corporation  represented  by  gov- 
erning boards. 

285.  The   same   subject  continued — 

Meeting  essential  to  official 
action. 

286.  The  same   subject  continued — 

Delegation  of  powers. 

287.  The  same  subject  continued. 

288.  Delegation  of  powers — A  Penn- 

sylvania case. 
The   same   subject  continued — 

The  rule  limited. 
Constitution  of  council. 
The  same  subject  continued. 
Conflicting     councils — Kerr     v. 

Trego. 
293.  Acts  of  de  facto  councils. 


280. 
281. 
282. 


283. 


284. 


289. 

290. 
291. 
292. 


Section 

294.  Quorum  of  definite  body. 

295.  The  same  subject  continued. 

296.  The   same   subject  continued — 

An  exception  to  the  rule. 

297.  The   same   subject   continued — 

Special  charter  provisions. 

298.  Quorums    and    majorities    fur- 

ther considered — The  rule  in 
England. 

299.  The   same   subject  continued — 

Decisions      in      the      United 
States. 

300.  Further  application  of  majority 

principle. 

301.  Execution   of   authority   vested 

in  two  persons. 

302.  Presiding  officer. 

303.  The  same  subject  continued. 

304.  Commitment     for     contempt — 

Whitcomb's  case. 

305.  Ayes  and  nays. 

306.  Parliamentary  law. 

307.  Reconsideration  and  rescission 

— General  power. 

308.  The  same  subject  continued. 

309.  Power    to    reconsider    and    re- 

scind qualified. 

310.  The  same  subject  continued. 

311.  Reconsideration     distinguished 

from  repeal. 

312.  Joint     assemblies     of     definite 

bodies — Constitution  and  pro- 
ceedings. 

313.  Record  of  meetings. 


§  274.    Corporate  assemblies  of  the  old  English  corporations. — 

In  England  to  constitute  a  corporate  assembly  there  must  at  common 
law  be  present  the  mayor  or  other  head  officer/  a  majority  of  each  defi- 

*He  must  be  the  ofllcer  de  jure  and  not  merely  de  facto:  Rex  v.  Heb- 

(269) 


275 


PUBLIC    COlil'OHATJONS. 


270 


nite  integral  part,"  and  some  members  of  the  indefinite  class  nsually 
called  the  commonalty."''  The  latter  class  is  generally  cither  by  pre- 
scription or  by  charter  represented  by  a  common  council,  and  when  this 
body  exists  an  assembly  of  such  is  deemed  a  corporate  assembly,  and 
the  presence  of  the  legal  president  is  necessary  although  not  required 
by  charter.*  Where  there  is  no  definite  class  entitled  to  participate 
in  corporate  acts,  and  the  governing  body  consists  wholly  of  a  definite 
or  select  class,  it  is  necessary,  to  constitute  a  corporate  assembly 
(sometimes  termed  in  this  case  a  select  assembly),  that  a  majority 
of  the  select  class  or  classes  shall  be  present.  But  the  attendance  of 
the  mayor  is  not  required  at  a  meeting  of  this  kind  unless  it  is  ex- 
pressly so  provided.^ 

§  275.  The  same  subject  continued — Notice  at  common  law. — 
Where  the  days  and  times  for  the  transaction  of  particular  business 
are  appointed  by  usage,  statute,  charter  or  by-laws,  all  the  members 
are  presumed  to  have  knowledge  thereof,  and  no  notice  is  necessary.^ 
When  a  meeting  is  assembled  for  a  special  purpose,  every  member  who 
has  a  right  to  vote  is  entitled  to  notice,''^  unless  he  has  quit  the  munici- 
pality without  either  retaining  a  house  or  leaving  his  family  within 
its  limits.*    The  notice  must  be  issued  by  order  of  some  one  who  has 


den,  Andr.  388,  391;  Rex  v.  Dawes,  4 
Burr.  2277,  2279;  Rex  v.  Mayor  &c., 
5  T.  R.  66,  72.  And  he  must  attend 
in  that  capacity:  Rex  v.  Carter, 
Cowp.  58. 

2  That  is,  a  majority  of  that  num- 
ber by  which  each  of  these  parts  is 
constituted,  and  not  merely  a  ma- 
jority of  the  surviving  or  existing 
members:  Rex  v.  Morris,  4  East  17, 
26;  Rex  v.  Bellringer,  4  T.  R.  810, 
823;  Rex  v.  Thornton,  4  East  294. 
307;  Rex  v.  Miller,  6  T.  R.  268,  278; 
Rex  V.  Devonshire,  1  B.  &  C.  609, 
614;  Rex  v.  Hill,  4  B.  &  C.  426,  441; 
Rex  V.  Lathrop,  1  W.  Bl.  468,  471. 

'  Rex  V.  Varlo,  Cowp.  248,  250;  Rex 
V.  Monday,  Cowp.  530,  539;  Rex  v. 
Bower,  1  B.  &  C.  492,  498;  Rex  v. 
Bellringer,  4  T.  R.  810,  822. 

*  Willcock  Munic.  Corp.,  §  126. 

^  Willcock  Munic.  Corp.,  §§  92,  106. 
By  the  English  Municipal  Corpora- 
tions Act  of  1835  (5  &  6  Wm.  IV,  ch. 
76,  §  69)  one-third  of  the  council  by 
which  the  corporation  is  represented 


constitutes  a  quorum.  The  mayor 
presides,  but  if  he  is  absent  a  pre- 
siding officer  is  chosen  who  has  a 
casting  vote. 

«Rex  V.  Hill,  4  B.  &  C.  426,  441, 
443;  Willcock  Munic.  Corp.,  §  59. 
But  if  it  is  intended  to  do  any  other 
act  of  importance  at  such  a  meeting, 
a  notice  is  necessary:  Rex  v.  Mayor 
&c.,  2  Burr.  723,  734;  Rex  v.  Mayor 
&c.,  2  Burr.  738,  744;  Rex  v.  Hill,  4 
B.  &  C.  426,  442;  Rex  v.  Theodorick, 
8  East  543,  545. 

'Rex  V.  Mayor  &c.,  2  Burr.  723, 
731;  Rex  v.  May,  5  Burr.  2681;  Rex 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  Cas.  temp.  Hardw.  147, 
151;  Rex  v.  Lisle,  Andr.  163,  173; 
Kynaston  v.  Mayor  &c.,  2  Str.  1051; 
Rex  V.  Theodorick,  8  East  543,  546; 
Rex  V.  Hill,  4  B.  &  C.  426,  441.  In- 
cluding every  member  of  an  "indefi- 
nite" body,  if  the  incidental  powers 
of  the  corporation  are  still  exer- 
cised by  the  body  at  large:  Rex  v. 
Company  &c.,  8  T.  R.  356. 

«Rex  V.  Grimes,  5  Burr.  2598;  Rex 


371  PUBLIC    BOARDS.  §    276 

authority  to  assemble  the  corporation  for  that  particular  purpose,* 
It  must  be  personally  served  upon  him,  but  in  case  of  his  temporary 
absence  it  may  be  left  with  his  family  or  at  his  last  place  of  abode.  ^^ 
It  must  be  given  a  reasonable  time  before  the  hour  of  meeting ;  and  if 
the  meeting  be  not  at  the  usual  place  it  should  contain  an  intimation 
of  that  circumstance.^^  It  is  not  necessary  to  state  what  business  is 
to  be  transacted  when  it  relates  only  to  the  ordinary  affairs  of  the 
corporation;  but  when  it  is  for  the  purpose  of  election,  a  motion,  or 
making  ordinances,  the  fact  should  be  stated,  for  some  may  "feel  it 
their  duty  to  attend  upon  such  occasions,  to  counteract  the  spirit  of 
party  and  preserve  the  fundamental  principles  of  their  constitu- 
tion."^^ "If  every  member  of  a  select  body  be  present  either  at  a 
meeting  on  the  charter  day,  or  specially  convened,  or  even  by  acci- 
dent at  a  proper  place  and  time,  they  may  by  unanimous  consent^^ 
dispense  with  notice,  and  transact  any  extraordinary  business  within 
their  peculiar  province."^'*  Their  unanimity  is  only  necessary  for 
entering  upon  the  business,  after  which  it  may  be  transacted  in  the 
same  manner  as  if  the  assembly  had  met  upon  proper  notice. ^^ 

§  276.    The  same  subject  continued — Presence  of  the  mayor. — It 

is  the  common-law  privilege  attached  to  the  office  of  mayor  that  he 
is  an  integral  part  of  the  corporation,  and  that  no  corporate  act  done 
in  his  absence  is  valid. ^'''    He  must  preside  not  only  at  the  transaction 

V.    Mayor    &c.,    Cas.    temp.    Hardw.  grove  v.  Nevison,  1   Str.  584;    s.  c. 

147.     It  is  no   sufBcient  excuse  for  2   Ld.   Raym.   1358;    Rex  v.  May,   5 

omission   of   notice   that   the   officer  Burr.  2682. 

serving  it  heard  and  believed  he  had  ^^  Willcocli  Munic.  Corp.,  §  74;  Rex: 

departed,  if  such  was  not  the  fact:  v.   Tucker,   1   Barnard.   26;    Rex   v. 

Willcocl?;  Munic.  Corp.,  §  68.  Mayor  &c.,  Cas.  temp.  Hardw.  147; 

'But  the  want  of  authority  may  Rex  v.  Theodorick,  8  East  543;  Rex 

be  waived  by  the  presence  and  con-  v.  Hill,  4  B.  &  C.  426,  441. 

sent  of  all:   Rex  v.  Hill,  4  B.  &  C.  "It   ought  to   appear   plainly   by 

426,  444;   Rex  v.  Gaborian,  11  East  their  conduct  that  they  are  unani- 

77,  86,  n.;  Rex  v.  Atkins,  3  Mod.  3;  mous:  Willcock  Munic.  Corp.,  §  80. 

s.  c.  2  Show.  237.     At  common  law  a  "Willcock    Munic.    Corp.,    §    79; 

meeting  can  be  summoned  only  by  Rex  v.  Theodorick,  8  East  543;  Rex 

the  mayor:   Willcock  Munic.  Corp.,  v.  Wake,  1  Barnard.  80. 

§  94.  1^  Willcock    Munic.    Corp.,     §     81. 

^"  Rex    V.    Mayor    &c.,    Cas.    temp.  But  if  the  charter  requires  a  special 

Hardw.  147;  Kynaston  v.  Mayor  &c.,  notice,    this    can    not   be    dispensed 

2  Str.  1051.     It  need  not  be  in  writ-  with,  even  by  unanimous  consent: 

ing:  Rex  v.  Hill,  4  B.  &  C.  426,  442.  Rex  v.  Theodorick,  8  East  543. 

"Rex  V.  Hill,  4  B.  &  C.  426,  442.  ^^  Rex  v.  Atkins,  3  Mod.  3;   s.  c.  2 

The   guildhall   is   the   proper  place,  Show.    237;    Tremaine   233;    Rex   v. 

but  if  there  be  none  some  particular  Gaborian,  11  East  77,  87,  n.;   1  Rol. 

place    should    be    appointed:     Mus-  Abr.  514,  tit.  Corporations   (G),  pi. 


§    277  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  272 

of  those  affairs  which  are  merely  voluntary  or  convenient,  such  as 
the  election  of  new  members  into  the  corporation,  or  an  indefinite 
class,  but  at  those  which  are  of  the  utmost  necessity,  as  the  filling  of 
vacancies  or  the  annual  election  of  the  officers.^''  The  mayor  must 
also  propose  the  particular  business  or  acquiesce  in  the  proposal  of 
another  ;^^  and  he  must  preside  from  the  beginning  to  the  conclu- 
sion of  each  distinct  transaction.^®  In  some  instances,  however, 
either  by  immemorial  usage  or  by  the  terms  of  the  charter,  the  pres- 
ence of  the  head  officer  is  dispensed  with,  and  an  alternative  sub- 
stituted. In  such  cases  all  the  requisites  of  legality  must  exist  in  the 
office  of  the  person  substituted,  and  if  he  hold  by  delegation  from 
the  head  officer,  he  must  not  only  be  the  legal  deputy,  but  appointed 
by  the  legal  j^rincipal.-" 

§  277.  Regular  or  stated  meetings — Time  for  holding. — The  meet- 
ings of  corporate  bodies  are  either  (1)  regular  or  stated,  (2)  special, 
or  (3)  adjourned  meetings.  Unless  the  time  for  the  stated  meetings 
of  the  governing  body  is  fixed  hy  charter  or  statute,  or  otherwise 
provided  for  by  law,  the  power  of  determination  resides  with  the 
body  itself.  Where  a  city  charter  requires  the  council  to  hold  "stated 
meetings,"  and  omits  to  designate  the  time,  the  council  may  upon 
simple  motion  prescribe  such,  time,  which,  may  be  changed  by  the 
council  alone;  also  upon  mere  motion,  although  it  has  been  previ- 
ously fixed  by  a  formal  resolution,  approved  by  the  mayor  and  pub- 
lished.^^ All  the  members  of  the  board  are  presumed  to  have  knowl- 
edge of  the  times  for  holding  the  stated  meetings ;  and  if  any  member 
fails  to  attend  he  voluntarily  waives  his  right  to  participate  in  the 

7;    Rex    v.    Trew,    2    Barnard.    370.  "Rex  v.  Lisle,  Andr.  163,  174;  Rex 

"The  doctrine  of  the  English  courts  v.  Hebden,  Andr.  388,  392. 

as  to  the  old  corporations  in  that  ^*  Rex  v.  Gaborian,  11  East  77,  86, 

country,    that    the    mayor    was    an  n.,  87,  n.;  Rex  v.  BuUer,  8  East  389, 

integral    part    of    the    corporation,  392;    1   Rol.  Abr.   514,   tit.  Corpora- 

and   that  the   acts   of   the   corpora-  tions;    Rex  v.   Williams,   2   Mau.   & 

tion    in    his    absence    were    invalid,  S.  141,  144. 

has,  it  is  believed,  no  application  to  ^^  See    cases    cited    in    preceding 

the  office  of  mayor  in  this  country,  note. 

With  us,  the  powers  and  duties  of  ^"Willcock    Munic.    Corp.,    §    105; 

the  mayor  depend  entirely  upon  the  Rex  v.  Gaborian,  11  East  77,  86,  n.; 

provisions  of  the  charter,  or  the  act  Rex  v.  Corry,  5  East  372,  381;   s.  c. 

under  which  the  corporation  is  or-  1  Smith  543. 

ganized,  and  the  by-laws  passed  in  "^  It  requires  only  such  action  on 

pursuance  of  such  authority:"  Mar-  their  part  as  expresses  the  will  of 

tindale  v.  Palmer,  52  Ind.  411,  413;  the  body:  State  v.  Kantler,  33  Minn. 

Welch   V.   Ste.   Genevieve,   1   Dillon  69;  s.  c.  21  N.  W.  856;  6  Am.  &  Eng. 

130.  Corp.  Cas.  169. 


373 


PUBLIC    BOAPx-DS, 


278 


business  of  the  meeting,  and  is  bound  by  whatever  is  done  within  the 
ordinary  range  of  the  duties  of  the  board.-- 

§  278.  Adjournments. — At  a  meeting  duly  called  a  majority  of 
a  quorum  have  the  incidental  right  to  adjourn  to  another  time,  either 
on  the  same  or  on  a  future  day.^^  And  if  an  adjournment  is  irregu- 
lar because  of  the  want  of  a  quorum,  but  the  adjourned  meeting  is 
attended  by  all  the  members,  who  participate  without  objection  in  the 
proceedings,  the  irregularity  is  cured,  and  in  the  absence  of  any  find- 
ing the  court  will  presume  that  all  did  so  attend.^*     But  under  an 


""People  V.  Batchelor,  22  N.  Y. 
128;  Gildersleeve  v.  Board  of  Educa- 
tion, 17  Abb.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  201,  208. 
As  to  presumptions  in  favor  of  the 
regularity  of  meetings,  see  Hudson 
Co.  V.  State,  24  N.J.  L.  718;  State  v. 
Smith,  22  Minn.  218;  Insurance  Co. 
V.  Sanders,  36  N.H.  252;  State  v.  May- 
or &c.,  25  N.  J.  L.  309.  But  in  People 
V.  Batchelor,  supra,  where  the  board 
of  aldermen  at  a  stated  meeting 
adopted  a  resolution  to  meet  in  con- 
vention with  the  mayor  on  the  same 
day,  for  the  purpose  of  making  cer- 
tain appointments,  it  was  held  that 
those  absent  from  the  stated  meet- 
ing were  entitled  to  reasonable 
notice  of  the  time  for  holding  the 
convention.  For  construction  of  city 
charter  of  Buffalo  '  (laws  of  N.  Y. 
1891,  ch.  105),  see  Kittinger  v.  Buf- 
falo Traction  Co.,  160  N.  Y.  377;  s.  c. 
54  N.  E.  1081. 

23  In  re  Newland  Ave.,  38  N.  Y.  St. 
796;  s.  c.  15  N.  Y.  S.  63;  Ex  parte 
Wolf,  14  Neb.  24;  s.  c.  14  N.  W.  660; 
6  Am.  &  Eng.  Corp.  Cas.  153;  citing 
Dillon  Munic.  Corp.  287.  The  power 
is  incident  to  special  as  well  as  reg- 
ular meetings:  Stockton  v.  Powell, 
29  Fla.  1;  s.  c.  10  So.  688.  By  par- 
liamentary law  if  only  a  minority 
have  assembled  they  may  adjourn 
to  the  next  day  on  which  the  body 
can  meet  for  the  transaction  of  busi- 
ness: People  V.  Common  Council 
&c.,  5  Lans.  (N,  Y.)  142,  147.  Arbi- 
trary adjournment  by  presiding  offi- 
1  Smith — 18 


cer, — see  §  303,  post.  "The  rule,  as 
we  understand,  applicable  to  all  de- 
liberate bodies,  is  that  any  number 
have  power  to  adjourn,  though  they 
may  not  be  a  quorum  for  the  trans- 
action of  business:"  Kimball  v.  Mar- 
shall, 44  N.  H.  465,  468  (board  of  al- 
dermen). "It  is  not  at  all  unusual, 
and  never  has  been  supposed  to  be 
unlawful,  for  meetings  of  corpora- 
tions to  be  adjourned  for  want  of  a 
quorum,  without  transacting  any 
other  business."  This  remark  was 
made  in  a  case  where  a  town  meet- 
ing adjourned  to  a  certain  day  (not 
the  day  of  a  regular  meeting),  with- 
out the  choice  of  a  moderator.  But 
the  learned  judge  seems  not  to  have 
confined  his  statement  to  adjourn- 
ments of  popular  meetings:  Attor- 
ney-General V.  Simonds,  111  Mass. 
256,  260.  "The  law  is  silent  as  to 
the  power  of  the  board  [of  school 
inspectors]  to  adjourn.  We  think 
they  have  the  right  to  adjourn,  for 
any  sufficient  reason,  both  as  to  time 
and  place;  and  unless  it  be  made  to 
appear  that  such  adjournment  was 
an  abuse  of  the  corporate  functions, 
and  operated  to  the  detriment  of 
those  affected,  or  to  be  affected,  by 
the  proceedings,  such  action  is  not 
subject  to  review:"  Donough  v. 
Dewey,  82  Mich.  309,  312;  s.  c.  46 
N.  W.  782. 

"-'  State  V.  Smith,  22  Minn.  218. 
See  also,  on  the  last  point,  Citizens' 
&c.    Ins.    Co.    V.    Sortwell,    8    Allen 


§    279  PUBLIC    CORrORATIONS.  274 

act  providing  that  sessions  "shall  continue  six  days,  if  business  shall 
so  long  require,  and  no  longer,"  a  board  has  no  power  to  adjourn 
beyond  six  days,  and  proceedings  at  such  an  adjourned  session  are 
coram  non  judice  and  void.^^ 

§  279.  Special  meetings. — It  is  competent  for  a  public  board,  un- 
less expressly  or  impliedly  prohibited  by  statute,  to  call  special  meet- 
ings for  the  transaction  of  business  proper  to  come  before  it;  and 
where  a  regular  meeting  was  adjourned  to  the  next  regular  meeting 
without  taking  final  action  on  a  certain  matter,  and  at  a  special 
meeting  called  and  held  during  the  interval  it  was  again  taken  up 
and  disposed  of,  the  validity  of  the  proceedings  was  sustained.^^ 
Where  the  charter  expressly  provided  that  the  action  of  the  city  as- 
sembly at  a  special  session  called  by  the  mayor  should  be  confined  to 
the  objects  specially  stated  to  them  when  assembled,  the  language 
was  interpreted  to  exclude  legislation  upon  matters  communicated 
to  it  by  the  mayor  during  the  session  but  after  the  time  when  it 
assembled.^^ 

§  280.  Adjourned  meetings. — An  adjourned  meeting  of  either  a 
regular  or  special  meeting  is  a  continuation  of  the  same  meeting, 
and  any  business  which  it  would  have  been  proper  to  consider  at  the 
meeting  may  be  acted  upon  at  the  adjourned  meeting.^®     Conversely, 

(Mass.)    217,   223;    Sargent  v.   Web-  1  La.  An.  412;  Hudson  Co.  v.  State, 

ster,     13     Met.     (Mass.)     497.     504;  24  N.  J.  L.  718;  People  v.  Batchelor, 

Chosen  Freeholders  &c.  v.  State,  24  22  N.  Y.  128;    Smith  v.  Law,  21  N. 

N.  J.  L.  718;   Rutherford  v.  Hamil-  Y.  296;  People  v.  Martin,  5  N.  Y.  22; 

ton,  97  Mo.  543;   s.  c.  11  S.  W.  249.  Rex  v.  Harris,  1  B.  &  Ad.  936;  Scad- 

The  use  of  the  word  "recess"  by  the  ding  v.  Lorant,  5  Eng.  L.  &  Eq.  16. 

clerk  instead  of  "adjourn"  is  imma-  Where  the   statute   requires  that  a 

terial:    Ex   parte   Mirande,   73    Cal.  township  officer  be  elected  at  a  reg- 

365;  s.  c.  14  Pac.  888.  ular   meeting   held   on   a   particular 

^Grimmett  V.  Askew,  48  Ark.  151;  day.   such   officer   may   properly   be 

s.  c.  2  S.  W.  707.  elected  at  a  meeting,  held  at  a  later 

-"  Douglass  V.   Board   &c.,   23   Fla.  day,  which  is  an  adjournment  of  the 

419;    s.  c.  2   So.   776.     In  this  case,  regular  meeting:    Carter  v.   McFar- 

however,  no   stated   time   for  meet-  land,  75   Iowa  196;    s.  c.   39   N.  W. 

ings  was  prescribed  by  statute.     See  268;  State  v.  Vanosdal,  131  Ind.  388; 

also,  People  v.  Batchelor,  22  N.  Y.  s.  c.  31  N.  E.  79.     See  also,  State  v. 

128.  Harrison,    67    Ind.    71;     Sackett    v. 

^'  City  of  St.  Louis  v.  Withaus,  90  State,  74  Ind.  486.  A  statute  re- 
Mo.  646;  s.  c.  3  S.  W.  395.  quired    supervisors   to   act   at  their 

^  Magneau  v.  City  of  Fremont,  30  "session   in   October."     It  was   held 

Neb.     843;     s.    c.     47     N.    W.     280;  that  they  might  act  at  an  adjourned 

Warner     v.     Mower,     11     Vt.     385;  session:     Hubbard    v.    Winsor,     15 

City    of    New    Orleans    v.    Brooks,  Mich.  145.     Where  a  regular  meet- 

36     La.     An.     641;      Street     Case,  Ing  adjourns  for  a  particular  pur- 


275 


PUBLIC    BOARDS. 


281 


an  adjourned  meeting  is  limited  to  those  subjects  upon  which  it  was 
competent  for  the  original  meeting  to  take  action.  Thus,  where  a 
charter  provided  that  no  ordinance  should  be  passed  by  the  common 
council  unless  introduced  at  a  previous  stated  meeting,  and  the  rec- 
ord showed  that  the  ordinance  in  question  was  introduced  at  a  previ- 
ous adjourned  meeting,  without  disclosing  whether  it  was  an  ad- 
journed meeting  of  a  stated  or  of  a  special  meeting,  the  defect  was 
held  to  be  fatal.-'' 

§  281.  Notice  of  special  meetings. — A  charter  provision  requiring 
a  city  council  to  meet  "at  such  time  and  place  as  they  by  resolution 
may  direct"  is  mandatory  but  not  prohibitory,  and  a  valid  meeting 
may  be  convened  at  a  time  not  fixed  by  resolution.^"  Every  member 
entitled  to  be  present  at  a  special  meeting  is  entitled  to  notice  of  the 
time  and  place  thereof,  which  must  be  served  upon  him  personally, 
if  practicable,  or  unless  some  other  mode  of  notice  is  prescribed  by 
statute  or  charter.^  ^    Where  a  charter  provided  that  the  mayor  should 


pose,  the  adjourned  meeting  is  not 
confined  to  that  purpose,  but  may 
take  up  other  legislative  business: 
Ex  parte  Wolf,  14  Neb.  24;  s.  c.  14  N. 
W.  660.  In  this  country  an  ad- 
journed meeting  of  a  special  meet- 
ing is  not  limited  to  matters  actu- 
ally begun,  but  unfinished,  at  the 
first  meeting,  and  may,  in  Judge 
Dillon's  opinion,  consider  proper 
business  ab  initio:  Dillon  Munic. 
Corp.,  §  287,  n.  See  also,  Cassidy  v. 
City  of  Bangor,  61  Maine  434,  441. 
Action  taken  at  an  adjourned  regu- 
lar meeting  is  legal,  though  no  pro- 
vision is  made  in  the  code  for  re- 
cess or  adjournment:  Nixon  v.  City 
of  Biloxi,  76  Miss.  810;  s.  c.  25  So. 
664. 

=«  State  V.  Mayor  &c.,  25  N.  J.  L. 
309.  See  also,  State  v.  Inhabitants 
&c.,  45  N.  J.  L.  318;  s.  c.  2  Am.  & 
Eng.  Corp.  Cas.  38.  Where  the  gov- 
erning body  consists  of  two 
branches,  the  unfinished  business  of 
either  body  must  be  taken  up  in  the 
next  year  de  novo:  Wetmore  v. 
Story,  22  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  414. 

="*  State  V.  Smith,  22  Minn.  218. 
Code  of  Iowa,  §  303,  provides  that 
the  board  of  supervisors,  at  any  reg- 


ular meeting,  shall  have  power  "to 
provide  for  the  erection  of  all 
bridges."  The  code  provides  for 
special  meetings,  but  does  not  pre- 
scribe the  kind  of  business  that  may 
be  transacted.  It  was  held  that  the 
statute  does  not  prohibit  making 
provision  for  the  erection  of  bridges 
at  a  special  meeting,  or  reconsider- 
ing at  a  special  meeting  provisions 
made  at  a  regular  meeting:  Super- 
visors &c.  V.  Horton,  75  Iowa  271; 
s.  c.  39  N.  W.  394. 

''  Rogers  v.  Slonaker,  32  Kan.  191; 
s.  c.  4  Pac.  138;  People  v.  Batchelor, 
22  N.  Y.  128;  Harding  v.  Vande- 
water,  40  Cal.  77;  Burgess  v.  Pue,  2 
Gill  (Md.)  254;  Downing  v.  Rugar, 
21  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  178;  Stow  v. 
Wyse,  7  Conn.  214;  Paola  &c.  R.  Co. 
V.  Commissioners,  16  Kan.  302,  an 
excellent  case,  in  which  Brewer,  J., 
shows  that  the  rule  is  not  arbitrary, 
but  founded  upon  the  clearest  dic- 
tates of  reason;  Wiggin  v.  Elder  &c., 
8  Met.  (Mass.)  301;  Ex  parte  Rog- 
ers, 7  Cowen  (N.  Y.)  526,  n.;  Balti- 
more Tui'npike,  5  Binn.  (Pa.)  481; 
Cassin  v.  Zavalla  Co.,  70  Tex.  419; 
s.  c.  8  S.  W.  97.  See  also,  §  275,  ante. 
And  for  a  construction  of  provisions 


§  281 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIOXS. 


276 


he  ex  oflRcio  a  member  of  a  board  of  road  commissioners  and  preside  at 
its  meetings  when  present,  but  without  a  vote  except  in  case  of  a  tie,  it 
was  held  that  he  was  entitled  to  notice  of  a  meeting,  although  there 
was  not  a  tie  vote  in  the  particular  instance.^^  But  the  omission  of 
notice  is  cured  by  the  presence  and  consent  of  all  the  members,^^ 

relating  to  notice  in  the  English 
Municipal  Corporations  Act,  5  &  6 
Wm.  IV,  ch.  76,  §  69  (Consolidated 
Act,  1882,  §  22),  see  Town  Council 
&c.  V.  Court,  1  Bl.  &  El.  770;  Reg.  v. 
Whipp,  4  Q.  B.  141;  Reg.  v.  Grim- 
shaw,  10  Q.  B.  747,  755;  Reg.  v. 
Thomas,  8  Ad.  &  El.  183;  Rex  v. 
Harris,  1  B.  &  Ad.  936. 

^"  State  V.  Kirk,  46  Conn.  395,  hold- 
ing also  that  a  written  notice  to  a 
member  absent  from  the  state,  left 
at  the  store  of  his  son,  which  he 
was  in  the  habit  of  visiting  daily 
when  in  town,  was  sufficient.  Code 
of  Iowa,  §  301,  provides  that,  on  re- 
quest for  a  special  meeting  of  the 
board,  the  auditor  shall  fix  a  day  for 
such  meeting,  and  give  notice  in 
writing  to  each  supervisor  person- 
ally or  by  leaving  a  copy  thereof  at 
his  residence,  at  least  six  days  be- 
fore the  day  appointed,  and  also 
give  notice  by  publication  in  news- 
papers published  in  the  county,  or, 
if  there  be  none,  by  causing  notice 
to  be  posted  at  the  court-house  and 
at  two  other  places,  one  week  be- 
fore the  time  set.  Held,  that  the  six 
days'  limitation  of  the  notice  refers 
to  the  copy  left  at  the  residence,  and 
not  to  the  personal  notice;  and  the 
one-week  limitation  of  the  public 
notice  refers  to  the  posted  notice, 
and  not  the  publication  in  a  news- 
paper: Supervisors  &c.  v.  Horton, 
75  Iowa  271;  s.  c.  39  N.  W.  394. 
Charter  provisions  as  to  notice  must 
be  strictly  pursued:  Lord  v.  City  of 
Anoka,  36  Minn.  176;  s.  c.  30  N.  W. 
550.  See  also,  Scott  v.  Union  Co., 
63  Iowa  583;  s.  c.  19  N.  W.  667.  The 
notice  may  be  oral,  provided  all  the 
members  receive  it  in  time  to  at- 
tend:  Scott  V.  Paulen,  15  Kan.  162; 


White  V.  Fleming,  114  Ind.  560;  s. 
c.  16  N.  E.  487.  Two  days'  notice 
for  persons  all  residing  in  the  city, 
and  whose  duty  it  is  to  reside  in  the 
city  and  to  be  ready  to  perform  the 
functions  of  their  office,  is  not  so 
clearly  a  short  notice  that  on  a  plead- 
ing it  will  be  pronounced  insuf- 
ficient: People  V.  Walker,  23  Barb. 
(N.  Y.)  304,  305.  In  Whiteside  v. 
People,  26  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  635,  the 
notice  was  served  at  2  o'clock  p.  m. 
for  a  meeting  at  5  p.  m.  of  the  same 
day.  Where  notice  of  a  meeting  of 
school  inspectors  was  required  by 
law  to  be  given  by  the  township 
clerk,  who  was  ex  officio  clerk 
of  the  board,  it  was  sufficient  though 
signed  by  him  as  "clerk  of  the 
board":  Donough  v.  Dewey,  82  Mich. 
309;  s.  c.  46  N.  W.  782. 

^'  Magneau  v.  City  of  Fremont,  30 
Neb.  843;  s.  c.  47  N.  W.  280;  People 
V.  Frost,  32  111.  App.  242;  Thomas 
V.  Citizens'  Horse  R.  Co.,  104  111. 
462;  Lawrence  v.  Traner,  136  111. 
474;  s.  c.  27  N.  E.  197;  Beaver  Creek 
V.  Hastings,  52  Mich.  528;  s.  c.  18  N. 
W.  250;  State  v.  Smith,  22  Minn. 
218.  But  if  third  parties  have  a 
right  to  be  heard, — for  example,  tax- 
payers,— the  notice  is  jurisdictional, 
and  can  not  be  waived  by  the  con- 
sent of  a  majority  of  those  inter- 
ested: Gentle  v.  Board  &c.,  73  Mich. 
40;  s.  c.  40  N.  W.  928.  There  is  a 
presumption  in  favor  of  regularity: 
State  V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  45  N.  J.  L. 
318;  s.  c.  2  Am.  &  Eng.  Corp.  Cas. 
39;  Chosen  Freeholders  &c.  v.  State, 
24  N.  J.  L.  718;  Rutherford  v.  Ham- 
ilton, 97  Mo.  543;  s.  c.  11  S.  W.  249; 
Torr  V.  Corcoran,  115  Ind.  188;  s.  c. 
17  N.  E.  286;  Prezinger  v.  Harness, 
114  Ind.  491;  s.  c.  16  N.  E.  495,  and 


277 


PUBLIC    BOARDS. 


282 


"or  at  least  of  all  who  were  not  properly  notified."^* 

§  282.  The  same  subject  continued — Specification  of  object  of 
meeting. — It  was  held  in  a  very  early  case  in  New  Jersey  that  if  the 
particular  purpose  of  a  special  meeting  is  stated  in  the  call,  acts  of 
the  meeting  foreign  to  the  purpose  specified  are  invalid.^^  But  a  con- 
trary rule  is  laid  down  in  a  recent  decision  of  the  supreme  court  of  er- 
rors of  Connecticut.  A  charter  authorized  the  court  of  common  council 
to  provide  by  ordinance  for  the  warning  of  its  meetings,  but  no  pro- 
vision of  charter  or  ordinance  required  information  to  be  given  of 
the  matters  to  be  considered.  It  was  held  that  the  notice  of  a  special 
meeting  need  not  specify  the  oljject  thereof,  nor  could  the  scope  of 
authority  of  the  council  be  confined  to  purposes  actually  specified 
in  such  notice.  "The  familiar  rule  of  notice,"  said  Judge  Prentice, 
"as  applicable  to  meetings  of  towns  and  communities,  is  one  pre- 
scribed by  statute.  It  has  no  application  to  meetings  of  governmental 
representative  bodies  like  courts  of  common  council.  Their  status 
and  right  to  act  are  more  allied  to  those  of  the  governing  bodies  of 
private  corporations  and  of  the  general  assembly,  and  are  governed 
by  the  same  rules."^"    Where  all  the  members  of  the  council  and  the 


Indiana  cases  there  cited;  Stoddard 
V.  Johnson,  75  Ind.  20;  Tierney  v. 
Brown,  65  Miss.  563;  s.  c.  5  So.  104; 
7  Am.  St.  679;  Scott  v.  Paulen,  15 
Kan.  162.  Cf.  State  v.  Mayor  &c.,  25 
N.  J.  L.  309;  Harding  v.  Bader,  75 
Mich.  316,  321;  s.  c.  42  N.  W.  942; 
Newaygo  Co.  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Echtinaw, 
81  Mich.  416;  s.  c.  45  N.  W.  1010. 
Where  the  county  auditor  is  em- 
powered to  call  special  meetings  of 
the  board  of  commissioners,  when 
the  public  interests  require  it,  by  giv- 
ing at  least  six  days'  notice,  unless  in 
his  opinion  an  emergency  requires  a 
shorter  notice,  in  which  case  he  may 
fix  it  at  his  discretion,  his  determi- 
nation is  final  and  conclusive:  Jus- 
sen  V.  Board  &c.,  95  Ind.  567;  Prez- 
inger  v.  Harness,  114  Ind.  491;  s.  c. 
16  N.  E.  495.  If  want  of  notice  af- 
firmatively appears,  it  is  fatal:  Pa- 
ola  &c.  R.  Co.  V.  Commissioners,  16 
Kan.  302. 

'*  Lord  V.  City  of  Anoka,  36  Minn. 
176;  s.  c.  30  N.  W.  550,  551.  Com- 
missioners chosen  at  a  regular  meet- 


ing of  the  board  to  let  a  bridge  con- 
tract and  superintend  the  construc- 
tion, who  protested  against  the  le- 
gality and  the  sufficiency  of  the  no- 
tice of  a  subsequent  special  meeting 
in  which  the  former  action  was  re- 
considered, but  took  no  part  in  the 
whole  of  such  meeting,  and  at- 
tempted by  so  doing  to  accomplish 
their  purposes,  are  estopped  to  deny 
the  sufficiency  of  the  notice  of  the 
special  meeting:  Supervisors  &c.  v. 
Horton,  75  Iowa  271;  s.  c.  39  N.  W. 
394. 

==' Bergen  v.  Clarkson,  1  Halst.  (N. 
J.  L.)  428.  The  court  thought  the 
object  of  a  special  meeting  ought  al- 
ways to  be  mentioned  in  the  notice: 
referring  to  Rex  v.  Mayor  &c.,  2 
Burr.  723,  735. 

^"Whitney  v.  City  of  New  Haven, 
58  Conn.  450,  461;  s.  c.  20  Atl.  666; 
citing  Cooley  Const.  Lim.  (4th  ed.) 
155,  189;  Savings  Bank  v.  Davis,  8 
Conn.  192;  Town  of  Westbrook's  Ap- 
peal (fee,  75  Conn.  95;  s.  c.  17  Atl. 
368.     See  also,  Wilson  v.  Board  &c.. 


§    283  PUBLIC    CORrORATIONS.  278 

mayor  meet  and  act  as  a  body,  they  may  at  such  special  meeting,  or  any 
adjourned  session,  transact  any  business  within  the  powers  conferred 
by  law,  notwithstanding  no  written  call  for  the  meeting  was  made, 
or  in  case  one  was  made  which  failed  to  indicate  the  purpose  of  the 
meeting.  ^^ 

§  283.  Adjourned  meetings — Time  for  holding. — When  a  meeting 
is  adjourned  to  a  fixed  hour,  and  only  a  part  of  the  members  attend 
at  the  precise  time  and  others  arrive  later,  or  some  depart  before 
any  action  is  taken,  it  becomes  important  to  determine  when  the  pro- 
ceedings may  lawfully  begin.  Upon  this  question  the  supreme  court 
of  New  Hampshire  said:  "The  law  has  fixed  no  time  at  or  within 
which  such  meeting  must  be  organized,  called  to  order  or  proceed  to 
business.  It  has  been  held  that  an  appearance  within  the  hour  after 
the  time  fixed  will  save  the  default  of  a  party  summoned  to  appear 
at  court  at  a  particular  hour;^^  and  in  former  times  the  proceedings 
of  town  meetings  have  been  set  aside  by  the  legislature  where  a  party 
have  been  in  attendance  precisely  at  the  hour,  and  have  at  once  com- 
menced and  dispatched  the  business  of  the  meeting  and  adjourned 
finally  before  the  arrival  of  the  members  of  another  party,  who,  rely- 
ing upon  the  usual  dilatory  mode  of  commencing  such  meetings,  had 
made  no  haste,  and  had  not  arrived.  And  it  seems  to  have  been  very 
properly  done.  A  reasonable  time  should  be  allowed  for  parties  in- 
terested to  be  present,  and  an  hour  may  in  ordinary  cases  be  well 
regarded  as  a  reasonable  time.  Special  cases  must  of  course  rest  on 
their  own  circumstances  where  they  show  cause  for  greater  delay. 
*  *  *  And  we  apprehend  no  more  definite  rule  can  be  laid  down 
than  this:  that  where  parties  assemble  in  pursuance  of  a  notice  or 
appointment,  and  remain  together  for  the  purpose  of  attending  to 
the  business  as  soon  as  it  is  found  convenient  or  practicable,  the  pro- 
ceedings will  be  held  regular,  though  the  delay  may  seem  unreasona- 
ble to  impatient  persons  or  to  those  who  have  engagements  elsewhere ; 

68   Ind.   507;    Commissioners  &c.  v.  cil,  is  not  lost  because  he  made  a 

Kent,   5   Neb.   227;    Genesee   Tp.   v.  mistake  in  his  attempt  to  publish  it, 

McDonald,  98  Pa.  St.  444,  451.  where  there  is  no  evidence  that  any 

'■  Magneau  v.  City  of  Fremont,  30  one  was  misled  or  harmed  thereby: 

Neb.  843;    s.  c.  47  N.  W.  280.     The  Gilmore  v.  City  of  Utica,  131  N.  Y. 

court  said,  however,  that  the  deci-  26;  s.  c.  29  N.  E.  841;  aff'g  s.  c.  15 

sions  of  the   courts  are   conflicting  N.  Y.  S.  274. 

upon  the  question  whether  the  call  ^^  Or  even  a  few  minutes  over  the 
must  specify  the  object  of  the  meet-  hour:  Nugent  v.  Wrinn,  44  Conn, 
ing  when  the  statute  is  silent.  -  -  -  273.  See  also,  Wilde  v.  Dunn,  11 
The  power  of  a  city  clerk  to  issue  a  Johns.  (N.  Y.J  459;  Baldwin  v.  Car- 
notice  for  bids  for  a  public  improve-  ter,  15  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  496;  Atwood 
ment,  as  directed  by  the  city  coun-  v.  Austin,  16  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  180. 


279  PUBLIC    BOARDS.  §    284 

and  no  one  of  the  persons  thus  assembled  would  be  heard  to  object 
to  the  regularity  of  the  proceedings  if  he  should  go  away  without 
having  made  a  suitable  ciTort  to  induce  the  proper  officers  or  persons 
to  proceed  with  the  business;  and  no  third  person  would  be  heard  to 
object  unless  he  could  show  that  his  rights  were  affected  by  the 
delay."39 

§  284.  Corporation  represented  by  governing  boards. — The  cor- 
porate body  at  large  of  a  municipal  corporation  is  usually  represented 
by  a  common  council  or  other  municipal  board.*"  Where  corporate 
powers  were  conferred  in  general  terms  upon  "townships,"  the  power 
was  decided  to  belong  to  the  board  of  directors,  and  not  to  the  citizens 
en  masse,  to  select  and  purchase  a  site  for  a  township  hall.*^  So, 
under  a  charter  which  imposes  upon  the  common  council  the  duty 
"to  manage,  regulate  and  control  the  property,  real  and  personal,  of 
the  city,"  the  expediency  of  destroying  and  removing  or  repairing  a 
city  building  is  to  be  determined  exclusively  by  the  council;  and  the 
fact  that  a  majority  of  the  voters  of  the  city  have  expressed  themselves 
against  the  destruction  under  an  order  of  a  prior  council  submitting 
the  question  to  them  does  not  affect  this  power.* ^  The  legislative 
and  discretionary  powers  of  the  council  can  be  exercised  only  by  the 
coming  together  of  the  members  who  compose  it,  and  its  purposes  or 
will  can  be  expressed  only  by  a  vote  embodied  in  some  distinct  and 
definite  form.*^  If  no  method  is  prescribed  by  law,  it  is  left  free  to 
act  either  by  resolution  or  ordinance.** 

§  285.  The  same  subject  continued-rMeeting  essential  to  oiRcial 
action. — As  a  general  rule  the  individual  members  of  a  public  body 
possessing  deliberative  functions  have  no  authority  to  bind  the  mu- 

^*  Kimball   v.   Marshall,   44   N.   H.  do  no  valid  act  except  as  a  board, 

465,  467.  and  such  act  must  be  by  ordinance 

*"  Richards  v.  Town  of  Clarksburg,  or  resolution  or  something  equiva- 

30  W.  Va.  491;  s.  c.  4  S.  E.  774;   20  lent  thereto");  Dey  v.  Mayor  &c.,  19 

Am.  &  Eng.  Corp.  Cas.  Ill;  Central  N.  J.  Eq.  412.    Cf.  Taylor  v.  McFad- 

Bridge  Co.  v.  City  of  Lowell,  15  Gray  den,  84  Iowa  262;  s.  c.  50  N.  W.  1070, 

(Mass.)  106;  Dey  v.  Mayor  &c.,  19  N.  where  a  resolution  for  the  levy  of  a 

J.  Eq.  412;  Schumm  v.  Seymour,  24  tax  was  offered  at  the  meeting  of  a 

N.  J.  Eq.  143;    Mayor  &c.  v.  Poult-  city  council  and  certified  to  the  audi- 

ney,  25  Md.  18.  tor,  but  the  record  failed  to  show 

"  State  V.  Haynes,  72  Mo.  377.  that  it  was  adopted  by  the  council, 

*-  Whitney  v.  City  of  New  Haven,  and   the   adoption,   notwithstanding 

58  Conn.  450;  s.  c.  20  Atl.  666.  this  omission,  was  inferred  from  the 

*=•  Schumm   v.    Seymour,   24   N.   J.  fact  that  it  was  offered  and  ordered 

Eq.  143    ("The  mayor  and  common  to  be  so  certified, 

council,"  said  the  court  in  that  case,  **  Halsey  v.  Rapid  Transit  R.  Co., 

"exist  only  as  a  board,  and  they  can  47  N.  .J.  Eq.  380;  s.  c.  20  Atl.  859. 


285 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS. 


280 


nicipality  b}'^  unoflficial  statements  made  at  different  times  and 
places.'^  "The  public  for  whom  they  act/'  said  the  supreme  court 
of  Ohio,  'Tiave  the  right  to  their  best  judgment  after  free  and  full 
discussion  and  consultation  among  themselves  of  and  upon  the  public 
matters  intrusted  to  them  in  the  session  provided  for  by  the 
statute."*^ 


*^  "It  would  be  of  most  dangerous, 
not  to  say  fatal  tendency,  to  sanction 
the  notion  that  parol  testimony  of 
witnesses,  were  it  clear  and  unquali- 
fied, could  be  admitted  at  the  end  of 
ten  or  twelve  years  to  establish  a 
contract  of  any  kind  by  a  municipal 
agency  required  by  law  to  act  within 
a  very  narrow  range  of  power  and 
to  keep  a  record  of  its  public  trans- 
actions:" Strong  V.  District  of  Co- 
lumbia, 4  Mackey  (D.  C.)  242,  249; 
s.  c.  9  Am.  &  Eng.  Corp.  Cas.  568. 
That  the  corporate  body  at  large  is 
represented  by  its  governing  body, 
acting  collectively  and  not  as  indi- 
viduals, is  illustrated  by  decisions 
in  mandamus  proceedings  to  com- 
pel the  performance  of  a  corporate 
duty.  The  peremptory  writ  may  be 
directed  to  the  corporation  in  its 
corporate  name,  or  to  the  proper 
officers  in  their  corporate  ca- 
pacity and  official  style  with- 
out naming  them,  and  resigna- 
tions by  officers  after  service  of  the 
alternative  writ  do  not  abate  the 
proceedings:  Commissioners  v.  Sel- 
lew,  99  U.  S.  624  (in  which  case  the 
court  said: — "The  board  is  in  effect 
the  officer,  and  the  members  of  the 
board  are  but  the  agents  who  per- 
form its  duties") ;  City  of  Little  Rock 
V.  Board  &c.,  42  Ark.  152;  County 
Com'rs  &c.  v.  King,  13  Fla.  451;  Mad- 
dox  V.  Graham,  2  Met.  (Ky.)  56; 
State  V.  Common  Council  &c.,  15 
Wis.  33;  Pegram  v.  Commissioners 
&c.,  65  N.  C.  114;  People  v.  Collins, 
19  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  56.  68. 

«McCortle  v.  Bates,  29  Ohio  St. 
419,  where  a  written  contract  signed 
by  a  majority  of  the  members  of  a 


township  board  of  education,  which 
stipulated  that  the  subscribers 
would  formally  ratify  the  same  at  a 
legal  meeting,  was  held  to  be  con- 
trary to  public  policy,  and  not  en- 
forceable against  them  personally. 
The  decision  is  recognized  as  "un- 
doubtedly sound,"  in  People  v.  Sto- 
well,  9  Abb.  N.  C.  (N.  Y.)  456,  but 
not  deemed  to  render  invalid  a  reg- 
ular resolution  of  the  common  coun- 
cil because  the  majority  acted  in 
pursuance  of  a  mutual  pledge  made 
before  the  body  met:  Reed  v.  In- 
habitants &c.,  152  Mass.  500;  s.  c.  25 
N.  E.  974.  But  a  committee  chosen 
by  a  town  to  erect  a  building  is  an 
agent,  not  a  board  of  public  officers, 
and  may  act  by  the  agreement  of  the 
individual  members  separately  ob- 
tained: Shea  V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  145 
Mass.  528:  s.  c.  14  N.  E.  764;  Haven 
V.  City  of  Lowell,  5  Met.  (Mass.)  35. 
"The  vestrymen  of  a  church,  as  the 
representatives  of  a  corporate  body, 
must  meet  in  order  to  take  official 
action.  They  can  not  act  singly,  upon 
the  street  or  wherever  they  may  be 
found.  This  is  because  they  are  re- 
quired to  deliberate.  It  is  the  right 
of  the  minority  to  meet  the  major- 
ity and  by  discussion  and  delibera- 
tion to  bring  them  over  if  possible 
to  their  own  views:"  Rittenhouse's 
Estate,  140  Pa.  St.  172,  176;  s.  c.  21 
Atl.  224;  Paola  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Commis- 
sioners &c.,  16  Kan.  302,  309.  It 
was  held,  obiter,  in  Butler  v.  City  of 
CharlestoM-n,  7  Gray  (Mass.)  12, 
that  if  the  mayor  and  aldermen  had 
power  to  retain  counsel  on  behalf  of 
the  city  it  must  be  exercised  by  their 
official  act  at  a  lawful  meeting  of  the 


381 


PUBLIC    BOARDS. 


§  286 


§  286.    The  same  subject  continued — Delegation  of  powers. — It  is 

well  settled  that  the  legislative  powers  of  a  municipal  corporation 
can  not  be  delegated  to  others;  such  powers  are  in  the  nature  of 
public  trusts  conferred  upon  the  legislative  assembly  of  the  corpora- 
tion for  the  public  benefit,  and  can  not  be  vicariously  exercised. 
Thus,  where  a  charter  provided  that  a  city  council  should  have  power 
"to  restrain,  prohibit  and  suppress  dram-shops,*'  etc.,  an  ordinance 
of  that  body  prohibiting  the  sale  of  liquor  without  a  license,  but  au- 
thorizing the  city  treasurer  to  fix  the  fee  for  a  license,  and  the  term 
thereof,  within  certain  limits,  was  held  to  be  void,  as  an  unwarranta- 
ble transfer  of  discretion  designed  to  be  exercised  by  the  council 
alone.*'^     So,  also,  where  the  charter  of  a  street  railway  company 


board,  and  a  contract  made  by  a 
majority  of  the  board  informally 
would  not  be  binding,  nor  could  a 
custom  of  the  city  to  pay  bills  con- 
tracted in  that  manner  create  a 
valid  claim.  See  also,  on  the  last 
point,  Sikes  v.  Hatfield,  13  Gray 
(Mass.)  347.  The  fact  that  the 
chairman  of  a  town  board  of  super- 
visors, in  the  presence  of  another 
supervisor,  told  the  pathmaster  to 
fix  up  a  town  road  so  that  it  could 
be  traveled,  and  that  the  board  after- 
wards allowed  him  a  portion  of  his 
claim  for  the  work  done,  does  not 
amount  to  the  making  of  a  contract 
with  him  by  the  board  so  as  to  en- 
title him  to  sue  the  town  for  the 
balance  of  his  claim.  "To  bind  the 
town  the  supervisors  must  act  as  a 
town  board:"  Dieschel  v.  Town  of 
Maine,  81  Wis.  553;  s.  c.  51  N.  W. 
880;  Hardin  Co.  v.  Louisville  &c.  R. 
Co.,  92  Ky.  412;  s.  c.  17  S.  W.  860; 
Independent  School  Dist.  v.  Wirtner, 
85  Iowa  387;  s.  c.  52  N.  W.  243;  Com- 
monwealth V.  Howard,  149  Pa.  St. 
302;  s.  c.  24  Atl.  308;  Jackson  v.  Col- 
lins, 16  N.  Y.  S.  651.  See.however, 
for  modified  views,  Athearn  v.  Inde- 
pendent Dist.  &c.,  33  Iowa  105;  Hull 
V.  Independent  Dist.  &c.,  82  Iowa 
686;  s.  c.  46  N.  W.  1053.  A  bill  to 
enjoin  collection  of  a  school  tax  al- 
leged that  the  determination  to 
levy  was  not  made  by  the  school  di- 


rectors at  a  regular  or  special  meet- 
ing, nor  in  their  corporate  capacity, 
but  as  individuals.  Held,  that  such 
allegations  did  not  charge  that  the 
directors  acted  in  the  matter  with- 
out meeting  together:  Lawrence  v. 
Traner,  136  111.  474;  s.  c.  27  N.  E, 
197. 

*'City  of  East  St.  Louis  v.  Weh- 
rung,  50  111.  28.  See  further,  as  to 
the  delegation  by  various  municipal 
bodies  of  powers  vested  in  them,  the 
exercise  of  which  involves  questions 
of  expediency.  Day  v.  Green,  4  Cush. 
(Mass.)  433;  Coffin  v.  Nantucket,  5 
Cush.  (Mass.)  269;  Ruggles  v.  In- 
habitants &c.,  11  Cush.  (Mass.)  433 
State  V.  Mayor  &c.,  34  N.  J.  L.  163 
Ruggles  V.  Collier,  43  Mo.  353.  359 
Board  &c.  v.  Brush,  77  111.  59;  Mayor 
&c.  V.  Scharf,  54  Md.  499;  Cooley 
Const.  Lim.,  §  204;  Thompson  v. 
Schermerhorn,  6  N.  Y.  92.  In 
Matthews  v.  City  of  Alexandria,  68 
Mo.  115,  and  City  of  Oakland  v.  Car- 
pentier,  13  Cal.  540,  cities  empow- 
ered to  build  and  regulate  wharves 
undertook  to  confer  the  right  upon 
lessees  or  contractors.  Cf.  Gregory 
V.  City  of  Bridgeport,  41  Conn.  76 
(where  under  an  express  power  to 
"ordain  by-laws  relating  to  wharves,' 
and  a  general  authority  to  appoint 
necessary  officers  to  carry  by-laws 
into  effect,  an  ordinance  appointing 
a   superintendent   of   wharves   with 


386 


PUBLIC    COKPOKATIONS. 


282 


contained  a  provision  that  "said  railroad  shall  he  laid  out  by  the 
mayor  and  aldermen  in  like  manner  as  highways  are  laid  out,"  and 
a  single  track  railroad  was  laid  out  by  the  mayor  and  aldermen  with- 
out any  turnouts,  but  with  a  provision  in  the  record  of  the  laying 
out  that  "said  horse  railroad  company  may  construct  such  suitable 
turnouts  on  either  side  of  said  center  line  as  they  may  find  necessary 
in  the  prosecution  of  the  business,"  etc.,  it  was  held  that  the  company 
could  not  construct  a  turnout,  although  necessary  for  their  business 
and  required  for  public  convenience,  without  a  laying  out  by  the 
mayor  and  aldermen.*^ 


power  to  order  and  regulate  the 
mooring  of  vessels  was  held  to  be 
valid);  Birdsall  v.  Clark,  73  N.  Y. 
73;  State  v.  Bell,  34  Ohio  St.  194; 
Northern  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Mayor  &c.,  21 
Md.  93;  Evansville  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  City 
of  Evansville,  15  Ind.  395;  State  v. 
Hauser,  63  Ind.  155;  Phelps  v.  May- 
or &c.,  112  N.  Y.  216;  s.  c.  19  N.  E. 
408;  Young  v.  Black  Hawk  Co.,  66 
Iowa  460;  s.  c.  23  N.  W.  923;  Han- 
non  V.  Agnew,  96  N.  Y.  439;  City  of 
Indianapolis  v.  Indianapolis  &c.  Gas 
Co.,  66  Ind.  396;  Hickey  v.  Chicago 
&c.  R.  Co.,  6  111.  App.  172;  Bibel  v. 
People,  67  111.  172,  175;  Davis  v. 
Read,  65  N.  Y.  566;  In  re  Trustees 
&c..  57  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  500;  City  of 
Kinmundy  v.  Mayhan,  72  111.  462; 
Darling  v.  City  of  St.  Paul,  19  Minn. 
389;  Meuser  v.  Risdon,  36  Cal.  239; 
State  V.  Fiske,  9  R.  I.  94;  Smith  v. 
Morse,  2  Cal.  524;  Whyte  v.  Mayor 
&c.,  2  Swan  (Tenn.)  364;  Franke  v. 
Paducah  &c.  Co.,  88  Ky.  467;  s.  c.  11 
S.  W.  432,  718;  Gale  v.  Village  of 
Kalamazoo,  23  Mich.  344;  s.  c.  9  Am. 
R.  80;  Lord  v.  City  of  Oconto,  47 
Wis.  386;  s.  c.  2  N.  W.  785;  Schenley 
V.  Commonwealth,  36  Pa.  St.  62; 
Hydes  v.  Joyes,  4  Bush  (Ky.)  464; 
s.  c.  96  Am.  D.  311;  State  v.  Mayor 
&c.,  26  N.  J.  L.  444;  State  v.  Mayor 
&c.,  42  N.  J.  L".  395;  State  v.  Mayor 
&c.,  51  N.  J.  L.  498;  s.  c.  18  Atl.  116; 
28  Am.  &  Eng.  Corp.  Cas.  161;  Clark 
V.  Mayor  &c..  12  Wheat.  40;  Minne- 
apolis Gas  Light  Co.  v.  City  of  Min- 


neapolis, 36  Minn.  159;  s.  c.  30  N. 
W.  450  (holding  that  power  con- 
ferred by  the  city  charter  on  the  city 
council  to  provide  for  lighting  the 
city  and  altering  lamp  districts  can 
not  be  delegated  to  a  committee  for 
final  decision) ;  Dillard  v.  Webb,  55 
Ala.  468;  City  of  East  St.  Louis  v. 
Thomas,  11  111.  App.  283;  Pinney  v. 
Brown,  60  Conn.  164;  s.  c.  22  Atl. 
430;  Mullarky  v.  Town  of  Cedar 
Falls,  19  Iowa  21;  Milhau  v.  Sharp, 

17  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  435;  s.  c.  27  N.  Y. 
611;  Lyon  v.  Jerome,  26  Wend.  (N. 
Y.)  485;  s.  c.  37  Am.  D.  271;  Thom- 
son V.  Mayor  &c.,  61  Mo.  282;  Sco- 
field  V.  City  of  Lansing,  17  Mich. 
437;  Lauenstein  v.  City  of  Fond  du 
Lac,  28  Wis.  336;  Sheehan  v.  Glee- 
son,  46  Mo.  100;  City  of  Stockton  v. 
Creanor,  45  Cal.  643  (holding  that  a 
common  council  can  not  confer  upon 
a  committee  of  its  own  members  a 
power  vested  in  it  to  accept  a  bid  or 
award  a  contract  for  grading  a 
street). 

*'^  Concord  v.  Concord  Horse  R. 
Co.,  65  N.  H.  30;  s.  c.  18  Atl.  87. 
Where  a  statute  provides  that  cer- 
tain powers  thereby  conferred  upon 
a  mayor  and  council  shall  be  exe- 
cuted by  them  in  a  certain  manner, 
the  unauthorized  doings  of  an  officer 
who  undertakes  to  act  for  them  can 
not  be  validated  by  ratification:  the 
doctrine  of  estoppel  does  not  apply 
to  such  a  case:  Mayor  &c.  v.  Porter, 

18  Md.  289;  s.  c.  79  Am.  D.  686. 


283  PUBLIC   BOARDS.  §    287 

§  287.  The  same  subject  continued. — By  statute  in  Connecticut 
it  is  the  duty  of  tlie  selectmen  to  "superintend  the  concerns  of  the 
town."'*"  The  person  first  named  on  a  plurality  of  ballots  is  first 
selectman,  "and,  in  the  absence  of  a  special  appointment,  shall  be 
ex  officio  the  agent  of  such  town.'"^**  A  board  of  selectmen  appointed 
a  superintendent  of  highways  and  a  "town  agent."  The  town  had 
previously  at  a  legal  meeting  designated  the  first  selectman  as  super- 
intendent of  highways,  but  had  made  no  special  appointment  of  a 
town  agent.  It  was  held  that  both  appointments  by  the  selectmen 
were  void.  In  respect  of  the  first.  Chief  Justice  Andrews  said: 
"The  selectmen  had  no  authority  to  make  such  an  appointment. 
The  selectmen  of  a  town  are,  to  be  sure,  its  general  prudential  officers, 
and  are  charged  with  the  duty  of  superintending  the  concerns  of  the 
town,  but  in  so  doing  they  act  as  the  agents  of  the  town  and  exercise 
a  delegated  authority.  Their  powers  are  for  the  most  part  conferred 
by  some  statute.  In  respect  to  the  matters  mentioned  in  these  stat- 
utes they  can  not  go  beyond  the  special  limits  of  the  statute.  In 
other  matters  long  usage  has  given  to  the  selectmen  of  towns  certain 
powers.  In  either  case  their  authority  is  in  the  nature  of  a  personal 
trust  to  be  performed  by  themselves.  They  have  no  power  to  appoint 
another  to  perform  the  duties  that  devolve  on  them."  And,  touching 
the  appointment  of  town  agent,  he  continued :  "Undoubtedly  a  town, 
like  any  other  corporation,  may  appoint  an  agent  for  any  proper 
purpose.  Possibly  a  town  may  appoint  an  agent  to  perform  any  or 
all  duties  usually  performed  by  the  selectmen,  except  such  as  are 
specifically  imposed  on  the  selectmen  by  the  constitution  or  by  some 
statute.  But  the  selectmen,  being  themselves  agents,  can  not  appoint 
another  or  one  of  themselves  to  be  an  agent  for  their  own  town.  That 
rule  of  law  governs  which  is  found  in  the  maxim  "Delegata  potestas 
non  potest  delegare."  Certainly  they  could  not  unless  specially  em- 
powered so  to  do.  They  would  have  no  such  authority  by  virtue  of 
their  general  powers."^^  This  is  an  application  of  correct  principles 
to  municipal  boards. 

§  288.  Delegation  of  powers — A  Pennsylvania  case. — A  Pennsyl- 
vania statute  provided  that  two  county  commissioners  should  form 
a  board  for  the  transaction  of  business,  and  when  convened  in  pursu- 
ance of  notice  or  according  to  adjournment  should  be  competent  to 
perform  the  duties  appertaining  to  their  office.     The  commissioners 

"  Gen.    Stats.    1888,    §    64    et   seq.,         ™  Gen.  St.  1888,  §  48. 
where  certain  duties  are  also  par-        "  Pinney  v.  Brown,  60  Conn.  164; 
ticularized.  s.  c.  22  Atl.  430. 


§    289  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  284 

contracted  with  one  D.  to  build  a  court-house. """'^  D.  made  a  contract 
with  the  phiintiff  to  supply  him  with  brick.  After  the  plaintiff  had 
delivered  part  of  the  brick  called  for  by  his  contract  he  refused  to 
deliver  the  rest  on  the  ground  that  D.  had  not  paid  for  the  bricks 
already  delivered;  Avhereupon  two  of  the  commissioners  went  to  the 
plaintiff,  and  with  D.'s  assent  told  him  to  proceed  with  the  delivery 
of  the  bricks  and  that  they  would  pay  him.  At  that  time  there  was 
more  than  enough  money  due  to  D.  from  the  county  to  pay  the  plain- 
tiff for  the  bricks  to  be  delivered.  It  did  not  appear  that  the  other 
commissioners  were  informed  of  or  consulted  about  the  matter  or 
that  it  was  discussed  at  any  regular  session  of  the  board.  The  court 
submitted  the  question  to  the  jury  whether  the  two  commissioners 
acted  in  their  official  capacity  or  merely  as  individuals,  and  a  verdict 
against  the  county  was  sustained.  The  decision  "may  be  supported 
on  the  ground  that  the  contract  of  the  commissioners  was  merely  an 
incident  to  the  main  contract  for  the  building,  regularly  made,  and 
that  the  county  could  not  possibly  be  subjected  to  any  liability  under 
it  in  excess  of  the  amount  provided  in  the  original  undertaking  with 
D.  But  the  opinion  of  the  court  does  not  touch  these  features  of  the 
case,  and  its  reasoning  is  superficial  and  inadequate  of  itself  to  justify 
the  ruling  of  the  court  below.^^ 

§  289.  The  same  subject  continued — The  rule  limited. — But  while 
a  council  or  a  similar  body  can  not  delegate  all  the  power  conferred 
upon  it  by  the  legislature  in  a  given  instance,  it  may  like  every  other 
corporation  do  its  ministerial  work  by  agents  or  committees.^*    Where 

^-  This  seems  to  have  been  done  at  ney  v.  City  of  New  Haven,  58  Conn, 

a  regular  meeting  of  the  board.  450;  s.  c.  20  Atl.  666,  where  a  char- 

''^  Jefferson    Co.   v.    Slagle,    66    Pa.  ter  provision  that  the  board  of  pub- 

St.    202.     See    Cooper    v.    Lampeter  lie  works  should  execute  all  orders 

Tp.,  8  Watts   (Pa.)   125    (making  a  of    the    council    relating    to    parks, 

distinction  between  acts  done  by  one  etc.,  did  not  deprive  the  council  of 

member  in  the  ordinary  routine  of  authority    to    delegate    to    the    city 

his  duty  and  others  of  a  nature  de-  auditor  the   work   of   destroying  a 

manding  consultation  and  delibera-  public  building  situated  in  a  park; 

tion — between   the    repairing   of   an  Gilmore  v.  City  of  Utica,  131  N.  Y. 

old  bridge  and  the  building  of  a  new  26;   s.  c.  29  N.  E.  841;  aff'g  s.  c.  15 

one)  ;    Wolcott  v.  Town  of  Wolcott,  N.  Y.  S.  274,  where  clerk  of  council 

19   Vt.   37;    Throop   Public   OflBcers,  directed  to  publish  notice  of  meet- 

§  109.  ing  was  permitted  to  fix  the  day; 

^Holland  v.  State,  23  Fla.  123;  s.  distinguishing   State  v.   Mayor  &c., 

c.   1   So.   521;    Burlington  v.   Denni-  25    N.    J.    L.    309;     Bullitt    Co.    v. 

son,  42  N.  J.  L.   165;    Kramrath  v.  Washer,  130  U.  S.  142;  s.  c.  9  S.  Ct. 

City  of  Albany,  53  Hun  (N.  Y.)  206;  499.     Under    a    statute    authorizing 

s.  c.  6  N.  Y.  S.  54;  Damon  v.  Inhabi-  the  county  commissioners  "to  audit 

tants  &c.,  2  Pick.  (Mass.)  345;  Whit-  the  accounts  of  all  officers  having 


285 


PUBLIC    BOARDS. 


§    289 


a  cit}'  council  was  vested  with  power  to  cause  sidewalks  in  the  city  to 
be  constructed,  the  supreme  court  of  the  United  States  decided  that 
it  might  authorize  the  mayor  and  the  chairman  of  a  committee  on 
streets  and  alleys  to  make  in  its  behalf  and  pursuant  to  its  directions 
a  contract  for  doing  work,  and  also  give  to  the  owners  of  abutting 
lots  the  privilege  of  selecting  one  of  several  specified  materials,  re- 
serving to  the  chairman  of  the  committee  authority  to  select  in  case 
the  lot-owners  failed.^^  So,  also,  in  the  exercise  of  a  like  authority, 
the  council  may  refer  applications  for  the  location  or  alteration  of 
streets  to  a  committee  to  inquire  into  the  matter  and  report.^''  And 
where  the  council  is  the  sole  judge  of  the  election  of  its  members,  it 
may  upon  a  contest  appoint  a  committee  to  take  testimony  and  to  re- 
port the  facts  and  evidence  to  the  council.^^ 


the  care,  management,  collection  or 
disbursement"  of  county  moneys, 
the  commissioners  have  power  to 
contract  with  an  expert  to  examine 
the  county  treasurer's  accounts: 
Duncan  v.  Board  &c.,  101  Ind.  403; 
School  Town  of  Milford  v.  Zeigler,  1 
Ind.  App.  138;  s.  c.  27  N.  E.  303;  Gil- 
lett  v.  Board  &c.,  67  111.  256;  City  of 
Alton  V.  Mulledy,  21  111.  76;  Stew- 
art v.  City  of  Council  Bluffs,  58 
Iowa  642;  s.  c.  12  N.  W.  718;  State 
V.  Hauser,  63  Ind.  155;  Edwards  v. 
City  of  Watertown,  24  Hun  (N.  Y.) 
426.  The  English  Municipal  Corpo- 
rations Act  of  1882,  §  22,  provides 
that  "the  council  may  appoint  out 
of  their  body  such  and  so  many  com- 
mittees as  they  think  fit,  for  any 
purpose  which  in  the  opinion  of  the 
council  would  be  better  regulated 
and  managed  by  means  of  such  com- 
mittees; but  the  acts  of  every  such 
committee  shall  be  submitted  to  the 
council  for  their  approval."  See 
also,  Gregory  v.  City  of  Bridgeport, 
41  Conn.  76,  cited  in  note  47  to 
§  286,  ante. 

^'^  Hitchcock  V.  Galveston,  96  U.  S. 
341.  In  the  same  case  it  was  also 
held  that,  if  the  committee  were  ex- 
ercising an  unlawful  delegation  of 
power,  it  was  competent  for  the 
council  to  ratify  their  acts.  See 
also,  as  to  ratification.  School  Town 


of  Milford  v.  Powner,  126  Ind.  528; 
s.  c.  26  N.  E.  484;  Salmon  v.  Haynes, 
50  N.  J.  L.  97;  s.  c.  11  Atl.  151;  Han- 
nibal &c.  R.  Co.  V.  Marion  Co.,  36 
Mo.  294.  But  where  the  common 
council  was  required  by  charter  to 
cause  certain  work  to  be  done  by 
contract  or  otherwise,  an  ordinance 
directing  the  superintendent  of 
streets  to  "cause  the  work  to  be 
done"  was  declared  to  be  unauthor- 
ized:  Birdsall  v.  Clark,  73  N.  Y.  73. 

'"Preble  v.  City  of  Portland,  45 
Maine  241.  It  is  no  objection  to  a 
sewer  assessment  that  the  mayor 
and  aldermen  called  in  another  per- 
son to  assist  them  in  making  it: 
Collins  V.  Holyoke,  146  Mass.  298; 
s.  c.  15  N.  E.  908.  Council  may  or- 
der a  sewer  to  be  built  by  a  com- 
mittee: Dorey  v.  City  of  Boston, 
146  Mass.  336,  339;  s.  c.  15  N.  E. 
897,  and  cases  cited.  Where  the 
members  of  the  council  have  per- 
sonal knowledge  of  a  fact,  they  may 
act  without  any  further  or  formal 
inquiry:  Bissell  v.  City  of  Jefferson- 
ville,  24  How.  287,  296;  Main  v.  Fort 
Smith,  49  Ark.  480;  s.  c.  5  S.  W. 
801;  Commonwealth  v.  City  of  Pitts- 
burg, 14  Pa.  St.  177. 

"  "This  is  a  well-known  course  of 
proceeding  in  every  body  having 
power  to  judge  of  the  election  of  its 
own  members,  in  case  an  election  is 


§    290  PUBLIC  COKrOKATIONS.  286 

§  290.  Constitution  of  council. — In  the  old  English  municipal 
corporations,  when  the  mayor  or  other  chief  officer  was  not  present 
at  a  corporate  assembly,  it  could  transact  no  business  of  the  corpora- 
tion, for  without  his  presence  at  its  head  no  corporate  act  done  was 
valid. ^^  City  charters  in  this  country  do  not  always  agree  in  the 
constituents  of  the  council  or  governing  body.  In  some  cases  there 
is  a  separate  council  which  is  only  one  of  the  parts  of  the  city  legis- 
lature, and  requiring  the  approval  of  another  board  or  of  the  mayor 
acting  separately,  as  the  governor  does,  to  complete  their  action. 
But  most  of  our  cities,  in  their  earlier  stages,  if  not  permanently, 
have  had  a  council  where  the  mayor  sits  in  person  and  over  whose 
action  he  has  no  veto.  In  all  such  corporations  he  has  been  deemed 
a  member  as  clearly  as  the  aldermen.^®  Where  the  charter  provided 
"that  the  intendant  of  police  shall  have  a  seat  in  the  board  of  commis- 
sioners, and  when  present  shall  preside  therein;  in  his  absence  the 
board  shall  appoint  a  chairman  pro  tempore,"  it  was  held  that  the 
intendant  was  constituted  a  member  of  the  board. ®°  And  when  the 
language  of  the  organic  act  is  that  "the  mayor  and  councilmen  shall 
have  power,"  etc.,  the  co-ordinate  action  of  both  is  required  before 
their  action  can  have  any  binding  or  obligatory  force. ^^ 

§  291.  The  same  subject  continued. — If,  however,  by  a  fair  con- 
struction of  the  law  the  body  is  composed  exclusively  of  trustees  or 
councilmen,  the  mayor  is  not  a  member  of  the  council  and  has  no 
right  to  preside  or  vote  therein.^-     It  was  decided  by  the  United 

contested:"  Salmon  v.  Haynes,  50  N.  ^"Intendant  &c.  v.  Sorrell,  1  Jones 

J.  L.  97,  100;  s.  c.  11  Atl.  151.     The  L.    (N.   C.)    49.     Judge    Dillon   says 

powers   of   committees   may   be   re-  that  "whether  the  mere  fact  that  a 

voked   by   the  appointing  power   or  single  unauthorized  person  is  by  a 

controlled  by  new  members  added,  mistaken  construction  of  the  char- 

who  can  not  be  lawfully  excluded  ter    allowed    to    participate    in    the 

from  participation  in  their  proceed-  transactions    of    a    meeting   of    the 

ings:    Damon  v.   Inhabitants  &c.,  2  council    would    in    this    country    be 

Pick.  (Mass.)  345.  held  necessarily  to  avoid  them  is  a 

^**  Richards  v.  Town  of  Clarksburg,  question  which  perhaps  remains  yet 

30  W.  Va.  491,  497;  s.  c.  4  S.  E.  774;  to  be  settled:"  Dillon  Munic.  Corp., 

20  Am.  &  Eng.  Corp.  Cas.  Ill;  Will-  §273,  n. 

cock  Munic.  Corp.,  §§  94,  102;   Reg.  "  Saxton   v.    Beach,    50    Mo.    488, 

v.  Bailiffs,  2  Ld.  Raym.  1232.     See  Saxton  v.  City  of  St.  Joseph,  60  Mo. 

§  276,  ante.  153. 

^^  People    V.    Harshaw,    60    Mich.  "^  Cochran   v.    McCleary,   22    Iowa 

200;  s.  c.  26  N.  W.  860,  holding  that  75.     See  also,  Reynolds  v.  Baldwin, 

a  provision  in  a  charter  that  "the  1    La.   An.    162;    Commonwealth   v. 

mayor,  recorder  and  aldermen,  when  Kepner,   10   Phila.    (Pa.)    510;    Ach- 

assembled  together,  shall  constitute  ley's   Case,   4   Abb.   Pr.    (N.   Y.)    35. 

the    common    council,"    makes    the  "Where  a  charter  provided  that  the 

mayor  a  member  of  the  council.  "common  council  shall  consist  of  the 


287 


PUBLIC    BOARDS. 


§    292 


States  circuit  court  that  under  a  statute  providing  for  the  appoint- 
ment and  qualification  of  a  board  of  tax  commissioners  to  consist  of 
a  definite  number,  the  board  was  not  in  existence  until  all  had  duly 
qualified,  and  the  proceedings  of  a  majority  were  therefore  of  no 
vaiidity.^^  A  change  in  the  membership  of  a  board  pending  proceed- 
ings before  it  does  not  require  that  the  matters  be  taken  up  de  novo. 
Thus,  a  county  commissioner  may  act  with  his  associates  in  steps 
preliminary  to  laying  out  a  way,  and  his  successor  may  afterwards 
act  in  his  place  in  completing  the  proceedings,  where  the  acts  of  the 
former  are  separable  from  those  of  the  latter.®* 

§  292.  Conflicting  councils — ^Kerr  v.  Trego. — Where  two  bodies 
claim  to  be  regularly  organized  as  the  common  council  of  a  city,  and 
each  is  proceeding  to  act  as  such,  to  the  great  detriment  of  the  public 
interests,  may  the  wrongful  body  be  restrained  from  acting  by  means 
of  the  equity  remedy  of  injunction?  This  was  the  question  which 
arose  and  was  determined  by  the  supreme  court  of  Pennsylvania  in 
Kerr  v.  Trego. ''^  An  ordinance  of  the  common  council  of  Phila- 
delphia provided  that  the  clerk  and  assistant  clerk  elect  should  con- 
tinue in  office  until  the  organization  of  a  new  council  (after  an  elec- 
tion) and  until  their  sucessors  should  be  duly  elected,  and  it  appeared 


mayor  and  aldermen,"  etc.,  and  that 
a  vote  to  levy  a  certain  tax  should 
be  passed  by  two-thirds  vote  of  the 
"members  elect,"  it  was  held  that 
the  mayor  was  not  entitled  to  vote 
to  make  up  the  two-thirds:  Mills  v. 
Gleason,  11  Wis.  470. 

^^  Schenck  v.  Peay,  1  Woolw.  175. 
But  see  Hartshorn  v.  Schoff,  58  N. 
H.  197. 

^  "The  board  are  a  court,  and  the 
court,  is  not  dissolved  by  one  com- 
missioner going  out  and  another 
coming  in.  It  continues  to  be  the 
sariie  court  though  its  personality 
be  changed:"  Chapman  v.  County 
Com'rs,  79  Maine  267,  269;  s.  c.  9 
Atl.  728.  As  to  the  common  mode 
of  organizing  a  municipal  body 
where  part  of  its  members  are  con- 
stantly in  office,  and  some  new  mem- 
bers are  annually  infused,  see  Kerr 
V.  Trego,  47  Pa.  St.  292.  Under  Pa. 
act  of  1887,  §  4,  providing  for  certain 
new  executive  officers  in  cities, 
"which  shall  be  chosen  by  city  coun- 


cils," the  existing  council  at  the 
time  of  change  should  choose  such 
officers:  Commonwealth  v.  Wyman, 
137  Pa.  St.  508;  s.  c.  21  Atl.  389. 
Where  two  justices  of  the  peace 
"whose  terms  will  soonest  expire" 
were  constituted  members  of  a 
board,  it  was  not  necessary  that  the 
record  should  show  affirmatively 
that  the  two  justices  present  ful- 
filled the  requirement.  If  they  ap- 
peared and  acted,  the  presumption 
is  that  they  were  entitled  to  sit  as 
members:  Newaygo  Co.  Mfg.  Co.  v. 
Echtinaw,  81  Mich.  416;  s.  c.  45  N. 
W.  1010.  Where  the  members  of  a 
common  council  sit  as  a  court  to  try 
charges  against  an  oflSicer,  if  one  of 
their  number  presides  over  the  tri- 
bunal he  has  a  right  to  vote  upon 
the  question  of  guilt  in  the  absence 
of  any  statute  or  ordinance  to  the 
contrary:  Asbell  v.  Mayor  &c.,  80 
Ga.  503;  s.  c.  5  S.  E.  500. 
^  47  Pa.  St.  292. 


§  293  PUBLIC  conpoiiATiONS.  288 

that  on  the  day  and  at  the  hour  appointed  by  law  for  the  organization 
of  the  new  council  there  were  present  twenty-three  members  whose 
terms  had  yet  one  year  to  run,  among  whom  was  the  president  of  the 
preceding  year.  The  clerk  and  president  were  in  their  usual  places 
and  proceeded  first  to  call  the  roll  of  all  the  members  whose  terms 
of  office  had  not  yet  expired,  and  then  to  call  on  the  new  members 
to  present  their  certificate  of  election  that  their  names  might  be  en- 
rolled. Further  business  was  interrupted  by  the  disorderly  conduct 
of  the  new  members,  who  proclaimed  one  of  their  number  as  presi- 
dent, and  at  a  subsequent  meeting  assumed  to  act  as  the  lawful 
common  council.  The  court  held,  1.  That  there  was  a  wrong  sub- 
ject to  redress  by  judicial  power;  2.  That  injunction  was  the  ap- 
propriate remedy;  3.  That  one  of  the  conflicting  bodies  might  main- 
tain the  action  against  the  other,  the  attorney-general  not  having 
the  sole  right  to  file  such  a  bill ;  4.  That  the  maintenance  of  the  reg- 
ular forms  of  organization  was  the  test  of  right;  5.  That  the  mode 
of  organization  by  the  members  who  continued  in  office  was  legiti- 
mate and  according  to  common  usage ;  6.  That  an  intention  by  the 
complainants  to  use  their  power  fraudulently  did  not  defeat  their 
right  to  the  injunction.  The  opinion  of  the  court  is  interspersed 
with  wise  and  liberal  observations  in  respect  of  the  proper  limits  of 
judicial  interference  in  cases  of  this  kind,  and  is  strongly  supported 
by  the  temperate  judgment  of  Judge  Dillon.^® 

§  293.  Acts  of  de  facto  councils. — In  applying  the  principle  that 
the  acts  of  de  facto  officers,  properly  so  called,  are  valid,  no  distinction 
is  made  between  officers  whose  duties  are  executive  or  administra- 
tive and  those  who  compose  the  council  or  other  municipal  legis- 
lative body.''^     But  an  office  which  has  no  de  jure  existence  can  not 

«« Dillon    Munic.    Corp.,    §    275,   n.  ens,  5  Hill  (N.  Y.)  616;  Pritchett  v. 

See,  however.  In  re  Sawyer,  124  U.  People,   6   111.   525;    Cochran   v.   Mc- 

S.  200;   s.  c.  S.  Ct.  482,  and  the  dis-  Cleary,  22  Iowa  75,  84;  Town  of  De- 

senting    opinion    of    Chief    Justice  corah   v.    Bullis,    25    Iowa    12;    Car- 

Waite;    Demarest    v.    Wickham,    63  land  v.  Commissioners  &c.,  5  Mont. 

N.  Y.  320;  High  Injunctions,  §  1312.  579;  s.  c.  6  Pac.  24;  State  v.  Goowin, 

"Roche  v.  Jones,  87  Va.  484;  s.  c.  69  Tex.  55;  s.  c.  5  S.  W.  678  (where 
12  S.  E.  965;  De  Grave  v.  Mayor  &c.,  a  municipal  election  ordered  by  de 
4  Car.  &  P.  Ill;  State  v.  Jacobs,  17  facto  mayor  and  aldermen  was  de- 
Ohio  143;  Williams  v.  Inhabitants  clared  valid);  Dugan  v.  Farrier,  47 
&c.,  21  Pick.  (Mass.)  75;  Scovill  v.  N.  J.  L.  383;  s.  c.  1  Atl.  751  (where 
City  of  Cleveland,  1  Ohio  St.  126;  a  member  of  the  board  who  was  in- 
Trustees  &c.  v.  Hills,  6  Cowen  (N.  eligible  to  the  office  of  president 
Y.)  23;  People  v.  Runkle,  9  Johns,  claimed  the  right  to  preside  and  as- 
(N.  Y.)  147;  People  v.  Bartlett,  6  sumed  the  chair.  The  board  acqui- 
Wend.   (N.  Y.)   422;   People  v.  Stev-  esced   and   proceeded   to   appoint   a 


289 


PUBLIC    BOARDS. 


294 


have  a  de  facto  inciimbent."^^  Accordingly,  where  a  town  attempted 
to  reorganize  under  an  act  wliieh  did  not  apply  to  it,  a  new  council 
differently  constituted  from  that  of  the  old  corporation  was  declared 
to  have  no  power  to  pass  a  valid  ordinance."*  Where  a  county  court 
was  abolished  by  act  of  the  legislature  and  its  powers  transferred 
to  a  board  of  county  commissioners,  who  proceeded  to  issue  bonds 
under  their  new  authority,  and  the  statute  was  subsequently  held  to 
be  unconstitutional,  the  bonds  were  without  validity  even  in  the 
hands  of  bona  fide  holders.^" 

§  294.  ftuorum  of  definite  body. — "The  quorum  of  a  body  may  be 
defined  to  be  that  number  of  the  body  which  when  assembled  in  their 
proper  place  will  enable  them  to  transact  their  proper  business,  or, 
in  other  words,  that  number  that  makes  the  lawful  body,  and  gives 
them  the  power  to  pass  a  law  or  ordinance."^**  When  the  statute 
law  creating  it  is  silent  as  to  what  shall  constitute  a  legal  assembly 
of  a  definite  body,  the  common  law,  both  in  England  and  in  this 
country,  is  well  settled  that  the  majority  of  the  members  elect  shall 
constitute  a  legal  body.'^^     This  rule  of  the  common  law  can  not  be 


county  collector.  The  action  of  the 
board  was  sustained) ;  Spaulding  v. 
City  of  Saginaw,  84  Mich.  134;  s.  c. 
47  N.  W.  444;  In  re  Strahl,  16  Iowa 
369.  See  also,  Koontz  v.  Burgess 
&c.,  64  Md.  134;  s.  c.  20  Atl.  1039; 
Lockhart  v.  City  of  Troy,  48  Ala. 
579;  Rex  v.  Mayor  &c.,  8  Mod.  Ill; 
People  V.  Hopson,  1  Denio  (N.  Y.) 
574;  People  v.  Nostrand,  46  N.  Y. 
375;  Hamlin  v.  Dingman,  5  Lans. 
(N.  Y.)  61;  Olmsted  v.  Dennis,  77 
N.  Y.  378;  Riddle  v.  Bedford  Co., 
7  S.  &  R.  (Pa.)  386;  Lever  v.  Mc- 
Glachlin,  28  Wis.  364;  Cushing  v. 
Frankfort,  57  Maine  521.  As  to  ap- 
pointment of  an  officer  by  less  than 
a  quorum,  see  §  296,  post.  It  was 
held  in  a  well  considered  case  in 
England  that  an  act  done  by  a  defi- 
nite body  was  not  invalid  because 
officers  de  jure  and  officers  de  facto 
united  in  the  doing  of  it:  Scadding 
V.  Lorant,  5  Eng.  L.  &  Eq.  16.  See 
and  compare:  Intendant  &c.  v. 
Sorrell,  1  Jones  L.  (N.  C.)  49;  Will- 
cock  Munic.  Corp.,  §  68;  Parry  v. 
1  Smith — ly 


Berry,  1  Comyns  269;  Green  v.  May- 
or &c.,  1  Burr.  127;  Rex  v.  West- 
wood,  4  B.  &  C.  781,  799,  818;  Rex  v. 
Head,  4  Burr.  2515;  Hoblyn  v.  King, 
6  Bro.  P.  C.  511. 

''a  Burt  v.  Winona  &c.  R.  Co.,  31 
Minn.  472;  s.  c.  18  N.  W.  285,  289; 
Tinsley  v.  Kirby,  17  S.  C.  1,  8;  Carle- 
ton  V.  People,  10  Mich.  249;  People 
V.  White,  24  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  520,  540; 
Welch  V.  Ste.  Genevieve,  1  Dillon 
130;  Hildreth's  Heirs  v.  Mclntire's 
Devisees,  1  J.  J.  Marsh.  (Ky.)  206. 
Cf.  State  V.  Carroll,  38  Conn.  449; 
§  184,  ante. 

^^  Town  of  Decorah  v.  Bullis,  25 
Iowa  12  (by  Dillon,  C.  J.). 

■»  Norton  v.  Shelby  Co.,  118  U.  S. 
425;  s.  c.  6  S.  Ct.  1121.  See  §  184, 
ante. 

™Heiskell  v.  Mayor  &c.,  65  Md. 
125,  149;  s.  c.  4  Atl.  116. 

"Heiskell  v.  Mayor  &c.,  65  Md. 
125;  s.  c.  4  Atl.  116;  Blacket  v.  Bliz- 
ard,  9  B.  &  C.  851;  Barnert  v.  Mayor 
&c.,  48  N.  J.  L.  395;  s.  c.  16 
Atl.    15;     State    v.    Farr,    47    N.    J. 


294 


PUBLIC    COliPORATlONS. 


290 


abrogated  by  an  act  of  the  municipal  body  itself,  unauthorized  by 
statute  or  charter:'-  it  can  neither  enlarge  nor  diminish  the  num- 
ber required  to  constitute  a  quorum.  Thus^,  in  the  case  already  cited, 
where  one  of  the  co-ordinate  branches  of  a  city  council  adopted  a  rule 
prohibiting  action  unless  two-thirds  of  its  members  were  present,  it 
was  held  that  an  ordinance  might  be  repealed  at  a  meeting  consisting 
of  a  majority  only,  and  this  although  the  charter  contained  a  pro- 
vision authorizing  those  bodies  "to  settle  their  rules  of  procedure."^^ 
Where  a  statute  provides  that  a  majority  of  the  members  elected  shall 
be  a  quorum,  the  removal  of  an  alderman  from  his  ward  is  to  be 
deemed  a  resignation,  after  which  a  quorum  will  consist  of  a  majority 
of  the  remaining  members.'^*  Where  the  mayor  has  a  right  to  vote 
only  in  case  of  a  tie,  he  is  not  to  be  counted  a  member  in  determining 
whether  a  quorum  is  present.'^^  Where  the  rules  may  be  suspended 
by  a  three-fourths  vote,  four  out  of  six  may  suspend,  one  of  the  latter 
having  resigned  and  one  being  absent.'^^  It  is  immaterial  that  some 
of  the  town  trustees  voting  were  ineligible  where  the  vote  was  unani- 
mous and  the  quorum  was  composed  of  eligible  persons. '^^ 


L.  208;  s.  c.  4  Atl.  323;  State  v.  Mil- 
ler, 45  N.  J.  L.  251;  5  Dane  Abr. 
150;  Dartmouth  v.  County  Com'rs, 
153  Mass.  12;  s.  c.  26  N.  E.  425;  Ex 
parte  Willocks,  7  Cowen  (N.  Y.)  402, 
410;  Rex  v.  Devonshire,  1  B.  &  C. 
609;  Rex  v.  Headley,  7  B.  &  C.  496; 
Rex  V.  Bellringer,  4  T.  R.  810;  Rex 
V.  Bower,  1  B.  &  C.  492.  One  who 
has  a  right  to  vote  only  in  case  of 
a  tie  can  not  be  counted  in  determin- 
ing whether  there  is  a  quorum  pres- 
ent: State  V.  Porter,  113  Ind.  79;  s. 
c.  14  N.  B.  883.  In  the  New  Eng- 
land towns,  where  the  corporate 
power  is  primarily  exercised  by  the 
citizens  at  large,  any  number, 
though  less  than  a  majority  of  the 
whole,  when  assembled  at  a  legal 
meeting,  have  the  power  to  act  for 
the  whole,  unless  otherwise  provided 
by  law:  Damon  v.  Inhabitants  &c., 
2  Pick.  (Mass.)  345,  355;  Common- 
wealth V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  2  Pick. 
(Mass.)  70;  State  v.  Binder,  38  Mo. 
450;  Madison  &c.  Church  v.  Baptist 
Church,  5  Robt.  (N.  Y.)  649;  Will- 
iams  v.    Inhabitants   &c.,    21    Pick. 


(Mass.)  75;  Inhabitants  &c.  v. 
Stearns,  21  Pick.  (Mass.)  148. 

'-  "Of  the  power  of  the  general  as- 
sembly to  fix  and  determine  what 
should  be  a  quorum  there  can  be  no 
possible  doubt:"  Heiskell  v.  Mayor 
&c.,  65  Md.  125,  147;  s.  c.  4  Atl.  116. 

^^  "It  would  be  an  anomaly  in- 
deed," said  the  court,  "if  the  coun- 
cil itself  could  deprive  itself  of  the 
right  that  it  admittedly  had:"  Heis- 
kell V.  Mayor  &c.,  65  Md.  125,  152; 
s.  c.  4  Atl.  116. 

«  State  V.  Orr,  61  Ohio  St.  384;  s. 
c.  56  N.  E.  14. 

'^  City  of  Somerset  v.  Smith,  20 
Ky.  L.  1488;  s.  c.  49  S.  W.  456. 

"City  of  North  Platte  v.  North 
Platte  Water  Works  Co.,  56  Neb. 
403;  s.  c.  76  N.  W.  906. 

"Lewis  V.  Town  of  Brandenburg, 
20  Ky.  L.  1011;  s.  c.  47  S.  W.  832;  48 
S.  W.  978.  As  to  what  constitutes 
a  quorum,  and  validity  of  acts  of 
council,  see  State  v.  Yates,  19 
Mont.  239;  s.  c.  47  Pac.  1004;  Col- 
lopy  V.  Cloherty,  18  Ky.  L.  1061;  s. 
c.   39   S.   W.   431;    Tappan   v.   Long 


291  PUBLIC    liOARDS.  §    295 

§  295.  The  same  subject  continued. — But  it  is  also  essential  to 
the  validity  of  action  upon  a  proposition  submitted  to  the  board  that 
a  majority  of  all  the  members  qualified  to  vote  in  the  particular 
instance  shall  be  present;  and  members  having  a  direct  pecuniary 
interest  in  the  matter  adverse  to  the  municipality  which  they  repre- 
sent are  excluded  in  counting  a  quorum. '^^  The  physical  presence 
of  a  sufficient  number  constitutes  a  legal  quorum.  Thus,  where  half 
of  the  members  of  a  board  in  regular  session  for  the  purpose  of  choos- 
ing an  officer,  after  several  hundred  ineffectual  ballots,  withdrew 
from  the  place  of  balloting  and  took  places  among  the  bystanders, 
but  without  leaving  the  room,  it  was  held  that  the  quorum  was  not 
broken,  although  they  refused  to  vote  and  protested  against  further 
action.''^ 

§  296.    The  same  subject  continued — An  exception  to  the  rule. — 

The  principle  that  upholds  the  acts  of  de  facto  officers  prevails  over 
the  rule  requiring  the  presence  of  a  quorum  for  the  transaction  of 
business  by  public  bodies.  The  charter  of  the  city  of  Detroit  pro- 
vides for  the  designation  by  the  common  council  of  the  aldermen 
in  each  ward  to  the  election  districts  therein,  and  also  for  the  ap- 
pointment of  qualified  electors  in  each  district,  who  with  the  alder- 
men shall  act  as  chairmen  respectively  of  the  board  of  inspectors 
and  of  registration  in  these  districts.  These  appointments  must  be 
made  at  least  two  weeks  previous  to  a  general  election.  At  the  last 
meeting  of  the  council  prior  to  a  general  election  when  these  appoint- 
ments could  lawfully  he  made,  the  minority  faction  of  the  council 
withdrew,  and  the  majority,  though  not  constituting  a  quorum,  pro- 
Branch  &c.,  59  N.  J.  L.  371;  s.  c.  35  est  is  clearly  set  forth  by  Judge 
Atl.  1070.  A  resolution  adopted  at  a  Cooley  in  Steckert  v.  City  of  East 
meeting  when  a  majority  of  the  Saginaw,  22  Mich.  104.  As  a  general 
whole  number  of  the  council  is  not  rule  acts  done  by  less  than  a  quorum 
present  is  void  under  code  of  Iowa:  are  void:  State  v.  Trustees  &c.,  22 
Cascaden  v.  City  of  Waterloo,  106  Ohio  St.  288;  Pimental  v.  City  of  San 
Iowa  673;  s.  c.  77  N.  W.  333.  Francisco,   21   Cal.   351;    McCracken 

"*  "Perhaps  the  only  recognized  ex-  v.  City  of  San  Francisco,  16  Cal.  591; 
ception  to  this  rule  is  the  case  where  City  of  Logansport  v.  Legg,  20  Ind. 
the  body  or  board  is  permitted  to  fix  315;  Ferguson  v.  Crittenden  Co.,  6 
the  compensation  of  its  members:  Ark.  479;  Price  v.  Grand  Rapids  &c. 
Board  &c.  v.  Hall,  47  Wis.  208;  s.  c.  2  R.  Co.,  13  Ind.  58.  As  to  presump- 
N.  W.  291;  Pickett  v.  School  Dist.,  25  tions  in  favor  of  a  quorum,  see  Citi- 
Wis.  551;  United  Brethren  Church  v.  zens'  &c.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Sortwell,  8  Allen 
Vandusen,  37  Wis.  54;  Walworth  (Mass.)  217  (private  corporations). 
Bank  v.  Farmers'  Loan  &c.  Co.,  16  '''State  v.  Vanosdal,  131  Ind.  388; 
Wis.  629;  Coles  v.  Trustees  &c.,  10  s.  c.  31  N.  E.  79.  See  Beach  Priv. 
Wend.  (N.  Y.)  659.  The  distinction  Corp.,  §§  276,  295. 
between  a  remote  and  a  direct  inter- 


§    297  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  292 

eeeded  to  make  the  appointments.  The  court  held  that  the  acts  of 
the  officers  thus  aj^pointed  were  valid,  as  they  were  officers  de  facto, 
but  that  the  council  would  be  compelled  by  mandamus  to  designate 
immediately,  at  a  lawful  meeting,  the  chairmen  of  the  different 
boards  of  inspectors  to  take  the  place  of  those  illegally  appointed  at 
the  former  meeting.^** 

§  297.    The  same  subject  continued — Special  charter  provisions. — 

Where  a  charter  provided  that  no  ordinance  or  resolution  should  be 
passed  except  by  a  majority  of  all  the  members  elected,  and  one  of 
the  members  resigned  after  election,  it  was  held  that  a  bare  majority 
of  those  remaining  was  not  empowered  to  act.^^  But  if  the  majority 
is  constituted  a  quorum  to  do  business  "at  all  meetings"  of  the  board, 
such  a  number  may  organize  and  act  at  the  first  meeting,  as  well 
as  at  any  subsequent  meeting,  although  it  is  provided  that  "the 
board,"  etc.,  shall  assemble  for  the  purpose  of  organization.^^ 
The  power  of  removing  certain  officers  was  conferred  upon 
a  city  council,  to  be  exercised  "by  a  vote  of  two-thirds  of 
that  body,"  and  the  court  inclined  to  the  opinion  that  (aside  from 
the  French  text  of  the  charter,  which  disposed  of  any  doubt)  only 
two-thirds  of  the  body  as  legally  constituted  by  the  presence  of  a 
quorum  was  required.^ ^  But  where  the  language  was  that  "the  com- 
mon council,  with  the  concurrence  of  two-thirds  of  the  members 
thereof,"  might  order,  etc.,  two-thirds  of  the  whole  number  was 
declared  necessary  to  make  a  valid  order.**  And  where  a  charter 
requires  a  two-thirds  vote  of  the  members  of  a  council  on  certain 
measures,  and  the  body  is  composed  of  a  president  and  six  others, 
five  members  must  concur.*^ 

§  298.  Quorums  and  majorities  further  considered — The  rule 
in  England. — It  is  not  yet  settled  by  the  authorities  whether  the  busi- 
ness of  a  common  council  or  other  governing  board  can  be  conducted 
by  a  bare  majority  of  the  number  necessary  to  constitute  a  quorum,  or 
whether  the  passage  of  a  measure  requires  the  assent  of  a  majority 

™  Dingwall  v.  Common  Council,  82  "^  City  of   Oakland   v.    Carpentier, 

Mich.  568;   s.  c.  46  N.  W.  938.     See  13  Cal.  540. 

also,  as  to  acts  of  de  facto  councils,  '^^  Warnock  v.  City  of  Lafayette,  4 

§  293,  ante;  and  of  de  facto  officers  La.  An.  419. 

and  agents  generally,  §  291,  ante.  "*  City  of  Logansport  v.  Legg,   20 

"  City  of  San  Francisco  v.  Hazen,  Ind.  315.     See  also,  State  v.  Porter, 

5    Cal.    169;    McCracken   v.   City   of  113  Ind.  79;  s.  c.  14  N.  E.  883. 

San  Francisco,  16  Cal.  591;  Pimental  "^Whitney  v.  Common  Council  &c., 

V.  City  of  San  Francisco,  21  Cal.  351.  69  Mich.  189;  s.  c.  37  N.  W.  184,  30 

Am.  &  Eng.  Corp.  Cas.  453,  n. 


293  PUBLIC    J50AEDS.  §    299 

of  those  present  where  more  than  a  quorum  are  in  attendance.  Baron 
Martin,  in  delivering  his  opinion  in  Gosling  v.  Veley,**''  adopted 
and  explained  a  remark  by  Lord  Mansfield*^  suggesting  a  distinction 
between  elections  and  the  transaction  of  other  corporate  business. 
"It  is  clear  law,"  said  the  baron,  "  *  *  *  that  for  the  transaction 
of  business, — namely,  making  a  law,  imposing  a  tax,  making  a  by- 
law, in  fact,  transacting  any  business  whatever, — there  must  be,  first, 
a  lawful  meeting,  and  secondly,  a  vote  of  the  majority ;  and  unless  the 
majority  votes  for  the  law,  tax  or  by-law,  it  is  not  carried."  And  it 
was  accordingly  held  that  a  valid  church  rate  could  not  be  made  at 
a  vestry  meeting  where  the  majority  of  those  present  refrained  from 
voting.^^ 

§  299.  The  same  subject  continued — Decisions  in  the  United 
States. — The  distinction  noticed  in  the  preceding  section  has  been 
recognized  and  applied  in  election  cases  by  the  supreme  courts  of 
Ohio®^  and  Illinois.^'*  In  a  recent  case  in  Indiana®^  it  appeared  that 
a  resolution  was  introduced  at  a  meeting  of  a  common  council  for  the 
adoption  of  the  report  of  a  committee  relating  to  lighting  the  city. 
Three  of  the  six  members  composing  the  council,  all  being  present, 
voted  in  favor  of  the  resolution,  but  the  other  three  declined  to  vote, 
and  the  mayor  declared  that  it  was  adopted.  The  court  sustained 
this  view,  and  said:  "The  rule  is  that  where  there  is  a  quorum 
present,  and  a  majority  of  the  quorum  vote  in  favor  of  a  measure,  it 
will  prevail,  although  an  equal  number  should  refrain  from  voting. 
It  is  not  the  majority  of  the  whole  number  of  members  present  that 
is  required;  all  that  is  requisite  is  a  majority  of  the  number  of  mem- 
bers   required    to    constitute    a    quorum."'*-     The    same    doctrine    is 

^=  4  H.  L.  Cas.  679,  740.  would  hesitate  to  affirm  that  the  res- 
"  In  Rex  v.   Monday,   Cowp.   530,  olution  was  duly  passed;  and  it  can 
538.  make  no  difference  whether  four  or 
*"  Gosling  v.  Veley,  4  H.  L.  Cas.  679.  six  members  are  present,  since  it  is 
"' State  V.  Green,  37  Ohio  St.  227.  always  the  vote  of  the  majority  of 
""  Launtz  v.  People,  113  111.  137.  the   quorum  that  is  effective.     The 
"  Rushville    Gas    Co.    v.    City    of  mere  presence  of  inactive  members 
Rushville,  121  Ind.  206;  s.  c.  23  N.  E.  does  not  impair  the  right  of  the  ma- 
72;  6  L.  R.  A.  315.  jority  of  the  quorum  to  proceed  with 
"  Rushville    Gas    Co.    v.    City    of  the  business  of  the  body.    If  members 
Rushville,  121  Ind.  206;   s.  c.  23  N.  present  desire  to  defeat  a  measure 
E.  72 ;  6  L.  R.  A.  315.    The  court  con-  they  must  vote  against  it,  for  inac- 
tinued: — "If    there    had    been    four  tion  will  not  accomplish  their  pur- 
members    of    the    common    council  pose.     Their  silence  is  acquiescence, 
present,  and  three  had  voted  for  the  rather   than    opposition.      Their   re- 
resolution  and  one  had  voted  against  fusal  to  vote  is,  in  effect,  a  declara- 
it,  or  had  not  voted  at  all,  no  one  tion  that  they  consent  that  the  ma- 


300 


PUBLIC    CORPORATION'S. 


294 


affirmed  in  New  Hampshire  ;"^  while  in  Tennessee^*  the  opposite  ex- 
treme is  reached  in  holding  that  a  majority  of  all  present  is  necessary 
even  to  a  valid  election. 

§  300.  Further  application  of  majority  principle. — Where  author- 
ity to  do  an  act  of  a  public  nature  is  given  by  law  to  three  or  more  per- 
sons, if  the  act  is  merely  ministerial  in  its  character,  a  majority  at 
least  must  concur  and  unite  in  the  performance  of  it;  but  they  may 
act  separately  and  need  not  be  convened  in  a  body  or  notified  so  to 
convene  for  that  purpose;  but  if  the  act  is  one  which  requires  the 
exercise  of  discretion  and  judgment,  in  which  case  it  is  usually  termed 
a  judicial  act,  unless  special  provision  is  otherwise  made,  the  persons 
to  whom  the  authority  is  given  must  meet  and  confer  together  and 
be  present  when  the  act  is  performed,  in  which  ease  a  majority  may 
perform  the  act,  or,  after  all  have  been  notified  to  meet,  a  majority 
having  met  will  constitute  a  quorum  or  sufficient  number  to  perform 
the  act.  As  a  general  rule,  the  act  may  then  be  legally  done  by  the 
direction  or  with  the  concurrence  of  a  majority  of  the  quorum  so 
assembled.^^ 


jority  of  the  quorum  may  act  for  the 
body  of  which  they  are  members." 
Judge  Dillon,  in  referring  to  this 
case,  says: — "It  deserves  further 
consideration  whether  this  result  is 
consistent  with  the  majority  rule  ap- 
plicable to  definite  bodies:"  Dillon 
Munic.  Corp.  (4th  ed.),  §  292,  n.  The 
court  is  silent  as  to  any  distinction 
between  elections  and  business  pro- 
ceedings, although  it  cites  cases  in 
support  of  its  decision  where  the  dif- 
ference was  clearly  recognized. 

"^  Attorney-General  v.  Shepard,  62 
N.  H.  383. 

"*  Lawrence  v.  Ingersoll,  88  Tenn. 
52;  s.  c.  12  S.  W.  422;  6  L.  R.  A.  308; 
17  Am.  St.  870. 

'^Martin  v.  Lemon,  26  Conn.  192; 
Damon  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  2  Pick. 
(Mass.)  345,  354,  which  makes  a  dis- 
tinction between  committees  ap- 
pointed by  a  public  corporation  of 
its  own  members  and  committees  of 
persons  not  members,  requiring 
unanimity  in  the  latter  case;  Bal- 
lard v.  Davis,  31  Miss.  525;  Petrie  v. 
Doe,  30  Miss.  698;   ^  rindley  v.  Bar- 


ker, 1  Bos.  &  P.  229;  Keeler  v.  Frost, 
22  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  400;  Perry  v.  Ty- 
nen,  22  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  137;  In  re 
Rogers,  7  Cowen  (N.  Y.)  526;  Astor 
V.  New  York,  62  N.  Y.  567,  576,  580; 
In  re  Beekman,  31  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.) 
16;  In  re  Sewer  in  Thirty-fourth  St., 
31  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  42.  Upon  the 
death  of  one,  where  no  provision  ex- 
ists for  filling  the  vacancy,  the  power 
vests  in  the  survivors:  People  v. 
Mayor  &c.,  63  N.  Y.  291;  citing  Peo- 
ple v.  Palmer,  52  N.  Y.  84;  and  dis- 
tinguishing People  V.  Nostrand,  46 
N.  Y.  375.  The  presumption  is  that 
all  were  notified  and  that  all  met: 
Astor  V.  Mayor  &c.,  62  N.  Y.  567, 
576;  Young  v.  Buckingham,  5  Ohio 
485,  489;  Charles  v.  Mayor  &c.,  27  N. 
J.  L.  203.  See  also,  Jones  v.  Inhabit- 
ants &c.,  9  Pick.  (Mass.)  146;  In- 
habitants &c.  V.  Cole,  3  Pick.  (Mass.) 
232,  244;  Keyes  v.  Inhabitants  &c., 
17  Pick.  (Mass.)  273;  Kingsbury  v. 
School  Dist,  12  Met.  (Mass.)  99; 
Crommett  v.  Pearson,  18  Maine  344; 
Jenkins  v.  School  Dist.,  39  Maine 
220;  Green  v.  Miller,  6  Johns.  (N.  Y.) 


295 


PUBLIC    BOARDS. 


§  301 


§  301.  Execution  of  authority  vested  in  two  persons.  —  Where 
power  is  conferred  upon  two  persons,  or  where  a  larger  number  has 
by  death  or  vacancy  become  reduced  to  two,  nothing  can  be  done  with- 
out the  consent  of  both.""  Such  is  the  general  rule;  yet  there  are  au- 
thorities which  hold  clearly  that  to  prevent  a  failure  of  justice  one  may 
act  alone  without  consulting  the  other;  as,  if  one  be  dead  or  inter- 
ested or  absent  when  immediate  action  is  necessary. '*''  Moreover, 
the  common  presumption  in  favor  of  the  performance  of  official  duty 
dispenses  with  affirmative  proof  that  the  act  of  one  was  assented  to 
by  the  other,  and  it  has  been  held  that  this  presumption  can  be  re- 
butted only  by  the  testimony  of  him  whose  assent  was  denied."^  So 
far,  also,  as  their  duties  are  ministerial,  it  is  competent  for  one  to 
act  as  the  agent  or  deputy  of  both  with  the  other's  consent;  which  is 
only  an  application  of  the  general  rule  that  one  of  a  board  may  be  au- 
thorized to  act  in  behalf  of  the  whole  in  the  execution  of  whatever 
measure  they  may  resolve  upon."^ 

§  302.  Presiding  officer. — In  England""  and  generally  in  the 
United  States  it  is  one  of  the  duties  of  the  mayor  to  preside  at  cor- 


39;  King  v.  Beeston,  3  T.  R.  592; 
Guthrie  v.  Armstrong,  5  B.  &  Aid.  628 ; 
Keyser  v.  School  Dist.,  35  N.  H.  477; 
Wolcott  V.  Town  of  Wolcott,  19  Vt. 
37;  Throop  Public  Officers,  §  106; 
McCoy  V.  Curtice,  9  Wend.  (N.  Y.) 
17,  19;  Horton  v.  Harrison,  23  Barb. 
(N.  Y.)  176;  State  v.  Guiney,  26 
Minn.  313;  s.  c.  3  N.  W.  977;  Schenck 
V.  Peay,  1  Woolw.  175,  187;  People  v. 
Harrington,  63  Cal.  257;  Walker 
V.  Rogan,  1  Wis.  597;  In  re  Broad- 
way Widening,  63  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  572; 
Downing  v.  Rugar,  21  Wend.  (N.  Y.) 
178;  Somerset  Co.  v.  Parson,  105  Pa. 
St.  360;  Cooper  v.  Lampeter  Tp.,  8 
Watts  (Pa.)  125;  Commonwealth  v. 
Commissioners,  9  Watts  (Pa.)  466, 
471;  Baltimore  Turnpike,  5  Binn. 
(Pa.)  481;  Commissioners  v.  Leckey, 
6  S.  &  R.  (Pa.)  166;  McCready  v. 
Guardians,  9  S.  &  R.  (Pa.)  94;  Cald- 
well V.  Harrison,  11  Ala.  755;  Crist 
V.  Brownsville  Tp.,  10  Ind.  461;  Gal- 
lup V.  Tracy,  25  Conn.  10,  holding 
that  a  town  committee  to  stake  out 
oyster  grounds,  having  no  fixed  place 
of  acting  or  consulting,  no  record. 


no  clerk,  and  no  time  and  mode  of 
proceeding,  need  not  be  assembled 
to  act,  and  may  act  by  a  majority  of 
such  as  are  competent. 

■"Downing  v.  Rugar,  21  Wend.  (N. 
Y.)  178;  Pell  v.  Ulmar,  21  Barb. 
(N.  Y.)  500;  New  York  Life  Ins.  Co. 
V.  Staats,  21  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  570;  Per- 
ry V.  Tynen,  22  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  137; 
Powell  V.  Tuttle,  3  N.  Y.  396. 

"6  Vin.  Abr.,  tit.  Coroner  (H.), 
pi.  7;  14  Vin.  Abr.,  tit.  Joint  and 
Several  (B.),  pi.  1;  Rex  v.  Warring- 
ton, 1  Salk.  152;  Naylor  v.  Sharpless, 
2  Mod.  23.  And  see  Auditor  Curie's 
Case,  11  Coke  2;  Rich  v.  Player,  2 
Show.  262;  Downing  v.  Rugar,  21 
Wend.   (N.  Y.)  178,  183. 

'^  Downing  v.  Rugar,  21  Wend.  (N. 
Y.)  178. 

''^Downing  v.  Rugar,  21  Wend.  (N. 
Y.)  178;  People  v.  Commissioners,  3 
Hill  (N.  Y.)  599.  See  also.  People 
V.  Newell,  13  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  86;  s.  c. 
rev'd  7  N.  Y.  9,  but  not  on  this  point. 
See  §  286  et  seq.,  ante,  on  delegation 
of  powers. 

100  "Prior  to  the  Municipal  Corpo- 


§  303 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS. 


296 


porate  meetings;  but  he  has  not,  in  virtue  of  his  office  alone,  any 
right  to  preside,  which  in  all  cases  depends  upon  a  construction  of 
the  charter,  organic  law  or  constituent  act  of  the  corporation.^"^ 
When  the  charter  provides  that  the  city  council  shall  elect  one  of 
their  number  to  be  the  president  of  the  board,  but  does  not  prescribe 
the  number  of  votes  necessary  to  a  choice,  the  votes  of  a  majority 
of  a  quorum  duly  met  are  sufficient.^"^  The  presiding  officer,  although 
he  be  the  mayor,  can  not  vote  unless  he  is  a  member  of  the  body,  or 
is  authorized  by  the  charter  to  give  the  casting  vote  in  case  of  a 
tie.^°^  A  right  to  preside  over  the  meeting  of  the  council  is  a  "fran- 
chise," and  if  denied,  a  remedy  may  be  had  by  quo  warranto  or  infor- 
mation in  that  nature;  but  a  bill  in  equity  is  not  a  proper  proceeding 
for  that  purpose  unless  so  provided  by  statute.^"*    Where  the  statute 


rations  Act  of  1835  the  powers  and 
duties  of  mayors,  including  the  right 
to  preside,  depended  upon  charters, 
regal  and  parliamentary,  usages,  cus- 
toms, etc.:"  Dillon,  J.,  in  Cochran 
V.  McCleary,  22  Iowa  75,  82;  citing 
4  Jacob's  Law  Diet.  264,  265;  2  Bouv. 
Law  Diet.  150. 

^"^  Cochran  v.  McCleary,  22  Iowa 
75. 

^°- State  v.  Farr,  47  N.  J.  L.  208; 
s.  c.  4  Atl.  323.  In  Dugan  v.  Farrier, 
47  N.  J.  L.  383;  s.  c.  1  Atl.  751,  the 
point  was  raised  that  the  organiza- 
tion of  the  board,  including  the  se- 
lection of  a  presiding  officer,  is  es- 
sential to  the  valid  exercise  of  its 
other  functions,  but  the  question 
was  left  undetermined  by  the  court. 

"'City  of  Carrollton  v.  Clark,  21 
111.  App.  74;  Launtz  v.  People,  113 
111.  137;  s.  c.  55  Am.  R.  405;  Carroll 
V.  Wall,  35  Kan.  36;  s.  c.  10  Pac.  1; 
Carleton  v.  People,  10  Mich.  250; 
Town  of  Decorah  v.  Bullis,  25  Iowa 
12;  People  v.  White,  24  Wend.  (N. 
Y.)  520;  State  v.  Gray,  23  Neb.  365; 
s.  c.  36  N.  W.  577;  Hildreth  v.  Mcln- 
tire,  1  J.  J.  Marsh.  (Ky.)  206;  Rex 
V.  Westwood,  4  B.  &  C.  781,  799; 
Rex  V.  Head,  4  Burr.  2515;  Rex  v. 
Croke,  Cowp.  26;  Green  v.  Mayor 
&c.,  1  Burr.  127,  131;  Parry  v.  Berry, 
Comyns  269.  Where  the  charter 
makes  the  president  a  member  of 


the  council  with  the  right  to  vote  in 
every  case  and  a  casting  vote  in  case 
of  a  tie,  he  may  vote  on  a  question 
and  give  an  additional  vote  if  there 
is  a  tie:  Whitney  v.  Common  Coun- 
cil &c.,  69  Mich.  189;  s.  c.  37  N.  W. 
184;  30  Am.  &  Eng.  Corp.  Cas.  453,  n. 
^•"Cochran  v.  McCleary,  22  Iowa 
75,  where  the  question  is  discussed 
by  Judge  Dillon;  Commonwealth  v. 
Arrison,  15  S.  &  R.  (Pa.)  127,  130; 
In  re  Sawyer,  124  U.  S.  200;  s.  c.  8 
S.  Ct.  482;  Reynolds  v.  Baldwin,  1 
La.  An.  162,  where  the  right  of  a  re- 
corder of  a  municipality,  who  was 
ex  officio  president  of  its  council,  to 
vote  in  cases  where  there  was  not  a 
tie,  was  tested  on  quo  warranto;  Rex 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  1  Ld.  Raym.  426;  Com- 
monwealth V.  Kepner,  10  Phila. 
(Pa.)  510;  Tappan  v.  Gray,  7  Hill 
(N.  Y.)  259;  Commonwealth  v.  Com- 
mercial Bank,  28  Pa.  St.  383,  389; 
Southern  Plank  R.  Co.  v.  Hixon,  5 
Ind.  165;  Markle  v.  Wright,  13  Ind. 
548;  People  v.  Utica  Ins.  Co.,  15 
Johns.  (N.  Y.)  358;  Attorney-General 
V.  Utica  Ins.  Co.,  2  Johns.  Ch.  (N. 
Y.)  371;  People  v.  Carpenter,  24 
N.  Y.  86;  People  v.  Cook,  8  N.  Y.  67; 
People  V.  Draper,  15  N.  Y.  532;  Pea- 
body  V.  Flint,  6  Allen  (Mass.)  52; 
Mozley  v.  Alston,  1  Phill.  790;  Lord 
V.  Governor  &c.,  2  Phill.  740;  Hag- 
ner  v.  Heyberger,  7  W.  &  S.   (Pa.) 


297  PUBLIC    BOARDS.  §    303 

requires  all  appointments  of  city  officers  to  be  made  by  a  majority  vote 
of  the  whole  number  elected,  in  case  of  a  tie  the  mayor  has  no  right 
to  cast  the  deciding  vote,^""  Where  the  charter  makes  the  mayor  a 
member  of  the  council  its  action  in  dismissing  a  public  officer  does  not 
require  the  consent  of  the  mayor.^°"  A  statute  making  a  member  of 
the  council  ineligible  to  any  office,  employment  or  agency  chosen 
directly  by  the  council,  does  not  prevent  the  council  from  electing  one 
of  its  members  to  fill  a  vacancy  in  the  office  of  mayor,  where  such 
member  has  resigned  before  the  expiration  of  his  term.^"'^ 

§  303.  The  same  subject  continued. — The  functions  of  the  pre- 
siding officer  are  as  official  as  any  part  of  the  meeting  of  the  board,  and 
can  not  be  exercised  by  one  who  is  not  a  member.^"^  It  is  his  duty 
to  announce  the  result  of  a  vote  according  to  the  fact,  and  his  de- 
cision may  be  attacked  collaterally  ;^''®  and  mandamus  will  lie  to  com- 
pel him  to  reverse  his  decision  illegally  declaring  a  resolution  carried, 
and  to  declare  it  lost,  unless  the  resolution  is  itself  illegal  upon  its 
face.^^°  He  can  not  arbitrarily  adjourn  a  meeting  in  defiance  of 
the  majority  present. ^^^  When  the  mayor  has  a  right  to  appoint 
by  and  with  the  consent  of  the  council  and  also  to  vote  in  case  of 
a  tie,  he  may  give  a  casting  vote  to  confirm  his  own  appointment.  ^^^ 
And    the    declaration    of    a    presiding   officer   that   a    resolution    is 

104 ;  Demarest  v.  Wickham,  63  N.  Y.  the  council  has  no  power  to  elect  a 

320;  Hughes  v.  Parker,  20  N.  H.  58;  mayor  pro  tern,  when  the  mayor  is 

Ex  parte  Strahl,  16  Iowa  369;  Upde-  absent  from  a  council   meeting  on 

graff  V.  Crans,  47  Pa.  St.  103;  Facey  account  of  sickness,  though  not  ab- 

V.  Fuller,  13  Mich.  527.    The  remedy  sent  from  the  city:    Blair  v.  People, 

(by  quo  warranto)  does  not  exist  as  181  111.  460;  s.  c.  54  N.  E.  1024.  When 

a  matter  of  right,  and  in  offices  of  mayor  a  constituent  part  of  coun- 

short  duration  there  is  not  much  to  cil, — see    State   v.    Yates,    19    Mont, 

favor  interference  in  ordinary  cases:  239;  s.  c.  47  Pac.  1004. 

People  V.  Harshaw,  60  Mich.  200;  s.  ^«*  State  v.  Kirk,  46  Conn.  395,  398. 

c.  26  N.  W.  879,  where  it  was  held  ^'^  City  of  Chariton  v.  Holliday,  60 

that   a   charter   providing   that   the  Iowa  391;  s.  c.  14  N.  W.  775;  State  v. 

common  council  should  have  power  Fagan,  42  Conn.  32. 

to  determine  contested  elections  of  ""  Tennant    v.    Crocker,    85    Mich, 

its   members   made   the   decision   of  328;  s.  c.  48  N.  W.  577.    But  the  rem- 

that  body  conclusive  and  not  subject  edy  by  mandamus  is  discretionary, 

to  review.  and  in  this  case  it  was  denied  on  ac- 

^"^  State    V.    Alexander,    107    Iowa  count  of  the  patent  illegality  of  the 

177;  s.  c.  77  N.  W.  841.  resolution. 

^•^  Doherty  v.  City  of  Galveston,  19  "^  Dingwall    v.    Common    Council 

Tex.  Civ.  App.  708;  s.  c.  48  S.  W.  804.  &c.,  82  Mich.  568;  s.  c.  46  N.  W.  938. 

""Commonwealth    v.    Corcoran,    9  '^Carroll  v.  Wall,  35  Kan.  36;  s.  c. 

Kulp  (Pa.)  507.    Under  Starr  &  Cur-  10  Pac.  1. 
tis  Ann.  Stat.  111.,  ch.  24,  art.  2,  §  4, 


§    304  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  298 

adopted  has  been  held  to  be  a  casting  vote  in  its  favor,  if  the  other 
votes  are  equally  divided  ;^^^  otherwise,  where  the  vote  is  required  to 
be  by  ballot."*  When  the  chairman  announces  the  appointment  of 
a  secretary  in  the  presence  of  the  meeting,  and  the  secretary  serves 
without  objection  from  any  one,  the  act  of  the  chairman  is  the  act 
of  the  meeting.^^^  Where  the  president  of  the  board  is  vested  with 
power  to  appoint  a  committee  and  does  so  his  action  is  not  nullified 
by  a  resolution  of  the  board  continuing  an  old  committee. ^^^ 

§  304.    Commitment  for  contempt — Whitcomb's  case. — By  the  law 

of  England  a  town  or  city  council  had  no  power  without  express  act 
of  parliament  to  commit  for  contempt  of  its  authority. ^^''  The  only 
case  directly  in  point  in  this  country,  so  far  as  the  author's  reading 
goes,  is  Whitcomb's  case,^^^  decided  in  1876  by  the  supreme  judicial 
court  of  Massachusetts.  A  witness  having  been  duly  summoned  to 
testify  before  a  special  committee  of  the  common  council  of  Boston, 
appointed  with  full  powers  to  investigate  and  report  upon  certain 
charges  of  corruption  against  its  members,  declined  to  answer  a  ques- 
tion relating  to  the  matter,  and  was  committed  for  contempt  by  a  regu- 
lar order  of  the  council.  It  was  held  that  the  council  was  neither  a 
legislature  nor  a  court,  nor  in  the  accurate  use  of  language  was  it 
vested  with  any  judicial  functions  whatever,  although  the  charter  gave 
it  authority  to  decide  upon  all  questions  relative  to  the  qualifications, 
election  and  returns  of  its  members,  and  that  a  statute  conferring 
power  to  imprison  and  punish  without  right  of  appeal  or  trial  by  jury 
was  unconstitutional.^^® 

"^Launtz  v.  People,  113  111.  137;  "^  State  v.  McKee,  20  Or,  120;  s.  c. 

Rushville  Gas  Co.  v.  City  of  Rush-  25  Pac.  292. 

ville,  121  Ind.  206;  s.  c.  23  N.  E.  72;  "'' Buckton  v.  People,  12  Colo.  App. 

6  L.  R.  A.  315.     Contra,  Hornung  v.  86;  s.  c.  54  Pac.  871. 

State,  116  Ind.  458;  s.  c.  19  N.  E.  151,  "'  Grant  Corp.  84-86;  Parke,  B.,  in 

where  a  candidate,  being  a  member  Kielley  v.  Carson,  4  Moore  P.  C.  63, 

of  the  board,  voted  for  himself,  thus  89;    Barter  v.  Commonwealth,  3  P. 

making  a  tie,  and  the  chairman,  er-  &  W.  (Pa.)  253. 

roneously    assuming   that   the   vote  "'*120  Mass.  118. 

was  valid,  declared  him  elected,  and  ""  Whitcomb's  Case,  120  Mass.  118. 

there  was  no  dissent.  See  also,  In  re  Mason,  43  Fed.  510, 

"^  Lawrence  v.  Ingersoll,  88  Tenn.  which  holds  that  the  power  to  pun- 
52;  s.  c.  12  S.  W.  422;  6  L.  R.  A.  308;  ish  for  contempt  is  not  an  incident 
17  Am.  St.  870.  Cf.  Small  v.  Orne,  to  the  mere  exercise  of  judicial  func- 
79  Maine  78;  s.  c.  8  Atl.  152,  where,  tions.  In  In  re  Hammel,  9  R.  I.  248, 
under  a  particular  statutory  provl-  upon  habeas  corpus  it  appeared  that 
sion,  a  declaration  by  the  presiding  the  petitioner  was  summoned  to  tes- 
officer  was  deemed  a  casting  vote,  tify  before  a  town  council  on  a  mat- 
though  the  voting  was  by  ballot.  ter  pending  before  that  body,  and, 

refusing  to  take  an  oath  or  aflirma- 


299 


PUBLIC    BOARDS. 


30; 


§  305.  Yeas  and  nays. — A  provision  in  a  charter  that  tho  yeas  and 
nays  ''shall"  be  called  and  published  was  held  by  the  supreme  court 
of  New  York  to  be  directory  merely  and  not  indispensable  to  the 
validity  of  a  vote.^-*'  But  the  weight  of  authority  and  reason  is 
decidedly  in  favor  of  the  view  that  such  a  provision  is  mandatory, 
and  that  proceedings  in  contravention  thereof  are  void.^^^  And 
where  the  record  showed  the  names  of  those  present  at  the  opening 
of  the  meeting,  and  that  a  certain  resolution  was  "adopted  unani- 
mously on  call,"  it  was  declared  to  be  an  insufficient  compliance 
with  a  requirement  that  the  votes  "shall  be  entered  at  large  on  the 

tion,  he  was  ordered  to  be  committed 
to  jail  for  contempt  of  court.  The 
proceeding  was  declared  to  be  illegal 
for  the  reason  that  no  definite  term 
of  punishment  was  named.  The 
court  cited  no  authorities  and  ex- 
pressly refrained  from  passing  upon 
"other  questions  raised."  A  city 
charter  gave  a  committee  of  the  com- 
mon council  power  to  issue  a  sum- 
mons to  any  person  to  appear  and 
testify  in  any  matter  pending  before 
it,  and  provided  a  penalty  of  impris- 
onment for  refusal  to  obey  the  sum- 
mons or  to  "answer  any  proper  or 
pertinent  question,"  but  contained 
no  express  provision  authorizing  the 
committee  to  compel  the  production 
of  books  and  papers.  It  was  held 
that  there  was  no  power  to  commit 
for  contempt  for  refusing  to  produce 
them:  People  v.  Van  Tassel,  19  N. 
Y.  S.  643;  s.  c.  64  Hun  (N.  Y.)  444; 
affirming  s.  c.  17  N.  Y.  S.  938. 

^=°  Striker  v.  Kelly,  7  Hill  (N.  Y.) 
9;  s.  c.  affirmed  2  Denio  (N.  Y.)  323. 
^^'Steckert  v.  City  of  Bast  Sagi- 
naw, 22  Mich.  104  (where  Judge  Coo- 
ley  said: — "The  purpose,  among  oth- 
er things,  is  to  make  the  members  of 
the  common  council  feel  the  respon- 
sibility of  their  action  when  these 
important  measures  are  upon  their 
passage,  and  to  compel  each  member 
to  bear  his  share  in  the  responsibil- 
ity by  a  record  of  his  action  which 
should  not  afterwards  be  open  to  dis- 
pute"); Town  of  Olin  v.  Meyers,  55 
Iowa  209;  s.  c.  7  N.  W.  509;   Cutler 


v.  Town  of  Russellville,  40  Ark.  105; 
s.  c.  4  Am.  &  Eng.  Corp.  Cas.  414; 
Tracey  v.  People,  6  Colo.  151;  s.  c.  4 
Am.  &  Eng.  Corp.  Cas.  373;  Rich  v. 
City  of  Chicago,  59  111.  286;   Morri- 
son V.  Lawrence,  98  Mass.  219;  Sulli- 
van v.   City  of  Leadville,   11   Colo. 
483;    s.  c.  18  Pac.  736;    City  of  Lo- 
gansport  v.  Dykeman,  116  Ind.  15 ;  s. 
c.  17  N.  E.  587  (where,  however,  the 
reason  for  the  rule  was  held  not  to 
apply);   Coffin  v.  City  of  Portland, 
43  Fed.  411.     See  also,  Spangler  v. 
Jacoby,  14  111.  297;   Supervisors  &c. 
V.  People,  25  111.  163;  McCormick  v. 
Bay  City,  23  Mich.  457  (holding  that 
a  provision  requiring  ordinances  to 
be  passed  by  "a  majority  of  all  the 
aldermen,"  that  is,  of  all  the  mem- 
bers elect,  would  necessitate  the  re- 
cording of  the   number   if   not  the 
names  of  the  voters  on  each  side) ; 
City  of  Delphi  v.  Evans,  36  Ind.  90. 
In  such  cases  a  single  vote  by  yeas 
and     nays    on    several    ordinances 
grouped  together  is  not  a  passage  of 
any  of  them:    Sullivan  v.  Pausch,  5 
Ohio  C.  C.  196.    The  New  York  case 
(Striker  v.  Kelly,  7  Hill  (N.  Y.)  9) 
is  cited  and  approved  in  City  of  St. 
Louis  v.  Foster,  52  Mo.  513;  but  here 
the  yeas  and  nays  were  not  required 
and  the  cases  are  easily  distinguish- 
able.    City  of  Indianola  v.  Jones,  29 
Iowa  282;    In  re  Carlton  Street,  16 
Hun  (N.  Y.)  497;  In  re  Mount  Mor- 
ris Square,  2  Hill  (N.  Y.)  14,  20;  El- 
mendorf  v.  Mayor  &c.,  25  Wend.  (N. 
Y.)  693. 


§    306  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  300 

niiniites."^^^  But  the  omission  may  be  supplied  by  an  order  nunc 
pro  tune  causing  the  entry  to  be  made.^^^  If  the  record  fails  to  dis- 
close that  any  other  members  were  present  than  those  who  voted  "yea," 
it  need  not  state  that  the  nays  were  called  for.^-*,  A  charter  pro- 
viding that  a  vote  shall  "in  all  cases"  be  taken  by  yeas  and  nays  and 
entered  at  length  upon  the  journal  does  not  apply  to  votes  taken  upon 
motions  to  adjourn.^ ^^ 

§  306.  Parliamentary  law. — In  speaking  of  the  action  of  county 
boards  it  was  said: — "It  will  not  do  to  apply  to  the  orders  and  reso- 
lutions of  such  bodies  nice  verbal  criticism  and  strict  parliamentary 
distinctions,  because  the  business  is  transacted  generally  by  plain  men 
not  familiar  with  parliamentary  law.  Therefore  their  proceedings 
must  be  liberally  construed  in  order  to  get  at  the  real  intent  and  mean- 
ing of  the  body."^^"  And  it  was  declared  in  another  case  that  if  muni- 
cipal bodies  exercising  legislative  functions  pursue  a  method  of  pro- 
ceeding understood  by  themselves  which  arrives  at  substantial  results, 
their  action  should  not  be  overthrown  upon  any  technical  rules  or 
strict  construction  of  parliamentary  law.^^'^  It  was  held  to  be  no 
objection  to  the  validity  of  an  assessment  that  the  order  did  not 
receive,  in  either  branch  of  the  city  council,  two  several  readings 
before  its  passage,  as  required  by  the  rules.  "It  is  within  the  power 
of  all  deliberative  bodies,"  said  the  court,  "to  abolish,  modify  or  waive 
their  own  rules,  intended  as  security  against  hasty  or  inconsiderate 
action."^^*     Where  a  rule  of  the  council  provides  that  on  the  indefi- 

"'Non  constat  that  all   who  met  cey  v.  People,  6  Colo.  151;  s.  c.  4  Am. 

remained  through  the  proceedings:  &  Eng.  Corp.  Cas.  373. 

Steckert  v.  City  of  East  Saginaw,  22  "*  Town   of   Bayard  v.   Baker,   76 

Mich.  104.    A  formal  call  of  the  roll  Iowa  220;  s.  c.  40  N.  W.  818;  23  Am. 

is  not  required  if  the  votes  are  oth-  &  Eng.  Corp.  Cas.  126. 

erwise    ascertained    and    recorded:  ^-'^  City  of  Green  Bay  v.  Brauns,  50 

Brophy  v.  Hyatt,  10  Colo,  223;  s.  c.  Wis.  204;  s.  c.  6  N.  W.  503. 

15  Pac.  399.  ^-«  Hark  v.  Gladwell,  49  Wis.  172; 
'-'City  of  Logansport  v.  Crockett,  s.   c.  5  N.  W.  323;    quoted  and  ap- 

64  Ind.  319;  Vawter  v.  Franklin  Col-  proved  in  Wisconsin  &c.  R.  Co.  v. 

lege,  53  Ind.  88;  Mayhew  v.  District  Ashland  Co.,  81  Wis.  1;   s.  c.  50  N. 

of  Gay  Head,  13  Allen  (Mass.)  129;  W.  937. 

Commissioners   v.    Hearne,    59   Ala.  '-^But  the  effect  of  what  is  done 

371;    Musselman  v.   Manly,   42   Ind.  must  be  gathered  from  the  record 

462;  City  of  Delphi  v.  Evans,  36  Ind.  and  not  from  testimony  of  members 

90.    The  fact  must  appear  upon  the  as    to    their    understanding    of    it: 

face  of  the  record,  and  can  not  be  Whitney  v.  Common  Council  &c.,  69 

proved  aliunde:  In  re  Carlton  Street,  Mich.  189;  s.  c.  37  N.  W.  184;  30  Am. 

16  Hun   (N.  Y.)   497.     The  record  is  &  Eng.  Corp.  Cas.  453.  n. 

not  supported  by  presumption :    Tra-        '=^  Holt  v.  City  Council,  127  Mass. 


301 


l'ri5Ll(:    J'.OAKDS. 


307 


nite  postponemont  of  a  question  it  shall  not  be  acted  upon  or  con- 
sidered again  at  the  same  session  it  prevents  action  on  a  question 
substantially  the  same  at  the  same  session.^^"  Failure  of  the  council 
to  conform  to  the  rules  of  parliamentary  usage  will  not  invalidate 
their  proceedings  if  the  requisite  number  have  agreed  to  a  particular 
measure.^"'"' 

§  307.    Reconsideration  and  rescission — General  power. — It  is  the 

undoubted  rij^lit  of  corporate  bodies,  unless  clearly  restrained  by 
legislative  enactment,  to  reconsider  a  vote  as  often  as  they  see  fit, 
or  to  rescind  the  same,  provided  vested  rights  are  not  disturbed, 
up  to  the  time  when  by  a  conclusive  vote,  accepted  as  such  by  itself, 
a  determination  has  been  reached.^ ^^  They  may  adopt  rules  as  to 
the  time  when  reconsideration  may  be  moved  ;^^^  and  it  is  not  neces- 
sary to  the  validity  of  a  resolution  to  reconsider  that  it  should  be 
moved  by  one  who  voted  originally  with  the  majority ;^^^  and  a 
board  of  aldermen  which  has  indefinitely  postponed  action  on  a 
resolution  of  the  common  council  can  afterwards  rescind  that  action 
and  pass  the  resolution. ^^* 

§  308.  The  same  subject  continued. — An  order  may  be  rescinded 
by  implication ;  as  where  a  meeting  voted  to  proceed  to  an  election 
of  a  city  attorney  by  ballot,  and  subsequently  made  an  appointment 


408,  411;  citing  Bennett  v.  City  o£ 
New  Bedford,  110  Mass.  433. 

'-"■'  Zeiler  v.  Central  R.  Co.,  84  Md. 
304;  s.  c.  35  Atl.  932. 

'™Mann  v.  City  of  Le  Mars,  109 
Iowa  251;  s.  c.  80  N.  W.  327. 

"•  Higgins  v.  Curtis,  39  Kan.  283;  s. 
c.  18  Pac.  207;  State  v.  Van  Buskirk, 
40  N.  J.  L.  463;  State  v.  Barbour,  53 
Conn.  76;  s.  c.  22  Atl.  686;  55  Am.  R. 
65;  State  v.  Chapman,  44  Conn.  595; 
Baker  v.  Cushman,  127  Mass.  105; 
State  v.  Poster,  7  N.  J.  L.  101 ;  State 
v.  Justice,  24  N.  J.  L.  413;  State  v. 
Crosley,  36  N.  J.  L.  425;  Mayor  &c. 
V.  State,  30  N.  J.  L.-521;  Bigelow  v. 
Hillman,  37  Maine  52;  Common- 
wealth V.  City  of  Pittsburgh,  14  Pa. 
St.  177;  Reiff  v.  Connor.  10  Ark.  241; 
People  V.  Mills,  32  Hun  (N.  Y.)  459; 
State  V.  Hoyt,  2  Or.  246;  Red  v.  City 
Council  &c.,  25  Ga.  386;  Road  Case, 
17  Pa.  St.  71,  75;   City  of  New  Or- 


leans V.  St.  Louis  Church,  11  La.  An. 
244;  Dey  v.  Lee,  4  Jones  L.  (N.  C.) 
238;  Tucker  v.  Justices  &c.,  13  Ired. 
L.  (N.  C.)  434;  Bstey  v.  Starr,  56 
Vt.  690,  where  a  town  meeting  re- 
scinded a  vote  authorizing  a  sub- 
scription in  aid  of  a  railroad,  no  sub- 
scription having  actually  been  made; 
Stoddard  v.  Oilman,  22  Vt.  568;  Pond 
V.  Negus,  3  Mass.  230. 

"'  State  V.  Womack,  4  Wash.  19;  s. 
c.  29  Pac.  939. 

™  People  V.  Common  Council  &c., 
5  Lans.  (N.  Y.)  11.  They  may  re- 
consider at  an  adjourned  meeting  a 
vote  taken  at  a  previous  meeting: 
Supervisors  &c.  v.  Horton,  75  Iowa 
271;  s.  c.  39  N.  W.  394;  People  v. 
Common  Council  &c.,  5  Lans.  (N.  Y.) 
11;  Cassidy  v.  City  of  Bangor,  61 
Maine  434. 

'"*  Hough  V.  City  of  Bridgeport,  57 
Conn.  290;  s.  c.  18  Atl.  102. 


§    309  PUBLIC    COIM'OKATIONS.  302 

by  resolution  viva  voce.^^^  A  committee  appointed  by  a  board  for 
the  purpose  of  making  a  contract  on  its  behalf  acquires  no  vested 
right  and  may  be  deprived  of  its  power  by  subsequent  action  of  the 
board  ;^^^  and  a  town  school  committee  may  reconsider  its  vote  elect- 
ing a  superintendent  of  schools  at  the  same  meeting,  and  before  it 
has  been  communicated  to  the  person  so  elected. ^^'^  A  resolution 
adopted  at  a  meeting  when  such  action  was  illegal  may  be  cured  by 
subsequent  valid  proceedings  in  consummation  thereof.^^^ 

§  309.  Power  to  reconsider  and  rescind  qualified. — As  intimated 
in  the  preceding  section,  when  the  rights  of  third  parties  have  accrued 
under  proceedings  of  a  public  body  they  can  not  be  affected  by  a 
declaration  of  its  change  of  mind.  Thus,  a  vote  ratifying  a  contract 
made  by  town  officers  without  due  authority  can  not  be  rescinded 
so  as  to  discharge  the  town  from  its  obligation. ^^''  The  point  at 
which  the  election  of  a  public  officer  by  a  meeting  convened  for  that 
purpose  passes  beyond  its  control  and  becomes  irrevocable  has  been 
considered  in  several  cases.  While  it  is  universally  admitted  that 
a  ballot  may  be  set  aside  for  some  irregularity  or  illegality  before 
the  election  is  declared,^*''  it  was  stoutly  maintained  by  the  supreme 
court  of  errors  of  Connecticut  that  a  common  council,  having  ap- 
pointed an  officer  by  ballot  whom  it  had  no  power  to  remove,  could 
not  nullify  the  appointment  by  a  mere  declaration  that  there  was 
error  in  the  ballot  when  there  was  none,  and  by  a  subsequent  appoint- 
ment of  another  person. ^^^     It  was  also  held,  in  Maine,  that  after 

"^  It  would  have  been  more  regular  the  chapter  on  Meetings  and  Elec- 

to  have  first  formally  rescinded  the  tions,  post. 

previous  order:    State  v.  Chapman,  ""Supervisors   &c.   v.    Horton,    75 

44  Conn.  595.    In  Holbrook  v.  Faulk-  Iowa  271;  s.  c.  39  N.  W.  394. 

ner,  55  N.  H.  311,  a  school  district  "'Wood  v.  Cutter,  138  Mass.  149. 

meeting  voted  to  dismiss  an  article  ^^  State  v.   District  Court  &c.,  33 

in     the     warrant,     and     afterwards  Minn.  235;  s.  c.  22  N.  W.  625;  7  Am. 

passed  a  vote  which  was  not  within  &  Eng.  Corp.  Cas.  206. 

the  scope  of  any  article  except  the  ^^  Brown  v.  Winterport,  79  Maine 

one  rejected.    The  court  held  it  to  be  305;    s.  c.   9  Atl.   844.     See  also,   in 

invalid    (for   another   reason   also),  point,   Sanborn  v.   School   Dist.,   12 

and   simply   remarked  that  "no  at-  Minn.  17. 

tempt  appears  to  have  been  made  to  ""State  v.  Phillips,  79  Maine  506; 

reconsider  the  vote  dismissing  the  s.  c.  11  Atl.  274;  Putnam  v.  Langley, 

.     .     .     article."     These   cases   may  133  Mass.  204,  where  the  result  of  a 

evidently  stand  together,  for  the  first  recount,     differing    from    the    first 

related  to  the  mode  of  proceeding,  count,  was  acquiesced  in  by  the  meet- 

the  latter  to  the  proceeding  itself,  ing;    Baker  v.  Cushman,   127   Mass. 

Neither  case  is  cited  in  the  opinion  105. 

in  the  other.    See  further,  for  recon-  "^  State  v.  Barbour,  53  Conn.  76;  s. 

sideration,   etc.,   at   town   meetings,  c.  22  Atl.  686,  where  the  authorities 


303 


PUBLIC    BOARDS. 


a  cit}'  officer  has  been  declared  to  be  chosen  by  the  board  of  aklermen 
and  the  declaration  recorded,  the  board  can  not  at  an  adjourned 
meeting  held  the  next  day,  reconsider  its  action  and  choose  an- 
other.i" 

§  310.  The  same  subject  continued. — Where  an  officer's  resigna- 
tion is  accepted  by  the  proper  board,  which  then  confirms  the  mayor's 
nomination  of  a  successor,  the  latter  action  is  entirely  inconsistent 
with  the  idea  that  the  matter  of  resignation  remains  open  for  further 
deliberation  ;^*^  and  a  board  of  county  commissioners  having  rejected 
a  claim  duly  presented  to  it  can  not,  at  a  subsequent  meeting,  allow 
any  part  of  it.^**  Wliere  by  statute  a  vote  of  two-thirds  of  the 
members  of  a  common  council  is  necessary  to  pass  a  resolution,  a 


are  examined  and  adverse  views  crit- 
icized. There  was  a  motion  to  pro- 
ceed by  ballot  for  prosecuting  attor- 
ney, and  the  court  held  that  the  an- 
nouncement of  the  result  by  the  pre- 
siding officer  was  a  finality  without 
an  express  declaration  by  him  that 
the  relator  was  thereby  elected. 

1*=  State  V.  Phillips,  79  Maine  506; 
s.  c.  11  Atl.  274.  But  a  motion  to  re- 
consider may  be  adopted  at  a  subse- 
quent meeting,  where  a  legal  rule  of 
the  board  permits  it.  "All  contracts 
implied  from  a  resolution,"  said  the 
court,  "are  subject  to  the  right  to 
change  it  by  another  resolution, 
passed  in  accordance  with  the  rules 
of  the  board:"  People  v.  Mills,  32 
Hun  (N.  Y.)  459. 

"^  State  v.  Van  Buskirk,  40  N.  J. 
L.  463.  Act  N.  J.  March  20,  1860, 
§  5  (Revision,  p.  1201,  §  45),  provid- 
ing that  when  two  or  more  candi- 
dates for  the  same  office  have  re- 
ceived the  same  number  of  votes  at 
the  annual  meeting,  the  town  com- 
mittee shall  at  their  next  meeting 
thereafter  elect  between  those  hav- 
ing an  equal  number  of  votes,  unless 
they  shall  deem  a  special  meeting 
advisable,  and  in  that  case  shall  have 
power  to  call  such  special  meeting, 
as  now  provided  by  law,  is  manda- 
tory, and,  the  township  committee 
having  failed  to  elect,  and  ordered  a 


special  election,  and  caused  notices 
to  be  posted,  can  not  at  a  subsequent 
meeting  rescind  their  action:  State 
V.  Boden,  51  N.  J.  L.  114;  s.  c.  16 
Atl.  58. 

^"Ryan  v.  Dakota  Co.,  32  Minn. 
138;  s.  c.  19  N.  W.  653.  "A  vote  may 
be  reconsidered  at  an  adjourned 
meeting  if  it  has  not  been  so  acted 
on  that  it  can  not  thereby  be  ren- 
dered nugatory:"  Mitchell  v.  Brown, 
18  N.  H.  315  (school  district  meet- 
ing). But  in  that  case  such  proceed- 
ings had  been  taken  in  pursuance  of 
the  vote  that  the  status  quo  could 
not  be  restored.  A  resolution  once 
adopted  and  again  read  and  ap- 
proved can  not  be  repealed  after  the 
lapse  of  a  year,  and  when  the  board 
has  been  partly  changed  by  the  retir- 
ing of  members  and  the  election  of 
others,  on  the  ground  that  it  was  er- 
roneously entered,  upon  the  mere 
memory  of  the  members  and  without 
notice  to  the  parties  affected  there- 
by: Ridley  v.  Doughty,  85  Iowa  418; 
s.  c.  52  N.  W.  350.  And  a  resolution 
authorizing  the  mayor  to  compro- 
mise with  the  claimants  of  certain 
commons  by  conveying  the  land 
claimed  at  a  certain  price  can  not  be 
repudiated  so  as  to  affect  the  valid- 
ity of  a  deed  given  while  it  remained 
unrevoked:  Dausch  v.  Crane,  109 
Mo.  323;  s.  c.  19  S.  W.  61. 


§    311  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  304 

like  vote  is  required  to  reconsider  or  rescind  it,  in  the  absence  of  a 
contrary  rule  of  the  council  regulating  the  practice  upon  motions 
for  reconsideration.^*^  But  in  another  case,  where  subscriptions  to 
stock  were  required  to  be  passed  by  a  two-thirds  vote,  and  a  proposal 
was  made  by  the  requisite  number,  it  was  held  it  might  be  withdrawn 
before  acceptance,  by  less  than  a  majority,  and  very  likely  by  any 
number  greater  than  one-third.^*^ 

§  311.  Reconsideration  distinguished  from  repeal. — A  limitation 
of  the  power  of  municipal  legislative  bodies  to  reconsider  their  ac- 
tions, and  the  distinction  between  a  resolution  to  reconsider  and  a 
vote  to  repeal,  are  illustrated  in  a  recent  decision  of  the  supreme  court 
of  New  York.  An  ordinance  passed  by  the  common  council  was 
vetoed  by  the  mayor  and  passed  over  his  veto.  A  resolution  to  recon- 
sider was  thcD  adopted,  vetoed,  and  passed  over  the  veto.  It  was 
contended  that  the  ordinance  was  by  these  proceedings  rescinded. 
The  court  said:  "The  ordinance  in  question  may  be  repealed,  but 
it  can  not  be  reconsidered,  for  the  reason  that  when  it  was  passed 
over  the  mayor's  veto  it  became  a  law,  and  thereby  passed  beyond 
the  power  and  control  of  the  municipal  council  to  reconsider  it. 
According  to  the  uniform  practice  of  legislative  bodies,  where  a 
motion  to  reconsider  has  been  passed  in  the  affirmative,  the  question 
immediately  recurs  upon  the  question  reconsidered.  The  question 
reconsidered  was  never  acted  upon  in  this  case;  therefore,  if  the 
common  council  had  the  power  to  reconsider  the  ordinance,  it  never 
rescinded  it,  because  the  question  reconsidered  was  never  acted  upon. 
There  is  another  fatal  point  in  this  case,  which  is  that  the  ordinance, 
when  passed  over  the  mayor's  veto,  could  not  be  again  reconsidered. 
It  is  a  rule  well  settled  by  parliamentary  law  that  a  vote  on  the 
reconsideration  of  a  vetoed  bill  can  not  be  reconsidered  again."^*^ 

"' Whitney  v.  Common  Council  &c.,  N.  Y.  S.  855,  858;  s.  c.  60  Hun  (N. 
69  Midi.  189;  s.  c.  37  N.  W.  184;  30  Y.)  372;  citing  to  the  last  point,  Bar- 
Am.  &  Eng.  Corp.  Cas.  453,  n.;  Stock-  clay  Const.  Man.  197;  Fish  Amer. 
dale  V.  Wayland  School  Dist.,  47  Man.  Pari.  Law  90.  See  also,  Sank 
Mich.  226;  s.  c.  10  N.  W.  349.  In  the  v.  City  of  Philadelphia,  4  Brewst. 
case  first  cited  it  was  held  that  a  vote  (Pa.)  133.  But  there  seems  to  be 
is  rendered  nugatory  by  the  passage  no  technical  nor  substantial  differ- 
of  a  resolution  to  reconsider  it,  al-  ence  between  reconsideration  and 
though  it  be  not  afterwards  re-  rescission  in  the  proceedings  of  town 
scinded.  meetings.  Thus,  where  a  town  voted 

""  Belfast  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Inhabitants  to  raise  a  tax,  but  at  a  subsequent 

&c.,  62  Maine  148;  citing  Essex  Turn-  legal  meeting,  the  collector  having 

pike  Corp.  v.  Collins,  8  Mass.  292.  taken  no  steps  in  the  matter,  it  was 

"'Ashton  V.  City  of  Rochester,  14  voted    to    "reconsider"    the    former 


305  rUBLIC   BOARDS.  §    312 

^  312.  Joint  assemblies  of  definite  bodies — Constitution  and  pro- 
ceedings.— 111  England  it  is  clearly  (^stal)lislio(l  that  where  an  act  is 
to  be  performed  by  a  joint  meeting  of  two  or  more  definite  bodies, 
a  majority  of  each  body  is  essential  to  constitute  a  legal  assembly, 
and  if,  after  having  met,  one  of  the  integral  parts  withdraws  while 
a  proposition  is  pending,  further  action  thereon  by  those  remaining 
is  invalid.^*^  But  this  stringent  rule  has  been  materially  relaxed 
by  some  of  the  courts  in  this  country.  Thus,  it  is  held  in  New  York 
that  although  all  the  bodies — that  is,  a  majority  of  each — must  come 
together  for  consultation  and  deliberation,  yet,  when  they  do,  the 
vote  of  the  majority  of  persons  present  controls,  notwithstanding 
one  of  the  bodies  should  leave  before  the  vote  is  taken.^*^  The  su- 
preme court  of  Xew  Hampshire  has  taken  a  more  radical  departure 
from  the  rule,  holding  in  one  case  that  a  legal  vote  of  one  body  to 
meet  in  convention  is  sufficient  without  the  attendance  of  a  quorum 
of  such  body  at  the  joint  meeting ;^^*'  and  in  a  later  decision,  that  a 
vote  by  one  body  to  meet  the  other,  assented  to  by  the  latter,  who 
were  then  in  session,  but  with  less  than  a  quorum  present,  which 
members  alone  attended  the  convention,  was  equivalent  to  a  vote 
to  meet  by  both  bodies.^''^ 

§  313.  Record  of  meetings. — The  record  of  the  council,  kept  by 
the  proper  officer,  except  subject  to  the  rights  of  the  council  itself  to 
correct,  is  to  be  accepted  as  correct  in  the  absence  of  fraud. ^^^  Min- 
utes may  be  amended  by  the  council  even  after  approval  where  no  in- 
tervening rights  have  accrued.^ ^^  When  the  officer  in  charge  of  mu- 
nicipal records  produces  them  in  court  as  the  council  record  they  can 
only  be  impeached  for  fraud.^^*  The  minutes  of  a  preceding  meet- 
ing may  be  corrected  at  the  next  succeeding  meeting  in  order  to  show 
yeas  and  nays  in  compliance  with  the  statute. ^^^     A  nunc  pro  tunc 

vote,  the  court  held  that  the  tax  was  first  instance,  see  Commonwealth  v. 

not  lawfully  levied:  Stoddard  v.  Gil-  Hargest,  7  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  333. 

man,  22  Vt.  568.  «» Beck  v.  Hanscom,  29  N.  H.  213. 

^^King  V.  Williams,  2  Mau.  &  S.  "^Kimball  v.  Marshall,   44   N.   H. 

141;    King  v.    Buller,    8    Bast   389;  465. 

King  v.  Miller,  6  T.  R.  268.   •  "-  Commonwealth  v.  Schubmehl,  3 

"» Gildersleeve  v.  Board  of  Educa-  Lack.  Leg.  N.  (Pa.)  186. 

tion,  17  Abb.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  201;  White-  "^  Ryder's  Estate  v.  City  of  Alton, 

side  v.  People,  26  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  634;  175  111.  94;  s.  c.  51  N.  E.  821. 

reversing  s.  c.  23  Wend.   (N.  Y.)   9;  ^^  Ryder's  Estate  v.  City  of  Alton, 

Ex  parte  Humphrey,  10  Wend.    (N.  175  111.  94;  s.  c.  51  N.  E.  821. 

Y.)  613.    That  all  must  meet  in  the  ^'^^  Becker  v.  City  of  Henderson,  100 


Ky.  450;  s.  c.  38  S.  W.  857. 


1  Smith— 20 


§    313  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS,  306 

order  is  competent  to  make  the  minutes  speak  the  truth.^^®  The 
record  of  a  council  is  not  binding  in  a  quo  warranto  proceeding,  and 
may  be  contradicted/'^^ 

166  Everett  v.  Deal,  148  Ind,  90;  s.        ^"  State  v.  Kennedy,  69  Conn.  220; 
c.  47  N.  E.  219.  s.  c.  37  Atl.  503. 


CHAPTER  X. 


OFFICIAL   BONDS. 


Section 

314.  Official  bonds — Definition. 

315.  What  officers  must  give  bonds. 

316.  Form  and  requisites  of  bond. 

317.  Effect  of  signing  official  bonds 

in  blank. 

318.  The  same  subject  continued. 

319.  Construction  of  courts  on  bonds 

improperly  approved. 

320.  Defective  bonds  valid  as  com- 

mon-law obligations. 

321.  The  same  subject  continued. 

322.  Time    when    an    official    bond 

takes  effect. 

323.  Effect  of  not  filing  bonds  with- 

in the  time  prescribed  by 
statute. 

324.  The  same  subject  continued. 

325.  Liability  of  sureties  on  a  treas- 

urer's bond, 

326.  The  same  subject  continued. 

327.  Mingling    of    and     defalcation 

out  of  two  funds. 

328.  Liability  of  sureties  as  affected 

by  subsequent  legislation. 

329.  Liability   of   surety   when   sub- 

sequent legislation  imposes 
new  duties  of  the  same  gen- 
eral character. 

330.  The  same  subject  continued. 

331.  Liability  of  officer  on  his  bond 

where  the  loss  is  occasioned 
by  the  act  of  God  or  the  pub- 
lic enemy. 

332.  The  same  subject  continued. 

333.  Duty  of  obligee  to  notify  sure- 

ties of  increased  risk,  etc. 

334.  Liability  of  sureties  on  succes- 

sive bonds — (a)  Where  dif- 
ferent sureties  are  given  on 
each  bond. 


Section 

335.  The  same  subject  continued. 

336.  (b)    Where   funds   received   by 

the  officer  during  his  first 
term  remain  in  his  hands 
during  his  second  term. 

337.  (c)    When  the  sureties  of  the 

first  term  are  liable  for 
money  converted  or  collected 
by  the  officer  during  his  sec- 
ond term. 

338.  (d)  When  an  officer  before  en- 

tering on  his  second  term 
makes  a  report  to  or  settle- 
ment with  the  proper  au- 
thorities. 

339.  The  same  subject  continued. 

340.  (e)    Where   the   officer   applies 

money  received  in  his  second 
term  to  pay  deficiencies  in 
his  first  term. 

341.  (f)    Where  the  bond   is   given 

for  a  term  of  office  or  a  cer- 
tain period  of  time. 

342.  Laches  or  negligence  of  other 

officers  or  principal. 

343.  Liability  of  sureties  where  ad- 

ditional bonds  are  given. 

344.  Liability   of   surety   where   the 

official  occupies  two  or  more 
offices. 

345.  Liability  of  surety  for  unofficial 

acts  of  officer. 

346.  The  same  subject  continued. 

347.  Liability    of    sureties    for    acts 

done  under  color  of  office. 

348.  The   same  subject  continued — 

Lammon  v.  Feusier — The 
doctrine  of  the  federal  su- 
preme court. 

349.  The  same  subject  continued. 


(307) 


§    314  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  308 

Section  Section 

350.  The   same  subject  continued —     353.  Distinction     between     judicial 

The    doctrine    of    the    state  and  ministerial  duties, 

courts.  354.  Illustrations  of  the  doctrine. 

351.  The  same  subject  continued.  355.  The  same  subject  continued. 

352.  Illustrations  of  the  doctrine. 

§  314.  Official  bonds — Definition. — Every  bond  which  is  required 
or  authorized  by  statute  to  be  executed  by  an  officer  is  an  official 
bond.^  Accordingly  an  official  bond  is  a  contract  with  the  people 
for  the  faithful  discharge  of  the  official  duties  of  the  officer;^  and 
such  a  bond  given  by  a  public  officer  for  the  faithful  performance  of 
his  duties  is  an  official  bond,  although  not  in  the  form  prescribed  by 
statute.^ 

§  315.  What  officers  must  give  bonds. — Those  officers  who  receive 
public  moneys,  as  well  as  those  who  from  the  nature  of  their  duties 
receive  money  or  property  for  the  benefit  of  private  individuals,  or 
whose  duties  and  powers  bring  them  into  conflict  with  the  rights  of 
individuals,  or  involve  the  seizure  and  disposal  of  the  property  of 
individuals,  are  generally  required  by  statute  to  give  bonds  with  sure- 
ties for  the  faithful  performance  of  their  duties.'*  The  Indiana 
statute  provides  that  the  mayor  and  other  municipal  officers  therein 
named,  including  city  clerk,  shall,  before  entering  on  their  duties, 
execute  a  bond,  in  such  penal  sum  as  the  council  shall  direct,  "con- 
ditioned for  the  faithful  performance  of  the  duties  of  his  office  and 
the  payment  of  all  moneys  received  by  him  according  to  law  and 
the  ordinances  of  such  city."  The  supreme  court  of  that  state  ac- 
cordingly held  that  a  bond  filed  by  a  city  clerk  with  the  statutory 
conditions  was  authorized  by  the  statute  though  there  could  be  no 
"money  received  by  him  according  to  law  and  the  ordinances  of  such 
city."^ 

^  Commonwealth  v.  Adams,  3  Bush  officer,   whether   judicial,   executive 

(Ky.)  41,  46.  or  military,  in  authority  under  this 

^  Judge  Grover,  in  People  v.  Vilas,  state,"  to  take  the  oath  of  office.     It 

3  Abb.  Pr.  (N.  S.)   (N.  Y.)  252;  s.  c.  was  held   that  municipal   officers — 

36  N.  Y.  459.  listers   of    taxes,    for    instance — are 

^  Lucas  V.  Shepherd,  16  Ind.  368.  not  included   in   this   requirement: 

*Throop  Public  Officers,  §  170;  Rowell  v.  Horton,  58  Vt.  1;  s.  c.  3 
Dillon  Munic.  Corp.  (4th  ed.),  §  297;  Atl.  906.  A  town  may  lawfully  re- 
Glover  Corp.  305;  Grant  Corp.  76.  quire  any  of  its  officers  to  furnish, 

■^Middleton  v.  State,  120  Ind.  166;  bonds    with    sureties   that   he    will 

s.  c.  22  N.  E.  123;  construing  §  3530  faithfully  perform  the  duties  of  his 

Burns   R.    S.    Ind.    1901.     The   Ver-  office:  Morrell  v.  Sylvester,  1  Greenl. 

mont    constitution    requires    "every  (Maine)  248. 


309  OFFICIAL    BONDS.  §    3 TO 

§  316.  Form  and  requisites  of  bond. — Where  a  statute  or  charter 
provides  for  the  filing  of  an  ollieial  bond  it  almost  invariably  states 
the  requisites  of  the  bond;  but  a  substantial  compliance  with  the  stat- 
ute or  charter  is  all  that  is  necessary/  unless  the  statute  or  charter 
expressly  declares  that  it  shall  follow  the  exact  wording  of  the  stat- 
ute or  charter.''  And  it  has  been  repeatedly  held  that  a  defect  in 
the  acknowledgment  of  the  bond,  or  a  failure  to  approve  or  acknowl- 
edge it,  does  not  release  the  principal  or  surety ;  and  where  the  bond 
has  been  approved  or  acknowledged  before  an  officer  having  no  au- 
thority to  approve  or  acknowledge  it,  the  principal  or  surety  is  not 
released  by  reason  of  this  irregularity  from  liability  on  the  bond.® 

§  317.  Eifect  of  signing  official  bonds  in  blank. — A  party  execut- 
ing a  bond  knowing  that  there  are  blanks  in  it  to  be  filled  up  by 
inserting  particular  names  or  other  words  necessary  to  make  it  a 
perfect  instrument  must  be  considered  as  agreeing  that  the  blanks 
may  be  thus  filled  up  after  he  has  executed  the  bond.  If  the  party 
signing  the  paper  shall  insert  in  the  appropriate  places  the  amount 
of  the  penalty,  or  the  names  of  the  sureties,  or  any  other  thing  he  may 
deem  of  importance  as  affecting  his  interest,  he  may  in  that  way 
protect  himself  against  being  bound  otherwise  than  as  he  shall  thus 
specify.  But  if,  relying  upon  the  good  faith  of  the  principal,  the 
surety  shall  permit  him  to  have  possession  of  a  bond  signed  in  blank, 
the  surety  will. have  clothed  the  principal  with  an  apparent  authority 
to  fill  up  the  blanks  at  his  discretion,  in  any  appropriate  manner 
consistent  with  the  nature  of  the  obligation  to  be  given ;  so  that,  as 
against  the  obligee  receiving  the  bond  without  notice  or  negligence, 
and  in  good  faith,  the  surety  will  be  estopped  to  allege  that  he  exe- 
cuted the  instrument  with  a  reservation  or  upon  a  condition  in 
respect  of  the  filling  of  such  blanks ;  and  this  whether  the  blanks  to  be 
filled  have  reference  to  the  penalty  of  the  bond,  the  names  of  co- 
sureties or  other  matter.^ 

"  Tevis  V.  Randall,  6  Cal.  632.  22  Mich.  461;  Green  v.  Wardwell,  17 

^People  V.   Holmes,  2   Wend.    (N.  111.  278;  State  v.  Blair,  32  Ind.  313; 

Y.)     281;     Supervisors    &c.    v.    Van  People  v.  Edwards,  9  Cal.  286.     The 

Campen,  3  Wend.    (N.  Y.)    49;    Fel-  bond    must    not    impose    penalties 

lows  V.   Oilman,   4   Wend.    (N.   Y.)  greater  than  those  required  by  the 

414;  Lawton  v.  Erwin,  9  Wend.  (N.  statute:   Stewart  v.  Lee,  3  Cal.  364; 

Y.)    233;    Cornell  v.  Barnes,  7   Hill  United   States  v.   Morgan,   3   Wash. 

(N.  Y.)  35.  C.  C.  10. 

**  Musselman  v.  Commonwealth,  7  "  City  of  Chicago  v.  Gage,  95  111. 

Pa.  St.  240;  Young  v.  State,  7  Gill  &  593.     This  is  a  case  where  a  printed 

J.     (Md.)     253;     Inhabitants    &c.    v.  form  of  a  city  treasurer's  bond  was 

Fleming,  8  Gray  (Mass.)  613;  Moore  executed   by   himself   in   blank   and 

V.  State,  9  Mo.  334;  People  v.  Johr,  sent   by   him   to   his   sureties,   who' 


318 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS. 


310 


§  318.  The  same  subject  continued. — An  important  decision  on 
this  point  was  rendered  by  the  supreme  court  of  the  United  States  in 
1874.  This  was  a  suit  upon  the  bond  of  an  internal  revenue  collector 
executed  by  the  collector  as  principal  and  by  several  sureties.  One 
of  these  sureties  pleaded  that  when  he  signed  and  sealed  the  bond  it 
was  a  printed  form,  with  names,  dates  and  amount  of  penalty  in 
blank ;  that  he  delivered  it  to  the  collector  under  an  express  agreement 
that  the  latter  should  fill  the  blank  with  a  penalty  of  a  certain  amount 
only  and  procure  two  other  sureties  within  certain  territorial  limits 
each  worth  a  certain  amount,  otherwise  the  bond  was  to  be  null  and 
void  and  returned  to  him;  and  that  the  collector  fraudulently  filled 
the  bond  with  a  greater  penalty  than  that  agreed  upon  and  with  two 
additional  sureties,  neither  of  whom  resided  within  the  agreed  ter- 
ritorial limits  and  both  of  whom  were  insolvent.  The  court  decided 
that  the  plea  was  bad  and  that  the  sureties  were  liable.^'' 

§  319.    Construction  of  courts  on  bonds  improperly  approved. — 

Where  a  statute  does  not  especially  require  strict  compliance  with  its 
provisions  as  to  the  acknowledgment  and  execution  of  official  bonds 
to  render  them  valid,  courts  are  very  liberal  in  their  construction  of 
the  law  prescribing  the  mode  of  execution.^^     The  omission  of  an 


signed  it  in  blank  and  returned  it  to 
the  principal,  who  some  time  after- 
wards took  it  to  the  office  of  the  cor- 
poration counsel,  and  had  the  blanks 
filled  in,  when  the  bond  was  re- 
turned to  the  city  clerk  and  pre- 
sented to  and  approved  by  the  com- 
mon council  as  the  official  bond  of 
said  treasurer.  The  treasurer  de- 
faulted, suit  was  brought  on  the 
bond,  and  the  sureties  entered  pleas 
of  non  est  factum.  The  court  held 
that  the  sureties  were  liable,  and 
that  the  case  of  People  v.  Organ,  27 
111.  26,  was  overruled,  or,  more  cor- 
rectly speaking,  that  the  old  com- 
mon-law rule  upon  which  the  decis- 
ion in  People  v.  Organ  is  based 
has  been  overborne  by  the  applica- 
tion of  the  doctrine  of  estoppel  in 
pais.  Where  a  bond  has  been  exe- 
cuted in  blank  and  delivered  to  the 
proper  official,  he  may  fill  in  the 
blank,  and  the  bond  is  a  good  and 
valid  one:  Hultz  v.  Commonwealth, 
3   Grant  Gas.    (Pa.)    61.     See   State 


V.  Pepper,  31  Ind.  76.  For  con- 
trary decision,  see  United  States  v. 
Nelson,  2  Brock.  C.  G.  64. 

1"  Butler  V.  United  States,  21  Wall. 
272.  See  also,  Dair  v.  United  States, 
16  Wall.  1;  Drury  v.  Foster,  2  Wall. 
24;  Inhabitants  &c.  v.  Huntress,  53 
Maine  89;  State  v.  Pepper,  31  Ind. 
76,  and  cases  there  cited;  McGor- 
mick  V.  Bay  Gity,  23  Mich.  457; 
State  V.  Peck,  53  Maine  284;  Bart- 
lett  V.  Board  of  Education,  59  111. 
364;  Mutual  &c.  Go.  v.  Wilcox,  8 
Biss.  G.  G.  197;  s.  c.  4  Myer  Fed. 
Dec,  §  635. 

"  Young  V.  State,  7  Gill  &  J.  (Md.) 
253;  Boone  Go.  v.  Jones,  54  Iowa 
699;  s.  c.  2  N.  W.  987;  7  N.  W.  155; 
37  Am.  R.  229;  Mendocino  Go.  v. 
Morris,  32  Gal.  145.  For  cases 
where  a  bond  was  held  to  be  vitiated 
by  reason  of  a  defective  approval, 
see  O'Marrow  v.  Gity  of  Port  Huron, 
47  Mich.  585;  s.  c.  11  N.  W.  397; 
Grawford  v.  Meredith,  6  Ga.  552. 
The  sureties  on  a  town  treasurer's 


311  OFFICIAL   BONDS.  §    320 

excise  commissioner  to  execute  an  official  bond,  approved  by  the  super- 
visor of  the  town,  does  not  create  a  vacancy;  at  the  utmost,  it  only 
furnishes  cause  for  a  forfeiture  of  the  office ;  a  vacancy  can  be  effected 
only  by  a  direct  proceeding  for  that  purpose. ^^  Thus,  where  an 
excise  commissioner  failed  to  procure  the  approval  of  the  supervisor 
to  the  bond  presented  and  filed  by  him,  and  at  a  subsequent  town 
meeting,  on  the  supposition  that  the  failure  to  have  the  bond  approved 
vacated  the  office,  votes  were  cast  electing  another  excise  commis- 
sioner "to  fill  vacancy,  if  any  exist,"  it  was  held  that  the  failure  of 
the  first  commissioner  to  have  his  bond  approved  did  not  vacate  the 
office,  and  that  there  was  no  vacancy  to  fill.^^ 

§  320.    Defective  bonds  valid  as  common-law  obligations. — It  is 

a  well-settled  rule  of  law  where  a  defective  bond  is  given  and  the 
officer  enters  upon  and  discharges  his  duties,  that  the  bond  is  good 
as  a  common-law  obligation,  and  the  sureties  thereon  are  liable, 
unless  such  rule  would  be  contrary  to  public  policy  or  is  expressly 
forbidden  by  statute.^*  Thus,  where  the  board  of  education  of  a 
union  free  school,  incorporated  under  a  common  school  act,  by  mis- 
take and  in  good  faith,  instead  of  taking  a  bond  from  one  elected  as 
its  treasurer,  as  required  by  said  act,  accepted  a  writing  in  the  form 
of  a  bond,  but  not  under  seal,  the  same  was  held  valid  and  enforceable 
against  the  sureties  thereto.^^ 

bond  are  liable  on  the  bond  for  a  2  Humph.  (Tenn.)  500;  Lee  v.  War- 
failure  to  pay  over  or  account  for  ing,  3  Desau.  (S.  C.)  57;  Board  &c. 
moneys  received  notwithstanding  v.  Coffinbury,  1  Mich.  355;  Barnes  v. 
the  bond  was  approved  by  resolution  Brookman,  107  111.  317;  Pritchett  v. 
instead  of  ordinance:  Town  of  Glos-  People,  6  111.  525.  See  also,  McGow- 
ter  v.  Harrell,  77  Miss.  793;  s.  c.  23  en  v.  Deyo,  8  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  340 
So.  520,  941;  27  So.  609.  Classen  v.  Shaw,  5  Watts  (Pa.)  468 

"  People  V.  Common  Council  &c.,  State    v.    Thompson,    49    Mo.    188 

77  N.  Y.  503.  Freeman  v.  Davis,  7  Mass.  200;  Bur- 

^^Cronin    v.    Stoddard,    97    N.    Y.  roughs  v.  Lowder,  8  Mass.  373;  How- 

271;   following  Foot  v.  Stiles,  57  N.  ard  v.  Brown,  21  Maine  385;   Row- 

Y.  399.  lett  V.  Eubank,  1  Bush    (Ky.)    477; 

"  United   States  v.   Tingey,   5   Pe-  Williams  v.  Shelby,  2  Or.  144. 
ters  115;   United  States  v.  Linn,  15         ^^  Board  of  Education  v.  Fonda,  77 

Peters  290;  Jessup  v.  United  States,  N.  Y.  350  (distinguishing  Hardmann 

106    U.    S.   147;    s.   c.   1   S.    Ct.   74;  v.  Bowen,  39  N.  Y.  196);  Rounds  v. 

United    States    v.    Rogers,    28    Fed.  Mansfield,  38  Maine  586.     See  also, 

607;  Inhabitants  &c.  v.  Haughton,  7  Boothbay   v.    Giles,    68    Maine   160; 

Conn.   543;    State   v.   Horn,   94   Mo.  United   States  v.   Hodson,   10  Wall. 

162;  s.  c.  7  S.  W.  116;  State  v.  Bart-  395;  Thomas  v.  White,  12  Mass.  367. 

lett,  30  Miss.  624;   Sweetser  v.  Hay,  A     bond     without     any     specified 

2  Gray  (Mass.)   49,  and  cases  there  obligee  has  been  held  valid  as  a  com- 

cited;  King  v.  Ireland,  68  Tex.  682;  mon-law  obligation:  Fellows  v.  Gil- 

s.  c.  5  S.  W.  499;  Polk  v.  Plummer,  man,  4  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  414,  419. 


321 


PUBLIC    COEPORATIONS. 


.312 


§  321.  The  same  subject  continued. — Where  the  statute  prescribes 
certain  obligees  to  whom  an  othcial  bond  is  to  be  made  payable,  and 
a  bond  is  given  payable  to  an  obligee  other  than  the  one  prescribed 
by  statute,  and  the  bond  in  other  respects  complies  with  the  require- 
ments of  the  statute,  it  is  good  as  a  common-law  bond/®  And  where 
parties  being  under  no  legal  disability,  and  capable  of  making  con- 
tracts, enter  into  a  voluntary  bond  based  on  a  good  and  valid  con- 
sideration and  for  a  lawful  purpose,  the  bond  is  binding  on  them 
at  common  law." 

§  322.  Time  when  an  official  bond  takes  effect. — An  official  bond 
resembles  a  deed  in  that  it  takes  effect  from  the  date  of  delivery 
thereof.^®  Thus,  it  has  been  held  by  the  supreme  court  of  the  United 
States  that  where  a  bond  was  delivered  to  the  obligee  for  accept- 
ance, and  it  was  accepted  afterwards,  it  took  effect  from  the  date 
of  delivery  and  not  from  the  acceptance  thereof. ^^  The  court  said: 
"A  bond  may  not  be  a  complete  contract  until  accepted  by  the  obligee ; 
but  if  it  has  been  delivered  to  him  to  be  accepted  if  he  should  choose 
to  do  so,  that  is  not  a  conditional  delivery  which  will  postpone  the 
obligor's  undertaking  to  the  time  of  its  acceptance,  but  an  admission 
that  the  bond  is  then  binding  upon  him  and  will  be  so  from  that  time 
if  it  should  be  accepted."^*' 


"United  States  v.  Maurice,  2 
Brock.  C.  C.  96,  115;  Iredell  v.  Bar- 
bee,  9  Ired.  L.  (N.  C.)  250;  Reid  v. 
Humphreys,  7  Jones  L.  (N.  C.)  258; 
Williams  v.  Ehringhaus,  3  Dev.  L. 
(N.  C.)  297.  See  also,  Moore  v. 
Graves,  3  N.  H.  408;  Horn  v.  Whit- 
tier,  6  N.  H.  88;  Governor  v.  Allen, 
8  Humph.  (Tenn.)  176;  Van  Hook 
V.  Barnett,  4  Dev.  L.  (N.  C.)  268; 
Justices  V.  Smith,  2  J.  J.  Marsh. 
(Ky.)  472. 

"Archer  v.  Hart,  5  Fla.  234.  It 
has  been  held  that  where  an  officer 
occupying  two  official  positions, 
having  filed  a  bond  for  his  due  and 
faithful  performance  of  one  of  them, 
voluntarily  gives  a  bond  for  the  per- 
formance of  the  duties  of  the  other 
position,  the  latter  bond  is  a  valid 
common-law  obligation,  even  though 
he  was  not  required  by  statute  to 
give  such  a  bond:  State  v.  Harney, 
57  Miss.  863.  See  also.  Board  &c.  v. 
Coffinbury,   1   Mich.   355;    People  v. 


Johr,  22  Mich.  461;  City  of  Platte- 
ville  V.  Hooper,  63  Wis.  385;  s.  c. 
23  N.  W.  583.  For  contrary  opin- 
ions, see  State  v.  Heisey,  56  Iowa 
404;  s.  c.  9  N.  W.  327;  United  States 
V.  Humason,  6  Sawyer  199;  State  v. 
Bartlett,  30  Miss.  624. 

^'  Johnson  v.  Harvey,  84  N.  Y.  363; 
Eberhardt  v.  Wood,  6  Lea  (Tenn.) 
467;  s.  c.  2  Tenn.  Ch.  488;  Bryant  v. 
Woods,  11  Lea  (Tenn.)   327. 

"  Butler  V.  United  States,  88  U.  S. 
272. 

="See  also.  State  v.  Tool,  4  Ohio 
St.  553.  Where  a  collector's  bond 
has  been  filed  within  the  time  pre- 
scribed by  statute,  but  is  not  ac- 
cepted until  the  statutory  time  has 
elapsed,  the  acceptance  relates  back 
to  the  time  of  filing  and  the  bond 
is  valid:  Drew  v.  Morrill,  62  N.  H. 
23.  Where  a  statute  requires  an  of- 
ficial bond  to  be  given  and  makes 
no  special  provision  for  the  mode 
of  its  delivery,  it  has  been  held  that 


313 


OFFICIAL   BONDS. 


§  323 


§  323.  Effect  of  not  filing  bonds  within  the  time  prescribed  by 
statute. — The  weight  of  the  American  authorities  is  decidedly  in 
favor  of  the  doctrine  that  if  a  statute  fixes  the  time  within  which 
bonds  are  to  be  given  the  provision  is  directory  and  not  mandatory; 
and  that  unless  it  expressly  declares  that  the  failure  to  give  the  bond 
by  the  time  prescribed  ipso  facto  vacates  the  office,  the  bond  may  be 
given  at  any  time  if  no  vacancy  has  been  declared.  ^^  And  it  has  been 
held  where  the  statute  requires  an  officer  to  file  a  bond  every  year 
that  his  mere  failure  to  do  so  does  not  vacate  the  office.^^ 

§  324.  The  same  subject  continued. — But  the  cases  are  not  unani- 
mous on  this  point;  and  in  some  states  it  has  been  held  that  the  fail- 
ure to  give  the  bond  within  the  prescribed  time  vacates  the  office,  with- 
out any  proceedings  to  declare  it  vacant ;  so  that  it  can  not  be  restored 
by  any  subsequent  compliance  with  the  statute.'^     Thus,  in  a  Texas 


the  filing  thereof  is  a  delivery: 
Board  &c.  v.  Bird,  31  Cal.  66. 

=^  Dillon  Munic.  Corp.  (4th  ed.), 
§  214;  United  States  v.  Le  Baron,  19 
How.  73;  People  v.  Holley,  12  Wend. 
(N.  Y.)  481;  People  v.  Ferguson,  20 
Week.  Dig.  (N.  Y.)  276;  Duntley  v. 
Davis,  42  Hun  (N.  Y.)  229;  Cronin 
V.  Stoddard,  97  N.  Y.  271;  People  v. 
Crissey,  91  N.  Y.  616;  Marbury  v. 
Madison,  1  Cranch  137;  Kearney  v. 
Andrews,  10  N.  J.  Eq.  70;  President 
&c.  (Bank)  v.  Dandridge,  12  Wheat. 
64;  State  v.  Churchill,  41  Mo.  41; 
State  V.  County  Court,  44  Mo.  230; 
Ross  V.  Williamson,  44  Ga.  501; 
Paine  Elections,  §  232;  Sprowl  v. 
Lawrence,  33  Ala.  674;  State  v.  Fal- 
coner, 44  Ala.  696;  Smith  v.  Cronk- 
hite,  8  Ind.  134;  State  v.  Colvig,  15 
Or.  57;  s.  c.  13  Pac.  639;  State  v. 
Findley,  10  Ohio  51;  State  v.  Ring, 
29  Minn.  78;  s.  c.  11  N.  W.  233; 
Cawley  v.  People,  95  111.  249.  For 
the  effect  of  the  failure  of  a  city 
marshal  to  give  his  bond  in  time,  see 
State  V.  Porter,  7  Ind.  204.  For  city 
treasurer's  bond,  see  City  of  Chicago 
V.  Gage,  95  111.  593;  Caskey  v.  City 
of  Greensburg,  78  Ind.  233. 

"Clark  V.  Ennis,  45  N.  J.  L.  69. 
Where  a  statute  required  the  master 
in     chancery     within     three     weeks 


after  his  election  to  tender  his  bond 
for  approval,  and  upon  its  approval 
to  deposit  it  with  the  treasurer  and 
sue  out  his  commission,  and  that 
"upon  his  failure  to  do  so  within 
the  said  time  his  office  shall  be 
deemed  absolutely  vacant,  and  shall 
be  filled  by  election  or  appointment 
as  heretofore  provided,"  it  was  held 
that  the  failure  to  comply  with  this 
requirement  was  only  cause  of  for- 
feiture, but  not  a  forfeiture  ipso 
facto:  State  v.  Toomer,  7  Rich.  L. 
(S.  C.)  216.  See  also.  State  v. 
Laughton,  19  Nev.  202;  s.  c.  8  Pac. 
344;  9  Am.  &  Eng.  Corp.  Cas.  79,  n.; 
Sprowl  V.  Lawrence,  33  Ala.  674; 
Kottman  v.  Ayer,  3  Strob.  (S.  C.)  92. 
^^Throop  Public  Officers,  §  173;  In 
re  Attorney-General,  14  Fla.  277; 
Creighton  v.  Commonwealth,  83  Ky. 
142;  Falconer  v.  Shores,  37  Ark. 
386;  Vaughan  v.  Johnson,  77  Va. 
300;  Childrey  v.  Rady,  77  Va.  518; 
Owens  V.  O'Brien,  78  Va.  116;  State 
V.  Johnson,  100  Ind.  489;  State  v. 
Matheny,  7  Kan.  327;  People  v.  Per- 
kins, 85  Cal.  509;  s.  c.  26  Pac.  245; 
People  V.  Taylor,  57  Cal.  620;  State 
V.  Hadley,  27  Ind.  496;  Kilpatrick  v. 
Smith,  77  Va.  347;  Johnson  v.  Mann, 
77  Va.  265.  See  also,  Jackson  v. 
Simonton,  4  Cranch  C.  C.  255;   Ben- 


§    325  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  31-i 

case,^*  it  was  held  that  a  statute  requiring  an  officer  to  qualify  within 
a  certain  time  was  directory,  only  where  the  delay  was  caused  by 
something  over  which  he  had  no  control,  and  not  in  case  of  his  re- 
fusal or  neglect  to  qualify. 

§  325.  Liability  of  sureties  on  a  treasurer's  bond. — The  sureties 
on  a  city  treasurer's  bond  pleaded  that  by  ordinance  it  was  the  duty 
of  the  mayor  to  supervise  the  conduct  of  the  treasurer,  and,  in  case 
of  misconduct  of  the  treasurer,  to*  transmit  information  to  the  com- 
mon council;  and  that  the  mayor  was  invested  with  full  power  to 
examine  all  books  in  the  custody  of  the  treasurer ;  and  that  it  was  the 
duty  of  the  common  council  to  examine  into  the  conduct  of  the  treas- 
urer, and  to  remove  him  in  case  of  any  violation  of  his  duty ;  and  that 
defendants  became  sureties,  relying  on  the  protection  afEorded  them 
by  the  faithful  discharge  of  the  said  duty;  and  that  the  mayor  and 
the  common  council  refused  to  perform  such  duty,  and  knowingly 
suffered  the  breaches.  The  court  decided  that  the  duty  to  discharge 
the  official  would  arise,  and  the  non-performance  of  it  be  a  defense 
to  the  sureties,  only  after  knowledge  of  the  officer's  dishonesty  was 
brought  home  to  the  common  council;  and  that  on  the  averments  in 
this  plea  defense  was  made  on  the  neglect  of  duty  by  the  mayor ;  and 
that  his  neglect  of  duty  was  no  defense.^^     But  a  plea  by  the  sureties 

nett  V.  State,  58  Miss.  556.  For  the  bond  are  liable:  Priet  v.  De  La  Mon- 
English  rule,  see  Prowse  v.  Foot,  3  tanya,  85  Cal.  148;  s.  c.  24  Pac.  612. 
Bro.  P.  C.  167;  Anonymous,  Free.  A  complaint  alleged  that  a  city 
474.  treasurer  failed  to  pay  over  accord- 
^  Flatan  v.  State,  56  Tex.  93.  ing  to  law  money  which  came  into 
^  Mayor  &c.  v.  Stout,  52  N.  J.  L.  his  hands  as  treasurer.  Plaintiff 
35;  s.  c.  18  Atl.  943.  A  new  bond  offered  books  kept  by  the  treasurer 
given  by  a  village  treasurer  at  the  which  showed  parties  indebted  to 
request  of  the  village  council,  and  the  city  who  had,  in  fact,  paid  the 
thereafter  treated  and  accepted  as  treasurer;  also  an  ordinance  provid- 
his  official  bond,  is  binding  upon  ing  that  the  treasurer  should  keep 
him  and  his  sureties,  although  no  a  true  account  of  all  moneys  re- 
formal  resolution  requiring  the  ceived  by  him.  Defendants  pointed 
bond  and  no  resolution  approving  it  to  a  provision  that  the  city  treas- 
were  recorded:  Village  of  Evart  v.  urer  should  receive  one-sixth  of  all 
Postal,  86  Mich.  325;  s.  c.  49  N.  W.  moneys  collected  by  him,  and  also 
53.  Payment  by  a  city  treasurer  offered  the  treasurer's  books  which 
of  a  warrant  which  he  knows  to  be  showed  the  amount  collected  and 
illegal  out  of  money  set  apart  for  turned  into  the  city,  and  that  on 
the  payment  of  the  legal  warrant  this  amount  the  treasurer  had  re- 
substituted  for  that  which  was  il-  ceived  only  ten  per  cent.  The  court 
legal,  thereby  exhausting  the  fund  decided  that  the  additional  six  and 
out  of  which  the  former  was  pay-  two-thirds  per  cent,  should  have 
able,  is  a  misappropriation  of  the  been  considered  in  bar  of  recovery 
fund  for  which  the  sureties  on  his  against  the  sureties  under  a  general 


315 


Ol'^nCIAL    JiONDS. 


326 


on  a  city  treasurer's  l)on(l  that  tlie  city,  contriving  and  intending  to 
injure  defendnnts,  wilfully  neglected  to  examine  the  treasurer's  ac- 
counts annually,  and  otherwise  permitted,  encouraged  and  induced 
and  were  privy  to  the  alleged  breaches,  is  good."" 

§  326.  The  same  subject  continued. — A  county  treasurer's  bond 
reciting  that  the  treasurer  and  his  sureties  are  each  severally  bound, 
and  that  they  bind  themselves  severally,  is  not  rendered  void  so 
as  to  relieve  the  sureties  from  liability  by  the  failure  of  the  treasurer 
to  execute  the  bond.-''  Application  of  payments  by  a  public  officer 
is  binding  on  his  sureties;  and  they  can  not  escape  liability  for  his 
failure  to  pay  over  money  collected  during  the  term  for  which  they 
were  sureties  by  showing  that  he  wrongfully  applied  such  moneys 
to  the  payment  of  deficiencies  occurring  during  the  preceding  term.-* 


denial  of  the  complaint:  City  of 
Butte  v.  Cohen,  9  Mont.  435;  s.  c.  24 
Pac.  206.  Where  officers  of  a  town 
are  negligent  in  discovering  the 
defalcation  of  the  treasurer  within 
such  time  as  would  have  enabled 
the  sureties  to  protect  themselves  it 
will  not  discharge  the  sureties:  In- 
habitants &c.  V.  Soule,  175  Mass. 
400;  s.  c.  56  N.  E.  575. 

="  Mayor  &c.  v.  Stout,  52  N.  J.  L. 
35;  s.  c.  18  Atl.  943;  following  May- 
or V.  Dickerson,  45  N.  J.  L.  38. 

^  Douglas  Co.  V.  Bardon,  79  Wis. 
641;  s.  c.  48  N.  W.  969.  Opposite 
the  signature  of  each  bondsman  was 
set  the  amount  for  which  he  was  ob- 
ligated. In  the  body  of  the  instru- 
ment, after  the  part  specifying  these 
amounts,  was  the  phrase,  "for  the 
payment  of  which,  well  and  truly  to 
be  made,  we  bind  ourselves,  our 
heirs,  representatives,  administra- 
tors and  assigns,  jointly  and  sever- 
ally, by  these  presents."  Compiled 
statutes  of  Montana,  §  631  (Code 
Civil  Proc),  provides  that  in  the 
construction  of  the  instrument  the 
intention  of  the  parties  is  to  be  pur- 
sued, if  possible,  and  when  a  gen- 
eral and  a  particular  provision  are 
inconsistent  the  latter  is  paramount; 
and  a  particular  intent  will  control 
a  general   one  that  is  inconsistent 


with  it.  Section  336  provides  that 
when  an  agreement  has  been  in- 
tended in  a  different  sense  by  the 
different  parties  to  it,  the  sense  is 
to  prevail  against  either  party  in 
which  he  supposed  the  other  under- 
stood it;  and,  when  different  con- 
structions are  equally  proper,  that 
is  to  be  taken  which  is  most  favor- 
able to  the  party  in  whose  favor  the 
provision  was  made.  In  an  action 
on  the  bond  the  complaint  alleged 
that  "defendants  have  forfeited  the 
bond  and  become  and  are  indebted 
to  plaintiff  in  the  respective  sums 
set  after  their  names  in  said  bond." 
It  was  held  that  the  instrument 
bound  the  sureties  severally  for  the 
amount  only  expressly  stated  as  re- 
spectively undertaken:  City  of 
Butte  V.  Cohen,  9  Mont.  435;  s.  c.  24 
Pac.  206.  A  bond  of  a  town  treas- 
urer complying  with  the  statute,  ex- 
cept that  it  is  executed  to  the  su- 
pervisors of  the  town  or  their  suc- 
cessors in  office,  instead  of  "to  the 
town  by  its  name,"  is  valid,  and  an 
action  thereon  may  be  maintained 
by  the  town:  City  of  Platteville  v. 
Hooper,  63  Wis.  385;  s.  c.  23  N.  W. 
583. 

^  Crawn  v.  Commonwealth.  84  Va. 
282;  s.  c.  4  S.  E.  721;  10  Am.  St.  839; 
§  340,  post.    A  city  does  not,  by  ap- 


Q      o  W-)  IV 


PUBLIC    CORrORATlOiSrS. 


316 


§  327.  Mingling  of  and  defalcations  out  of  two  funds. — Where  the 
treasurer  of  a  hoard  of  education  was  also  the  general  manager  of  a 
private  corporation,  and  had  the  control  of  its  funds  as  well  as  of  the 
school  funds,  and  he  deposited  its  funds  and  the  school  funds  to- 
gether in  a  national  bank,  in  the  name  of  the  private  corporation, 
with  the  knowledge  and  consent  of  the  officers  of  the  bank,  such 
funds  to  be  subject  to  his  control,  and  to  his  checks  for  schools  and 
school  corporation  purposes,  as  well  as  for  the  private  corporation 
purposes, — it  was  held  that  although  as  manager  of  the  private  cor- 
poration he  drew  out  the  funds  in  the  bank  so  as  to  cause  a  deficit 
in  the  amount  of  the  school  funds  on  deposit  at  the  time  of  the 
execution  of  a  second  bond,  still,  as  more  than  enough  moneys  were 
afterwards  deposited  by  him  as  treasurer  of  the  private  corporation 
to  liquidate  and  satisfy  the  shortage,  such  deficit  ceased  to  exist,  and 
for  a  subsequent  defalcation  in  the  school  funds  the  sureties  on  the 
second  bond  were  liable."^  And  wdiere  a  city  treasurer  was  custodian 
of  a  school  fund  in  respect  of  which  the  sureties  on  his  official  bond 
were  hot  liable,  and  the  money  received  by  him  was  kept  in  one  mass 
without  any  means  of  determining  to  which  fund  any  part  of  it 
belonged,  and  he  misappropriated  some  of  the  funds  so  that  it  was 
proving  the  reports  of  the  city  treas-     fund:    Broad   v.    City   of   Paris,    66 


urer  from  time  to  time,  estop  itself 
to  sue  on  the  treasurer's  bond  after 
the  end  of  his  term,  for  embezzle- 
ment or  defalcation  prior  to  such 
approval.  "We  do  not  think,"  said 
the  court,  "that  the  approval  by  the 
city  of  the  treasurer's  reports 
amounted  to  an  assertion  that  the 
treasurer  actually  held  in  his  hands 
the  money  so  appearing  by  the  re- 
ports:" Britton  v.  City  of  Fort 
Worth,  78  Tex.  227,  231;  s.  c.  14  S. 
W.  585;  34  Am.  &  Eng.  Corp.  Cas. 
411.  Under  the  revised  statutes  of 
Texas,  ch.  3,  tit.  78,  art.  3791,  pro- 
viding that  treasurers  of  cities  hav- 
ing management  of  schools  shall 
have  the  same  powers  and  perform 
the  same  duties  as  county  treas- 
urers, and  art.  3728,  providing  that 
county  treasurers  shall  execute 
special  bonds  as  school  treasurers, 
the  sureties  on  the  general  bond  of 
a  city  treasurer  are  not  liable  for 
his  defalcations  out  of   the   school 


Tex.  119;  s.  c.  18  S.  W.  342. 

-"  Gilbert  v.  Board  of  Education, 
45  Kan.  31;  s.  c.  25  Pac.  226;  34  Am. 
&  Eng.  Corp.  Cas.  399.  "In  all  cases 
where  accounts  exist  between  par- 
ties," said  the  court,  "including 
bank  accounts,  a  cause  of  action 
does  not  exist  with  reference  to 
each  item  of  the  account,  but  only 
as  to  the  balance  that  may  be  due  to 
one  or  the  other  of  the  parties;  and 
it  exists  in  favor  only  of  that  party 
in  whose  favor  the  balance  is  due: 
Waffle  V.  Short,  25  Kan.  503;  Tootle 
V.  Wells,  39  Kan.  452;  s.  c.  18  Pac. 
692.  And  each  new  item  added  to 
the  account,  in  favor  of  the  person 
against  whom  the  balance  is  due, 
operates  as  payment  or  partial  pay- 
ment of  such  balance;  and  it  will 
generally  operate  in  payment  or  par- 
tial payment  of  the  oldest  item  of 
the  account  not  yet  paid  or  satis- 
fied: Shellabarger  v.  Binns,  18  Kan. 
345;  1  Morse  Banks  and  Banking, 
§  355." 


317  OFFICIAL   BONDS.  §    328 

impos^sible  to  say  that  any  sum  less  than  the  whole  that  was  mis- 
appropriated l)elongecl  to  either,  it  was  presumed  in  an  action  upon 
his  official  bond  that  he  embezzled  a  pro  rata  proportion  of  each 
fund.-''" 

§  328.  Liability  of  sureties  as  affected  by  subsequent  legislation. — 

In  a  Virginia  case'"^  it  was  held  tliat  tlie  regulations  prescribed  by 
law  for  the  settlement  of  officers'  accounts  at  stated  intervals,  being 
intended  for  the  benefit  of  the  government,  to  secure  punctuality 
and  promptness  in  its  officers,  were  directory  merely  and  did  not 
enter  into  and  form  part  of  the  contract  of  the  sureties,  so  as  to  pre- 
vent the  legislature  from  altering  or  extending  the  times  of  settle- 
ment at  pleasure  without  the  assent  of  the  sureties ;  and  therefore, 
and  from  the  nature  of  the  officer's  obligation  and  duties,  and  of  the 
condition  of  the  bond,  such  an  extension  did  not  operate  as  a  dis- 
charge of  the  surety.  This  doctrine  was  approved  in  a  case^^  where 
the  surety  of  a  treasurer  who  had  defaulted  to  the  state  claimed  to 
be  discharged  of  his  obligation  by  the  act  of  the  assembly  which  ex- 
tended the  time  of  payment  by  the  debtor,  and  thus  enabled  him,  as 
was  alleged,  to  default  by  postponing  the  time  of  the  discovery  of  his 
delinquencies.^^ 

§  329.  Liability  of  surety  when  subsequent  legislation  imposes 
new  duties  of  the  same  general  character. — A  public  officer  takes 
his  office  with  the  obligation  to  j^erform  all  the  duties  incident  to  or 
connected  with  it  then  existing,  or  that  may  be  added  by  the  legisla- 
ture, provided  the  nature  and  character  of  the  duties  remain  the 
same ;  it  is  indispensable  to  the  proper  management  of  public  af- 
fairs, and  serious  injury  to  the  public  interest  would  occur  were  the 
rule  otherwise.  The  obligation  is  for  a  faithful  performance  by  the 
principal  of  all  the  duties  of  the  office  during  the  term  of  his  appoint- 
ment, not  of  duties  as  they  exist  at  any  particular  moment.  His 
duties  vary  with  the  requisitions  of  the  statute;  and  whatever  the 

^^  Britton  v.  City  of  Fort  Worth,  own  security  and  protection  and  to 

78  Tex.  227;   s.  c.  14  S.  W.  585;   34  regulate  the  conduct  of  its  own  offi- 

Am.  &  Eng.  Corp.  Cas.  411.  cars.     They  are  merely  directory  to 

"  Commonwealth    v.    Holmes,    25  such  officers  and  constitute  no  part 

Graft.  (Va.)  771.  of  the  contract  of  the  surety."     On 

"  Smith     V.     Commonwealth,     25  this  point  see  also,  United  States  v. 

Gratt.  (Va.)  780»  Boyd,    15    Peters    187-208;     United 

=«In  the  case  of  United  States  v.  States  v.  Van  Zandt,  11  Wheat.  184; 

Kirkpatrick,    9    Wheat.    720,    Judge  United  States  v.  Nicholl,  12  Wheat. 

Story  says  these  regulations  as  to  505,   509;    State  v.  Carleton,   1  Gill 

settlements  "are  provisions  of  law  (Md.)  249. 
created  by  the  government  for  its 


330 


PUBLIC    COKPOKATIONS. 


318 


statute  imposes  or  withdraws  becomes  or  ceases  to  be  a  part  of  his 
duty.  The  only  limitation  to  this  rule  is  that  the  duties  imposed 
shall  be  of  the  same  general  nature  and  character.^* 

§  330.  The  same  subject  continued. — Mr.  Justice  Clifford,  in  de- 
livering the  opinion  of  the  supreme  court  of  the  United  States,  said 
that  "any  substantial  addition  by  law  to  the  duties  of  the  obligor  of 
a  bond,  after  the  execution  of  the  instrument,  materially  enlarging 
his  liabilities,  will  not  impose  any  additional  responsibility  upon  his 
sureties  unless  the  words  of  the  bond,  by  a  fair  and  reasonable  con- 
struction, bring  such  subsequently  imposed  duties  within  its  pro- 
visions."^^ In  a  later  case  substantially  the  same  rule  was  laid  down 
by  Judge  Lowell,  of  the  United  States  circuit  court.  ^^  And  in 
England  it  was  said  by  Chief  Justice  Campbell  that  "the  question 
is  whether  the  nature  and  functions  of  the  office  or  employment  are 
changed;  for  if  they  are,  it  is  not  the  same  office  within  the  meaning 
of  the  bond."^^     Thus,  where  a  superintendent  of  water-works  whose 


^People  V.  Vilas,  3  Abb.  Pr.  (N. 
S.)  (N.  Y.)  252;  s.  c.  36  N.  Y.  459; 
Mayor  &c.  v.  Ryan,  35  How.  Pr.  (N. 
Y.)  408;  Strong  v.  United  States,  6 
Wall.  788;  White  v.  Fox,  22  Maine 
341;  Marney  v.  State,  13  Mo.  7;  Col- 
ter V.  Morgan,  12  B.  Mon.  (Ky.) 
278;  Walker  v.  Chapman,  22  Ala. 
116;  Bartlett  v.  Governor,  2  Bibb 
(Ky.)  586;  Governor  v.  Ridgeway, 
12  111.  14;  Compher  v.  People,  12 
III.  290;  Grayham  v.  County  Court 
&c.,  9  Dana  (Ky.)  184;  Hatch  v.  In- 
habitants &c.,  97  Mass.  533.  See 
also,  Gaussen  v.  United  States,  97 
U.  S.  584.  The  imposition  by  the 
board  of  supervisors  of  a  county 
upon  the  CQunty  treasurer  during 
his  term  of  office  of  the  duty  of  rais- 
ing, keeping  and  disbursing  large 
sums  of  money  in  addition  to  the 
usual  and  ordinary  duties  of  his  of- 
fice,— for  instance,  the  raising  and 
disbursing  money  during  a  war  for 
bounty  purposes,  —  does  not  dis- 
charge the  sureties  upon  his  bond 
from  liability:  Board  &c.  v.  Clarke, 
92  N.  Y.  391. 

'=  United  States  v.  Powell,  14  Wall. 
493,  504;  holding,  however,  that  a 
distiller's  bond  for  the  faithful  per- 


formance of  all  the  provisions  of 
law  relating  to  his  duties  was  broad 
enough  to  cover  duties  subsequently 
imposed  by  law:  Farr  v.  Hollis,  9 
B.  &  C.  315,  322.  Cf.  United  States 
V.  Kirkpatrick,  9  Wheat.  720,  738; 
United  States  v.  Singer,  15  Wall. 
Ill;  People  v.  Tompkins,  74  111.  482. 

^"United  States  v.  McCortney,  1 
Fed.  104;  citing  Postmaster-General 
V.  Munger,  2  Paine  C.  C.  189;  White 
V.  Fox,  22  Maine  341;  Governor  v. 
Ridgway,  12  111.  14;  Boody  v.  United 
States,  1  Woodb.  &  M.  150;  Smith  v. 
Board  &c.,  59  111.  412;  People  v. 
Vilas,  36  N.  Y.  459,  465;  Mayor  v. 
Sibberns,  3  Abb.  App.  Dec.  (N,  Y.) 
266;  Bartlett  v.  Governor,  2  Bibb 
(Ky.)  586;  Colter  v.  Morgan,  12  B. 
Mon.  (Ky.)  278;  Commonwealth  v. 
Gabbert,  5  Bush  (Ky.)  438;  Marney 
V.  State,  13  Mo.  7;  King  v.  Nichols, 
16  Ohio  St.  80;  Gaussen  v.  United 
States,  2  Woods  92;  s.  c.  97  U.  S. 
584;  United  States  v.  Powell,  14 
Wall.  493;  United  States  v.  Singer, 
15  Wall.  111. 

"Pybus  V.  Gibb,  6  El.  &  Bl.  902. 
which  holds  that  the  surety  is  en- 
tirely discharged.  See  also,  Os- 
wald V.  Mayor  &c.,  5  H.  L.  Cas.  856, 


;n9 


OFFICIAL   BONDS. 


331 


duties  were  not  defined  by  law  gave  a  bond  for  the  performance  of 
liis  duties,  including  the  accounting  for  moneys,  and  an  ordinance  was 
then  passed  requiring  him  to  collect  water  rents,  his  sureties  were  not 
deemed  to  guaranty  his  fidelity  in  respect  of  such  rents.^^ 

§  331.    Liability  of  officer  on  his  bond  where  the  loss  is  occasioned 

by  the  act  of  God  or  the  public  enemy. — It  is  tlie  doctrine  of  the 
supreme  court  of  the  United  States  that  a  public  officer  who  has  given 
a  bond  for  the  faithful  performance  of  his  duties,  and  the  keeping, 
accounting  for  and  paying  over  of  the  moneys  which  come  to  his 
hands,  is  relieved  from  liability  for  loss  only  where  it  is  occasioned 
by  the  act  of  God  or  the  public  enemy.^®  This  general  rule  is  affirmed 
in  many  of  the  state  courts  ;*°  where  it  is  accordingly  held  that  if 
money  is  lost  by  the  failure  of  a  bank  in  which  it  was  deposited,  the 
officer  and  his  sureties  are  liable  regardless  of  negligence.*^ 


But  several  cases  in  the  United 
States  enforced  the  obligation  of 
the  bond  in  respect  of  duties  im- 
posed by  law  at  the  time  it  was  exe- 
cuted, and  declared  it  void  as  against 
the  sureties  only  for  the  extension: 
United  States  v.  Kirkpatrick,  9 
Wheat.  720;  Commonwealth  v. 
Holmes,  25  Gratt.  (Va.)  771;  Gaus- 
sen  V.  United  States,  97  U.  S.  584. 
See  also,  Marquette  Co.  v.  Ward,  50 
Mich.  174;  s.  c.  15  N.  W.  70. 

^^  City  of  Lafayette  v.  James,  92 
Ind.  240;  s.  c.  47  Am.  R.  140;  Peo- 
ple V.  Pennock,  60  N.  Y.  421;  Mum- 
ford  V.  Memphis  &c.  R.  Co.,  2  Lea 
(Tenn.)  393;  s.  c.  31  Am.  R.  616; 
White  S.  M.  Co.  v.  Mullins,  41  Mich. 
339;  s.  c.  2  N.  W.  196. 

^United  States  v.  Prescott,  3 
How.  578  (the  leading  case,  where 
Mr.  Justice  McLean  does  not  consid- 
er the  law  of  bailments  appli- 
cable to  the  case,  and  places  the  li- 
ability on  the  breach  of  the  express 
contract,  and  fortifies  it  by  consid- 
erations of  public  policy) ;  Bevans 
v.  United  States,  13  Wall.  56;  United 
States  V.  Keehler,  9  Wall.  83;  Boy- 
den  v.  United  States,  13  Wall.  17; 
United  States  v.  Dashiel,  4  Wall. 
182;  United  States  v.  Morgan.  11 
How.  153;  United  States  v.  Thomas, 


15  Wall.  337;   United  States  v.  Hu- 
mason,  6  Sawyer  199. 

'» State  V.  Clark,  73  N,  C.  255,  and 
United  States  v.  Watts,  1  N.  Mex. 
553,  carrying  the  rule  to  the  utter- 
most limits;  Inhabitants  &c.  v.  Haz- 
zard,  12  Cush.  (Mass.)  112;  Com- 
monwealth V.  Comly,  3  Pa.  St.  372; 
Inhabitants  &c.  v.  McEachron,  33  N. 
J.  L.  339;  Board  &c.  v.  Jewell,  44 
Minn.  427;  s.  c.  46  N.  W.  914;  Board 
&c.  V.  Tower,  28  Minn.  45;  s.  c.  8  N. 
W.  907;  County  Com'rs  v.  Line- 
berger,  3  Mont.  231;  State  v.  Harper, 
6  Ohio  St.  607;  State  v.  Nevin,  19 
Nev.  162;  s.  c.  7  Pac.  650;  State  v. 
Moore,  74  Mo.  413;  Taylor  Tp.  v. 
Morton,  37  Iowa  550;  Rock  v. 
Stinger,  36  Ind.  346;  Morbeck  v. 
State,  28  Ind.  86;  Halbert  v.  State, 
22  Ind.  125;  Clay  Co.  v.  Simonson, 
1  Date  403;  s.  c.  46  N.  W.  592.  See 
also.  Muzzy  v.  Shattuck,  1  Denio  (N. 
Y.)  233;  Union  Tp.  v.  Smith,  39 
Iowa  9. 

"  Havens  v.  Lathene,  75  N.  C.  505; 
Lowry  v.  Polk  Co.,  51  Iowa  50;  s.  c. 
49  N.  W.  1049;  Nason  v.  Poor  Direc- 
tors, 126  Pa.  St.  445;  s.  c.  17  Atl. 
616;  Hart  v.  Poor  Guardians,  81i/^ 
Pa.  St.  466;  State  v.  Powell,  67  Mo. 
395;  Perley  v.  Muskegon  Co.,  32 
Mich.  132. 


§    332  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  320 

§  332.  The  same  subject  continued. — On  the  other  hand,  several 
state  courts  of  high  authority  have  arrived  at  a  contrary  conclusion. 
Thus,  in  New  York,  it  was  held  that  there  was  no  liability  on  the  bond 
of  a  county  treasurer  for  the  loss  of  money  by  theft  without  negli- 
gence on  his  part.*-  In  Alabama  "the  highest  amount  of  care,  dili- 
gence and  vigilance"  is  exacted  of  the  officer;  but  if  he  is  roblied 
despite  great  prudence  and  circumspection,  which  is  a  question  of 
fact  for  the  jury,  it  constitutes  a  good  defense.*^  The  same  rule  is 
declared  in  Maine,**  South  Carolina,*^  and  by  implication  at  least  in 
Louisiana.*® 

§  333.    Duty  of  obligee  to  notify  sureties  of  increased  risk,  etc. — 

The  question  has  frequently  arisen  between  private  corporations  and 
the  sureties  on  the  official  bonds  of  their  agents  whether  the  obligee 
is  bound  to  communicate  to  the  guarantor  facts  which  materially 
increase  the  risk,  such  as  the  previous  dishonesty  or  default  of  the 
agent.  It  is  declared  in  Massachusetts  that  "the  creditor  owes  no 
duty  of  active  diligence  to  take  care  of  the  interest  of  the  surety. 
It  is  the  business  of  the  surety  to  see  that  his  principal  performs  the 
duty  which  he  has  guaranteed  and  not  that  of  the  creditor.  *  *  * 
Mere  inaction  of  the  creditor  will  not  discharge  the  surety  unless  it 
amounts  to  fraud  or  concealment."*^    This  is  also  the  rule  in  lowa,*^ 

^-Supervisors  v.  Dorr,  25  Wend.  196;  citing  Wright  v.  Simpson,  6 
(N.  Y.)  440;  s.  c.  7  Hill  (N.  Y.)  Ves.  714;  President  &c.  v.  Anthony, 
583.  And  in  the  same  state  the  18  Pick.  (Mass.)  238;  Taft  v.  Gifford, 
sureties  of  a  surrogate  were  not  li-  13  Met.  (Mass.)  187;  Tapley  v.  Mar- 
able  for  the  loss  of  money  deposited  tin,  116  Mass.  275;  and  disapproving 
with  a  banker  in  good  credit,  who  Sanderson  v.  Aston,  L.  R.  8  Ex.  73; 
afterward  failed:  People  v.  Faulk-  s.  c.  4  Eng.  Rep.  452.  See  also, 
ner,  107  N.  Y.  477;  s.  c.  14  N.  E.  President  &c.  v.  Root,  2  Met.  (Mass.) 
415;  rev'g  s.  c.  38  Hun  (N.  Y.)  607.  522;  Locke  v.  Postmaster-General,  3 

'^  State  V.   Houston,   78  Ala.   576;  Mason  446;   McKecknie  v.  Ward,  58 

State  V.  Houston,  83  Ala.  361;   s.  c.  N.  Y.   541.     Cf.   Graves  v.   Lebanon 

3  So.  859.  Nat'l  Bank,  10  Bush  (Ky.)   23;   s.  c. 

"  Inhabitants   &c.    v.    Pennell,    69  19  Am.  R.  50,  where  the  directors  of 

Maine  357.     See,  for  a  qualification  a  bank  published  a  statement  show- 

of  this  defense.   Inhabitants  &c.  v.  ing  its  affairs  to  be  in  good  condi- 

Lowell,  70  Maine  437.  tion,  when  by  reasonable  diligence 

*^  York  Co.  V.  Watson,  15  S.  C.  1.  they  would  have  discovered  that  the 

^"  State  V.  Lanier,  31  La.  An.  423.  cashier  was  a  defaulter.     This  was 

See  also.  Walker  v.  British  Guaran-  held  to  discharge  one  who  became  a 

tee  Ass'n,  18  Q.  B.  277;  s.  c.  21  L.  J.  surety  of  the  cashier  upon  the  faith 

Q.  B.  257.  of  their  statement. 

"''  Watertown   F.   Ins.   Co.  v.   Sim-        ^^  Home    Ins.    Co.    v.    Holway,    55 

mons,  131  Mass.  85;  s.  c.  41  Am.  R.  Iowa  571;  s.  c.  8  N.  W.  457. 


321  OFFICIAL   BONDS.  §    334 

Wisconsin,*®  Illinois,^"  Rhode  Island,"  and  New  York;^^  but  it  is 
ojjposed  to  the  doctrine  in  England,"'^  New  Jersey,^*  Maine/°  and 
Kentucky.'^®  Admitting  the  tortious  quality  of  a  neglect  to  notify 
the  surety  in  such  cases,  it  would  be  difficult  to  maintain  that  the 
sureties  on  the  bond  of  a  public  officer  are  discharged  by  a  failure  to 
inform  them  of  previous  defaults.  It  was  expressly  decided  in  Min- 
nesota that  knowledge  by  a  board  of  county  commissioners  when  they 
accepted  a  treasurer's  bond  that  the  officer  had  converted  funds 
during  a  prior  term  did  not  release  the  sureties.^'^  Nor  would  the 
members  of  the  board  be  personally  liable  under  the  same  circum- 
stances.^® 

§  334.  Liability  of  sureties  on  successive  bonds — (a)  Where  dif- 
ferent sureties  are  given  on  each  bond. — When  successive  bonds  with 
different  sureties  have  been  given  for  the  faithful  jjerformance  of  the 
duties  of  the  same  officer,  and  a  breach  has  taken  place  in  the  con- 
ditions of  the  bonds  in  not  accounting  for  and  paying  over  moneys 
by  him  received,  considerable  difficulty  may  be  experienced  in  deter- 
mining upon  which  bond  and  its  sureties  the  liability  shall  fall. 
With  respect  to  the  general  principle  applicable  to  such  cases  there 
is  no  great  contrariety  of  opinion;  but  in  the  application  of  those 
principles  to  existing  cases  considerable  judicial  dissension  has  been 
manifested.  There  is  no  doubt  that  an  official  bond  may  be  so  drawn 
as  to  render  the  sureties  answerable  for  the  past  as  well  as  for  the 
future  derelictions  of  their  principal.  Thus,  if  the  condition  of  a 
bond  is  that  the  officer  shall  pay  all  sums  of  money  which  he  has  re- 
ceived, and  all  which  he  shall  hereafter  receive,  this  language  will 
impose  on  the  sureties  the  liability  for  past  as  well  as  for  future 
defaults.  ^9 

*^  ^tna  L.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Mabbett,  18  ='=  Graves  v.  Lebanon  Nat'l  Bank, 

Wis.  698.  10  Bush   (Ky.)   23.     See  also,  Char- 

™  Roper    V.    Trustees    &c.,    91    111.  lotte  &c.  Co.  v.  Gow,  59  Ga.  685. 

518.     See    also.    Ham    v.    Greve,    34  "  "If  the  bond  was  sufficient  it  was 

Ind.  18.  their  duty  to  accept  it:"  Pine  Co.  v. 

"Atlas  Bank  v.  Brownell,  9  R.  I.  Willard,  39   Minn.   125;    s.   c.   39   N, 

168.  W.  71. 

"Bostwick  V.  Van  Voorhis,  91  N.  ^  Held  v.  Bagwell,   58   Iowa  139; 

Y.  353.  s.  c.  12  N.  W.  226,  holding,  as  inti- 

"*  Phillips  V.  Foxhall,  L.  R.  7  Q.  B.  mated  in  the  case  last  cited,  that  the 

666;   Enright  v.  Falvey,  4  L.  R.  Ir.  duty  of  approving  bonds  is  purely 

397;  Sanderson  v.  Aston,  L.  R.  8  Ex.  public. 

73.  '**  Saunders   v.    Taylor,   9   B.   &   C. 

"  State  V.  Sooy,  39  N.  J.  L.  135.  35.     But  the  construction  of  all  offi- 

^'^  Franklin    Bank    v.    Cooper,    36  cial  bonds,  in  the  absence  of  express 

Maine  179,  197.  provision  to  the  contrary,  is  pros- 
1  Smith — 21 


335 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS. 


S22 


§  335.    The  same  subject  continued. — In  other  words,  it  may  be 

said  that  the  sureties  of  an  oil  leer  are  answerable  only  for  those  acts 
or  defaults  of  their  principal  which  occur  subsequently  to  the  execu- 
tion of  his  ofhcial  bond.  So,  if  after  an  official  bond  has  been  given 
a  further  bond  is  executed  for  any  reason  for  the  same  othcer,  the 
sureties  on  this  last  bond  are  answerable  only  for  such  moneys  as 
may  be  received  by  their  principal  after  its  execution.^*'  The  de- 
faults of  a  prior  term  are  not  chargeable  against  the  sureties  on  an 
official  bond  for  a  subsequent  term.**^ 

§  336.  (b)  Where  funds  received  by  the  officer  during  his  first 
term  remain  in  his  hands  during  his  second  term. — If,  however,  the 
moneys  which  have  been  collected  during  the  first  term  of  office 
remain  in  the  custody  of  the  officer  when  he  enters  upon  the  discharge 
of  his  duties  for  the  second  term,  the  sureties  for  the  latter  term 
immediately  become  answerable  therefor,  and  those  of  the  former 
term  are  relieved  from  further  liability.®^  It  is  sometimes  the  duty 
of  an  officer,  notwithstanding  the  expiration  of  his  official  term,  to 
proceed  to  complete  some  matter  which  has  devolved  upon  him  offi- 
cially.    In  that  event  his  sureties  remain  liable  for  his  acts  done 


pective  rather  than  retrospective. 
If  the  principal  in  the  bond  has  re- 
ceived moneys,  prior  to  its  execu- 
tion, whether  before  or  after  his 
appointment  to  the  office,  the  bond 
will  not  be  construed  as  having  re- 
gard to  such  moneys;  and  his  de- 
fault in  not  properly  accounting  for 
them  will  not  be  regarded  as  a 
breach  of  such  bond:  United  States 
V.  Boyd,  15  Peters  187;  United 
States  V.  Giles,  9  Cranch  212;  Gov- 
ernor V.  Gibson,  14  Ala.  326;  Sebas- 
tian V.  Bryan,  21  Ark.  447;  Jeffers 
V.  Johnson,  18  N.  J.  L.  382;  Myers  v. 
United  States,  1  McLean  493;  Mc- 
Intyre  v.  School  Trustees,  3  111. 
App.  77;  Stern  v.  People,  96  111.  475. 

'^  Bessinger  v.  Dickerson,  20  Iowa 
260;  Thompson  v.  Dickerson,  22 
Iowa  360. 

"Bissell  V.  Saxton,  77  N.  Y.  191; 
Patterson  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  38  N. 
J.  L.  255;  Street  v.  Laurens,  5  Rich. 
Eq.  (S.  C.)  227;  Heuitt  v.  State,  6 
Har.  &  J.  (Md.)  95;  s.  c.  14  Am.  D. 
259;  Inhabitants  &c.  v.  Randall,  105 


Mass.  295;  s.  c.  7  Am.  R.  519.  The 
sureties  upon  the  last  bond  should 
be  treated  precisely  as  if  their  prin- 
cipal had  not  been  the  incumbent  of 
the  office  during  the  preceding 
term:  City  of  Paducah  v.  Cully,  9 
Bush  (Ky.)  323;  City  of  Detroit  v. 
Weber,  29  Mich.  24;  Vivian  v.  Otis, 
24  Wis.  518;  s.  c.  1  Am.  R.  199.  For 
cases  where  the  sureties  were  held 
not  liable  for  moneys  which  either 
in  fact  or  in  contemplation  of  law 
came  into  his  possession  during  the 
term  subsequent  to  that  for  which 
they  became  his  sureties,  see  Bryan 
V.  United  States,  1  Black  140;  Tyler 
V.  Nelson,  14  Graft.  (Va.)  214; 
Heuitt  V.  State,  6  Har.  &  J.  (Md.) 
95;  s.  c.  14  Am.  D.  259. 

^  Board  of  Education  v.  Fonda,  77 
N.  Y.  350;  De  Hart  v.  McGuire,  10 
Phila.  (Pa.)  359;  Moore  v.  Madison 
Co.,  38  Ala.  670;  State  v.  Van  Pelt, 
1  Ind.  304;  Morley  v.  Town  of  Met- 
amora,  78  111.  394;  s.  c.  20  Am.  R. 
266. 


323  OFFICIAL   BONDS.  §    337 

after  the  termination  of  his  oflicc.  Thus,  if  a  sherifT  has  levied  a 
writ,  it  will  be  his  duty  to  proceed  to  advertise.  And  if  a  public 
administrator,  or  one  who  from  his  odicial  position  is  charged  with 
the  administration  of  the  estates  of  decedents,  has  had  committed  to 
him  the  administration  of  a  particular  estate,  it  is  his  duty  to  proceed 
to  the  completion  of  such  administration,  though  the  period  for  which 
he  was  elected  has  expired.  In  either  case  the  officer  may  be  re- 
elected and  enter  upon  the  discharge  of  his  duties  for  a  second  term, 
but  if  he  does  so  the  sureties  of  the  first  term  are  answerable  for  his 
defaults.«=^ 

§  337.    (c)   When  the  sureties  of  the  first  term  are  liable  for 
money  converted  or  collected  by  the  officer  during  his  second  term. — 

The  proper  test  in  such  cases  seems  to  be  to  inquire  whether  the  offi- 
cer had  so  far  entered  upon  the  execution  of  a  writ  before  his  first 
term  expired  that  it  would  have  been  his  duty  to  continue  in  the 
execution  of  such  writ,  even  if  he  had  not  been  re-elected;  where 
this  is  the  ease  the  sureties  for  the  first  term  have  in  many  states  been 
held  liable.®*  On  the  other  hand,  it  has  been  held  in  some  states 
that  the  liability  of  the  sureties  attaches  upon  the  receipt  of  the  writ, 
whether  anything  is  done  under  it  during  the  term  or  not.*^^  In 
Missouri  and  Alabama  the  rule  is  that  those  who  were  sureties  at 
the  actual  time  of  the  conversion  are  liable,  though  the  officer  began 
to  serve  the  writ  during  his  prior  term  of  office.  ®® 

§  338.    (d)    When  an  officer  before  entering  on  his  second  term 
makes  a  report  to  or  settlement  with  the  proper  authorities. — It  has 

been  held  in  many  states  that  where  an  officer  who  is  about  to  enter 

*^  People  V.   Ten   Eyck,   13  "Wend.  Where  a  writ  is  received  by  a  public 

(N.    Y.)     448;     Tyler    v.    Nelson's  officer  during  the  first  term  and  re- 

Adm'r,   14    Gratt.    (Va.)    214;    Dab-  mains  in  his  hands  wholly  unexe- 

ney's  Adm'r  v.  Smith,  5  Leigh  (Va.)  cuted  until  he  enters  upon  the  duties 

13;  State  v.  Watts.  23  Ark.  304.     In  of  the  office  for  the  second  term,  the 

Tennessee  it  has  been  held  that  if  sureties  for  the  last  term  are  liable 

the  sheriif,  after  collecting  a  portion  for  his  neglect  to  execute  it,  or  to 

of  the  county  taxes,  is  required  to  pay  over  the  moneys  which  may  be 

give  a  new  bond  and  does  so,  his  received  under  it:    State  v.  Roberts, 

sureties  on  such  new  bond  are  liable  12  N.  J.  L.  132. 

for    the    moneys     collected    before  ^  State    v.    Turney,    8    Gill    &    J. 

its   execution:     Miller   v.    Moore,    3  (Md.)   125;   McCormick  v.  Moss,  41 

Humph.  (Tenn.)  189.  111.  352. 

'*Larned  v.  Allen,  13  Mass.   295;  «"  Warren  v.  State,  11  Mo.  583;  In- 

Tyree  v.  Wilson,  9  Gratt.   (Va.)   59;  gram  v.  McCombs,  17  Mo.  558;  State 

Campbell  v.  Cobb,  2  Sneed  (Tenn.)  v.  McCormack,  50  Mo.- 568;  Governor 

18;    Hill  V.  Pitzpatrick,  6  Ala.  314;  v.  Robbins,  7  Ala.  79;  Dumas  v.  Pat- 

Sidner  v.  Alexander,  31  Ohio  St.  378.  terson,  9  Ala.  484. 


339 


PUBLIC    CORPORATION'S. 


324 


upon  the  discharge  of  his  duties  for  a  second  term  makes  a  report 
to,  or  a  settlement  with  the  proper  authorities,  from  which  it  appears 
that  he  has  on  hand  at  the  close  of  his  first  term  a  certain  sum  of 
money,  such  settlement  is  conclusive  upon  his  sureties  for  the  second 
term  as  well  as  upon  himself  if  the  officers  with  whom  the  settlement 
is  made  act  in  good  faith  and  have  no  knowledge  that  the  sum  of 
money  which  he  reports  is  not  actually  in  his  hands.®^  On  the  other 
hand,  it  has  been  held  that  an  official  bond  is  not  retrospective ;  that 
the  sureties  thereto  are  only  bound  for  the  public  money  in  the 
hands  of  the  officer  when  the  bond  was  executed  and  for  that  which 
subsequently  came  into  his  possession,  and  can  not  be  held  for  past 
derelictions  of  duty  by  their  principal.*^ ^ 

§  339.  The  same  subject  continued. — If  a  public  officer — such,  for 
instance,  as  a  receiver  of  public  moneys — gives  receipts  for  moneys 
which  he  has  not  in  fact  received,  whereby  a  fraud  is  perpetrated  on 
the  United  States,  his  sureties  at  the  time  are  doubtless  estopped 
from  denying  that  he  received  such  money.'' ^  But  where  the  sure- 
ties for  a  subsequent  term  are  pursued  a  different  question  arises: 
the  weight  of  authorities  favors  the  rule  that  the  sureties  of  a  public 
officer  are  not  estopped  by  reports  made  by  their  principal  during  or 
at  the  close  of  the  preceding  term.^*' 


«' State  V.  Grammer,  29  Ind.  530; 
Morley  v.  Town  of  Metamora,  78  111. 
394;  s.  c.  20  Am.  R.  266;  Baker  v. 
Preston,  1  Gilm.  (Va.)  235;  Roper  v. 
Trustees  &c.,  91  111.  518;  s.  c.  33  Am. 
R.  60.  The  reasoning  on  this  sub- 
ject has  been  more  forcibly  stated 
by  the  supreme  court  of  Iowa  than 
elsewhere  in  deciding  the  case  of 
Boone  Co.  v.  Jones,  54  Iowa  699;  s.  c. 
2  N.  W.  987;  7  N.  W.  155;  37  Am.  R. 
229.  As  against  the  officer  himself, 
his  reports  are  conclusive:  State  v. 
Hutchinson,  60  Iowa  478;  s.  c.  15  N. 
W.  298. 

'^  Mahaska  Co.  v.  Ingalls,  16  Iowa 
81;  Bessinger  v.  Dickerson,  20  Iowa 
260;  Warren  Co.  v.  Ward,  21  Iowa 
84;  Independent  School  Dist.  v.  Mc- 
Donald, 39  Iowa  564.  Where  at  the 
time  of  settlement  by  a  county  treas- 
urer the  board  of  supervisors  did  not 
in  fact  insist  on  the  production  of 
the  moneys  which  his  account 
showed  to  be  on  hand,  but  permitted 


him  to  make  an  apparent  showing 
with  checks  and  certificates  of  de- 
posit which  they  knew  to  be  either 
spurious  or  worthless,  it  was  held 
that  the  sureties  on  his  bond  for  the 
second  term  were  not  estopped  by 
such  settlement,  and  could  be  re- 
lieved from  liability  by  showing  the 
real  amount  which  their  principal 
had  on  hand  at  the  end  of  his  former 
term  of  office :  Webster  Co.  v.  Hutch- 
inson, 60  Iowa  721;  s.  c.  9  N.  W.  901; 
12  N.  W.  534. 

""  United  States  v.  Girault,  11  How. 
22. 

™Bissell  V.  Saxton,  66  N.  Y.  55; 
Mann  v.  Yazoo  City,  31  Miss.  574; 
Broad  v.  City  of  Paris,  66  Tex.  119; 
s.  c.  18  S.  W.  342;  State  v.  Newton, 
33  Ark.  276;  State  v.  Rhoades,  6  Nev. 
352;  Vivian  v.  Otis,  24  Wis.  518; 
s.  c.  1  Am.  R.  199.  The  leading  case 
on  this  subject  is  that  of  United 
States  V.  Boyd,  5  How.  29,  in  which 
the  court  said: — "It  has  been  con- 


325 


OFFICIAL    BONDS. 


§    340 


§  340.  (e)  Where  the  officer  applies  money  received  in  his  second 
term  to  pay  deficiencies  in  his  first  term. — The  right  of  an  officer  to 
direct  the  api)lication  of  i)aynieiits  made  by  him  seems  now  to  be  as 
well  established  as  that  of  a  private  individual,  though  in  directing 
such  application  he  may,  in  effect,  take  moneys  which  he  has  col- 
lected during  his  second  term,  and  with  them  satisfy  the  deficiency 
which  existed  at  the  close  of  the  former  term,  and  thus  shift  the 
responsibility  for  such  deficiency  from  the  sureties  of  his  first  term 
to  those  oi  the  second.''^  The  reasoning  sustaining  these  decisions  is 
that  the  sureties  of  the  second  term  are  responsible  for  any  misappro- 
priation of  the  moneys  collected  during  that  term;  and  the  taking 
of  such  moneys,  and  with  them  paying  a  deficiency  existing  during 
a  preceding  term,  is  as  much  a  misappropriation  as  though  they 
were  taken  and  used  in  payment  of  a  private  debt  of  the  principal, 
or  for  any  other  purpose  to  which  he  had  no  right  to  apply  them.'^^ 


tended  that  the  returns  of  the  re- 
ceiver to  the  treasury  department 
after  the  execution  of  the  bond, 
which  admit  the  money  to  be  then 
in  his  hands  to  the  amount  claimed, 
should  be  conclusive  upon  the  sure- 
ties. We  do  not  think  so.  The  ac- 
counts rendered  to  the  department 
of  money  received  properly  authenti- 
cated are  evidence  in  the  first  in- 
stance of  the  indebtedness  of  the  offi- 
cer against  the  sureties,  but  subject 
to  explanation  and  contradiction. 
They  are  responsible  for  all  the  pub- 
lic moneys  which  were  in  his  hands 
at  the  date  of  the  bond,  or  that  may 
have  come  into  them  afterwards,  and 
not  properly  accounted  for,  but  not 
for  moneys  which  the  oflacer  may 
choose  falsely  to  admit  in  his  hands 
in  his  accounts  with  the  govern- 
ment. The  sureties  can  not  be  con- 
cluded by  fabricated  accounts  of 
their  principal  with  his  creditors; 
they  may  always  inquire  into  the 
reality  and  truth  of  the  transactions 
existing  between  them.  The  princi- 
ple has  been  asserted  and  applied  by 
this  court  in  several  cases." 

'"■  Stone  V.  Seymour,  15  Wend.  (N. 
Y.)  19;  Inhabitants  &c.  v.  Benjamin, 
12.5  Mass.  15;  Town  of  Lyndon  v. 
Miller,  36  Vt.  329;  Attorney-General 


v.  Manderson,  12  Jur.  383;  Williams 
V.  Rawlinson,  10  Moore  362,  371; 
State  V.  Smith,  26  Mo.  226;  s.  c.  72 
Am.  D.  204;  State  v.  Smith,  32  Mo. 
524;  State  v.  Hayes,  7  La.  An.  118, 
121;  State  v.  Powell,  40  La.  An.  234; 
s.  c.  4  So.  46;  8  Am.  St.  522;  Inhab- 
itants &c.  V.  Bell,  9  Met.  (Mass.) 
499;  Gwynne  v.  Burnell,  7  CI.  &  F. 
572;  s.  c.  2  Bing.  N.  C.  7;  Chapman 
V.  Commonwealth,  25  Graft.  (Va.) 
721;  §  326,  ante. 

"  Where  a  public  official  pays  mon- 
ey without  any  direction  respecting 
its  application,  and  the  officers  to 
whom  the  payment  is  made  know  the 
source  from  which  the  moneys  were 
obtained,  and  the  application  of 
them  which  ought  in  justice  and 
equity  to  be  made,  they  are  not  at 
liberty  to  make  an  application  which 
will  divert  the  moneys  from  the  dis- 
charge of  the  obligation  to  which 
they  ought  to  be  applied.  Hence,  if 
such  officers  know  that  moneys  have 
been  collected  by  an  official  during 
his  present  term  of  offi.ce,  and  he 
does  not  direct  their  application, 
they  are  not  at  liberty  to  apply  them 
to  the  satisfaction  of  a  balance  due 
from  him  for  some  preceding  term: 
Inhabitants  &c.  v.  Stanley,  47  Maine 
515;  Boring  v.  Williams,  17  Ala.  510. 


§    341  PUBLIC    C0KP01{AT10NS.  336 

;?  341.  (f )  Where  the  bond  is  given  for  a  term  of  office  or  a 
certain  period  of  time. — The  American  doctrine  seems  to  be  that 
where  persons  have  become  sureties  on  an  official  bond  for  a  stated 
period  of  time  or  during  a  particular  term  of  office  their  liability  can 
not  be  continued  indefinitely  by  reason  of  the  failure  of  the  suc- 
cessor of  their  principal  to  qualify.  And  it  makes  no  difference 
whether  their  principal  is  re-elected,  or  some  other  person  is  chosen 
in  his  stead :  new  bonds  must  be  given.  The  liability  of  the  sureties 
will  not  terminate  immediately  upon  the  expiration  of  the  official 
term ;  but  if  no  officer  qualifies  within  a  reasonable  time  they  will  be 
discharged  from  all  further  responsibility,  although  their  principal 
may  in  fact  continue  in  the  discharge  of  the  duties  of  the  office. '^^ 
When  the  office  is  in  fact  annual,  although  not  so  recited  in  the  bond, 
still  the  bond  only  covers  the  official  acts  of  the  year  for  which  it 
was  given.'^* 

§  342.  Laches  or  negligence  of  other  officers  or  principal. — Sure- 
ties on  official  bonds  can  not  set  up  laches  or  omissions  of  other 
officers  of  the  state  as  a  ground  of  discharge  of  their  own  liability; 
nor  is  the  ineligibility  or  disqualification  of  their  principal  any  de- 
fense to  an  action  against  them  on  his  bond.'^^  And  it  has  been  held 
that  even  if  the  government  is  guilty  of  negligence,  or  the  principal 
has  committed  fraud,  the  surety  is  not  discharged  by  reason  thereof.^^ 

'^United  States  v.  Kirkpatrick,  9  are  elected  and   qualified:     City  of 

Wheat.   720;    Kingston  &c.   Ins.  Co.  Ballard  v.  Thompson,  21  Wash.  669; 

V.    Clark,    33    Barb.     (N.    Y.)     196;  s.  c.  59  Pac.  517. 

Mayor  &c.  v.  Crowell,  40  N.  J.  L.  '"■  Peppin  v.  Cooper,  2  B.  &  Aid. 
207;  s.  c.  29  Am.  R.  224;  Welch  v.  431;  Hassell  v.  Long,  2  M.  &  S.  363; 
Seymour,  28  Conn.  387;  Bigelow  v.  Wardens  of  St.  Saviours  v.  Bostock, 
Bridge,  8  Mass.  275;  Rany  v.  Gov-  2  Bos.  &  P.  N.  R.  175;  Company  &c. 
ernor,  4  Blackf.  (Ind.)  2;  Mutual  v.  Atkinson,  6  East  507;  Arlington  v. 
Loan  &c.  Ass'n  v.  Price,  16  Fla.  204;  Merricke,  2  Saund.  411. 
s.  c.  26  Am.  R.  703;  Dover  v.  Twom-  "'^  State  v.  Hayes,  7  La.  An.  118; 
bly,  42  N.  H.  59;  Commonwealth  v.  Duncan  v.  State,  7  La.  An.  377;  State 
Fairfax,  4  Hen.  &  M.  (Va.)  208;  Wa-  v.  Dunn,  11  La.  An.  549;  Mayor  v. 
pello  Co.  v.  Bigham,  10  Iowa  39;  s.  c.  Merritt,  27  La.  An.  568;  Board  &c. 
74  Am.  D.  370;  Moss  v.  State,  10  Mo.  v.  Brown,  33  La.  An.  383;  State  v. 
338;  s.  c.  47  Am.  D.  116;  State  v.  Blohm,  26  La.  An.  538;  Board  v.  Ju- 
Crooks,  7  Ohio  (pt.  2)  221;  Riddel  dice,  39  La.  An.  896;  s.  c.  2  So.  792; 
V.  School  Dist.,  15  Kan.  168;  State  v.  Powell,  40  La.  An.  234;  s.  c. 
Chelmsford  Co.  v.  Demarest,  7  Gray  4  So.  46;  8  Am.  St.  522.  The  case  of 
(Mass.)  1.  The  sureties  of  a  town  Mayor  v.  Blache,  3  Miller  (La.)  618, 
treasurer  who  holds  over  for  a  sec-  learnedly  and  scientifically  disposes 
ond  term  without  giving  a  new  bond  of  the  defense  of  error  based  on  con- 
are  not  liable,  notwithstanding  the  cealment  or  failure  to  give  notice  of 
law  provides  that  the  term  of  officers  prior  defalcation, 
shall  continue  until  their  successors        '^  Osborne  v.  United  States,  86  U. 


327  OFFICIAL   BONDS.  §    343 

§  343.    Liability  of  sureties  where  additional  bonds  are  given. — 

Where  a  bond  given  by  an  ollicial  is  regarded  as  inadequate  in 
amount,  he  is  sometimes  required  to  give  an  "additional  bond"  in 
such  further  amount  as  may  be  required  by  competent  authority. 
The  sureties  on  the  additional  bond  are  not  liable  for  any  defalca- 
tion committed  by  their  principal  prior  to  its  date,  nor  are  the  sure- 
ties on  the  prior  bond  given  by  him  released  from  liability  for  any  of 
his  defalcations,  past  or  future;''^  both  bonds  become  concurrent 
securities  that  the  principal  will  faithfully  perform  his  duties  after 
the  giving  of  the  last  bond.  But  it  must  not  be  understood  that  the 
term  "additional  bond"  indicates  that  it  is  a  bond  which  can  be  re- 
sorted to  only  after  the  remedies  against  the  other  bond  have  been 
exhausted ;  for  on  the  contrary,  the  liability  of  the  sureties  on  the  two 
bonds  is  the  same  regarding  acts  committed  after  the  signing  of  the 
last  bond,  as  if  they  had  become  sureties  at  the  same  time  and  by  the 
same  bond.'^® 

§  344.  Liability  of  surety  where  the  official  occupies  two  or  more 
offices. — When  one  person  at  the  same  time  occupies  two  or  more 
offices,  they  should  be  treated,  as  far  as  possible,  as  though  they  were 
occupied  by  different  persons.  The  result  is,  that  a  default  in  one 
office  can  not  be  charged  against  the  sureties  on  the  official  bond  of 
the  officer  as  the  incumbent  of  the  other  offiee.'^^  Thus,  where  a  sheriff 
is  ex  officio  tax  collector,  but  the  offices  are  separate  and  distinct, 
separate  bonds  being  given  for  each,  the  sureties  on  his  bond  as  col- 
lector are  not  liable  for  acts  committed  by  him  as  sheriff ;  nor  can  they 
take  advantage  of  the  statutory  time  within  which  actions  must  be 
brought  upon  a  sheriff's  bond.^''  But  where  a  person  holds  two  offices, 
one  of  them  ex  officio,  and  they  are  so  closely  connected  that  only 

S.  577;  Ryan  v.  United  States,  86  U.  State  v.  Sappington,  67  Mo.  529;  s. 

S.  514.  c.  68  Mo.  454;    Jones  v.  Blanton,   6 

"Postmaster-General  v.  Munger,  2  Ired.  Bq.   (N.  C.)   115,  120;  Allen  v. 

Paine   189;    Sebastian   v.   Bryan,   21  State,  61  Ind.  268;    s.  c.  28  Am.  R. 

Ark.  447.    If  moneys  collected  before  673. 

the   additional    bond    was   executed        "  People  v.  Edwards,  9  Cal.  286.   It 

are    afterwards    converted    by    the  has  been  held  that  where  a  clerk  of 

principal,  the  sureties  on  both  the  the  court  is  appointed  receiver  in  a 

original  and  the  additional  bond  are  suit  being  carried   on  therein,  the 

liable:    Governor  v.  Robbins,  7  Ala.  sureties  on  his  official  bond  are  not 

79;  Dumas  v.  Patterson,  9  Ala.  484.  liable  for  acts  committed  by  him  in 

'*  Jones  V.  Hays,   3   Ired.  Eq.    (N.  the  course  of  receivership:    Waters 

C.)   502;  s.  c.  44  Am.  D.  78;   Hutch-  v.    Carroll,    9    Yerg.     (Tenn.)     102; 

craft  v.  Shrout's  Heirs,  1  T.  B.  Mon.  State  v.  Odom,  86  N.  C.  432;  Syme  v. 

(Ky.)    206;    s.    c.    15    Am.    D.    100;  Bunting,  91  N.  C.  48. 
United    States   v.    Hoyt,    1    Blatchf.        »"  People  v.  Burkhart,  76  Cal.  606; 

326;    State   v.   Watts,    23   Ark.    304;  s.  c.  18  Pac.  776. 


345 


PUBLIC    COEPOKATIONS. 


338 


one  bond  is  given  for  both,  his  sureties  are  liable  for  an  act  committed 
in  either  otfice,  although  only  one  may  be  named  in  the  bond.^^ 

§  345.  Liability  of  surety  for  unofficial  acts  of  officer. — It  is  of 
course  contemplated  by  the  sureties  on  an  official  bond  in  incurring 
their  liability  that  the  acts  of  the  officer  for  which  they  bind  them- 
selves shall  be  of  an  official  character;  that  is  to  say,  these  acts 
must  be  such  as  the  law  imposes  upon  the  incumbent  of  the  office 
which  their  principal  has  assumed.  As  a  natural  consequence  it 
flows  from  this  consideration  that  the  sureties  are  liable  only  for  the 
official  acts  of  their  principal.*^  Thus,  where  money  was  paid  to  a 
notary  public  to  be  applied  by  him  in  canceling  a  mortgage,  his  sure- 
ties were  not  held  liable  for  his  defalcation,  as  the  receipt  of  money 
for  such  a  purpose  was  not  among  the  official  duties  of  a  notary  pub- 
lic.^^  And  in  a  California  case,  where  a  city  assessor  collected  taxes 
without  statutory  or  other  authority  to  make  such  collections,  it  was 
decided  that  his  sureties  could  not  be  held.^* 


"Van  Valkenbergh  v.  Mayor  &c., 
47  N.  J.  L.  146;  People  v.  Stewart,  6 
111.  App.  62;  Satterfield  v.  People, 
104  111.  448.  In  the  case  of  Butte  Co. 
V.  Morgan,  76  Cal.  1;  s.  c.  18  Pac. 
115,  it  was  shown  that  the  defendant 
at  the  same  time  held  the  offices  of 
tax  collector  and  treasurer  of  the 
same  county,  and  that  in  his  capac- 
ity of  tax  collector  he  made  a  settle- 
ment with  the  county  auditor  in 
which  they  agreed  upon  the  amounts 
then  due  to  the  county,  and  the  aud- 
itor thereupon  gave  a  certificate 
which  stated  that  "William  J.  Mor- 
gan, tax  collector,  has  this  day  the 
amount  as  given  below,  to  be  paid 
into  the  county  treasury."  The  aud- 
itor handed  the  certificate  to  Mor- 
gan, who  took  it  away  with  him,  and 
the  auditor  credited  the  tax  collec- 
tor with  the  amount  as  paid,  and 
charged  the  treasurer  with  it.  Suit 
was  brought  against  the  sureties  of 
Morgan  as  treasurer,  and  they  set  up 
the  defense  that  there  was  no  evi- 
dence to  show  that  Morgan  had  be- 
come answerable  as  treasurer  by 
ceasing  to  be  liable  as  tax  collector. 
The    court    decided,    however,    that 


there  was,  and  found  for  the  plain- 
tiff. 

^^  United  States  v.  Adams,  24  Fed. 
348;  People  v.  Lucas,  93  N.  Y.  585; 
Ward  V.  Stahl,  81  N.  Y.  406;  People 
V.  Pennock,  60  N.  Y.  421;  Governor 
V.  Perrine,  23  Ala.  807;  State  v. 
Blair,  76  N.  C.  78;  State  v.  Long,  8 
Ired.  L.  (N.  C.)  415;  Cotton  v.  Atkin- 
son, 53  Ark.  98;  s.  c.  13  S.  W.  415; 
Bowers  v.  Fleming,  67  Ind.  541; 
Scott  V.  State,  46  Ind.  203;  Wright 
V.  Harris,  31  Iowa  272;  Morgan  v. 
Long,  29  Iowa  434;  Bessinger  v. 
Dickinson,  20  Iowa  260;  Sample  v. 
Davis, 4  Greene  (Iowa)  117;  Coleman 
V.  Ormond,  60  Ala.  328;  City  of  San 
Jose  V.  Welch,  65  Cal.  358;  s.  c.  4 
Pac.  207;  Hill  v.  Kemble,  9  Cal.  71; 
Lescouzeve  v.  Ducatel,  18  La.  An. 
470;  State  v.  Bonner,  72  Mo.  387; 
Watson  V.  Smith,  26  Pa.  St.  395; 
Hale  V.  Commonwealth,  8  Pa.  St. 
415;  State  v.  White,  10  Rich.  L.  (S. 
C.)  442;  State  v.  Conover,  28  N.  J. 
L.  224. 

^^  Lescouzeve  v.  Ducatel,  18  La. 
An.  470. 

>*^City  of  San  Jose  v.  Welch,  65 
Cal.  358;  s.  c.  4  Pac.  207.    A  similar 


329  OFFICIAL   BONDS.  §   346 

§  346.  The  same  subject  continued. — In  several  states  it  has  been 
held  that  the  sureties  of  a  constal)le  are  not  liable  for  his  default 
in  failing  to  account  for  moneys  collected  by  him,  when  the  claims 
were  placed  in  his  hands  for  collection  in  a  personal  and  not  in  an 
official  capacity;^''  and  a  similar  doctrine  has  been  applied  in  Ten- 
nessee to  the  liability  of  the  sureties  of  a  sheriff. ^^  So,  also,  the  sure- 
ties of  a  sheriff  are  not  liable  for  his  failure  to  protect  a  person  from 
an  attack  of  a  mob.^'^  Where  the  sheriff  of  a  Maine  county  served  a 
writ  without  lawful  authority  to  do  so,  no  liability  was  thereby  im- 
posed upon  his  sureties.^®  It  is  to  be  noted,  however,  that  when  the 
act  is  done  under  color  of  office,  the  sureties  may  be  held  liable  even 
for  an  unauthorized  and  illegal  act  of  the  officer;  as  in  the  case  of  a 
Massachusetts  constable  who  seized  goods  under  color  of  a  process 
which  he  had  no  legal  power  to  execute:  his  sureties  were  not- 
withstanding held  to  be  liable  on  the  ground  that  although  he  had  no 
sufficient  warrant  for  taking  them,  he  was  still  responsible  to  third 
parties  because  such  taking  was  a  breach  of  his  official  duty.*"  The 
sureties  on  the  bond  of  the  mayor  are  liable  for  his  acts  done  under 
color  of  office  and  in  the  line  of  his  official  duty,  but  which  are  beyond 
his  authority.'"' 

§  347.    liability  of  sureties  for  acts  done  under  color  of  office. — 

There  are  many  acts  which,  although  illegal,  are  yet  performed  under 
color  of  office,  and  are  therefore  official  acts;  for  these  acts  the  sure- 
ties on  official  bonds  are  of  course  liable.  This  question  frequently 
arises  where  the  officer  seizes  under  an  execution  or  a  writ  of  attach- 
ment or  other  similar  process  the  property  of  a  person  other  than  the 
defendant  in  the  action.  The  question  whether  under  these  circum- 
stances the  sureties  on  the  bond  of  the  officer  are  liable  for  his  act 
has  been  differently  decided  in  different  states.  In  the  supreme 
court  of  the  United  States  and  in  the  courts  of  most  of  the  states 
it  is  now  well  settled  that  the  act  is  an  official  act,  as  done  under 
color  of  office,  and  that  the  sureties  on  the  bond  are  therefore  liable."^ 

doctrine  obtains  in  the  case  of  pri-  tenden  v.   Terrill,   2   Head    (Tenn.) 

vate  corporations.     Thus,  the  sure-  588. 

ties  of  an  assistant  clerk  in  a  bank  ^^  Haynes     v.     Bridge,     1     Coldw. 

are    not    liable    for    his    default    as  (Tenn.)  32. 

bookkeeper:      Manufacturers'    Nat'l  "  South  v.  Maryland,  18  How.  396. 

Bank  v.  Dickerson,  41  N.  J.  L.  448;  ^*  Dane  v.  Gilmore,  51  Maine  544. 

s.  c.  32  Am.  R.  237;  Rollstone  Nat'l  '"City  of  Lowell  v.  Parker,  10  Met. 

Bank  v.  Carleton,  136  Mass.  226.     In  (Mass.)  309. 

the  last-cited  case  the  doctrine  stated  ^  State  v.  McDaniel,  78  Miss.  1;  s. 

is    not    expressly    affirmed    but    is  c.  27  So.  994. 

strongly  implied.  "Lammon  v.  Feusier,  111  U.  S.  17; 

'^Bogart  V.  Green,  8  Mo.  115;  Grit-  s.  c.  4  S.  Ct.  286;  Carmack  v.  Com- 


§    348  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  330 

The  law  on  this  subject  was  laid  down  and  the  authorities  collated 
in  an  able  and  exhaustive  opinion  by  Mr.  Justice  Gray  in  a  recent 
case  in  the  supreme  court  of  the  United  States,  which,  is  quoted  in  the 
succeeding  sections.®^ 

§  348.  The  same  subject  continued — Lammon  v.  Feusier — The 
doctrine  of  the  federal  supreme  court. — "The  marshal,  in  serving  a 
writ  of  attachment  on  mesne  process,  which  directs  him  to  take  the 
property  of  a  particular  person,  acts  officially.  His  official  duty  is  to 
take  the  property  of  that  person,  and  of  that  person  only ;  and  to  take 
only  such  property  of  his  as  is  subject  to  be  attached,  and  not  property 
exempt  by  law  from  attachment.  A  neglect  to  take  the  attachable 
property  of  tliat  person,  and  a  taking,  upon  the  writ,  of  the  property 
of  another  person,  or  of  property  exempt  from  attachment,  are  equally 
breaches  of  his  official  duty.  The  taking  of  the  attachable  property 
of  the  person  named  in  the  writ  is  rightful;  the  taking  of  the  prop- 
erty of  another  person  is  wrongful ;  but  each,  being  done  by  the  mar- 
shal in  executing  the  writ  in  his  hands,  is  an  attempt  to  perform  his 
official  duty,  and  is  an  ofScial  act.  A  person  other  than  the  defendant 
named  in  the  writ,  whose  property  is  wrongfully  taken,  may  indeed 
sue  the  marshal,  like  any  other  wrong-doer,  in  an  action  of  trespass,  to 
recover  damages  for  the  wrongful  taking;  and  neither  the  official 
character  of  the  marshal,  nor  the  writ  of  attachment,  affords  him  any 
defense  to  such  an  action. ^^  But  the  remedy  of  a  person,  whose  prop- 
erty is  wrongfully  taken  by  the  marshal  in  officially  executing  his 
writ,  is  not  limited  to  an  action  against  him  personally.  His  official 
bond  is  not  made  to  the  person  in  whose  behalf  the  writ  is  issued,  nor 
to  any  other  individual,  but  to  the  government,  for  the  indemnity  of 
all  persons  injured  by  the  official  misconduct  of  himself  or  his  depu- 
ties f*  and  his  bond  may  be  put  in  suit  by  and  for  the  benefit  of  any 
such  person." 

§  349.  The  same  subject  continued. — "Wlien  a  marshal,  upon  a 
writ  of  attachment  on  mesne  process,  takes  property  of  a  person  not 
named  in  the  writ,  the  property  is  in  his  official  custody,  and  under 
the  coi;itrol  of  the  court  whose  officer  he  is,  and  whose  writ  he  is  exe- 

monwealth,  5  Binn.  (Pa.)  184;  Arch-  °=  Lammon  v.  Feusier,  111  U.  S.  17; 

er  v.  Noble,  3  Greenl.   (Maine)  418;  s.  c.  4  S.  Ct.  286. 

Harris  v.  Hanson,  2  Fairf.   (Maine)  =>' Citing  Day  v.  Gallup,  2  Wall.  97; 

241,  243;  Tracy  v.  Goodwin,  5  Allen  Buck  v.  Colbath,  3  Wall.  334. 

(Mass.)    409;    Sangster  v.  Common-  "^  See   United    States   v.   Moore,   2 

wealth,   17   Gratt.    (Va.)    124.     And  Brock.  C.  C.  317. 
see  other  cases  cited  in  the  succeed- 
ing sections. 


331  OFFICIAL    BONDS.  §    350 

euting;  and,  according  to  the  decisions  of  this  court,  the  rightful 
owner  can  not  maintain  an  action  of  replevin  against  him,  nor  recover 
the  property  specifieally  in  any  way,  except  in  the  court  from  which 
the  writ  issued.""  The  principle  upon  which  those  decisions  are 
founded  is,  as  declared  hy  Mr.  Justice  Miller  in  Buck  v.  Colbath,^" 
above  cited,  'that  whenever  property  has  been  seized  by  an  officer  of 
the  court,  by  virtue  of  its  process,  the  property  is  to  be  considered  as 
in  the  custody  of  the  court,  and  under  its  control  for  the  time  being; 
and  that  no  other  court  has  a  right  to  interfere  with  that  possession, 
unless  it  be  some  court  which  may  have  a  direct  supervisory  control 
over  the  court  whose  process  has  first  taken  possession,  or  some  su- 
perior jurisdiction  in  the  premises.'  Because  the  law  had  been  so 
settled  by  this  court,  the  plaintiff  in  this  case  failed  to  maintain  re- 
plevin in  the  courts  of  the  state  of  Nevada  against  the  marshal,  for 
the  very  taking  which  is  the  ground  of  the  present  action."^  For  these 
reasons  the  court  is  of  opinion  that  the  taking  of  goods,  upon  a  writ  of 
attachment,  into  the  custody  of  the  marshal,  as  the  officer  of  the 
court  that  issues  the  writ,  is,  whether  the  goods  are  the  property  of 
the  defendant  in  the  writ  or  of  any  other  person,  an  official  act,  and 
therefore,  if  wrongful,  a  breach  of  the  bond  given  by  the  marshal 
for  the  faithful  performance  of  the  duties  of  his  office." 

§  350.  The  same  subject  continued — The  doctrine  of  the  state 
courts. — "Upon  the  analogous  question,  whether  the  sureties  upon  the 
official  bond  of  a  sheriff,  a  coroner,  or  a  constable  are  responsible  for 
his  taking  upon  a  writ,  directing  him  to  take  the  property  of  one  per- 
son, the  property  of  another,  there  has  been  some  difference  of  opin- 
ion in  the  courts  of  the  several  states.  The  view  that  the  sureties 
are  not  liable  in  such  a  case  has  been  maintained  by  decisions  of  the 
supreme  courts  of  New  York,  New  Jersey,  North  Carolina  and  Wis- 
consin, and  perhaps  receives  some  support  from  decisions  in  Alabama, 
Mississippi  and  Indiana.'"^^ 

°^  Citing    Freeman    v.    Howe,    24  v.  Hancock,  2  Ala.  728;   McEltianey 

How.  450;  Krippendorf  v.  Hyde,  110  v.  Gilleland,  30  Ala.  183;   Brown  v. 

U.  S.  276;  s.  c.  4  S.  Ct.  27.  Mosely,   11   Sm.  &   M.    (Miss.)    354; 

''« 3  Wall.  334,  341.  Jenkins   v.    Lemonds,    29    Ind.    294; 

■"  Citing    Feusier    v.    Lammon,    6  Carey  v.  State,  34  Ind.  105.     "But," 

Nev.  209.  continues  the  opinion,  "in  People  v. 

^'Citing  Ex  parte  Reed,  4  Hill  (N.  Schuyler,  4  N.  Y.  173,  the  judgment 

Y.)  572;  People  v.  Schuyler,  5  Barb,  in  5  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  166,  was  reversed, 

(N.    Y.)    166;    State    v.    Conover,    4  and  the  case  of  Ex  parte  Reed,  4  Hill 

Dutch.    (N.  J.)    224;    State  v.  Long,  (N.  Y.)   572,  overruled  by  a  major- 

8    Ired.    L.    (N.    C.)    415;    State    v.  ity  of  the   New  York   court  of  ap- 

Brown,  11  Ired.  L.  (N.  C.)  141;  Ger-  peals,  with  the  concurrence  of  Chief 

ber  V.  Ackley,  32  Wis.  233;  Governor  Justice  Bronson,  who  had  taken  part 


§  351 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS. 


332 


§351.  The  same  subject  continued. — Mr.  Justice  Gray  continues: 
"And  the  liability  of  the  sureties  in  siieli  eases  lias  been  affirmed  by 
a  great  preponderance  of  authority,  including  decisions  in  the  highest 
courts  of  Pennsylvania,  Maine,  Massachusetts,  Ohio,  Virginia,  Ken- 
tucky, Missouri,  Iowa,  ISTebraska,  Texas  and  California,  and  in  the 
supreme  court  of  the  District  of  Columbia.'"*^  In  State  v.  Jen- 
nings^ ^^  Chief  Justice  Thurman  said:  "The  authorities  seem  to 
us  quite  conclusive,  that  a  seizure  of  the  goods  of  A  under  color  of 
process  against  B  is  official  misconduct  in  the  officer  making  the 
seizure;  and  is  a  breach  of  the  condition  of  his  official  bond,  where 
that  is,  that  he  will  faithfully  perform  the  duties  of  his  office.  The 
reason  for  this  is,  that  the  trespass  is  not  the  act  of  a  mere  individual, 
but  is  perpetrated  colore  officii.  If  an  officer,  under  color  of  a  fi.  fa., 
seize  property  of  the  debtor  that  is  exempt  from  execution,  no  one, 
I  imagine,  would  deny,  that  he  had  broken  the  condition  of  his  bond. 
Why  should  the  law  be  different  if,  under  color  of  the  same  process,  he 
take  the  goods  of  a  third  person  ?  If  the  exemption  of  the  goods 
from  the  execution  in  the  one  case,  makes  their  seizure  official  miscon- 
duct, why  should  it  not  have  the  like  effect  in  the  other?     True,  it 


in  deciding  Reed's  case.  The  final 
decision  in  People  v.  Schuyler,  4  N. 
Y.  173,  has  been  since  treated  by  the 
court  of  appeals  as  settling  the  law 
upon  this  point:  Mayor  &c.  v.  Sib- 
berns,  3  Abb.  App.  Dec.  (N.  Y.)  266; 
s.  c.  7  Daly  (N.  Y.)  436;  Cummings 
V.  Brown,  43  N.  Y.  514;  People  v. 
Lucas,  93  N.  Y.  585."  In  addition  to 
the  state  courts  mentioned  by  the 
learned  justice  as  holding  that  the 
sureties  are  not  liable  under  the  cir- 
cumstances under  consideration  may 
be  mentioned  the  supreme  court  of 
Maryland:  State  v.  Brown,  54  Md. 
318.  It  is  also  to  be  noted  that  State 
V.  Druly,  3  Ind.  431,  is  in  conflict 
with  Jenkins  v.  Lemonds,  29  Ind. 
294,  the  former  case  affirming  the 
liability  of  the  sureties  under  the 
circumstances  considered. 

®*  Citing  Carmack  v.  Common- 
wealth, 5  Binn.  (Pa.)  184;  Brunott 
V.  McKee,  6  W.  &  S.  (Pa.)  513; 
Archer  v.  Noble,  3  Greenl.  (Maine) 
418;  Harris  v.  Hanson,  2  Fairf. 
(Maine)  243;  Greenfield  v.  Wilson, 
13  Gray  (Mass.)  384;  Tracy  v.  Good- 


win, 5  Allen  (Mass.)  409;  Sangster 
V.  Commonwealth,  17  Gratt.  (Va.) 
124;  Commonwealth  v.  Stockton,  5 
T.  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  192;  Jewell  v. 
Mills,  3  Bush  (Ky.)  62;  State  v. 
Moore,  19  Mo.  369;  State  v.  Fitzpat- 
rick,  64  Mo.  185;  Charles  v.  Haskins, 
11  Iowa  329;  Turner  v.  Killian,  12 
Neb.  580;  s.  c.  12  N.  W.  101;  Holli- 
man  v.  Carroll's  Adm'r,  27  Tex.  23; 
Van  Pelt  v.  Littler,  14  Cal.  194; 
United  States  v.  Hine,  3  MacArth. 
(D.  C.)  27.  The  courts  of  Georgia 
and  Illinois  also  concur  in  the  con- 
clusions of  Mr.  Justice  Gray:  Jeffer- 
son V.  Hartley,  81  Ga.  716;  s.  c.  9  S. 
E.  174;  Jones  v.  People,  19  111.  App. 
300.  In  addition  to  these  cases  cited 
in  Lammon  v.  Feusier  may  be  men- 
tioned as  supporting  the  doctrine  of 
the  text,  Strunk  v.  Ocheltree,  11 
Iowa  158;  Hubbard  v.  Elden,  43  Ohio 
St.  380;  s.  c.  2  N.  B.  434;  Forsythe 
V.  Ellis,  4  J.  J.  Marsh.  (Ky.)  298; 
Turner  v.  Sisson,  137  Mass.  191;  Peo- 
ple V.  Mersereau,  74  Mich.  687;  s.  c. 
42  N.  W.  153. 

''a  4  Ohio  St.  418. 


333  OFFICIAL    BONDS.  §    352 

may  sometimes  l)o  more  diffieult  to  ascertain  the  ownership  of  goods, 
than  to  know  wliether  a  jjarticukir  piece  of  property  is  exempt 
from  execution  ;  but  this  is  not  always  the  case,  and  if  it  were,  it 
wouhl  not  justify  us  in  restricting  to  litigants,  the  indemnity  afforded 
by  the  otlicial  bond,  thus  leaving  the  rest  of  the  community  with  no 
other  indemnity  against  oflicial  misconduct  than  the  responsibility 
of  the  officer  might  furnish." 

§  352.  Illustrations  of  the  doctrine. — In  some  cases  where  the  offi- 
cer or  agent  had  the  legal  right  and  authority  to  receive  the  money 
in  respect  to  which  he  defaulted,  he  did  not  receive  the  funds  accord- 
ing to  the  manner  prescribed  by  statute.  Thus,  in  North  Carolina,  a 
judgment  debtor  paid  a  sheriff  before  the  issue  of  execution  a  sum 
of  money  to  be  applied  in  payment  of  the  judgment.  The  sheriff 
defaulted  in  respect  to  the  money,  and  his  sureties  were  exonerated 
from  liability  on  the  ground  that  the  receipt  of  the  money  by  the 
sheriff  before  execution  issued  was  an  unofficial  act."**  It  is  not  suffi- 
cient that  there  is  a  custom  authorizing  the  defaulting  officer  to  re- 
ceive the  money  in  respect  to  which  he  has  defaulted:  it  must  be 
his  legal  right  and  duty  to  receive  the  funds  ;^"^  and  the  general 
rule  may  be  stated  to  be  that  the  sureties  of  an  officer  incur  no  liability 
in  respect  to  money  received  by  him  where  the  statute  does  not  require 
him  to  receive  the  money.  "^ 

§  353.    Distinction  between  judicial  and  ministerial  duties. — The 

same  distinction  between  the  judicial  and  the  ministerial  acts  of 
public  officers  obtains  in  this  branch  of  the  subject  under  discussion 
as  where  the  personal  liability  of  officers  and  agents  and  the  liability 
of  the  corporation  for  their  acts  was  considered. ^"^  As  the  officer  is 
not  in  general  personally  liable  for  his  misfeasance  or  nonfeasance 
in  the  discharge  of  a  judicial  duty,  and  as  the  corporation  itself  is 

""State  V.  Allen,  7  Jones  L.    (N.  the   last-cited    case   it   was   pleaded 

C.)    564.     And   in   several   states   it  that  there   was  a   custom   that   the 

has  been  held  where  an  officer  seized  clerk  should  receive  all  moneys  paid 

property   under   process,   and   after-  into   court,   although   there   was   no 

wards  by  agreement  of  the  parties  statutory  authority  for  his  doing  so. 

sold  that  property  in  a  manner  dif-  His  sureties  were  held  not  liable  on 

ferent  from  the  mode  prescribed  by  the  ground  that  the  receipt  of  the 

law,  that  the  sureties  were  not  liable  moneys  by  him  was  not  an  official 

for  default  of  the  officer  in  respect  act. 

to  the  proceeds  of  the  sale:  Webb  v.  "-Ward   v.   Stahl,   81   N.   Y.   406; 

Anspach,  3  Ohio  St.  522;    Governor  Smith  v.  Stapler,  53  Ga.  300;  Branch 

V.  Perrine,  23  Ala.  807;    Schloss  v.  v.  Commonwealth,  2  Call  (Va.)  510; 

White,  16  Cal.  65.  Saltenberry  v.  Loucks,  8  La.  An.  95. 

""  Carey  v.  State,  34  Ind.  105;  Har-  "*  Ante,  §  215  et  seq. 
din  V.  Carrico,  3  Met.  (Ky.)  289.     In 


§  354  ruBLic  coRPouATioNS.  334 

not  liable  in  such  case,  so  the  sureties  upon  his  bond  can  not  be  held 
for  such  act  or  omission.^"*  This  general  rule  is  obvious,  but  there 
is  often  great  difficulty  in  determining  whether  the  particular  act 
under  consideration  is  a  judicial  or  a  ministerial  act.  This  is  espe- 
cially the  case  in  considering  the  liability  of  the  sureties  of  justices 
of  the  peace  and  of  highway  commissioners — from  the  nature  of  each 
office  it  is  evident  that  it  is  frequently  difficult  to  differentiate  these 
two  classes  of  duties.  It  is  perhaps  impossible  to  lay  down  any  gen- 
eral rule  to  determine  to  which  class  a  particular  act  belongs;  the 
circumstances  of  each  case  must  be  considered  before  a  conclusion 
can  be  reached. 

§  354.  Illustrations  of  the  doctrine. — The  act  of  a  justice  of  the 
peace  in  entering  judgment  and  issuing  execution  thereon  before  the 
time  prescribed  by  law  has  been  held  in  South  Carolina  to  be  a  judi- 
cial and  not  a  ministerial  act.^°^  And  so,  also,  the  adjournment  of  a 
case  against  the  objection  of  the  plaintiff,  where  the  defendant  did  not 
appear,  was  considered  in  a  recent  New  York  case  to  be  an  act  of  a 
judicial  character,  although  by  the  provisions  of  the  statute  the  jus- 
tice was  required  to  enter  judgment  upon  the  failure  of  the  defend- 
ant to  appear.^**"  These  acts  being  judicial  in  character,  it  is  not 
competent  for  the  court  to  inquire  into  the  motive  of  the  justice; 
and  neither  the  justice  nor  his  sureties  incur  any  liability  therefor.^"^ 

^'^  Place  V.  Taylor,  22  Ohio  St.  317;  where  the  law  gave  him  no  authority 

McGrew  v.  Governor,  19  Ala.  89.  This  to  do  so:  White  v.  Morse,  139  Mass. 

is  of  course  a  necessary  consequence  162;    s.   c.   29   N.   E.   539.     Entering 

of  the  freedom  of  the  officer  and  the  judgment    for    less    than    the    sum 

corporation  from  liability  for  the  er-  proved  to  be  due:  Kress  v.  State,  65 

rors  of  the  officer  in  the  performance  Ind.    106.     Accepting    an    informal 

of  a  judicial  duty.  recognizance:    Chickering  v.  Robin- 

I'^'Abrams  v.  Carlisle,  18  S.  C.  242.  son,  3  Gush.   (Mass.)   543.    Error  in 

"^Merwin  v.  Rogers,  24  N.  Y.  St.  refusing  to  grant  an  appeal:  Jordan 

496.  V.  Hanson,  49  N.  H.  199.     Error  in 

^•"Throop   Public    Officers,    §    733.  determining  the  sufficiency  of  bail: 

The  learned  author  collates  a  num-  Lining  v.  Bentham,  2  Bay  (S.  C.)  1. 

her  of  cases  in  each  of  which  the  act  See  also,  on  this  subject,  Fisher  v. 

of  the  justice  was  decided  to  be  ju-  Deans,   107  Mass.   118;    Johnston  v. 

dicial  and  not  ministerial  in  its  char-  Moorman,  80  Va.  131;  Heard  v.  Har- 

acter.     Among   them   may   be   men-  ris,  68  Ala.  43.  The  following  acts  of 

tioned  the  following: — An  error  of  justices  of  the  peace  have  been  held 

the  justice  in  directing  the  writ  to  to   be    ministerial;    for   these    acts, 

the  sheriff  or  any  constable,  where  therefore,   their    sureties   would    be 

the   statute  required   that  the  writ  bound: — Refusing  to  issue  a  writ  of 

should  be  directed  to  the  sheriff:  Al-  execution  upon  a  judgment  entered 

lee  V.  Reese,  39  Fed.  341.    The  act  of  by  him:  Fairchild  v.  Keith,  29  Ohio 

a  justice  in  giving  judgment  for  costs  St.   156.  Issuing  an   execution   void 


335 


OFFICIAL    BONDS. 


§    3; 


g  355.  The  same  subject  continued. — The  same  rule  applies  in 
coiisideriug  the  liability  of  t^urcties  upon  the  bonds  of  highway  com- 
missioners. The  duties  of  these  officers  as  of  justices  of  the  peace  are 
of  a  twofold  nature:  some  of  these  duties  are  judicial,  others  are 
ministerial.  Their  judicial  duties,  according  to  Mr.  Throop,  include 
those  which  are  connected  with  the  opening,  discontinuing,  closing 
and  general  management  of  highways,  together  with  the  assessment 
of  damages  or  of  benefits  thereon.  For  any  act  done  in  the  perform- 
ance of  these  duties  they,  and  consequently  their  sureties,  are  not  lia- 
ble so  long  as  the  act  is  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  officer  as  de- 
fined by  statute.^"*  It  is,  however,  a  ministerial  duty  for  these  offi- 
cers to  keep  the  highways  in  repair  if  they  have  sufficient  funds  to 
do  so;  and  it  is  also  a  ministerial  duty  for  them,  if  practicable,  to 


upon  its  face:  Noxon  v.  Hill,  2  Allen 
(Mass.)  215.  Rendering  a  judgment 
exceeding  his  jurisdiction :  Estopinal 
V.  Peyroux,  37  La.  An.  477.  Issuing  a 
warrant  of  attachment  or  of  arrest 
in  a  case  where  he  was  not  author- 
ized at  law  to  issue  such  process: 
Wright  V.  Rouss,  18  Neb.  234;  s.  c. 
25  N.  W.  80;  Truesdell  v.  Combs,  33 
Ohio  St.  186.  See  also,  for  similar 
instances  collated  in  Throop  Public 
Officers,  §  734:  Inos  v.  Winspear,  18 
Cal.  397;  Briggs  v.  Wardwell,  10 
Mass.  356;  Sullivan  v.  Jones,  2  Gray 
(Mass.)  570;  Fisher  v.  Deans,  107 
Mass.  118;  Albee  v.  Ward,  8  Mass. 
79;  State  v.  Carrick,  70  Md.  586;  s. 
c.  17  Atl.  559;  Spencer  v.  Perry,  17 
Maine  413;  Grumon  v.  Raymond,  1 
Conn.  40;  Tracy  v.  Williams,  4  Conn. 
107;  Flack  v.  Harrington,  1  111.  213; 
Adkins  v.  Brewer,  3  Cow.  (N.  Y.) 
206;  Clarke  v.  May,  2  Gray  (Mass.) 
410;  Piper  v.  Pearson,  2  Gray 
(Mass.)  120;  Doggett  v.  Cook,  11 
Cush.  (Mass.)  262;  Shaw  v.  Reed, 
16  Mass.  450;  Welch  v.  Gleason,  28 
S.  C.  247;  s.  c.  5  S.  E.  599;  Kelly  v. 
Moore,  51  Ala.  364;  Lanpher  v.  Dew- 
ell,  56  Iowa  153;  s.  c.  9  N.  W.  101; 
Revill  V.  Pettit.  3  Met.  (Ky.)  314; 
Bore  V.  Bush,  6  Mart.  N.  S.  (La.)  1; 
Terrail  v.  Tinney,  20  La.  An.  444; 
Tyler  v.  Alford,  38  Maine  530;  Ken- 
dall V.  Powers,  4  Met.   (Mass.)   553; 


Knowles  v.  Davis,  2  Allen  (Mass.) 
61;  Guenther  v.  Whiteacre,  24  Mich. 
504;  Evertson  v.  Sutton,  5  Wend. 
(N.  Y.)  280;  Tompkins  v.  Sands,  8 
Wend.  (N.  Y.)  462;  Cunningham  v. 
Bucklin,  8  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  178;  Hough- 
ton V.  Swarthout,  1  Denio  (N.  Y.) 
589;  Christopher  v.  Van  Liew,  57 
Barb.  (N.  Y.)  17;  Blythe  v.  Tomp- 
kins, 2  Abb.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  468;  Kerns 
V.  Schoonmaker,  4  Ohio  331;  Miller 
v.  Grice,  2  Rich.  L.  (S.  C.)  27;  Mor- 
rill V.  Thurston,  46  Vt.  732;  Vaughn 
V.  Congdon,  56  Vt.  111. 

^<«  Throop  Public  Officers,  §  736; 
citing  Elder  v.  Bemis,  2  Met. 
(Mass.)  599;  Benjamin  v.  Wheeler, 
15  Gray  (Mass.)  486;  Morrison  v. 
Howe,  120  Mass.  565;  Denniston  v. 
Clark,  125  Mass.  216;  Hatch  v. 
Hawkes,  126  Mass.  177;  TJpham  v. 
Marsh,  128  Mass.  546;  Johnson  v. 
Dunn,  134  Mass.  522;  Sage  v.  Lau- 
rain,  19  Mich.  137;  Highway  Com'rs 
V.  Ely,  54  Mich.  173;  s.  c.  19  N.  W. 
940;  Lamed  v.  Briscoe,  62  Mich.  393; 
s.  c.  29  N.  W.  22;  Clark  v.  Phelps,  4 
Cow.  (N.  Y.)  190;  Van  Steenbergh 
V.  Bigelow,  3  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  42;  Mil- 
ler V.  Brown,  56  N.  Y.  383;  Morse  v. 
Williamson,  35  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  472; 
Harrington  v.  Commissioners  &c.,  2 
McC.  (S.  C.)  400.  Contra,  Adams  v. 
Richardson,  43  N.  H.  212. 


§   355  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  336 

obtain  the  requisite  and  necessary  funds ;  and  for  their  official  default 
in  respect  to  these  duties  their  sureties  are  considered  to  be  liable.^''^ 

i»»Throop  Public  Officers,  §  737;  N.  E.  43;  People  v.  Board  &c.,  75  N. 
citing  Pomfrey  v.  Village  of  Sara-  Y.  316;  Hover  v.  Barkhoof,  44  N.  Y. 
toga  Springs,  104  N.  Y.  459;  s.  c.  11    113;  and  other  cases. 


CHAPTEE  XI. 

I 

MEETINGS    AND    ELECTIONS. 


362. 

363. 
364. 
365. 
366. 
367. 


Section  Section 

356.  Town  meeting  in  New  England    382.  The 

and  elsewhere. 

357.  Right    to    meeting — Mandamus 

to  enforce. 

358.  Application    for   and    authority 

to  call  a  meeting. 

359.  Secondary   authority   to   call   a 

meeting. 

360.  General  purpose  of  a  warning. 

361.  Designation  of  time  and  place 

of  meeting. 
General   and   formal   requisites 

of  a  warrant. 
The  same  subject  continued. 
Service  of  warrant. 
Time  of  service. 
Return  of  service. 
Notice  of  annual  meetings. 

368.  The  same  subject  continued. 

369.  Time  of  meeting. 

370.  Place  of  meeting. 

371.  Organization    of   meeting — The 

moderator. 

The   same   subject   continued — 
Clerk  and  clerk  pro  tempore. 

Adjournments  of  meetings. 

The  same  subject  continued. 

The  power  of  adjournment  lim- 
ited. 

Adjourned  meetings. 

Reconsideration       and      rescis- 
sion— The  general  rule. 
378.  The   same   subject  continued — 
Illustrations. 

The   same   subject   continued — 
The  rule  qualified. 

Ratification  of  doings  of  inval- 
id meetings. 

Parliamentary     law     in     town 
meetings. 

1  Smith— 22  (337) 


372. 

373. 
374. 
375. 

376. 
377. 


379. 


380. 


381. 


same   subject  continued — 
Illustrations. 

Validity  of  votes  as  determined 
by  the  warrant — Illustrations. 

The  same  subject  continued. 

Invalidity    of    votes  —  Illustra- 
tions. 

The  same  subject  continued. 
387.  Votes    at    town    meeting — Gen- 
eral rules  of  construction. 

Record  of  proceedings. 

Parol  evidence  of  proceedings. 

Doings  of  meetings  not  legally 
called. 

Presumptions   in   favor   of   an- 
cient meetings. 

392.  Notice  of  election. 

393.  Qualification  of  voters — Power 
to  prescribe. 

Registration  acts. 

Place  of  election. 

The  same  subject  continued. 

Popular  elections — Plurality. 

The   same   subject  continued — 

Majorities,  etc. 
Voting  by  ballot. 

400.  The  same  subject  continued. 

401.  The  Australian  ballot  and  cu- 
mulative voting. 

402.  Absolute  accuracy  not  required 
in  a  ballot. 

403.  Votes  for  ineligible  candidates. 

404.  Putting  up  offices  at  auction — 
Tax  collector. 

405.  City  council  as  judge  of  elec- 
tion and  qualification  of  its 
members. 

406.  Canvass  and  return  and  contest 
of  elections. 


383. 

384. 
385. 

386. 


388. 
389. 
390. 

391. 


394. 
395. 
396. 
397. 
398. 

399. 


^    356  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  338 

§  356.  Town  meetings  in  New  England  and  elsewhere. — In  a  pre- 
ceding chapter  we  have  discussed  the  rules  of  law  by  which  the  meet- 
ings and  proceedings  of  public  boards  are  regulated.^  We  shall  now 
consider  some  of  the  statutory  and  judicial  regulations  of  "town 
meetings,"  a  term  which  we  apply  generically  to  all  popular  meetings 
of  the  inhabitants  of  local  communities — whether  of  strictly  munici- 
pal corporations  or  of  public  quasi-corporations,  such  as  school  dis- 
tricts. The  institution  of  town  meetings  in  this  country  is  coeval 
with  the  settlement  of  New  England;  and  it  is  in  the  decisions  of 
the  courts  of  the  states  composing  that  section  that  we  find  the  great 
body  of  the  law  on  this  subject.  These  gatherings  of  the  people  have 
been  jjronounced  by  students  of  political  science  who  have  closely  ex- 
amined their  methods  of  operation  and  the  influence  exerted  by  them, 
to  be  the  most  potent  agents  in  promoting  the  art  of  self-government 
that  the  world  has  ever  known.  "In  a  New  England  township  the 
people  directly  govern  themselves;  the  government  is  the  people,  or, 
to  speak  with  entire  precision,  it  is  all  the  male  inhabitants  of  one- 
and-twenty  years  of  age  and  upwards.  The  people  tax  themselves. 
Once  each  year,  usually  in  March,  but  sometimes  as  early  as  February 
or  as  late  as  April,  a  'town  meeting  is  held  at  which  all  the  grown 
men  of  the  township  are  expected  to  be  present  and  to  vote,  while 
any  one  may  introduce  motions  or  take  part  in  the  discussion.'  In 
early  times  there  was  a  fine  for  non-attendance,  but  this  is  no  longer 
the  case;  it  is  supposed  that  a  due  regard  to  his  own  interests  will 
induce  every  man  to  come.  The  town  meeting  is  held  in  the  town 
house,  but  at  first  it  used  to  be  held  in  the  church,  which  was  thus 
a  meeting  house  'for  civil  as  well  as  ecclesiastical  purposes.'  At  the 
town  meeting  measures  relating  to  the  administration  of  town  afEairs 
are  discussed  and  adopted  or  rejected;  appropriations  are  made  for 
the  public  expenses  of  the  town,  or,  in  other  words,  the  amount  of  the 
town  taxes  for  the  year  is  determined  and  town  officers  are  elected 
for  the  year."^  But  the  administration  of  local  affairs  by  means  of 
town  meetings  is  not  now  confined  to  the  towns  of  New  England,  al- 

^  Public  Boards,  ch.  9,  ante.  political    training-school     in     exist- 

^  Prof.  Fiske's  "Civil  Government  ence.     Its  educational  value  is  far 

in  the  United  States,"  p.  19.     In  an-  higher  than  that  of  the  newspaper, 

other  part  of  this  work,  which  is  an  which  in  spite  of  its  many  merits 

interesting  and  eloquent  dissertation  as  a  diffuser  of  information  is  very 

on     town     meetings,     the     author  apt  to  do  its  best  to  bemuddle  and 

says: — "In   the   kind   of   discussion  sophisticate  plain   facts."     Ibid.,   p. 

which  it  provokes,  in  the  necessity  31.      See   also,     'American    Political 

of  facing  argument  with  argument.  Ideas,"  by  the  same  author,  ch.   1, 

and  of  keeping  one's  temper  under  Town  Meetings, 
control,  the  town  meeting  is  the  best 


339  MEETINGS   AND   ELECTIONS.  §    357 

though  these  are  perhaps  invested  with  more  ample  powers  than  are 
conferred  upon  tliem  elsewhere:  in  many  of  the  western  states  the 
township  system  with  its  town  meeting  for  deliberative  purposes  is 
steadily  supplanting  or  ceasing  to  become  subordinate  to  the  system 
of  county  government,  and  when  tried  under  favorable  conditions  is 
not  likely  to  be  abandoned,  except  when  of  necessity  an  increase  of 
population  demands  a  representative  borough  or  city  government.^ 

§  357.    Right  to  meeting — Mandamus  to  enforce. — In  Connecticut 

"special  town  meetings  may  be  convened  when  the  selectmen  shall 
deem  it  necessary  or  on  application  of  twenty  inhabitants  qualified 
to  vote  in  town  meetings."  By  judicial  construction  the  last  clause 
of  this  provision  is  mandatory  to  the  selectmen,  and  the  requisite 
number  of  voters  have  a  right  to  demand  that  a  meeting  be  called 
for  any  legitimate  and  proper  purpose.*  Although  it  is  not  compe- 
tent for  the  petitioners  to  dictate  to  the  selectmen  the  day  and  hour 
for  the  meeting  to  be  held,  it  is  no  objection  to  the  petition  that  it 
specifies  the  day  and  hour,  for  the  selectmen  may  call  a  meeting  at 
any  reasonable  time.^  If,  however,  those  officers  neglect  to  perform 
their  duty  in  the  premises,  the  remedy  is  by  mandamus;  but  all  the 
selectmen  must  be  made  parties  to  the  proceeding,  and  the  writ  can 
only  issue  in  the  name  of  the  state  as  plaintiff.*' 

^  See  Prof.  Fiske's  treatise  cited  in  the  writ  or  whether  it  may  be  pros- 

the  preceding  note,  p.  89  et  seq.  ecuted  by  any  inhabitant  of  the  town 

*  But  the  purpose  must  not  be  un-  as  relator  is  a  question  on  which  the 
lawful  or  manifestly  frivolous  or  im-  authorities  differ.  It  is  held  by  some 
proper.  See  dissenting  opinion  of  that  any  person  having  a  general  in- 
Phelps,  J.,  in  Lyon  v.  Rice,  41  Conn,  terest  in  the  subject-matter  may  be 
245,  251.  There  is  no  clear  legal  a  relator  and  prosecute  the  writ  in 
right  to  have  a  meeting  called  "to  the  name  of  the  state:  People  v. 
take  action  on  resolutions  to  be  of-  Collins,  19  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  56;  Ham- 
fered  [in  the  legislature]  for  the  re-  ilton  v.  State,  3  Ind.  452;  State  v. 
peal  of  the  charter  of  the  borough."  County  Judge,  7  Iowa  186;  Hall  v. 
The  court  said  that  "the  borough  People,  57  111.  307.  By  others  it  is 
meeting  is  not  the  proper  tribunal  to  held  that  it  can  only  be  prosecuted 
pass  upon  that  question:"  Peck  v.  by  a  public  officer:  People  v.  Re- 
Booth,  42  Conn.  271,  274.  gents   &c.,    4    Mich.    98;    Heffner   v. 

"Lyon  V.  Rice,  41  Conn.  245.    Cf.  Commonwealth,  28  Pa.  St.  108;  Bob- 

Denniston  v.  School  Dist.,  17  N.  H.  bett  v.  State,  10  Kan.  9;   Linden  v. 

492,    where    it    was    held    that    the  Alameda  Co.,  45   Cal.   6;    Sanger  v. 

choice  of  day  by  the  petitioners  must  Commissioners,  25  Maine  291;  Bates 

not  be  disregarded.  v.   Overseers   &c.,   14   Gray    (Mass.) 

<=Peck  V.  Booth,  42  Conn.  271,  274;  163."     See  also,  Wyandotte  &c.  Br. 

Lyon  V.  Rice,  41  Conn.  245.     In  the  Co.  v.  Commissioners,  10  Kan.  331; 

case    last    cited    the    court    said: —  Territory  v.  Cole,  3  Dak.  301;   s.  c. 

"Whether     the     prosecuting     officer  19  N.  W.  418;  State  v.  Ware,  13  Or. 

alone  may  apply  for  and  prosecute  380;  s.  c.  10  Pac.  885.    And  cf.  State 


§  358 


PUBLIC    CORrORATIONS. 


340 


§  358.  Application  for  and  authority  to  call  a  meeting. — Where 
a  board  has  autliority  to  call  a  meeting  upon  the  application  of  a  cer- 
tain umuber  of  voters  or  freeholders  the  petition  need  not  describe 
them  as  such;"  and  the  decision  of  the  board  that  the  subscribers  are 
qualified  is  final  and  conclusive.®  An  application  for  a  school-district 
meeting  bearing  date  before  the  town  meeting  at  which  it  should  be 
determined  whether  the  district  would  bo  permitted  to  hold  a  meeting 
is  premature  and  all  action  under  it  void.^  Any  signer  of  the  peti- 
tion may  withdraw  his  name  before  action  has  been  taken,  and  if  a 
sufficient  number  do  not  remain  the  duty  to  call  the  meeting  ceases.^'' 
A  board  of  trustees  having  authority  to  call  a  meeting  when  in  their 
judgment  the  interests  of  the  district  require  it  can  act  only  at  a  reg- 
ular session;  and  a  call  signed  by  two  without  notice  to  the  other, 
who  afterward  refuses  to  sign  it,  is  without  any  legal  efficacy. ^^  A 
meeting  may  be  called  by  officers  de  facto :  provided,  of  course,  that . 
the  same  officers  de  jure  would  have  that  power.  ^-  Where  a  school 
district  has  exercised  a  statutory  right  to  prescribe  the  manner  in 
which  meetings  shall  be  called  they  can  not  be  convened  in  any  other 
way  so  long  as  the  vote  remains  unrescinded.^^ 


V.  Common  Council  &c.,  33  N.  J.  L. 
110;  People  v.  Brooklyn  Council,  77 
N.  Y.  503. 

^  "It  is  sufficient  if  they  are  such:" 
Fletcher  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  20  Maine 
439.  A  meeting  called  upon  the  ap- 
plication of  less  than  the  required 
number  of  persons  is  void:  McVichie 
V.  Town  of  Knight,  82  Wis.  137;  s.  c. 
51  N.  W.  1094. 

*  State  V.  Supervisors  &c.,  23  Minn. 
521.  Except,  perhaps,  the  court  said, 
upon  a  review  in  a  direct  proceed- 
ing. Contra,  Ladd  v.  Clements,  4 
Gush.  (Mass.)  476;  Fletcher  v.  In- 
habitants &c.,  20  Maine  439.  See 
also,  cases  cited  in  the  following 
section. 

^  School  Dist.  V.  Lord,  44  Maine 
374. 

"  Dutten  V.  Village  of  Hanover,  42 
Ohio  St.  215.  The  application  need 
not  be  recorded:  Roper  v.  Inhab- 
itants &c.,  28  Maine  193.  And  a 
statute  requiring  it  is  directory 
merely:  State  v.  Supervisors,  58 
Wis.  291;  s.  c.  17  N.  W.  20. 


"  Bogert  V.  Trustees,  43  N.  J.  L. 
358. 

^-Williams  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  21 
Pick.  (Mass.)  75.  Cf.  Little  v.  Mer- 
rill, 10  Pick.  (Mass.)  543. 

"  Hayward  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  2 
Cush.  (Mass.)  419.  The  power  given 
by  statute  to  an  ecclesiastical  body 
to  prescribe  the  mode  of  warning  its 
meetings  does  not  enable  it  to  dis- 
pense with  a  warning  by  the  com- 
mittee: Society  of  Bethany  v.  Sper- 
ry,  10  Conn.  200.  See  further,  for  a 
construction  of  statutes  and  by-laws 
conferring  authority  to  call  school- 
district  meetings,  Stone  v.  Inhab- 
itants &c.,  8  Cush.  (Mass.)  592  (au- 
thority to  warn  not  authority  to 
call ) ;  Little  v.  Merrill,  10  Pick. 
(Mass.)  543;  Mason  v.  School  Dist, 
20  Vt.  487;  Corliss  v.  Corliss,  8  Vt. 
373.  And  that  an  application  will 
be  presumed,  Chandler  v.  Bradish, 
23  Vt.  416;  Mason  v.  School  Dist, 
20  Vt  487. 


341  MEETINGS    AND    ELECTIONS.  §    359 

§  359.  Secondary  authority  to  call  a  meeting. — Anthority  to  call 
meetings  is  frequently  given  by  statute  to  a  certain  officer  or  board 
contingent  upon  tlie  neglect  or  refusal  of  others  to  perform  the  duty 
east  upon  them  in  the  first  instance.  In  such  cases  the  well-estab- 
lished principle  that  nothing  can  be  presumed  in  favor  of  the  juris- 
diction of  the  parties  acting  under  special  authority^*  is  generally 
applied,  and  the  existence  of  the  conditions  precedent  becomes  an 
issuable  fact;  and  if  successfully  controverted  the  result  is  so  fatal 
that  a  tax  collector  appointed  at  a  meeting  founded  on  the  call  can 
not  justify  in  an  action  of  trespass. ^'^^  But  where  a  school-district 
committee  upon  due  application  for  a  meeting  on  a  day  certain  re- 
fused to  call  it,  and,  within  the  time  allowed  by  statute,  called  a 
meeting  for  a  day  one  month  later  than  that  specified,  the  court  held 
it  to  be  a  "neglect  *  *  *  after  application,"  etc.,  which  author- 
ized the  selectmen  to  call  a  meeting;^''  and  the  same  construction  of 
the  statute  was  adopted  in  a  case  where  the  meeting  called  upon  the 
original  application  would  have  been  illegal  for  want  of  sufficient 
notice.^® 

§  360.  General  purpose  of  a  warning. — The  rationale  of  warnings 
of  New  England  town  meetings  is,  perhaps,  placed  upon  a  firmer 
foundation  by  Justice  Gray  of  the  United  States  supreme  court  than 
by  any  other  jurist  who  has  had  occasion  to  discuss  the  subject.  "In 
Connecticut,  as  in  Massachusetts  and  Maine,"  said  he,  "by  common 
law  or  immemorial  usage  the  property  of  any  inhabitant  may  be 
taken  on  execution  upon  a  judgment  against  the  town.^^     A  town 

"Little     V.      Merrill,      10      Pick.  &c.  v.  Stearns,  21  Pick.  (Mass.)  148. 

(Mass.)     543;    Rossiter    v.    Peck,    3  Cf.  State  v.  Supervisors  &c.,  23  Minn. 

Gray  (Mass.)  538;  Barrett  v.  Crane,  521,  cited  in  note  8,  ante. 

16  Vt.  246;  Betts  v.  Bagley,  12  Pick.  ''^  Dennlston  v.  School  Dist,  17  N. 

(Mass.)    572;    Bennett   v.    Burch,    1  H.  492.     If  the  committee  could  ig- 

Denio   (N.  Y. )   141;   Sharp  v.  Spier,  nore   the   petitioner's   desire   in   re- 

4  Hill  (N.  Y.)  76.  spect  of  the  time,  "it  is  plain,"  said 

"a  Brewster  v.  Hyde,  7  N.  H.  206;  the  court,  "that  no  special  meeting 

Giles  V.  School  Dist.,  31  N.  H.  304;  could    ever    be    held    against    their 

Starbird  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  51  Maine  will."      In    Connecticut    the    officers 

101.     A  justice  of  the  peace  having  are  not  in  default  if  the  day  fixed  by 

authority  to  call  a  meeting  upon  ap-  them  is  within  a  reasonable  time: 

plication  after  an  unreasonable  re-  Lyon  v.  Rice,  41  Conn.  245. 

fusal  of  the  selectmen,  is  powerless  ^"Pickering  v.   De  Rochemont,   66 

to    act    if    the    majority    of    the    se-  N.  H.  377;  s.  c.  23  Atl.  88,  where  it 

lectmen    have    not   been    requested:  was  held  that  the  warrant  need  not 

Southard  v.    Inhabitants,   53   Maine  recite  the  neglect. 

389;  citing  Ladd  V.  Clements,  4  Cvish.  ^"Citing    Atwater    v.    Inhabitants 

(Mass.)    476;    Fletcher    v.    Inhabit-  &c.,  6  Conn.  223,  228;  McLoud  v.  Sel- 

ants  &c.,  20  Maine  439;   Inhabitants  by,     10     Conn.     390;     Beardsley    v. 


§    361  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  342 

can  not  contract  or  authorize  any  officer  or  agent  to  make  one  except 
by  vote  in  a  town  meeting  duly  notified  or  warned;  and  the  notice  or 
warning  must  specify  the  matter  to  be  acted  on  in  order  that  all  the 
inhabitants  (whose  property  will  be  subject  to  be  taken  on  execution 
to  satisfy  the  obligation  of  the  town)  may  know  in  advance  what  busi- 
ness is  to  be  transacted  at  the  meeting,"^**  This  reason  has  also  been 
adduced:  "If  the  object  of  the  meeting  is  specified  it  will  present  a 
motive  to  the  inhabitants  to  be  present  and  they  will  leave  business 
even  if  it  be  pressing,  provided  they  feel  an  interest  in  the  subject  to 
be  determined.  On  the  other  hand,  if  the  object  is  unimportant  and 
any  of  the  inhabitants  should  feel  no  concern  in  the  result,  they  may 
with  safety  pursue  their  ordinary  business;  and  this  certainly  is 
matter  of  convenience.  The  warning  designating  the  object  of  the 
meeting  is  fair  and  in  prevention  of  those  little  artifices  which  some- 
times endanger  the  public  peace  and  throw  communities  into  animos- 
ities and  divisions."^  ^  Again,  it  is  to  enable  the  people  "to  give  the 
subject  consideration  previous  to  the  meeting,"-"  and  "that  the  will 
of  individuals  may  not  be  subjected  to  the  will  of  a  majority  any  fur- 
ther than  it  is  subjected  by  law."-^ 

§  361.  Designation  of  time  and  place  of  meeting. — A  statute  pro- 
vided that  annual  town  meetings  should  be  held  at  the  place  where 
the  last  meeting  was  held  or  at  such  other  place  as  should  have  been 
ordered  at  a  previous  meeting.  There  was  also  a  general  provision 
that  the  doings  of  town  meetings  might  be  reconsidered  upon  motion 
made  within  a  certain  time.^^  It  was  decided  that  the  mere  fact  that 
a  majority  of  the  ballots  for  town  officers  cast  at  a  regular  meeting 
contained  words  indicating  the  will  of  the  voters  that  the  next  meet- 
ing should  be  held  at  a  certain  place  named  thereon  M^as  not  a  suffi- 
cient designation  within  the  intent  of  the  law.  The  proposition 
should  have  been  submitted  to  the  meeting  as  a  deliberative  body, 
and  the  election  of  an  officer  in  the  following  year  at  the  place  as- 
signed was  declared  to  be  void.^^     If  an  annual  meeting  neglects  to 

Smith,  16  Conn.   368;    5  Dane  Abr.  ^^  Hayden  v.   Noyes,   5   Conn.   391, 

158;     Chase    v.     President    &c.,    19  396. 

Pick.    (Mass.)    564,    569;    Gaskill   v.  -"Blush  v.  Town  of  Colchester,  39 

Dudley,  6  Met.   (Mass.)   546;  Adams  Vt.  193,  196. 

V.  President  &c.,  1  Greenl.    (Maine)  -'Pittsburg  v.  Danforth,  56  N.  H. 

361;    Fernald    v.    Lewis,    6    Greenl.  272. 

(Maine)    264;    Hopkins  v.   Town   of  "- The  power  to  reconsider  does  not 

Elmore,  49  Vt.  176;  Rev.  Stats.  N.  H.  depend  on  statute:    See  §  377  et  seq., 

1878,  ch.  239,   §  8.     See  also,  ch.  5,  post. 

ante.  ''  State  v.  Davidson,  32  Wis.  114. 

'*  Bloomfield  v.  Charter  Oak  Bank,  A  charter  provision  that  all   warn 

121  U.  S.  121;  s.  c.  7  S.  Ct.  865.  ings  of  city  meetings  "shall  be  is- 


343 


MEETINGS  AND  ELECTIONS. 


§  362 


appoint  a  timo  and  place  under  the  power  conferred  by  statute,  and 
the  hitter  makes  no  provision  in  case  of  such  a  failure,  the  proceedings 
of  a  meeting  duly  called  by  the  proper  authorities  will  be  upheld;^* 
but  a  statute  providing  for  such  an  omission  is  mandatory.-^  A  by- 
law prescribing  seven  days'  notice  of  meetings  is  reasonable  f^  but  an 
ordinance  requiring  a  notice  of  not  less  than  three  months  is  void 
for  unreasonableness.^'^  ^ 

§  362.  General  and  formal  requisites  of  a  warrant. — The  statutes, 
with  only  slight  dilfereuces  in  phraseology,  require  the  time,  place 
and  objects  of  a  meeting  to  be  specified  in  the  notice,  or  warrant,  as 
it  is  usually  termed.  It  is  not  essential  that  it  be  addressed  to  the 
inhabitants  or  voters,^^  or  that  the  application  be  recited  in  it;^* 
and,  in  the  absence  of  statute,  no  seal  is  required.^**  A  date  is  not  in- 
dispensable;^^ and  if  a  warrant  be  issued  by  freeholders  under  statu- 
tory authority  their  naked  signatures  suffice.^"  It  is  valid  if  signed 
by  a  majority  of  the  board  having  power  to  issue  it;^^  and  a  meeting 
is  "called  by  the  *  *  *  committee"  when  the  warrant  is  signed 
by  the  clerk  "by  order  of  the  *  *  *  committee;"^'*  but  it  is  not 
"under  the  hands  of  the  selectmen"  where  only  one  of  the  board 


sued  by  the  mayor  and  published  in 
the  manner  designated  in  the  by- 
laws of  the  city"  delegates  to  the 
city  the  right  to  fix  by  a  standing 
by-law  the  time  and  extent  of  such 
publication,  and  is  not  controlled  by 
the  general  statutes  which  prescribe 
how  town  meetings  shall  be  warned: 
Allen  V.  City  of  Burlington,  45  Vt. 
202. 

-'  Otherwise  no  annual  meeting 
could  ever  afterwards  be  held:  San- 
born V.  School  Dist,  12  Minn.  17. 

-^  Marchant  v.  Langworthy,  6  Hill 
(N.  Y.)  646;  s.  c.  affirmed,  3  Denio 
(N.  Y.)  526. 

=«  Rand  v.  Wilder,  11  Gush.  (Mass.) 
294. 

-^  Jones  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  66 
Maine  585. 

^  Baldwin  v.  Town  of  North 
Branford,  32  Conn.  47.  See  also, 
Pickering  v.  De  Rochemont,  66  N. 
H.  377;  s.  c.  23  Atl.  88. 

^  Roper  V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  28 
Maine  193;  Sherwin  v.  Bugbee,  16 
Vt.  439.     See  also,  Pickering  v.  Ue 


Rochemont,  66  N.  H.  377;  s.  c.  23 
Atl.  88;  Mason  v.  School  Dist,  20 
Vt.  487. 

™Colman  v.  Anderson,  10  Mass. 
105;  Kingsbury  v.  School  Dist.,  12 
Met.  (Mass.)  99;  Inhabitants  &c.  v. 
Spofford,  12  Maine  487. 

^^  Denniston  v.  School  Dist,  17  N. 
H.  492;  Briggs  v.  Murdock,  13  Pick. 
(Mass.)  305. 

^-  Sturm  v.  School  Dist,  45  Minn. 
88;  s.  c.  47  N.  W.  462;  citing  Willis 
V.  Sproule,  13  Kan.  257;  Austin  v. 
Allen,  6  Wis.  134;  Washington  Ice 
Co.  V.  Lay,  103  Ind.  48;  s.  c.  2  N.  E. 
222. 

^^  Reynolds  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  6 
Met.  (Mass.)  340.  Cf.  Bogert  v. 
Trustees,  43  N.  J.  L.  358,  cited  in 
§  358,  ante. 

^*  Kingsbury  v.  School  Dist..  12 
Met  (Mass.)  99.  See  also.  Smith  v. 
Board  &c.,  45  Fed.  725.  Otherwise 
if  there  is  no  previous  authority  or 
subsequent  ratification:  Society  of 
Bethany  v.  Sperry,  10  Conn.  200. 


S  3G3 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS. 


344 


signs  "by  order  of  the  selectmen  ;"^'^  and  it  is  not  "issued"  by  the 
mayor  unless  signed  by  him;^°  and  a  warrant  signed  by  the  proper 
officer,  but  without  any  official  designation  or  anything  in  the  docu- 
ment to  indicate  his  official  character,  is  fatally  defective.^'^  The  year 
of  the  meeting  ought  to  be  specified,^®  and  the  hour^"  and  place*"  are 
of  vital  importance.*^ 

§  363.  The  same  subject  continued. — Technical  accuracy  is  not 
required,  nor  is  the  warrant  to  be  construed  with  the  same  strictness 
as  a  power  of  attorney,  or  a  penal  statute,*^  or  a  special  plea:*^  the 
law  is  satisfied  if  the  propositions  to  be  submitted  are  indicated  with 
such  reasonable  certainty  that  no  person  interested  can  be  misled.** 
Where  the  design  is  to  raise  money  the  subjects  need  not  be  set  forth 
with  greater  particularity  than  is  expressed  in  the  statute'  which  au- 
thorizes the  town  to  vote  money  for  the  purposes  named  in  the  war- 
rant.*^ If  the  application  for  a  meeting  contains  precise  and  enu- 
merated articles  and  the  warrant  is  annexed  thereto  upon  the  same 


^''  Reynolds  v.  Inhabitants,  6  Met. 
(Mass.)  340.     And  see  s.  c,  p.  344. 

^^  Allen  V.  City  of  Burlington,  45 
Vt.  202. 

"  McVichie  v.  Town  of  Knight,  82 
Wis.  137;  s.  c.  51  N.  W.  1094. 

^^  Wilson  V.  Waltersville  School 
Dist.,  44  Conn.  157,  which,  however, 
does  not  decide  that  it  is  indispen- 
sable. 

""  If  this  is  omitted  in  the  record 
of  the  warning,  parol  evidence  is  in- 
admissible to  show  that  the  original 
did  in  fact  fix  the  hour,  or  that  all 
the  legal  voters  were  present  and 
voted:  Sherwin  v.  Bugbee,  17  Vt. 
337;  s.  c.  16  Vt.  439.  See  also.  King 
v.  Theodorick,  8  East  543;  Moor  v. 
Newfield,  4  Maine  44. 

'"Sherwin  v.  Bugbee,  16  Vt.  439. 
A  warrant  calling  a  meeting  at  a 
certain  hall  may  imply  that  it  is  in 
the  town  and  known  to  the  voters: 
George  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  6  Met. 
(Mass.)  497. 

"  The  presence  and  consent  of  all 
the  inhabitants  at  a  meeting  not  le- 
gally warned  is  not  a  waiver  of  the 
defect:  Moor  v.  Newfield,  4  Maine 
44.  See  also,  Ruhland  v.  Supervis- 
ors, 55  Wis.  664;  s.  c.  13  N.  W.  877. 


"  Belfast  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Inhabitants 
&c.,  60  Maine  568;  Grover  v.  Inhabit- 
ants &c.,  11  Allen  (Mass.)  88;  Kitt- 
redge  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  138  Mass. 
286. 

'^  South  School  Dist.  v.  Blakeslee, 
13  Conn.  227. 

«Wyley  v.  Wilson,  44  Vt.  404; 
Ovitt  V.  Chase,  37  Vt.  196;  Moore 
v.  Beattie,  33  Vt.  219;  Austin  v.  In- 
habitants &c.,  57  Maine  304;  Alger 
V.  Curry,  40  Vt.  437;  Bloomfield  v. 
Charter  Oak  Bank,  121  U.  S.  121;  s. 
c.  7  S.  Ct.  865.  "They  are  the  lan- 
guage of  plain  men  for  practical 
purposes:"  Per  Redfield,  J.,  in  Hub- 
bard V.  Newton,  52  Vt.  346;  Blush 
V.  Town  of  Colchester,  39  Vt.  193. 
A  statute  requiring  the  subject-mat- 
ter to  be  "distinctly  stated"  adds  no 
force  to  the  intent  of  a  former  stat- 
ute providing  that  the  "intent  and 
design"  should  be  specified:  Child 
V.  Colburn,  54  N.  H.  71,  80.  See 
also,  cases  cited  in  the  two  preced- 
ing notes;  and  for  a  more  particular 
examination  of  the  subject,  §  383  et 
seq.,  post. 

"' Alger  V.  Curry,  40  Vt.  437.  See 
also,  Tucker  v.  Aiken,  7  N.  H.  113. 


oio  MEETINGS    AND   ELECTIONS.  §    3G-i 

paper  calling  a  meeting  to  act  on  those  articles,  they  are  a  part  of 
the  warrant  as  ett'ectually  as  if  they  were  embodied  in  it;*"  and  a 
meeting  is  called  for  each  and  every  article  in  the  warrant,  although 
one  article  requires  a  majority  vote  and  another  a  two-thirds  vote.*'' 
Where  the  action  of  a  town  was  invalid  because  of  want  of  power 
and  also  because  there  was  no  notice  in  the  warning  of  the  subject 
which  was  considered,  an  act  of  the  legislature  referring  to  such  pro- 
ceedings as  "without  authority  of  law,"  and  confirming  them,  heals 
all  the  invalidities.*^ 

§  364.  Service  of  warrant. — The  statutes  generally  require  an 
attested  copy  of  the  warrant  to  be  posted  in  two  or  more  public 
places  a  certain  time  before  the  meeting.*^  The  original  may  be 
posted,  although  the  letter  of  the  law  specities  a  copy,  and  the  original 
to  be  returned  with  the  officer's  doing  thereon.^''  The  notice  must 
be  put  up  the  required  length  of  time,''^  but  not  necessarily  in  the 
usual  place. ^-  The  words  "public  places,"  as  used  in  statutes,  are 
construed  to  mean  such  places  as  in  comparison  with  others  in  the 
same  town  are  those  where  the  inhabitants  and  others  most  fre- 
quently meet  or  resort  or  have  occasion  to  be,  so  that  a  notice  there 
would  for  that  reason  be  most  likely  to  be  seen.  The  character  of 
the  town  and  the  situation  and  use  of  the  place  and  the  amount  of 
resort  to  it,  if  disputed,  are  matters  of  fact  for  a  jury;  but  if  the 
facts  are  apparent  it  is  a  question  of  law  what  is  a  public  place.^^    A 

*"  George  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  6  Met.  =°  Brewster  v.  Hyde,  7  N.  H.  206; 

(Mass.)  497.  Norris  v.  Eaton,  7  N.  H.  284.     See 

^'Inhabitants    &c.    v.     Smith,    65  also,  Eaton  v.  Miner,  5  N.  H.  542; 

Maine  203.  King  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  6  T.  R.  534; 

^*  Baldwin  v.  Town  of  North  Bran-  King  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  1  East  13. 

ford,  32  Conn.  47.  Copies  should  include  all  the  signa- 

"  It  has  been  said  that  this  duty  is  tures    to    the    original:     Chapin    v. 

personal  and  can  not  be  delegated;  School  Dist.,  30  N.  H.  25. 

but    the     officer's    return     that    he  '^^  And  the  record  may  be  amended 

"caused"  the  notice  to  be  posted  im-  to  record  the  fact  that  it  was  not, 

plies    that   it    was    done    under   his  and  thus  invalidate  the  action  of  the 

own    eye:     Parker    v.    Titcomb,    82  meeting:   Blake  v.  Orford,  64  N.  H. 

Maine  180;  s.  c.  19  Atl.  162.  Cf.  Phil-  299;    s.  c.  10  Atl.  117.     There  were 

lips  v.  Town  of  Albany,  28  Wis.  340,  no  vested  rights,  "if  in  a  case  of  this 

where  the  officer  employed  others  to  character  the  question  is  material," 

do  the  posting,  and  the  court  was  said  the  court. 

loath  to  believe  that  an  objection  °-  Stoddard  v.  Oilman,  22  Vt.  568. 
was  seriously  taken;  "if  it  is,  it  is  '^^Proprietors  &c.  v.  Chandler,  6 
seriously  overruled:"  S.  C,  p.  356.  N.  H.  271,  279;  Gibson  v.  Bailey,  9 
Presumption  in  favor  of  regularity:  N.  H.  168,  175,  178;  Wells  v.  Bur- 
State  V.  Supervisors  &c.,  23  Minn,  bank,  17  N.  H.  393;  Proprietors  &c. 
521.  See  also,  Town  of  Lennington  v.  Page,  6  N.  H.  182,  190;  Russell  v. 
V.  Blodgett,  37  Vt.  210.  Dyer,  40  N.  H.  173,  186,  187;  s.  c.  43 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS. 


346 


"conspicuous"  place  is  not  synonymous  with  '^public";  both  words 
are  sometimes  used  in  conjunction  to  insure  the  posting  of  notice  in 
a  public  place  in  such  a  position  that  it  may  readily  be  seen.^* 

§  365.  Time  of  service. — It  was  held  in  England  that  where  notice 
was  required  "at  least  sixteen  days  before"  a  meeting,  both  the  day 
of  tbe  notice  and  the  day  of  the  meeting  were  to  be  excluded  in  the 
computation  f^  but  according  to  the  unifonn  rule  in  this  country 
wherever  the  question  has  arisen  only  one  of  these  days  is  excluded  f^ 
it  was  so  decided  where  the  language  was  "at  least  twelve  days  before 
the  time  appointed;"^''  and  where  it  was  "at  least  five  days  inclusive 
before  the  meeting  is  to  be  held."^^  Where  notice  is  published  the 
date  of  a  newspaper  is  presumed  to  be  the  date  of  its  publication,'^''  al- 
though it  is  printed  and  many  copies  sent  out  on  the  preceding  day.*''* 
Statutory  provisions  relating  to  the  period  of  notice  of  public  meet- 


N.  H.  396,  397,  398;  Wells  v.  Jack- 
son &c.  Co.,  47  N.  H.  235,  255;  Ca- 
hoon  V.  Coe,  52  N.  H.  518,  522; 
French  v.  Spalding,  61  N.  H.  395, 
401.  A  shoemaker's  shop  is  not  a 
public  place:  Tidd  v.  Smith,  3  N.  H. 
178.  Prima  facie  a  blacksmith  shop 
is:  Soper  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  28 
Maine  193.  And  an  inn  and  a  post- 
office:  Hoitt  V.  Burnham,  61  N.  H. 
620.  And  houses  of  public  wor- 
ship: Scammon  v.  Scammon,  28  N. 
H.  419.  But  not  the  inside  of  the 
door  if  it  is  kept  locked:  Osgood  v. 
Blake,  21  N.  H.  550,  562.  And  a 
grist-mill:  Fletcher  v.  Inhabitants 
&c.,  20  Maine  439.  A  stage  office 
may  be:  Baker  v.  Shephard,  24  N. 
H.  208,  212.  And  a  schoolhouse;  a 
building  formerly  used  as  a  grain 
building;  a  large  board  fastened  on 
the  roadside  wall:  Seabury  v.  How- 
land,  15  R.  I.  446;  s.  c.  8  Atl.  341. 
For  other  cases  relating  to  desig- 
nated or  public  places  and  depend- 
ing upon  special  facts,  see  Chapin 
V.  School  Dist.,  30  N.  H.  25;  Briggs 
V.  Murdock,  13  Pick.  (Mass.)'  305; 
Soper  V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  28  Maine 
193;  State  v.  Beeman,  35  Maine  242. 
An  allegation  in  a  complaint  that  the 
notice  was  not  posted  in  the  most 
public  place  is  a  sufficient  averment 


of  fact,  and  not  merely  of  a  legal 
conclusion,  to  withstand  a  demur- 
rer: McVichie  v.  Town  of  Knight, 
82  Wis.  137;  s.  c.  51  N.  W.  1094. 

^*  A  neglect  to  heed  this  distinc- 
tion is  fatal:  Lewey's  Island  R.  Co. 
v.  Bolton,  48  Maine  451;  Wardens 
&c.  V.  Woodward,  26  Maine  172. 

^^  Reg.  V.  Justices  &c.,  8  Ad.  &  El. 
173.  See  also,  Reg.  v.  Lander,  1  Ir. 
R.  C.  L.  225. 

^^  Mason  v.  School  Dist.,  20  Vt. 
487;  Hunt  v.  School  Dist,  14  Vt. 
300;  Hubbard  v.  Town  of  Williams- 
town,  61  Wis.  397;  s.  c.  21  N.  W. 
295;  Brooklyn  Trust  Co.  v.  Town  of 
Hebron,  51  Conn.  22;  citing  Sheets 
v.  Selden's  Lessee,  2  Wall.  177; 
Bigelow  v.  Wilson,  1  Pick.  (Mass.) 
485;  Bemis  v.  Leonard,  118  Mass. 
502.  See  also,  Osgood  v.  Blake,  21 
N.  H.  550,  562. 

"  Pratt  v.  Town  of  Swanton,  15 
Vt.  147. 

^^  Brooklyn  Trust  Co.  v.  Town  of 
Hebron,  51  Conn.  22. 

^^  Schoff  V.  Gould,  52  N.  H.  512. 

'"  "General  publicity  can  not  fair- 
ly be  said  to  be  given  to  anything 
contained  in  it  till  the  day  of  its 
date  and  general  circulation:" 
Queen  v.  Aberdare  Canal  Co.,  14  Q. 
B.  854. 


MEETINGS    AND    ELECTIONS. 


§  366 


ings  are  mandatory,  and  a  strict  compliance  therewith  is  an  indispen- 
sable prerequisite  to  valid  action/^  but  a  defect  in  this  particular  may 
be  cured  by  act  of  the  legislature." - 

§  366.  Return  of  service. — A  return  of  service  of  a  warning  is 
necessary  even  if  no  statute  requires  it.^^  The  return  need  not  be 
dated/*  nor  is  the  date  conclusive  of  the  time  of  service.®^  If  it  is 
signed  "B,  Constable/^  without  adding  "of  the  town  of,"  etc.,  it  is 
sufficient.*'®  In  Maine,  where  the  statute  requires  the  return  to  state 
"the  manner  of  notice  and  the  time  it  was  given,"  it  must  show  spe- 
cifically and  precisely  that  the  notice  was  served  in  exact  conformity 
with  the  statute.**^ 


«^  McVichie  v.  Town  of  Knight,  82 
Wis.  137;  s.  c.  51  N.  W.  1094;  Green- 
banks  V.  Boutwell,  43  Vt.  207; 
Stuart  v.  Town  of  Warren,  37  Conn. 
225;  and  the  preceding  notes  to  this 
section.  If  the  warning  is  not 
dated  and  is  not  required  to  be,  the 
posted  copy  need  not  be  dated,  in 
which  case  parol  evidence  is  admis- 
sible to  show  when  it  was  put  up: 
Braley  v.  Dickinson,  48  Vt.  599. 

"=  Stuart  v.  Town  of  Warren,  37 
Conn.  225.  See  also,  Allen  v.  Arch- 
er, 49  Maine  346.  But  a  statute 
validating  the  "doings"  of  certain 
cities,  etc.,  in  respect  of  bounties, 
contemplates  only  the  doings  of 
meetings  legally  held:  Sanborn  v. 
Machiasport,  53  Maine  82. 

^^  "Such  has  been  the  invariable 
practice  from  time  immemorial  in 
towns  and  parishes  in  Massachu- 
setts and  in  this  state  since  its  or- 
ganization : "  Tuttle  V.  Gary,  7  Maine 
426.  430. 

"  Briggs  V.  Murdock,  13  Pick. 
(Mass.)   305. 

^■^  Williams  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  21 
Pick.  (Mass.)  75;  Inhabitants  &c.  v. 
Spofford,  12  Maine  487.  "It  is  the 
common  practice  and  sanctioned  as 
legal"  to  date  it  on  the  day  of  the 
meeting:  Ford  v.  Clough.  8  Maine 
334;  Tuttle  v.  Gary,  7  Maine  426, 
430;  Thayer  v.  Stearns,  1  Pick. 
(Mass.)  109. 


®*  Commonwealth  v.  Shaw,  7  Met. 
(Mass.)  52. 

""  General  statements  in  regard  to 
time  or  place  are  insufficient:  War- 
dens &c.  V.  Woodward,  26  Maine  172; 
Bearce  v.  Fossett,  34  Maine  575; 
Tuttle  V.  Gary,  7  Maine  426;  Allen  v. 
Archer,  49  Maine  346;  Nelson  v. 
Pierce,  6  N.  H.  194;  Gibson  v.  Bai- 
ley, 9  N.  H.  168,  178;  Proprietors  &c. 
V.  Page,  6  N.  H.  182;  Clark  v.  Ward- 
well.  55  Maine  61;  Hamilton  v.  In- 
habitants &c.,  55  Maine  193;  State 
V.  Williams,  25  Maine  561,  a  thor- 
oughly considered  case.  See  also, 
Rowland  v.  School  Dist.,  15  R.  I. 
184;  s.  c.  2  Atl.  549;  8  Atl.  337.  It 
must  state  that  the  copies  were  "at- 
tested:" Fossett  V.  Bearce,  29  Maine 
523.  The  court  will  not  take  ju- 
dicial notice  that  the  "Baptist,"  etc., 
meeting-houses  or  the  "schoolhouse 
over  the  hill"  are  within  the  town: 
Brown  v.  Witham,  51  Maine  29.  Cf. 
Marble  v.  McKenney,  60  Maine  332. 
The  original  is  admissible  if  the 
statute  does  not  require  a  record  of 
it:  Inhabitants  &c.  v.  Spofford,  12 
Maine  487.  The  rule  is  otherwise 
than  as  stated  in  the  text  where  the 
statute  does  not  prescribe  the  mode 
except  that  it  shall  be  as  the  town 
may  agree:  Inhabitants  &c.  v.  Spof- 
ford, 12  Maine  487;  Ford  v.  Clough, 
8  Maine  334.  Notices  presumed  to  be 
legally    posted    in    case    of    ancient 


S  367 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS. 


348 


§  367.  Notice  of  annual  meetings. — Although  the  proceedings  of 
special  meetings  are  founded  wholly  upon  a  rigid  compliance  with 
the  provisions  of  the  statute  relating  to  notice,  it  is  held  in  some  cases 
and  intimated  in  others  that  these  regulations  are  not  mandatory  in 
every  particular  when  applied  to  annual  meetings;  indeed,  it  was 
declared  in  New  York  that  no  notice  whatever  is  essential  to  the  legal- 
ity of  an  annual  school-district  meeting  held  at  a  time  and  place 
previously  fixed  according  to  law.^^  Somewhat  more  guarded  expres- 
sions are  iised  elsewhere.  "The  annual  election  of  town  officers,"  said 
Justice  Gray,  "or  any  other  act  which  the  statutes  require  to  be  done 
by  the  inhabitants  at  each  annual  meeting,  might  perhaps  be  suffi- 
ciently proved  by  what  was  done  at  the  meeting  without  proving  a 
special  notice  of  it  in  the  warning.®''  But  wdth  these  exceptions  such 
a  notice  is  a  necessary  prerequisite  to  the  validity  of  any  act  of  the 
town  either  at  annual  meetings  or  at  a  special  meeting."""  And 
Judge  Cooley  says:  "Where,  however,  both  the  time  and  place  of 
an  election  are  prescribed  by  law,  every  voter  has  a  right  to  take  notice 
of  the  law  and  to  deposit  his  ballot  at  the  time  and  place  appointed. 


meetings:  School  Dist.  v.  Bragdon, 
23  N.  H.  507,  514  (more  than  twenty 
years)  ;  Adams  v.  Stanyon,  24  N.  H. 
405;  Willey  v.  Portsmouth,  35  N.  H. 
303,  309;  Peterborough  v.  Lancaster, 
14  N.  H.  382  (thirty-eight  years); 
and  especially,  Schoff  v.  Gould,  52  N. 
H.  512  (thirty  years).  And  these 
defects  are  amenable  according  to 
the  facts:  Kellar  v.  Savage,  17 
Maine  444;  Harris  v.  School  Dist.. 
28  N.  H.  58;  Clark  v.  Wardwell,  55 
Maine  61.  An  omission  to  return 
may  be  supplied:  Bean  v.  Thomp- 
son, 19  N.  H.  290.  The  amendment 
can  be  made  only  by  the  officer: 
Fossett  v.  Bearce,  29  Maine  523.  In 
Massachusetts  the  question  was  for- 
merly one  of  doubt,  the  ground  tak- 
en being  that  it  required  the  for- 
mality of  an  officer's  return  in  a 
civil  suit:  Perry  v.  Inhabitants  &c., 
12  Pick.  (Mass.)  206;  Thayer  v. 
Stearns,  1  Pick.  (Mass.)  109;  Gil- 
more  V.  Holt,  4  Pick.  (Mass.)  258. 
But  under  the  latest  exposition  of 
the  law  a  general  return  of  service 
"according    to    law"    is    sufficient: 


Briggs  V.  Murdock,  13  Pick.  (Mass.) 
305;  Houghton  v.  Davenport,  23 
Pick.   (Mass.)   235;   Rand  v.  Wilder, 

11  Gush.  (Mass.)  294.  See  also. 
Commonwealth     v.     Shaw,     7     Met. 

(Mass.)  52;  Sanborn  v.  School  Dist., 

12  Minn.  17;  Doughty  v.  Hope,  3 
Denio  (N.  Y.)  594;  Detroit  &c.  R. 
Co.  v.  Bearss,  39  Ind.  598;  Codman 
V.  Winslow,  10  Mass.  146;  State  v. 
Donahay,  30  N.  J.  L.  404.  Cf.  Hard- 
castle  V.  State,  27  N.  J.  L.  551.  The 
Massachusetts  and  Maine  cases  are 
reconciled  in  State  v.  Williams,  25 
Maine  561,  the  distinctness  of  the 
Maine  statute  controlling  the  deci- 
sions in  that  state.  Return  can  not 
be  impeached  by  parol;  if  false, 
the  officer  may  be  indicted:  Saxton 
V.  Nimms,  14  Mass.  315. 

•^^  Obiter,  Marchant  v.  Langworthy, 
6  Hill  (N.  Y.)  646;  s.  c.  affirmed,  3 
Denio  (N.  Y.)  526. 

•"*  Citing  Thayer  v.  Stearns,  1  Pick. 
(Mass.)  109;  Gilmore  v.  Holt,  4 
Pick.  (Mass.)  258. 

""  Bloomfleld  v.  Charter  Oak  Bank, 
121  U.  S.  121;  s.  c.  7  S.  Ct.  865. 


349  MEETINGS    AND   ELECTIONS.  §    368 

notwithstanding  the  ofTicial  whose  duty  it  is  to  give  notice  of  the  elec- 
tion has  failed  in  that  duty/''^ 

§  368.  The  same  subject  continued. — Where  annual  town  meetings 
are  empowered  to  raise  money  for  the  support  of  the  poor,  and  for 
defraying  all  other  proper  charges  and  expenses  of  the  town,  and  to 
direct  the  institution  and  defense  of  all  actions  in  which  the  town 
is  a  party  or  interested,  the  meeting  may  vote  to  allow  a  certain  sum 
in  settlement  of  a  claim  for  the  support  of  a  pauper  without  previous 
notice  that  such  claim  would  he  presented.'^-  It  was  said  in  a  Con- 
necticut case  that  a  vote  at  an  annual  town  meeting  appointing  a 
superintendent  of  highways  was  void  for  the  reason  that  there  was 
nothing  in  the  warning  to  notify  the  inhabitants  that  such  an  officer 
would  be  chosen. '^^  A  by-law  of  a  corporation,  fixing  a  time  but  not 
a  place  for  an  annual  election,  does  not  dispense  with  the  public 
notice  required  by  its  charter  or  render  that  provision  of  the  charter 
merely  directory.''* 

§  369.  Time  of  meeting. — A  town  meeting  should  be  held  sub- 
stantially at  the  hour  specified  in  the  warning.'^ ^  It  ought  to  be 
opened  within  a  reasonable  time  after  the  hour  appointed.  What 
would  be  a  reasonable  time  depends  in  some  measure  upon  the  cir- 
cumstances. It  is  frequently  the  case  that  a  meeting  is  named  to 
be  holden  at  nine  o'clock  in  the  forenoon  and  not  opened  until  some 
hours  afterward.     If  the  delay  is  for  the  mere  purpose  of  enabling 

"  Cooley  Const.  Lim.  (6th  ed.)  "  Per  Andrews,  C.  J.,  in  Pinney  v. 
759;  citing  People  v.  Cowles,  13  N.  Brown,  60  Conn.  164;  s.  c.  22  Atl. 
Y.  350;  Peoifle  v.  Brenahm,  3  Cal.  430.  Note,  however,  that  in  Con- 
477;  State  v.  Jones,  19  Ind.  356;  necticut  a  superintendent  of  high- 
People  V.  Hartwell,  12  Mich.  508;  ways  is  an  officer  unlinown  to  the 
Dishon  V.  Smith,  10  Iowa  212;  State  statute.  In  Gordon  v.  Clifford,  28 
V.  Orvis,  20  Wis.  235;  State  v.  N.  H.  402,  it  was  objected  to  the  le- 
Goetze,  22  Wis.  363;  State  v.  Skirv-  gality  of  the  election  of  selectmen 
ing,  19  Neb.  497;  s.  c.  27  N.  W.  723.  that  the  warning  did  not  specify  the 
Contra,  Foster  v.  Scarff,  15  Ohio  St.  purpose  of  the  meeting,  and  the  case 
532.  See  also,  Warner  v.  Mower,  11  sent  up  to  the  supreme  court  did  not 
Vt.  385,  at  p.  391.  Of  course,  there  show  affirmatively  that  the  warrant 
can  be  no  contention  where  the  stat-  was  perfect,  yet  the  court  presumed 
ute  by  fair  implication  dispenses  that  it  was  sufficient  until  the  con- 
with  notice  of  annual  meetings,  trary  should  be  shown, 
and  such  is  held  to  be  the  case  if  the  "  United  States  v.  McKelden, 
statute  requires  notice  only  of  spe-  MacArth.  &  M.  162. 
cial  meetings:  Schoff  v.  Town  of  '^  See  Sherwin  v.  Bugbee,  16  Vt. 
Bloomfield,  8  Vt.  472.  439. 

"Tuttle   V.   Town   of   Weston,   59 
Wis.  151;  s.  c.  17  N.  W.  12. 


§    370  PUBLIC    COIU'OKATIOXS.  350 

the  inhabitants  to  assemble,  and  without  prejudice  to  any  one,  it  would 
be  outrageously  unjust  to  hold  the  proceedings  illegal.  But,  on  the 
other  hand,  if  it  is  such  as  to  create  a  general  belief  that  no  meeting 
will  be  held,  and  thereby  induce  the  great  body  of  the  inhabitants  to 
disperse,  and  a  few  afterwards  open  the  meeting  and  pass  votes 
which  could  not  have  been  passed  except  for  the  delay,  it  would  be 
unjust  to  hold  them  legal  and  binding.  The  presumption  is  that  a 
meeting  was  opened  at  a  suitable  and  proper  time  in  the  day  and  in 
pursuance  of  the  warning,  and  the  burden  of  proving  unreasonable 
delay  is  upon  him  who  attacks  the  legality  of  the  proceedings.  It 
has  been  decided  that  a  meeting  opened  one  hour  and  five  minutes 
after  the  hour  fixed  is  not  illegal  as  a  matter  of  law,  although  only  a 
few  persons  remained.  The  others  might  have  gone  away  for  the 
very  purpose  of  preventing  the  meeting  from  acting. '^^ 

§  370.  Place  of  meeting. — We  have  seen  that  the  warrant  must 
point  out  the  place  of  meeting,  and  it  is  undoubtedly  essential  to  the 
validity  of  the  proceedings  that  the  inhabitants  assemble  at  that 
place.^^  But  in  the  absence  of  fraudulent  intent  the  courts  permit  a 
reasonable  adaptation  to  circumstances,  and  the  doings  of  a  gathering 
at  another  place  are  not  always  and  as  a  matter  of  law  illegal.  Thus, 
a  meeting  was  called  at  a  school  building  in  which  it  was  usually 
held,  and  the  clerk  having  lost  the  key  stationed  a  boy  at  the  door 
to  direct  persons  to  a  hall  where  the  proceedings  were  afterwards  con- 
ducted in  due  form  with  an  average  attendance.  An  election  at  this 
meeting  was  held  to  be  valid.'^^  When,  however,  there  is  evidence 
of  unfairness  or  oppression,  the  acts  of  parties  who  deviate  a  hair's 
breadth  from  the  strictly  legal  course  will  be  overthrown.  When, 
for  instance,  the  place  appointed  is  a  schoolhouse,  it  is  taken  to 
mean  within  its  walls;  and  a  few  persons,  including  the  town  clerk, 
who  meet  in  the  highway  in  front  of  the  building  and  formally  ad- 
journ to  a  distant  part  of  the  town,  whereby  other  citizens  are  de- 
signedly prevented  from  participating  in  the  transaction  of  impor- 
tant business,  will  have  only  their  trouble  for  their  pains.  Such 
conduct  would  not  be  tolerated  even  if  the  first  meeting  were  legally 
held.''^ 

§  371.  Organization  of  meeting — The  moderator. — The  business 
of  a  meeting  can  not  be  conducted  without  a  presiding  officer,  or 

^«  South  School  Dist.  v.  Blakeslee,  '^Wakefield  v.  Patterson,  25  Kan. 

13  Conn.  227.  709. 

"Chamberlain  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  ""Chamberlain  v.  Dover,  13  Maine 

13  Maine  466;   Wakefield  v.  Patter-  466.     See  also,  §  375,  post, 
son,  25  Kan.  709. 


351  MEETINGS   AND   ELECTIONS.  §    31.2 

"moderator,"  according  to  the  terminology  of  New  England  town 
meetings.'*'*  It  is  usually  made  the  duty  of  the  town  clerk,  by  statute, 
to  preside  until  a  moderator  is  chosen;  and  it  has  been  said  that  his 
duty  to  do  so  is  an  incident  to  his  office,  without  any  positive  require- 
ment.^^ It  is  not  necessary  that  a  moderator  be  elected  by  ballot 
or  be  sworn  unless  the  statute  prescribes  it.*"  And  where  he  neglects 
to  take  an  oath  as  provided  by  statute,  "whether  the  doings  of  towns 
can,  in  an}'  case,  be  held  void  on  that  account,  and  if  in  any  in  what 
cases,  may  be  questions  of  no  little  difficulty,"  to  quote  from  the 
opinion  of  the  court  in  an  early  New  Hampshire  case.  It  was  there 
held,  at  any  rate,  that  a  tax  collector  chosen  at  such  a  meeting  was 
a  good  de  facto  officer.*^  And,  likewise,  the  acts  of  a  moderator  ap- 
pointed in  violation  of  a  statute  requiring  a  check-list,  were  sus- 
tained on  the  principle  which  upholds  the  acts  of  de  facto  officers.** 
And  where  a  moderator  elected  at  an  annual  town  meeting  was  called 
without  another  election  to  preside  at  a  meeting  held  during  the 
year,  and  there  was  no  objection  on  the  part  of  any  one,  a  voter  who 
was  present  was  estopped  from  contesting  the  validity  of  the  pro- 
ceedings of  the  meeting.^ ^ 

§  372.  The  same  subject  continued — Clerk  and  clerk  pro  tem- 
pore.— The  town  clerk  is  the  proper  officer  to  record  the  doings  of 
a  meeting ;  but  the  fact  that  the  statute  provides  for  the  appointment 
of  a  clerk  when  there  is  a  vacancy  does  not  preclude  the  meeting  from 
appointing  a  clerk  pro  tempore  in  the  absence  of  the  regular  clerk;®® 
and  an  appointment  by  the  moderator  acquiesced  in  by  the  meeting 
will  be  an  appointment  by  the  meeting.  ^'^  Where  the  selectmen  with- 
out authority  appointed  a  clerk  pro  tempore,  who  thereupon  acted  as 

*"  Attorney-General  v.  Crocker,  138  cited  in  the  preceding  note  seem  to 

Mass.  214.     As  to  the  power  to  ad-  dispose   of   the   difficulty   suggested 

journ  before  appointing  a  modera-  in  Tucker  v.  Aiken,  7  N.  H.  113,  140, 

tor,  see  §  374,  post.  quoted   in  the   text.     As  to  the  ef- 

^'  Dodds   v.    Henry,    9    Mass.    262,  feet   of   a  protest   if   it  were   made 

holding  that  he  is  the  proper  person  when  the  moderator  first  assumed  to 

to  receive  and  count  the  votes  given  act,     qusere:      Attorney-General     v. 

for  moderator.  Crocker,  138  Mass.  214,  219. 

"Mitchell  V.  Brown,  18  N.  H.  315.  "'' Hutchinson  v.  Pratt,  11  Vt.  402; 

^Tucker  v.  Aiken,  7  N.   H.   113,  citing  Hawkins  P.  C.  18,  §  3.     See 

140.  also,  Hickok  v.  Town  of  Shelburne, 

***  Attorney-General  v.  Crocker,  138  41  Vt.  409.     There  can  not  be  a  rec- 

Mass.      214.     See      also.      Common-  ord  without  a  clerk:   Attorney-Gen- 

wealth  V.  Shaw,  7  Met.   (Mass.)   52,  eral  v.  Crocker,  138  Mass.  214. 

56.  "State  v.  McKee,  20  Or.  120;  s.  c. 

""  State   V.   Town   of  Vershire,   52  25  Pac.  292;  State  v.  Smith  (Or.),  25 

Vt.  41.    Cf.  State  v.  Harris,  52  Vt.  Pac.  389. 
216.     These    cases    and    the    cases 


373 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS. 


352 


such  with  the  acquiescence  of  the  meeting,  his  record  of  the  proceed- 
ings was  valid  as  the  act  of  an  officer  de  facto.^^  At  a  meeting  of  a 
school  society  a  clerk  pro  tempore  was  appointed  in  the  absence  of  the  , 
regular  clerk,  but  he  did  not  take  the  oath  of  office  provided  by  law 
until  some  months  afterward,  nor  make  any  record  of  the  business  of 
the  meeting  before  that  time,  and  then  only  from  memoranda  and 
recollection.  The  record  was  held  to  be  perfect.  The  court  said: 
"It  is  sufficient  if  the  oath  be  administered  before  the  official  acts 
required  of  the  clerk  are  performed,  so  that  those  acts  are  done  under 
its  influence  and  sanction.  Many  acts  of  public  meetings  must  of 
necessity  transpire  before  the  clerk  be  sworn;  such  as  the  choice 
of  a  presiding  officer  and  the  appointment  of  clerks  themselves.  It 
is  not  necessary  that  a  clerk  be  a  witness  of  the  proceedings  of  a  meet- 
ing under  his  official  oath;  it  is  sufficient  if  he  record  them  or  sanc- 
tion the  record  of  them  after  he  has  been  sworn."^^ 

§  373.  Adjournments  of  meetings. — When  a  meeting  is  fairly  or- 
ganized it  can  not  be  doubted  that  it  possesses  the  incidental  power  of 
adjournment  to  another  time  and  place,  unless  it  is  prohibited  by 
statute.^"     Wliere  the  voters  and  officers  by  unanimous  consent,  but 


^  Attorney-General  v.  Crocker,  138 
Mass.  214.  It  was  held  that  a  pro- 
test made  by  a  voter,  after  the  elec- 
tion of  town  officers  at  a  meeting 
where  such  a  clerk  acted,  "as  to  the 
legality  of  their  election,"  did  not 
show  that  he  was  not  reputed  to  be 
town  clerk.  The  court  refrained 
from  deciding  what  the  effect  would 
have  been  if  a  protest  had  been  dis- 
tinctly and  seasonably  made:  S.  C, 
p.  219. 

^^  Bartlett  v.  Kinsley,  15  Conn. 
327.  A  statute  requiring  a  record 
to  be  made  of  the  persons  sworn 
into  office  is  directory,  and  it  does 
not  prevent  the  fact  from  being  oth- 
erwise proved  when  there  is  no  such 
record.  So  held  where  the  record 
of  a  town  meeting  was  certified  by  a 
clerk  pro  tem.  whose  oath  of  office 
was  not  on  record :  Kellar  v.  Savage, 
17  Maine  444. 

**  "Nor  is  it  necessary  that  the  rec- 
ord should  state  any  reason  for  the 
adjournment.  The  voters  are  the 
sole  judges  of  that:"  Hathaway  v. 


Inhabitants  &c.,  48  Maine  440,  at  p. 
444.  It  is  a  measure  which  can  be 
taken  only  at  a  regular  meeting  held 
at  the  place  appointed  in  the  warn- 
ing: Chamberlain  v.  Inhabitants  &c., 
13  Maine  466.  A  statute  providing 
that  a  town  meeting  shall  be  held 
open  only  between  sunrise  and  sun- 
set does  not  require  it  to  be  kept 
open  from  the  rising  until  the  set- 
ting of  the  sun.  It  may  adjourn 
from  forenoon  to  afternoon:  People 
V.  Martin,  1  Seld.  (N.  Y.)  22,  hold- 
ing, further,  that  although  the  stat- 
ute prescribes  the  place  of  meeting 
it  is  competent  for  a  meeting  first 
convened  there  to  adjourn  to  anoth- 
er place;  citing  Goodel  v.  Baker,  8 
Cowen  (N.  Y.)  286.  Reasonable  pre- 
sumptions will  be  made  in  favor  of 
regularity  and  good  faith:  Converse 
V.  Porter,  45  N.  H.  385.  See  also, 
McDaniels  v.  Flower  Brook  &c.  Co., 
22  Vt.  274.  Adjournment  to  a  par- 
ticular day  can  not  be  proved  by 
parol;  it  must  appear  of  record: 
Taylor   v.    Henry,    2    Pick.    (Mass.) 


353  MEETINGS    AND    ELECTIONS.  §    374 

without  any  formal  adjournment  or  vote,  go  out  into  the  open  air 
in  front  of  the  place  of  meeting  for  greater  convenience,  and  there 
vote  without  objection  on  the  part  of  any  person,  and  no  one  is  preju- 
diced in  any  way,  tlie  action  is  legal. "^  A  town  meeting  called  to 
vote  aid  to  a  railroad  under  a  statute  which  requires  a  two-thirds 
vote  may  adjourn  by  a  majority  vote."- 

§  374.  The  same  subject  continued. — Where  the  town  clerk  presides 
at  the  opening  of  a  meeting,  though  it  is  not  competent  for  the  meet- 
ing to  transact  business  until  the  appointment  of  a  moderator,  it  may 
nevertheless  adjourn ;  and  so,  a  fortiori,  where  a  moderator  presides 
who  is  illegally  chosen."^  If  a  meeting  legally  held  is  adjourned  to 
another  day  without  specifying  the  hour,  the  proceedings  of  the  ad- 
journed meeting  are  invalid.  "Theoretically,  it  might  be  well  enough 
to  establish  it  as  a  general  rule  that  when  a  meeting  called  at  or  ad- 
journed to  a  particular  hour  votes  an  adjournment  without  naming 
any  hour,  it  shall  be  taken  to  be  the  same  hour  as  that  fixed  in  the 
warning  or  in  the  last  vote  for  adjournment  in  which  the  hour  is 
named.  We  are  inclined,  on  the  whole,  however,  to  think  that  the 
reasons  arising  from  a  consideration  of  the  practical  consequences 
likely  to  flow  from  the  one  rule  and  the  other  weigh  most  strongly 
in  favor  of  putting  the  vote  of  adjournment  upon  the  same  ground 
and  under  the  same  rule  as  has  already  been  established  in  the  case 
referred  to  above***  as  to  the  omission  in  the  warning  to  name  any 
hour  for  the  meeting.'"*^  But  where  at  a  March  meeting  it  was 
"voted  that  this  meeting  stand  adjourned  to  the  April  meeting,"  and 
it  was  shown  to  have  been  the  uniform  custom  for  fifty  years  to  hold 

397.     See  also,  Andrews  v.   Inhabi-  stating    that    any    vote    was    taken, 

tants  &c.,  110  Mass.  214.     And  where  sufficiently  shows  that  it  was  the  act 

the  record  shows  an  adjournment  to  of    the    meeting:    Hathaway   v.    In- 

another  place  and  proceedings  there  habitants   &c.,   48   Maine   440,   at   p. 

had   it  can   not  be   contradicted   by  444. 

parol   evidence   of   an    adjournment        "-  Inhabitants    &c.    v.     Smith,     65 

without    day:     Hunneman    v.    Fire  Maine  203. 

District,    37    Vt.    40.     "Recess"    and         "'Attorney-General     v.      Simonds, 

"adjournment"      are      synonymous:  111  Mass.  256. 

People  V.  Martin,  1  Seld.  (N.  Y.)  24,        '*  Sherwin  v.  Bugbee,  17  Vt.  337; 

27;   Ex  parte  Mirande,  73  Cal.  365;  s.  c.  16  Vt.  439. 

s.  c.  14  Pac.  888.  "'  Greenbanks  v.  Boutwell,  43  Vt. 

"  Brown    v.    Inhabitants    &c.,    79  207.     If  the   record   of  an   adjourn- 

Maiue  305;    s.  c.  9  Atl.  844;    citing  ment  omits  the  hour,  a  town  clerk 

Dale  v.  Irwin,  78  111.  170;  People  v.  chosen  at  the  adjourned  meeting  can 

Kniffin,  21  How.  Pr.   (N.  Y.)   42.     A  not  amend   it:    Taylor  v.   Henry,   2 

record  stating  that  the  meeting  "was  Pick,  (Mass.)  397,  402. 
then    adjourned    to,"    etc.,    without 

1    SiMlTH — 23 


§    375  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  354 

a  meeting  on  the  first  Monday  of  April,  it  was  decided  that  the  regu- 
lar April  meeting  called  by  an  independent  warrant  was  also  a  legal 
adjourned  meeting.'"' 

§  375.  The  power  of  adjournment  limited. — A  limit  to  the  power 
of  the  majority  to  adjourn  a  meeting  is  well  illustrated  in  a  Vermont 
case,  where  the  charter  made  it  imperative  on  a  village  at  every  annual 
meeting  to  elect  its  officers;  and  the  court  held  that  the  majority  of 
the  meeting  could  not  adjourn  the  same  without  day  in  fraud  of  the 
law  and  the  minority ;  and  that  if  a  legal  minority  immediately  follow- 
ing such  a  fraudulent  adjournment  reorganizes  the  meeting  and  elects 
officers  they  will  be  entitled  to  hold  their  offices.  "This  corporation 
is  governmental  in  its  functions,"  said  the  court,  "and  invested  with 
certain  powers,  rights  and  privileges  that  it  may  perform  the  duties 
cast  upon  it,  and  it  can  not  by  refusing  to  perform  those  duties  be 
permitted  to  defeat  the  provisions  and  purposes  of  the  law  of  its 
creation.  At  a  meeting  duly  constituted  and  organized  a  majority 
of  the  voters  present,  in  the  absence  of  any  statute  or  other  restrain- 
ing authority  to  the  contrary,  have  an  implied  right  to  adjourn  the 
meeting  to  another  time  and  place.  But  even  this  we  apprehend  must 
be  fairly  done  and  for  no  improper  purpose.  In  People  v.  Martin,"^* 
Paige,  J.,  says:  'I  think  that  the  power  of  adjourning  a  town  meet- 
ing to  another  time  and  place  may  under  peculiar  circumstances  be 
oppressively  exercised  and  lead  to  a  defeat  of  the  public  will.  This 
power  ought  not  to  be  exercised  except  in  a  case  of  extreme  necessity.' 
Chancellor  Kent,  in  speaking  of  cases  where  the  members  of  a  corpo- 
ration are  directed  to  be  but  are  not  annually  elected,  says  that  the 
omission  to  elect  does  not  take  away  the  power  incident  to  the  corpo- 
ration to  elect  afterwards,  when  the  annual  day  has  passed,  by  some 
means  free  from  design  or  fraud.  Now,  in  the  case  at  bar  it  was 
by  design  that  the  last  annual  meeting  was  adjourned  without  day, 
and  such  adjournment  was  a  fraud  both  upon  the  law  and  upon  the 
minority  who  were  in  favor  of  abiding  by  the  law.'"''^ 

§  376.  Adjourned  meetings. — It  is  too  well  settled  to  require  com- 
ment that  all  corporations,  whether  municipal  or  private,  may  tran- 

""Reed    v.     Inhabitants    &c.,    117  make  no  legal  adjournment  to  such 

Mass.  384.  a  time  as  would  defeat  the  perform- 

^s.  5  N.  Y.  24,  27.  ance  of  the  prescribed  duty,  and  the 

"'  Stone  v.  Small,  54  Vt.  498.    Row-  minority  might  keep  the  meeting  in 

ells,  J.,  concludes  his  opinion  on  this  existence   till   the   duty   was   done." 

point  by   quoting  from   Kimball   v.  See  also.  People  v.  Martin,  5  N.  Y. 

Marshall,  44  N.  H.   465    (see  §   283,  24,  27;    Chamberlain  v.   Inhabitants 

ante),  where  Bell,   C.  J.,  said  in  a  &c.,  13  Maine  466. 
similar  case: — "The  majority  could 


355  MEETINGS   AND    ELECTIONS.  §    377 

sact  any  business  at  an  adjourned  meeting  which  they  could  have  done 
at  the  original  meeting ;  it  is  but  a  continuation  of  the  same  meeting ; 
whether  the  meeting  is  continued  without  interruption  for  many 
days,  or  by  adjournment  from  day  to  day  or  from  time  to  time,  many 
days  intervening,  it  is  evident  it  must  be  considered  the  same  meeting 
without  any  loss  or  diminution  of  powers.^^  If  a  moderator  is  chosen 
at  the  original  meeting  in  violation  of  a  statute  requiring  a  check- 
list, all  that  is  done  while  he  presides  is  of  no  binding  force;  and  if 
town  officers  are  elected  ai  that  meeting,  the  town  may,  at  an  ad- 
journed meeting,  elect  a  moderator  regularly,  and  different  town 
officers,  who  will  be  entitled  to  their  offices  as  against  those  claiming 
under  the  first  election.^''  On  the  other  hand,  an  adjourned  meeting 
has  no  more  authority  than  the  original  meeting ;  if  the  latter  be  void 
for  want  of  legal  notice,  or  otherwise,  no  capacity  can  be  acquired  by 
adjournment  ;^*'°  in  otjier  words,  there  can  be  no  increase  of  mo- 
mentum without  the  application  of  new  force. 

g  377.    Reconsideration   and   rescission — The   general   rule. — The 

general  rule  is  settled  beyond  dispute  that  action  taken  by  a  town 
meeting  may  be  reconsidered  and  rescinded  at  the  same  meeting, 
or  at  any  adjourned  or  any  other  subsequent  meeting.^"^    And  a  vote 

'*  Warner   v.    Mower,    11   Vt.    385,  held  insufficient.     But  in  that  case 

391;    Inhabitants   &c.    v.    Smith,    65  the  record  of  the  original  meeting 

Maine  203.     "A  regular  and  proper  did  not  show  an  adjournment  which 

adjournment  of  a  town  is  a  continu-  was,  in  fact,  taken, 

ation  of  the  same  meeting:"  Attor-  ""Attorney-General     v.     Simonds, 

ney-General   v.    Simonds,    111    Mass.  Ill  Mass.  256. 

256.  An  adjourned  meeting  of  a  ""  United  States  v.  McKelden,  Mac- 
special  meeting  may  transact  busi-  Arth.  &  M.  162;  Sherwin  v.  Bugbee, 
ness  under  the  original  call:  Hickok  16  Vt.  439;  s.  c.  17  Vt.  337. 
V.  Town  of  Shelburne,  41  Vt.  409.  '"'Marsh  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  153 
See  also,  Reed  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  117  Mass.  34;  s.  c.  26  N.  E.  412;  Parker 
Mass.  384,  331;  Withington  v.  In-  v.  Titcomb,  82  Maine  180;  s.  c.  19 
habitants  &c.,  8  Gush.  (Mass.)  66;  Atl.  162;  Hunneman  v.  Inhabitants 
Hunneman  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  10  &c.,  10  Met.  (Mass.)  454,  456;  Bel- 
Met.  (Mass.)  454.  The  record  of  a  fast  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  62 
vote  stating  that  it  was  passed  "at  Maine  148;  Mitchell  v.  Brown,  18  N, 
a  meeting,"  etc.,  "legally  holden  by  H.  315;  Getchell  v.  Inhabitants  &c., 
adjournment,"  is  sufficient  prima  55  Maine  433;  George  v.  Inhabitants 
facie  evidence  that  it  was  a  legal  &c.,  6  Met.  (Mass.)  497;  Eddy  v.  Wil- 
meeting:  Brownell  v.  Palmer,  22  son,  43  Vt.  362;  Stackhouse  v.  Clark, 
Conn.  107.  See,  however,  Taylor  v.  52  N.  J.  L.  291;  s.  c.  19  Atl.  462; 
Henry,  2  Pick.  (Mass.)  397,  where  a  Withington  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  8 
record  of  doings  "at  an  adjourned  Cush.  (Mass.)  66.  Of  course,  such 
meeting,"  without  showing  of  what  action,  to  be  effective,  must  be  with- 
meeting  it  was  an  adjournment,  was  in  the  scope  of  the  warning.     See 


§  378  PUBLIC  cocroRATiONS.  356 

not  to  reconsider  a  previous  vote  taken  at  the  same  meeting  does  not 
abridge  the  power  of  future  meetings  over  that  vote.^°^  Where  there 
is  a  vote  in  the  negative  the  voters  may  nevertheless  at  the  same  or 
any  other  meeting  rescind  the  vote  and  pass  measures  in  the  afhrma- 
tive;"^  or  they  may  take  inconsistent  action  without  formally  re- 
scinding the  vote:^***  if  the  votes  are  repugnant  the  former  is  re- 
scinded by  implication.^"'^  Where  the  law  requires  the  assent  of  a 
town  to  be  indicated  by  a  two-thirds  vote,  a  proposal  passed  by  the 
requisite  number  may  be  reconsidered  by  a  bare  majority  of  the 
voters  before  it  has  become  binding  by  the  acceptance  of  the  party 
to  whom  it  is  made.^°®  When  a  motion  to  reconsider  a  vote  is 
adopted  the  vote  ceases  to  have  any  effect,  just  as  if  it  had  never 
been  passed.^**^ 

§  378.  The  same  subject  considered — Illustrations. — A  town  au- 
thorized by  the  legislature  to  subscribe  to  the  capital  stock  of  a  rail- 
road and  voting  to  do  so  at  a  lawful  meeting  may  at  a  subsequent 
meeting  rescind  the  vote  if  the  rights  of  third  parties  have  not  inter- 
vened and  nothing  has  been  done  under  the  original  vote.^°^  So, 
also,  where  the  voters  at  any  legally  called  meeting  were  authorized 
to  appropriate  a  certain  sum  for  building  a  schoolhouse,  which  they 
accordingly  did,  but  at  a  subsequent  meeting  the  resolution  was 
rescinded,  it  was  held  that  they  might,  at  a  still  later  meeting,  make 
the  appropriation.^''^  After  a  vote  to  levy  a  tax  has  been  reconsidered 
the  collector  can  not  lawfully  proceed  to  collect  it.^^"  A  town  voted 
to  let  an  inhabitant,  who  sent  his  children  to  school  in  another  town, 
"draw  his  proportion  of  school  money,"  and  reconsidered  this  vote 
before  the  money  was  paid.     It  was  held  that  assumpsit  could  not  be 

§  383  et  seq.,  post,  and  also  §  307  et  could  not,  by  a  mere  majority,  vote 

seq.;    ante,    relating   to    reconsidera-  to  waive  the  condition:  Portland  &c. 

tion  and  rescission  by  public  boards.  R.  Co.  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  58  Maine 

"'-  Hunneman    v.    Inhabitants   &c.,  23. 

10  Met.  (Mass.)  454,  457.  ^"' Withington   v.    Inhabitants  &c., 

"^Stackhouse  v.  Clark,  52  N.  J.  L.  8  Cush.  (Mass.)  66;  Stoddard  v.  Gil- 

291;  s.  c.  19  Atl.  462.  man,  22  Vt.  568. 

^'*  Eddy  v.  Wilson,  43  Vt.  362.  "^  "If,   therefore,   the   town   when 

^*  George  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  6  Met.  clothed  with  an  optional  power  may 

(Mass.)  497.  rescind  action  once  taken  in  its  cus- 

100  Perhaps   even   a   minority   con-  ternary  municipal  affairs,  no  reason 

sisting     of     more     than     one-third  can  be  assigned  why  it  may  not.  un- 

might  do  so:    Belfast  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  der  like  circumstances,  do  the  same 

Inhabitants     &c.,     62      Maine     148.  under  a  grant  of  power  unusual  in 

Where  a  vote  to  issue  bonds  to  a  its     municipal     affairs:"     Estey    v. 

railroad   was   passed    by  the   neces-  Starr,  56  Vt.  690,  693. 

sary  two-thirds,  with  a  condition  an-  '°^  Sanford  v.  Prentice,  28  Wis.  358. 

nexed   to  it,  a   subsequent  meeting  "°  Stoddard  v.  Oilman,  22  Vt.  568. 


357  MEETINGS    AXD   ELECTIONS.  §    ?uO 

maintained  ao^ainst  tho  town  for  the  amount  of  taxes  assessed  njmn 
and  ])aid  by  him  for  the  support  of  sehools.^^^  Under  autliority  to 
divide,  unite  and  alter  school  districts  from  time  to  time,  wlicn 
deemed  necessary,  a  town  at  an  annual  meeting  set  one  district  over 
to  another.  It  was  competent  at  a  subsequent  meeting  to  rescind  the 
vote  and  reinstate  the  district.^^- 

§  379.  The  same  subject  continued — The  rule  qualified. — The 
power  to  reconsider  and  rescind  is  subject  to  several  just  and  neces- 
sary qualifications.  If  a  vote  of  the  town  has  given  a  cause  of  action 
against  it,  no  subsequent  proceedings  can  impair  or  destroy  this 
vested  right.^^^  Thus,  the  appointment  of  a  committee  to  make  a 
contract  on  behalf  of  the  town  can  not  be  reconsidered  and  the  au- 
thority of  the  committee  withdrawn  so  as  to  avoid  an  intervening 
contract.  ^^*  A  resolution  which  constitutes  an  acknowledgment  so  as 
to  take  a  debt  out  of  the  statute  of  limitations  can  not  be  taken  back 
and  the  claim  brought  within  the  bar  of  the  statute."^  And,  gen- 
erally, rights  of  third  parties  resting  on  a  vote  can  not  be  divested  by 
rescission.^ ^"^  Again,  if  a  vote  has  accomplished  its  purpose  and 
worked  out  the  intended  result,  its  force  is  spent,  and  an  attempt  to 
reconsider  it  is  futile.  For  instance,  a  statute  required  each  town 
at  its  annual  meeting  to  vote  on  the  question  of  abolishing  the  school 
-district  system  and  adopting  the  town  system,  and  that  the  result  of 
the  vote  should  be  certified  to  the  secretary  of  state.  At  a  town 
meeting  the  first  vote  was  a  tie,  and  another  was  taken  at  the  same 
meeting  resulting  in  the  abolition  of  the  district  system.  It  was 
held  that  the  vote  first  taken  was  final  and  conclusive,  and  exhausted 
the  authority  of  the  town  in  the  premises,  and  that  an  election  of 
officers  of  the  town  system  was  illegal. ^^^ 

"^  Withington   v.   Inhabitants  &c.,  tee  directed  not  to  proceed  till  the 

8  Cush.   (Mass.)   66.  meeting  was  dissolved:"  Hunneman 

"'Bill  v.  Dow,  56  Vt.  562.  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  10  Met.    (Mass.) 

"'  Hall     v.     Inhabitants    &c.,     116  454,  456.    Cf.  Damon  v.  Inhabitants 

Mass.  172;  Nelson  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  &c.,  2  Pick.  (Mass.)  345. 

7  Pick.    (Mass.)    18.     A  vote  ratify-  "'Sanborn     v.     School     Dist.,     12 

ing  the  doings  of  selectmen  in  bor-  Minn.  17. 

rowing  money  and  giving  a  note  ""  Where  an  unauthorized  pay- 
therefor  in  behalf  of  the  town  can  ment  by  a  town  treasurer  was  rati- 
not  be  rescinded  at  a  subsequent  fled  it  could  not  be  rescinded  and 
meeting:  Brown  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  the  amount  recovered  from  him: 
79  Maine  305;  s.  c.  9  Atl.  844.  Inhabitants  &c.  v.  Peirce,  122  Mass. 

"*  Not  even  at  an  adjourned  meet-  270. 
ing.     "To  have  been  affected  by  the  "'State  v.  Adams,  58  Vt.  634;  s.  c. 
adjournment     the     subject     should  4  Atl.  228.     See  also,  Parker  v.  Tit- 
have  been  suspended  or  the  commit-  comb,  82  Maine  180;  s.  c.  19  Atl.  162. 


380 


rUBLIC    CORPORATIONS. 


358 


§  380.  Ratification  of  doings  of  invalid  meetings. — "V^Hicre  the 
doings  of  a  town  nuH'tiiig  arc  invalid  by  reason  of  a  defoctive  warn- 
ing, or  are  lacking  in  some  technical  requisite,  a  subsequent  meeting 
may  supersede  the  vitiating  effect  of  such  irregularities  by  ratifi- 
cation.^^** A  vote  at  an  illegal  meeting  which  has  been  spread  upon 
the  records  may  be  expressly  referred  to  in  such  a  way  as  to  become 
part  of  a  vote  at  a  subsequent  valid  meeting.  ^^^  But  the  courts  are 
altogether  averse  to  an  implied  ratification;  and  a  resolution  adopting 
previous  defective  proceedings  will  have  effect  only  to  the  precise 
extent  indicated  by  its  terms. ^-'*  "Thus,  a  vote  to  reconsider  certain 
votes  passed  at  a  former  meeting  does  not  recognize  the  validity  of 
other  acts  of  the  same  meeting  ;^-^  and  a  vote  not  to  rescind  certain 


A  school  district  voted  to  raise 
money,  and  it  became  the  duty  of 
the  clerk  to  certify  the  vote  to  the 
selectmen,  who  were  thereby  re- 
quired to  assess  a  tax  for  the 
amount.  At  a  subsequent  meeting 
the  selectmen  not  having  assessed 
the  tax  a  motion  was  made  to  re- 
consider, which  the  moderator  re- 
fused to  put  to  vote.  At  a  later 
meeting  it  was  voted  to  reconsider, 
but  in  the  meanwhile  the  tax  had 
been  assessed.  Held,  that  the  action 
of  the  moderator  was  unwarrant- 
able, but  it  did  not  operate  to  re- 
verse or  impair  the  vote  to  raise  the 
money;  and  the  vote  to  reconsider 
was  of  no  effect,  because  the  assess- 
ment had  intervened:  Mitchell  v. 
Brown,  18  N.  H.  315. 

"*  But  this  can  not  be  proved  by 
parol:  Jordan  v.  School  Dist.,  38 
Maine  164;  and  the  meeting  must  be 
duly  warned.  "The  vote  of  those 
who  attend  a  town  meeting  being  of 
no  validity  against  the  town  or  its 
inhabitants  unless  the  object  of  the 
vote  is  set  forth  in  the  notice  or 
warning  of  the  meeting,  the  town 
can  no  more  ratify  an  act  after- 
wards than  authorize  it  beforehand, 
except  by  a  vote  passed  pursuant  to 
a  previous  notice  specifying  the  ob- 
ject. Without  the  indispensable  pre- 
requisite of  such  a  notice  those  pres- 


ent at  a  meeting  have  no  greater 
power  to  bind  the  town  indirectly 
by  ratification  or  estoppel  than  they 
have  to  bind  it  directly  by  an  origi- 
nal vote:"  Per  Justice  Gray,  in 
Bloomfield  v.  Charter  Oak  Bank,  121 
U.  S.  121;  s.  c.  7  S.  Ct.  865.  This  is 
the  same  principle  that  controls  in 
the  well-settled  doctrine  that  acts 
absolutely  ultra  vires  can  not  be 
ratified.  See  chapter  on  Liability 
of  the  Corporation  for  Acts  of  its 
Officers  and  Agents.  Ex  nihilo  nihil 
fieri  potest. 

""Inhabitants  &c.  v.  Smith,  65 
Maine  203,  at  p.  207. 

^-°  Hamilton  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  55 
Maine  193.  In  Southard  v.  Inhabit- 
ants &c.,  53  Maine  389,  391,  the 
court  said: — "We  can  not  presume 
the  town  intended  to  ratify  the  pro- 
ceedings of  a  meeting  not  legally 
called.  If  such  was  the  intention 
of  the  town,  it  should  have  used 
language  so  clear  and  explicit  that 
there  could  be  no  doubt  of  its  pur- 
pose." 

'^^  "It  should  have  been  one  of  the 
articles  in  the  warrant  to  see  wheth- 
er the  town  would  ratify  those  do- 
ings and  an  affirmative  vote  had 
thereon  before  they  could  be  con- 
firmed so  as  to  be  binding  on  the 
town:"  Chamberlain  v.  Inhabitants 
&c.,  13  Maine  466,  474. 


359  MEETINGS    AND   ELECTIONS.  §    381 

doings  does  not  give  tliom  any  efficac-y.''^-  Where  a  town  voted, 
at  a  meeting  not  legally  held,  to  aeeept  the  provisions  of  an  act 
abolishing  school  districts,  and  afterwards,  at  a  meeting  called  under 
an  article  'Ho  see  if  the  town  will  reconsider  their  action"  relating 
to  school  districts  under  the  act,  specifying  it,  "and  return  to  the  old 
school-district  system,"  it  was  voted  that  this  article  be  indefinitely 
postponed,  it  did  not  legalize  the  action  of  the  previous  meeting.  ^'^ 

§  381.  Parliamentary  law  in  town  meetings. — "With  the  excep- 
tion of  the  election  of  those  officers  which  the  statute  prescribes  shall 
be  elected  by  ballot,  all  or  nearly  all  of  the  functions  of  a  towai  meeting 
are  such  as  pertain  to  a  deliberative  body  or  assembly.  The  subjects 
upon  which  a  town  meeting  may  take  action  are  numerous  and  di- 
versified. The  course  of  procedure  wdiich  is  to  be  pursued  is  not  fully 
mai'ked  out  by  statute,  and  I  deem  it  only  safe  to  say  that  when  the 
statute  does  not  give  direction  the  general  rules  of  parliamentary 
law,  so  far  as  they  may  be  applicable,  should  be  observed  and  enforced 
in  conducting  the  business  of  a  town  meeting.  It  will  necessarily 
follow  that  propositions  upon  which  the  town  meeting  may  lawfully 
act  may  be  submitted  to  it  by  motion  or  resolution  or  in  the  form  of 
proposed  by-laws  or  orders  by  any  elector  of  the  town  for  the  con- 
sideration of  the  meeting.  It  also  follows  from  such  application  of 
the  rules  of  parliamentary  law  that  the  chairman  of  the  meeting  can 
not  prevent  action  upon  any  subject  within  the  power  conferred  upon 
the  meeting  by  neglecting  or  refusing  to  present  the  same  to  the  meet- 
ing for  its  action."^^*  It  has  also  been  said,  however,  that  "the  tech- 
nical rules  of  a  legislative  body,  framed  for  its  own  convenient  action 
and  government,  are  not  of  binding  force  on  towns  unless  such  rules 
have  been  so  acted  upon  and  enforced  by  the  town  in  their  regular 

meetings  as  to  create  a  law  for  themselves  and  binding  on  the  in- 
habitants."!" 

§  382.  The  same  subject  continued — Illustrations. — A  school-dis- 
trict meeting  voted  to  dismiss  an  article  in  the  w^arrant  and  after- 

'""The  immunity  of  the  district  46  N.  H.  411;  and,  for  a  relaxation 
was  perfect;  no  subsequent  inaction  of  the  rule  where  the  town  has  ac- 
could  affect  it;  it  could  be  taken  quired  property  in  pursuance  of  de- 
from  it  only  by  positive  vote  upon  fective  votes,  Greenbanks  v.  Bout- 
clear    notice    that    it    would    pay:"  well,  43  Vt.  207. 

Wright  v.  North  School  Dist.,  53  ^*  Per  Lyon,  J.,  in  State  v.  David- 
Conn.  576.     See  also,  Brooklyn  Trust  son,  32  Wis.  114. 

Co.  v.  Town  of  Hebron,  51  Conn.  22,  ^-^  Hunneman    v.    Inhabitants    &c., 

a  strong  case.  10  Met.  (Mass.)  454,  457 — not  a  very 

^^^  Child  v.  Colburn,  54  N.  H.   71.  perspicuous     statement.     See     also. 

See  also,  Rollins  v.  Town  of  Chester,  §  306,  ante. 


§    383  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  360 

ward  passed  a  vote  which  was  not  germane  to  any  article  except  the 
one  dismissed.  For  that  and  another  reason  the  court  held  the  vote 
to  be  invalid.^-®  A  motion  was  put  to  vote  and  rejected.  Afterwards 
an  amendment  was  passed,  but  the  original  resolution  was  not  again 
submitted  to  the  meeting.  It  was  adjudged  that  it  could  not  be 
amended  without  a  reconsideration  and  therefore  there  was  no  vote.^^^ 
Although  in  strict  parliamentary  law  the  acceptance  of  the  report  of 
a  committee  will  not  be  an  affirmance  by  the  constituent  body  of  the 
matters  contained  in  it,  yet  when  a  matter  is  referred  to  a  recognized 
permanent  department  of  a  municipal  corporation,  like  selectmen, 
with  authority  to  take  or  propose  some  definite  action  on  the  subject, 
and  they  make  a  report  accordingly  without  suggesting  any  separate 
vote  or  resolution  for  more  effectually  carrying  the  measure  into 
effect,  a  vote  accepting  the  report  has  been  deemed  of  itself  an  adapta- 
tion and  execution  of  the  measure  proposed.^-®  Where  there  was  a 
spontaneous  adjournment  of  a  meeting  to  the  open  air,  without  a 
vote,  the  court  in  approving  the  proceeding  invoked  the  maxim  of 
parliamentary  law  that  anything  as  to  the  mode  of  action  may  be  done 
by  unanimous  consent. ^-^ 

§  383.  Validity  of  votes  as  determined  by  the  warrant —  Illustra- 
tions.— The  measure  of  exactness  which  the  law  requires  in  specifying 
the  subject-matter  in  a  warrant  has  already  been  discussed  in  general 
terms,  and  is  now  reverted  to  for  the  purpose  of  showing  a  few  illus- 
trations of  the  well-recognized  rules.  A  liberal  construction  has 
always  been  given  to  the  language  of  warrants  so  as  to  include  all 
that  is  properly,  even  if  incidentally,  embraced  in  the  subject  to  which 
they  relate,  and  the  articles  they  contain  are  mere  abstracts  or  heads 
of  the  propositions  to  be  laid  before  the  inhabitants.^^"  The  question 
of  granting  money  need  not  be  distinctly  set  forth  if  the  subject- 
matter  to  be  acted  on  be  one  which  is  likely  to  require  an  appropria- 
tion.^^^     Thus,  a  tax  may  be  voted  under  an  article  "to  see  what 

""  On    this    point    the    court    re-  ^^  Brown  v.  Winterport,  79  Maine 

marked  that  "no  attempt  appears  to  305,  311;  s.  c.  9  Atl.  844. 

have   been   made  to   reconsider  the  ""  Commonwealth    v.    Wentworth, 

vote     dismissing     the     .     .     .     arti-  145  Mass.  50,  52;  s.  c.  12  N.  E.  845, 

cle:"   Holbrook  v.   Faulliner,   55   N.  "These   municipal   divisions   of   the 

H.  311.    Cf.  Eddy  v.  Wilson,  43  Vt.  state   [school  districts]   are  created 

362,  and  George  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  to  work  out  beneficial  results  to  the 

6  Met.    (Mass.)   497,  cited  in  §  377,  people  in  education  and  other  vital 

ante.  mattei's    to    the    well-being    of    the 

^^  Stuart  V.  Town  of  Warren,  37  state,  and  their  acts  should  not  be 

Conn.  225.  too  sharply  criticized:"    Hubbard  v. 

'^Niles  V.  Patch,  13  Gray  (Mass.)  Newton,  52  Vt.  346. 

254,   261.     See   also,   Hark   v.   Glad-  "'  Blackburn  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  9 

well,  49  Wis.  172;  s.  c.  5  N.  W.  323.  Pick.  (Mass.)  97. 


361  MEETIXGS  AXD  ELECTIONS.  §  384 

method  the  district  will  take  to  pay  the  expense"  of  the  school  ;^^- 
and  an  article  "to  see  what  measures  the  town  will  take  to  build"  a 
bridge,  "or  any  matters  and  things  relating  thereto,"  will  authorize 
the  raising  of  money  for  that  purpose.^^^  A  tax  may  be  laid  under 
a  warrant  "to  take  into  consideration  the  expediency  of  raising  money 
for  the  use  of  schools  ;"^^*  and  a  warrant  "to  see  if  the  town  would 
make  an  appropriation  towards  purchasing  a  fire-engine"  is  sufficient 
authority  for  a  vote  "to  raise  and  appropriate"  a  sum  for  that  pur- 
pose. ^^^  Under  a  warrant  to  raise  money  by  a  tax  the  town  may 
instruct  the  collector  to  pay  it  to  the  selectmen,  although  it  is  the 
usual  course  to  pay  it  to  the  town  treasurer.^^'^ 

§  384.  The  same  subject  continued. — A  public  act  authorizing 
town  aid  to  railroads  need  not  be  noticed  in  the  warrant  to  see  if  the 
town  will  vote  such  aid.^^^  So,  also,  "to  see  if  the  town  will  vote  to 
subscribe  for  and  hold  shares  in  the  capital  stock  of"  the  road;  "to 
see  if  the  town  will  vote  to  become  an  associate  for  the  formation  of 
the"  road;  and  "to  see  what  action  the  town  will  take  in  regard  to 
raising  money  to  aid  in  building"  the  road, — will  support  a  vote  au- 
thorizing a  committee  to  borrow  money  and  gives  notes  and  bonds 
therefor.^^®  On  the  other  hand,  if  a  public  act  conferring  authority 
is  referred  to  by  title,  page  and  chapter,  its  provisions  need  not  be 
recited. ^^^  And  a  subscription  for  stock  is  within  the  scope  of  the 
warrant  "to  see  if  the  town  will  loan  its  credit  to  aid  in  the  con- 
struction of  the  railroad."^**'  An  agent  to  build  a  road  may  be  ap- 
pointed under  a  warrant  "to  choose  all  necessary  town  officers."^*^ 
Where  a  warrant  was  to  see  if  the  town  would  raise  money  to  pay  the 
bounty  "promised"  to  soldiers,  a  vote  to  pay  the  bounty  "offered"  to 
soldiers  followed  the  warning.^*'  A  town  may  vote  to  unite  two  exist- 
ing districts  under  an  article  of  the  warrant  "to  see  if  the  town  will 
alter  the  boundaries  of  any  of  the  school  districts."^*^     In  a  warning 

^^-  Chandler  v.  Bradish,  23  Vt.  416.  '''  Kittredge    v.     Inhabitants    &c., 

i33Foj.(j  y_  Clough,  8  Maine  334.  138  Mass.  286. 

^^Bartlett    v.    Kinsley,    15    Conn.  ^^^  Child  v.  Colburn,  54  N.  H.  71. 

327.  See  also,  Birge  v.  Berlin  Iron  Bridge 

'=5  But  if  the  warrant  had  been  to  Co.,  16  N.  Y.  S.  596;  s.  c.  62  Hun  (N. 

see  if  the  town  would  appropriate  to  Y.)   618   (mem.). 

a   specific  object  money  already  in  ""  Belfast  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Inhabitants 

the  treasury,  it  seems  the  town  could  &c.,  60  Maine  568. 

not  have  laid  a  tax  for  that  purpose:  "^  He  is  not  strictly  a  town  officer: 

Torrey  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  21  Pick.  Baker  v.  Shepard,  24  N.  H.  208. 

(Mass.)  64.  "=  Blodgett  V.  Holbrook,  39  Vt.  336. 

''"  Alger  V.  Curry,  40  Vt.  437.  "'  Converse  v.  Porter,  45  N.  H.  385. 

"'  Inhabitants    &c.    v.    Smith,    65 
Maine  203. 


385 


PUBLIC  CORPORATIONS. 


dG2 


to  act  upon  the  acceptance  of  a  town  way  a  general  description  of  the 
way  is  sufficient.^**  A  vote  to  purchase  hmd  for  a  schoolhouse  is  sus- 
tained by  an  article  of  the  warrant  "to  see  wdiat  measures  the  district 
will  take  in  relation  to  building  a  schoolhouse."^*'^  Many  other  cases 
where  votes  have  been  tested  by  the  warrant  and  declared  valid  are 
cited  in  the  note.^*® 

§  385.  Invalidity  of  votes — Illustrations. — The  subject-matter 
being  plainly  referred  to  may  properly  include  authority  to  act  upon 
minute  specifications  and  particulars  included  and  necessarily  in- 
volved in  it,  which  need  not  be  in  particular  terms  enumerated. ^*^ 
But  when  the  main  proposition  is  narrow  and  restrictive  it  can  not  be 
extended.  Thus,  where  a  town  meeting  voted  to  dispense  with  an 
article  in  the  warrant  providing  for  bounties  to  men  who  were  drafted 
between  certain  dates,  and  voted  a  bounty  to  all,  it  was  held  that  a 
subsequent  meeting,  called  to  see  if  the  town  would  ratify  "the  vote 
or  article"  of  the  previous  meeting  to  pay  a  bounty  to  those  described 
in  the  rejected  article,  could  not  legally  appropriate  money  for  any 


^"  State  V.  Beeman,  35  Maine  242. 

"=Dix  V.  School  Dist,  22  Vt.  309. 

""  Brown  v.  Inhabitants  &c,  79 
Maine  305;  s.  c.  9  Atl.  844;  Daven- 
port V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  10  Maine 
317;  Drisko  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  75 
Maine  73 ;  Sawyer  v.  Manchester  &c. 
R.  Co.,  62  N.  H.  135;  Tucker  v. 
Aiken,  7  N.  H.  113;  Moore  v.  Beattie, 
33  Vt.  219;  Hubbard  v.  Newton,  52 
Vt.  346;  Weeks  v.  Batchelder,  41  Vt. 
317;  Ovitt  v.  Chase,  37  Vt.  196; 
Hickok  V.  Town  of  Shelburne,  41  Vt. 
409;  Kittredge  v.  Town  of  Walden, 
40  Vt.  211;  Hunneman  v.  Fire  Dist., 
37  Vt.  40;  Hall  v.  School  Dist,  46 
Vt.  19;  Commonwealth  v.  Went- 
worth,  145  Mass.  50,  52;  s.  c.  12  N.  E. 
845;  Matthews  v.  Inhabitants  &c., 
131  Mass.  521;  s.  c.  134  Mass.  555; 
Inhabitants  &c.  v.  Searle,  127  Mass. 
502;  Reed  v.  Inhabitants  &c..  117 
Mass.  384;  Whitney  v.  Inhabitants 
&c..  Ill  Mass.  368;  Sherman  v.  Tor- 
rey,  99  Mass.  472;  Grover  v.  Inhabit- 
ants &c.,  11  Allen  (Mass.)  88; 
Rideout  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  1  Allen 
(Mass.)  232;  Fuller  v.  Inhabitants 
&c.,  11  Gray  (Mass.)  340;  Hadsell  v. 


Inhabitants  &c.,  3  Gray  (Mass.)  526; 
Avery  v.  Stewart,  1  Cush.  (Mass.) 
496;  Kingsbury  v.  School  Dist.,  12 
Met.  (Mass.)  99;  Haven  v.  City  of 
Lowell,  5  Met.  (Mass.)  35;  Williams 
v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  21  Pick.  (Mass.) 
75;  Blackburn  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  9 
Pick.  (Mass.)  97;  Seabury  v.  How- 
land,  15  R.  I.  446;  s.  c.  8  Atl.  341; 
South  School  Dist.  v.  Blakeslee,  13 
Conn.  227;  People  v.  Board  of  Edu- 
cation, 1  N.  Y.  S.  593;  s.  c.  48  Hun 
(N.  Y.)  618;  State  v.  Trustees  &c., 
52  N.  J.  L.  104;  s.  c.  18  Atl.  683; 
Briggs  V.  Borden,  71  Mich.  87;  s.  c. 
38  N.  W.  712;  Mason  v.  Kennedy,  89 
Mo.  23;  s.  c.  14  S.  W.  514;  Williams- 
town  &c.  School  Dist.  V.  Webb,  89 
Ky.  264;  s.  c.  12  S.  W.  298;  Reynolds 
Land  &c  Co.  v.  McCabe,  72  Tex.  57; 
s.  c.  12  S.  W.  165;  People  v.  Sisson, 
98  111.  335. 

"'  Pittsburg  V.  Danf  orth,  56  N.  H. 
272.  If  the  warning  has  been  re- 
corded a  copy  of  the  record  is  the 
usual  evidence;  the  original  need 
not  be  produced:  Commonwealth  v. 
Shaw,  7  Met.  (Mass.)  52. 


363  MEETINGS    AXD    ELECTIONS.  §    386 

except  those  persons  wlio  came  within  the  description  in  the  rejected 
article. ^''■^  The  method  as  well  as  the  object  of  raising  money  is  a 
matter  of  substantial  interest  to  the  taxpayers,  and  a  vote  to  borrow 
money  can  not  be  founded  on  a  proposition  to  levy  a  tax.^*^  Sweep- 
ing clauses,  such  as  "to  do  other  town  business,"  are  entirely  nugatory 
and  do  not  extend  the  scope  of  the  specifications  preceding  tliem.^^'^ 

§  386.  The  same  subject  continued. — A  meeting  warned  to  con- 
sider "the  question  of  raising  money,"  etc.,  "for  school  purposes  for 
the  ensuing  year,"  can  not  vote  money  for  the  purpose  of  building 
a  high-school  building.^^^  An  article  "to  see  if  said  town  vrill  accept 
and  adopt  the  report  of  the  committee  to  alter  school  districts"  au- 
thorizes such  alterations  as  the  committee  recommend  and  no 
others.^^^  It  seems  that  a  meeting  called  "to  take  action  with  regard 
to  rescinding  the  doings"  of  a  former  illegal  meeting  can  not  vote  to 
ratify.^^^  An  article  in  the  warrant  "to  see  if  the  town  will  vote  to 
pay  the  same  bounty  to  those  who  may  enlist,"  etc.,  "as  is  now  paid 
to  those  who  enlisted,"  etc.,  docs  not  authorize  a  vote  to  pay  a  larger 
bounty.  ^^*  A  school-district  meeting  was  called  "for  the  purpose  of 
obtaining  information  with  regard  to  the  recent  assessments  upon  the 
property  of  the  district."  At  the  meeting  a  vote  was  passed  appoint- 
ing a  committee  to  make  the  investigation,  with  power  to  employ  coun- 
sel. It  was  held  that  the  district  was  not  liable  for  the  services  of 
counsel  who  instituted  legal  proceedings. ^^^  Other  cases  where  the 
doings  of  meetings  have  been  pronounced  to  be  extraneous  to  the  pur- 
poses specified  in  the  warrant,  and  therefore  invalid,  are  cited  in  the 
note.^^^ 

"^Pittsburg  V.  Danforth,  56  N.  H.  ^^^ Allen  v.  City  of  Burlington,  45 

272.  Vt.  202. 

i*»  Blush  V.  Town  of  Colchester,  39  ^'•'-  Wyley  v.  Wilson,  44  Vt.  404. 

Vt.  193 ;  Atwood  v.  Town  of  Lincoln,  ^^  Wright   v.    North    School    Dist, 

44  Vt.  332.  53  Conn.  576;  s.  c.  5  Atl.  708. 

^^'Hayden  v.  Noyes,  5  Conn.  391;  "^Austin    v.    Inhabitants    &c.,    57 

Baldwin    v.    Town    of    North    Bran-  Maine  304. 

ford,  32  Conn.  47;    Hunt  v.   School  ^^=  Wright   v.    North    School    Dist., 

Dist,  14  Vt.  300;    Child  v.  Colburn,  53  Conn.  576;  s.  c.  5  Atl.  708. 

54  N.  H.  71.     Although  a  meeting  be  '""  Inhabitants    &c.    v.     Pease,     19 

duly  warned  for  some  purposes,  ix  a  Maine  184;  Allen  v.  City  of  Burling- 

vote  is  had   upon  some  subject  not  ton,  45  Vt.  202;   Rollins  v.  Town  of 

specified  in  the  warning,  as  to  that  Chester,  46  N.  H.  411;   Wood  v.  In- 

vote  the  meeting  is  void:   Pinney  v.  habitants,    11    Cush.     (Mass.)     487; 

Brown,  60  Conn.  164;    s.  c.  22  Atl.  Wilson  v.  Waltersville  School  Dist., 

430.  44  Conn.  157;   Bramwell  v.  Guheen, 

2  Idaho  1069;  s.  c.  29  Pac.  110. 


§    387  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  364 

§  387.    Votes  at  town  meeting — General  rules  of  construction. — 

Votes  upon  questious  pending  iu  town  meetings  may  be  given  in  any 
recognized  manner  in  the  absence  of  specific  requirements,  and  need 
not  be  by  ballot.^"  Nor  do  the  courts  expect  or  demand  a  scrupulous 
observance  of  the  most  approved  formalities;  if  the  proceedings  are 
in  substance  what  they  should  be,  and  intelligible,  it  would  be  mis- 
'chievous  to  set  them  aside  for  the  want  of  technical  precision;  a 
liberal  and  favorable  construction  prevails,  especially  when  no  one 
is  injured  by  it  or  deprived  of  any  right. ^"^  Thus,  instruments  not 
nnder  seal  executed  in  pursuance  of  a  vote  directing  an  issue  of 
"bonds"  were  held  to  be  valid  obligations;^^®  and  a  vote  to  pay  a  cer- 
tain bounty  "to  each  drafted  man  who  may  be  accepted  by  the  board 
of  enrollment"  is  not  void  for  uncertainty  as  being  applicable  to  all 
drafted  men  wherever  they  may  belong,  but  only  refers  to  the  men 
drafted  to  fill  the  quota  of  thfe  town.^^®  The  same  rule  that  applies 
in  construing  a  statute  under  the  constitution  is  applied  in  construing 
the  votes  and  acts  of  towns  under  a  law  of  the  state,  and  if  the  valid 
parts  of  a  vote  are  separable  from  those  that  are  void,  they  will  be 
sustained.^'^** 

§  388.  Record  of  proceedings. — Where  the  statute  requires  that  a 
vote  shall  be  passed  by  two-thirds  of  the  voters  present,  a  record  of 
a  meeting  which  states  that  it  was  "voted,"  etc.,  is  not  sufficient  un- 

^"  Where   a   constitution   required  a  town   in   raising  money   shall  be 

that    all    elections    by    the    people  expressed   in   the   vote   is  that  the 

should  be  by  ballot  it  was  held  that  vote     should     indicate     in     general 

the   meetings   of   district  townships  terms    the    purpose    or    object    for 

were   not   designed    to   be    elections  which  the  money  is  raised,  and  if 

within  the  meaning  of  the  term,  no  that   purpose   or   object   is    such   as 

judges    of    election    being    provided  comes  within  the  scope  of  the  pow- 

for,  etc.:   Seaman  v.  Baughman,  82  ers  of  the  town  it  is  sufficient:  Blod- 

lowa  216;  s.  c.  47  N.  W.  1091.     Un-  gett  v.  Holbrook,  39  Vt.  336. 

der   a    statute    providing   that   any  ^='*  Lane    v.     Inhabitants    &c.,     72 

town  may,  at  a  town  meeting,  abol-  Maine  354. 

ish    all    school    districts   therein,    a  '="  Baldwin     v.     Town     of     North 

town    divided    into   voting   districts  Branford,  32  Conn.  47.  A  description 

can  not  legally  vote  in  district  meet-  of  a  school  district  as  "all  the  ter- 

ings  on  the  question  of  abolishing  ritory  between"  two  given  lines  is 

school  districts:  Comstock  v.  School  not  necessarily   defective:    Allen   v. 

Committee  &c.,  17  R.  I.  827;  s.  c.  24  Archer,    49    Maine    346.     See    also, 

Atl.  145.  Avery  v.  Stewart,  1  Cush.    (Mass.) 

^"a  Soper  V.  Inhabitants,  28  Maine  496. 

193 ;  Kellar  v.  Savage,  17  Maine  444.  '""  Barbour  v.   Inhabitants  &c.,  51 

"All  that  is  necessary  in  respect  to  Maine   608;    Upton  v.   Stoddard,   47 

the  manner  in  which  the  purpose  of  N.  H.  167. 


365  MEETINGS    AND    ELECTIONS.  §    389 

less  it  shows  that  it  was  carried  by  two-thirds.^®^  And  where  a  record 
that  a  meeting  is  "duly  or  legally  notified"  is  made  prima  facie  suffi- 
cient by  statute,  a  record  simply  stating  that  the  meeting  was  held 
"according  to  notice"  is  defective.^^^  A  record  of  a  vote  passed  "in 
legal  meeting  assembled"  is  not  proof  that  the  meeting  was  specially 
warned  for  that  purpose. ^'^^  A  town  was  empowered  by  special  act 
to  guaranty  a  certain  amount  of  the  bonds  of  a  railroad  company,  pro- 
vided the  vote  should  be  passed  by  ballot  at  a  meeting  called  for  that 
purpose.  The  record  of  a  meeting  showed  that  it  was  warned  to 
vote  by  ballot  on  the  subject  and  that  the  vote  in  question  was 
"passed."  The  vote  was  not,  in  fact,  passed  by  ballot,  but  by  a  divi- 
sion of  the  house,  and  the  record  was  subsequently  amended  by  order 
of  the  court.  In  the  meanwhile  the  company,  on  the  strength  of  the 
vote,  had  expended  money  and  made  contracts  for  the  delivery  of  the 
bonds.  The  court  held  that  the  town  was  estopped  from  insisting  on 
Ihe  invalidity  of  the  vote.^^* 

§  389.  Parol  evidence  of  proceedings. — The  official  record  is  the 
proper  evidence  of  the  doings  of  the  meeting,  and  it  is  not  open  to 
contradiction,  enlargement  or  explanation  by  parol.  This  general 
rule  applies  to  the  records  of  towns,  parishes,  school  districts  and  all 
similar  organizations,^*^^     But  in  an  action  against  a  town  to  recover 

^"  The  maxim  "Omnia  prsesumun-        ^"^  Willard  v.  Warden  &c.,  8  Conn, 

tur  rite,"  etc.,  does  not  apply:  Port-  248,   253.     See   Isbell  v.   New   York 

land  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  &c.  R.  Co.,  25  Conn.  556,  for  a  suffi- 

65    Maine    63;    Andrews   v.    Inhabi-  cient  record  in  such  a  case, 
tants  &c.,  110  Mass.  214.    Cf.  Attor-        "■*  New  Haven  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Town 

ney-General    v.    Crocker,    138    Mass.  of  Chatham,  42  Conn.  465.  Cf.  Brook- 

214,    215.     An    amendment    by    the  lyn  Trust  Co.  v.  Town  of  Hebron,  51 

clerk   stating  that   "to   the   best   of  Conn.  22. 

my  recollection"  the  vote  was  passed        ^"^  Halleck  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  117 

by  two-thirds  does  not  cure  it.     If,  Mass.  469;   Andrews  v.  Inhabitants 

however,  he  had  stated  it  as  a  fact,  &c.,  110  Mass.  214;  Wood  v.  Simons, 

the  record  could  not  be  contradicted  110  Mass.  116;   Adams  v.  Pratt,  109 

by  parol  testimony,  but  he  might  be  Mass.  59 ;  Mayhew  v.  District  of  Gay 

liable  for  fraudulent  conduct  in  his  Head,  13  Allen   (Mass.)   129;   Third 

office:  Judd  v.  Thompson,  125  Mass.  School    Dist.    v.    Atherton,    12    Met. 

553.  (Mass.)    105;    Saxton  v.  Nimms,   14 

^^^Seabury  v.  Howland,  15  R.  I.  Mass.  315;  Manning  v.  Inhabitants 
446;  s.  c.  8  Atl.  341.  It  was  held  &c.,  6  Pick.  (Mass.)  6;  Taylor  v. 
that  a  record  is  not  objectionable  be-  Henry,  2  Pick.  (Mass.)  397;  Picker- 
cause  it  omits  to  state  the  hour  the  ing  v.  Pickering,  11  N.  H.  141,  144; 
meeting  was  held  when  it  describes  Jordan  v.  School  Dist.,  38  Maine 
the  meeting  as  that  which  was  noti-  164;  Moore  v.  Newfield,  4  Maine  44. 
fied  and  the  notice  appoints  the  Parol  evidence  can  not  be  admitted 
hour:  Howland  v.  School  Dist.,  15  to  show  that  a  vote  was  passed 
R.  I.  184;  s.  c.  2  Atl.  549;  8  Atl.  337.  which    the    record    does    not   show: 


§  390 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS. 


366 


a  sum  voted  to  the  plaintiff  for  injuries  received  by  him  while  in  the 
employ  of  the  town,  parol  evidence  was  admitted  to  show  that  the 
amount  voted  was  a  mere  gratuity  and  not  supported  by  any  claim 
of  legal  liability  against  the  town.^''° 

§  390.  Doings  of  meetings  not  legally  called. — Where  a  meeting 
is  not  legally  warned,  all  the  officers  that  are  chosen  hold  their  offices 
without  authority  of  law;  and  a  vote  to  raise  money  is  not  binding 
upon  the  inhabitants  and  can  not  be  the  proper  and  legal  foundation 
for  the  assessment  of  any  tax.^"  A  person  elected  at  such  a  meeting, 
though  sworn  into  office,  can  draw  from  that  election  no  justification 
for  acts  done  under  color  of  the  office  ;"^  but  his  acts  would  be  valid 
and  binding  to  the  extent  of  the  rule  which  applies  to  the  doings  of 
officers  de  facto.  ^''^  "No  one  can  rely  upon  a  vote  of  a  town  as  giving 
him  any  rights  against  the  town  without  proving  a  sufficient  notice  or 
warning  of  the  meeting  at  which  it  was  passed  ;"^^*'  and  an  indictment 


Orford  v.  Benton,  36  N.  H.  395,  403; 
Harris  v.  School  Dist,  28  N.  H.  58, 
66.  Nor  is  evidence  admissible  of 
what  the  voters  intended  to  do  or 
supposed  they  had  done:  Adams  v. 
Crowell,  40  Vt.  31,  34;  Cameron  v. 
School  Dist,  42  Vt.  507.  The  record 
of  a  school  district  showed  that  "it 
was  voted  that  the  district  build  a 
new  schoolhouse;  16  for  and 
11  against  it."  Evidence  that  seven 
who  voted  in  the  affirmative  were 
not  legal  voters  in  the  district  was 
properly  rejected  in  replevin  for 
property  taken  by  the  tax  collector. 
"The  records  of  the  proceedings  of 
municipal  public  corporations  can 
not  be  collaterally  attacked  and 
overthrown  by  evidence  of  this 
character:"  Eddy  v.  Wilson,  43  Vt. 
362.  Cf.  Davis  v.  School  Dist,  43  N. 
H.  381,  where  counsel  claimed  to 
appear  for  a  school-district  defend- 
ant under  authority  of  a  vote  of  the 
district.  The  plaintiff  offered  evi- 
dence that  at  a  subsequent  meeting 
the  authority  was  revoked.  The 
court  admitted  evidence  that  the 
vote  of  revocation  was  passed  by  il- 
legal votes.  These  cases  may,  per- 
haps, be  reconciled  on  the  ground 
that    in    the    former    the    question 


arose  between  strangers  to  the  pro- 
ceedings, while  in  the  latter  the 
dispute  was  between  the  parties. 
Where,  according  to  the  usual 
course  of  proceeding,  the  warrant 
is  either  recorded  or  preserved  in 
the  office  of  the  town  clerk,  it  can 
not  be  proved  by  parol  unless  a  suffi- 
cient reason  is  shown  for  not  pro- 
ducing the  original  or  a  certified 
copy:  Brunswick  v.  McKean,  4 
Maine  508.  But  it  is  not  in  the  pow- 
er of  a  clerk  to  destroy  the  effect  of 
the  action  of  a  meeting  by  failing  or 
refusing  to  record  the  proper  papers 
to  show  that  the  meeting  was  regu- 
larly called  and  notified  so  long  as 
clear  proof  of  those  facts  can  be 
made  aliunde:  Marble  v.  McKenney, 
60  Maine  332. 

'""  Matthews  v.  Inhabitants  &c., 
134  Mass.  555. 

'"Osgood  V.  Blake,  21  N.  H.  550, 
564;  Grafton  Bank  v.  Kimball,  20  N. 
H.  107. 

i'^'  Bearce  v.  Fossett,  34  Maine  575. 

'""School  Dist  V.  Lord,  44  Maine 
374. 

""  Per  Justice  Gray  in  Bloomfield 
V.  Charter  Oak  Bank,  121  U.  S.  121; 
s.  c.  7  S.  Ct.  865.  A  contract  made 
with  a  school  district  by  a  member 


3G7 


MEETINGS   AND   ELECTIONS. 


§  391 


against  a  person  for  illegal  voting  at  a  town  meeting  can  not  be  sus- 
tained unless  the  meeting  was  legally  warned. ^^^ 

§  391.  Presumptions  in  favor  of  ancient  meetings. — No  presump- 
tion is  indulged  in  favor  of  the  essential  regularity  of  recent  proceed- 
ings of  town  meetings  ;^'^^  but  it  is  otherwise  where  from  lapse  of 
time  there  is  a  probability  that  the  officers  who  made  the  record  are 
no  longer  living,  or  have  lost  a  recollection  of  the  facts  so  that  no 
amendment  can  be  made,  or  where  it  is  proved  that  such  officers  have 
deceased  so  that  the  records  can  not  be  corrected. ^'^^  After  the  lapse 
of  thirty  years  it  was  held  that  a  jury  might  presume  that  a  warrant 
for  a  town  meeting  which  was  shown  to  have  been  properly  posted 
remained  posted  during  the  time  required  by  law.^'^'*  The  records 
of  the  proprietors  of  a  town  purporting  to  have  been  made  in  1738 
contained  the  proceedings  of  a  meeting  held  at  that  time.  It  did  not 
appear  that  there  was  any  notice  for  the  meeting,  nor  did  the  records 
appear  to  be  attested  by  any  clerk  or  recording  officer,  but  they  were 
produced  by  the  town  clerk,  who  testified  that  he  received  them  from 
his  predecessor  in  office  together  with  the  other  records  of  the  town. 
They  were  held  to  be  competent  evidence  to  be  submitted  to  a  jury 
as  to  the  doings  of  the  meeting.^'' ^ 


thereof  at  a  meeting  not  legally 
warned  is  binding  upon  neither  par- 
ty: School  Dist.  V.  Atherton,  12  Met. 
(Mass.)  105. 

"^  State  V.  Williams,  25  Maine  561. 
But  after  a  decree  of  foreclosure  in 
favor  of  a  town,  a  vote  at  a  meeting 
not  warned  for  that  purpose  extend- 
ing the  period  of  redemption  is  suffi- 
cient in  equity  to  prevent  the  decree 
from  becoming  absolute  upon  the 
day  named:  Daggett  v.  Town  of 
Mendon,  64  Vt.  323;  s.  c.  24  Atl.  242. 

^'-  Bloomfield  v.  Charter  Oak  Bank, 
121  U.  S.  121;  s.  c.  7  S.  Ct.  865;  Cavis 
V.  Robertson,  9  N.  H.  524;  overruling 
Bishop  V.  Cone,  3  N.  H.  513,  515. 

^"' Cavis  V.  Robertson,  9  N.  H.  524; 
Gibson  v.  Bailey,  9  N.  H.  168.  It  was 
said  in  those  cases  that  under  such 
circumstances  it  may  be  submitted 
to  a  jury  to  presume  from  a  defect- 
ive record  of  the  election  of  a  town 
officer  and  from  his  having  acted  un- 
der the  appointment  that  the  meet- 
ing was  duly  held,  the  proceedings 


of  the  town  regular  and  the  officer 
duly  sworn;  but  this  can  not  be  done 
where  the  proceedings  are  recent 
and  no  reason  is  shown  why  the  rec- 
ord can  not  be  amended  if  the  truth 
will  warrant  it:  Brownell  v.  Pal- 
mer, 22  Conn.  107  (twenty-five  years 
sufficient) ;  State  v.  Taff,  37  Conn. 
392  (fifteen  years  too  short  a  time) ; 
Peterborough  v.  Lancaster,  14  N.  H. 
383  (thirty-eight  years  sufficient). 

"*  "It  does  not  appear  that  the  offi- 
cers who  made  the  record  are  dead, 
but  it  is  a  fair  presumption  that 
they  have  lost  recollection  of  the 
fact,"  etc.:  Schoff  v.  Gould,  52  N.  H. 
512,  and  cases  there  cited.  "It  is  not 
to  be  presumed  that  the  meeting  is 
not  both  legal  and  regular  because 
there  is  now  no  record  showing  that 
it  was  so:"  Willey  v.  Portsmouth, 
35  N.  H.  303,  309.  See  also.  School 
Dist.  V.  Bragdon,  23  N.  H.  507,  514. 

"^  Adams  v.  Stanyan,  24  N.  H.  405 ; 
citing  as  to  want  of  attestation.  In- 
habitants &c.   V.   Inhabitants  &c.,   3 


§  392 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS. 


368 


§  392.  Notice  of  election. — Where  both  the  time  and  place  of  a 
general  election  are  fixed  by  law  the  requirement  of  notice  is  di- 
rectory, and  the  election  is  not  vitiated  by  the  failure  of  the  authori- 
ties to  make  the  publication."*^  But  in  the  case  of  special  elections, 
when  either  the  time  or  place  is  not  prescribed  by  law,  the  provision 
for  notice  is  mandatory^"^  when  notice  is  necessary.  An  election 
called  l)y  an  unauthorized  person  is  void;  it  has  no  greater  validity 
than  the  unauthorized  action  of  a  mass  meeting  would  have.^'^^  But 
where  notice  is  to  be  given  by  a  board,  a  notice  signed  by  the  clerk 
in  which  it  appears  that  the  election  was  ordered  by  the  board  is 
sulScient.^^'^  Where  the  statute  confers  upon  the  mayor  of  a  city 
the  power  of  proclaiming  an  election,  it  may  be  exercised  in  the 
mayor's  absence  by  one  whom  the  charter  vests  with  the  powers  of 


Greenl.  (Maine)  223.  The  record  of 
the  choice  of  a  person  as  hog-reeve 
and  field  driver  and  proof  of  his 
service  as  such  for  one  year  suffices 
for  the  presumption  in  question: 
Northwood  v.  Barrington,  9  N.  H. 
369  (forty  years). 

i'«  Smith  V.  Crutcher,  92  Ky.  586; 
s.  c.  18  S.  W.  521;  Paine  Elections, 
§  384;  citing  Carson  v.  McPhetridge, 
15  Ind.  327;  Light  v.  State,  14  Kan. 
489;  People  v.  Cowles,  13  N.  Y.  350; 
People  V.  Porter,  6  Cal.  26;  People  v. 
Weller,  11  Cal.  49;  s.  c.  70  Am. 
D.  754;  People  v.  Brenham,  3  Cal. 
477;  Cooley  Const.  Lim.  759;  Dickey 
V.  Hurlburt,  5  Cal.  343;  State  v. 
Jones,  19  Ind.  356;  s.  c.  81  Am. 
D.  403;  People  v.  Hartwell,  12  Mich. 
508;  s.  c.  86  Am.  D.  70;  City 
of  Lafayette  v.  State,  69  Ind.  218; 
Dishon  v.  Smith,  10  Iowa  212;  Jones 
V.  Gridley,  20  Kan.  584;  State  v.  Or- 
vis,  20  Wis.  248;  State  v.  Goetze,  22 
Wis.  363;  People  v.  Martin,  12  Cal. 
409;  People  v.  Rosborough,  14  Cal. 
180.  See  also.  Commonwealth  v. 
Smith,  132  Mass.  289;  State  v.  Skirv- 
ing,  19  Neb.  497;  s.  c.  27  N.  W.  723. 
As  to  notices  of  vacancies  to  be 
filed  at  a  regular  election,  see  Peo- 
ple V.  Cowles,  13  N.  Y.  350;  People 
V.  Weller,  11  Cal.  49;  s.  c.  70  Am.  D. 
754;  People  v.  Crissey,  91  N.  Y.  616; 
Beal  V.  Ray,  17  Ind.  554;  State  v. 
Good,  41  N.  J.  L.  296;  People  v.  Ros- 


borough, 29  Cal.  415;  People  v.  Por- 
ter, 6  Cal.  26;  People  v.  Martin,  12 
Cal.  409;  Foster  v.  Scarff,  15  Ohio 
St.  532. 

"■  United  States  v.  McKelden,  Mac- 
Arth.  &  M.  162;  State  v.  Mayor  &c., 
44  N.  J.  L.  137;  Kenfield  v.  Irwin,  52 
Cal.  164;  Hubbard  v.  Town  of  Will- 
iamstown,  61  Wis.  397;  s.  c.  21  N. 
W.  295;  People  v.  Crissey,  91  N.  Y. 
616;  Haddox  v.  Clarke  Co.,  79  Va. 
677.  Unless  an  election  is  fixed  by 
law  there  must  be  some  notice, 
though  none  is  required  by  the  stat- 
ute:   McPike  V.  Pen,  51  Mo.  63. 

178  porce  V.  Town  of  Batavia,  61 
111.  99. 

^■''  Smith  V.  Board  &c.,  45  Fed.  725. 
See  also,  Williams  v.  People,  132  111. 
574;  s.  c.  24  N.  E.  647;  and  §  362, 
ante.  An  error  in  the  proclamation 
must,  in  order  to  invalidate  the  elec- 
tion, appear  from  proofs  or  by  nec- 
essary intendment  to  have  so  affect- 
ed the  election  as  to  have  changed 
the  result.  On  this  point  the  court 
will  not  indulge  in  speculation  or 
mere  conjecture:  In  re  Petition  of 
Cleveland,  51  N.  J.  L.  319;  s.  c.  18 
Atl.  67;  52  N.  J.  L.  188;  19  Atl.  17; 
30  Am.  &  Eng.  Corp.  Cas.  230.  See 
also,  San  Luis  Obispo  Co.  v.  White, 
91  Cal.  432;  s.  c.  24  Pac.  864;  27  Pac. 
756,  where  the  clerk  affixed  a  scroll 
to  the  proclamation  instead  of  a  seal 
required  by  statute. 


3G9 


MEETINGS   AND  ELECTIONS. 


§  393 


mayoralty  in  such  a  contingency;^""  and  the  service  of  notice  by  an 
officer  cle  facto  will  not  affect  the  validity  of  the  election. ^^^ 

§  393.  Qualifications  of  voters — Povirer  to  prescribe. — The  quali- 
fications of  voters  are  fixed  by  the  constitutions  or  statutes  of  the 
states,  and  the  right  of  each  state  to  define  the  qualifications  of  its 
voters  is  complete  and  perfect,  except  so  far  as  it  is  controlled  by  the 
fifteenth  article  of  the  amendments  to  the  constitution  of  the  United 
States,  which  provides  that  "the  right  of  citizens  of  the  United  States 
to  vote  shall  not  be  denied  or  abridged  by  the  United  States  or  by  any 
state  on  account  of  race,  color,  or  previous  condition  of  servitude."^^^ 
But  it  is  not  competent  for  the  legislature  to  add  a  substantive  quali- 
fication to  those  prescribed  by  the  constitution,  unless  that  instru- 
ment confers  the  power  in  express  terms  or  by  necessary  implica- 
tion.^^^  Thus,  where  the  constitution  requires  residence  in  the  state 
for  a  certain  period,  a  statute  which  requires  residence  in  the  ward, 
city  or  township  is  void.^®*  And  a  provision  in  a  village  charter 
limiting  the  right  to  vote  to  those  who  have  resided  within  the  village 


™  In  re  Petition  of  Cleveland,  51 
N.  J.  L.  319;  s.  c.  18  Atl.  67;  52  N. 
J.  L.  188;  19  Atl.  17;  30  Am.  &  Eng. 
Corp.  Cas.  230. 

^'^Bird  V.  Merrick,  Lor.  &  R. 
(Mass.  Elec.  Cas.)  115. 

^"- Blair  v.  Ridgely,  41  Mo.  63;  s.  c. 
97  Am.  D.  248;  Anderson  v.  Baker, 
23  Md.  531;  United  States  v.  Reese, 
92  U.  S.  214;  United  States  v.  Cruik- 
shank,  92  U.  S.  542;  Minor  v.  Hap- 
persett,  21  Wall.  162;  Kinneen  v. 
Wells,  144  Mass.  497;  s.  c.  11  N.  E. 
916;  59  Am.  R.  105;  Van  Valkenburg 
V.  Brown,  43  Cal.  43;  s.  c.  13  Am.  R. 
136;  Huber  v.  Reily,  53  Pa.  St.  112; 
Ridley  v.  Sherbrook,  3  Coldw. 
(Tenn.)  569;  United  States  v.  An- 
thony, 11  Blatch.  200;  State  v.  Sta- 
ten,  6  Coldw.  (Tenn.)  233.  The  state 
may  also  regulate  nominating  con- 
ventions and  caucuses:  Leonard  v. 
Commonwealth,  112  Pa.  St.  607;  s.  c. 
4  Atl.  220;  In  re  House  Bill,  9  Colo. 
624;  s.  c.  21  Pac.  472. 

^"'Page  v.  Hardin,  8  B.  Mon.  (Ky.) 
648;  Quinn  v.  State,  35  Ind.  485; 
s.  c.  9  Am.  R.  754;  Rison  v.  Parr,  24 
Ark.  161;  s.  c.  87  Am.  D.  52;  Thomas 

1  Smith — 24 


V.  Owens,  4  Md.  189;  Clayton  v.  Har- 
ris, 7  Nev.  64;  State  v.  Symonds,  57 
Maine  148;  State  v.  Corner,  22  Neb. 
265;  s.  c.  34  N.  W.  499;  3  Am.  St. 
267;  17  Am.  &  Eng.  Corp.  Cas.  453; 
Kinneen  v.  Wells,  144  Mass.  497;  s. 
c.  11  N.  E.  916;  59  Am.  R.  105;  St. 
Joseph  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Buchanan  Coun- 
ty Court,  39  Mo.  485;  Barker  v.  Peo- 
ple, 3  Cowen  (N.  Y.)  686;  s.  c.  15 
Am.  D.  322;  People  v.  Canaday,  73 
N.  C.  198;  s.  c.  21  Am.  R.  465;  White 
V.  Commissioners  &c.,  13  Or.  317;  s. 
c.  10  Pac.  484;  57  Am.  R.  20,  n.; 
Monroe  v.  Collins,  17  Ohio  St.  665;, 
Daggett  V.  Hudson,  43  Ohio  St.  548; 
s.  c.  3  N.  E.  538;  54  Am.  R.  832; 
State  V.  Constantine,  42  Ohio  St.  437; 
s.  c.  51  Am.  R.  833;  State  v.  Tuttle, 
53  Wis.  45;  s.  c.  9  N.  W.  791;  State 
V.  Baker,  38  Wis.  71;  State  v.  Will- 
iams, 5  Wis.  308;  Davies  v.  McKee- 
by,  5  Nev.  369;  State  v.  Staten,  6 
Coldw.  (Tenn.)  233;  United  States 
V.  Slater,  4  Wood  356;  Randolph  v. 
Good,  3  W.  Va.  551;  McCafferty  v. 
Guyer,  59  Pa.  St.  109. 

^«*  Quinn  v.  State,  35  Ind.  485;  s.  c. 
9  Am.  R.  754. 


§  394 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS. 


370 


for  twenty  days  immediately  preceding  the  election  conflicts  with  a 
constitution  prescribing  residence  for  no  definite  period. ^**'^  An  act 
which  restricts  the  right  to  vote  to  taxable  inhabitants  is  repugnant 
to  a  constitution  which  is  silent  respecting  property  qualification.^®^ 

§  394.  Registration  acts. — It  is  held  by  the  decided  weight  of  au- 
thority tliat  when  the  constitution  is  silent  on  the  subject  of  registra- 
tion it  is  competent  for  the  legislature  to  require  voters  to  be  regis- 
tered a  reasonable  time  before  the  election,  or  to  be  debarred  of  the 
right  to  vote.^-'^  "The  true  rule  is  that  whenever  a  registration  is 
ordered  it  should  give  the  voters  an  opportunity  as  near  the  day  of 
election  as  practicable  for  qualifying  themselves  as  electors.  All  the 
authorities  agree  in  holding  that  if  the  length  of  time  between  the 
closing  of  the  registration  and  the  election  is  unreasonable,  the  elec- 


"^  State  v.  Tuttle,  53  Wis.  45;  s.  c. 
9  N.  W.  791.  See  also,  People  v.  Can- 
aday,  73  N.  C.  198;  s.  c.  21  Am.  R. 
465;  Klnneen  v.  Wells,  144  Mass. 
497;  s.  c.  11  R  E.  916;  59  Am.  R. 
105. 

'"« St.  Joseph  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Buchan- 
an County  Court,  39  Mo.  485.  Cf.  Mc- 
Mahon  v.  Mayor  &c.,  66  Ga.  217;  s.  c. 
42  Am.  R.  65;  Buckner  v.  Gordon,  81 
Ky.  665. 

^"Capen  v.  Foster,  12  Pick.  (Mass.) 
485;  s.  c.  23  Am.  D.  632;  Hyde  v. 
Brush,  34  Conn.  454;  People  v.  Kop- 
plekom,  16  Mich.  342;  Edmonds  v. 
Banbury,  28  Iowa  267;  s.  c.  4  Am.  R. 
177;  People  v.  Laine,  33  Cal.  55; 
Webster  v.  Byrnes,  34  Cal.  273;  By- 
ler  v.  Asher,  47  111.  101;  People  v. 
Wilson,  62  N.  Y.  186;  Davis  v.  School 
Dist.,  44  N.  H.  398;  Patterson  v.  Bar- 
low, 60  Pa.  St.  54;  Auld  v.  Walton, 
12  La.  An.  129;  Harris  v.  Whitcomb, 
4  Gray  (Mass.)  433;  Smith  v.  City 
of  Wilmington,  98  N.  C.  343;  s.  c.  4 
S.  E.  489;  Southerland  v.  Board  &c., 
96  N.  C.  49;  s.  c.  1  S.  E.  760;  17  Am. 
&  Eng.  Corp.  Cas.  393;  Duke  v. 
Brown,  96  N.  C.  127;  s.  c.  1  S.  E.  873; 
McDowell  v.  Massachusetts  &c.  Const. 
Co.,  96  N.  C.  514;  s.  c.  2  S.  E.  351; 
Wood  V.  Town  of  Oxford,  97  N.  C. 
227;  s.  c.  2  S.  E.  653;  State  v.  Baker. 
38  Wis.  71;  Monroe  v.  Collins,  17 
Ohio  St.  665;  Daggett  v.  Hudson.  43 


Ohio  St.  548;  s.  c.  3  N.  E.  538;  54 
Am.  R.  832;  State  v.  Butts,  31  Kan. 
537;  s.  c.  2  Pac.  618;  In  re  Polling 
Lists,  13  R.  I.  729;  People  v.  Hoff- 
man, 116  111.  587;  s.  c.  5  N.  E.  596; 
8  N.  E.  788;  56  Am.  R.  793;  Stephens 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  84  Ga.  630;  s.  c.  11  S. 
E.  150;  30  Am.  &  Eng.  Corp.  Cas. 
282;  State  v.  Corner,  22  Neb.  265; 
s.  c.  34  N.  W.  499;  3  Am.  St.  267;  17 
Am.  &  Eng.  Corp.  Cas.  453;  McMa- 
hon  V.  Mayor,  66  Ga.  217;  s.  c.  42 
Am.  R.  65;  People  v.  Canaday,  73  N. 
C.  198;  s.  c.  21  Am.  R.  465;  Com- 
monwealth V.  McClelland,  83  Ky. 
686.  See  also,  Kinneen  v.  Wells, 
144  Mass.  497;  s.  c.  11  N.  E. 
916;  59  Am.  R.  105;  Cooley  Const. 
Lim.  (6th  ed.)  756  et  seq.;  McCrary 
Elections,  §  95  et  seq.;  Paine  Elec- 
tions, §  340  et  seq.;  Mechem  Public 
Offices  and  Officers,  §  149.  Contra, 
Page  V.  Allen,  58  Pa.  St.  338;  Dells 
V.  Kennedy,  49  Wis.  555;  s.  c.  6  N. 
W.  246,  381;  White  v:  Commission- 
ers &c.,  13  Or.  317;  s.  c.  10  Pac.  484; 
54  Am.  R.  832,  n.;  12  Am.  &  Eng. 
Corp.  Cas.  485;  State  v.  Corner,  22 
Neb.  265;  s.  c.  34  N.  W.  499;  3  Am. 
St.  267;  17  Am.  &  Eng.  Corp.  Cas. 
453,  holds  that  the  voter  can  not  be 
deprived  of  the  right  to  register  at 
any  time  before  the  closing  of  the 
polls. 


371  MEETINGS    AND    ELECTIONS.  §    395 

tion  should  be  held  void."^^^  Accordingly,  a  law  which  allowed  only 
seven  days  in  the  year  for  voters  to  register  was  declared  to  be  sub- 
versive of  constitutional  right  and  therefore  void;^'*'-'  and  a  statute 
providing  that  no  person  thereafter  naturalized  should  be  entitled 
to  be  registered  within  thirty  days  after  such  naturalization  was  open 
to  the  same  objection  ;^'"'  but  an  act  fixing  three  weeks  before  the  elec- 
tion for  the  completion  of  the  registry  was  sustained.^ "^ 

§  395.  Place  of  election. — Where  a  statute  incorporating  a  munici- 
pality enumerates  the  officers  to  be  chosen  and  prescribes  the  qualifi- 
cations of  voters,  but  does  not  designate  any  polling-place,  the  voters 
have  the  implied  right  to  supply  the  omission.^ ^^  But  if  elections  are 
required  by  law  to  be  held  at  fixed  times  and  places  these  can  not  be 
changed  except  by  direct  legislative  authority  ;^^^  time  and  place  are 
of  the  substance  of  every  election,  and  statutory  provisions  by  which 
they  are  definitely  fixed  are  mandatory  and  must  be  obeyed.^''*  Where 
the  polls  were  opened  at  a  distance  of  three  miles  from  the  place 
appointed,  without  any  just  excuse,  the  election  was  void.^'*'^  Chief 
Justice  Thompson,  of  the  supreme  court  of  Pennsylvania,  expounded 
the  law  in  point  as  follows:  "I  will  not  say  that  in  case  of  the  de- 
struction of  a  designated  building  on  the  eve  of  an  election,  the  elec- 

^"^  Stephens  v.  Mayor  &c.,  84  Ga.  281;  s.  c.  25  N.  E.  221;  Stephens  v. 
630;  s.  c.  11  S.  E.  150;  30  Am.  &  Bng.  Mayor  &c.,  84  Ga.  630;  s.  c.  11  S.  E. 
Corp.  Gas.  282.  Laws  regulating  the  150.  When  an  eligible  person  has 
exercise  of  the  right  of  suffrage  must  been  duly  registered  he  continues  to 
be  reasonable,  uniform  and  impar-  have  the  right  to  vote  until  he  loses 
tial,  and  must  be  calculated  to  facil-  or  is  dispossessed  of  it  according  to 
itate  and  secure  rather  than  to  sub-  law.  Where  the  mayor  and  alder- 
vert  or  impede  the  exercise  of  the  men  without  authority  ordered  a 
right  to  vote:  Daggett  v.  Hudson,  new  registration,  the  election  was 
43  Ohio  St.  548;  s.  c.  3  N.  E.  538;  54  void:  Smith  v.  City  of  Wilmington, 
Am.  R.  832;  Monroe  v.  Collins,  17  98  N.  C.  343;  s.  c.  4  S.  E.  489. 
Ohio  St.  666,  687.  ^°' State  v.  Burbridge,  24  Fla.  112; 

^™  Daggett  V.  Hudson,  43  Ohio  St.  s.  c.  3  So.  869. 

548;  s.  c.  3  N.  E.  538;  54  Am.  R.  832.  ^^^  City  Council  v.  Youmans,  85  Ga. 

i^'Kinneen    v.    Wells,    144    Mass.  708,  712;  s.  c.  11  S.  E.  865. 

497;   s.  c.  11  N.  E.  916;    59  Am.  R.  ^"^  McCrary  Elections    (3d   ed.),   § 

105.     This  was  because  the  regula-  141;  Paine  Elections,  §  327. 

tion  was  not  uniform  and  impartial.  ^"^  Heyfron    v.    Mahoney,    9    Mont. 

^"^  People  v.  Hoffman,  116  111.  587;  497;  s.  c.  24  Pac.  93;  Knowles  v. 
s.  c.  5  N.  E.  596;  8  N.  E.  788;  56  Am.  Yeates,  31  Cal.  82,  92.  See  also,  Com- 
R.  793.  And  ten  days  was  held  rea-  monwealth  v.  County  Com'rs,  5 
sonable:  State  v.  Butts,  31  Kan.  537;  Rawle  (Pa.)  75;  Juker  v.  Common- 
s.  c.  2  Pac.  618.  For  unreasonable  wealth,  20  Pa.  St.  484;  Miller  v.  En- 
registration  laws,  see  City  of  Owens-  glish,  21  N.  J.  L.  317;  Ex  parte  Rob- 
boro  v.  Hickman,  90  Ky.  629;  s.  c.  14  inson,  3  Pug.  (N.  B.)  389. 
S.  W.  688;  Morris  v.  Powell,  125  Ind. 


§    396  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  372 

tion  might  not  l)c  held  on  the  pamc  or  contiguous  ground  as  a  matter  of 
necessity — necessitas  non  habct  legem.  But  then  the  necessity  must 
be  absolute,  discarding  all  mere  ideas  of  convenience.  *  *  *  To 
move  the  place  of  an  election  three  miles  from  that  designated  by 
law  or  to  a  place  more  than  half  a  mile  distant  therefrom  without 
authority  or  any  absolute  controlling  circumstances  must  render  the 
election  therein  void.''^"''  But  the  circumstances  which  do  not 
affect  the  result  when  the  place  designated  has  been  changed  are  shown 
in  another  case,  where  the  polls  were  opened  a  short  distance  from  and 
in  plain  view  of  the  place  appointed,  the  owner  of  the  house  selected 
having  objected  to  the  use  of  it  for  that  purpose,  and  no  voter  being 
misled  or  deprived  of  his  vote.  The  court  held  that  the  election  was 
legal.i" 

§  396.  The  same  subject  continued. — A  statute  provided  that 
"whenever  it  shall  become  impossible  or  inconvenient  to  hold  a  town 
meeting  at  the  place  designated  therefor,  the  town  board  of  in- 
spectors, after  having  assembled  at  or  as  near  as  practicable  to  such 
place  and  opened  the  meeting  and  before  receiving  any  votes,  may 
adjourn  such  meeting  to  the  nearest  convenient  place  for  holding  the 
same."  They  were  also  required  to  make  proclamation  of  the  ad- 
journment and  to  station  a  proper  person  at  the  door  to  notify  electors 
as  they  arrived.  Polls  were  to  be  opened  at  town  meetings  at  nine 
o'clock.  The  record  showed  that  a  meeting  was  legally  called,  and 
upon  motion  it  was  voted  to  adjourn  to  a  certain  place,  where  the 
board  met  pursuant  to  the  adjournment  and  called  the  meeting  to  or- 
der at  nine  o'clock.  The  court  held  that  the  law  would  presume  the 
first  meeting  to  have  been  opened  only  a  few  minutes  before  nine; 
that  whether  the  place  was  impossible  or  inconvenient  and  whether  the 
adjourned  meeting  was  held  at  the  nearest  and  most  convenient  place 
were  matters  solely  for  the  judgment  of  the  board ;  and  that  a  failure 
to  make  proclamation  or  to  station  any  one  at  the  door  to  give  notice 
would  not  avoid  the  election  unless  there  was  affirmative  proof  that 
the  electors  were  thereby  kept  from  the  meeting.^^®  The  neglect  to 
close  the  polls  at  the  prescribed  time  is  not  a  fatal  irregularity  if  the 
result  of  the  election  is  not  afEected;^^^  and  an  election  was  pro- 

"«Melvin's   Case,   68   Pa.   St.   333,  18  N.  W.  544;   Wakefield  v.  Patter- 

338.  son,  25  Kan.  709. 

^°'  Preston   v.   Culbertson,   58   Cal.  ^^^  Wisconsin  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Ashland 

198,  209;    in  quatuor  pedibus.  Dale  Co.,  81  Wis.  1;  s.  c.  50  N.  W.  937. 

V.  Irwin,  78  111.  170,  180.     See  also,  ^""Holland  v.  I^avies,  36  Ark.  446; 

Steele  v.  Calhoun,  61  Miss.  556;  Far-  Knox  Co.  v.  Davis,  63  111.  405;   Cle- 

rington  v.  Turner,  53  Mich.  27;  s.  c.  land  v.  Porter,  74  111.  76. 


373 


MEETINGS    AND   ELECTIONS. 


§    397 


nounced  valid  whoro  the  closing  of  the  polls  was  one  hour  premature, 
no  elector  havinfj  Ix'en  thereby  deprived  of  his  right.-"'* 

§  397.  Popular  elections — Plurality. — "It  is  the  theory  and  general 
practice  of  our  government  that  the  candidate  who  has  but  a  minority 
of  the  legal  votes  cast  docs  not  become  a  duly  elected  olTicer.  But  it 
is  also  the  theory  and  practice  of  our  government  that  a  minority  of 
the  whole  body  of  qualified  electors  may  elect  to  an  office,  when  a 
majority  of  that  body  refuse  or  decline  to  vote  for  any  one  for  that 
office.  Those  of  them  who  are  absent  from  the  polls  in  theory  and 
practical  result  are  assumed  to  assent  to  the  action  of  those  who  go 
to  the  polls."^°^  Furthermore,  it  is  not  necessary  that  a  candidate  for 
office  shall  have  an  absolute  majority  of  all  the  votes  cast  at  a  popular 
election.  "At  an  election,  by  common  law,  it  is  only  necessary  that 
there  should  be  a  majority  for  one  candidate  over  every  other  [any 
other]  candidate.  There  may  be  as  many  candidates  as  there  are 
electors,  less  one,  and  the  votes  of  two  would  carry  the  election,  how- 
ever numerous  the  electors,  if  all  the  others  voted  for  separate  can- 
didates, and  the  vote  of  one  would  be  a  lawful  election  if  no  other 
elector  voted."^"^ 


=»  People  V.  Cook,  8  N.  Y.  67. 

■201  pgj.  Folger,  J.,  in  People  v.  Clute, 
50  N.  Y.  451,  461;  Verbeck  v.  Scott, 
71  Wis.  59;  s.  c.  36  N.  W.  600;  Rex 
V.  Varlo,  Cowp.  248;  Field  v.  Field, 
9  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  394.  "All  qualified 
voters  who  absent  themselves  from 
an  election  duly  called  ai'e  presumed 
to  assent  to  the  expressed  will  of  the 
majority  of  those  voting,  unless  the 
law  providing  for  the  election  other- 
wise declares.  Any  other  rule  would 
be  productive  of  the  greatest  incon- 
venience, and  ought  not  to  be  adopt- 
ed unless  the  legislative  will  to  that 
effect  is  clearly  expressed:"  Cass  Co. 
V.  Johnston,  95  U.  S.  360,  369,  per 
Waite,  C.  J. 

="' Gosling  V.  Veley,  4  H.  L.  Cas. 
679,  740,  per  Martin,  B.;  Throop  Pub- 
lic Agents,  §  139;  citing  Paine  Elec- 
tions, §§  173,  174;  Naar  Elections 
147;  Cooley  Const.  Lim.  (5th  ed.) 
779.  See  also.  State  v.  Green,  37 
Ohio  St.  227;  People  v.  Clute,  50  N. 
Y.  451,  461;  Lawrence  v.  Ingersoll, 
88  Tenn.  52;  s.  c.  12  S.  W.  422;  6  L. 


R.  A.  308;  and  especially.  People  v. 
Stone,  78  Mich.  635,  639;  s.  c.  44  N. 
W.  333,  cited  in  §  156,  ante,  where 
the  plurality  rule  was  applied  to 
elections  by  definite  bodies;  and  a 
fortiori,  that  doctrine  would  govern 
in  popular  elections.  State  v.  Wil- 
mington, 3  Harr.  (Del.)  294,  lays 
down  a  contrai'y  rule  as  the  common 
law,  but  Harrington,  J.,  dissented, 
"as  it  would  seem,  with  reason," 
says  Judge  Dillon:  Dillon  Munic. 
Coi'p.,  §  277,  n.  A  dictum  in  ^State 
V.  Fagan,  42  Conn.  32,  35,  is  squarely 
opposed  to  the  text.  The  matter  in 
issue  was  the  validity  of  a  (popular) 
school  district  election.  The  court 
said: — "Viewing  the  questions  raised 
in  this  case  to  be  determined,  as  we 
do,  entirely  by  statute,  it  is  quite 
unnecessary  to  consider  what  the 
rule  of  the  common  law  may  be  as 
to  the  effect  of  a  plurality  vote,  or 
the  necessity  for  a  majority  vote  to 
make  a  valid  election.  Our  govern- 
ment and  our  institutions  rest  on 
the  principle  that  controlling  power 


398 


PUBLIC    CORPOKATIONS. 


374r 


§  398.  The  same  subject  continued — Majorities,  etc. — The  follow- 
ing expressions  in  statutory  or  constitutional  provisions  as  to  an  elec- 
tion have  been  held  to  mean  a  majority,  two-thirds,  etc.,  as  the  case 
may  be,  of  those  actually  voting,  and  not  a  majority  of  all  who  might 
have  voted:  "a  majority  of  such,  electors ;"^°^  "two-thirds  of  such 
qualified  voters  ;"-°'*  "wishes  of  a  majority  of  the  members  *  *  * 
expressed  at  a  church  election;"-"^  "majority  of  the  legal  voters ;"^'^*' 
"two-thirds  of  the  qualified  voters  of  the  township  voting  at  such 
election  ;"-*'^  "three-fifths  of  the  voters  of  said  city  f^"^  "three-fifths 
of  the  voters  therein  voting;"-**'*  "two-thirds  of  the  qualified 
voters;"-^**  "majority  of  the  voters ;"^^^  "majority  of  the  legal 
voters."^^- 

§  399.  Voting  by  ballot. — Where  a  statute  provides  that  the  elec- 
tion of  certain  officers  at  a  town  meeting  shall  be  by  ballot  if  called 
for,  this  does  not  necessarily  imply  that  they  must  be  voted  for  each 


is  vested  in  the  majority.  In  the 
absence  of  any  provision  by  law  to 
the  contrary,  the  will  of  any  com- 
munity or  association,  body  politic 
or  corporate,  is  properly  declared 
only  by  the  voice  of  the  majority." 

'"« Taylor  v.  Taylor,  10  Minn.  107; 
Bayard  v.  Klinge,  16  Minn.  249;  Ev- 
erett v.  Smith,  22  Minn.  53. 

="*  State  v.  Renick,  37  Mo.  270.  See 
also,  State  v.  Binder,  38  Mo.  450. 

"'^  Craig  V.  First  Presbyt'n  Church, 
88  Pa.  St.  42. 

^""'St.  Joseph  Tp.  V.  Rogers,  16 
Wall.  644. 

''°'Cass  Co.  V.  Johnston,  95  U.  S. 
360. 

^'^  Yesler  v.  City  of  Seattle,  1  Wash. 
308;  s.  c.  25  Pac.  1014. 

=»  Metcalfe  v.  City  of  Seattle,  1 
Wash.  297;  s.  c.  25  Pac.  1010;  State 
v.  Snodgrass,  1  Wash.  305;  s.  c.  25 
Pac.  1014. 

^"Carroll  Co.  v.  Smith,  111  U. 
S.  556;  s.  c.  4  S.  Ct.  539.  Contra, 
State  v.  Sutterfleld,  54  Mo.  391; 
Southerland  v.  Board  &c.,  96  N.  C. 
49;  s.  c.  1  S.  E.  760. 

^^  Louisville  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Davidson 
County  Court,  1  Sneed  (Tenn.)  637; 
People  V.  Wiant,  48  111.  263;  People 
V.  Warfield,  20  111.  160;  People  v. 
Garner,  47  111.  246,  holding  that  the 


vote  cast  at  a  general  election  is 
prima  facie  evidence  of  the  number 
of  legal  voters  in  the  county;  Tay- 
lor v.  Taylor,  10  Minn.  107,  to  the 
same  point;  State  v.  Binder,  38  Mo. 
450.  Contra,  People  v.  Brown,  11  111. 
478.  "A  vote  of  the  majority  of  qual- 
ified voters  therein:"  Chester  &c.  R. 
Co.  V.  Commissioners  &c.,  72  N.  C. 
486. 

"^-  "Legal  voter"  means  a  "qualified 
elector"  who  does  in  fact  vote:  San- 
ford  V.  Prentice,  28  Wis.  358.  "Pro- 
vided that  a  majority  of,"  etc.,  "shall 
be  present  .  .  .  and  shall  vote," 
prevents  action  by  less  than  a  major- 
ity of  the  whole:  Point  Pleasant 
Land  Co.  v.  Trustees,  47  N.  J.  L.  235; 
State  V.  Trustees,  49  N.  J.  L.  607; 
s.  c.  10  Atl.  191.  See  also,  an  article 
by  Irving  Browne,  Esq.,  on  "What 
Constitutes  a  Majority  of  Electors?" 
in  22  Alb.  L.  J.  44.  Under  a  consti- 
tutional provision  that  the  legisla- 
ture shall  have  no  power  to  remove 
a  county  seat,  and  that  no  county 
seat  shall  be  removed  unless  a  ma- 
jority of  the  electors  vote  for  its  re- 
moval, the  legislature  may  provide 
that  there  shall  be  no  removal  unless 
two-thirds  of  the  electors  vote  for 
it:  Alexander  v.  People,  7  Colo.  155; 
s.  c.  2  Pac.  894. 


375    .  MEETINGS    AND   ELECTIONS.  §    400 

upon  a  separate  and  single  ballot  and  in  succession,  one  after  another : 
it  would  bo  competent  for  the  meeting  to  direct  by  vote  properly 
taken  that  all  the  officers  to  be  elected,  or  a  part  of  them  as  might 
be  deemed  expedient,  be  voted  for  together  on  the  same  ballot  in  a 
manner  similar  to  that  in  which  state  and  county  officers  are  voted 
for;  this  would  give  each  voter  the  right  and  opportunity  to  cast 
his  vote  for  tbe  very  man  of  his  choice  for  each  office  by  making  up 
his  ballot  with  the  names  of  such  men.  But  this  can  not  be  done 
where  a  ticket  is  nominated  by  a  committee  and  the  voters  are  re- 
quired to  accept  or  reject  the  whole  report.  The  privilege  of  voting 
for  some  of  the  nominees  and  against  the  rest,  and  for  somebody  else 
in  their  stead, — to  "scratch  the  ticket,"  as  the  modern  expression  is, — 
can  not  be  lawfully  denied  to  the  voter.  And  although  the  mode  of 
voting  on  a  ticket  as  an  entirety  may  have  been  used  without  objection 
in  previous  meetings,  it  does  not  become  binding  upon  any  one;  it 
is  not  a  case  for  the  loss  of  a  right  by  non-user  or  acquiescence  or  the 
gaining  of  a  right  by  adverse  use."^^ 

§  400.  The  same  subject  continued. — At  a  village  meeting  a  ballot 
was  taken  for  moderator.  Many  were  present  besides  lawful  voters, 
who  were  mixed  indiscriminately  in  the  crowd  and  were  participating 
in  the  excitement  and  uproar  that  characterized  the  scene.  Tellers 
with  hats  made  their  way  through  the  crowd,  and  it  was  impossible 
to  know  whether  some  voters,  legal  or  illegal,  did  not  deposit  more 
than  a  single  vote,  or  that  a  single  voter  did  not  put  a  vote  or  votes 
into  more  than  one  hat.  The  court  in  condemning  the  proceedings 
said:  "However  proper  such  a  mode  of  voting  may  be  on  some 
special  occasions  when  the  voters  are  few  and  are  well-known  and 
reliable  men,  and  the  excitement  of  hostile  interests  is  not  operating 
to  prompt  to  anything  but  fair  and  legal  voting,  and  when  it  would  at 
once  be  manifest  if  illegal  votes  should  be  cast,  nothing  that  could  be 
said  upon  the  subject  could  make  more  palpable  the  gross  impropriety 
of  taking  the  vote  as  it  was  done  in  this  case.  It  was  but  a  burlesque 
and  a  mockery  of  all  sensible  and  sober  ideas  of  a  ballot  answerable 
to  the  lawful  right  of  the  citizen  and  to  the  soundness  with  which  the 
exercise  of  that  right  is  hallowed  in  the  speech,  at  least,  of  the  dema- 
gogue, as  well  as  of  the  ingenuous  citizen.  It  is  of  no  avail  to  say  that 
it  was  difficult  to  take  the  vote  in  any  other  way.  It  would  have  been 
in  point  and  cogent  to  answer  that  it  better  not  have  been  taken  at 
all  than  to  be  taken  as  it  was..  It  is  at  the  bottom  of  all  honest  and 
just  ideas  of  a  proper  vote  that  some  mode  should  be  adopted  by 
which  it  may  be  known  by  persons  authorized  to  determine  a  ques- 

"^  State  V.  Harris,  52  Vt.  216,  226. 


§    401  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  376 

tioned  right  to  vote  what  persons  oiTer  to  cast  votes,  or  to  vote  by 
voice  or  by  count,  that  the  right  of  any  such  may  be  challenged  and 
jjroperly  determined,  and  that  in  voting  by  ballot  it  may,  with  all 
practicable  certainty,  be  known  whether  more  votes  have  been  cast 
than  there  are  legal  voters  to  cast  them."-^'* 

§  401.  The  Australian  ballot  and  cumulative  voting. — The  Aus- 
tralian ballot  system,  as  it  is  called,  has  been  adopted  by  statute  in 
many  of  the  states.-^ ^  The  main  feature  of  this  system  is  that  each 
voter  is  provided  with  an  official  ballot.  Upon  this  the  names  of  the 
candidates  are  printed,  and  the  use  of  any  other  paper  as  a  ballot  is 
forbidden.  But  blank  spaces  are  left  for  the  insertion  of  any  names 
that  may  be  desired.  These  statutes  are  not  in  conflict  with  the  con- 
stitutional requirement  that  "elections  shall  be  free  and  equal," 
although  the  privilege  of  having  ballots  printed  at  the  expense  of  the 
state  is  granted  only  when  the  number  of  those  who  support  a  par- 
ticular ticket  is  equal  to  a  certain  percentage  of  the  whole  number 
of  votes  cast  at  a  previous  election. ^^®  An  attempt  has  been  made  in 
Ohio  and  Michigan  to  provide  for  minority  representation  by  statute 
in  the  absence  of  express  constitutional  authority ;  and  in  New  York 
there  has  been  legislation  sanctioning  cumulative  voting  in  certain 
cases.  The  supreme  court  of  Ohio  held  that  every  elector  is  entitled 
to  vote  for  every  candidate  who  is  to  be  elected,  and  a  law  which  de- 
nied the  right  to  vote  for  more  than  two  of  the  jiersons  to  be  chosen 
was  declared  to  be  unconstitutional;*^'^  and  this  rule  has  been  fol- 
lowed in  Michigan.^^^  The  question  has  been  twice  before  the  court 
of  appeals  of  New  York,  but  the  tribunal  has  found  a  way  of  dis- 
posing of  the  cases  without  passing  upon  the  constitutionality  of  the 
law.^^®     It  is  significant,  however,  that  all  the  other  states  which 

='■*  State  V.  Harris,  52  Vt.  216,  222.  -'^  For  an  enumeration  of  ttie  states 

The   court  lield   tliat  quo   warranto  and  a  citation  of  tlie  legislative  acts, 

lies  against  a  moderator  elected  by  see  Amer.   Dig.  Ann.   1891,  p.   1417, 

the  vote  of  those  who  had  no  right  §    66;    Ibid.,   1892,   p.   1634,    §    93   et 

to  vote,  and  that  where  the  statute  seq. 

requires  an  election  to  be  by  ballot,  -^'''  De  Walt  v.  Hartley,  146  Pa.  St. 

"if  called  for,"  it  is  the  right  of  a  529;   s.  c.  24  Atl.  185;   State  v.  Mc- 

single  voter  to  have  a  ballot  upon  Millan,  108  Mo.  153;   s.  c.  18  S.  W. 

his  demand  when  heard  and  under-  784. 

stood  by  the  presiding  officer.     If  a  -'"  State  v.  Constantine,  42  Ohio  St. 
moderator   who   is   illegally   chosen  437.      See    also.    Hays    v.    Common- 
presides  at  a  meeting,  and  a  distinct  wealth,  82  Pa.  St.  518. 
and     contemporaneous     protest     is  '^^  Maynard  v.  Board  &c.,  84  Mich. 
made,  it  is  at  least  doubtful  if  the  228;  s.  c.  47  N.  W.  756. 
proceedings  are  of  any  validity  what-  ™  People  v.  Crissey,  91  N.  Y.  616; 
ever.    See  on  this  point,  §  372,  n.  88,  People  v.  Kenney,  96  N.  Y.  294. 
ante. 


377  MEETINGS    AND    ELECTIONS.  §    402 

have  authorized  such  voting  have  submitted  it  to  the  people  for  their 
adoption  as  part  of  their  fundamental  law,  and  it  is  not  likely  that  it 
can  be  successfully  introduced  in  any  other  way, 

§  402.  Absolute  accuracy  not  required  in  a  ballot. — Voting  is  usu- 
ally required  to  be  by  ballot,  but  that  method  is  not  imperative  in 
the  absence  of  such  a  requirement.^^''  Voting  by  proxy  is  not  per- 
mitted, but  a  ballot  deposited  by  another  in  the  voter's  presence  and 
at  his  request  would  not  be  rejected.--^  The  names  of  the  persons 
voted  for  should  be  expressed  with  reasonable  certainty,  but  incorrect 
spelling  will  not  vitiate  a  ballot  if  the  name  is  idem  sonans.  The 
rule  was  recently  stated  by  the  supreme  court  of  Illinois,  as  follows: 
^'A  ballot  is  indicative  of  the  will  of  the  voter.  It  is  not  required 
that  it  should  be  nicely  or  accurately  written,  or  that  the  name  of  the 
candidate  voted  for  should  be  correctly  spelled.  It  should  be  read 
in  the  light  of  all  the  circumstances  surrounding  the  election  and  the 
voter,  and  the  object  should  be  to  ascertain  and  carry  into  effect  the 
intention  of  the  voter,  if  it  can  be  determined  with  reasonable  cer- 
tainty. The  ballot  should  be  liberally  construed,  and  the  intend- 
ments should  be  in  favor  of  a  reading  and  construction  which  will 
Tender  the  ballot  effective  rather  than  in  favor  of  a  conclusion  which 
"will  on  some  technical  ground  render  it  ineffective.  At  the  same  time 
it  is  not  admissible  to  show  that  something  was  intended  which  is 
contradictory  of  what  was  done,  and  if  the  ballot  is  so  defective  as 
to  fail  to  show  any  intention  whatever,  it  must  be  disregarded."-^^ 

-^•^  Mechem  Public  Oflfices  and  Offi-  Behrn,  Benhmyer,  Berhenmeyer  and 

cers,  §  190.  Behrsyer.      Considerable    deviations 

'■^'-  Opinion    of   Justices,    41    N.    H.  and    omissions    are    allowed  where 

550;    People    v.    Blodgett,    13    Mich,  there  is  no  other  candidate  of  the 

127;  Clark  v.  Robinson,  88  111.  498.  same  name,  such  as  the  omission  of 

^^- Behrensmeyer  v.  Kreitz,  135  111.  a  middle  letter:    People  v.  Kennedy, 

591;  s.  c.  26  N.  E.  704.    Accordingly,  37  Mich.  67;  State  v.  Gates,  43  Conn, 

in  that  case,  where  the  plaintiff  was  533  (a  wrong  middle  letter;  cf.  Opin- 

a  candidate   and   his  name,   though  ion  of  Judges,  38  Maine  598)  ;  or  of 

properly  pronounced   in   four   sylla-  a  suffix:     People  v.   Cook,   14  Barb. 

bles,  was  sometimes  syncopated  into  (N.   Y.)    259;    s.   c.   59  Am.   D.   451. 

two,  it  was  held  lawful  to  count  for  Initials  of  the  first  name  are  suffi- 

liim  ballots  on  which  the  name  was  cient:     Attorney-General    v.    Ely,    4 

written  respectively:    Behrenmeyer,  Wis.    420;     People    v.    Ferguson,    8 

Behrsmeyer,     Bauersmyer,     Bernsh-  Cowen    (N.  Y.)    102;    People  v.  Sea- 

myer,  Benshmyer,  Benshmyre,  Ben-  man,  5  Denio  (N.  Y.)  409;  People  v. 

ere,    Bensmyer,    Bernsmere,    Borns-  Cook.  8  N.  Y.  67;   Chapman  v.  Per- 

moer,    Berhensmeyer,    Bernstmeyer,  giison,  1  Bart.  El.  Cas.  267.    Contra, 

Berensmyer,    Bernmyer,   Bernsmier,  People  v.  Tisdale,  1  Doug.    (Mich.) 

Behrensmier,    Benmyr,    Berenmyer,  59;   People  v.  Higgins,  3  Mich.  233; 

Behrnsmeyer,  Berntsmire,  Behrens,  s.  c.  61  Am.  D.  491;  People  v.  Cicott, 


§  40^ 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS. 


378 


§  403.  Votes  for  ineligible  candidates. — It  is  the  rule  in  England 
that  if  an  ineligible  candidate  has  a  majority  of  valid  votes  the  per- 
son having  the  next  highest  numher  is  not  elected,  and  there  must  be 
a  new  election.  If  the  voter  is  ignorant  of  the  fact  of  disqualifica- 
tion,^^^ or  of  disqualification  as  a  conclusion  of  law,^^*  his  vote  is 
valid  for  the  purpose  of  being  counted.--'''  In  the  United  States  "the 
great  current  of  authority  sustains  the  doctrine  that  the  ineligibility 
of  the  majority  candidate  does  not  elect  the  minority  candidate,  and 
this  without  reference  to  the  question  as  to  whether  the  voters 
knew  of  the  ineligibility  of  the  candidate  for  whom  they  voted.  It 
is  considered  that  in  such  a  case  the  votes  for  the  ineligible  candidate 
are  not  void."--''  But  the  authorities  are  not  entirely  uniform. 
Thus,  in  New  York,  as  in  England,  knowledge  is  an  element  in  the 


16  Mich.  282;  s.  c.  97  Am.  D.  141. 
See  also,  Opinion  of  Judges,  64 
Maine  596;  '  Clark  v.  Board  &c.,  126 
Mass.  282.  Common  abbreviations 
of  the  first  name  are  not  fatal:  Reg. 
v.  Bradley,  3  El.  &  El.  634;  People  v. 
Ferguson,  8  Cowen  (N.  Y.)  102; 
Chumasero  v.  Gilbert,  26  111.  39; 
Gillham  v.  President  &c.,  2  Scam. 
(111.)  245;  Bank  v.  Peel,  11  Ark.  750. 
Nor  in  one  case  was  its  total  omis- 
sion: Talkington  v.  Turner,  71  111. 
234.  But  if  there  is  a  radical  depar- 
ture the  ballot  must  be  thrown  out: 
People  V.  Cicott,  16  Mich.  282;  State 
V.  Judge  &c.,  13  Ala.  805.  See  also, 
on  this  subject,  Paine  Elections, 
§  540  et  seq.;  Mechem  Public  Offices 
and  Officers,  §  199  et  seq. 

--'  Gosling  V.  Veley,  7  Ad.  &  El.  (N. 
S.)  406;  s.  c.  4  H.  L.  Cas.  679;  Reg. 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  L.  R.  3  Q.  B.  629;  Reg. 
V.  Coaks,  3  El.  &  Bl.  249;  Claridge  v. 
Evelyn,  5  B.  &  Aid.  81;  Rex  v.  Mon- 
day, 2  Cowp.  530;  Rex  v.  Hawkins, 
10  East  211;  Rex  v.  Bridge,  1  M.  & 
S.  76. 

"'  Reg.  V.  Mayor  &c.,  L.  R.  3  Q.  B. 
629,  holding  that  the  maxim  "Igno- 
rantia  legis  non  excusat"  has  no  ap- 
plication. 

--^  See  also,  for  the  rule  in  Ireland, 
In  re  Tipperary  Elec.  9  Ir.  R.  C.  L. 
217;  Reg.  v.  Franklin,  6  Ir.  R.  C. 
L.  239;  Trench  v.  Nolan,  6  Ir.  R.  C. 


L.  464;  s.  c.  27  L.  T.  R.  69.  But  the 
next  highest  candidate  is  elected  if 
the  ineligibility  both  as  to  fact  and 
law  was  known  and  notorious:  Rex 
V.  Hawkins,  10  East  211;  King  v. 
Parry,  14  East  549;  Gosling  v.  Veley, 

7  Ad.  &  El.  (N.  S.)  406;  s.  c.  4  H.  L. 
Cas.  679;  Rex  v.  Monday,  2  Cowp. 
530;  Rex  v.  Foxcroft,  2  Burr.  1017; 
Reg.  V.  Coaks,  3  El.  &  Bl.  249; 
Trench  v.  Nolan,  2  Moak  711.  See 
also,  Cooley  Const.  Lim.  (6th  ed.) 
780. 

--"Privett  V.  Bickford,  26  Kan.  52, 
57;  Crawford  v.  Dunbar,  52  Cal.  36; 
Saunders  v.  Haynes,  13  Cal.  145;  In 
re  Corliss,  11  R.  I.  638;  State  v. 
Smith,  11  Wis.  65;  State  v.  Smith, 
14  Wis.  497;  People  v.  Molitor,  23 
Mich.  341;  Hoskins  v.  Brantley,  57 
Miss.  814;  Sublett  v.  Bedwell,  47 
Miss.  266;  s.  c.  12  Am.  R.  338;  Wood 
V.  Bartling,  16  Kan.  109,  114;  Bar- 
num  V.  Gilman,  27  Minn.  466;   s.  c. 

8  N.  W.  375;  State  v.  Gastinel,  20 
La.  An.  114;  State  v.  Boal,  46  Mo. 
528;  State  v.  Vail,  53  Mo.  97;  Dryden 
V.  Swinburne,  20  W.  Va.  89;  Com- 
monwealth V.  Cluley,  56  Pa.  St.  270; 
State  V.  Walsh,  7  Mo.  App.  142,  where 
the  death  of  the  majority  candidate 
befoi-e  the  polls  were  opened,  though 
it  was  known  to  the  voters,  did  not 
result  in  giving  the  election  to  the 
next  highest. 


379  MEETINGS   AND   ELECTIONS.  §    401 

case,  but  information  of  both  fact  and  law  must  be  brought  directly 
to  the  notice  of  the  voter  in  order  to  render  the  vote  a  nullity;^" 
while  in  Indiana  it  is  held  that  voters  are  conclusively  presumed  to 
know  of  a  candidate's  constitutional  disqualification  by  reason  of 
holding  another  office  within  the  election  district,  and  the  next 
highest  candidate  is  elected.--*^ 

§  404.  Putting  up  offices  at  auction — Tax  collector. — The  office  of 
tax  collector  was  set  up  at  auction  in  a  town  meeting  and  struck  off 
to  the  lowest  bidder,  and  the  town  afterwards  at  the  same  meeting 
chose  the  same  person  collector.  It  was  held  that  the  proceeding  was 
illegal.  The  court  said :  "Of  the  impropriety  of  putting  up  any 
office  at  auction  I  can  entertain  no  doubt.  *  *  *  The  direct  tend- 
ency of  such  a  practice  is  to  introduce  unsuitable  persons  into  public 
employment — to  induce  the  electors  to  give  their  suffrages  to  him 
who  will  work  cheapest  instead  of  him  who  is  best  qualified.  And 
if  an  office  which  is  supposed  to  be  onerous  and  to  deserve  compensa- 
tion may  be  offered  to  him  who  is  disposed  to  serve  for  the  lowest 
wages,  it  is  not  apparent  why  those  to  which  some  honor  is  attached 
may  not  be  offered  to  him  who  is  willing  to  give  most  for  the  privilege 
of  executing  them.  The  formality  of  an  election  may  be  had  after- 
wards in  the  one  case  as  well  as  in  the  other.  In  fact,  the  office  of 
collector  has,  in  one  instance  at  least,  been  deemed  such  an  object 
of  competition  as  to  produce  an  offer  of  a  nominal  even  if  it  was  not 
an  actual  consideration  duly  paid.  In  a  case  recently  tried  in  another 
county  the  following  was  among  the  records  produced:     'Voted,  that 

the  collectoTship  should  be  set  up  to  the  best  bidder.     J M 

agreed  to  give  one  and  a  half  mugs  of  toddy  for  the  privilege  of 
collecting.'  No  evidence  of  the  impropriety  of  setting  up  the  office 
at  auction  more  conclusive  than  this  would  be  desired  or  furnished. 
And  there  is  no  necessity  for  such  a  practice.  The  town  may  fix  upon 
a  suitable  compensation  in  the  first  instance ;  or  it  may  be  left  for  such 
compensation  to  be  afterwards  made  as  the  services  rendered  shall 
appear  to  demand ;  and  in  either  case  there  is  no  inducement  to  elect 
an  unsuitable  person."--^ 

"' People  v.  Clute,  50  N.  Y.  451.  in  a  concurring  opinion  said: — "A 

^^*  Gulick  V.  New,  14  Ind.  93;  s.  c.  collector  thus  chosen  is  not  fit  to  be 

77  Am.  D.  49.     See  also,  Hatcheson  trusted  with  the  power  to  seize  the 

V.  Tilden,  4  Harr.  &  McH.  (Md.)  279;  goods  and  arrest  the  bodies  of  citi- 

State  V.  Boal,  46  Mo.  528.  zens,  especially  of  citizens  who  did 

229  Per  Parker,  J.,  in  Tucker  v.  Ai-  not  concur  in  the  choice.    And  if  an 

ken,  7  N.  H.  113,  129,  130.     But  the  action  of  trespass  had  been  brought 

court  held  that  the  collector  was  an  against   [the  defendant]    for  taking 

officer  de  facto.     Richardson,  C.  J.,  the    goods    mentioned      ...      he 


§    405  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  380 

§  405.  City  council  as  judge  of  election  and  qualification  of  its 
members. — It  is  the  settled  doctrine  in  some  jurisdictions  that  where 
provision  is  made  hy  statute  for  contesting  elections,  the  statutory- 
proceeding  is  the  exclusive  remedy  ;^^°  but  the  weight  of  authority 
is  to  the  contrary :  holding  that  where  common  councils  are  made  the 
judges  of  the  elections  and  qualifications  of  their  members  the  com- 
mon-law remedy  of  quo  warranto  is  not  prohibited  unless  the  power 
of  the  council  is  expressly  declared  to  be  final. -^^  And  w^here  there 
is  no  such  office  as  that  which  a  claimant  assumes  to  fill,  or  there  is 
no  authority  for  his  election  thereto,  the  attempt  by  him  to  exercise 
its  functions  is  a  mere  usurpation.  In  such  a  case  a  proceeding  to 
contest  his  election  is  inapplicable  and  inappropriate,  and  if  the 
puljlic  exigencies  demand  it  he  may  be  ousted  by  quo  warranto;  as, 
for  instance,  Avhere  a  person  claims  to  be  elected  a  member  of  a 
council  from  a  ward  which  has  no  legal  existence,^^^  or  from  a  ward 
which  is  already  fully  represented.-^^  In  the  latter  case  the  court 
said:  "The  supreme  court  can  not  inquire  whetlier  the  election  was 
regularly  conducted,  for  that  duty  belongs  to  the  branch  of  the 
council  in  wliich  the  seat  is  claimed;  but  tliey  can  decide  the  question 
w^hether  there  was  an  oi^ce  or  vacancy  to  be  filled."^^* 

§  406.    Canvass  and  return  and  contest  of  elections. — "It  is  well 

settled  that  the  duties  of  canvassing  officers  and  boards  are  ministerial 
merely,  and  not  judicial.  Their  duty  is  to  count  the  votes  as  cast^ 
and  they  have  no  authority,  unless  expressly  granted,  to  hear  evidence 
or  to  pass  upon  or  correct  alleged  errors,  irregularities  or  frauds."- ^^ 

would  probably  have  found  it  very  34  N.  W.  226;   17  Am.  &  Eng.  Corp. 

difficult  to   show   a  legal   defense:"  Cas.   388;    State  v.   Gates,   35   Minn. 

S.  C,  p.  140.     See  also,  Proprietors  385;  s.  c.  28  N.  W.  927;  Board  &c.  v. 

&c.  V.  Page,  6  N.  H.  182.  Darrow,  13  Colo.  460;    s.  c.  22   Pac. 

=*' State    V.    Marlow,    15    Ohio    St.  784;   30  Am.  &  Eng,  Corp.  Cas.  342; 

114;  State  v.  Berry,  14  Ohio  St.  315;  People  v.  Londoner,  13  Colo.  303;   s. 

State  V.  Berry,  47  Ohio  St.  232;  s.  c.  c.  22  Pac.  764;  State  v.  Kraft,  18  Or. 

24  N.  E.   266;    State  v.  O'Brien,   47  550;  s.  c.  23  Pac.  663;  30  Am.  &  Eng. 

Ohio  St.  464;   s.  c.  25  N.  E.  121;   34  Corp.  Cas.  337. 

Am.  &  Eng.  Corp.  Cas.  361;  People  v.  ='-  State  v.  O'Brien,  47  Ohio  St.  464; 

Metzker,  47  Cal.  524   (see,  however,  s.  c.  25  N.  E.  121;    34  Am.  &  Eng. 

People  V.  Bingham,  82  Cal.  238;  s.  c.  Corp.  Cas.  361. 

22  Pac.  1039);    People  v.  Harshaw,  -"  Commonwealth  v.  Meeser,  44  Pa. 

60   Mich.   200;    s.   c.   26  N.  W.   879;  St.  341. 

Commonwealth  v.  Leech,  44  Pa.  St.  -'^*  Commonwealth  v.  Meeser,  44  Pa. 

332.    Cf.  Commonwealth  v.  Allen,  70  St.  341. 

Pa.  St.  465.  "'''  Mechem  Public  Offices  and  Offi- 

-"  McVeany  v.  Mayor  &c.,  80  N.  Y.  cers,    §    208;    citing    People   v.   Van 

185;    People  v.  Hall,   80  N.  Y.  117;  Cleve,  1  Mich.  362;    s.  c.  53  Am.  D. 

State  V.  Kempf,  69  Wis.  470;   s.  c.  69;    People  v.  Cicott,  16  Mich.   253, 


581 


MEETINGS    AND    ELECTIONS. 


406 


Genuine  and  regular  returns  are  to  be  accepted  without  question  by 
the  canvassers,  whose  function  is  simply  to  declare  the  api)arcnt  re- 
sult of  the  voting,  and  not  to  investigate  or  pass  upon  the  legality  of 
the  election.-''"'  They  may  be  compelled  to  act  by  mandamus;-''^  and 
when  they  have  completed  their  task  their  powers  are  exhausted,  and 
they  become  functi  officio.-^®  The  common-law  remedy  for  a  defeated 
candidate  who  wishes  to  contest  the  finding  and  certificate  of  elec- 
tion is  by  an  information  in  the  nature  of  a  quo  warranto;  but 
where  the  statute  prescribes  the  mode  of  procedure  it  is  generally 
exclusive.-^^  Where  an  ordinance  enacted  pursuant  to  the  charter 
provides  for  a  contest  before  the  council,  that  is  the  only  method;-**^ 
and  the  action  of  the  council  in  regard  to  the  election  of  its  members 
is  not  reviewable  on  error.^*^  Where  the  council  is  made  the  judge 
of  the  election  and  qualification  of  its  members  courts  have  no  juris- 
diction in  the  matter  of  contests.-"*^ 


321;  s.  c.  97  Am.  D.  141;  Morgan  v. 
Quackenbush,  22  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  72; 
Dalton  V.  State,  43  Ohio  St.  652;  s.  c. 
3  N.  E.  685;  Opinions  of  Court.  58 
N.  H.  621;  State  v.  Steers,  44  Mo. 
223;  People  v.  Van  Slyck,  4  Cowen 
(N.  Y.)  297;  Ex  parte  Heath,  3  Hill 
(N.  Y.)  42,  47;  Dishon  v.  Smith,  10 
Iowa  212;  State  v.  Cavers,  22  Iowa 
343;  Attorney-General  v.  Barstow,  4 
Wis.  567,  749;  State  v.  Rodman,  43 
Mo.  256;  State  v.  Harrison,  38  Mo. 
540;  Taylor  v.  Taylor,  10  Minn.  107; 
O'Farrell  v.  Colby,  2  Minn.  180; 
Leigh  V.  State,  69  Ala.  261;  State  v. 
Wilson,  24  Neb.  139;  s.  c.  38  N.  W. 
31;  Maxwell  v.  Tolly,  26  S.  C.  77;  s. 
c.  1  S.  E.  160. 

-^^  Paine  Elections,  §  603;  Lewis  v. 
Commissioners,  16  Kan.  102;  s.  c.  22 
Am.  R.  275;  State  v.  Board  &c.,  17 
Fla.  29;  Peebles  v.  Commissioners, 
82  N.  C.  385;  State  v.  Steers,  44  Mo. 
223.  "They  have  no  discretion  to 
hear  and  take  proof  as  to  frauds, 
even  if  morally  certain  that  mon- 
strous frauds  have  been  perpe- 
trated:" Attorney-General  v.  Bar- 
stow,  4  Wis.  567. 

^^  Brown  v.  Commissioners  &c.,  38 


Kan.  436;  s.  c.  17  Pac.  304;  Lewis  v. 
Commissioners  &c.,  16  Kan.  102;  s.  c. 
22  Am.  R.  275;  State  v.  County 
Com'rs,  23  Kan.  264;  State  v.  Wilson, 
24  Neb.  139;  s.  c.  38  N.  W.  31;  State 
v.  Hill,  10  Neb.  58;  s.  c.  4  N.  W.  514; 
Magee  v.  Supervisors,  10  Cal.  376; 
Kisler  v.  Cameron,  39  Ind.  488;  State 
V.  County  Judge,  7  Iowa  186;  Clark 
V.  McKenzie,  7  Bush  (Ky.)  523;  At- 
torney-General V.  Board  &c.,  64  Mich. 
607;  s.  c.  31  N.  W.  539;  Common- 
wealth V.  Emminger,  74  Pa.  St.  479; 
Burke  v.  Supervisors,  4  W.  Va.  371; 
Alderson  v.  Commissioners,  31  W. 
Va.  633;  s.  c.  8  S.  E.  274. 

"-^  State  v.  Randall,  35  Ohio  St.  64, 

^'"See  Paine  Elections,  §  811; 
Mechem  Public  Offices  and  Officers, 
§  215  et  seq. 

^^ostine  V.  Berry,  96  Ky.  63;  s.  c. 
27  S.  W.  809. 

-"  Stearns  v.  Village  of  Wyoming, 
53  Ohio  St.  352;  s.  c.  41  N.  E.  578. 

'^"  Foley  V.  Tyler,  161  111.  167;  s.  c. 
43  N.  E.  845;  Linegar  v.  Rittenhouse, 
94  111.  208.  But  this  may  not  bar 
quo  warranto  mandamus:  Linegar 
V.  Rittenhouse,  supra;  State  v.  Mor- 
ris, 14  Wash.  262;  s.  c.  44  Pac.  266. 


CHAPTER  XII. 


CONSOLIDATION  AND  REORGANIZATION. 


Section 

407.  How  effected. 

408.  Power  of  legislature. 

409.  Constitutionality    of    laws    for 

annexation. 

410.  Delegation  of  legislative  power. 

411.  Illinois  decisions. 

412.  Mai-yland  decisions. 

413.  Michigan  decisions. 

414.  Missouri   and  Tennessee   decis- 

ions. 

415.  Ruling  as  to  Baltimore  City. 

416.  Rule   as   declared   in   Washing- 

ton. 

417.  Powers  of  cities  under  the  laws. 

418.  The  same  subject  continued. 

419.  What    may    be    annexed — Gen- 

eral rule. 

420.  The   same   subject   continued — 

Construction  of  statutes. 

421.  The  same  subject  continued. 

422.  Right  of  taxation  as  to  annexed 

lands. 

423.  Taxation  for  antecedent  indebt- 

edness. 

424.  Remedy  of  taxpayer. 

425.  Effect  of  consolidation. 

426.  The  same  subject  continued. 

427.  Annexation  proceedings  —  No- 

tice. 


431 

432 
433 
434 
435 


437. 
438. 
439. 


Section 

428.  Mode  of  voting. 

429.  Jurisdiction  and  procedure. 

430.  The  same  subject  continued. 
Reasonableness   of   annexation. 
Validity  of  annexation. 
Procedure  to  test  validity. 
The  same  subject  continued. 
Special   acts   as   to   reorganiza- 
tion. 

436.  Nebraska  act. 

Effect  of  reorganization. 
The  same  subject  continued. 
The   same   subject  continued — 

Decisions   in    California    and 

Tennessee. 

440.  Validity     of     reorganization — 

Special  cases. 

441.  Invalid  reorganization. 

442.  Property  rights  passing  to  new 

corporation. 

For  what  the  reorganized  cor- 
poration becomes  liable. 

Further  scope  of  the  foregoing 
doctrine. 

What  are  such  liabilities. 

Remedy  of  creditors  of  the  old 
corporation. 


443. 

444. 

445. 
446. 


§  407.  How  effected. — Municipal  corporations  may  be  consolidated 
by  act  of  the  legislature,  or  may  extend  their  boundaries  by  annexation 
of  territory  adjacent  by  proper  proceedings  according  to  the  procedure 
named  in  the  acts  of  the  legislature  providing  a  mode  in  which  this 
can  he  accomplished,  and  proper  tribunals  for  hearing  on  the  merits, 
and  trial  of  the  issues  involved  between  the  parties  desiring  annexa- 
tion and  those  remonstrating  against  it.  Reorganization  is  accom- 
plished by  a  new  act  of  incorporation,  in  the  form  of  a  new  charter 
from  the  legislature,  or  through  the  forms  and  modes  provided  in. 

(382) 


383  CONSOLIDATION    AND      REORGANIZATION.  g    408 

general  laws  existent  in  many  of  the  states  for  the  incorporation,  re- 
organization, etc.,  of  such  corporations. 

§  408.  Power  of  legislature. — The  power  to  divide  large  munici- 
palities, to  annul  their  old  charters  and  to  reorganize  them,  and  to 
consolidate  small  ones  as  well  as  to  detach  portions  of  territory  from 
one  and  annex  it  to  another,  to  meet  the  wishes  of  its  residents  or  to 
promote  the  public  interests,  as  understood  by  it,  is  conceded  to  the 
legislature.  This  power  is  full,  in  the  absence  of  constitutional  re- 
striction.^ And  the  legislature  by  the  passage  of  a  general  law  pre- 
scribing modes  by  which  adjacent  territory  may  be  annexed  to  mu- 
nicipal corporations  does  not  surrender  its  power  and  obligation  to 
enlarge  or  diminish  the  corporate  limits  of  any  town  or  city  whenever 
the  public  exigency  demands  that  it  should  be  done.^ 

§  409.  Constitutionality  of  laws  for  annexation. — Questions  have 
frequently  been  made  upon  the  constitutionality  of  laws  providing 
for  the  annexation  of  territory  to  municipal  corporations;  generally 
the  laws  have  been  upheld.  The  principal  cases  will  be  herein  referred 
to.  That  property  brought  by  annexation  within  the  corporate  limits 
of  a  municipal  corporation  will  be  subject  to  taxation  to  discharge  its 
pre-existing  indebtedness  is  no  constitutional  objection  to  the  exercise 
of  the  power  of  compulsory  annexation,  this  being  a  matter,  in  the 
absence  of  special  constitutional  restrictions,  belonging  wholly  to  the 
legislature  to  determine.^     The  supreme  court  of  Ohio  has  held  that 

^  Mount  Pleasant  v.  Beckwlth,  100  lature  shall  have  no  power  to  sus- 

U.  S.  514;  Morgan  v.  Beloit,  7  Wall,  pend  any  general  law  for  the  benefit 

613;    Thompson    v.    Abbott,    61    Mo.  of  individuals  inconsistent  with  the 

176;    Mayor  &c.   v.   Seaber,   3   Burr,  general    laws    of    the    land."     Cant- 

1866;    Inhabitants   &c.   v.   Skillings,  well,  J.,  said:    "By  these    [general] 

45    Maine    133;    Girard    v.   Philadel-  laws  the  power  to  create  or  abolish, 

phia,  7  Wall.  1;    s.  c.  19  L.  ed.  53;  enlarge  or  diminish,  municipalities 

Story  on  Const.,  §§  1385,  1388;   Dil-  is   reposed    in   the   legislature.    The 

Ion  Munic.  Corp.  139 ;  Cooley  Const,  power  of  annexation  by  a  prescribed 

Lim.  (6th  ed.)   228,  and  cases  cited  method    was   conferred   on   citizens 

in  notes;  True  v.  Davis,  133  111.  522;  and   freeholders  concerned;    and   at 

s    c.  22  N.  E.  410;    6  L.  R.  A.  266;  the  same  time  the  inherent  power  of 

Daly  V.  Morgan,  69  Md.  460;  s.  c.  16  annexation  by  special  act  was  left 

Atl.  287.  in    the    legislature.     The    situation 

-  Williams  v.  Nashville,   89   Tenn.  was  as  that  of  two  laws,  coexisting, 

487;  s.  c.  15  S.  W.  364.  where  a  legis-  by  either  of  which  the  same  result 

lative     act    annexing     territory     to  might  be  accomplished,  and  in  which 

Nashville  was  sustained  as  not  in-  resort  to  one  will  not  be  inconsistent 

consistent  with  the  general  laws  in  with  or  a  suspension  of  the  other." 

respect   to   annexation,    and    not   in  ^  Girard  v.  Philadelphia,  7  Wall.  1; 

conflict  with  Const.   Tenn.,  art.   11,  Elston  v.  Board  &c..  20  Ind.  272;  Ed- 

§  8,  cl.  1,  providing  that  "the  legis-  munds  v.  Gookins,  20  Ind.  477;  Mor- 


§  410  ruBLic  conroKATioxs.  384 

proceedings  to  annex  contiguous  territory  to  the  corporate  limits  of 
a  town,  in  pursuance  of  their  statute  upon  the  subject,  are  not  in  con- 
'  travention  of  the  provisions  of  the  constitution  of  the  state.*  The 
statutes  of  Kansas,  conferring  on  cities  of  the  second  chiss  power  to 
extend  their  boundaries  so  as  to  inchide  adjacent  hind  that  has  been 
subdivided  into  blocks  and  lots,  have  been  held  not  to  be  unconstitu- 
tional because  of  the  provision  of  the  constitution  of  Kansas  which 
gives  the  power  to  the  legislature  to  confer  on  the  tribunals  transact- 
ing county  business  such  powers  of  local  legislation  and  administra- 
tion as  it  may  deem  expedient,  as  such  power  is  not  exclusive,  but  can 
be  conferred  on  other  local  agencies.^ 

§  410.  Delegation  of  legislative  power. — The  laws  for  enlarging 
the  limits  of  municipal  corporations  have  been  frequently  assailed 
upon  the  ground  that  they  amount  to  a  delegation  of  legislative 
power  and  are  therefore  repugnant  to  the  constitutions  of  the  differ- 
ent states.  The  supreme  court  of  Kansas  has  held  the  first  class 
city  act  (1887),  which  provides  that  "any  city  of  the  first  class  may 
enlarge  or  extend  its  limits  or  area  by  an  ordinance  specifying  with 
accuracy  the  new  line  or  lines  to  which  it  is  proposed  to  enlarge  or 
extend  such  limits  or  area,"  not  to  be  such  a  delegation  of  legislative 
power  to  the  officers  of  a  municipality  as  will  vitiate  the  act.*'  The 
Missouri  act  conferring  on  cities  power  to  extend  their  limits  has 
been  held  not  to  be  an  unconstitutional  delegation  of  power.'^  In  a 
similar  case  in  Nebraska  it  was  urged  that  a  statute  providing  that, 

ford  V.  Unger,  8  Iowa  82;   Burling-  =*  City    of    Emporia    v.    Smith,    42 

ton  &c.  R.  Co.  V.  Spearman,  12  Iowa  Kan.  433;  s.  c.  22  Pac.  616. 

112;   Cheaney  v.  Hooser,  9  B.  Mon.  "^  Hurla    v.    City    of    Kansas    City 

(Ky.)    330;    Layton  v.  City  of  New  46  Kan.  738;    s.   c.  27  Pac.   143,  an 

Orleans,  12  La.  An.  515;  Arnoult  v.  action  to  set  aside  the  proceedings 

City  of  New  Orleans,  11  La.  An.  54;  by  which  the  boundaries  of  Kansas 

Inhabitants  &c.   v.   Inhabitants   &c..  City,  Kan.,  were  extended  to  include 

21  Maine  59;  Opinion  of  Justices,  6  the  original  cities  of  Kansas   City, 

Cush.    (Mass.)    578,  580;    Warren  v.  Armourdale     and     Wyandotte     and 

Mayor  &c.,  2  Gray   (Mass.)   84,  104;  other   contiguous  territory;    follow- 

Chandler    v.    City    of    Boston,    112  ing  Callen  v.  City  of  Junction  City, 

Mass.  200;  City  of  St.  Louis  v.  Rus-  43  Kan.  627;  s.  c.  23  Pac.  652. 

sell,  9  Mo.  503;  City  of  St.  Louis  v.  "Kelly  v.  Meeks,  87  Mo.  396.     See 

Allen,    13    Mo.    400;    Smith    v.    Mc-  on  same  point,  Stilz  v.  City  of  In- 

Carthy,    56    Pa.    St.    359;    Norris   v.  dianapolis,    55    Ind.    515;    Taylor   v. 

Mayor    &c.,    1    Swan     (Tenn.)    164;  City   of   Fort  Wayne,    47    Ind.    274; 

Wade  V.  City  of  Richmond,  18  Graft.  People  &c.  v.  Bennett,  29  Mich.  451; 

(Va.)    583;    1    Dillon    Munic.   Corp.,  Blanchard  v.  Bissell,  11  Ohio  St.  96; 

§  248.  People  v.  Carpenter,  24  N.  Y.  86;  De- 

*  Powers  V.  County  Com'rs,  8  Ohio  vore's  Appeal,  56  Pa.  St.  163;  Dillon 

St.  285.  Munic.  Corp.,  §  183. 


385 


CONSOLIDATION    AND   REORGANIZATION. 


§  411 


after  a  city  council  has  voted  to  annex  any  contiguous  territory,  the 
district  court  shall,  on  petition  by  the  city  and  after  notice  to  the 
owners  of  such  territory,  determine  the  truth  of  the  allegations  of  the 
petition,  and  whether  all  or  any  part  of  such  territory  would  receive 
material  benefit  from  annexation  to  the  city,  and  whether  justice 
and  equity  require  such  annexation,  and  shall  enter  a  decree  accord- 
ingly,— was  an  attempt  to  invest  the  court  with  extra-judicial  powers 
— a  legislative  power.  The  court  held  that,  as  a  condition  of  such  an- 
nexation, the  questions  required  to  be  determined  by  the  court  were 
entirely  of  a  judicial  character,  and  that  it  was  properly  invested  with 
jurisdiction  in  such  matters.*^ 

§  411.  Illinois  decisions. — The  act  of  the  legislature  of  Illinois 
amendatory  of  "An  act  to  revise  the  law  in  relation  to  township  or- 
ganization," so  far  as  it  attempted  to  change  the  boundaries  of  cities 
and  incorporated  villages,  was  held  to  be  in  violation  of  the  Illi- 
nois constitution,  as  embracing  more  than  one   subject.®     But  the 


*City  of  Wahoo  v.  Dickinson,  23 
Neb.  426;  s.  c.  36  N.  W.  813.  The 
court,  in  not  giving  assent  to  Gales- 
burg  v.  Hawkinson,  75  111.  152,  relied 
upon  by  objectors  to  the  law, 
conceded  "that  an  arbitrary  annexa- 
tion of  territory  to  a  city  or  town, 
where  the  benefits  to  be  received  by 
the  territory  annexed  are  not  con- 
sidered, can  only  be  accomplished  by 
legislation,  either  by  the  legislature 
itself  or  with  a  tribunal  clothed  with 
power  for  that  purpose,  and  that  a 
court  under  our  [Nebraska]  consti- 
tution could  not  be  clothed  with 
such  legislative  power." 

^Dolese  v.  Pierce,  124  111.  140;  s. 
c.  16  N.  E.  218,  the  court  saying:  — 
"Under  the  title  of  the  act  of  1887, 
the  legislature  had  the  right  to  pro- 
vide, as  it  did,  for  the  change  of 
township  boundaries,  but  this  right 
did  not  carry  with  it,  as  an  incident, 
the  power  to  change  the  boundaries 
of  cities  and  villages,  unless  the 
change  of  the  latter  was  necessary 
to  effectuate  a  change  of  the  former, 
or  at  least  to  promote  such  object. 
Nothing  of  this  kind  is  pretended. 
The  only  thing  claimed — or  which 

1    bMlTH — 25 


can  be  truthfully  claimed — is,  that 
there  is  some  resemblance,  or  that 
there  are  common  characteristics, 
between  townships  and  cities  and 
villages.  But  this  is  equally  true 
of  all  corporate  bodies.  While  town- 
ships are  regarded  as  municipal  cor- 
porations, in  the  general  sense  of 
that  term,  yet  they  stand  upon  a 
plane  altogether  different  from  that 
occupied  by  cities  and  villages.  The 
latter  are  possessed  of  a  much  high- 
er order  of  corporate  existence  than 
the  former,  and  differ  from  them  in 
many  essentia]  particulars.  They 
are,  in  law  and  in  fact,  as  distinct 
from  one  another  as  any  two  artifi- 
cial beings  could  be,  whatever  their 
supposed  resemblance  may  be.  This 
is  equally  so  with  respect  to  their  or- 
ganization and  jurisdiction.  In  the 
exercise  of  the  powers  conferred 
upon  them,  they  act  wholly  inde- 
pendent of  each  other,  even  where 
their  jurisdiction  extends  over  the 
same  people  and  territory.  .  .  . 
Looking  at  the  act  as  a  whole,  it  is 
difficult  to  repel  the  conviction  that 
it  is  nothing  more  than  a  method  of 
extending,    almost   indefinitely,    the 


§    413  PUBLIC    COlirORATlONS.  38G 

annexation  of  two  or  more  cities,  incorporated  towns  and  villages  to 
each  other,  all  of  which  are  indebted,  the  indebtedness  of  some  being 
in  excess  of  the  limit  allowed  by  the  constitution  of  Illinois,  is  not 
prohibited  by  the  section  providing  that  no  municipal  corporation 
shall  become  indebted  to  an  amount  "in  the  aggregate  exceeding  five 
per  cent,  on  the  taxable  property  therein ;"  and  that  any  such  corpora- 
tion incurring  indebtedness  "shall  provide  for  the  collection  of  a  direct 
tax"  for  the  payment  of  the  same.^" 

§  412.  Maryland  decisions. — It  was  objected  to  a  legislative  act  in 
Maryland,  which  provided  that  until  the  year  1900  the  rate  of  taxa- 
tion for  city  purposes  on  all  taxable  property  within  the  districts  to 
be  annexed  to  the  city  of  Baltimore  should  not  exceed  the  existing 
rate  in  Baltimore  county,  that  it.  conflicted  with  the  article  of  the 
declaration  of  rights  in  the  constitution  of  Maryland  which  declares 
that  "every  person  in  the  state,  or  person  holding  property  therein, 
ought  to  contribute  his  proportion  of  public  taxes  for  the  support  of 
the  government  according  to  his  actual  worth  in  real  or  personal 
property."  The  supreme  court  of  the  state  sustained  the  law  over 
this  contention,  holding  that  the  principle  of  equality  in  taxation  is 
fully  gratified  by  making  local  taxation  equal  and  uniform  as  to  all 
property  within  the  limits  of  the  taxing-district;  and  that  equality 
and  uniformity,  as  between  different  taxing-districts,  whether  the 
district  be  an  entire  city  or  parts  of  a  city,  is  not  required  in  local 
taxation.  ^^ 

limits  of  the  great  cities  of  our  state  "  Daly  v.  Morgan,  69  Md.  460,  468; 
without  consulting  the  people  living  s.  c.  16  Atl.  287,  the  court  saying: 
in  them,  or  at  least  but  a  small  por-  — "The  effect  of  the  provisions  of 
tion  of  them,  and  all  this  without  a  the  nineteenth  section  is  to  make 
word  in  the  title  of  the  act  to  indi-  the  territory  annexed  under  it  a  sep- 
cate  such  a  purpose."  arate  taxing-district,  within  the 
'"True  v.  Davis,  133  111.  522;  s.  c.  limits  of  the  city  as  thus  extended, 
22  N.  E.  410;  6  L.  R.  A.  266,  267,  and  the  legislature  itself,  exercising 
where  the  court  said: — "If,  then,  its  reserved  right  of  taxation,  fixes 
there  is  no  constitutional  restriction  for  a  limited  period  the  rate  of  as- 
upon  annexation  of  municipalities,  sessment  and  taxation  for  local  pur- 
and  no  constitutional  right  to  ex-  poses  within  such  district.  That  it 
empt  the  property  of  taxpayers  may  exercise  this  power  instead  of 
from  burdens  other  than  debts  con-  delegating  it  to  the  local  authorities 
tracted  by  the  municipality  while  is  well  settled  in  this  state."  The 
the  property  or  person  was  within  court  cites  State  v.  Mayhew,  2  Gill 
its  jurisdiction,  it  would  seem  inevi-  (Md.)  487;  State  v.  Sterling,  20  Md. 
tably  to  follow  that  there  is  no  con-  502,  and  as  sustaining  the  same  con- 
stitutional ground  to  object  that  the  struction  refers  to  Serrill  v.  City  of 
burden  of  some  taxpayers  will  be  Philadelphia,  38  Pa.  St.  355;  Gil- 
larger  in  consequence  of  annexation  lette  v.  City  of  Hartford,  31  Conn, 
than  it  would  otherwise  have  been."  351;  City  of  Henderson  v.  Lambert, 


387  CONSOLIDATION    AND    REORGANIZATION.  §    413 

§413.  Michig-an  decisions. — The  Michigan  act  consolidating  the 
two  cities  of  Saginaw  and  East  Saginaw,  which  comprised  distinct 
representative  districts,  has  hcen  held  not  to  contravene  that  section 
of  the  constitution  of  Michigan  which  provides  for  the  division  of 
the  state  into  representative  districts  and  enacts  that  such  division 
shall  remain  unaltered  until  the  return  of  another  enumeration,  which 
is  to  be  had  ever}'  ten  years;  as  the  act  expressly  provides  that  it  shall 
not  change  in  any  respect  the  boundaries  of  the  existing  representa- 
tive districts,  or  the  manner  of  electing  representatives,  and  preserves 
the  old  voting  precincts  intact.  Also,  that  if  the  act,  which  author- 
ized and  made  it  the  duty  of  the  council  of  the  consolidated  city 
to  issue  bonds  to  raise  money  to  purchase  a  site  for  and  erect  a  city 
hall,  and  provided  that  this  requirement  should  not  be  abrogated 
"without  the  assent  of  a  majority  of  the  aldermen,  and  should  be  con- 
strued as  in  the  nature  of  a  contract  between  the  two  cities,  was  un- 
constitutional, it  did  not  affect  the  validity  of  the  rest  of  the  act.  And 
further,  that  where  it  appears  that  the  consolidation  of  two  or  more 
cities  is  for  the  interest  of  the  inhabitants  thereof,  an  act  of  consoli- 
dation is  not  contrary  to  public  policy,  and  does  not  abridge  the  rights 
of  citizens.^" 

§  414.  Missouri  and  Tennessee  decisions. — Kansas  City,  Missouri, 
governed  by  a  special  charter  under  the  constitutional  provision  re- 
lating to  cities  of  a  population  of  more  than  one  hundred  thousand 

8  Bush  (Ky.)  607;  Benoist  v.  City  of  — "The  power  of  the  legislature  to 
St.  Louis,  19  Mo.  179;  United  States  consolidate  two  municipal  corpora- 
T.  Memphis,  97  U.  S.  293.  tions  is  not  questioned.  In  a  new 
"  Smith  v.  Mayor  &c.,  81  Mich,  and  growing  state,  cases  must  often 
123;  s.  c.  45  N.  W.  964;  Local  acts  arise  where  it  is  for  the  interest  of 
Mich.,  1889,  No.  455.  The  relator  in  the  people  that  territory  lying  in 
this  application  for  a  mandamus  re-  different  representative  districts 
lied  upon  People  v.  Holihan,  29  should,  for  the  purpose  of  local  self- 
Mich.  116,  to  sustain  his  contention  government,  be  comprised  in  one 
that  the  act  of  consolidation  was  un-  municipality.  .  .  .  The  constitu- 
constitutional.  The  court  thus  dis-  tional  provisions  are  fully  satisfied 
tinguished  the  case  cited: — "In  Peo-  when  the  legislative  districts  are 
pie  v.  Holihan  the  legislature  made  preserved  intact,  and  the  territories 
no  provision  for  preserving  the  in-  united  for  municipal  purposes  only, 
tegrity  of  the  representative  dis-  preserving  to  the  electors  the  neces- 
trict  from  which  the  territory  was  sary  provisions  for  electing  their 
detached,  but,  by  the  very  terms  of  representatives;"  citing  Bay  Co.  v. 
the  act,  the  boundaries  of  two  repre-  Bullock,  51  Mich.  544;  s.  c.  16  N.  W. 
sentative  districts  were  changed,  896;  Stone  v.  City  of  Charlestown, 
the  electors  of  one  district  trans-  114  Mass.  214;  Wade  v.  City  of  Rich- 
ferred  to  another  and  the  preserva-  mond.  18  Graft.  (Va.)  583;  Opinion 
tion  of  the  district  made  impossi-  of  Judges,  33  Maine  587. 
ble."     Further,      Grant,      J.,      said: 


§    415  PUBLIC    CORrORATIONS.  388 

inhabitants,  by  an  ordinance  attempted  to  annex  a  large  adjacent  ter- 
ritory including  the  city  of  Westport.  In  a  case  involving  the  validity 
of  this  annexation  ordinance  it  was  held  that  the  ordinance  was  void ; 
that  it  was  an  amendment  to  the  charter,  and  the  constitution  of  the 
state  denied  the  city  the  right  thus  to  extend  its  limits  without  first 
submitting  the  proposition  to  and  procuring  the  consent  of  three- 
iifths  of  its  voters,  which  it  had  failed  to  do.^^  The  placing  of  prop- 
erty within  the  corporate  limits  of  a  given  town  is  not  a  taking  of 
private  property,  as  the  ownership  remains  unchanged;  and  a  Ten- 
nessee statute  providing  for  annexation  of  land  to  the  city  of  Nash- 
ville was  held  not  to  be  in  conflict  with  the  fifth  amendment  to  the 
constitution  of  the  United  States,  which  provides  that  "private  prop- 
erty shall  not  be  taken  for  public  use  without  just  compensation,"  nor 
with  the  constitution  of  Tennessee,  containing  similar  provisions  ;^^^ 
nor  was  said  act  repugnant  to  the  provisions  of  the  constitution  of 
Tennessee  providing  that  "no  corporation  shall  be  created  or  its  pow- 
ers increased  or  diminished  by  special  laws,"  as  this  clause  applies 
only  to  private  corporations.^* 

§  415.  Ruling  as  to  Baltimore  City. — The  act  of  Maryland  extend- 
ing the  limits  of  Baltimore  City  by  including  therein  parts  of  Balti- 
more County  has  been  held  not  to  violate  the  provision  of  the  constitu- 
tion of  Maryland,  relating  to  the  organization  of  new  counties  and  the 
location  of  county  seats,  which  provides  that  the  lines  of  a  county 
shall  not  be  changed  without  the  consent  of  a  majority  of  the  Voters  of 
the  territory  sought  to  be  taken  from  one  and  added  to  another  coun- 
ty. ^^  It  was  further  held  that  the  legislature  of  the  state  had  the 
power  to  extend  the  limits  of  a  city  by  including  therein  parts  of  the 
county  adjoining,  the  city  itself  being  a  part  of  the  county.^®  In  sup- 
port of  this  holding  Robinson,  J.,  said :  "Counties  are  political  divi- 
sions of  the  state,  organized  with  a  view  to  the  general  policy  of  the 
state,  and  the  functions  and  powers  exercised  by  them  have  reference 
mainly  to  such  policy.  Besides,  their  representation  in  the  general 
assembly  is  fixed  by  the  constitution,  and  we  can  understand  why  it 
was  deemed  proper  to  make  some  provision  in  regard  to  the  organiza- 
tion of  counties,  and  the  annexation  of  part  of  one  county  to  another. 
Towns  and  cities,  however,  are  ordinarily  chartered  at  the  instance, 
and  mainly  with  reference  to  the  interest,  convenience  and  advantage, 

"City  of  Westport  v.  Kansas  City,  ^^  Daly  v.  Morgan,  69  Md.  460;  s.  c. 

103  Mo.  141;  s.  c.  15  S.  W.  68.  16  Atl.  287. 

"a  So   held    in   Williams  v.   Nash-  '"  Daly  v.  Morgan,  69  Md.  460;  s.  c. 

ville,  89  Tenn.  487;  s.  c.  15  S.  W.  364.  16  Atl.  287. 

"Williams  v.  Nashville,  89  Tenn. 
487;  s.  c.  15  S.  W.  364. 


"89  CONSOLIDATION    AND   REORGANIZATION.  §    JlG 

of  persons  residing  within  the  particular  locality  incorporated.  They 
are  chartered  by  the  legislature,  and  their  boundaries  are  fixed  by  it, 
and  the  power  to  extend  tlicm,  whenever  in  its  judgment  the  public 
interests  require  it,  has  been  exercised  by  the  legislature  from  the 
earliest  days  of  the  colony.  No  reason  has  been  suggested  why  the 
constitution  should  prohibit  the  exercise  of  this  power,  and  it  would 
seem  strange  that  it  should  provide  for  the  annexation  of  parts  of  one 
county  to  another,  and  deny  to  the  legislature  the  power  to  extend  the 
limits  of  a  city,  by  including  therein  parts  of  an  adjoining  county, 
even  though  such  county  should  be  a  separate  and  independent  terri- 
torial division  of  the  state." 

§  416.  Rule  as  declared  in  Washington. — The  constitution  of 
Washington  declares  that  municipal  corporations  shall  not  be  created 
by  special  laws,  but  the  legislature,  by  general  laws,  shall  provide  for 
their  incorporation,  organization,  etc.  This  does  not  prevent  two 
existing  municipal  corporations,  or  one  existing  corporation  and  an 
adjacent  body  whose  incorporation  was  void,  from  being  consolidated 
under  a  law  authorizing  a  special  election  on  the  question  of  consoli- 
dation.^'^ 

§  417.  Powers  of  cities  under  the  laws. — A  Florida  statute  gave 
municipal  authorities  the  power  to  extend  their  territorial  limits,  and 

"  State  v.  City  of  New  Whatcom,  uniformity  it  provides  that  existing 
3  Wash.  7;  s.  c.  27  Pac.  1020;  it  be-  cities  and  towns  may,  without  leg- 
ing  held  that  the  title,  "An  act  pro-  islative  compulsion,  drop  their  spe- 
viding  for  the  organization,  incorpo-  cial  charters  and  take  up  the  organi- 
ration  and  government  of  municipal  zation  of  their  respective  classes  un- 
corporations,"  was  sufficiently  broad  der  such  general  laws  as  may  be  en- 
to  cover  provisions  authorizing  the  acted.  To  do  this,"  he  says,  "is  in 
consolidation  of  two  municipal  cor-  no  sense  to  destroy  or  disincorporate 
porations  and  the  holding  of  a  spe-  a  city  or  town.  The  territory  covered 
cial  election  on  the  question.  Pur-  is  to  be  the  same.  The  name  is  con- 
ther,  that  the  act  of  Washington,  tinned  and  the  people  are  identical. 
March  27,  1890  (acts,  p.  138),  pro-  But  when  two  existing  corporations 
viding  that  "two  or  more  contiguous  are  to  be  consolidated  the  prelimi- 
municipal  corporations  may  become  nary  thing  to  be  accomplished  is  the 
consolidated  into  one  corporation  disincorporation  of  the  old,  and  then 
after  proceedings  had  as  required  in  follows  the  incorporation  of  a  new 
this  section,"  and  authorizing  a  municipality,  in  which  there  must  be 
special  election  to  be  held  on  the  new  territory,  a  new  name  (at  least 
question  of  consolidation,  applied  to  as  to  a  part  of  the  new  territory)  and 
pre-existing  corporations  created  by  uew  people.  This  operation  .  .  . 
special  charter,  as  well  as  those  or-  may  be  accompanied  by  either  a  gen- 
ganized  under  general  incorporation  eral  or  a  special  election,  as  the  leg- 
laws.  Stiles,  J.,  says  of  the  constitu-  islature  may  direct." 
tional  provision,  that  "to  encourage 


§418  PUBLIC    CORPORATIOXS.  390 

defined  generally  the  powers  and  duties  of  municipalities.  Another 
statute  established  provisional  governments  for  cities  whose  charters 
were  repealed  for  indebtedness,  appointing  con)missioners  with  certain 
general  powers,  and  declared  the  defunct  cities  to  be  provisional  mu- 
nicipalities, "the  boundaries  of  which  shall  be  coextensive  with  the 
boundaries  of  such  defunct  cities  and  towns,"  giving  to  the  officers 
thereof  the  same  powers  vested  in  the  officers  of  such  defunct  cities 
under  the  act  of  1869.  It  has  been  held  that  the  provisional  munici- 
palities had  power  to  extend  their  territorial  limits."  Under  the 
Indiana  statutes  the  common  council  of  a  city,  while  having  authority, 
without  the  consent  of  the  owner,  to  annex  territory,  and  extend  its 
boundaries  so  as  to  include  lots  platted  adjoining  it  if  the  plat  has 
been  acknowledged  and  properly  recorded,  can  not  annex  land  of  a 
married  woman,  platted  by  her  husband,  without  her  authority  and 
knowledge,  even  though  she  may  have  erroneously  supposed  it  to  be 
included  in  another  plat  before  made  by  herself  and  husband  and  duly 
acknowledged  and  recorded.^^  The  limits  of  a  city  can  not  be  ex- 
tended by  vote  of  the  electors  thereof,  without  the  consent  of  the 
voters  of  the  territory  to  be  annexed,  under  the  Texas  statutes.-"  The 
power  to  annex  teritory  is  not  affected  by  the  fact  that  part  of  it  is 
occupied  as  a  rural  homestead ;  nor  by  the  fact  of  the  territory  being 
used  for  agricultural  and  grazing  purposes.  ^^  And  it  is  immaterial 
that  it  lies  on  several  sides  of  a  city,  if  the  territory  proposed  to  be 
annexed  by  one  proceeding  comprises  but  one  body  of  land.^^ 

§  418.  The  same  subject  continued. — A  city  of  the  first  class  under 
the  Kansas  statute  can  not  extend  its  limits  so  as  to  include  unplatted 
territory  of  over  five  acres  against  the  protest  of  the  owner  thereof, 
unless  the  same  is  circumscribed  by  platted  territory  that  is  taken 
into  said  city.^^  Under  the  Nebraska  statute  providing  that  a  city 
of  the  metropolitan  class  may  include  within  its  corporate  limits  an 
area  not  to  exceed  twenty-five  square  miles,  including  any  township 

"  Saunders  v.  Provisional  Munici-  poration,  except  that  they  may  be 

pality  &c.,  24  Fla.  226;  s.  c.  4  So.  801;  extended     by     additional     territory 

Act  Fla.,  Feb.  4,  1869   (McClel.  Dig.  whenever  the  majority  of  the  quali- 

255,    §    44),   as  amended,    Fla.   laws  fled  electors  of  said  territory  shall 

1879,  ch.  3161,  §  2.  indicate  a  desire  to  be  included  with- 

^^  City   of   Indianapolis   v.    Fatter-  in  the  limits  of  the  corporation, 

son,  112  Ind.  344;  s.  c.  14  N.  E.  551;  "State  v.  City  of  Waxahachie,  81 

Burns  R.  S.  Ind.  1901,  §  3658.  Texas  626;  s.  c.  17  S.  W.  348. 

""Lum  v.  City  of  Bowie  (Tex.),  IS  ==  State  v.  City  of  Waxahachie,  su- 

S.  W.  142.     Sayles  Civil  St.   (Tex.),  pra. 

art.  343,  enacts  that  the  limits  of  a  "^  Union  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  City  of  Kan- 
city  accepting  titles  17  and  18  shall  sas  City,  42  Kan.  497;  s.  c.  22  Pac. 
remain  as  fixed  by  the  act  of  incor-  633. 


391  CONSOLIDATION'    AXD    KEORGAKIZATION.  §    419 

or  village  organization  within  such  limits,  and  that  such  organization 
shall  thereupon  cease  and  terminate,  such  a  city  can  not  divide  the 
territory  of  a  village  and  annex  a  portion  thereof,  but  it  must  include 
the  entire  village.'*  Nor  can  it  extend  its  limits  so  as  to  include  a 
city  of  the  second  class. ^°  The  revised  statutes  of  Texas,  providing 
for  annexation  of  adjacent  territory  to  the  limits  of  a  city,  have  been 
construed,  and  it  was  held  that  by  the  words  "to  the  extent  of  a  half 
mile  in  width"  it  was  not  intended  to  confine  the  authority  to  make  an 
annexation  of  territory  to  an  area  neither  more  nor  less  than  half  a 
mile  wide,  but  it  was  intended  to  limit  the  area  of  territory  which 
might  be  added  to  a  city  to  half  a  mile  wide  ;-**  and  so  long  as  the 
territories  added  are  only  a  half  mile  wide,  their  outer  boundaries 
may  be  extended  until  they  intersect,  though  the  corner  thus  formed 
is  more  than  a  half  mile  from  the  original  city  limits.-^ 

§  419.  "What  may  be  annexed — General  rule. — If  it  does  not  ap- 
pear that  the  territory  as  a  whole  should  be  annexed,  it  is  error  to 
annex  any  part  of  it.-^  Such  land  must  have  great  value  for  urban 
purposes.-*^  Land  which  evidence  shows  represents  a  city's  growth 
beyond  its  limits,  and  that  it  derives  its  value  from  actual  or  pros- 
pective use  for  town  purposes,  is  a  proper  subject  for  annexation 
though  a  considerable  part  thereof  may  be  used  for  agricultural  pur- 
poses.^" Where  suburban  property  is  platted  into  lots,  and  marked 
in  such  way  as  to  impress  on  it  the  character  of  urban  property  as 
distinguished  from  rural  use,  the  fact  that  the  lots  are  larger  than 
ordinary  city  lots  will  not  exclude  them  from  the  operation  of  the 
laws  of  Indiana  authorizing  a  city  to  annex  suburban  territory  which 
has  been  platted  into  lots.^^ 

"*  City  of  Omaha  v.  City  of  South  "  State  v.  City  of  Waxahachie,  81 

Omaha,  31  Neb.  378;   s.  c.  47  N.  W.  Tex.  626;  s.  c.  17  S.  W.  348. 

1113;  Comp.  St.  Neb.,  ch.  12a,  §  3.  ^Vestal   v.   Little   Rock,    54   Ark. 

=^City  of  Omaha  v.  City  of  South  321;  s.  c.  15  S.  W.  891;  16  S.  W.  291. 

Omalia,  supra.  ""  Woodruff  v.  Eureka  Springs,  55 

^''City  of  East  Dallas  v.  State,  73  Ark.  618;  s.  c.  19  S.  W.  15;  the  court 

Tex.   370;    s.   c.   11   S.  W.   1030;    the  expressing  a  doubt  as  to  whether  an- 

court  deeming  it  reasonable  to  pre-  nexation  could  be  justified  upon  the 

sume  an  intention  of  the  legislature  ground  alone  that  the  city  desired  to 

to  restrain  "a  tendency  on  the  part  establish,     maintain    and    preserve 

of  thriving  and  ambitious  cities  to  water-works  upon  it. 

extend  the  limits  of  the  municipal-  ™  Vogel    v.    Little    Rock,    55    Ark. 

ity  beyond  the  urban  population  and  609;  s.  c.  19  S.  W.  13,  where  an  an- 

to  subject  to  taxation  persons  and  nexation  was  held  to  be  right  and 

property  who  neither  need  nor  re-  proper  under  the  rule  established  in 

ceive  any  protection  from  the  city  Vestal  v.  Little  Rock,  54  Ark.  321; 

government."  s.  c.  15  S.  W.  891;  16  S.  W.  291. 

'^Glover  v.  City  of  Terre  Haute, 


§    420  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  392 

§  420.  The  same  subject  continued — Construction  of  statutes. — 
Territory  separated  from  a  city  by  a  navigable  river  is  "contiguous" 
within  the  meaning  of  a  statute  authorizing  municipal  corporations 
to  annex  contiguous  territory  lying  in  the  same  county.  Therefore, 
an  unincorporated  town  on  one  side  of  an  intervening  river  may  be 
annexed  to  a  city  on  the  other  side,  although  at  the  time  the  only 
means  of  communication  are  two  toll-bridges  and  a  number  of  small 
boats  operated  by  private  persons  for  hire.^^  The  annexation  of  un- 
platted land  which  is  touched  on  two  sides  to  its  entire  extent  by  plat- 
ted lands  will  not  be  set  aside  on  appeal  because  it  is  vacant,  low,  flat 
and  wet  and  covered  with  timber,  since  it  may  have  been  needed  for 
town  purposes,  and  may  have  needed  organized  local  government  to 
reclaim  it.^^  As  ordinarily  the  territory  of  a  municipal  corporation  is 
subdivided  into  lots  and  blocks,  and  the  residents  therein  do  not  de- 
pend on  the  cultivation  of  the  soil  for  a  livelihood,  it  is  not  the  policy 
of  the  law  to  annex  large  tracts  of  agricultural  lands  to  a  village  or 
city  unless  under  the  circumstances  such  lands  should  be  subdivided 
and  sold  as  village  lots.^*  The  act  of  Pennsylvania  of  April,  1876, 
authorizing  the  court  of  quarter  sessions  to  annex  the  lands  of  persons 
resident  in  one  township  or  borough  to  another  township  or  borough 
for  school  purposes,  does  not  authorize  the  annexation  of  land  to  a 
non-adjacent  township.^ ^ 

§  421.  The  same  subject  continued. — Under  the  act  of  Pennsyl- 
vania of  April  3,  1851,  as  amended  by  act  of  June  11,  1879,^^  provid- 
ing for  the  annexation  to  a  borough  of  "any  lots,  outlots  or  tracts  of 
land  adjacent"  thereto,  on  application  of  the  inhabitants  of  such 
land,  annexation  may  be  decreed  if  the  land  of  all  the  petitioners, 
taken  as  one  tract,  adjoins  a  borough,  though  land  not  annexed  may 

129  Ind.  593;  s.  c.  29  N.  E.  412.    See  North  Des  Moines,  80  Iowa  626;  s.  c. 

also,  Collins  v.  City  of  New  Albany,  45  N.  W.  1031. 

59   Ind.   396;    City  of  Evansville  v.         ^*  Village   of  Hartington  v.   Luge, 

Page,  23  Ind.  525;  Edmunds  v.  Gook-  33  Neb.  623;  s.  c.  50  N.  W.  957;  the 

ins,  24  Ind.  169.  court  saying  that  "the  principal  ben- 

^'Vogel    V.    Little   Rock,    54   Ark.  efit  in  this  case  would  be  to  the  vil- 

335;  s.  c.  15  S.  W.  836.  lage  by  adding  to  the  taxable  prop- 

^'  So  held  in  Vestal  v.  Little  Rock,  erty  therein,  but  this  of  itself  is  not 

54  Ark.  321;   s.  c.  15  S.  W.  891;   16  sufficient."    They  reversed  the  judg- 

S.  W.  291,  a  proceeding  on  the  part  ment  of  the  district  court  as  to  all 

of  the  city  under  Mansf.  Dig.  Ark.,  the  lands  not  subdivided  into  lots. 
§  922,  to  annex  contiguous  territory;         ^  In  re  Heidler,  122  Pa.  St.  653; 

citing  as  to  where  there  is  an  inter-  s.  c.  16  Atl.  97. 
vening  river,   Blanchard  v.   Bissell,        °*  Purd.  Dig.,  p.  199,  §  20  et  seq. 
11  Ohio  St.  96,  and  Ford  v.  Town  of 


393  COXSOLIDATIOX    AXD   REORGANIZATION".  §    422 

intervene  between  the  borough  and  some  of  the  tracts.''^  A  city  of 
the  first  chiss  in  Kansas  has  the  power  to  extend  and  enlarge  its 
boundaries  so  as  to  include  within  it  a  continuous  body  of  land  lying 
contiguous  to  the  prior  limits  of  said  city,  when  the  ordinance  pro- 
viding for  such  extension  is  approved,  by  the  district  court  of  the 
county  within  which  such  city  is  situated.  This  extension  may  in- 
clude several  tracts  of  land,  some  of  which  adjoin  the  city,  and  others 
adjoining  those  that  do  adjoin  the  city,  so  as  to  form  one  contiguous 
body,  the  annexation  ordinance  being  approved  by  the  district  court 
in  the  manner  and  under  the  conditions  and  requirements  of  the 
statute.^^  Where  owners  have  platted  into  blocks  and  lots  their  farm- 
ing land  adjacent  to  a  city  in  a  manner  to  bring  it  within  the  laws 
of  Kansas  providing  for  it,  such  subdivision  may  be  annexed  by  ordi- 
nance to  the  city.^"  Agricultural  land  distant  a  half  or  three-quarters 
of  a  mile  from  any  settlement,  to  which  no  streets  or  other  city  im- 
provements extend,  and  which  is  not  needed  nor  at  present  adaptable 
for  city  uses,  should  not  be  annexed  to  a  city.*" 

§  422.  Right  of  taxation  as  to  annexed  lands. — Land  within  the 
limits  of  a  city,  annexed  to  it  by  legal,  regular  proceedings,  although 
used  only  for  agricultural  and  horticultural  purposes,  is  subject  to  be 
taxed  for  ordinary  city  revenues.*^  It  has  been  held  that  where  a 
town  incorporated,  including  within  its  boundaries  unplatted  lands, 
and  was  afterwards  incorporated  as  a  city  of  the  first  class  with  the 
same  boundaries,  and  levied  municipal  taxes  upon  these  unplatted 
lands,  the  then  owners  of  the  lands  who  had  paid  the  taxes  could  not 
maintain  an  action  for  the  recovery  of  those  taxes.*^     The  owner  of 

"Appeal  of  Brinton,   142   Pa.   St.  ha,    1    Neb.    16;    County    Com'rs   v. 

511;  s.  c.  21  Atl.  978.  President  &c.,  51  Md.  465;    2  Dillon 

^So  held  in  Hurla  v.  City  of  Kan-  Munic.  Corp.,  §  795  and  note;   Bor- 

sas  City,  46  Kan.  738;   s.  c.  27  Pac.  ough  of  West  Philadelphia,  5  W.  & 

143.  S.  (Pa.)  281;  Kelly  v.  Meeks,  87  Mo. 

=^  Tilford  V.  City  of  Olathe,  44  Kan.  396. 
721;  s.  c.  25  Pac.  223;  following  City        "Hurla  v.  City  of  Kansas  City,  46 

of  Emporia  v.  Smith,  42  Kan.  433;  Kan.  738;  s.  c.  27  Pac.  143;  following 

s.  c.  22  Pac.  616.  Mendenhall  v.  Burton,  42  Kan.  570; 

^^  So  held  in  Vestal  v.  Little  Rock,  s.  c.  22  Pac.  558. 
54  Ark.  321;    s.  c.  15  S.  W.  891;   16         "  McClay   v.    City   of   Lincoln,    32 

S.  W.  291;  citing  People  v.  Bennett,  Neb.   412;    s.   c.   49   N.  W.   282;    the 

29  Mich.  451;    s.  c.  18  Am.  R.  107,  court  relying,  to  sustain  their  judg- 

111;   Cheaney  v.  Hooser,  9  B.  Mon.  ment,  upon  South  Platte  Land  Co. 

(Ky.)    330;    City   of      Covington   v.  v.  Buffalo  Co.,  15  Neb.  605;  s.  c.  19 

Southgate,   15   B.   Mon.    (Ky.)    491;  N.    W.    711;     and    especially    upon 

Morford  v.  Unger,  8  Iowa  82;    City  Blanchard  v.  Bissell,  11  Ohio  St.  96, 

of  New  Orleans  v.  Michoud,  10  La.  where  the  supreme  court  of  Ohio  re- 

An.  763;  Bradshaw  v.  City  of  Oma-  versed  a  decree  of  perpetual  injunc- 


§  433 


rUBLIC    COKI'OKATIONS. 


394 


land  annexed  to  a  city  upon  the  finding  of  a  court  as  provided  for  in  a 
Nebraska  statute  can  not  claim  exemption  from  taxation  by  the  cor- 
poration, which  is  provided  for  in  another  section  touching  voluntary 
annexations.*^  But  a  person  whose  land  has  been  annexed  to  a  city 
under  the  first-mentioned  statute,  and  become  liable,  by  another  sec- 
tion, to  subdivision  into  lots  and  blocks,  with  streets  and  alleys,  and 
subject  to  taxation  for  the  city's  antecedent  debts,  and  who  has  taken 
no  appeal  from  the  judgment  of  annexation,  can  not  in  another  action 
complain  that  the  statute  was  unconstitutional  in  that  it  authorized 
the  taking  of  private  property  for  public  use  without  compensation.** 

§  423.  Taxation  for  antecedent  indebtedness. — Property  included 
in  the  extended  limits  of  a  municipality  becomes,  in  the  absence  of 
legislation  to  the  contrary,  subject  to  taxation  for  all  municipal  in- 
debtedness existing  before  the  limits  were  extended.*^ 


tion  against  the  collection  of  munic- 
ipal taxes  upon  lands  annexed  to  the 
city  of  Toledo  under  a  statute  sim- 
ilar to  the  one  in  Nebraska;  the 
Ohio  court  holding  on  review  that 
"the  territory  so  annexed  was  con- 
tiguous to  the  original  city;  that 
such  annexation  might  be  ordered 
without  the  consent  and  against  the 
remonstrance  of  a  majority  of  the 
persons  residing  in  the  annexed  ter- 
ritory; and  the  lands  were  liable  to 
local  taxation  on  account  of  pre-ex- 
isting city  debts." 

*^  Gottschalk  v.  Becher,  32  Neb. 
653;  s.  c.  49  N.  W.  715;  the  court 
thus  distinguishing  the  two  sec- 
tions:— "Territory  annexed  volun- 
tarily under  §  95  may  be  so  situated 
that  it  would  be  against  equity  to 
compel  it  to  share  prior  burdens. 
The  policy  of  the  statute  encourages 
annexation  and  municipal  accretion 
and  wealth.  Territory  can  only  be 
annexed  under  §  99  when  the  court 
shall  find  that  'it  would  receive  ma- 
terial benefit,'  or  'that  justice  and 
equity  require  it.'  Upon  such  find- 
ings and  resulting  annexation  the 
taxation  must  be  uniform  under  the 
constitution,  art.  9,  §  6." 

•"  Gottschalk  v.  Becher,  supra. 

^=>Madry  v.  Cox,  73  Tex.  538;  s.  c. 


11  S.  W.  541;  citing  Layton  v.  City 
of  New  Orleans,  12  La.  An.  515, 
where  it  was  held  that  where  the 
act  annexing  additional  territory  (a 
city)  provided  that  it  should  be  sub- 
ject to  taxation  to  meet  such  debts 
only  as  had  been  created  by  itself, 
a  subsequent  act  of  the  legislature 
might  subject  property  to  a  higher 
rate  of  taxation  than  was  necessary 
to  meet  such  indebtedness,  even 
though  the  tax  thus  raised  went  to 
discharge  indebtedness  of  the  corpo- 
ration to  which  it  was  attached  ex- 
isting before  the  consolidation.  Cit- 
ing also.  United  States  v.  Memphis, 
97  U.  S.  289,  where  it  was  held  that 
an  act  subsequent  to  one  annexing 
territory  to  a  city  relieving  the  an- 
nexed territory  from  taxation  to 
meet  the  cost  of  paving,  the  most  of 
which  was  done  after  annexation, 
and  outside  of  the  annexed  territory, 
was  valid;  the  court  saying,  how- 
ever, that  the  act  of  annexation, 
though  it  might  have  done  so,  not 
having  exempted  this  property  from 
the  tax,  "the  people  resident  [there- 
in] became  at  once  entitled  to  a  com- 
mon ownership  of  the  city's  property 
and  privileges,  subject  to  the  same 
duties  as  those  resting  on  others. 
Had  the  [subsequent]  act  never  been 


395  COXSOLIDATIOX    AND    REORGANIZATION.  §    424 

§  424.  Remedy  of  taxpayer. — An  injunction  will  lie  to  restrain 
taxes  levied  by  a  city  on  annexed  territory  where  the  city  has  voted  to 
extend  its  limits  without  the  consent  of  the  electors  of  the  territory 
sought  to  be  annexed.*"  The  fact  that  personal  property  of  one  who 
resides  within  territory  annexed  by  ordinance  of  a  city  extending  its 
boundaries  as  allowed  by  law.  has  thus  become  subject  to  municipal 
taxation  does  not  justify  an  assault  on  his  part  upon  the  validity  of 
that  ordinance.*"  In  an  action  to  enjoin  the  collection  of  taxes  levied 
upon  annexed  suburban  platted  territory,  the  motive  of  a  city  in  an- 
nexing it  can  not  be  inquired  into.** 

§  425.  Effect  of  consolidation. — The  city  of  Philadelphia,  when  it 
covered  about  two  miles  square,  was  made  by  the  will  of  Stephen 
Girard  trustee  to  administer  the  trusts  of  that  will.  By  various  acts 
of  the  legislature  culminating  in  the  "consolidation  act"  of  1854, 
the  twenty-eight  municipal  corporations,  comprising  "districts,"  bor- 
oughs and  townships,  making  the  residue  of  the  county  of  Phila- 
delphia, were  brought  into  one  city.  A  bill  was  filed  by  testator's 
heirs  alleging,  among  other  things,  that  the  new  city  became  incom- 
petent to  act  as  a  trustee.  The  dismissal  of  this  bill  was  affirmed  by 
the  supreme  court  of  the  United  States,  it  being  held  that,  by  the 
supplement  to  the  act  incorporating  the  city  (commonly  called  the 
"consolidation  act"),  the  identity  of  the  corporation  was  not  de- 
stroyed; nor  could  the  changes  in  its  name,  the  enlargement  of  its 
area  or  increase  in  the  number  of  its  corporators  affect  its  title  to 
property  held  at  the  time  of  such  change.     It  was  further  held  that 

passed  it  must  be  conceded  that  they  "  City  of  Plattsburg  v.  Riley,  42 

would  have  been  on  exact  equality  Mo.  App.  18. 

with  all  other  owners  of  property  in  ***  Glover  v.  City  of  Terre  Haute, 

the  city,  equally  entitled  with  them  129  Ind.  593;  s.  c.  29  N.  E.  412,  where 

to   all    municipal    rights   and    privi-  it   was   objected   that   the   city   had 

leges  and  equally  subject  to  all  mu-  been   neglectful   of   its   duty   in   ex- 

nicipal  burdens  and  charges."  tending  water-works,  street  improve- 

^"Lum  v.  City  of  Bowie  (Tex.),  18  ments  and  lights  into  this  portion  of 

S.  W.  142;  the  court  distinguishing  the  city,  and  that  by  such  neglect 

Brennan  v.  City  of  Weatherford,  53  the  right  to  treat  it  as  a  part  of  the 

Tex.    330,    and    Graham    v.    City    of  city   had   been   forfeited,   though    it 

Greenville,  67  Tex.  62;  s.  c.  2  S.  W.  had    maintained    a    school    therein; 

742,  in  that  the  validity  of  the  ex-  and  it  was  contended  that  the  pur 

isting   corporations    in   those    cases  pose  and  object  of  the  city  in  mak- 

was    disputed,    and    it   seemed   this  ing  the  annexation   v/as  simply   to 

could  only  be  done  by  quo  warranto  increase  the  revenues  of  the  city  by 

proceedings.     Here  there  is  no  ques-  the  taxation  of  this  property.     See 

tion  made  as  to  the  validity  of  the  also.  City  of  Logansport  v.  Seybold, 

corporation.  59  Ind.  225;   Burns  Rev.  Stats.  Ind. 

1901,  §§  3658.  3659,  and  notes. 


§  426 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS. 


396 


the  corporation,  -under  its  amended  charter,  had  every  capacity  to 
hold  and  every  power  and  authority  necessary  to  execute  the  trusts 
of  the  will.*'^ 

§  426.  The  same  subject  continued. — It  has  been  held  that  the 
effect  of  the  provision  of  the  Minnesota  statute  consolidating  the 
cities  of  St.  Anthony  and  Minneapolis,  and  providing  that  "all  ordi- 
nances and  resolutions  heretofore  made  *  *  *  ^y  the  city  coun- 
cil of  *  *  *  St.  Anthony  or  by  the  common  council  of  *  *  * 
Minneapolis  *  *  *  shall  be  and  remain  in  force  until  altered, 
modified  or  repealed  by  the  city  council  of  said  city,"  was  not  to  extend 
the  ordinances  of  each  city  over  the  new  city,  but  to  confine  their 
operation  within  their  former  territorial  limits  until  changed  by  the 
new  city  council.^ °  A  village  lying  within  the  limits  of  an  incor- 
porated town  does  not,  by  annexation  to  an  adjacent  city,  the  limits 
of  which  are  coterminous  with  those  of  another  town,  become  part  of 
the  latter  town.^^ 

§  427.  Annexation  proceedings — Notice. — The  rule  in  Michigan  is 
that  the  "notice  in  writing"  to  be  posted  on  application  to  detach  ter- 
ritory from  one  township  and  attach  it  to  another  may  be  printed,  and 
the  names  attached  printed  if  properly  authenticated.^^    The  annexa- 

*''Girard  v.  Philadelphia,  7  Wall.  Coke  86;  Haddock's  Case,  T.  Raym. 
1.  On  p.  14,  as  to  the  power  of  the 
legislature  in  the  premises,  Grier, 
J.,  says:  "The  legislature  may  alter, 
modify,  or  even  annul  the  franchises 
of  a  public  municipal  corporation, 
although  it  may  not  impose  burdens 
on  it  without  its  consent;"  and  con- 
tinues: "In  this  case  the  corporation 
has  assented  to  accept  the  changes, 
assume  the  burdens  and  perform  the 
duties  imposed  upon  it;  and  it  is 
difficult  to  conceive  how  they  can 
have  forfeited  their  right  to  the 
charities  which  the  law  makes  it 
their  duty  to  administer.  The  ob- 
jects of  the  testator's  charity  remain 
the  same  while  the  city,  large  or 
small,  exists;  the  trust  is  an  existing 
and  valid  one,  the  trustee  is  vested 
by  law  with  the  estate  and  the  full- 
est power  and  authority  to  execute 
the  trust."  As  to  change  of  name  or 
enlargement  of  franchises  not  de- 
stroying the  identity  of  a  municipal 
corporation,    see    Luttrel's    Case,    4 


435;  s.  c.  1  Vent.  355. 

^"  Camp  V.  City  of  Minneapolis,  33 
Minn.  461;  s.  c.  23  N.  W.  845. 

"  City  of  East  St.  Louis  v.  Rhein, 
139  111.  116;  s.  c.  28  N.  E.  1089;  the 
court  conceding  that  the  question  of 
annexing  the  village  to  the  city  had 
been  properly  submitted  to  the 
voters  of  the  same,  but  the  question 
of  detaching  a  part  of  the  town  (em- 
braced in  the  village)  and  attaching 
it  to  the  other  town  had  not  been 
submitted  to  the  voters  of  the  towns. 
The  ruling  was  based  upon  People  v. 
Brayton,  94  111.  341;  Dolese  v.  Pierce, 
124  111.  140;  s.  c.  16  N.  E.  218;  Vil- 
lage of  Hyde  Park  v.  City  of  Chicago, 
124  111.  156;  s.  c.  16  N.  E.  222;  Don- 
nersberger  v.  Prendergast,  128  111. 
229;  s.  c.  21  N.  E.  1;  111.  laws  1887, 
300;  3  Starr  &  C.  Anno.  St.  (111.) 
522;  111.  laws  1889,-  66,  361;  2  Starr 
&  C.  Anno.  St.  (111.)  2410;  True  v. 
Davis,  133  111.  522;  s.  c.  22  N.  E.  410. 

"  Pelton  V.  Ottawa  Co.  Supervisors, 
52  Mich.  517;  s.  c.  18  N.  W.  245. 


397  CONSOLIDATION    AND    REORGANIZATION.  §    428 

tion  of  adjacent  tfrrilory  undci-  the  Nebraska  statute  is  a  judieial 
proceeding  in  which  the  bindowner  is  entitled  to  all  the  rights  of 
contravention  and  appeal/'''  l^arties  appearing  and  contesting  the 
proceedings  for  annexation  of  adjacent  territory  to  a  borough  on 
application  of  the  inhabitants,  in  accordance  with  the  Pennsylvania 
statute,  after  notice,  can  not  complain  that  the  notice  was  not  in  the 
form  prescribed  by  the  act.°*  The  Iowa  code  provides  for  the  incor- 
poration of  a  town  or  the  annexation  of  territory  thereto  by  proceed- 
ings in  the  district  court.  It  was  held  that  the  code  did  not  require 
that  the  notice  of  election  should  be  made  of  record :  it  was  sufficient 
that  the  record  showed  that  notice  was  duly  given.  Also,  that  where 
all  the  proceedings  relating  to  the  annexation  of  territory  to  an  in- 
corporated town  were  regular,  and  the  town  had  assumed  iinquestioned 
jurisdiction  of  the  territory,  the  annexation  was  not  invalidated  by 
the  fact  that  the  copies  of  the  proceedings  filed  in  the  office  of  the 
county  recorder  and  of  the  secretary  of  state,  as  required,  were  not 
certified  to  be  correct  copies;  especially  where  the  proper  certificates 
were  supplied  even  after  the  sufficiency  of  the  annexation  was  called 
in  question  by  actions  commenced. ^^ 

§  428.  Mode  of  voting. — The  revised  statutes  of  Illinois  give  the 
county  judge  a  discretionary  power  to  submit  the  question  of  annexa- 
tion "at  either  a  special  election  called  for  that  purpose,  or  at  any  mu- 
nicipal election,  or  at  any  general  election,"  "to  be  holden  in  each 
of  said  incorporated  cities,  towns  or  villages."  That  such  a  ques- 
tion was  voted  upon  in  a  village  at  its  regular  municipal  election, 
and  in  the  city  at  its  regular  municipal  election  held  on  another  day, 
has  been  held  not  to  invalidate  the  election.^''  The  construction  of 
the  Texas  statutes  as  to  the  vote  on  questions  of  annexation  is  that  the 
voters  are  allowed  to  express  their  preferences  on  the  subject  by  any 
method  of  voting  which  is  satisfactory  to  themselves  and  to  the  city 
council ;  and  that  when  it  is  shown  by  the  proper  affidavit  that  a  ma- 
jority have  favored  annexation  the  city  council  is  authorized  to  receive 
the  territory  of  their  residences  into  the  city  limits. ^^    A  construction 

"  So  held  in  Gottschalk  v.  Becher,  29  N.  E.  849,  where  the  annexation 

32  Neb.  653;  s.  c.  49  N.  W.  715.  proceedings     were     sustained;     the 

"  Appeal   of   Brinton,   142    Pa.   St.  court  further  holding  that  the  cor- 

511;   s.  c.  21  Atl.  978;   citing  Incor-  poration  first  voting  would  retain  its 

poration  of  Edgewood  Borough,  130  separate  corporate  existence  until  a 

Pa.  St.  349;  s.  c.  18  Atl.  646.  majority  of  the  voters  of  the  other 

^^  Ford    v.    Town    of    North    Des  had  declared  in  its  favor,  when  the 

Moines,  80  Iowa  626;  s.  c.  45  N.  W.  consolidation    would    be    completed 

1031.  and  go  into  effect. 

^® Village  of  North   Springfield  v.  ^'Graham  v.  City  of  Greenville,  67 

City  of  Springfield,  140  111.  165;  s.  c.  Tex.  62;  s.  c.  2  S.  W.  742,  which  v/as 


§    429  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  398 

has  been  placed  iipon  the  x\rkansas  statute  providing  that  "when  any 
municipal  corporation  shall  desire  to  annex  any  contiguous  territory 
thereto,  lying  in  the  same  county,  it  shall  be  lawful  for  the  council 
to  submit  the  question  to  the  qualitied  electors  at  least  one  month 
before  the  annual  election,"  to  the  effect  that  the  council  was  required 
to  make  an  order  at  least  a  month  before  the  annual  election  for  the 
submission  of  the  question  at  that  election,  and  not  to  submit  the 
question  at  an  election  held  one  month  before  the  annual  election.^^ 

§  429.  Jurisdiction  and  procedure. — By  the  laws  in  which  the  legis- 
latures of  the  different  states  have  provided  modes  for  annexation  of 
territory  to  the  limits  of  municipal  corporations,  'there  is  provision 
made  for  voluntary  and  involuntary  annexation  in  so  far  as  the  own- 
ers of  the  lands  are  concerned.  Therefore,  a  procedure  and  a  juris- 
diction for  the  trial  of  the  issues  presented  has  been  named,  and  the 
general  rule  is  that  there  must  be  strict  compliance  with  the  require- 
ments of  the  statutes  to  make  the  annexation  valid.  ^^  ISTo  part  of  a 
specified  territory  can  be  annexed  to  a  city  without  a  public  notice  of 
the  hearing  before  the  county  court,  as  prescribed  by  statute,  even 
though  a  majority  of  the -property  holders  of  such  territory  voluntarily 
appear  at  the  hearing  and  consent  to  the  annexation.''*'  The  supreme 
court  of  Nebraska  reversed  the  court  below  in  a  proceeding  for  an- 
nexation of  territory  to  a  city  of  the  second  class  and  dismissed  the 
petition,  for  the  reason  that  the  record  did  not  show  that  a  resolution 

followed  in  State  v.  City  of  Waxa-  the  court  of  quarter  sessions  as  to 
liachie,  81  Tex.  626;  s.  c.  17  S.  W.  the  annexation  of  this  land  having 
348,  where  a  majority  of  the  voters  been  lost,  the  record  from  the  re- 
signed a  paper  which  was  presented  corder's  office  was  evidence  and 
to  the  city  council  on  the  affidavit  of  could  not  be  questioned.  The  pre- 
three  of  the  number,  which  stated,  sumption  in  such  a  case  is  that  the 
among  other  things,  that  the  signers  court  required  strict  compliance  with 
thereby  "cast  our  [their]  votes"  in  the  provisions  of  the  act  before  the 
favor  of  the  annexation,  and  de-  decree  was  made  and  recorded;  this 
scribed  the  territory.  being  especially  true  after  lapse  of 

^^  Vogel    V.    Little    Rock,    55    Ark.  time  and  proof  that  the  persons  re- 

609;  s.  c.  19  S.  W.  13.  siding  thereon  had  after  the  time  of 

^^  McFate's  Appeal,  105  Pa.  St.  323,  such   record  acted  as  if  the  decree 

where  it  was  held,  in  a  proceeding  were  valid. 

to  restrain  a  borough  from  exercis-  ""  Gunter  v.  Fayetteville,  56  Ark. 
ing  jurisdiction  over  a  section  in-  202;  s.  c.  19  S.  W.  577;  the  court  say- 
eluded  in  its  enlarged  limits,  which  ing: — "This  class  of  cases  is  anoma- 
enlargement  was  under  the  provis-  lous, — the  court  acts  upon  the  terri- 
ions  of  the  act  of  April  1,  1834  (P.  tory  as  a  whole,  without  the  power 
L.  Pa.  163),  that  the  petition  and  de-  of  dividing  it  or  of  severing  any 
cree  in  the  matter  having  been  re-  part;"  citing  Vestal  v.  Little  Rock, 
corded  in  the  recorder's  office  as  re-  54  Ark.  321,  323;  s.  c.  15  S.  W.  891; 
quired  by  the  statute,  the  records  of  16  S.  W.  291. 


399  CONSOL]DATJO\    AXD    KKORGANIZATION'.  §    430 

to  annex  such  territory  had  been  adopted  by  the  city  council  by  a 
two-thirds  vote  of  all  the  members  elect  of  such  body,  which  by  statute 
was  the  first  step  to  be  taken,  and  a  condition  precedent  to  the  author- 
ity of  the  district  court  in  the  premises.*'^ 

§  430.  The  same  subject  continued. — In  an  action  to  annex  terri- 
tory to  a  village  it  must  appear  from  the  facts  stated  in  the  petition 
that  some  portion  of  the  territory  sought  to  be  annexed  will  be  bene- 
fited from  the  annexation;  and  the  particular  facts  showing  such 
benefits  with  justice  and  equity  of  the  relief  sought  must  be  alleged.**^ 
A  petition  for  annexation  in  Pennsylvania  must  state  that  the  land 
adjoins  the  township  to  which  the  court  is  asked  to  annex  it.®^  An- 
nexation cases,  when  appealed  from  the  county  court  to  the  circuit 
court,  should  be  tried  de  novo,  and  such  proceedings  had  and  such 
judgment  rendered  as  though  that  court  had  original  jurisdiction.®* 
The  circuit  court  may  therefore  permit  amendments  such  as  would 
be  proper  in  the  county  court  to  the  petition  in  such  cases  to  exclude 
part  of  the  land  included  in  it;  but  such  an  amendment  can  not  be 
made  in  the  supreme  court:  the  cause  must  be  remanded  to  the  cir- 
cuit court,  the  amendments  made  there  and  the  case  tried  de  novo.*^^ 
But  neither  the  court  on  its  own  motion,  nor  the  attorney  of  the  cor- 
poration by  leave,  has  the  right  to  make  such  amendments  except 
upon  terms  that  permit  remonstrance  to  be  fairly  heard  upon  the 
petition  as  amended."®  No  ordinance  of  the  council  of  the  city  is 
necessary  to  empower  the  attorney  to  make  such  amendment.®'^  An 
ordinance  of  a  city  submitting  to  the  electors  the  question  of  annexa- 
tion of  contiguous  territory,  which  properly  describes  the  land,  is  not 
rendered  invalid  by  reason  of  its  omitting  to  recite  that  the  land  is 
contiguous.®*     Under  the  Pennsylvania  statutes,  in  proceedings  to 

"City   of    Seward   v.    Conroy,    33  Eureka  Springs,  55  Ark.  618;   s.  c. 

Neb.  430;  s.  c.  50  N.  W.  329.  19  S.  W.  15. 

®=  Village  of  Hartington  v.  Luge,  33  "^  Woodruff  v.  Eureka  Springs,  55 

Neb.  623;  s.  c.  50  N.  W.  957.  Ark.  618;  s.  c.  19  S.  W.  15.  The  court 

'Un  re  Heidler,  122  Pa.  St.  653;  said:— "The  fact,  and  not  the  recital 

s.  c.  16  Atl.  97.  of  contiguity,  authorizes  the  council 

**  Dodson  v.  Fort  Smith,  33  Ark.  to   act;    and   where   the   fact  exists 

508,  515.  there  is  nothing  that  requires  that 

"^  Vestal   V.   Little   Rock,   54   Ark.  it  appear  by  a  recital  upon  the  rec- 

321;  s.  c.  15  S.  W.  891;  16  S.  W.  291.  ords    of   the    council.      The    council 

^'^  Woodruff  V.  Eureka  Springs,  55  acts  in  a  legislative,  and  not  in  a 

Ark.  618;  s.  c.  19  S.  W.  15,  remand-  judicial,    capacity;     and    the    rules 

ing  the  case  with  directions  to  allow  which  require  that  the  jurisdiction 

amendments  upon  such  terms.  of  inferior  courts  shall  appear  of  rec- 

'^Vogel   V.   Little   Rock,    55    Ark.  ord  are  not  applicable." 
609;  s.  c.  19  S.  W.  13;  Woodruff  v. 


§    431  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  400 

annex  adjacent  territory  to  a  borough,  no  appeal  on  the  merits  lies  to 
the  supreme  court;,  and  the  expediency  of  such  annexation  can  not  be 
considered."''  The  statute  of  Arlvansas  probably  never  intended  an 
appeal  in  annexation  cases,  as  it  borrows  its  provisions  from  states 
where  the  acts  prescribed  to  be  performed  by  the  county  court  are  ad- 
ministrative purely,  and  where  no  appeal  is  allowed ;  but  the  right  to 
appeal  in  that  state  is  well  established.^" 

§  431.  Reasonableness  of  annexation. — The  supreme  court  of  Mis- 
souri has  held  that  the  power  of  a  city  to  annex  by  ordinance  contigu- 
ous territory  to  its  limits  is  restricted  to  a  reasonable  and  proper 
exercise  of  such  power.^^  The  supreme  court  of  Arkansas,  after  fully 
considering  the  various  cases  in  different  jurisdictions  upon  this  sub- 
ject, summed  up  their  conclusions  in  what  may  be  styled  an  excellent 
rule  to  guide  courts  in  the  determination  of  applications  for  annexa- 
tion ;  the  court  said :  "That  city  limits  may  reasonably  and  properly 
be  extended  so  as  to  take  in  contiguous  lands:  (1)  when  they  are 
platted  and  held  for  sale  or  use  as  town  lots;  (2)  whether  platted  or 
not,  if  they  are  held  to  be  bought  on  the  market  and  sold  as  town 
property  when  they  reach  a  value  corresponding  with  the  views  of  the 
owner;  (3)  when  they  furnish  the  abode  for  a  densely  settled  com- 
munity, or  represent  the  actual  growth  of  the  town  beyond  its  legal 
boundary;  (4)  when  they  are  needed  for  any  proper  town  purpose,  as 
for  the  extension  of  its  streets,  or  sewer,  gas  or  water  system,  or  to 
supply  places  for  the  abode  or  business  of  its  residents,  or  for  the  ex- 
tension of  needed  police  regulation;  and  (5)  when  they  are  valuable 
by  reason  of  their  adaptability  for  prospective  town  uses;  but  the 
mere  fact  that  their  value  is  enhanced  by  reason  of  their  nearness  to 
the  corporation  would  not  give  ground  for  their  annexation  if  it  did 
not  apl^ear  that  such  value  was  enhanced  on  account  of  their  adapta- 
bility to  town  use."^^  But  an  objection  that  an  extension  of  the  limits 
of  a  town,  otherwise  reasonable,  is  unreasonable  in  that  it  includes 
and  subjects  to  taxation  for  municipal  purposes  land  lying  along  a 
river  and  subject  to  overflow,  will  not  be  allowed  in  lowa.'^^ 

§  432.  Validity  of  annexation. — Land  of  an  owner  who  had  not 
platted  and  made  a  map  of  the  same,  but  which  had  been  included 

«« Appeal  of   Brinton,   142   Pa.   St.  "Vestal   v.   Little   Rock,   54   Ark. 

511;  s.  c.  21  Atl.  978.  321,  323;  s.  c.  15  S.  W.  891;  16  S.  W. 

™Gunter  v.   Fayetteville,   56  Ark.  291. 

202;    s.  c.  19  S.  W.  577;    Dodson  v.  "Ford    v.    Town    of    North    Des 

Mayor  &c.,  33  Ark.  508;  Foreman  v.  Moines,  80  Iowa  626;  s.  c.  45  N.  W. 

Town  of  Marianna,  43  Ark.  324.  1031. 

'*  Kelly  v.  Meeks,  87  Mo.  396. 


401  CONSOLIDATION    AND   REORGANIZATION",  §    433 

in  a  proposed  addition  to  a  city  and  platted  by  another  owning  the 
most  of  this  addition,  has  been  hekl  iiot  to  have  become  a  part  of  the 
city,  although  there  was  an  ordinance  of  tlie  city  attempting  to  make 
the  addition. ■'•*  And  tlio  fact  that  plaintiff  had  paid  a  municipal  tax 
upon  his  lands  was  held  not  to  be  a  ratification  on  his  part  of  the 
annexation  to  the  city,  nor  to  estop  him  from  denying  the  validity 
of  the  annexation.  If  plaintiff  had  acquiesced  in  the  annexation 
proceedings,  stood  by  and  without  objection  seen  the  city  appropriate 
money  or  make  improvements  upon  the  faith  of  the  validity  of  the 
proceedings  by  which  the  land  was  attempted  to  be  annexed  to  the 
city,  it  would  have  bound  him.'^^  Where  a  county  seat,  in  accordance 
with  the  laws  of  Kansas,  by  an  election  of  citizens  has  been  located  in 
a  town  site,  the  officers  of  the  county  have  no  right  to  remove  the 
courthouse  and  records  to  an  addition  to  said  town  site  which  has 
been  with  the  original  town  site  incorporated  as  a  city  of  the  same 
name.''® 

§  433.  Procedure  to  test  validity. — The  property  of  an  incorpo- 
rated village  being  in  the  nature  of  a  trust  fund,  which  the  corporate 
authorities  hold  for  the  use  of  the  public,  any  unlawful  interference 
with  it  calculated  to  inflict  irreparable  injury  upon  the  community 
presents  a  clear  case  for  equitable  relief.  Therefore,  a  bill  for  in- 
junction as  a  mode  of  testing  the  validity  of  an  alleged  law  by  which 
it  was  attempted  to  annex  the  village  to  the  city  and  on  which  the 
latter  relied  to  justify  its  usurpation  of  authority  over  the  property 
of  the  former  has  been  approved.''^  A  writ  of  certiorari  to  quash  an 
order  of  annexation  of  territory  to  a  town  or  city,  which  was  granted 
upon  the  petition  of  owners  of  the  annexed  territory,  should  be  re- 
fused unless  such  owners  or  the  persons  named  in  the  petition  as 
authorized  to  act  for  them  should  be  made  parties.    Laches  in  apply- 

"  Armstrong  v.  City  of  Topeka,  36        ™  State  v.  Harwi,  36  Kan.  588;  s.  c. 

Kan.  432;  s.  c.  13  Pac.  843;  reversing  14  Pac.  158;  the  court  saying: — "An 

a  refusal  to  restrain  the  defendant  addition    to   a   county   seat   is   not, 

from  opening  a  street  through  plain-  strictly  speaking,  a  part  of  the  orig- 

tiff's  land.    Cf.  City  of  Topeka  v.  Gil-  inal    town    site;"    citing    State    v. 

lett,  32  Kan.  431;    s.  c.  4   Pac.  800.  Smith,  46  Mo.  60. 
See  Comp.  L.  Kan.  1879,  ch.  78,  §  1.         "  Village  of  Hyde  Park  v.  City  of 

'"  Armstrong  v.  City  of  Topeka,  36  Chicago,  124  111.  156;   s.  c.  16  N.  E. 

Kan.  432;  s.  c.  13  Pac.  843.    See  also,  222;   citing  City  of  Peoria  v.  John- 

Strosser  v.  City  of  Ft.  Wayne,  100  ston.  56  111.  45,  52;  Smith  v.  Bangs, 

Ind.  443;  Langworthy  v.  City  of  Du-  15  111.  399;   People  v.  Whitcomb,  55 

buque,  13  Iowa  86;   Greencastle  Tp.  111.  172;  McCord  v.  Pike,  121  111.  288; 

v.  Black,  5  Ind.  557.  s.  c.  12  N.  B.  259. 

1  SivnTH— 26 


§    434  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  402 

ing  for  the  writ  is  also  ground  for  its  refusal.''^  The  jurisdiction  for 
testing  the  validity  of  a  reorganization  of  a  municipal  corporation  in 
Texas  is  in  the  district  courts ;  and  an  information  in  the  nature  of  a 
quo  warranto  against  the  officers  of  the  assumed  reorganized  corpora- 
tion was  allowed  hy  the  district  judge.''''  And  passing  an  ordinance 
of  annexation,  taking  steps  preparatory  to  levying  a  tax  on  the  new 
territory,  and  recognizing  it  as  a  ward  of  the  city,  are  a  sufficient  indi- 
cation of  the  purpose  to  exercise  the  corporate  franchises  of  the  city 
over  the  territory  to  sustain  such  quo  warranto  to  determine  the  valid- 
ity of  the  annexation.*** 

§  434.  The  same  subject  continued. — ^Vhere  a  town  is  made  a  part 
of  a  city  by  an  unconstitutional  act,  equity  may  restrain  the  city  from 
exercising  municipal  jurisdiction  over  it,  and  interfering  'with  its 
property  in  a  manner  calculated  to  inflict  on  the  community  irrepara- 
ble injury.*^  Under  the  code  of  civil  procedure  of  California,  which 
declares  that  an  action  may  be  brought  by  the  attorney-general  in  the 
name  of  the  people  against  any  "person"  who  usurps  or  unlawfully 
exercises  any  franchise,  and  under  the  police  code,  declaring  that  the 
word  "person"  shall  include  a  corporation  as  well  as  a  natural  person, 
it  was  held  that  a  municipal  corporation  was  a  person  within  the 
meaning  of  said  section;  and  that  where  such  a  corporation  claimed 
the  right  to  govern  and  tax  the  inhabitants  of  territory  claimed  to 
have  been  annexed  to  it,  but  which  was  not  described  as  being  in  its 
boundaries  as  named  in  its  recognized  charter,  the  right  thus  claimed 
was  a  franchise  in  addition  to  and  distinct  from  that  of  being  a  cor- 
poration, and  the  exercise  of  such  right  was  a  usurpation  for  which 
the  attorney -general  was  authorized  to  bring  an  action.*-  If  a  ma- 
jority of  the  qualified  electors  vote  for  annexation,  others  can  not 
complain  that  the  proceedings  were  kept  secret  and  put  through  in 
haste.*^     One  who  delays  eight  months  in  filing  a  petition  to  annul 

^»  Black  v.  Brinkley,  54  Ark.  372;  "State  v.  Dunson,  71  Tex.  65;  s.  c. 

s.  c.  15  S.  W.  1030;    the  court  say-  9  S.  W.  103;  Buford  v.  State,  72  Tex. 

ing:— "It   is   fair   to   presume   that  182;  s.  c.  10  S.  W.  401. 

jurisdiction  has  been  assumed  over  ^"City  of  East  Dallas  v.  State,  73 

the  annexed  territory  with  whatever  Tex.  370;  s.  c.  11  S.  W.  1030. 

of   expense   is   necessarily    incident  "  Village  of  Hyde  Park  v.  City  of 

thereto,  that  taxes  had  been  assessed  Chicago,  124  111.  156;   s.  c.  16  N.  E. 

and    paid    for    municipal    purposes,  222. 

and  that  the  citizens  residing  within  *-  People   v.    City    of    Oakland,    92 

the   annexed   territory   had    partici-  Cal.  611;  s.  c.  28  Pac.  807. 

pated  in  electing  town  officers.  Great  ^^  State  v.  City  of  Waxahachie,  81 

confusion   would  have  arisen   from  Tex.  626;  s.  c.  17  S.  W.  348. 
the  quashal  of  the  order." 


403  CONSOLIDATION    AND    REORGANIZATION.  §    435 

an  order  of  annexation  to  a  town  and  offers  no  excuse  for  the  delay 
can  not  question  its  legality.®* 

§  435.  Special  acts  as  to  reorganization. — The  act  of  Washington, 
entitled  "An  act  providing  for  the  organization,  classification,  incor- 
poration and  government  of  municipal  corporations,"  has  been  held 
sufficient  to  include  sections  relating  to  the  enlargement  and  consoli- 
dation of  municipal  corporations.  Held,  also,  that  by  implication  it 
repealed  a  prior  act  providing  for  extending  the  corporate  limits  of 
cities  by  modes  prescribed  therein. ^^  The  provisions  of  the  Utah 
statute  entitled  "An  act  providing  for  the  incorporation  of  cities, 
relating  to  municipal  government,  and  the  mode  of  election  of  city 
officers,"  were  held  not  applicable  to  an  incorporated  city  the  charter 
of  which  provided  for  the  manner  of  electing  its  officers,  existing  at 
the  time  the  act  went  into  effect,  until  it  had  become  reincorporated 
under  a  section  which  provides  that  when  the  common  council  call  an 
election  to  determine  whether  the  city  shall  be  reincorporated  under 
the  act  they  shall  give  notice  of  the  class  to  which  the  city  will  belong 
if  reincorporated.^® 

§  436.  Nebraska  act. — It  has  been  held  that  the  statute  of  Ne- 
braska classifying  cities  within  the  state  had  the  effect  to  transform  a 
village  of  the  proper  number  of  inhabitants  into  a  city  of  the  second 
class — in  other  words,  to  reorganize  it;  and  a  mandamus  was  issued 
to  the  officers  to  divide  the  village  into  wards  under  the  law  and  pro- 
vide for  an  election  of  city  officers.®"^  To'  make  this  statute  effectual, 
it  was  not  necessary  that  the  corporation  accept  its  provisions.*'^     In 

^*  Black  v.  Brinkley,  54  Ark.  372;  state,  and  the  annexed  territory  not 

s.  c.  15  S.  W.  1030.  being  liable  for  the  debts  of  the  old. 

''^  Board    &c.    v.    Davies,    1    Wash.  '« Watson  v.  Corey,  6  Utah  150;  s. 

290;  s.  c.  24  Pac.  540;  reversing  the  c.  21  Pac.  1089;    affirming  the  quashal 

court    below     and     sustaining    the  of  a  mandamus  to  register  a  voter 

board  of  commissioners  in  their  re-  otherwise  than  as  a  voter  in  the  city 

fusal  to  act  under  the  repealed  pro-  at  large. 

vision  and  order  an  election  as  re-  ^"a  State  v.  Holden,  19  Neb.   249; 

quested.     By  the  new  act  change  of  s.  c.  27  N.  W.  120. 

boundaries  of  a  municipal  corpora-  *' State  v.  Holden,  19  Neb.  249;   s. 

tion  is  effected  on  a  petition  of  one-  c.   27   N.  W.   120;    the  court  saying 

fifth  or  more  of  the  electors  of  the  that  the  rule  which  applies  to  pri- 

municipality  to  the  council,  which  vate  corporations  in  that  regard  has 

submits  the  question  to  the  electors  no  application  to  municipal  corpora- 

within  and  without  the  city,  a  ma-  tions,   unless   the   act   of   incorpora- 

jority  of  each  body  of  electors  being  tion     is     made     conditional.     They 

necessary  to  carry  annexation,  and  then  quote  from  People  v.  Morris,  13 

an    abstract   of   the    vote    being   re-  Wend.    (N.    Y.)    325,    as    follows:  — 

quired  to  be  sent  to  the  secretary  of  "The  distinction  between  public  and 


§    437  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  404 

such  cases  the  village  government  must,  from  the  nature  of  the  case, 
continue  until  superseded  by  the  city. 

§  437.  Effect  of  reorganization. — The  city  of  San  Diego  is  built 
around  three  sides  of  a  bay,  shaped  like  a  horseshoe,  and  was  origin- 
ally a  pueblo,  whose  water-line  was  the  bay.  A  peninsula  began  near 
the  mouth,  and  at  one  side  of  the  bay,  running  nearly  in  the  center, 
and  more  than  half  way  up  the  bay,  around  which  the  water  for  an 
indefinite  distance  was  called  the  "Ship's  Channel."  A  special  act  re- 
incorporated the  city,  with  the  same  limits  on  the  land  side  as  before, 
but  provided  that  the  "water-front  line  should  be  the  Ship's  Channel," 
and  gave  the  city  jurisdiction  of  the  bay  and  of  the  sea  for  one  league 
from  shore.  A  section  of  the  act  divided  the  peninsula  into  wards 
for  voting  purposes,  and  drew  the  boundary  line  of  one  ward  from 
one  point  to  another  across  the  mouth  of  the  bay;  thus  including, 
practically,  the  whole  peninsula.  Other  sections  restricted  the  elec- 
tive franchise  to  residents  of  the  city,  and  authorized  the  city  to  ac- 
quire land  outside  of  its  boundaries  for  municipal  purposes  only.  It 
has  been  held  that  the  act  included  the  peninsula  within  the  city  lim- 
its.^® A  Texas  municipality,  originally  a  town,  but  afterwards  re- 
incorporated as  a  city  by  the  legislature,  with  an  extension  of  its 
boundaries,  has  been  held  liable  for  bonds  donated  by  the  town  to  a 
railroad  company,  in  a  proceeding  to  restrain  the  collection  of  a  city 
tax  for  payment  of  these  bonds,  on  lands  in  the  enlarged  limits.  One 
contention  was  that  the  lands  of  complainants  were  agricultural  lands 
removed  from  the  benefits  to  be  derived  from  municipal  government, 
and  therefore  improperly  brought  within  the  limits  of  the  city.  Upon 
this  it  was  held  that  whether  this  addition  of  territory  was  necessary 
or  proper  was  a  question  addressed  to  the  legislature,  and  not  subject 
to  review  by  the  court.^® 

private  corporations  is  strongly  mere  trustees,  who  hold  and  exer- 
marked,  and  as  to  all  essential  pur-  cise  such  powers  for  the  public  good. 
poses  they  correspond  only  in  name.  The  only  interest  involved  is  the 
We  speak  of  the  erection  of  a  town  public  interest,  and  no  other  is  Con- 
or county,  and  the  term  would  be  cerned  in  their  creation,  continu- 
just  as  appropriate  when  applied  to  ance,  alteration  or  renewal."  Citing 
cities  or  villages.  They  are  sever-  also,  Berlin  v.  Gorham,  34  N.  H.  266; 
ally  political  institutions  erected  to  Warren  v.  Mayor  &c.,  2  Gray 
be  employed  in  the  internal  govern-  (Mass.)  84;  People  v.  President,  9 
ment  of  the  state.  There  is  no  con-  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  351;  1  Dillon  Munic. 
tract  between  the  government  and  Corp.,  §  23  and  notes, 
the  governed,  for  but  one  party  is  ^''  City  of  San  Diego  v.  Granniss, 
concerned — the  public;  and  the  in-  77  Cal.  511;  s.  c.  19  Pac.  875. 
habitants  upon  whom  the  powers  **  Madry  v.  Cox,  73  Tex.  538;  s.  c. 
and    privileges    are    conferred    are  11  S.  W.  541;  affirming  the  dissolu- 


405  CONSOLIDATION    AND   REORGANIZATION.  §    438 

§  438.  The  same  subject  continued. — A  city  which  had  been  incor- 
porated with  c(M-taiii  boundaries,  afterwards,  under  the  general  law 
of  California  alh^wing  it  in  a  certain  prescribed  mode,  was  reincor- 
porated, the  new  charter  naminc:  the  same  boundaries  as  did  its 
original  charter.  Before  the  adoption  of  this  last  charter  in  terms  of 
law,  there  had  been  proceedings  to  annex  territory  to  the  city  under 
the  general  law  of  the  state  providing  a  procedure  for  that  purpose. 
It  was  held  in  a  quo  warranto  proceeding  against  the  city  inquiring 
into  its  right  to  exercise  municipal  authority  over  this  annexed  ter- 
ritory that  the  result  of  the  annexation  proceedings  was  to  amend  its 
original  charter  as  to  its  boundaries,  and  that  the  effect  of  the  re- 
incorporation later  with  the  original  boundaries  was  to  supersede 
the  amended  as  well  as  the  original  charter,  and  that  the  city  had  no 
municipal  authority  over  the  annexed  district.""  The  Florida  statute, 
entitled  "An  act  to  provide  for  the  incorporation  of  cities  and  towns 
and  to  establish  a  uniform  system  of  municipal  government  in  this 
state,"  provided  "that  all  the  powers  and  privileges  conferred  in  and 
by  this  act  may  be  exercised  by  any  city  or  town  within  the  limits  of 
this  state  heretofore  incorporated ;  and  it  shall  be  lawful  for  any  pre- 
viously incorporated  city  to  reorganize  their  municipal  government 
under  the  provisions  thereof  by  a  voluntary  surrender  of  their  charters 
and  privileges  and  by  an  organization  under  this  act;  and  upon  a 
failure  on  the  part  of  any  incorporated  town  or  city  to  accept  the 
provisions  of  this  act  within  nine  months  after  its  approval,  all  the 
acts  vesting  such  city  or  town  with  power  are  hereby  repealed."  This 
last  clause  was  construed  by  Woods,  J.,  to  provide  merely  for  a  sus- 
pension of  the  powers  of  the  municipal  corporations  failing  to  reor- 
ganize under  the  act  and  not  for  a  dissolution  of  the  corporation 
itself.  "1 

§  439.  The  same  subject  continued — Decisions  in  California  and 
Tennessee. — A  statute  of  California  upon  the  organization,  incorpora- 
tion and  government  of  municipal  corporations  provides  that  any 

tion   of  the   injunction   temporarily  Pensacola  to   reorganize   under   the 

granted.    Cf.  Norris  v.  City  of  Waco,  act  within  nine  months  after  its  pas- 

57  Tex.  635;   New  Orleans  v.  Clark,  sage  did  not  put  an  end  to  its  corpo- 

95  U.  S.  644;  Kelly  v.  City  of  Pitts-  rate   existence,   and   that  its   subse- 

burg,  85  Pa.  St.  170;  Martin  v.  Dix,  quent  reorganization  under  the  first 

52  Miss.  53.  six  sections  of  the  act  did  not  create 

^"  People   V.   City   of   Oakland,    92  a  new  but  was  merely  the  rehabilita- 

Cal.  611;  s.  c.  28  Pac.  807.  tion  of  an  old  corporate  body.     Ap- 

"  Milner's  Adm'r  v.  City  of  Pensa-  proved   in   Broughton   v.   Pensacola, 

cola,  2  Woods  632,  640,  where  it  v.-as  93  U.  S.  266,  270;  and  cited  in  §  443, 

held  that  the  failure  of  the  city  of  post. 


§    440  rUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  406 

municipal  corporation  organized  prior  to  January  1,  1880,  may  reor- 
ganize imder  its  provisions.  The  constitution  of  the  state  provides 
that  ''any  city  *  *  *  j^ay  frame  a  charter  for  its  own  government 
consistent  with  and  subject  to  the  constitution  and  laws  of  this  state/' 
by  taking  certain  steps  therein  specified  for  preparing  and  publishing 
a  proposed  charter,  which  shall  become  effective  when  approved  by 
the  legislature;  and  further,  that  municipal  corporations  "shall  not 
be  created  by  special  laws,  but  the  legislature,  by  general  laws,  shall 
provide  for  the  incorporation,  organization  and  classification  *  *  * 
of  cities  and  towns,"  etc.  It  has  been  held  that  since  the  act, 
although  a  general  law,  was  simply  permissive,  a  city  incorporated 
thereunder  might  reincorpoate  in  the  manner  provided  by  the  con- 
stitution, and  that  when  the  charter  so  framed  was  affirmed  by  the  leg- 
islature it  superseded  the  old  charter.*'^  In  a  Tennessee  case,  where  a 
town  had  been  incorporated  by  the  legislature,  and  afterwards  a  peti- 
tion had  been  presented  for  a  reincorporation  and  change  of  bounda- 
ries to  the  county  court  and  the  prayer  of  the  petition  granted,  a 
suit  for  a  license  fee  imposed  under  the  ordinances  of  the  town  before 
the  action  of  the  county  court  was  defended  on  the  plea  that  the 
effect  of  the  reincorporation  was  a  surrender  of  the  old  charter  and 
a  dissolution  of  the  same,  and  therefore  the  last  corporation  had  no 
power  to  collect  the  tax.  It  was  held  that  to  make  the  surrender  by 
the  corporators  of  their  charter  of  incorporation  effectual  it  was  neces- 
sary that  it  be  accepted  by  the  government  and  a  record  thereof  be 
made;  hence,  if  the  inhabitants  of  the  town,  incorporated  by  an  act 
of  the  legislature,  accepted  the  act  of  incorporation,  and  subsequently, 
in  pursuance  of  the  reincorporation  act,  were  reincorporated,  with 
an  enlargement  of  the  incorporated  district,  the  charter  granted  by 
the  legislature  was  not  thereby  surrendered.®^ 

§  440.  Validity  of  reorganization — Special  cases. — There  is  in 
Tennessee,  in  the  act  which  prescribes  a  mode  by  which  municipal 
corporations  Avhich  have  been  dissolved  in  any  manner  may  reorganize, 
a  provision  for  a  "petition  of  a  majority  of  the  voters  within  the  lim- 
its of  such  town  or  city  at  the  time  of  the  repeal  or  surrender  of  the 
charter."  The  supreme  court  of  the  state  has  construed  this  provi- 
sion and  held  that  the  words  "at  the  time  of  the  repeal"  merely  define 
the  limits  of  the  town,  and  do  not  qualify  the  word  "voters."®*    And 

"=  People  v.  Bagley,  85  Cal.  343;  s.  °^  Norris    v.    Mayor   &c.,    1    Swan 

c.    24    Pac.    716,    where   the    council  (Tenn.)  164. 

elected   under   the   charter   of  rein-  "^  Pepper  v.  Smith,  15  Lea  (Tenn.) 

corporation  was  held  to  be  the  true  551,  where  the  reorganization  of  the 

council  of  the  city  of  Stockton.  town  of  Lynnville  into  the  taxing- 


407  CONSOLIDATION    AND    REORGANIZATION.  §    441 

it  was  held  also  that  the  motives  of  one  of  the  petitioners  for  the  re- 
organization of  a  town  into  a  taxing-district  could  not  affect  the  rights 
of  the  other  petitioners,  if  they  constituted  a  majority  of  the  voters, 
nor  could  the  motives  of  any  of  the  petitioners  be  inquired  into  under  a 
bill  filed  to  contest  the  legality  of  the  reorganization,  nor  his  character 
be  impeached."^  A  reorganization  in  1887  of  the  territory  of  a  town 
incorporated  in  1859,  under  the  act  of  January  27, 1858,  in  Texas,  was 
held  to  be  void,  as,  in  the  opinion  of  the  court,  the  laws  in  force  since 
the  adoption  of  the  revised  statutes  do  not  provide  for  the  reorganiza- 
tion of  an}^  municipal  corporation  by  the  acceptance  of  the  general 
law  ill  lieu  of  a  former  charter,  whereby  the  former  corporation  is 
practically  dissolved  in  any  manner  other  than  that  prescribed  in 
article  340  of  the  revised  statutes.  Any  effort  on  the  part  of  the  in- 
habitants of  territory  within  an  existing  corporation  otherwise  than 
as  so  provided  was  held  to  be  without  authority  and  of  no  legal  effect. 
So,  also,  as  to  any  effort  to  increase  the  boundaries  of  such  corporation 
otherwise  than  as  provided  by  existing  statutes.^® 

§  441.  Invalid  reorganization. — An  invalid  reorganization  of  an 
incorporated  town  as  a  city  can  not  effect  its  corporate  existence. ^'^  A 
reincorporation  of  a  town  ]:)y  an  adoption  of  an  article  in  the  Texas 
statute®*  by  vote  of  electors  was  held  to  be  void;  it  could  adopt 
that  article  only  in  the  manner  prescribed  therein  "by  a  two-thirds 
vote  of  the  city  council.'""*  The  organization  of  a  town  as  a  munici- 
pal corporation  under  the  act  of  Tennessee  of  1869-70  superseded  its 
organization  under  the  code.  A  repeal  of  that  act,  accepted  and  ac- 
quiesced in,  did  not  restore  its  old  organization,  but  left  it  without 

district  of  Lynnville  was  held  to  be  made     .     .     .     that  in  the  reorganl- 

valid    and    in   compliance   with    the  zation  of  a  city  the  boundaries,  as 

law.  determined   by  the  former  charter, 

°^  Pepper  V.  Smith,  15  Lea  (Tenn.)  remain,   unless  additional   territory 

551.  be  added  at  the  desire  of  a  majority 

""  State  V.  Dunson,  71  Tex.  65;  s.  c.  of  the  qualified  voters  residing  with- 

9    S.   W.   103;    the   court   saying: —  in  the  territory  to  be  added:    Rev. 

"The  act  of  March  15,  1875,  incorpo-  Stats.,  arts.  343,  503."     In  Buford  v. 

rated     in     the     revised      statutes,  State,  72  Tex.  182;  s.  c.  10  S.  W.  401, 

changed    the    method    by    which    a  the  reincorporation  of  the  town  of 

town    or    city   already    incorporated  Henderson  was  held  void  upon  this 

might  surrender  its  corporate  exist-  construction  of  the  revised  statutes. 

ence  and  reincorporate  under  that  ""  Laird  v.  City  of  De  Soto,  22  Fed. 

general    law     (January    27,    1858).  421. 

The  revised  statutes,  art.  340,  pro-  '"  Sayles  Civil  Stat.  Tex.,  tit.   17, 

vide  that  this  may  be  done  by  a  two-  ch.  1,  art.  340. 

thirds   vote   of   the   city   council   of  ""  Lum  v.  City  of  Bowie  (Tex.),  18 

such    city.     A    further    change    was  S.  W.  142. 


g    442  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  408 

municipal  organization.^*"*  It  was  held  that  a  city  having  a  special 
charter  did  not  by  force  of  the  act  of  Washington  entitled  "An  act 
providing  for  the  organization,  classification,  incorporation  and  gov- 
ernment of  municipal  corporations,"  become  reincorporated  there- 
imder.^"^  A  town  in  Texas  was  reincorporated  in  1859,  and  its  cor- 
])orate  organization  kept  up  at  intervals  till  1882.  In  1887  steps  were 
taken  as  for  the  original  incorporation  of  a  city  or  town,  with  boun- 
daries larger  than  those  of  the  original  town.  It  was  held  that  the 
corporation  created  in  1859  could  not  be  presumed  to  be  dissolved  by 
the  failure  to  elect  officers;  and  that  as  the  statute  provides  the  only 
manner  in  which  a  city  or  town  may  surrender  its  corporate  existence 
and  reincorporate  under  the  general  law,  and  that  the  boundaries 
of  such  a  city  shall  remain  as  they  were  fixed  by  the  former  charter, 
unless  additional  territory  be  afterward  annexed  in  the  manner  therein 
prescribed,  the  proceedings  had  in  1887  did  not  create  a  corporation, 
nor  dissolve  the  one  previously  existing.  ^''^ 

§  442.  Property  rights  passing  to  new  corporation. — Where  a  mu- 
nicipal corporation  is  legislated  out  of  existence  and  its  territory  an- 
nexed to  other  corporations,  the  latter,  unless  the  legislature  other- 
wise provides,  become  entitled  to  all  its  property  and  immunities,  and 
severally  liable  for  a  proportionate  share  of  all  its  subsisting  legal 
debts,  and  vested  with  its  power  to  raise  revenue  wherewith  to  pay 
them  by  levying  taxes  upon  the  property  transferred  and  the  persons 
residing  therein. ^''^  So,  too,  when  a  municipal  corporation  with  fixed 
boundaries  is  divided  by  law  and  a  new  corporation  is  created  by  the 
legislature  for  the  same  general  purposes  but  with  new  boundaries 
embracing  less  territory,  but  containing  substantially  the  same  popu- 
lation, the  great  mass  of  the  taxable  property  and  the  corporate  prop- 
erty of  the  old  corporation,  which  passes  without  consideration  and  for 
the  same  uses,  the  debts  of  the  old  corporation  fall  upon  the  new  cor- 
poration as  the  legal  successor,  and  powers  of  taxation  to  pay  them, 
which  it  had  at  the  time  of  their  creation  and  which  entered  into 

""So  held  in  Ruohs  v.  Athens,  91  Wash.  91;  s.  c.  29  Pac.  768,  where  it 

Tenn.  20;  s.  c.  18  S.  W.  400,  in  which  was    determined    that    such    a    city, 

the  court  further  ruled  that  as  an  not  having  been   reincorporated   as 

attempted  reorganization  afterwards  provided  for  in  the  act,  could  not  be 

was    void    for    an    irregularity    the  embraced  within  the  classifications 

town  could  plead  the  invalidity  of  of  such  act. 

its  organization  in  defense  of  a  suit  "-State  v.  Dunson,  71  Tex.  65;   s. 

brought  on  bonds.     Burke  v.  State,  c.  9  S.  W.  103. 

5  Lea   (Tenn.)  349,  was  followed  in  "' Mount  Pleasant  v.  Beckwith,  100 

this  case.  U.  S.  514. 

"'  So  held  in  Rohde  v.  Seavey,  4 


409  CONSOLIDATION    AND   REORGANIZATION,  §    443 

the  contracts,  also  survive  and  pass  into  the  new  corporation.^"*  The 
right  to  a  liquor  tax  levied  but  not  collected  by  a  town  previous  to  its 
annexation  to  a  city  is  not  transferred  by  this  annexation  to  the 
latter."^ 

§  443.    For  what  the  reorganized  corporation  becomes  liable. — 

Where  an  incorporated  town  is  reorganized  as  a  city,  the  latter  becomes 
liable  for  the  debts  of  the  former.^"*^  In  holding  the  city  of  Pensacola 
liable  for  the  bonds  issued  by  the  former  city  of  Pensacola,  which  it 
was  contended  had  been  dissolved  by  failure  of  the  city  to  reorganize 
within  nine  months  after  the  approval  of  an  act  providing  for  a  uni- 
form system  of  municipal  government  in  the  State  of  Florida,  Woods, 
J.,  concluded  that  the  present  city  was  the  same  corporate  body 
as  that  by  which  the  bonds  were  issued ;  reorganized  and  clothed  with 
a  new  charter  and  with  new  powers  and  privileges,  it  is  true,  but  still 
the  same  municij)al  corporation.^"^  Where  a  town  has  been  vacated 
by  a  county  board  exercising  legislative  power  in  the  mode  prescribed 
by  the  law  of  the  state,  and  its  territory  in  part  annexed  to  another, 
the  latter  becomes  liable  for  the  debts  of  the  former;  as,  for  instance, 
for  a  sum  due  to  an  attorney  for  prosecuting  an  action  for  the  former 
town  against  the  latter,  the  action  being  dismissed  on  the  annexa- 
tion.^"*   And  it  is  not  within  the  power  of  a  legislature,  by  the  repeal 

^<*  Mobile  V.  Watson,  116  U.  S.  289;  tion  by  the  decree  in  quo  warranto, 

s.  c.  6  S.  Ct.  398;  holding  the  port  of  is    the    legitimate   successor    of   the 

Mobile  liable  for  bonds  issued  by  the  town  of  De  Soto  which  issued  the 

city  of  Mobile  in  aid  of  a  railroad,  bonds,  being  composed  of  the  same 

and  in  the  contract  connected  there-  trustees  and  the  same  people,  and  is 

with  the  dissolved  corporation  had  only  a  change  in  the  name  of  the 

provided    for    the    payment    of    the  corporation  and  in  its  mode  of  gov- 

same  by  levy  of  a  certain  tax.  ernment;"  citing  Broughton  v.  Pen- 

'"'  So   held    in    Springwells  Tp.   v.  sacola,  93  U.  S.  266. 

Wayne  Co.  Treasurer,  58  Mich.  240;  "' Milner's  Adm'r  v.  City  of  Pensa- 

s.  c.  25  N.  W.  329;  the  court  saying:  cola,    2    Woods    632,    642,    cited    in 

— "Detaching    part    of    a    township  §  438,  ante. 

does  not  affect  the  ownership  of  any-  ^""^  Knight  v.  Town  of  Ashland,  61 

thing  but  lands.     All  debts  or  rights  Wis.  233;  s.  c.  21  N.  W.  65;  the  court 

incorporeal  continue  to  be  owned  by  saying: — "The  general  power  of  the 

the    township    unless    provision    is  legislature  to  apportion  the  property 

made  by  law  to  the  contrary."  and  the  liabilities  of  a  vacated  town 

^•"^  Laird   v.    City   of    De    Soto,   22  among  the  towns  to  which  its  terri- 

Fed.  421.     Miller,  J.,  says: — "If  the  tory    is    attached    is    recognized    by 

city  organization  of  1877  was  abso-  this    court   in    Town   of   Depere   v. 

lutely  void,  the  town  of  De  Soto  re-  Town  of  Bellevue,  31  Wis.  120,  125; 

mained,    and   the   city    organization  Goodhue  v.  Town  of  Beloit,  21  Wis. 

now  sued,  which  was  created  by  or-  636;   Supervisors  &c.  v.  O'Malley,  47 

der   of   the   county   court  after   the  Wis.  332;  s.  c.  2  N.  W.  632;  Town  of 

dissolution  of  the  first  city  organiza-  Butternut  v.  O'Malley,  50  Wis.  333; 


444 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS. 


410 


of  the  charter  of  a  municipal  corporation,  to  invade  the  rights  of  its 
creditors  and  cancel  its  indebtedness;  such  legislation  impairs  the 
obligation  of  contracts  and  is  unconstitutional."^ 

§  444.  Further  scope  of  the  foregoing  doctrine. — A  change  in  the 
charter  of  a  municipal  corporation,  in  whole  or  in  part,  by  an  amend- 
ment of  its  provisions,  or  the  substitution  of  a  new  charter  in  place  of 
the  old  one,  embracing  substantially  the  same  corporators  and  the 
same  territory,  will  not  be  deemed,  in  the  absence  of  express  legisla- 
tive declaration  otherwise,  to  affect  the  identity  of  the  corporation,  or 
to  relieve  it  from  its  previous  liabilities,  although  different  powers 
are  possessed  under  the  amended  or  new  charter,  and  different  officers 
administer  its  affairs.^^** 

§  445.  What  are  such  liabilities. — The  word  "debts"  in  the  Texas 
statute  repealing  the  charter  of  East  Dallas  and  annexing  its  terri- 
tory to  the  city  of  Dallas,  placing  the  liability  for  the  debts  of  the 
former  upon  the  latter,  has  been  held  to  include  a  liability  for  dam- 
ao-es  resulting  from  the  tortious  acts  of  the  municipal  officers  in,  re- 
moving a  private  dwelling  and  tearing  down  a  fence  preparatory  to 
taking  the  land  for  a  public  street."^     A  law  imposing  political  obli- 


s.  c.  7  N.  W.  248."  In  the  case  of 
Supervisors  &c.,  v.  O'Malley,  supra, 
it  was  held  that  the  county  hoard  of 
supervisors  had  all  the  powers  of  the 
legislature  in  vacating  towns. 

^"^Milner's  Adm'r  v.  City  of  Pen- 
sacola,  2  Woods  632,  642;  citing  1 
Dillon  Munic.  Corp.,  §  114,  where  are 
cited  in  support  of  this  view,  Cooley 
Const.  Lim.  290,  292;  Curran  v. 
Arkansas,  15  How.  304;  Thompson 
V.  Lee  Co.,  3  Wall.  327;  Havemeyer 
V.  Iowa  Co.,  3  Wall.  294;  2  Kent 
Com.  307,  n.;  Board  &c.  v.  Cox,  6 
Ind.  403;  Coulter  v.  Robertson,  24 
Miss.  278;  State  v.  Common  Council 
&c.,  15  Wis.  30;  Blake  v.  Portsmouth 
&c.  R.  Co.,  39  N.  H.  435. 

""  Broughton  v.  Pensacola,  93  U. 
S.  266.  Leading  up  to  this  conclu- 
sion, on  p.  269  Field,  J.,  says:  — 
"Although  a  municipal  corporation, 
so  far  as  it  is  invested  with  subordi- 
nate legislative  powers  for  local 
purposes,  is  a  mere  instrumentality 
of  the  state  for  the  convenient  ad- 


ministration of  government,  yet, 
when  authorized  to  take  stock  in  a 
railroad  company  and  issue  its  obli- 
gations in  payment  of  the  stock,  it 
is  to  that  extent  to  be  deemed  a  pri- 
vate corporation,  and  its  obligations 
are  secured  by  all  the  guaranties 
which  protect  the  engagements  of 
private  individuals.  The  inhibition 
of  the  constitution,  wnich  preserves 
against  the  interference  of  a  state 
the  sacredness  of  contracts,  applies 
to  the  liabilities  of  municipal  corpo- 
rations created  by  its  permission; 
and  although  the  repeal  or  modifica- 
tion of  the  charter  of  a  corporation 
of  that  kind  is  not  within  the  inhi- 
bition, yet  it  will  not  be  admittea, 
where  its  legislation  is  susceptible 
of  another  construction,  that  the 
state  has  in  this  way  sanctioned  an 
evasion  of  or  escape  from  liabilities, 
the  creation  of  which  is  authorized.'' 
"'  Barber  v.  City  of  East  Dallas, 
83  Tex.  147;  s.  c.  18  S.  W.  438;  the 
court  saying: — "Although  in  the  na- 


411  CONSOLIDATION    AND    KEOUOANIZATION.  §    4  iU 

gations — as,  for  instance,  the  issuing  of  bonds  for  the  purpose  of  build- 
ing a  city  hall — upon  a  municipal  corporation,  which  by  a  subsequent 
act  of  the  legislature  was  specially  abolished  and  the  same  territory 
reincorporated  as  a  city,  with  the  same  name  even,  is  not  effectual  to 
impose  the  same  obligations  upon  the  latter.^ ^^  The  city  of  New 
Orleans  has  been  held  liable  and  burdened  with  the  contract  obliga- 
tions entered  into  by  two  cities  with  a  gas  company  prior  to  an  act 
consolidating  them  with  the  city  of  New  Orleans. ^^^  An  attorney 
agreed  to  prosecute  an  action  of  the  town  of  L.  against  the  town  of 
A.  for  a  certain  sum,  which,  also,  he  was  to  have  if  the  action  should 
be  discontinued  without  his  consent.  Pending  the  action  L.  was 
vacated  and  A.  made  its  successor,  and  A.  obtained  the  discontinuance 
of  the  action.  It  was  held  that  A.  was  liable  to  the  attorney  for  the 
sum  agreed  upon.^^''  A  new  town  set  off  from  another  is  not  released 
or  discharged  from  the  payment  of  a  debt  created  prior  to  the  sepa- 
ration.^^°  Where  an  act  consolidating  two  cities  provides  that  the 
corporation  as  consolidated  shall  pay  all  the  lawful  debts  of  the  an- 
nexed corporation,  the  consolidated  corporation  was  held  liable  for 
damages  to  land  caused  by  the  wrongful  digging  of  a  ditch  by  the 
annexed  corporation.^^*'  Under  a  statute  of  New  Jersey  providing  a 
mode  of  equitable  adjustment  and  apportionment  of  the  indebtedness 
and  assets  when  a  portion  of  a  township  has  been  set  off,  it  was  held 
that  a  borough  set  off  from  a  township  was  not  liable  for  the  pre- 
viously contracted  debts  of  the  township.^ ^'^ 

§  446.    Remedy  of  creditors  of  the  old  corporation. — The  remedy 
of  creditors  of  an  extinguished  municipal  corporation  is  in  equity 

ture  of  a  tort,  the  liability  is  a  fixed  tort,  ought  not  to  be  cut  off,  rather 

one,  growing  out  of  the  exercise  of  than  of  a  purpose  to  require  the  new 

power   conferred    upon   the    defend-  municipality,  whose  charter  was  ap- 

ant  by  law,  and  although  the  law  parently  complete  in  Itself,  to  per- 

prescribed    the    manner    in    which  form  whatever  political  duties  had 

property    may    be    condemned    and  been    by    law    specifically    imposed 

taken  for  the  use  of  a  street."  upon  the  former  city." 

"^  So  held  in  Carey  v.  City  of  Du-  "'  State  v.  City  of  New  Orleans,  41 

luth,  38  Minn.   218;    s.  c.   36  N.  W.  La.  An.  91;  s.  c.  5  So.  262. 

459;    the   court  construing  the   Ian-  "*  Knight  v.  Town  of  Ashland,  65 

guage  of  the  act  charging  the  rein-  Wis.  166;  s.  c.  26  N.  W.  565. 

corporated   city   with    responsibility  "■'  Canosia  Tp.  v.  Grand  Lake  Tp., 

for  the  "legal  debts,  obligations  and  80  Minn.  357;  s.  c.  83  N.  W.  346. 

liabilities"  of  the  former  city  to  be  ""  City   of   Dallas   v.   Beeman,    23 

"indicative  merely  of  a  purpose  to  Tex.  Civ.  App.  315;  s.  c.  55  S.  W.  762. 

transfer  to  it  the  pecuniary  or  legal  ^^"  Inhabitants  &c.   v.    Hackensack 

responsibility    of    the    extinguished  Imp.  Com.,  60  N.  J.  Eq.  229;  s.  c.  46 

municipality  in  favor  of  those  whose  Atl.  782. 
rights,   springing   from   contract   or 


446 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS. 


412 


against  the  corporation  succeeding  to  its  property  and  powers."^  A 
reorganized  municipal  corporation,  legal  successor  to  one  dissolved, 
is  a  proper  party-defendant  in  a  suit  to  recover  for  claims  and  obliga- 
tions entered  into  by  the  dissolved  corporation,  and  a  judgment 
against  the  new  corporation  settles  all  questions  of  its  liability  for  the 
debts  of  the  old."^  The  United  States  circuit  court,  on  a  judgment 
obtained  by  a  bondholder  against  the  reorganized  corporation  on  such 
a  debt  of  the  dissolved  one,  ordered  a  peremptory  mandamus  to  be 
issued  to  the  officers  of  the  form(>r  to  levy  a  tax  to  raise  money  for  the 
payment  of  this  judgment.  This  was  affirmed  by  the  supreme  court 
of  the  United  States.^-"  Wliere  judgment  is  recovered  against  a 
municipal  corporation  which  is  subsequently  dissolved  and  another 
created  in  its  place,  scire  facias  is  the  proper  proceeding  to  revive  the 
judgment  against  its  successor.  Such  a  case  is  distinguishable  from 
scire  facias  against  an  heir  to  subject  him  to  liability  for  his  ancestor's 
debt :  the  heir  is  not  liable  for  the  debt,  but  only  the  property  in  his 
hands;  while  the  successor  of  the  municipal  corporation  is  liable,  be- 


"^  Mount  Pleasant  v.  Beckwith, 
100  U.  S.  514. 

1'"  United  States  v.  Port  of  Mobile, 
12  Fed.  768.  See  also,  Dousman  v. 
President  &c.,  1  Pin.  (Wis.)  81. 

^^o  Mobile  V.  Watson,  116  U.  S.  289; 
s.  c.  6  S.  Ct.  298,  where  it  was  con- 
tended that  as  the  act  chartering  the 
new  corporation  made  simply  a  pro- 
vision for  an  adjustment,  through 
commissioners  to  be  appointed  for 
the  purpose,  of  the  claims  against 
the  dissolved  corporation,  there  was 
no  power  given  to  the  reorganized 
corporation  to  levy  such  a  tax.  The 
court's  reason  for  such  ruling  was  as 
follows: — "The  remedies  for  the  en- 
forcement of  such  obligations  as- 
sumed by  a  municipal  corporation, 
which  existed  when  the  contract  was 
made,  must  be  left  unimpaired  by 
the  legislature,  or  if  they  are 
changed  a  substantial  equivalent 
must  be  provided.  Where  the  re- 
source for  the  payment  of  the  bonds 
of  a  municipal  corporation  is  the 
power  of  taxation  existing  when  the 
bonds  were  issued,  any  law  which 
withdraws  or  limits  the  taxing  pow- 


ers and  leaves  no  adequate  means 
for  the  payment  of  the  bonds  is  for- 
bidden by  the  constitution  of  the 
United  States  and  is  null  and  void: 
Citing  Von  Hoffman  v.  City  of  Quin- 
cy,  4  Wall.  535;  Edwards  v.  Kearzey, 
96  U.  S.  595;  Ralls  County  Court  v. 
United  States,  105  U.  S.  733;  Louisi- 
ana V.  Pilsbury,  105  U.  S.  278; 
Louisiana  v.  Mayor  &c.,  109  U.  S. 
285;  s.  c.  3  S.  Ct.  211.  Cf.  and  as 
supporting  the  doctrine:  Commis- 
sioners &c.  V.  Rather,  48  Ala.  433; 
Edwards  v.  Williamson,  70  Ala.  145; 
Slaughter  v.  Mobile  Co.,  73  Ala.  134. 
See  also,  Wolff  v.  New  Orleans,  103 
U.  S.  358,  368.  Cf.  Amy  v.  Selma,  77 
Ala.  103,  where  it  was  held  that  the 
Alabama  act  of  February  17,  1883, 
incorporating  the  same  territory 
and  inhabitants  under  another 
name,  made  the. new  corporation  the 
successor  of  the  dissolved  one,  and 
bound  it  to  the  payment  of  the  debts 
and  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  liabili- 
ties of  the  dissolved  corporation, 
and  made  it  a  necessary  party  to  a 
bill  filed  by  the  commissioners  ap- 
pointed under  the  act  of  1882. 


413  CONSOLIDATION    AND    REORGANIZATION.  §    446 

cause  it  is  the  same  debtor  under  a  different  name,  and  scire  facias 
lies  against  such  successor  although  equity  is  administering  the  assets 
of  the  former  municipality.^-^ 

"^Grantland  v.  City  of  Memphis,  12  Fed.  287. 


CHAPTEE  XIII. 


PARTITION    AND   DISSOLUTION. 


(a)  Partition. 
Section 

447.  Partition — General  rule. 

448.  Validity  of  partition. 

449.  Rules  as  to  division  of  counties 

and  towns. 

450.  Procedure  for  division  not  ap- 

plicable in  vacating  a  town. 

451.  Indiana  rules. 

452.  Michigan  rules. 

453.  Rules  as  to  severing  territory. 

454.  Pennsylvania  rule. 

455.  Constitutionality — Wisconsin. 

456.  Rulings    as    to    constitution    of 

Wisconsin  on  division  of 
counties. 

457.  The  same  subject  continued — 

Uniformity  of  system  of  gov- 
ernment. 

458.  Title  of  act. 

459.  Florida   decisions  on   constitu- 

tionality of  acts. 

460.  Kansas  decisions. 

461.  How  partition  affects  officers. 

462.  Where     unorganized     territory 

has  been  attached  to  a  county. 

463.  Settlement  of  inhabitants. 

464.  Territory  severed  from  an  old 

to  form  a  new  corporation  is 
a  part  of  the  old  until  the  new 
is  fully  organized. 

465.  Some  Wisconsin  acts  construed. 

466.  Provisions  of  act  as  to  county 

sites. 

467.  Apportionment  of  liabilities. 

468.  Rules  as  to  property  and  liabil- 

ities. 

469.  The  same  subject  continued. 

470.  A  Wisconsin  case  on  property 

rights. 


Section 

471.  Rules   as  to  apportionment  of 

liabilities  and   remedies. 

472.  Rules  in  North  Carolina  as  to 

settlement  between  new  and 
old  counties. 

473.  Rules  for  adjustment  of  liabil- 

ities. 

474.  Liabilities  which  fall  upon  the 

portion  severed. 

475.  Defenses  to  claims  growing  out 

of  partition. 

476.  Enforcement  of  obligations  of 

old  and  new. 

477.  Miscellaneous. 

(b)  Dissolution. 

478.  Dissolution  —  How    effected  in 

general. 

479.  The  same  subject  continued. 

480.  Surrender  of  charter. 

481.  The  same  subject  continued. 

482.  Florida    decisions    on    constitu- 

tionality of  acts  to  dissolve. 

483.  Vacated  towns. 

484.  This  was  no  dissolution. 

485.  Effect  of  dissolution  as  to  liabil- 

ities and  funds  in  hand. 

486.  Effect  of  dissolution  upon  lia- 

bilities. 

487.  What  does  not  affect  liabilities 

and  remedies. 

488.  Repealing  charters. 

489.  The  same  subject  continued. 

490.  Receiver  for  a  city. 

491.  The  same  subject  continued. 

492.  Where  such  a  receiver  was  ap- 

pointed. 


(414) 


415  PARTITION    AND   DISSOLUTION.  §    447 

(a)  Partition. 

§  447.  Partition — General  rule. — The  power  to  divide  counties  and 
form  new  ones  of  portions  of  the  old,  to  divide  towns,  and  to  sever 
territory  from  one  municipal  corporation  and  attach  it  to  another,  is 
not  questioned.  This  power  is  lodged  in  the  legislatures  of  the  states; 
but  its  exercise  over  corporations  different  from  counties  is  in  some 
cases  delegated  by  general  law  to  the  ruling  bodies  of  the  counties  of 
the  state.  It  has  been  held  in  New  York  that  a  county  may  be  divided 
by  the  legislature  into  two  or  more  counties  by  a  mere  majority  vote,  it 
not  being  necessary  that  a  bill  for  such  purpose  should  receive  the  as- 
sent of  two-thirds  of  all  the  members.^  Where,  since  the  passage  of  an 
act  organizing  a  township,  the  supervisors  of  the  county  out  of  which 
the  township  was  formed  have  undertaken  to  form  two  other  townships 
out  of  that  organized  by  the  legislature,  without  seeking  a  bill,  and  on 
a  petition  not  appearing  on  its  face  to  be  signed  by  any  freeholders 
of  the  township  organized  by  the  legislature,  their  action  can  not 
stand  in  the  way  of  the  legislative  organization,  or  interfere  with  the 
rights  of  an  officer  duly  elected  for  such  township.-  The  word  "town" 
as  used  in  the  constitution  of  Wisconsin  denotes  a  civil  division  com- 
posed of  contiguous  territory ;  and  under  the  power  granted  to  county 
boards  by  the  statute,  such  a  board  can  not  make  a  valid  order  chang- 
ing the  boundaries  of  a  town  so  that  it  shall  consist  of  two  separate 
and  detached  tracts  of  land.^  ^Vliere  a  severance  has  been  allowed 
by  order  of  court  on  an  application,  it  may  be  held  erroneous  if,  under 
the  circumstances,  justice  and  equity  did  not  require  it.*  Provisions 
of  a  previous  statute  relating  to  severance  of  territor}^  have  been  held 
applicable  alike  to  cities  and  towns  organized  under  the  general 
incorporation  law  and  those  previously  organized  under  special  char- 
ters.^ Such  statutory  provisions  are  applicable  to  territory  within  the 
city  or  town  whether  it  is  or  is  not  laid  out  into  lots  and  blocks.  If  so 
laid  out,  the  severance  would,  it  seems,  operate  as  an  extinguishment 
of  the  rights  of  the  corporation  in  the  streets  and  alleys  of  such  por- 
tion.*^    Where  the  application  for  division  of  a  township  is  properly 

1  People  V.  Morrell,  21  Wend.   (N.         « McKean  v.  City  of  Mt.  Vernon,  51 

Y.)  563.  Iowa  306;  s.  c.  1  N.  W.  617;  Way  v. 

=  So   held    in   Attorney-General   v.  Town  of  Center  Point,  51  Jowa  708; 

Rice,  64  Mich.  385;    s.  c.  31  N.  W.  s.  c.  1  N.  W.  692.     Where  the  stat- 

203.  utes  provide  a  method  of  detaching 

^  Chicago  &c.   R.    Co.   v.   Town   of  territory  embraced  in  a  village  the 

Oconto,  50  Wis.  189;    s.  c.  6  N.  W.  trustees   have   no    discretion   where 

607.  the    preliminary    steps    have    been 

*  Hosier  v.  City  of  Des  Moines,  31  taken,  in  accordance  with  the  stat- 

lowa  174.  ute:    Young  v.   Carey,   184   111.   613; 

'  Whiting  V.  City  of  Mt.  Pleasant,  s.  c.  56  N.  E.  960. 
11  Iowa  482. 


§  448  PUBLIC  conroRATiONS.  41 G 

made,  the  board  of  supervisors  has  no  discretion,  and  may  be  com- 
pelled by  mandamus  to  make  such  division.'^  A  new  township  formed 
out  of  an  old  one  does  not  become  independent  until  its  complete  or- 
ganization— when  the  officers  elected  for  it  enter  upon  the  discharge  of 
their  duties.®  In  Iowa,  upon  the  formation  of  a  new  township,  no  elec- 
tion except  that  upon  the  question  of  formation  of  such  township  can 
be  held  until  after  the  1st  of  January  following;  special  elections 
contemplated  or  authorized  by  law  to  be  held  prior  to  that  time  must 
be  held  in  the  old  or  original  township.^ 

§  448.  Validity  of  partition. — The  statute  of  New  York  does  not, 
it  seems,  require  that  the  published  copy  of  notice  of  the  application 
of  twelve  freeholders  for  the  erection  of  a  new  town  shall  contain  the 
names  of  such  applicants :  it  is  sufficient  that  the  notice  posted  should 
be  thus  described.  And  an  affidavit  that  a  notice  was  left  with  another 
person  to  be  posted  up,  "which  was  done,"  has  been  construed  as  a 
positive  averment  of  the  posting.^"  Where,  in  the  partition  of  a  town, 
and  forming  a  new  one  from  a  portion  thereof,  the  dividing  line  only 
was  described  in  the  act  of  the  board  of  supervisors,  it  has  been  held 
that  the  uncertainty  was  cured  by  the  reference  in  such  act  to  the 
petition,  etc.,  upon  which  it  was  founded,  and  from  which  it  appeared 
that  the  new  town  was  to  lie  south  of  the  line  of  division,  and  by 
proof  aliunde  that  the  place  named  in  the  act  for  holding  the  first 
town  meeting  was  south  of  such  line.^^  The  question  whether  a  town 
has  been  legally  erected  may  be  tested  in  an  action  in  the  nature  of 
quo  warranto  against  one  claiming  to  exercise  the  office  of  supervisor 
of  such  town.^"  Where  an  act  of  supervisors  or  other  officers  author- 
ized to  divide  municipal  corporations  is  attacked  for  irregularities  or 
otherwise,  the  burden  of  disproving  a  compliance  with  the  conditions 
imposed  by  law  as  requisite  to  the  exercise  of  the  power  is  upon  those 
who  would  impeach  it ;  the  act  of  the  officers  is  one  of  a  legislative 
character,  in  favor  of  the  regularity  of  which  all  presumptions  are  to 
be  indulged. ^^  The  supreme  court  of  Michigan  has  held  that  the 
legality  of  the  division  of  a  township,  consisting  of  two  governmental 
towns,  can  not  be  raised  in  an  action  attacking  the  validity  of  a  tax, 
on  the  ground  that  the  assessment  rolls  for  the  old  township  did  not 
contain  the  lands  included  in  the  new  one.^* 

'Henry  v.  Taylor,  57  Iowa  72;  s.  c.  '"People  v.  Carpenter,  24  N.  Y.  86. 

10  N.  W.  308.  "  People  v.  Carpenter,  supra. 

*  Lamb  v.  Burlington  &c.  R.  Co.,  39  ^^  People  v.  Carpenter,  supra. 

Iowa  333.  "People  v.  Carpenter,  supra. 

"Williams  v.   Poor,   65   Iowa  410;  "Mills  v.  Richland  Tp.,  72  Mich, 

s.  c.  21  N.  W.  753.  100;  s.  c.  40  N.  W.  183. 


417  PARTITION    AND   DISSOLUTION.  §    449 

§  449.  Rules  as  to  division  of  counties  and  towns. — An  act  to  create 
two  counties,  etc.,  which  tlividccl  the  territory  of  two  existing  counties 
so  that  a  large  part  of  the  one  was  cut  off  and  attached  to  the  other 
to  form  one  of  these  new  counties,  and  the  other  new  county  was 
formed  of  the  halance  left  of  the  first,  violated  that  provision  of  the 
constitution  of  Idaho  which  declares  that  "no  county  shall  be  divided 
unless  a  majority  of  the  qualified  electors  of  the  territory  proposed  to 
be  cut  off,  voting  on  the  proposition  at  a  general  election,  shall  vote  in 
favor  of  such  division."^ "^  Where  the  constitution  of  a  state  provides 
that  no  county  shall  be  formed  of  an  area  less  than  a  fixed  number  of 
square  miles,  a  county  board  can  not  lawfully  submit  a  proposition  to 
divide  a  county  where  the  new  counties  would  be  less  in  area  than  the 
constitutional  limit.  ^*'  A  county  board  can  not  lawfully  submit  to  be 
voted  upon  at  the  same  election  two  propositions  to  erect  from  a 
county  two  new  counties  when  the  territory  described  in  one  proposi- 
tion embraces  a  part  of  that  included  in  another,  under  a  provision  in 
a  statute  that  on  a  proper  petition  the  county  board  shall  submit  to 
the  electors  of  the  county  affected  the  question  of  the  division  of  the 
county.  ^^  An  act  of  Tennessee  abolishing  the  county  of  James  and 
restoring  its  territory  to  the  counties  of  Hamilton  and  Bradley,  from 
which  it  was  formed,  was  held  to  be  void  under  that  article  of  the 
constitution  of  Tennessee  providing  for  the  formation  of  new  coun- 
ties with  the  consent  of  the  voters  of  the  territory  taken  to  form  such 
counties,  and  particularly  prescribing  how  such  new  counties  may  be 
established,  but  giving  no  authority  to  abolish  an  old  county  entirely.^* 
Where  one  town  is  set  off  by  the  legislature  from  the  territory  of  an- 
other town,  the  boundary  between  them  being  a  stream  of  water,  the 
center  of  the  stream  is  the  dividing  line  between  the  two.^^  Commis- 
sioners in  proceedings  to  alter  township  lines  are  not  restricted  to 
the  approval  or  rejection  of  the  line  established  by  the  report  of  the 
first  commissioners  who  viewed.  Xor  are  reviewers  in  such  proceed- 
ings required  to  go  within  any  particular  distance  of  the  proposed  line, 
if  they  go  near  enough  to  get  a  view  that  will  enable  them  to  form  an 
intelligent  opinion. ^°  The  constitution  of  Nebraska,  declaring  that 
"no  county  shall  be  divided,  or  have  any  part  stricken  therefrom, 
without  first  submitting  the  question  to  a  vote  of  the  people  of  the 

''^  People  v.  George,  2  Idaho  813;  s.  ^' James  Co.   v.   Hamilton   Co.,   89 

c.  26  Pac.  983.  Tenn.  237;  s.  c.  14  S.  W.  601. 

"State  V.  Armstrong,  30  Neb.  493;  "Flynn    v.    City    of    Boston,    153 

s.  c.  46  N.  W.  618.  Mass.  372;  s.  c.  26  N.  E.  868. 

"  State  V.  Armstrong,  supra.  -"  Exeter  &c.  Township  Line,  8  Pa. 

Co.  Ct.  524. 
1  Smith — 27 


§    450  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  418 

county,  nor  unless  a  majority  of  all  the  legal  voters  of  the  county 
voting  on  the  question  shall  vote  for  the  same/'  is  a  restriction  upon 
the  powers  of  the  legislature  to  the  extent  named,  but  does  not  prohibit 
a  law  requiring  a  three-fifths  vote.^^  The  auditor-general  of  Michigan 
apportioned  the  state  taxes  for  1891  to  a  county  from  which  a  part 
had  been  taken  by  an  act  passed  May  21,  1891,  but  not  to  go  into  effect 
until  October  2,  1891,  and  with  parts  of  other  counties  formed  into  a 
new  county,  without  reference  to  the  new  county,  and  applied  for  a 
writ  of  mandamus  to  compel  the  board  of  supervisors  of  that  county 
to  levy  the  tax.  It  was  held  that  the  writ  should  be  denied ;  that  the 
auditor-general  should  separate  the  legalized  valuation,  and  apportion 
the  taxes  to  the  old  county  in  proportion  to  the  valuation  of  the  prop- 
erty therein,  after  deducting  the  valuation  of  the  townships  or  parts 
of  townships  taken  from  that  county  to  form  the  new  county.^^  An 
act  detaching  certain  territory  from  a  county  and  annexing  it  to  an 
adjoining  one,  which  brought  the  line  between  the  counties  within 
less  than  six  miles  of  the  court-house  of  the  county  from  which  the 
territory  was  detached,  was  held  to  be  void  as  repugnant  to  the  consti- 
tution of  Tennessee,  which  provides  that  the  line  of  any  new  county 
formed  shall  not  approach  the  court-house  of  an  old  county  from  which 
it  may  be  taken  nearer  than  eleven  miles.^^  No  appeal  lies  from  a 
statutory  proceeding  for  the  division  of  a  township  unless  expressly 
allowed  by  statute.^* 

§  450.    Procedure  for  division  not  applicable  in  vacating  a  town. — 

The  Wisconsin  statutes  prescribe  a  procedure  for  division  of  towns 
and  for  vacating  towns.  It  has  been  held  that  the  only  limitation 
upon  the  powers  of  the  county  board  in  setting  off,  organizing,  vacat- 
ing and  changing  the  boundaries  of  towns  is  contained  in  the  statute 
that  a  town  shall  not  be  vacated  unless  a  majority  of  the  members 
elected  to  seats  therein  shall  so  desire.^^ 

^^  State  v.  Nelson,  34  Neb.  162;  s.  c.  a  failure  to  take  the  steps  provided 

51  N.  W.  648;    State  v.  Painter,  34  for  in  this  section  made  the  action 

Neb.  173;  s.  c.  51  N.  W.  652.  of  the  county  board  void.    The  court 

"  Auditor-General  v.  Board  &c.,  89  held  this  section  not  applicable  in 

Mich.  552;  s.  c.  51  N.  W.  483.  proceedings  to  vacate  a  town.     The 

-^  Union  Co.  v.  Knox  Co.,  90  Tenn.  court   say   that   the    ordinance    can 

541;  s.  c.  18  S.  W.  254.  not  be  said  "correctly   [to  be]   one 

"''  In  re  Division  of  Valley  Tp.,  146  dividing  the  town  of  Dexter.     It  va- 

Pa.  St.  Ill;  s.  c.  23  Atl.  222.  cates  that  town  absolutely,  and  then 

"^  State  V.  Board  &c.,  61  Wis.  278;  proceeds    to    attach    the    territory 

s.  c.  21  N.  W.  55,  in  which  it  was  thereby  left  unorganized  to  certain 

contended  that  the  provisions  of  the  organized  towns  adjacent  thereto.   It 

section   relating  to   the   division   of  was  the  clear  duty  of  the  board  to 

towns  applied  to  the  case,  and  that  extend  organized  town  government 


419  TARTITION    AXD   DISSOLUTION.  §    451 

§  451.  Indiana  rules. — The  legislature  may,  on  division  of  a 
county,  divide  property  of  the  same.^"  It  has  been  held  in  Indiana 
that  the  legislature  may  delegate  the  power  to  organize  new  counties ; 
furtlior,  that  their  act  of  ]\Iarch,  1857,  upon  this  subject  was  not  in 
conflict  with  their  constitution;  that  no  legislative  power  was  dele- 
gated by  that  act."^  Provisions  for  the  establishment  of  boundaries 
of  existing  counties  and  provisions  for  formation  of  new  counties  are 
matters  which  may  be  properly  embraced  in  the  same  act  of  the  legis- 
lature.^* Under  the  act  of  March,  1857,  a  single  county  containing 
the  requisite  area  might  be  divided  by  its  own  board  of  commissioners, 
acting  through  a  single  committee  of  freeholders.^^  By  the  establish- 
ment of  boundaries  of  a  new  county,  under  the  provisions  of  the  sup- 
plementary act  of  March  5,  1859,  it  becomes  simply  an  organized  po- 
litical body ;  the  jurisdiction  of  courts  is  not  affected  thereby ;  in  such 
case  the  courts  of  the  old  county  continue  to  hold  Jurisdiction  in  ac- 
tions concerning  real  estate,  situate  within  the  boundaries  of  the  new 
county,  until  the  time  is  fixed  by  the  judge  for  holding  the  first  term 
in  the  new  county.^"  Change  of  boundaries  of  two  adjoining  counties 
by  boards  of  commissioners,  subsequent  to  action  of  the  assessors  of 
townships  of  the  county  from  which  a  portion  was  detached,  in  making 
their  enlistments  and  returning  their  list  of  taxation  to  the  auditor  of 
the  county,  and  prior  to  the  day  when  the  rate  of  taxation  was  fixed, 
will  not  affect  the  right  of  the  county  to  collect  against  persons  re- 
siding in  the  detached  territory;  but  even  if  the  county  from  which 
such  j)ortion  was  detached  were  in  the  wrong  in  attempting  to  collect 
such  taxes,  the  one  having  a  part  of  its  territory  attached  to  it  would 
not  be  a  proper  party  to  enjoin  it:  a  taxpayer  should  move  in  such 
matters. ^^     A  bill  of  revivor  of  a  bill  in  chancery  filed  in  an  old 

over  such  territory.    Under  existing  nature  of  things  can  not  be — until 

laws  it  is  only  through  the  machin-  the  ordinance  vacating  the  town  has 

ery  of  town  government  that  prop-  taken  effect.    See  State  v.  Timme,  54 

erty  outside  of  municipalities  can  be  Wis.  318;  s.  c.  11  N.  W.  785.    Hence, 

assessed  for  taxation,  or  taxed,  or  when    that    part   of   the    ordinance 

that  electors  not  residing  in  munici-  which   attached   the   territory   once 

palities   can   exercise   the   right   of  situated   in  the  town  of  Dexter  to 

suffrage.     [There  is]  no  good  reason  other  towns  became  operative,  there 

why  provision  may  not  be  made  in  was  no  town  of  Dexter  to  divide." 

the  same  ordinance  for  vacating  a  =°  State  v.  Votaw,  8  Blackf.   (Ind.) 

town    and    for   extending   the   town  2;  Lucas  v.  Board  &c.,  44  Ind.  524. 

government    over    the    unorganized  "' Board  &c.  v.  Spitler,  13  Ind.  235; 

territory  which  constituted  the  va-  Haggard  v.  Hawkins,  14  Ind.  299. 

cated  town,  as  well  as  to  make  two  -■*  Haggard  v.  Hawkins,  14  Ind.  299. 

ordinances  to  accomplish  the  same  ""  Haggard  v.  Hawkins,  14  Ind.  299. 

result.    In  either  case  the  provisions  =°  Milk  v.  Kent,  60  Ind.  226. 

for  attaching  the  territory  to  organ-  "  Board  &c.  v.  Board  &c.,  32  Ind. 

ized  towns  are  not  operative — in  the  234. 


§    453  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  42Q 

county  respecting  land  situate  in  the  old  county  at  the  time  of  decree 
should  be  filed  in  the  same  county,  notwithstanding  by  a  change 
of  boundaries  the  land  was  afterwards  in  another  county;  for  this 
latter  county  had  no  jurisdiction  of  the  cause,  and  a  bill  of  revivor 
merely  continues  the  original  suit.^^  And  an  action  to  foreclose  a 
mortgage  when  brought  in  the  proper  county  can  not  be  defeated  by  a 
subsequent  division  of  the  county,  as  the  division  of  the  county  by 
commissioners  would  not  be  complete  till  a  court  was  so  organized 
in  the  new  county  as  to  enable  suits  to  be  instituted. ^^  A  division  of 
a  county  by  commissioners  in  such  a  case  is  a  matter  of  proof.^'*  It 
was  not  the  intention  of  the  legislature  to  exclude  other  evidence  as  to 
whether  petitioners  for  formation  of  new  counties  formed  a  majority 
of  the  voters,  in  providing,  as  a  mode  of  ascertaining  that  fact,  a 
reference  to  the  number  of  votes  cast  at  the  last  preceding  congres- 
sional election.^^ 
i 

§  452.  Michigan  rules. — An  act  to  organize  a  new  county  out  of 
parts  of  three  old  counties  provided  for  an  election  upon  the  forma- 
tion of  the  new  county  by  the  electors  of  the  three  counties  "at  the 
township  meetings  in  said  county,"  etc.  The  new  county  organized 
under  this  act  with  the  assent  of  the  voters  of  the  parts  of  those 
counties  embraced  within  its  boundaries  was  held  to  be  properly  or- 
ganized: the  act  being  construed  not  to  require  that  the  question  be 
submitted  to  the  voters  of  the  whole  of  those  counties  from  which  it 
was  organized,  but  only  to  those  within  the  new  county.^*'  The  con- 
stitutional prohibition  in  Michigan  against  reducing  any  county  to 
less  than  sixteen  townships  is  meant  to  prevent  its  unreasonable  re- 
duction in  size  and  to  preclude  the  division  of  survej^ed  townships,  if 
convenience  requires,  in  organizing  new  counties.  It  was  not  violated 
where  a  county  was  left  with  fifteen  whole  and  two  half  townships.^^ 
It  is  competent  for  the  legislature  in  creating  a  now  county  out  of 
the  territory  taken  from  two  old  ones  to  enact  that  suits  pending  on 
a  certain  date  in  any  court  in  either  of  the  old  counties  shall  be 
prosecuted  to  final  judgment  in  the  county  where  commenced. ^^ 

=^  Arnold  v.  Styles,  2  Blackf.  (Ind.)  new  county  and  new  township  held 

391.  Illegal    in    People    v.    Maynard,    15 

^^  Buckinghouse  v.  Gregg,  19  Ind.  Mich.  463.     See  People  v.  Board  &g., 

401.  41  Mich.  647;  s.  c.  2  N.  W.  904,  as  to 

'■'*  Buckinghouse  v.  Gregg,  supra.  illegal  division  of  township. 

'^  Allen  V.  Hostetter,  16  Ind.  15.  ^^  So   held    in    an    ejectment   case 

^^  People  v.  Burns,  5  Mich.  114.  brought  in  the  new  county:  Spalding 

'''Bay  Co.  v.  Bullock,  51  Mich.  544;  v.  Kelly,  66  Mich.  693;  s.  c.  33  N.  W. 

s.   c.    16   N.   W.   896.     Acts  creating  803. 


421  TARTITION    AND   DISSOLUTION.  §    453 

§  453.  Eules  as  to  severing  territory. — An  act  for  the  creation  of  a 
new  count}'  out  of  portions  ol'  two  old  ones  provided  "that  a  portion 
of  K.  county  and  a  portion  of  S.  county,  hereby  proposed  to  ])e  segre- 
gated, shall  not  be  cut  off  unless  the  question  of  segregation  shall  be 
first  submitted  to  the  vote  of  the  people  of  K.  county,  and  also  to  the 
voters  of  that  part  of  range  69  proposed  to  be  detached  from  S. 
county,  at  a  special  election  called  for  that  purpose.  *  *  *  In  case 
a  majority  of  the  legal  voters  of  said  K.  county,  and  of  said  range 
69,  voting,  shall  vote  in  favor  of  said  segregation,  then  this  act  shall 
be  in  full  force  and  effect."  It  was  held  that  a  majority  of  the  aggre- 
gate vote  cast  in  both  counties  was  insufficient,  but  a  majority  of  each 
was  necessary  to  the  creation  of  the  proposed  county.^''  Lands  within 
the  limits  of  a  city,  used  wholly  for  agricultural  purposes,  not  bene- 
fited by  their  connection  with  the  city  and  not  needed  for  city  pur- 
poses, will  be  severed  on  petition  of  the  owners ;  and  if  not  liable  for 
municipal  taxes  the  severance  can  not  be  conditioned  on  the  payment 
of  any  part  of  the  municipal  indebtedness.*"  A  Texas  act  which 
amends  and  is  a  part  of  a  title  of  the  revised  statutes  provides  for 
elections  to  withdraw  territory  from  corporate  limits,  but  does  not 
direct  the  manner  thereof.  It  was  held  that  the  act  was  not,  therefore, 
invalid,  but  that  the  election  in  question  should  be  held  as  other  elec- 
tions provided  for  in  the  title.*^  The  same  act  directs  that,  npon  a 
petition  by  fifty  qualified  voters  of  territory  within  the  limits  of  a  mu- 
nicipal corporation,  the  mayor  shall  order  an  election  to  determine 
whether  such  territory  shall  be  allowed  to  withdraw  from  the  munici- 
pality, provided  that  such  municipality  be  not  thereby  reduced  to  an 
area  of  less  than  one  square  mile,  or  one  mile  in  diameter  around  the 
center  of  the  original  corporate  limits.  It  was  held  that  where  there 
was  no  dispute  that  the  requisite  number  of  qualified  voters  had 
signed,  and  that  the  withdrawal  in  contemplation  would  leave  the 
requisite  area,  the  act  of  ordering  the  election  involved  no  exercise  of 
discretion,  and  mandamus  would  lie  against  the  mayor  in  case  of  re- 
fusal.*2 

§454.  Pennsylvania  rule.— A  municipal  corporation" is  merely  an 
agency  instituted  by  the  sovereign  for  the  purpose  of  carrying  out  in 
detail  the  objects  of  government, — essentially  a  revocable  agency, — 
having  no  vested  right  to  any  of  its  powers  or  franchises,  the  charter 
or  act  of  erecting  being  in  no  sense  a  contract  with  the  state,  and 

=»Van   Dusen   v.   Fridley,   6   Dak.  "  Sansom  v.  Mercer,  68  Tex.  488; 

322;  s.  c.  43  N.  W.  703.  s.  c.  5  S.  W.  62. 

*»  Evans  v.  City  of  Council  Bluffs,  ^=  Sansom  v.  Mercei%  68  Tex.  488; 

65  Iowa  238;  s.  c.  21  N.  W.  584.  s.  c.  5  S.  W.  62. 


§    455  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  4:22 

therefore  fully  subject  to  the  control  of  the  legislature,  who  may 
enlarge  or  diminish  its  territorial  extent  or  its  functions,  may  change 
or  modify  its  internal  arrangement,  or  destroy  its  very  existence  with 
the  mere  breath  of  arbitrary  discretion.  Sic  volo,  sic  jubeo,  that  is 
all  the  sovereign  authority  need  say.  This  much  is  undeniable  and 
has  not  been  denied.*^  The  supreme  court  of  Pennsylvania  held  the 
power  of  an  original  borough  supreme  over  a  portion  of  its  territory 
which  had  been  detached  by  proceedings  in  the  court  of  quarter  ses- 
sions, and  constituted  a  part  of  a  new  borough  erected  in  those  pro- 
ceedings, as  there  was  no  power  in  the  court  in  the  manner  employed 
to  change  the  limits  of  a  borough.  Under  the  act  governing  such 
changes  the  procedure  is  by  an  application  made  for  the  purpose, 
signed  by  a  majority  of  the  freeholders  residing  within  the  limits  of 
the  borough ;  due  notice  must  be  given  as  directed  by  law,  and  it  must 
be  approved  by  the  grand  jury  and  confirmed  by  the  court.  An  omis- 
sion to  take  these  steps  was  fatal,  and  the  new  borough  was  not  prop- 
erly formed  as  to  the  part  it  detached  from  the  original  borough.** 

§  455.  Constitutionality — Wisconsin. — A  part  of  a  town  had  been 
detached  by  act  of  the  legislature  from  one  county  and  annexed  to 
another  county.  By  legislative  edict  it  was  restored  to  the  former. 
In  the  meantime  taxes  had  been  collected  and  paid  to  the  county  to 
which  it  was  annexed.  It  was  contended  that  an  act  passed  subse- 
quently, ordering  the  treasurer  of  the  latter  county  to  pay  over  the 
taxes  collected  and  to  assign  titles  to  land  bought  in  for  such  taxes 
to  the  county  from  which  the  town  was  originally  detached,  was  un- 
constitutional because  it  purported  to  create  an  indebtedness  from  the 
first  county  to  the  second,' which  the  legislature  could  not  do.     The 

"  Philadelphia  v.  Fox,   64  Pa.   St.  coextensive  with  the  corporate  lim- 

169.  its.     Their  responsibility  as  public 

"  Darby  v.  Sharon  Hill,  112  Pa.  St.  agents  exists  mainly  in  the  perform- 
66;  s.  c.  4  Atl.  722;  the  court  say-  ance  of  acts  for  the  public  benefit, 
ing: — "The  legislature  may  by  ap-  but  they  have  also  a  distinctly  legal 
propriate  general  laws  to  that  effect,  personality;  they  may  make  con- 
preserving  the  vested  rights  of  third  tracts,  purchase  property,  create 
parties,  either  enlarge  or  contract  debts,  borrow  money,  and  they  have 
the  boundaries  of  boroughs;  may  a  right,  to  the  extent  of  the  limits 
consolidate  several  such  corpora-  fixed  by  their  charter,  to  corporate 
tions  into  one  or  divide  one  into  sev-  existence;  their  rights  and  responsi- 
eral.  But  it  is  incompetent  for  the  bilities  are  in  this  regard  analogous 
court  to  dismember  a  borough,  ex-  to  those  of  private  corporations,  sub- 
cept  as  they  may  be  authorized  by  ject  only  to  the  action  of  the  law- 
law;  the  charter  of  a  municipal  cor-  making  power,  as  we  have  stated, 
poration  grants  privileges  and  im-  The  courts  of  quarter  sessions  in 
munities  which  are  perpetual,  and  this  respect  have  just  such  powers 
their  privileges  and  immunities  are  as  the  legislature  has  given  them." 


423  PAHTITlOy    AND    DISSOLUTION".  §    456 

court  conceded  tliat  the  legislature  was  not  competent  to  create  such 
an  indebtedness,  but  overruled  the  contention.  They  said :  "But 
if  money  had  been  paid  by  mistake,  growing  out  of  hasty  legislation 
in  annexing  a  town  in  one  county  to  another  without  making  any 
provision  as  to  the  effect  of  the  change,  it  would  be  competent  for  the 
legislature  to  provide  in  what  manner  this  mistake  should  be  cor- 
rected."*^ An  act  providing  for  the  ajipointment  of  commissioners  to 
adjust  and  settle  the  rights  of  the  old  and  new  counties  is  not  a  con- 
ferring of  judicial  ])Owers  upon  them,  where  an  appeal  is  given  from 
their  decisions  to  the  regularly  constituted  courts  of  the  state,  which 
would  make  it  repugnant  to  the  constitution  of  Wisconsin.*®  The 
division  of  existing  towns  and  the  creation  of  new  towns  by  direct 
action  of  the  legislature  is  not  the  "enacting  of  any  special  or  private 
law  for  incoi^porating  any  town/'  within  the  meaning  of  the  state 
constitution.*^ 

§  456.  Rulings  as  to  constitution  of  Wisconsin  on  division  of  coun- 
ties.— The  constitution  of  Wisconsin  forbade  the  division  of  a  county 
with  an  area  of  nine  hundred  square  miles  or  less  without  submitting 
the  question  to  a  vote  of  the  people  of  the  county  and  a  majority  of 
all  the  voters  voting  on  the  same.  It  has  been  held  that  bodies  of 
water,  such  as  Lake  j\Iichigan  or  a  part  thereof,  lying  within  the 
boundaries  of  the  county,  are  to  be  computed ;  and  the  act  for  the 
formation  of  a  county  from  Washington  county,  which  with  the 
water  area  had  more  than  nine  hundred  square  miles,  was  not  repug- 
nant to  this  section  of  the  constitution.*®  The  original  surveys  of  the 
United  States  government  are  not  to  be  taken  as  conclusive  by  pre- 
sumption of  law :  they  may  be  rebutted  and  impeached  as  to  their 
correctness;  but,  prima  facie,  they  are  to  be  presumed  to  be  correct 
until  their  accuracy  has  been  properly  impeached.*'*  The  accuracy 
of  these  surveys  may  be  put  in  issue  by  the  pleadings,  and  be  deter- 
mined like  other  questions  of  fact.^°  Where  a  county  from  which 
territory  was  detached  appeared  by  the  United  States  surveys  to  con- 

*^  Supervisors    &c.    v.    Supervisors  Wis.   605;    s.   c.   45   N.  W.   598.     Cf. 

&c.,   13   Wis.    490,   in   which   it  was  Gough  v.  Dorsey,  27  Wis.  119,  131, 

held  that  an  action  for  the  amount  133;  Gaston  v.  Babcock,  6  Wis.  503, 

claimed  could  not  be  sustained  until  507. 

the     plaintiffs    had     submitted    the  ^' State  v.  Forest  Co.,  74  Wis.  610; 

claim  to  the  defendants  and  it  had  s.  c.  43  N.  W.  551. 

been  disallowed.     This  act  gave  no  ^  State  v.  Larrabee,  1  Wis.  200. 

additional  remedy,  unless  perhaps  a  ^^  State   v.    Merriman,    6    Wis.    14. 

mandamus  to  compel  the  treasurer  See  also,  Kane  v.  Parker,  4  Wis.  123, 

to  comply  with  its  provisions.  128;  Vroman  v.  Dewey,  23  Wis.  530. 

^  Forest  Co.   v.   Langlade  Co.,   76  ^°  State  v.  Merriman,  6  Wis.  14. 


§    457  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  434 

tain  just  nine  Imndred  square  miles,  the  act  forming  a  new  county  of 
the  same  was  only  prima  facie  unconstitutional;  but  the  burden  was 
upon  those  who  supported  the  act  to  show  that  the  county  contained 
more.^^  The  provision  to  submit  to  a  vote  is  not  merely  directory  to 
the  legislature:  it  is  inhibitory  and  imperative.^^  An  act  which  sub- 
mitted the  act  itself  to  popular  vote  of  the  electors  of  the  county,  but 
by  its  entire  scope  evidently  intended  only  to  submit  the  question  of 
division  to  popular  vote,  was  held  valid  notwithstanding  the  apparently 
unconstitutional  delegation  of  legislative  power  by  its  inaccurate  lan- 
guage, and  was  held  to  have  provided  constitutionally  for  a  division  of 
the  county.  ^^  A  county  having  originally  less  than  nine  hundred 
square  miles  in  area  may  have  attached  to  it  a  part  of  one  which  can 
spare  the  territory ;  and  if  by  this  addition  its  area  is  thus  increased  to 
more  than  the  area  required  in  this  provision  of  the  constitution,  it 
can  be  divided  to  form  a  part  or  the  whole  of  a  new  county  without 
submitting  the  question  to  a  vote.^* 

§  457.  The  same  subject  continued — TTniformity  of  system  of  gov- 
ernment.— The  creation  or  division  of  counties,  and  the  adjustment  of 
the  respective  rights  and  liabilities  of  the  new  and  old  counties  as  to 
the  assets  and  debts  of  the  latter,  are  not  part  of  the  system  of  county 
government,  which  by  the  constitution  of  Wisconsin  is  required  to  be 
uniform.^^  To  make  the  town  board  in  such  a  case  also  the 
county  board  of  a  new  county  is  no  infringement  of  the  rule  of  unity 
or  the  rule  of  uniformity  required  by  the  constitution  as  to  a  system 
of  town  and  county  government. ^^     Kor  was  an  act  for  dividing  a 

"State   v.   Merriman,   6   Wis.   14;  N.  W.  104;    State  v.  Forest  Co.,  74 

followed  in  Perry  v.  State,  9  Wis.  19.  Wis.  610,  615;  s.  c.  43  N.  W.  551. 

"State    v.    Merriman,    6   Wis.    14.         '*" Cathcart   v.    Comstock,    56   Wis. 

See  also,  State  v.  Elwood,  11  Wis.  17.  590;   s.  c.  14  N.  W.  833.     The  court 

^^  State  V.  Elwood,  11  Wis.  17.  say: — "There  may  be  necessity  for 

^*  State  V.  Cram,  16  Wis.  343.  more  than  one  town,  and  yet  there 

^°  Forest  Co.   v.  Langlade   Co.,   76  may  be  necessity  for  a  county.    But 

Wis.   605;    s.   c.   45   N.  W.   598.    Cf.  a  county  necessitates  a  board  of  su- 

Crawford    Co.    v.    Iowa   Co.,    2    Pin.  pervisors,  and  if  it  contains  but  one 

(Wis.)    368;    Town  of  Milwaukee  v.  town,    then    there    can    be    but    one 

City  of  Milwaukee,  12  Wis.  93;  Mor-  chairman  in  such  town,  and  it  would 

gan  v.  Beloit  City,  7  Wall.  613;  Town  hardly  be  claimed  that  one  person 

of  Depere  v.  Town  of  Bellevue,  31  should  constitute  such  board.  [Where 

Wis.  120;    Mount  Pleasant  v.  Beck-  there  are   several  towns   in  a  new 

with,  100  U.  S.  514;  Knight  v.  Town  county  the  law  here  provided  that 

of  Ashland,  61  Wis.  233;  s.  c.  21  N.  the  chairman  of  the  supervisors  of 

W.    65;    Schriber   v.    Town   of   Lan-  the  different  towns  should  constitute 

glade,  66  Wis.  616,  629,  631;  s.  c.  29  the  county  board.]    It  [the  board  of 

N.  W.  547,  554;    Yorty  v.  Paine,  62  the  town]  supplies  a  necessity,  and 

Wis.   154,  161;    s.  c.  22  N.  W.  137;  is  as  nearly  uniform  as  practicable, 

Hall  v.  Baker,  74  Wis.  118;  s.  c.  42  and  preserves  the  unity  of  the  sys- 


435 


TARTITIOX    AND    DISSOLUTION. 


458 


county  into  three  towns  in  violation  of  the  same  constitutional  pro- 
vision.'" 


§  458.  Title  of  act. — An  act  which  expressed  its  object  to  be  to 
^'incorporate"  a  certain  township,  but  only  mentioned  one  of  the  town- 
ships from  which  it  was  to  be  taken,  is  not  repugnant  to  the  constitu- 
tion of  New  Jersey,  providing  that  the  object  of  an  act  must  be  ex- 
pressed in  its  title,  because  of  its  omission  of  the  other  township  fur- 
nishing a  portion  of  its  territory.^*  As  to  the  objection  to  the  title 
not  embracing  all  the  subject-matter  of  the  bill,  it  was  held  that  the 
title,  "An  act  to  create  and  establish  the  county  of  Lake  from  portions 
of  Sumter  and  Orange  counties,"  was  broad  enough  to  cover  any  pro- 
vision as  to  the  location  of  the  county  site  or  a  change  of  the  same  at 
any  period  or  stage  of  the  existence  of  the  county.^® 


tern  in  that  it  constitutes  the  county 
board  from  town  supervisors." 

"  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Langlade 
Co.,  56  Wis.  614;  s.  c.  14  N.  W.  844. 
The  court  say: — "It  is  the  one  sys- 
tem which  is  to  be  as  nearly  uniform 
as  practicable.  It  is  that  which  is  to 
be  protected  against  legislative  en- 
croachment. This  system  which  is 
to  be  thus  guarded  is  nothing  more 
nor  less  than  the  plan  or  scheme  by 
which  the  town  and  county  are  to  be 
governed.  Within  the  limits  of  the 
constitution  this  plan  or  scheme  of 
governing  either  town  or  county 
may  be  changed  by  the  legislature 
without  any  interference  with  the 
other.  The  mere  fact  that  the  legis- 
lature, in  a  given  case,  prescribes  a 
particular  method  of  organizing  new 
towns  and  bringing  them  into  the 
one  established  system,  does  not  nec- 
essarily imply  that  the  plan  or 
scheme  of  governing  such  new 
towns,  after  they  are  thus  brought 
into  the  system,  is  to  be  any  differ- 
ent from  that  in  other  towns.  The 
incipient  steps  leading  towards  or- 
ganization should  not  be  mistaken 
for  the  more  advanced  stages.  A 
town  implies  inception  and  progres- 
sion as  well  as  completed  organiza- 
tion. The  same  is  true  of  a  county. 
Induction   into  the  family  of  local 


governments  is  quite  a  different 
thing  from  exercising  the  functions 
of  such  government  after  having 
been  thus  inducted.  The  one  in- 
volves action  prior  to  reaching  the 
system,  the  other  implies  action 
after  becoming  a  constituent  part  of 
it.  The  unity  and  uniformity  re- 
quired apply  to  the  organization 
when  completed  rather  than  the 
methods  to  bring  about  such  organi- 
zation." 

=^*  State  V.  Elvins,  32  N.  J.  L.  362; 
the  court  saying: — "Any  statement 
in  the  title,  as  to  the  territory  to  be 
taken  to  form  the  new  town,  was 
unnecessary.  Such  statement  goes 
beyond  the  mere  expression  of  the 
object  of  the  statute,  and  is  a  par- 
ticularity which  the  constitution 
does  not  require." 

«"  County  Com'rs  &c.  v.  State,  24 
Fla.  263;  s.  c.  4  So.  795;  the  court  say- 
ing:— "Provisions  for  such  change, 
whether  from  a  temporary  or  a  per- 
manent, an  original  or  a  subsequent 
location,  are  a  part  of  the  county 
government  established.  Any  pro- 
vision relating  to  its  organization  or 
government,,  though  for  use  in  the 
future,  is  as  much  matter  properly 
connected  with  the  establishment  of 
the  county  as  are  those  relating  to 
the  earliest  stages  of  its  existence. 


§    459  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  426 

§  459.  Florida  decisions  on  constitutionality  of  acts. — A  section  of 
the  Florida  statutes  providing  for  the  incorporation  of  cities  and 
towns  autliorized  the  county  commissioners  to  prescribe  new  bound- 
aries of  an  incorporated  town,  when,  on  the  petition  of  five  registered 
inhabitants  of  tlie  town  setting  forth  that  "the  boundaries  of  the  town 
are  of  unreasonable  and  unnecessary  extent,"  it  shall  be  found  by 
the  commissioners  that  the  boundaries  of  such  town  "are  extended 
beyond  necessary  and  useful  limits,  and  include  an  undue  amount  of 
vacant  farming  lands."  Another  section  of  the  law  authorized  the 
county  commissioners  to  enlarge  the  boundaries  of  any  city  or  town  on 
the  application  of  the  corporate  authorities  thereof.  This  act  has  been 
held  constitutional  over  an  objection  that  it  conferred  judicial  func- 
tions upon  the  county  commissioners. "^^  Neither  was  the  grant  of 
power  to  a  board  of  county  commissioners  of  a  new  county,  or  a  ma- 
jority of  them,  to  locate  the  temporary  county  site,  a  delegation  of  the 
lawmaking  power;  nor  was  it  prohibited  by  the  constitution  of 
Florida  in  legislation  organizing  a  new  county.^^  In  another  case 
there  was  a  contention  that  the  legislature  had  annulled  and  abrogated 
a  contract  between  the  county  and  bondholders,  by  disrobing  the 
county,  without  her  consent,  in  creating  new  counties  from  the  terri- 
tory composing  the  county  at  the  time  of  issuing  the  bonds.  It  was 
held  that  severing  a  portion  of  the  territory  of  a  county  by  act  of  the 

The  subject  of  the  establishment  of  build   bridges,   and   similar   powers 

a  county,  within  the  meaning  of  the  and    duties,    they    merely    exercise 

constitutional  provision  in  question,  such  judgment  and  discretion,  adopt- 

includes  not  merely  what  is  neces-  ing  such  measures  under  the  law  as 

sary  to  put  it  on  its  feet  as  a  county,  to    them    may    seem    conducive    to 

but  anything  that  may  concern  its  the    public   convenience   and   public 

future  existence  or  operation.    Noth-  needs."    At  the  same  time  the  court 

ing  is  more  properly  connected  with  held  that  the  power  to  sever  a  part 

the  subject  of  establishing  a  county  of  a  town  solely  for  the  purpose  of 

than  making  provision  for  a  change  annexing  it  to  another  was  not  con- 

of  the   county   site   in   the   future."  ferred  by  this  act. 

The  court  cited  Cooley  Const.  Lim.  "^  County  Com'rs  &c.   v.   State,  24 

144;    Morford  v.   linger,  8  Iowa  82:  Fla.  263;   s.  c.  4  So.  795;   the  court 

Whiting  V.  City  of  Mt.  Pleasant,  11  saying: — "Where  the  legislature  has 

Iowa  482;  Bright  v.  McCullough,  27  the  power  to  do  a  thing  by  law,  and 

Ind.  223;  Mayor  &c.  v.  State,  30  Md.  the  constitution  has  not  prescribed 

112;   State  v.  Town  of  Union,  33  N.  the  manner  of  doing  it,  or  the  nature 

J.  L.  350;  Humboldt  Co.  v.  Churchill  of  the  thing  is  not  such  as  to  require 

Co.  Com'rs,  6  Nev.  30.  that  it  be  done  directly  by  the  legis- 

""  City  of  Jacksonville  v.  L'Engle,  lature,  it  may,  through  the  provis- 

20  Pla.  344;    the  court  saying  that,  ions  of  its  law,  use  any  proper  in- 

"like  the  powers  to  hear  and  deter-  strumentality  for  effecting  the  result 

mine  applications  to  lay  out,  open  to  be  accomplished." 
and    discontinue    roads,    locate   and 


42^ 


PARTITION    AND   DISSOLUTION. 


§    460 


legislature  was  not  a  taking  of  "private  property  for  public  use  with- 
out a  just  compensation."*'" 

§  460.  Kansas  decisions. — A  Kansas  statute,  which  was  intended  in 
its  language  to  make  liable  for  bonds  issued  by  an  original  old  town- 
ship for  building  a  bridge  tlie  people  of  a  new  township  which  had 
before  the  building  of  the  bridge  been  detached  from  the  old  one,  was 
held  unconstitutional  and  void,  because  under  the  facts  and  circum- 
stances of  the  case  such  people  were  under  no  moral  obligation  to 
assist  in  paying  such  bonds.°^  A  former  act  containing  slightly 
different  provisions  was  held  valid  upon  the  theory  that  it  simply 
furnished  a  remedy  for  the  enforcement  of  a  pre-existing  moral 
obligation.®'*  A  vote  does  not  create  any  liability  or  any  contract,  but 
merely  gives  authority  to  afterward  create  such  liability  or  contract.®^ 

§  461.  How  partition  affects  officers. — Where  a  county  is  divided 
and  two  separate  and  distinct  counties  formed  out  of  it  by  act  of  the 
legislature,  to  one  of  which  a  new  name  is  given,  whilst  the  other,  it 
is  declared,  shall  be  and  remain  a  separate  and  distinct  county  by  the 
name  of  the  county  as  it  existed  previous  to  the  division,  judges  of 


^"  County  Com'rs  &c.  v.  King,  13 
Fla.  451;  the  court  not  being  able  to 
"perceive  how  the  state  can  be  sub- 
stituted as  the  debtor,  and  liable  to 
pay  the  debts  of  the  county,  by  the 
action  of  the  legislature  in  changing 
her  boundaries." 

«=  Craft  V.  Lofinck,  34  Kan.  365;  s. 
c.  8  Pac.  359.  The  people  of  the  old 
township  had  voted  for  the  building 
of  a  bridge.  Before  it  was  done  the 
new  township  was  detached  from  it. 
Afterwards  the  new  township  built 
a  bridge  which  was  "an  imperative 
public  necessity."  The  old  township 
built  the  one  for  v/hich  the  bonds  in 
this  case  were  issued.  It  did  not  ap- 
pear that  this  one  was  needed.  The 
view  of  the  court  was  that  it  is  nec- 
essary in  order  to  enable  the  legisla- 
ture by  retrospective  legislation  to 
impose  a  legal  liability  upon  the  peo- 
ple owning  property  in  a  portion  of 
a  township  or  other  subdivision  of 
the  territory  of  a  state  where  no 
such  liability  existed  before,  that  a 
pre-existing  moral  obligation  should 
rest  upon  such  people  to  discharge 


such  liability.  And  in  such  a  case, 
though  it  is  clearly  within  the  prov- 
ince of  the  legislature  in  the  first 
instance,  to  determine  the  question 
whether  such  a  moral  obligation  ex- 
ists or  not,  yet  it  is  not  exclusively 
within  its  province.  The  determina- 
tion of  the  question  finally  devolves 
upon  the  court.  The  court  distin- 
guished cases  where  an  act  of  1873, 
ch.  142,  had  been  interpreted.  That 
act  made  detached  territory  liable 
only  for  bonds  that  had  been  "au- 
thorized and  issued"  prior  to  the  de- 
tachment of  the  territory;  while  §  2 
of  the  act  of  1883  made  the  detached 
territory  liable  only  where  a  vote 
authorizing  the  township  to  issue  its 
bonds  was  had  prior  to  the  detach- 
ment. 

"*  Commissioners  &c.  v.  Bunker,  16 
Kan.  498.  Cf.  Commissioners  &c.  v. 
Nelson,  19  Kan.  234;  Board  &c.  v. 
Board  &c.,  26  Kan.  181;  Chandler 
V.  Reynolds,  19  Kan.  249. 

'''■•  Union  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Board  &c., 
6  Kan.  256. 


§  461  PUBLIC  coitroRATioxs.  428 

county  courts  appointed  previous  to  the  division  who  happen  to  reside 
in  that  portion  of  the  territory  distinguished  as  a  county  with  a  new 
name,  under  the  operation  of  an  act  requiring  judges  of  county  courts 
to  reside  within  the  counties  for  which  they  are  appointed,  lose  their 
offices,  and  are  no  longer  competent  to  act  under  their  commissions; 
those  continuing  in  the  portion  which  retains  the  original  name  con- 
tinue to  the  expiration  of  their  term.®^  It  seems  that  by  express 
enactment  the  legislature  might  have  continued  these  judges  in  office ; 
but  failing  to  do  that  the  office  is  gone.**®  On  similar  reasoning  the 
supreme  court  of  Ohio  have  held  that  the  county  commissioners  of 
any  of  the  counties  from  which  a  now  county  is  formed  whose  resi- 
dences are  thrown  into  the  new  county  lose  their  offices.*'^  Where  a 
town  is  divided  by  the  incorporation  of  a  part  of  it  as  a  new  town, 
such  new  town  remains  in  the  same  judicial  district  as  the  old  one,  in 
the  absence  of  anything  to  the  contrary  in  the  statute  incorporating 
it."''  A  provision  in  an  act  annexing  the  larger  portion  of  a  village  to 
a  city  that  the  taxes  in  the  annexed  territory  shall  be  collected  as  if  the 
act  had  not  been  passed  does  not  have  the  effect  of  retaining  a  former 
treasurer  of  the  village  in  office  for  the  purpose  of  collecting  the 
taxes.'^^  Where  a  portion  of  a  township  is  declared  by  proclamation 
a  city  of  the  second  class,  the  residue  retains  its  organization ;  and  the 
members  of  the  township  board  are  still  de  facto  officers  at  least, 

^'People  V.  Morrell,  21  Wend.  563;  or  territorial  limits  of  the  corpora- 
ttie  court  distinguishing  Ex  parte  tions  to  which  the  offices  in  question 
M'Collum,  1  Cowen  (N.  Y.)  550,  and  belonged;  much  less  an  actual  dis- 
people V.  Garey,  6  Cowen  (N.  Y.)  solution  of  those  corporations. 
642,  in  the  first  of  which  the  court  '^''  Cases  cited  in  preceding  note, 
held  that  a  legislative  organization  ""  State  v.  Walker,  17  Ohio  135. 
of  a  new  county  by  combining  sev-  ""  Commonwealth  v.  Brennan,  150 
eral  definite  subsisting  towns  of  oth-  Mass.  63;  s.  c.  22  N.  E.  628;  where 
er  counties,  and  declaring  that  the  it  was  held  that  a  justice  of  the 
justices  already  appointed  for  those  peace  with  authority  to  issue  war- 
towns  respectively  should  hold  for  rants  in  criminal  cases  anywhere 
the  residue  of  their  terms  in  the  within  the  district,  whose  residence 
same  towns,  and  relatively  to  the  fell  within  the  new  town,  might  con- 
new  county,  was  constitutional;  and  tinue  to  issue  warrants  in  such 
the  last  holding  that  in  a  similar  cases  as  above  therein  as  well  as 
erection  of  the  county  of  Orleans  elsewhere  within  the  district, 
from  definite  subsisting  towns  of  '^  So  held  in  Ketcham  v.  Wagner, 
Ontario  county,  the  legislature  had  90  Mich.  271;  s.  c.  51  N.  W,  281,  a 
no  power  to  abridge  the  term  of  of-  case  where  the  former  treasurer  re- 
fice  for  which  the  several  justices  sided  in  the  portion  of  the  village 
had  been  appointed  while  their  annexed  to  the  city  of  Detroit,  by 
towns  belonged  to  Ontario.  The  local  act  1891,  No.  214,  and  an  elec- 
distinction  was  that  in  neither  case  tion  of  a  new  treasurer  for  the  vil- 
was  there  even  a  change  in  the  name  lage  had  become  necessary. 


429  PAKTITIOX    AND   DISSOLUTION.  §    4.G2 

although  they  reside  within  the  limits  of  the  new  city.''^  Under  the 
statutes  of  Xebraska  concerning  township  organization,  when,  in  a 
new  town  erected  by  the  county  board,  in  the  division  of  the  county 
into  towns  or  townships,  at  the  first  meeting  of  said  board,  the  offices 
of  the  town  board  as  well  as  the  town  clerk  are  all  vacant,  it  is  the 
duty  of  the  county  clerk  to  fill  such  vacancies  as  well  as  all  other 
vacancies  in  the  offices  of  such  town  by  appointment.'^^  Although  com- 
missioners living  within  the  territory  taken  from  their  county  cease 
to  be  commissioners  unless  they  remove  to  parts  of  the  county  remain- 
ing unaffected  by  the  division,  still,  if  before  removal  they  appoint 
a  county  treasurer,  their  act  will  be  valid  as  that  of  de  facto  officers.'* 

§  462.  Where  unorganized  territory  has  been  attached  to  a 
county. — The  Nebraska  statute'^  which  provides  for  attaching  unor- 
ganized territory  to  the  "nearest  organized  county  directly  east  for 
election,  judicial  and  revenue  purposes"  has  been  construed;  and  it 
has  been  held  that  an  unorganized  county  did  not  thereby  become  a 
part  of  the  organized  one,  but  for  certain  purposes  therein  named  was 
placed  under  its  care;  and  that,  therefore,  after  the  organization  of 
such  unorganized  territory  as  a  county  and  the  qualification  of  its 
officers,  taxes  on  property  in  the  county  were  payable  to  them  and  not 
to  officers  of  the  county  to  which  it  was  formerly  attached. '^^  So,  also, 
where  after  the  officers  of  an  organized  county  have  levied  taxes  on 
property  in  an  unorganized  county  attached  thereto,  and  before  the 
taxes  become  due  the  unorganized  county  is  organized,  the  taxes  are 
payable  to  the  treasurer  of  the  new  county.'^'^  Garfield  county,  which, 
was  created  by  the  laws  of  Kansas,  1887,  chapter  81,  was  by  chapter 
132  attached  with  other  unorganized  counties  to  Hodgeman  county  for 
judicial  purposes;  chapter  1-12  provided  for  district  courts  in  Gar- 
field county.  These  acts  were  approved  by  the  governor  the  same  day. 
Chapter  132  was  published  March  11th,  and  repealed  conflicting  pro- 
visions, and  chapter  1-42  on  March  10th.    Upon  the  question  of  legality 

"Walnut  Tp.  v.  Jordan,  38  Kan.  '« Fremont   &c.    R.    Co.    v.    Brown 

562;  s.  c.  16  Pac.  812.  Co.,  18  Neb.  516;  s.  c.  26  N.  W.  194; 

"State  V.  Forney,  21  Neb.  223;  s.  the  court  saying  that,  "being  an  or- 

c.  31  N.  W.  802;  where  this  particu-  ganized    county,    the   ligament   that 

lar   township   was   formed   of   terri-  bound    it   to    the    former   county    is 

tory  not  theretofore  constituting  a  severed  by  the  force  of  the  organiza- 

precinct    or    town,    and    containing  tion  and  it  takes  its  place  as  one  of 

within    its    boundaries    no    person  the    counties   of   the    state,   and    its 

elected  as  a  town  oflBcer  at  any  elec-  officers  become  amenable  to  the  law 

tion.  for  the  faithful  performance  of  their 

"  State  V.  Jacobs,  17  Ohio  143.  duty." 

'"  Compiled  Stats,  of  Neb.,  ch.  18,  "Morse  v.  Hitchcock  Co.,  19  Neb. 

§  146.  566;  s.  c.  27  N.  W.  637. 


g    4G3  PUBLIC    CORPOIIATIONS.  430 

of  the  detention  of  a  prisoner  by  the  sheriff  of  that  county,  it  was 
licld  that  the  several  acts  must  be  considered  together,  and  that  Gar- 
field county  was  attached  to  Hodgeman  county  for  judicial  purposes 
only  until  organized;  after  its  organization  courts  should  be  held  in 
Garfield  county."  By  the  laws  of  Texas,  1856,  page  41,  Archer  county 
was  attached  to  Clay  county  for  judicial  purposes.  By  the  laws  of 
1866,  page  94,  it  was  attached  to  Jack  county  "for  judicial  and  other 
purposes."  By  the  laws  of  1870,  page  53,  it  was  attached  to  Montague 
county  "for  judicial  purposes"  only.  This  last  act  was  superseded  by 
the  laws  of  1874,  page  53,  changing  the  terms  of  court,  which  omitted 
the  clause  attaching  Archer  to  Montague.  In  1879  (laws  of  1879,  p. 
150)  it  was  attached  to  Clay  "for  judicial  and  other  purposes."  It 
was  held  that,  under  the  operation  of  the  foregoing  statutes,  Archer 
county  was  not  attached  to  Clay  for  any  purpose  in  August,  1875,  and 
that  the  registration  in  the  latter  county  of  a  deed  of  land  situate  in 
the  former  was  not  constructive  notice.^® 

§  483.  Settlement  of  inhabitants. — AYhen  part  of  the  territory  com- 
posing a  township  is  by  the  act  of  the  legislature  formed  into  a  new 
township,  those  persons  Avho  at  the  time  of  separation  had  a  legal 
settlement  in  the  old  township,  and  resided  on  the  territory  so  cut 
off,  acquire  ipso  facto  a  legal  settlement  in  the  new  township.®*'  The 
court  said:  "This  doctrine  seems  to  flow  from  what  may  reasonably 
be  presumed  to  have  been  the  object  of  the  legislature  in  creating  the 
new  township ;  namely,  that  instead  of  the  public  relations  previously 
existing  between  the  inhabitants  and  the  old  township,  there  should 
be  substituted  similar  relations  between  them  and  the  new  town- 
ship."®^ This  rule  was  adopted  by  statute  in  Massachusetts  as  early  as 
1793,  but  the  courts  of  that  state  deemed  it  a  principle  of  the  common 
law  deducible  from  the  nature  of  corporate  rights  and  duties.®^  Chief 
Justice  Shaw  speaks  of  the  statute  as  "little  more  than  an  authorita- 
tive declaration  of  rules  which  had  been  before  established  as  the  rules 
by  which  persons  had  been  held  to  acquire  settlements."®^  The  New 
York  court  was  divided  on  this  question,  but  the  principle  adopted  in 
Massachusetts  was  approved  by  Chief  Justice  Kent.®*    In  New  Jersey 

'*'In  re  Hall,  38  Kan.  670;  s.  c.  17  «5:c.  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  4  Mass.  676, 

Pac.  649.  678;    Inhabitants  &c.  v.  Inhabitants 

™  Alford  V.  Jones,  71  Tex.  519;  s.  c.  &c.,  14  Mass.  253,  256. 

9  S.  W.  470.  *'  Inhabitants    &c    v.    Inhabitants 

>'»  Overseer  &c.  v.  Overseer  &c.,  51  &c.,  6  Met.  (Mass.)  484,  486. 

N.  J.  L.  93;  s.  c.  16  Atl.  184.  **  Overseers  &c.  v.  Overseers  &c.,  3 

"Overseer    &c.    v.    Overseer    &c.,  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  193.    Cf.  Stillwater  v. 

supra.  Green,  9  N.  J.  L.  59;   Overseers  &c. 

*'  Inhabitants    &c.    v.    Inhabitants  v.  Overseers  &c.,  32  N.  J.  L.  66. 
&c.,   4   Mass.   384,   390;    Inhabitants 


431 


PARTITION    AND   DISSOLUTION". 


§  4G  t 


a  residence  of  ten  consecutive  years  in  the  same  dwelling,  begun  while 
the  dwelling-place  is  in  one  township  and  ended  after  it  has  been 
comprised  by  act  of  the  legislature  within  the  limits  of  another  town- 
ship, will  confer  a  legal  settlement  in  the  latter  township  by  force  of 
the  statute,^^  which  has  been  held  to  be  retrospective.*** 

§  464.  Territory  severed  from  an  old  to  form  a  new  corporation 
is  a  part  of  the  old  until  the  new  is  fully  organized. — Wbere  part  of  a 
town  is  detached  from  it  and  incorporated  as  a  city  by  an  act  of  the 
legislature,  which  provides  for  an  election  of  city  officers  by  a  certain 
time,  and  the  election  is  not  held,  thus  leaving  the  organization  of 
the  city  in  abeyance,  it  continues  to  be  a  part  of  the  town  until  the 
organization  of  the  city  is  completed.^**^ 

§  465.  Some  Wisconsin  acts  construed. — An  act  of  the  legislature 
provided  for  a  division  of  a  county,  by  which  the  territory  of  one  town 
and  fractions  of  other  towns  was  erected  into  a  new  county.  The  con- 
struction placed  upon  this  act  by  the  supreme  court  of  Wisconsin  was 


*«Rev.  Supp.  N.  J.  800;  Overseer 
&c.  v.  Overseer  &c.,  51  N.  J.  L.  93; 
s.  c.  16  Atl.  184. 

^^  Inhabitants  &c.  v.  Inhabitants 
&c.,  50  N.  J.  L.  509;  s.  c.  14  Atl.  595; 
Woodbridge  v.  Amboy,  1  N.  J.  L.  213. 

^a  state  V.  Button,  25  Wis.  109; 
the  court  holding  that  the  act  did 
not  proprio  vigore  sever  this  part  of 
the  town  so  completely  as  to  make 
the  votes  of  its  inhabitants  in  the 
town  illegal.  The  court  cite  as  sus- 
taining their  view,  Haynes  v.  Wash- 
ington Co.,  19  111.  66,  where  the 
court  said: — "Grants  of  corporate 
powers  for  purposes  of  local  munici- 
pal government,  such  as  belong  to 
towns  and  cities,  are  a  delegation  of 
a  portion  of  the  general  sovereignty 
of  the  state  designed  to  enable  the 
inhabitants  of  particular  localities 
to  establish  and  maintain  police  reg- 
ulations and  to  advance  their  com- 
mon prosperity.  A  charter  or  act  of 
incorporation  is  but  evidence  of  the 
powers  delegated,  and  which  powers 
remain  dormant  or  in  abeyance  un- 
til in  the  mode  pointed  out  in  the 
charter  the  inhabitants  for  whose 
benefit    those    powers    are    granted 


bring  them  into  life  and  exercise  by 
an  organization  of  the  local  govern- 
ment. Here  the  law  incorporating 
the  town  in  authorizing  the  inhabit- 
ants to  form  by  the  means  provided 
a  local  government  was  evidently 
intended  for  the  benefit  of  the  in- 
habitants, and  is  presumed  to  have 
been  made  at  their  instance  and  not 
upon  the  consideration  that  the 
common  good  and  policy  of  the  state 
demanded  the  establishment  of  such 
local  government  and  the  separation 
of  the  particular  territory  for  such 
purpose  from  the  jurisdiction  of 
county  authority.  Until  an  organi- 
zation by  an  election  and  qualifica- 
tion of  the  number  of  persons  being 
the  several  integral  parts  of  the  cor- 
poration, and  forming  the  political 
body  provided  for  in  the  laws,  there 
could  be  in  being  no  municipal  cor- 
poration or  government;  and  the 
condition  of  the  inhabitants  within 
the  limits  named  in  the  law  as  to 
rights  and  duties  would  continue 
unchanged  and  unaffected  by  the 
law  authorizing  them  in  a  corporate 
capacity  to  exercise  municipal  pow- 
ers." 


§    466  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  432- 

that  the  original  county  had  jurisdiction  for  governmental  purposes 
over  the  detached  territory  only  until  the  organization  of  the  new 
county  was  effected;  and  that  as  it  emhraced  Ijut  one  complete  town 
the  supervisors  of  that  town  became  the  board  of  supervisors  of  the 
new  county,  and  the  new  county  was  at  once  an  organized  county. 
Upon  the  organization  of  the  new  county  the  whole  of  its  territory 
became  for  the  purposes  of  town  government  one  town ;  and  the  or- 
ganized town  was  in  effect  enlarged  so  as  to  embrace  the  whole  of  such 
territory.*^  This  act  was  not  repugnant  to  the  constitution,  which 
was  intended  to  prohibit  the  enactment  of  any  special  or  private  law 
for  incorporating  any  town  or  village  by  special  charter,  or  for  the 
amendment  of  such  charter.  This  has  no  reference  to  quasi-corpora- 
tions like  the  towns  which  exist  as  political  subdivisions  in  this  state.^* 
A  new  county  having  been  formed  of  a  part  of  another,  the  same  act 
providing  for  an  appointment  of  officers  for  the  new  county  by  the 
governor,  though  the  suspension  of  the  power  of  the  people  to  elect 
their  own  officers  might  be  invalid,  the  offices  were  properly  created 
and  existed  de  jure ;  and  the  persons  appointed  thereto  having  entered 
upon  the  duties  of  such  offices  were  officers  de  facto  whose  official  ac- 
tion could  not  be  questioned  collaterally. ^'^ 

§  466.  Provisions  of  act  as  to  county  sites. — In  Florida  an  act  cre- 
ating a  new  county  has  been  held  constitutional  over  an  objection  that 
by  its  provisions  it  allowed  the  commissioners  of  the  new  county  to 
establish  a  temporary  county  seat  and  afterwards  order  an  election  for 
a  permanent  county  seat;  it  being  urged  that  this  amounted  to  a  re- 
moval of  the  county  seat,  and  the  constitution  forbade  removal  of 
county  seats  except  by  a  general  law.^°    The  supreme  court  of  Michi- 

**'  Cathcart   v.   Comstock,   56   Wis.  acting  as  a  county  board  was  prop- 

590;   s.  c.  14  N.  W.  833,  which  sus-  erly  made  for  the  next  year, 

tained  the  authority  of  the  supervis-  "^  Cathcart   v.   Comstock,   56   Wis. 

ors  of  the  town  to  levy  and  appor-  590;  s.  c.  14  N.  W.  833. 

tion   taxes   upon   such   property   as  ^^  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Langlade 

was  situated  in  the  original  town,  Co.,  56  Wis.  614;   s.  c.  14  N.  W.  844 

and  the  sales  of  such  property  made  (action  to  set  aside  an  assessment 

by  the  county  treasurer  of  the  new  of  taxes  on  the  ground  of  lack  of  au- 

county,  after  he  was  elected,  as  to  thority  of  the  officers  of  a  new  coun- 

the  period  before  an  election  of  the  ty  to  assess,  etc.). 

other  county  officers.     The  election  ^  County  Com'rs  &c.  v.   State,   24 

of  town  officers  for  the  town  as  en-  Fla.  263;   s.  c.  4  So.  795;  the  court 

larged  by  virtue  of  the  statute  after-  holding  that  the   proviso,   "that  in 

wards  was  also  held  to  have  been  the  formation  of  new  counties  the 

proper,   and   assessment,   apportion-  county  seat  may  be  temporarily  es- 

ment   and    levy    of   taxes   made   by  tablished  by  law,"  qualifies  the  con- 

their    town    supervisors    so    elected  stitution,  art.  8,  §  4,  providing  that 


433  PARTITION    AND   DISSOLUTION.  §    467 

gan  has  also  held  that  an  elootion  of  a  permanent  county  scat  under 
the  provisions  of  tlie  laws  of  jMichigan  organizing  the  county  of  Iron, 
and  naming  a  tem])orary  county  seat  until  the  next  general  election, 
when  it  provided  for  the  election  of  a  permanent  one,  could  not  be  re- 
garded as  the  removal  of  a  county  seat  once  established,  and  that  the 
law  was  not  unconstitutional  for  not  conforming  to  the  requirements 
of  the  constitutional  provision  for  such  removals."^  But  the  supreme 
court  of  West  Virginia  has  held  that  the  provisions  of  the  statute  law 
of  West  Virginia,  prescril)ing  the  manner  in  which  the  county  seat 
of  any  county  may  be  relocated  by  a  vote  of  the  people  at  a  general 
election,  apply  to  all  the  counties  in  the  state,  including  those  whose 
county  seats  were  declared  permanent  in  the  special  act  of  the  legisla- 
ture creating  such  counties. ^^ 

§  467.  Apportionment  of  liabilities. — ^AHien  a  county,  city  or  town 
is  divided  and  its  territory  reduced  or  set  apart  by  legislative  au- 
thority, the  legislature  may  make  regulations  not  only  to  apportion 
the  property  of  the  corporate  body  among  the  new  members  or  com- 
munities created,  but  to  throw  the  obligation  to  pay  the  debts  of  the 
entire  body  upon  the  several  parts  in  proportion  to  the  taxable  wealth 
of  each.^^  The  Michigan  statute  relating  to  settlements  between  the 
respective  boards  of  supervisors  wdiere  two  counties  are  formed  out  of 
one  has  been  held  not  to  contemplate  any  other  division  than  of  ex- 
isting property  and  liabilities,  nor  to  provide  for  the  assumption  by 
one  county  of  the  W'hole  burden  of  state  taxation  for  both  counties  un- 
til the  next  equalization.®*  And  a  provision  requiring  state  taxes  to 
be  levied  for  five  years  on  the  basis  of  the  last  equalization,  has  been 

"the  legislature  shall  have  no  power  the  power  to  create  and  do  every- 
to  remove  the   county   seat  of  any  thing  necessary   and   proper   to   its 
county,  but  shall  provide  by  general  perfect  organization  that  is  not  pro- 
law  for  such  removal,"  so  far  as  it  hibited  by  other  portions  of  the  con- 
was  a  limitation  upon  the  power  of  stitution.  and  a  county  site  is,  to  say 
the  legislature.  By  the  proviso  there  the  least,  a  proper,  if  not  necessary, 
was  reserved  to  the  legislature  the  element  of  county  organization." 
power  to  establish  for  the  new  coun-  ''^  Attorney-General   v.    Board    &c., 
ty  a  temporary  county  seat,  which  64  Mich.  607;  s.  c.  31  N.  W.  539. 
should  not  be  subject  to  such  limita-  °-  Welch  v.   County  Court  &c.,  29 
tion,  but  should  be  the  county  seat  W.  Va.  63;  s.  c.  1  S.  B.  337. 
only    until    the    permanent    county  '^  Canova    v.    State.    18    Fla.    512. 
seat   should    be   established    in    the  See,  where  this  is  well  considered, 
manner  provided  by  the  act  organiz-  County  Com'rs  v.  King,  13  Fla.  451, 
ing  the  county.    The  court  said: —  472. 

"...     The     power     to     make     a  "-^  Supervisors   &c.    v.    Supervisors 

county     .     .    .     necessarily  Includes  &c.,  74  Mich.  721;  s.  c.  42  N.  W.  170. 

1  Smith— 28 


§    468  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  434 

held  not  to  mean  that  when  two  counties  are  made  out  of  one  the 
old  county  must  bear  the  whole  burden  of  state  tax  as  before  the 
division,  until  the  next  equalization;  the  proportion  which  the 
assessment  rolls  of  the  year  when  the  last  equalization  was  made,  of 
all  the  towns  in  the  new  county,  bear  to  the  aggregate  assessments 
of  all  the  towns  then  in  the  old  (undivided)  county,  furnishes  the 
rule  of  apportionment  for  the  two  counties  until  the  next  equaliza- 
tion.^^ The  Xew  Jersey  act  which  divided  the  township  of  Hacken- 
sack  into  the  townships  of  Ridgefield,  of  Englewood  and  of , Palisades, 
and  which  declared  that  the  inhabitants  of  said  townships  should  be 
liable  to  pay  their  just  proportions  of  the  debts  of  the  inhabitants  of 
the  township  of  Hackensack,  did  not,  proprio  vigore,  make  any  single 
township  legally  responsible  for  any  particular  debt,  even  though 
the  debt  had  been  wholly  contracted  for  work  done  within  its-  terri- 
torial limits.^®  The  legislature  has  power  to  divide  counties  and 
towns  at  its  pleasure,  and  to  apportion  the  common  property  and  the 
common  burdens  in  such  manner  as  to  it  may  seem  reasonable  and 
equitable. ^'^  Where  the  general  assembly  created  a  new  county  out 
of  territory  formerly  belonging  to  other  counties,  and  to  compensate 
such  counties  added  territory  to  them  from  adjoining  counties,  it 
was  competent  also  to  provide  that  the  county  receiving  the  accession 
should  levy  an  equitable  proportion  of  the  indebtedness  of  the  county 
from  which  such  territory  was  taken.  ^'^ 

§  468.  Rules  as  to  property  and  liabilities. — Upon  the  division  of  a 
municipal  corporation  and  the  organization  of  a  new  one  out  of  a 
portion  of  the  old,  in  the  absence  of  legislative  provision  to  the  con- 
trary, the  old  corporation  owns  all  the  public  property  within  its 
new  limits  and  is  responsible  for  all  the  debts  of  the  corporation 
contracted  before  the  act  of  separation  was  passed;  the  new  corpora- 
tion has  no  claim  to  any  of  the  property  except  what  falls  within  its 
boundaries  and  to  which  the  old  corporation  has  no  claim.  ^'^     Where 

''•''Supervisors    &c.    v.    Supervisors  v.  County  Judge,  37  Ark.  339;  Super- 

&c.,  74  Mich.  721;  s.  c.  42  N.  W.  170.  visors    &c.    v.    Supervisors    &c.,    58 

"« So  held  in  Vanderbeck  V.  Inhabi-  Miss.  619;    Eagle  v.  Beard,  33  Ark. 

tants  &c.,  39  N.  J.  L.  345;  sustaining  497;    State   v.   McFadden,   23    Minn, 

a  nonsuit  which  had  been  ordered  in  40;  Askew  v.  Hale  Co.,  54  Ala.  639; 

an  action  brought  by  one  on  a  claim  Commissioners   &c.   v.    Commission- 

against    Hackensack    township    for  ers  &c.,  79  N.  C.  565;  Commissioners 

work  done  on  Engle  street,  which  be-  &c.  v.  Bunker,  16  Kan.  498. 

came  a  part  of  Englewood.  ®^  Commissioners    &c.    v.    Auditor 

"^  Morrow  Co.  v.  Hendryx.  14  Or.  &c..  1  Ohio  St.  322. 

397;  s.  c.  12  Pac.  806.     See  also.  Can-  '■'"Commissioners    &c.    v.    Commis- 

ova  V.  State,  18  Fla.  512;  Trinity  Co.  sioners  &c.,  92  U.  S.  307;   Bristol  v. 

V.  Polk  Co.,  58  Tex.  321;  Pulaski  Co.  New  Chester,  3  N.  H.  524. 


435  PARTITION    AND   DISSOLUTION.  §    4G9 

two  separate  towns  are  created  out  of  one,  cadi  in  the  absence  of  any 
statutory  regulation  is  entitled  to  hold  in  severalty  the  puljlic  prop- 
erty of  the  old  corporation  which  falls  within  its  limits.^""  If  a  town 
is  divided  and  a  part  of  its  territory  with  the  inhabitants  therein  is 
incorporated  into  a  new  town,  the  old  town  will  retain  all  the  prop- 
erty and  be  responsible  for  the  existing  liabilities,  unless  there  is 
some  legislative  provision  to  the  contrary;  but  upon  such  division 
the  legislature  has  constitutional  authority  to  provide  that  the  prop- 
erty owned  by  the  original  town  sball  be  apportioned  or  held  for  the 
use  and  enjoyment  of  the  inhabitants  of  both  towns,  and  to  impose 
upon  each  town  the  payment  of  a  share  of  the  corporate  debts. ^"^ 
An  act  creating  a  new  county  out  of  territory  formerly  embraced  in 
another  county  failing  to  provide  for  a  division  of  the  school  fund, 
the  whole  fund  belonging  to  it  before  the  division  may  be  retained 
by  the  parent  county. ^"^ 

§  469.  The  same  subject  continued. — Upon  the  formation  of  a  new 
county  out  of  a  portion  of  another,  the  debt  of  the  latter  to  the  state 
was  apportioned  between  the  two,  and  each  issued  certificates  for  its 
share.  By  the  acts  under  which  the  debt  was  originally  incurred  a 
railroad  company  for  whose  benefit  it  was  incurred  was  required  to 
pay  certain  sums  into  the  state  treasury  to  apply  on  the  debt.  It  was 
held  that  the  sums  paid  by  such  company  should  be  applied  to  the 
certificates  of  the  two  counties  in  proportion  to  the  share  of  debt  as- 
sumed by  each.^°^  A  general  law  providing  for  the  apportionment  of 
debts  and  credits  in  all  cases  where  new  counties  are  created  does  not 

^°°Town    of    North    Hempsted    v.  '"-Cooke  v.  School  Dist.,  12  Colo. 

Town  of  Hempsted,  2  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  453;  s.  c.  21  Pac.  496,  719;  the  court 

109;  Hartford  Bridge  Co.  v.  Town  of  holding  that  a  making  of  the  esti- 

East  Hartford,  16  Conn.  149,  171.  mate    of    what    proportion    of    the 

'"  Inhabitants  &c.  v.  Skillings,  45  school-fund  of  a  county  belongs  to 
Maine  133.  In  support  of  first  the  several  school  districts  by  the 
clause,  see  Inhabitants  &c.  v.  In-  county  superintendent  under  gen- 
habitants  &c.,  4  Mass.  384,  and  In-  eral  statutes  of  Nebraska,  §  3067, 
habitants  &c.  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  16  was  not  of  itself  sufficient  to  vest  m 
Mass.  86,  where  the  same  doctrine  is  the  several  school  districts  the  own- 
reiterated.  In  support  of  second  ership  of  their  respective  shares; 
clause,  see  Inhabitants  &c.  v.  Inhabi-  therefore  concluding  that  the  coun- 
tants  &c.,  4  Mass.  278;  Inhabitants  ties  and  not  the  school  districts  re 
&c.  V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  4  Mass.  315;  owners  of  the  school-funds  until 
Inhabitants  &c.  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  4  they  are  accredited  to  the  several 
Mass.  384;   Minot  v.  Curtis,  7  Mass.  school  districts. 

441;    Inhabitants  &c.  v.  Dunning,  7  '"'State  v.  Harshaw,  73  Wis.  211; 

Mass.  445;  Inhabitants  &c.  v.  Inhabi-  s.  c.  40  N.  W.  641. 
tants  &c.,  16  Mass.  16;    Inhabitants 
&c.  V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  16  Mass.  76. 


§    470  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  436 

deprive  subsequent  legislatures  of  the  power  to  provide  otherwise  as 
to  counties  created  by  them.^°*  The  divided  county  has  the  same 
rights,  duties  and  burdens  as  before  in  respect  to  the  remaining  ter- 
ritory, except  as  changed  by  the  legislature.^"^  School  districts  are 
corporations  for  certain  specified  purposes,  and  neither  their  rights 
nor  their  obligations  are  affected  by  a  change  of  their  names  or  altera- 
tion of  their  boundaries.^°*'  In  the  change  of  county  lines  whereby 
territory  is  detached  from  one  county  and  attached  to  another,  the 
county  acquiring  the  additional  territory  is  not  entitled  to  demand 
from  the  other  any  portion  of  the  funds  in  its  treasury. ^°'^  If  part  of 
the  territory  of  a  town  is  separated  from  it  by  annexation  to  another, 
or  by  the  creation  of  a  new  corporation,  without  any  provision  for  con- 
tribution to  the  debts  of  the  old  town,  and  that  retains  all  its  property 
and  franchises,  such  detached  portion  is  not  liable  therefor.  ^°^  A 
county  from  which  territory  is  detached  to  form  part  of  a  new  county 
is  entitled  to  deduct  its  existing  indebtedness  from  the  bridge  fund, 
as  well  as  other  moneys  previously  collected  and  remaining  in  its 
treasury  at  the  time  of  the  division ;  and  the  balance  only,  after  mak- 
ing the  deduction,  is  required  to  be  divided  between  the  old  and  new 
counties.  ^''^  If  an  equitable  claim  exists  against  a  new  county  in  favor 
of  an  old  county  growing  out  of  its  being  erected  from  the  latter,  it  is 
competent  for  the  legislature  to  create  by  law  a  board  of  commis- 
sioners to  ascertain,  settle  and  report  the  amount  due,  and  further,  to 
compel  the  board  of  supervisors  of  the  county  to  levy  a  special  tax 
to  pay  the  amount  reported  to  be  due.^^°  It  has  been  held  in  Cali- 
fornia that  a  claim  of  an  old  county  against  a  new  one  formed  out  of 
it  for  the  payment  of  its  proportion  of  the  debt  of  the  old  is  of  an 
equitable  nature  only,  and  that  it  requires  legislation  to  enable  the  old 
county  to  enforce  it.^^^  The  act  forming  the  new  county  was  held 
not  to  require  the  new  county  to  pay  interest  on  its  proportion  of  the 
debt  of  the  old."^ 

§  470.  A  Wisconsin  case  on  property  rights. — The  towns  of  Wis- 
consin by  operation  of  the  laws  of  the  territory  became  the  owners  of 
lands  which  were  held  for  the  benefit  of  those  corporations.  When  the 
territory  became  a  state  these  rights  were  preserved  by  the  constitu- 

lot  Forest  Co.  v.  Langlade  Co.,  76  "'  Town    of    Depere    v.    Town    of 

Wis.  605;  s.  c.  45  N.  W.  598.  Bellevue,  31  Wis.  120. 

'"^  Attorney-General  v.  Fitzpatrick,  ^"^  Commissioners   &c.   v.   Commis- 

2  Wis.  542.  sioners  &c.,  2  Ohio  St.  508. 

"« District  No.  3  v.  Macloon,  4  Wis.  ""  People  v.  Board  &c.,  26  Cal.  641. 

79.  "'  Beals  v.  Board  &c.,  28  Cal.  449. 

^"'Commissioners   &c.   v.   Commis-  "^ Beals  v.  Board  &c.,  supra, 
sioners  &c.,  16  Ohio  466. 


437  I'AirnTiox  and  dissolution,  §  471 

tion  and  laws  of  tlie  state:  the  partition  of  a  town  and  the  annexa- 
tion of  a  portion  of  its  territory  to  another  municipality  which  was 
incorporated  as  a  city  made  no  change  in  these  rights:  the  town 
continued  to  hold  its  title  to  this  real  estate.  The  legislature  had  an 
undoubted  right  to  change  the  territorial  limits  of  municipal  corpora- 
tions, and  to  detach  this  territory  from  one  and  annex  it  to  another, 
and  in  so  doing  might  provide  for  an  equitable  division  of  the  com- 
mon property ;  but  where  this  detaching  and  annexation  is  done 
without  providing  for  the  disposal  of  the  land,  under  such  circum- 
stances that  the  assent  of  the  town  to  part  with  its  title  can  not  be 
presumed,  it  continues  the  owner  notwithstanding  the  separation ; 
the  legislature  has  not  the  power,  either  directly  or  indirectly,  to  di- 
vest a  municipality  of  its  private  property  without  the  consent  of  its 
inhabitants.^^^ 

§  471.    Rules  as  to  apportionment  of  liabilities  and  remedies. — A 

village  may  be  created  out  of  the  territory  of  a  city,  and  as  between 
the  city  and  the  village  the  legislature  may  apportion  the  existing 
indebtedness;  but  when  the  corporation  which  created  the  debt  is 
shorn  of  its  population  and  taxable  property  to  such  an  extent  that 
there  is  no  reasonable  expectation  of  its  meeting  its  present  indebted- 
ness, and  it  is  unable  to  do  so,  the  creditors  at  least  can  enforce  the 
proportionate  share  of  their  obligations  against  the  two  corporations 
carved  out  of  one,  both  being  liable  to  the  extent  of  the  property 
set  off  to  each  respectively.^^*    Where  a  coxinty  has  been  divided  by 

113  Town  of  Milwaukee  v.  City  of  person.  Its  rights  of  property  once 
Milwaukee,  12  Wis.  93.  Dixon,  C.  acquired,  though  designed  and  used 
J.,  said: — "The  difficulty  about  the  to  aid  it  in  the  discharge  of  its  du- 
question  is  to  distinguish  between  ties  as  a  local  government,  are  en- 
the  corporation  as  a  civil  institution  tirely  distinct  and  separate  from  its 
or  delegation  of  merely  political  powers  as  a  political  or  municipal 
power,  and  as  an  ideal  being  en-  body.  It  might  sell  its  property,  or 
dowed  with  the  capacity  to  acquire  the  same  might  be  lost  or  destroyed, 
and  hold  property  for  corporate  or  and  yet  its  power  of  government 
other  purposes.  In  its  political  or  would  remain.  In  its  character  of  a 
governmental  capacity  it  is  liable  at  political  power,  or  local  subdivision 
any  time  to  be  changed,  modified  or  of  government,  it  is  a  public  corpora- 
destroyed  by  the  legislature;  but  in  tion,  but  in  its  character  of  owner  of 
its  capacity  of  owner  of  property,  property  it  is  a  private  corporation, 
designed  for  its  own  or  the  exclusive  possessing  the  same  rights,  duties 
use  and  benefit  of  its  inhabitants,  its  and  privileges  as  any  other."  See 
vested  rights  of  property  are  no  also,  Bailey  v.  Mayor  &c.,  3  Hill  (N. 
more  the  subject  of  legislative  inter-  Y.)  531. 

ference  or  control,  without  the  con-  "'  Brewis  v.  City  of  Duluth,  3  Mc- 

sent  of  the  corporators,  than  those  Crary  219. 
of  a  merely  private  corporation  or 


§    473  PUBLIC    COKPORATIONS.  438 

an  act  of  the  legislature,  one  portion  thereof  retaining  the  forrnor 
name,  county  seat,  county  organization,  county  buildings  and  all 
other  county  property,  and  the  other  portion  being  formed  into  new 
counties,  the  county  retaining  such  name  and  organization  is  responsi- 
ble and  liable  solely  for  the  entire  indebtedness  of  the  county  at  the 
time  of  such  division,  and  can  not  bring  an  action  for  contribution 
against  the  counties  thus  set  off,  unless  specially  authorized  to  do  so 
by  a  legislative  provision.^ ^^  Where  a  city  was  created  out  of  a  town 
by  an  act  of  the  legislature,  which  made  the  city  and  the  town  liable 
proportionately  for  the  indebtedness  of  the  town  created  before  the 
city  and  town  were  separated,  it  was  held  that  as  the  apportionment  of 
this  liability  between  the  town  and  the  city,  depending  upon  accounts 
and  computations  founded  upon  the  proper  assessment  roll,  could 
not  be  made  in  an  action  at  law,  a  bill  in  equity  was  the  proper 
remedy  to  apportion  such  indebtedness  between  the  two  municipali- 
ties, especially  as  authority  to  tax  for  the  payment  of  municipal  lia- 
bilities, in  cases  like  this,  was  in  the  nature  of  a  trust. ^^'^  But  where 
it  appears  that  the  property  left  to  the  old  corporation  has  increased 
rapidly  and  is  sufficient  to  meet  the  debt  apportioned  to  it,  there  is  no 
legal  or  equitable  reason  for  going  beliind  the  legislative  apportion- 
ments^'^ 

§  472.  Rules  in  North  Carolina  as  to  settlement  between  new 
and  old  counties. — Where  a  new  county  was  created  providing  that 
"that  portion  of  the  citizens  and  taxable  property  taken  from"  two 
other  counties  "and  attached  to  the"  new  county  "shall  not  be  re- 
leased from  their  portion  of  the  outstanding  public  debts"  of  the  two 
counties  "contracted  before  the  passage  of  the  act;"  and  the  matter 
to  be  adjusted  by  the  county  commissioners  of  the  three  counties  in 
such  manner  and  mode  as  might  be  agreed  upon,  and  one  of  these 
counties  appointed  a  commissioner,  but  the  new  county  took  no  action 
whatever, — it  was  held  that  the  county  appointing  a  commissioner 
could  maintain  an  action  against  the  new  county  to  have  an  account 
taken  to  ascertain  the  indebtedness  at  the  passage  of  the  act,  and 
obtain  judgment  for  the  amount  found  due  as  the  new  county's  pro- 
portion, and  for  mandamus  to  compel  its  county  authorities  to  levy 
upon  the  people  and  property  detached  from  the  complainant  county 
to  pay  said  judgment. ^^^     The  interest  and  claims  of  the  two  coun- 

"■'  County  Com'rs  v.  County  "'  Morgan  v.  City  and  Town  of 
Com'rs,  1  Wyo.  Ter.  140.  Beloit,  supra. 

""  Morgan  v.  City  and  Town  of  "'^  Commissioners  &c.  v.  Commis- 
Beloit,  7  Wall.  613.  sioners  &c.,  107  N.  C.  291;  s.  c.  12  S- 

E.  39. 


439  PARTITION   AND   DISSOLUTION.  §    473 

ties  from  which  territory  was  detached  against  the  new  county  being 
several,  it  was  not  necessary  to  join  tlie  other  coimty  as  a  party- 
phiintifT."^  The  following  rulings  were  made  upon  tlie  merits:  The 
act  created  no  change  in  the  liability  of  the  people  and  property 
taken  from  the  com])lainant  county:  it  continued  their  liability  just 
as  it  stood  at  the  time  of  the  separation,  and  as  if  no  separation  had 
taken  place.  The  court  established  this  rule  for  determination  of  the 
indebtedness  of  the  complainant  county.  Judgments  rendered  against 
it  before  the  separation  and  paid  after  with  money  raised  before 
should  be  deducted.  The  total  indebtedness  at  the  time  of  separation 
should  be  reduced  by  the  balance  of  taxes  collected  or  collectible  in 
the  year  before  and  on  hand  six  months  after  the  separation,  since 
such  balance  was  applicable  to  the  jjayment  of  indebtedness  outstand- 
ing one  year  before  the  separation.  But  such  indebtedness  should  not 
be  reduced  by  the  amount  of  the  taxes  collected  for  the  year  before 
separation,  and  applied  to  the  current  expenses  for  the  six  months 
after,  since  those  taxes  were  expressly  designed  by  law  for  that  pur- 
pose. Nor  should  it  be  reduced  by  an  amount  equal  to  the  value  of 
certain  lands  held  at  the  time  of  separation,  in  excess  of  the  needs 
of  the  county.  The  people  detached  had  no  right  to  have  such  lands 
sold  to  pay  the  county  debt,  in  the  absence  of  an  appropriation  to 
that  purpose  before  the  separation.^-*' 

§  473.  Rules  for  adjustment  of  liabilities. — Power  being  reposed 
in  the  commissioners  of  an  old  and  a  new  county  formed  from  it  to 
apportion  the  debt  of  the  old  between  the  two,  and  to  adjust  and  settle 
all  matters  of  revenue  proper  to  be  done  on  account  of  the  formation 
of  the  new  county,  the  new  county  is  liable  for  its  share  of  the  existing 
debt,  without  making  any  deduction  on  account  of  cash  in  the  treas- 
ury of  the  old  county,  or  of  unpaid  taxes  due  to  it.^"^  And  such  new 
county  is  liable  in  praesenti  to  the  old  county  for  its  share  of  the  debt 
though  part  of  the  debt  is  not  due.^-^  And  claims  against  the  old 
county  which  are  the  subject  of  pending  litigation,  and  the  validity 
of  which  is  denied  by  that  county,  can  not  be  included  in  the  debt  to 
be  apportioned. ^^^    Where,  upon  the  formation  of  a  new  town  out  of 

"'  Commissioners  &c.   v.   Commis-  On  the  organization  of  a  new  bor- 

sioners  &c.,  107  N.  C.  291;  s.  c.  12  S.  ougli    out    of    part    of    an    old    one 

E.  39.  wiiich  has  a  funded  debt,  under  act 

'-"Commissioners   &c.   v.   Commis-  of  Pennsylvania,   May  29,   1889    (P. 

sioners  &c.,  supra.  L.  393),  the  rights  and  liabilities  of 

'"  Board  &c.  v.  Board  &c.,  15  Colo,  the   old    borough    and    its   creditors 

320;  s.  c.  25  Pac.  508.  may  be  adjusted  under  act  of  Penn- 

'"  Board  &c.  v.  Board  &c.,  supra,  sylvania,  June  1,  1887    (P.  L.   285), 

"^  Board  &c.  v.   Board  &c.,   supra,  which  provides  for  adjusting  the  lia- 


§    474  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  440 

part  of  the  territory  of  an  old  one,  a  part  of  the  indebtedness  of  the  old 
town  is  prorated  to  the  new  under  the  revised  statutes  of  Wisconsin, 
section  672,  requiring  the  new  town  to  pay  its  proportion  of  the  in- 
debtedness of  the  old,  but  the  board  divides  this  indebtedness  accord- 
ing to  the  assessment  roll  of  the  old  town  next  preceding  the  last, 
instead  of  according  to  the  last  one  as  required  by  that  statute,  where- 
by the  new  town  is  charged  with  less  than  it  would  have  been  had  the 
apportionment  been  made  as  required,  the  new  town  can  not  resist 
payment  of  its  proportion  on  the  ground  that  the  apportionment  was 
not  in  accordance  with  the  statute. ^^*  Under  the  same  statute,  after 
an  apportionment  of  the  debt  the  old  town  can  sue  for  the  amount 
due  from  the  new  town  if  it  refuses  to  pay.^^^  Where  a  new  county 
including  a  portion  of  an  old  one  has  been  created  under  an  act 
which  declared  that  the  detached  portion  of  the  old  county  should 
remain  liable  for  the  payment  of  certain  old  bonds  of  the  latter,  and 
after  the  date  of  this  act  the  old  county  had  refunded  a  portion  of 
those  bonds  and  issued  new  ones,  it  was  held  that  the  new  bonds  were 
only  evidence  of  the  old  debt,  and  the  detached  portion  of  the  old 
county  still  remained  a  part  of  it  for  the  payment  of  the  bonds. ^^^ 

§  474.    Liabilities  which  fall  upon  the  portion  severed. — In  the 

division  of  towns  the  legislature  may  apportion  the  burdens  between 
the  two,  and  may  determine  the  proportion  to  be  borne  by  each.^^''' 
A  new  county  may  be  made  liable  for  a  ratable  proportion  of  the  ex- 
isting liabilities  of  the  counties  out  of  which  it  is  created  under  the 
constitution  of  Nebraska.^^*  Where  territory,  parts  of  two  townships, 
was  subjected  to  certain  incumbrances  in  its  former  relations,  justice 
requires  that  the  same  incumbrances  should  go  with  the  territory 
when  taken  for  a  new  town.^-"  A  county  created  from  a  portion  of 
another  has  been  held  in  Arkansas,  in  a  proceeding  to  determine  its 
pro-rata  indebtedness  on  account  of  liabilities  of  the  old  county  as  pro- 
vided in  the  act  creating  it,  to  be  liable  for  its  pro-rata  share  of  such 

bilities  for  "all  indebtedness"  of  a  376;  City  of  Olney  v.  Harvey,  50.111. 

borough  when  proceedings  are  com-  453;  Borough  of  Dunmore's  Appeal, 

menced  for  changing  its  limits:  Bor-  52  Pa.  St.  374. 

ough    of    Sharon    Hill,    140    Pa.    St.  ^"^  In    re    Establishment    of    New 

250;  s.  c.  21  Atl.  394.  Counties,  9  Colo.  639;   s.  c.  21  Pac. 

^^  Town    of    Ackley    v.    Town    of  478. 

Vilas,  79  Wis.  157;  s.  c.  48  N.  W.  257.  '-'  State  v.  Elvins,  32  N.  J.  L.  362, 

125  Town    of    Ackley    v.    Town    of  holding  an  assessment  upon  the  in- 

Vilas,  supra.  habitants  of  a   portion   of  the  new 

^-'''  Montgomery  Co.  v.  Menefee  Co.  town   for  a  debt  of  the  town  from 

Court,  93  Ky.  33;  s.  c.  18  S.  W.  1021.  which  it  was  formed,  of  which  these 

'-'  Sill  v.  Village  of  Corning,  15  N.  prosecutors     were     not     residents, 

Y.  297;   Mayor  &c.  v.  State,  15  Md.  valid. 


441  rAKTITJOX    AND    DISSOLUTION.  §    -475 

portion  of  the  Ijonds  signed  before  the  division  of  territory  for  the 
purpose  of  building  a  court-house  and  jail,  as  were  absolutely  nego- 
tiated and  sold,  as  well  as  interest  from  the  date  of  negotiation. 
There  was  a  contention  that  as  they  had  been  all  signed  and  placed 
in  the  hands  of  the  county  commissioners  the  new  county  was  bound 
for  its  share  of  the  whole.  This  the  court  overruled  for  the  reason 
that  as  long  as  they  were  in  the  hands  of  the  old  county's  agents  un- 
negotiated  they  were  the  property  of  the  county,  and  there  was  no 
debt  or  liability. ^^°  Under  an  act  creating  a  new  county,  A,  out  of 
parts  of  old  counties,  among  which  was  B,  and  providing  that  the  new 
county  "shall  pay  its  portion  of  the  debts  of  the  counties  respectively 
from  which  said  county  is  formed,  said  proportions  to  be  determined 
by  the  assessed  value  of  the  *  *  *  property  within  its  limits,"  the 
supervisors  of  the  old  counties  continued  to  be  the  auditing  boards 
of  the  new  as  to  all  pre-existing  debts.  It  was  also  held  that  where 
bonds  issued  by  the  supervisors  of  B  county  for  a  debt  existing  at  the 
time  of  the  creation  of  A  county  were  voluntarily  paid  off  by  the  offi- 
cers of  B  county  without  objection  by  A  county,  the  latter  was  Ijound 
to  contribute  to  B  her  portion  of  the  debts  thus  paid.^^^  Where  the 
only  provision  in  a  statute  organizing  a  new  county  from  parts  of  oth- 
ers in  reference  to  its  liabilities  because  of  the  territory  detached  is 
that  the  property  taken  from  these  several  counties  respectively  shall 
be  subject  to  taxation  "for  the  pro-rata  proportion  of  any  debts"  due ' 
by  the  several  counties,  it  subjects  the  county  to  a  proportionate 
liability  for  debts,  but  not  for  contingent  liabilities  arising  out  of  a 
breach  of  duty.^^- 

§  475.  Defenses  to  claims  growing  out  of  partition. — Where  a  new 
county  has  been  formed  from  another  by  an  act  providing  that  it 
should  issue  its  pro-rata  share  of  bonds  for  an  indebtedness  of  its 
parent  county  to  a  third  from  which  it  was  severed,  for  which  it  would 

^=''  Hempstead  Co.  v.  Howard  Co.,  parts  of  the  county  set  off  to  form 
51  Ark.  344;  s.  c.  11  S.  W.  478.  See  other  counties  which  were  inter- 
also,  Phillips  Co.  V.  Lee  Co.,  34  Ark.  ested  in  the  bonds  remained  for  the 
240,  purposes  of  the  debt  a  part  of  Carter 

^"  Board  &c.  v.  Board  &c.,  62  Miss,  county.     A    suit    against    it    on    ac- 

325.     Where     Carter     county.     Ken-  count  of  the  bonds  is  a  suit  against 

tucky,   had   issued    bonds,   and   por-  the   parts   set   off,    and   a   judgment 

tions  of  its  territory  had  been  taken  against  the  county  was  held  to  be 

to  form  other  counties  by  acts  which  payable  out  of  taxes  collected  within 

provided  that  the  citizens  and  prop-  the  boundaries  of  the  original  coun- 

erty  within  the  old  limits  should  re-  ty:    Carter  Co.  v.  Sinton,  120  U.  S. 

main  liable  to  taxation  for  the  pay-  517;  s.  c.  7  S.  Ct.  650. 

ment  of  those  bonds  as  though  "this  "^  Askew  v.  Hale  Co.,  54  Ala.  639. 
act    had    never    been    passed,"    the 


§    475  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  442 

receive  its  share  of  railroad  stock  issued  to  the  original  county  in 
exchange  for  its  bonds  under  the  internal  improvement  laws  of 
Florida,  the  depreciation  of  such  railroad  stock  constitutes  no  valid 
reason  for  the  refusal  on  the  part  of  the  new  county  to  pay  its  propor- 
tion of  the  indebtedness/^^  Before  a  county  from  which  a  new  one  is 
formed  can  proceed  to  compel  the  latter  to  issue  bonds  for  its  pro- 
rata share  of  the  bonded  indebtedness  of  the  former  to  the  one  from 
which  it  was  formed,  it  must  appear  that  the  plaintiff  county  has 
issued  and  delivered  its  bonds  for  the  whole  amount  to  its  parent 
county.  ^^■^  In  the  same  case  the  fact  that  the  new  county  was  not  a 
party  to  mandamus  proceedings  of  the  original  county  against  the 
parent  county  was  held  not  to  affect  its  liability;  and  it  was  not  pre- 
cluded by  a  judgment  in  that  case  from  showing  the  true  amount  of 
its  liability  in  any  proceedings  of  its  parent  county  to  compel  the 
payment  of  its  pro-rata  share  of  the  indebtedness  to  the  original 
county.  The  court  ruled,  however,  that  a  mere  answer  that  a  sum 
stated  was  not  the  correct  amount  was  not  sufficiently  specific;  that 
a  return  to  an  alternative  writ  of  mandamus  should,  for  the  purpose 
of  making  an  issue,  set  up  a  positive  denial  of  the  facts,  or  should 
state  other  facts  sufficient  to  defeat  relator's  right.  Under  the  Illinois 
statutes,  providing  that,  when  a  portion  of  one  town  is  taken  there- 
from and  added  to  a  second  town,  the  second  town  shall  bear  a  due 
proportion  of  the  debts  of  the  first  town,  to  be  apportioned  by  the 
supervisors  and  assessors  of  the  two  towns,  a  suit  was  brought  for 
mandamus  to  compel  the  supervisors  and  assessors  of  the  town  re- 
ceiving the  addition  to  comply  with  the  law,  but  this  action  was  not 
commenced  until  more  than  ten  years  after  the  cause  accrued.  It  was 
held  that  there  was  no  such  trust  made  out  by  the  case  as  to  prevent 
the  bar  of  the  statute  of  limitations.^^^  This  was  a  case  simply  in- 
volving private  rights, — a  matter  of  indebtedness  between  two  cor- 
porations ;  no  public  rights  were  involved  or  the  rule  would  have  been 
different."^ 

"^Canova   v.    State,   18   Fla.   512;  reversing  an  order  granting  a  man- 

the     court    saying    that    "the     act  damus. 

.  .  .  did  not  create  an  indebted-  "^  People  v.  Town  of  Oran,  121  111. 
ness  and  impose  it  upon  [the  newj  650;  s.  c.  13  N.  E.  726,  in  which  a 
county,  but  intended  that  its  due  proceeding  to  apportion  the  indebt- 
proportion  of  the  debt  [due  from  the  edness  of  the  old  and  the  new  town 
county  of  which  it  was  formed  to  an  formed  from  it,  of  the  bonded  in- 
original  county  from  which  this  last  debtedness  of  the  former,  was  held 
was  formed]  should  be  paid  by  it  as  barred  by  the  statute  of  limitations, 
though  there  had  been  no  division  of  under  which  it  should  have  been  ba- 
the parent  county."  gun  within  five  years  from  the  time 

'^  Canova   v.    State,    18   Fla.   512;  the  right  accrued. 

'=°  People  v.  Town  of  Oran,  121  111. 


443  PARTITIOX    AND   DISSOLUTION.  §    476 

§  476.  Enforcement  of  obligations  of  old  and  new. — Under  the 
acts  severing  a  })art  of  a  coiinty  and  creating  of  it  new  counties,  with  a 
provision  that  the  new  counties  should  compensate  the  old  county  ac- 
cording to  the  relative  and  pro-rata  assessed  valuation  of  the  property 
in  the  territory  detached,  it  was  held  neither  necessary  nor  practicable 
to  make  the  new  counties  parties  in  a  proceeding  against  the  old 
county  to  enforce  collection  of  its  bonds. ^^^  A  county  had  received 
in  exchange  for  its  bonds,  under  the  internal  improvement  act  of 
Florida,  an  equivalent  in  shares  of  a  railroad  company.  A  new 
county  Avas  formed  afterwards  of  a  part  of  its  territory.  The  new 
county  issued  its  bonds,  and  upon  delivery  to  the  commissioners  of 
the  original  county  the  latter  duly  assigned  over  to  the  commissioners 
of  the  new  county  shares  of  this  railroad  stock  to  equal  the  amount 
of  the  new  county's  bonds.  It  was  held  that  this  assignment  trans- 
ferred to  the  new  county  a  proprietary  interest  in  that  stock,  and 
that  the  county  could  enforce  its  right  to  have  those  shares  trans- 
ferred on  the  books  of  the  railroad  company  whenever  it  was  de- 
sired.^^"^  And  the  proprietary  rights  of  the  new  county  were  not 
affected  by  the  fact  that  the  old  county,  after  the  assignment,  had 
voted  the  whole  number  of  the  shares  originally  given  to  it  for 
its  bonds,  which  were  still  standing  in  its  name :  it  had  parted 
with  its  right  of  property  and  the  new  county  had  gained  it.^^® 
The  acceptance  by  a  new  county  of  its  share  of  the  railroad  stock 
issued  to  the  old  county  from  which  it  was  severed  in  exchange  for  its 
bonds,  and  the  issuing  of  the  bonds  of  the  new  to  the  old  therefor, 
fixed  upon  the  new  county  the  liability  for  its  bonds ;  and  the  supreme 
court  of  Florida  ordered  a  peremptory  mandamus  to  the  officers  of 
the  new  county  to  levy  a  tax  to  pay  them.^*°  Where  by  the  error  of 
the  auditor-general  the  whole  tax,  after  the  division  of  its  territory, 
has  been  paid  by  the  old  county,  its  remedy  is  by  an  action  at  law 

650;    s.   c.   13   N.   E.   726.     See  also,  plead  or  have  pleaded  against  them 

Piatt    Co.    v.    Goodell,    97    111.    84;  the  statute  of  limitations." 

School  Directors  v.  School  Directors,  "'  County  Com'rs  v.  King,  13  Fla. 

105  111.  653;  in  the  first  of  which  the  451. 

rule  is  stated  as  "our  [the  court's]  "*  State     v.     County     Com'rs,     21 

understanding  of  the  law  is,  that  as  Fla.  1. 

respects  all  public  rights,  or  as  re-  "^  State     v.     County     Com'rs,     21 

spects  property  held  for  public  use  Fla.  1. 

upon  trusts,  municipal  corporations  ""  State  v.  County  Com'rs,  21  Fla. 

are  not  within  the  operation  of  the  1.     The  respondent  in  this  case  filed 

statute  of  limitations;  but  in  regard  several  defenses,  and  asked  that  the 

to  contracts  or  mere  private  rights  issues  be  tried  by  a  jury.     The  court 

the  rule  is  different,  and  such  corpo-  denied  the  motion,  holding  that  the 

rations,   like   private   citizens,   may  issues  in  such  matters  were  triable 

only  by  the  court. 


§    477  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  444 

against  the  new  county  to  recover  the  latter's  proportionate  share; 
and  not  by  mandamus  to  compel  a  settlement  between  the  respective 
boards  of  supervisors.^'*^  The  legislature  has  power,  upon  the  crea- 
tion of  a  new  county  by  division  of  an  old  one,  to  make  special  provi- 
sions for  adjusting  the  debts  and  credits  between  them,  and  the  en- 
forcement of  their  respective  claims;  and  they  are  not  obliged  to  en- 
force such  claims  in  the  manner  prescribed  in  general  statutes.^'*-  A 
township  can  not  divest  itself  of  its  liability  to  pay  its  indebtedness 
by  altering  its  boundaries  and  changing  its  name.^*^  The  obligation 
of  a  new  county  to  issue  its  bonds  or  to  pay  its  debts  in  the  manner 
provided  in  the  act  creating  the  same  is  not  affected  or  controlled 
by  subsequent  constitutional  or  legislative  enactment:  the  obligation 
of  the  contract  can  not  be  thus  impaired.^** 

§  477.  Miscellaneous. — When  a  new  county  is  created  out  of  a  part 
of  an  old  county,  the  old  county  takes  the  county  property  and  becomes 
liable  for  the  whole  of  the  county  indebtedness,  in  the  absence  of  legis- 
lative provision  to  the  contrary,  and  is  therefore  liable  to  pay  the 
whole  of  the  state  levy  of  taxes  charged  upon  the  whole  county  at  the 
time  of  the  division. ^''^  An  act  of  Texas  authorized  the  organization 
of  Eeeves  county  out  of  a  portion  of  the  territory  of  Pecos  county, 
but,  owing  to  the  delay  of  the  commissioners  and  Judges  of  Pecos 
county,  such  organization  was  not  perfected  until  the  lap.se  of  several 
months ;  and  meantime  the  inhabitants  of  that  portion  included  in  the 
new  county  paid  taxes  into  the  treasury  of  Pecos  county.  It  was  held 
that  the  delay  of  the  officers  of  Pecos  county  to  do  their  duty  did  not 
give  Eeeves  county  the  right  to  recover  such  taxes  from  Pecos  coun- 
ty.^**' In  Wisconsin  the  county  of  M.  was  organized  out  of  territory 
theretofore  embraced  in  the  county  of  0.,  and  it  was  enacted  that  each 
county  should  be  the  exclusive  owner  of  all  real  property  within  its 
boundaries,  and  that  the  treasurer  of  0.  county  should,  upon  demand 
by  the  treasurer  of  ]\I.  county,  "assign  to  the  county  of  M.  all  tax  cer- 
tificates in  his  office  upon  lands  situated  in  the  county  of  M."    It  was 

"^  So  held  in  Board  &c.  v.  Board  warrants    issued    by    the    original 

&c.,  74  Mich.  721;  s.  c.  42  N.  W.  170.  township. 

"=  Forest  Co.  v.  Langlade  Co.,  76  "'  Canova  v.  State,  18  Fla.  512. 

Wis.  605;  s.  c.  45  N.  W.  598.  ""^Gilliam  Co.  v.  Wasco  Co.,  14  Or, 

"^So  held  in  Walnut  Tp.  v.  Jor-  525;  s.  c.  13  Pac.  324. 

dan,  38  Kan.  562;   s.  c.  16  Pac.  812;  ">=  Reeves  Co.  v.  Pecos  Co.,  69  Tex. 

in  which,  after  a  city  of  the  second  177;  s.  c.  7  S.  W.  54;  upon  the  prin- 

class  had  been  proclaimed  as  to  a  ciple  that  a  new  county  organized 

portion  of  a  township,  the  city  there-  out  of  a  portion  of  the  territory  of 

by  detached   from   it  was  adjudged  an   old   one   is   not   entitled   to   any 

to  be  liable  for  its  pro-rata  share  of  funds  nor  subject  to  any  obligations 

of  the  latter.         * 


445  PARTITION    AND   DISSOLUTION".  §    478 

held  that  the  act  itself  did  not  pass  to  M.  county  the  legal  title  to 
tax  certificates  on  lands  in  that  county  held  by  0.  county,  but  that  the 
legal  title  remained  in  the  latter  county  until  the  assignment  pro- 
vided for  was  made.^'''  The  constitution  of  Colorado  requires  that 
each  new  county,  on  its  establishment,  shall  be  made  responsible 
for  a  ratable  proportion  of  the  "then  existing  liabilities  of  the  county 
or  counties"  from  which  it  is  formed.  Two  new  counties  were  carved 
out  of  an  old  one,  under  acts  providing  for  the  enforcement  of  this 
mandate  and  that  "all  county  records  and  other  property"  theretofore 
belonging  to  the  old  county  should  remain  its  property.  They  further 
provided  for  a  tribunal  to  adjust  and  settle  all  matters  of  revenue 
proper  to  be  done  on  account  of  the  formation  of  the  new  counties, 
and  to  apportion  the  indebtedness  of  the  old  county.  It  was  held 
that  the  new  counties  were  not  entitled  to  any  part  of  the  surplus 
funds  of  the  old  county.^**  On  the  division  of  a  township  into  two 
townships,  each  is  entitled  to  the  public  property  which,  falls  within 
its  territorial  limits;  but,  as  to  money  and  choses  in  action,  the  re- 
spective claims  must  be  adjusted  upon  principles  of  equity,  and  the 
new  township  is  entitled  to  a  proportionate  share  of  the  funds  realized 
from  taxes,  based  on  the  amount  of  taxable  property  in  the  territory 
taken  from  the  old  township  and  the  number  of  persons  therein 
against  whom  a  poll-tax  was  assessed,  while  it  should  receive  a  propor- 
tionate share  of  the  special  school-fund,  based  on  the  school  enumera- 
tion of  such  territory.  ^■^^ 

(b)  Dissolution. 

§  478.  Dissolution — ^How  effected  in  general. — In  England  a  mu- 
nicipal corporation  may  be  dissolved  by  an  act  of  parliament ;^^°  by 
the  loss  of  an  integral  part;^^^  by  a  surrender  of  its  franchises  ;^^-  or 

"'Hall  v.  Baker,  74  Wis.  118;  s.  c.  v.  School  Town  &c.,  109  Ind.  559;  s. 

42  N.  W.  104.  c.  10  N.  E.  578. 

"« Washington  Co.  v.  Weld  Co.,  12        '='''2  Kyd  Corp.  447;  Coke  Litt.  176, 

Colo.  152;  s.  c.  20  Pac.  273.  and   note;    Rex  v.   Amery,   2   T.   R. 

"^Towle  V.  Brown,  110  Ind.  65;  s.  515;  Glover  Corp.  408;  Angell  & 
c.  10  N.  E.  626;  following  Johnson  v.  Ames  Corp.,  §  767;  2  Kent  Com.  305; 
Smith,  64  Ind.  275.  As  to  equity  Board  &c.  v.  Cox,  6  Ind.  403;  State  v. 
jurisdiction  and  adjustment  upon  Trustees  &c.,  5  Ind.  77. 
equitable  principles,  see  1  Dillon  ^"  Rex  v.  Morris,  3  East  214;  Rex 
Munic.  Corp.,  §§  173,  186,  189;  Zart-  v.  Stewart,  4  East  17;  Rex  v.  Pas- 
man  V.  State,  109  Ind.  360;  s.  c.  10  N.  more,  3  T.  R.  199;  Reg.  v.  Bewdley, 
E.  94;  Mount  Pleasant  v.  Beckwith,  1  P.  Wms.  207;  Banbury  Case,  10 
100  U.  S.  514.  As  to  rights  of  prop-  Mod.  346;  Rex  v.  Mayor  &c.,  8  Mod. 
erty  in  general,  see  1  Dillon  Munic.  127;  Colchester  v.  Seaber,  3  Burr. 
Corp.  (3d  ed.),  §  188;  Town  of  North  1870;  Bacon  v.  Robertson,  18  How. 
Hempstead  v.  Town  of  Hempstead,  480;  Smith  v.  Smith,  3  Dessaus.  (S. 
2  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  109;  School  Tp.  &c.  C.)  557. 

•"Rex   V.   Osbourne,    4   East   326; 


§    479  PUBLIC    COKPOEATIONS.  446 

by  forfeiture  of  its  charter.^^^  In  the  United  States  the  law  is  dif- 
ferent in  some  respects.  Incorporated  towns  and  cities  being  but 
arms  and  instrumentalities  of  the  state  government,  creatures  of  the 
legislature,  and  subject  to  its  control  and  will,  it  may,  as  it  can  estab- 
lish, also  abolish  them  at  its  pleasure. ^^*  The  supreme  court  of 
California  say :  "And  as  a  city  may,  by  legislative  enactment,  spring 
from  the  body  of  the  county,  being  the  first  subdivision  of  the  terri- 
tory and  political  power  of  the  state,  there  is  no  reason  in  law  why 
it  may  not  be  resolved  back  to  its  original  elements,  or  why  the  power 
that  has  called  this  political  being  into  existence  may  not  again  de- 
stroy it.  There  is  no  limitation  on  the  power  of  the  legislature  in 
this  respect,  and  economy  and  convenience  may  often  require  that 
an  act  incorporating  a  city  should  be  repealed,  and  the  inliabitants 
thereof  placed  in  their  original  situation."^^^ 

§  479.  The  same  subject  continued. — There  is  no  constitutional 
restriction  upon  the  power  of  the  legislature  to  abolish  municipal  and 
county  organizations  in  Kansas,  and  the  existence  of  the  power  is  not 
disputed  and  can  not  be  doubted.^^^  A  municipal  corporation  is  not 
dissolved  by  the  failure  to  elect  officers  ;^^^  the  existence  of  a  corpo- 
ration does  not  depend  upon  the  existence  of  officers;  the  people 
have  the  right  to  elect  them  but  they  are  mere  agents  of  the  people ; 
the  corporation  might  become  dormant  or  be  suspended  by  the  re- 
moval of  all  the  people  from  it,  but  the  failure  to  elect  officers  while 
the  right  or  capacity  to  elect  them  remains  will  not  dissolve  a  corpora- 
tion.^^^      Wilson,    Justice,   in   a    dissenting   opinion,    discussing   the 

Rex  v.  Miller,  6  T.  R.  268;  Howard's  36  Kan.  530;   s.  c.  13  Pac.  850.     See 

Case,  Hutton  86;  Grant  Corp.  306.  also,    Division    of    Howard    Co.,    15 

'"Rex  v.  Grosvenor,  7  Mod.  198;  Kan.  194;  In  re  Hinkle,  31  Kan.  712; 

Smith's  Case,  4  Mod.  53,  55;  Rex  v.  s.  c.  3  Pac.  531;  State  v.  Meadows,  1 

Saunders,  3  East  119;  Rex  v.  Inhabi-  Kan.   90;    Duncombe  v.   Prindle,   12 

tants   &c.,    13    East    220;    Attorney-  Iowa  1;   Dillon  Munic.  Corp.,  §§  46, 

General   v.   Corporation   of   Shrews-  65. 

bury,  6  Beav.  220.  '"State  v.  Dunson,  71  Tex.  65;   s. 

'^'Williams  v.  Nashville,  89  Tenn.  c.  9  S.  W.  103;  followed  in  Buford  v. 

487;    s.   c.   15   S.  W.   364.     See  also.  State,  72  Tex.  182;  s.  c.  10  S.  W.  401, 

Luehrman    v.    Taxing    Dist.,    2    Lea  in  which  case  the  court  declined  to 

(Tenn.)    425,  and  authorities  there  follow   Lea   v.    Hernandez,    10    Tex. 

cited;     State    v.     Wilson,     12     Lea  137,  where  such  facts  were  held  to 

(Tenn.)   290,  246;   State  v.  Waggon-  evidence  a  civil  death — a  dissolution 

er,  88  Tenn.  290;  s.  c.  12  S.  W.  721;  of  the  corporation — although  not  ex- 

Cooley  Const.  Lim.  230,  231.  pressly  overruled  in  Blessing  v.  City 

"■•■  People  V.  Hill,  7  Cal.  97,  103.  of  Galveston,  42  Tex.  641. 

"«So  held  in  State  v.  Hamilton,  40  '■'*'  1  Dillon  Munic.  Corp.  (4th  ed.), 

Kan.  323;  s.  c.  19  Pac.  723;  approv-  §  166.     See  also.  Bacon  v.  Robertson, 

ing  and  following  State  v.  Osborne,  18  How.  480;  Lowber  v.  Mayor  &c.,  5 


447  PARTITION'    AXD   DISSOLUTION.  §    480 

power  of  a  legislature  to  destroy  a  county,  to  prevent  a  misapprehen- 
sion of  the  opinion  of  the  Illinois  court  in  Coles  v.  Madison  Coun- 
ty^iso  where  such  a  power,  by  way  of  illustration,  was  conceded,  says: 
"The  only  manner  that  occurs  to  my  mind,  by  which  a  legislature  can 
destroy  a  county,  is  by  annexing  it  to  one  or  more  organized  counties. 
No  interregnum  would  then  take  place ;  the  government  of  the  county 
to  which  it  was  annexed  would  be  extended  over  and  embrace  it  simul- 
taneously with  its  annexation ;  and  thus  no  evil  or  inconvenience 
would  occur."^*''^  A  municipal  corporation  is  not  dissolved  by  an 
amendment  of  its  charter  which  is  unconstitutional  in  whole  or  in 
part,  as  to  the  election  of  officers;  as  the  offices  previously  existed 
de  jure,  the  persons  holding  them  under  the  void  law  are  de  facto 
officers,  and  the  organization  continues.^''^  The  effect  of  a  judgment 
of  ouster  on  an  information  in  the  nature  of  a  quo  warranto  against 
a  municipal  corporation  and  its  officers  is  to  immediately  dissolve  the 
corporation,  whether  it  existed  de  jure  or  de  facto,  and  work  its  disso- 
lution, and  take  away  all  its  rights,  liberties,  privileges  and  fran- 
chises;^*'- a  dissolution  in  this  manner,  as  in  the  death  of  a  natural 
person,  operates  as  an  absolute  revocation  of  all  power  and  authority 
on  the  part  of  others  to  act  in  its  name  or  in  its  behalf.^"^ 

§  480.  Surrender  of  charter. — Judge  Dillon  thus  states  the  doc- 
trine :  "Since  all  of  our  charters  of  incorporation  come  from  the  leg- 
islature a  municipal  corporation  can  not  dissolve  itself  by  a  surrender 
of  its  franchise.  The  state  creates  such  corporations  for  public  ends, 
and  they  will  and  must  continue  until  the  legislature  annuls  or  de- 
stroys them  or  authorizes  it  to  be  done."^®*  As  to  the  power  of  a  mu- 
nicipal corporation  to  surrender  any  of  its  franchises, — for  instance, 
the  franchise  of  collecting  tolls  on  freight  passing  over  a  certain  chan- 
nel connecting  another  bay  with  the  bay  upon  which  the  city  was  situ- 
ated,— it  has  been  considered  an  extremely  doubtful  power ;  as  not  only 

Abb.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  325;  Clarke  v.  City  Schriber  v.   Town   of   Langdale,    66 

of   Rochester,    5    Abb.    Pr.    (N.    Y.)  Wis.  616;  s.  c.  29  N.  W.  547,  554. 

107;  Welch  v.  Ste.  Genevieve,  1  Dill.  ^^^  Breese  (111.)  154. 

130;    Philips   v.   Wickham,    1    Paige  ^'°  People  v.  Wren,  5  111.  269,  279. 

Ch.   (N.  Y.)   590;   Commonwealth  v.  Holt,  C,  in  Walnut  Tp.  v.  Jordan,  38 

Cullen,   1   Harris    (Pa.)    133;    Presi-  Kan.    562,    565;    s.    c.    16    Pac.    812, 

dent  &c.  V.  Thompson,  20  111.  197;  quotes   this    and    highly    commends 

Rose  V.  Turnpike  Co.,  3  Watts  (Pa.)  the  doctrine. 

46;     People    v.    Wren,    5    111.    269;  ^'^^  Cole   v.   Black   River   Falls,   57 

Brown  v.   Insurance  Co.,  3  La.  An.  Wis.  110;  s.  c.  14  N.  W.  906. 

177;    Green    Township,    9    W.    &    S.  '"=  Dodge   v.   People,   113    111.   491; 

(Pa.)    22;    Vincennes   University   v.  s.  c.  1  N.  E.  826. 

Indiana,    14    How.    268;     Muscatine  "'^  Dodge  v.  People,  supra. 

Turnverein  v.  Funck,  18  Iowa  469;  '"1  Dillon  Munic.  Corp.  (4th  ed.), 

§  167.     See  also,  Idem,  §§  37,  43,  54. 


§    481  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  448 

the  corporation  but  a  large  portion  of  the  state's  population  residing- 
without  the  city's  limits  as  well  as  of  the  commercial  world  were  in- 
terested.^^'^  Towns  incorporated  under  the  general  law  of  Missouri 
can  be  disincorporated  only  in  the  manner  therein  authorized. ^^^  A 
charter  granted  by  the  legislature  to  a  municipal  corporation  must  be 
surrendered  to  and  accepted  by  the  legislature.  Where,  therefore, 
a  town  formerly  incorporated  was  reincorporated  under  a  general 
law,  this  was  held  not  to  amount  to  an  eifectual  surrender  of  the 
charter:  it  should  have  been  accepted  and  a  record  made  of  this  fact; 
the  action  of  the  county  court  extending  the  limits  of  the  corporation 
in  proceedings  to  reincorporate  was  a  mere  amendment  of  the  char- 
ter.i" 

§  481.  The  same  subject  continued. — The  Ohio  revised  statutes 
provide  the  mode  by  which  municipal  corporations  may  surrender 
their  municipal  powers.  It  has  been  held  that  upon  the  presentation 
of  a  petition  to  the  council  for  an  election  upon  the  question  of  sur- 
render it  was  the  duty  of  the  council  before  taking  action  thereon  to 
satisfy  itself  that  it  contained  the  requisite  number  of  qualified  peti- 
tioners, and  for  that  purpose  they  might  refer  the  same  to  a  commit- 
tee to  make  the  requisite  examination.  Before  an  election  is  ordered 
petitioners  may  withdraw  their  names,  and  if  thereby  the  number  is 
reduced  below  the  number  required,  the  council  should  refuse  to  order 
an  election.  Query,  if  an  election  had  been  ordered,  whether  they 
could  withdraw  their  names.  In  a  mandamus  proceeding  to  compel  a 
council  to  order  an  election,  whether  there  has  been  a  petition  with  the 
requisite  number  of  signers  presents  an  issue  not  of  right  triable  by  a 
jury,  and  an  appeal  properly  lies  from  the  judgment  of  the  common 
pleas  thereon.^''^  In  Ohio,  an  act  "to  provide  for  the  organization  of 
cities  and  incorporated  villages,"  in  its  first  section  repealing  "all 
laws"  then  "in  force  for  the  organization  or  government"  of  municipal 
corporations,  was  held  not  to  annihilate  the  old  corporations ;  it  recre- 
ated' them ;  it  was  a  reorganization,  not  a  dissolution ;  neither  their 
corporate  existence  nor  corporate  identity  was  afEected  by  it.  Some  of 
them  took,  under  its  operation,  a  different  legal  designation, — as,  in- 

165  Morris  v.  State,  65  Tex.  53.  undertake  to  dissolve  the  old  corpo- 

"•^  So  held  in  Hambleton  v.  Town  ration;  nor  did  the  law  authorize  the 

of  Dexter,  89  Mo.  188;   s.  c.  1  S.  W.  incorporation  of  a  new  town  out  of 

234,  where  the  effect  of  reincorpora-  a  part  of  the  inhabitants  and  terri- 

tion  under  this  law  was  held  not  to  tory  already  incorporated. 

have  disincorporated  the  old  town,  '""  Norris    v.    Mayor   &c.,    1    Swan 

because  there  was  no  notice  given  as  (Tenn.)  164. 

required  by  the  law;  neither  did  the  '""*  Diitten  v.  Village  of  Hanover,  42 

order  of  the  county  court  attempt  or  Ohio  St.  215. 


449  PARTITION    AND   DISSOLUTION.  §    482 

corporatod  villages  instead  of  towns ;  the  particular  made  of  their 
organization  was  somewhat  changed,  and  their  powers,  privileges, 
rights  and  duties  were  restricted,  enlarged  or  modified;  but  their 
territorial  limits  remained  the  same  as  before;  legal  obligations  in- 
curred by  or  to  them  remained  unchanged.'"^  There  is  no  method 
provided,  under  the  Idaho  statutes  defining  the  power  of  town  trus- 
tees, whereby  they  can  dissolve  the  corporation  or  effect  a  disincorpo- 
ration,  and  it  is  not  within  their  power  to  abandon  such  incorporation 
and  procure  a  reincorporation;  therefore,  the  acts  done  by  a  board 
of  trustees  of  a  lawfully  incorporated  town  in  an  attempt  to  abandon 
or  disincorporate  such  municipality,  and  set  up  a  new  government, 
were  held  to  be  without  authority  of  law,  and  void.^^** 

§  482.    Florida  decisions  on  constitutionality  of  acts  to  dissolve. — 

The  Florida  statute  which  provided  a  mode  for  dissolution  of  munici- 
pal corporations  owing  bonded  debts  was  held  unconstitutional  in  that 
its  object  was  not  solely  to  dissolve,  but  manifestly  to  reincorporate 
at  once,  and  by  this  mode  of  reincorporation  by  vote  of  a  certain 
number  of  bondholders  and  citizens  leading  up  to  an  appointment  of 
the  officers  of  the  municipality  by  the  governor  of  the  state,  it  de- 
parted from  the  usual  rule  as  to  such  bodies,  and  was  in  contravention 
of  that  provision  of  the  constitution  which  provides  that  "the  legis- 
lature shall  establish  a  uniform  system  of  county,  township  and  mu- 
nicipal government.''^'^^  "An  act  to  dissolve"  municipal  corporations 
under  circumstances  therein  stated  "and  to  provide  provisional  gov- 
ernments for  the  same,"  providing  that  "whenever  any  city  or  town 
incorporated  under  the  general  municipal-corporation  act  *  *  *  jg 
indebted  to  the  amount  of  $200,000,  and  has  defaulted  and  still  de- 
faults in  the  payment  of  its  interest  account,  the  charter  of  such  city 
or  town  shall  be,  and  is  hereby  declared  to  be,  repealed  and  the  incor- 
poration thereof  dissolved,"  was  held  not  to  be  a  special  law  within 
the  prohibition  of  the  constitution,  but  a  general  law;  the  fact  that 

^^^  State  V.  Mayor  &c.,  14  Ohio  St.  void;  tlie  court  especially  wishing  it 

472.  understood  that  they  "do  not  decide 

""People  V.  Bancroft, 2  Idaho  1077;  or  hold  that  the  legislature  can,  un- 

s.  c.  29  Pac.  112.  der  the  constitution,   authorize  the 

"1  State  V.  Stark,  18  Pla.  255;  giv-  holders  of  one-half  of  the  bonds  of 

ing  a  judgment  of  ouster  against  the  an   indebted    municipal    corporation 

mayor  of  Fernandina  appointed  by  to  dissolve  such  corporation;"  nor  to 

the  governor  under  this  act,  and  vir-  say  "that  the  act,  stripped  of  the  dis- 

tually   holding   that   the   attempted  cretion   vested   in   the   bondholders, 

dissolution    in    the    mode    provided  would  be  constitutional." 
therein    of    the    original    city    was 
1  Smith— 29 


§    483  PUBLIC    CORrORATIONS.  450 

there  may  have  been  but  one  municipality  of  the  class  named  at  the 
time  of  the  approval  of  the  act  not  of  itself  rendering  the  statute  creat- 
ing this  class  special  and  unconstitutional.^^^ 

§  4S3.  Vacated  towns. — Where  a  town  had  recovered  a  judgment 
in  a  suit  and  was  afterwards  vacated  and  abolished,  the  ordinance 
providing  that  the  town  to  which  it  was  to  be  attached  should  be  the 
successor  to  the  vacated  town  in  its  actions  at  law,  the  ownership  of 
such  judgment  became  entirely  vested  in  the  last  town.^^^  It  was 
contended  also  that  the  board  of  supervisors  of  the  county  had  no  au- 
thority to  make  any  distribution  of  the  property  of  the  county,  and 
that  so  much  of  the  ordinance  abolishing  this  town  and  making  the 
one  of  which  it  was  constituted  a  part  of  its  successor  as  the  owner 
of  this  judgment  was  void.  It  was  held  that  under  the  constitution, 
which  empowers  the  legislature  to  confer  upon  boards  of  county 
supervisors  "powers  of  a  local  legislative  and  administrative  charac- 
ter," when  any  subject  of  legislation  is  intrusted  to  county  boards 
by  general  words  in  a  statute  they  acquire  a  right  to  pass  any  ordi- 
nance necessary  or  convenient  for  the  purpose  of  disposing  of  the 
whole  subject  so  committed  to  them,  and  for  that  purpose  have  all 
the  powers  of  the  state  legislature  over  that  subject,  unless  the  statute 
restricts  the  power  or  directs  its  exercise  in  a  certain  way.^^*     And 

""Ex  parte  Wells,  21  Pla.  280;  the  not  creating  rules  for  the  regulation 
court  summing  up  its  conclusions  as  of  future  controversies  between  par- 
follows: — "Unless  there  is  a  limita-  ties,  it  is  simply,  as  it  were,  shap- 
tion  in  the  constitution  restraining  ing  its  own  instrumentality.  .  .  . 
the  legislature,  it  can  at  will  dis-  Municipal  corporations  can,  inde- 
solve  one  city  or  many  municipali-  pendent  of  constitutional  limita- 
ties  and  leave  others  in  existence.  It  tions,  be  dissolved  without  violating 
could,  moreover,  dissolve  all  existing  the  principle  suggested  for  petition- 
municipalities  and  prevent  the  same  er."  The  principle  referred  to  was 
communities  from  reorganizing,  yet  that  "it  [the  statute]  does  not  pre- 
provide  for  others  to  incorporate,  scribe  a  rule  of  civil  conduct,"  but 
.  .  .  The  legislature  has  not  pre-  deals  only  with  the  past  and  present, 
tended  to  either  compel  communities  and  not  with  the  future, 
to  organize  as  municipalities,  nor  "^  Supervisors  &c.  v.  O'Malley,  47 
when  so  organized  to  remain  such,  Wis.  332;  s.  c.  2  N.  W.  632. 
but  has  expressly  provided  for  sur-  ^^*  Supervisors  &c.  v.  O'Malley,  47 
render  of  its  franchises  by  any  city  Wis.  332;  s.  c.  2  N.  W.  632;  holding 
or  town.  We  are  not  satisiied  that,  also,  that  under  revised  statutes, 
having  the  power  to  authorize  one  or  §  670,  the  county  board  had  power  to 
many  to  surrender  its  corporate  ex-  abolish  an  existing  town,  attach  dif- 
istence,  it  can  not  for  satisfactory  ferent  parts  of  its  territory  to  other 
cause  dissolve  any  one  of  them.  The  existing  towns  and  provide  that  one 
legislature,  in  repealing  or  modify-  of  the  latter  should  succeed  to  the 
ing  the  charter  of  a  municipality,  is  rights  of  the  old  town  in  specified 


451  PARTITION    AND   DISSOLUTION.  §    484 

when  substituted   in  such  suits  the  successor  is  entitled  to  costs.^'^^ 

§  484.  This  was  no  dissolution. — The  qualified  electors  of  a  corpo- 
ration in  Texas  elected  a  city  council  known  to  be  in  favor  of  disso- 
lution, which,  at  a  regular  meeting  in  the  year  of  their  election,  made 
a  full,  complete  and  permanent  settlement  of  all  corporate  business 
with  a  view  to  its  dissolution ;  when  they  resigned,  after  unanimously 
passing  an  ordinance  declaring  the  several  municipal  ofhces  forever 
thereafter  vacant.  It  was  held  that  the  only  law  relating  to  the  dis- 
solution of  municipal  corporations  by  their  own  action  was  the  act 
authorizing  cities  of  a  certain  population  to  accept  its  provisions  in 
lieu  of  any  existing  charter  by  a  two-thirds  vote  of  the  council,  and  on 
compliance  with  certain  requirements ;  and  that  this  attempted  disso- 
lution by  vote  of  the  mayor  and  aldermen,  and  a  subsequent  incorpora- 
tion under  laws  relating  to  unincorporated  towns  and  cities,  was 
void.  And  being  void,  dissolution  could  not  be  presumed  from 
acquiescence  and  lapse  of  time.  The  court,  on  the  argument  that  the 
dissolution  of  the  corporation  should  be  presumed  from  the  period  of 
time  which  had  elapsed  since  the  city  had  acted  under  its  original  char- 
ter, said  "that  presumptions  can  not  be  indulged  in  opposition  to  facts 
which  show  that  the  fact  sought  to  be  established  by  presumption  can 
have  no  existence."  ^^*^  In  a  similar  case  it  was  held  that  as  a  munic- 
ipality could  not  at  will  abandon  its  special  charter  and  reorganize  un- 
der general  laws,  a  corporation  under  a  special  charter,  whose  officers 
had  been  ousted,  was  not  dissolved  by  its  failure  to  elect  new  officers, 
nor  by  an  attempt  to  reorganize  it  under  the  general  laws  of  the 
state.i" 

§  485.    Effect  of  dissolution  as  to  liabilities  and  funds  in  hand. — 

Where  a  road  district  had  been  incorporated  from  a  portion  of  a  town- 
ship with  power  to  contract  debts  for  certain  purposes,  and  had  done 
so,  and  was  afterwards  dissolved  by  a  repeal  of  its  charter  with  a  pro- 
vision that  the  repeal  should  not  in  any  way  impair  any  legal  contracts 
which  its  board  of  commissioners  had  made  and  which  might  remain 
unexecuted,  it  has  been  held  that  it  was  the  intention  of  the  legisla- 
ture to  impose  upon  the  township  committee  the  liabilities  which  the 
commissioners  had  legitimately  contracted  within  the  scope  of  their 
duties  and  for  the  object  of  their  appointment.     Such  are  claims  for 

property — in   this   case  a  judgment  ^"^  Town  of  Butternut  v.  O'Malley, 

against  third  parties.    The  appeal  in  50  Wis.  333;  s.  c.  7  N.  W.  248. 

this  case  was  dismissed  because  the  ^'''Largen  v.  State,  76  Tex.  323;  s. 

successor    (town  of  Butternut)   had  c.  13  S.  W.  161. 

not  been  substituted  and  the  appeal  "^  Welch  v.  Ste.  Genevieve,  1  Dill. 

taken  in  its  name.  130. 


§    486  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  453 

compensation,  etc.,  of  the  surveyor  and  his  assistants,  for  services  of  a 
clerk  and  for  sewer-pipe  for  use  in  making  improvements.^''**  The 
repeal  of  an  act  incorporating  a  portion  of  a  township  as  a  polling- 
district  dissolves  such  a  government  corporation  and  abolishes  its 
officers.  The  result  is  that  any  funds  in  the  hands  of  its  treasurer, 
raised  by  taxation  for  public  purposes,  come  immediately  under  the 
control  of  the  legislature;  and  in  obedience  to  its  direction  by  the 
general  laws  applicable  in  such  cases,  it  is  the  duty  of  that  treasurer 
to  pay  over  to  the  proper  officer  of  the  township  from  which  this  poll- 
ing-district was  formed  whatever  he  has  in  hand.^'^^  An  act  of  the 
legislature  of  Alabama  to  vacate  and  annul  the  charter  of  and  dissolve 
a  municipal  corporation  was  held  to  operate  a  dissolution  of  the  corpo- 
ration— a  withdrawal  from  it  of  all  governmental  power  which,  had 
been  confided  to  it,  except  so  far  as  the  act  authorized  the  continued 
exercise  of  such  power;  but  upon  debts  and  liabilities  which  had  been 
created  or  contracted  by  the  corporation  in  the  exercise  of  a  power 
with  which  it  had  been  clothed  by  the  general  assembly  it  was  without 
operation;  these  debts  or  liabilities  were  not  lessened  in  obligation 
nor  extinguished;  nor  was  it  within  the  competency  of  legislative 
power  to  lessen  them  in  obligation  or  to  extinguish  them.^^**  The  su- 
preme court  of  New  Mexico  has  construed  its  disincorporating  act, 
as  it  may  be  styled,  and  held  that  the  effect  of  its  sections  providing 
for  a  settlement  of  the  debts  of  a  disincorporated  city  was  to  make 
of  the  county  a  mere  auditing  and  collecting  agent  for  the  creditor 
of  a  defendant  municipal  corporation,  empowered  to  make  by  special 
tax  out  of  the  assets  of  the  dead  city,  in  the  manner  prescribed,  a 
sufficient  amount  to  discharge  all  claims  duly  presented  and  allowed, 
and  not  to  transfer  the  liability  of  the  city  to  the  county. ^^^ 

§  486.  Effect  of  dissolution  upon  liabilities. — The  legislature,  in 
the  exercise  of  its  supreme  power  over  municipal  corporations,  may 

''*  Union  Tp.  v.  Rader,  41  N.  J.  L.  within  six  montlis  from  tlie  time  the 

617.  city    of    Las    Vegas    was    discorpo- 

""  Meckel  v.  Sandford,  40  N.  J.  L.  rated.     Laws  of  New  Mexico,   1884, 

180.  ch.  38,  provide  for  disincorporation 

""Amy  v.  Selma,  77  Ala.  103.  of  cities,  and  §  3  declares  that  the 

^"  Board  &c.  v.  Pierce,  6  N.  Mex.  commissioners  of  the  county  in 
324;  s.  c.  28  Pac.  512,  where  it  was  which  such  cities  are  situated  shall 
held  that  the  plaintiff  could  not  audit  claims  against  such  cities,  and 
recover  of  the  county  because  he  that  persons  having  such  claims 
had  not  followed  the  provisions  of  shall  present  them  within  six  months 
the  disincorporating  act  in  the  pre-  and  not  afterwards.  Section  6  pre- 
sentation of  his  claims,  etc.;  and  vides  for  publishing  notice  to  claim- 
that  the  claims  were  barred  by  rea-  ants  and  issuing  warrants  for 
son   of  not   having  been   presented  amounts  allowed.   Section  9  provides 


453  PARTITION    AXD   DISSOLUTION".  §    486 

repeal  their  charters  at  any  time,  in  its  discretion.  The  only  limita- 
tion on  tlie  operation  of  such  a  repeal  is  as  to  creditors, — that  it  shall 
not  operate  to  impair  the  obligation  of  existing  contracts,  or  deprive 
them  of  any  remedy  for  enforcing  such  contracts  which  existed  when 
they  were  niade.^*^^  In  a  case,  therefore,  where  a  part  of  a  township 
had  been  incorporated  for  the  purpose  of  laying  out,  opening  and  im- 
proving streets,  with  full  power  through  its  commissioners  to  borrow 
money,  issue  bonds,  etc.,  but  owning  no  property,  and  debts  had  been 
incurred  in  accordance  with  the  statute  incorporating  it,  and  this 
charter  was  repealed  and  the  corporation  thereby  dissolved,  the  act  of 
repeal  was  held  constitutional,  inasmuch  as  it  preserved  the  debts  and 
imposed  upon  the  authorities  of  the  township  the  duties  of  the  com- 
missioners of  the  dissolved  corporation  as  to  assessment,  and  other 
steps  for  compromise,  adjustment  and  settlement  of  those  claims.^*^^ 
Upon  the  contention  that  the  act  of  the  legislature  of  Alabama  dis- 
solving the  old  corporation  of  "The  City  of  Selma"  and  reincorpo- 
rating it  as  "Selma"  was  in  contravention  of  the  constitution  of  the 
state,  in  that  it  impaired  the  obligation  of  contracts  "by  destroying 
or  impairing  the  remedy  for  their  enforcement,"  the  act  was  sustained ; 
the  court  stating  its  conclusion  as  follows :  "An  act  to  dissolve  a  mu- 
nicipal corporation  is  not  objectionable  so  far  as  it  authorizes  the  ap- 
pointment of  commissioners  with  authority  to  take  charge  of,  collect 
and  control  the  assets  of  the  dissolved  corporation,  making  of  them  the 
application  required  by  law,  Nor  is  it  objectionable  so  far  as  it  names 
a  court  and  authorizes  the  commissioners  to  apply  on  the  equity  side 
of  that  court  for  instruction,  direction  and  protection  in  the  perform- 
ance and  discharge  of  their  duties.  Nor  is  it  objectionable  so  far  as 
in  this  respect  it  may  be  considered  a  grant  of  jurisdiction  to  said 
court,  nor  in  the  mode  of  procedure  which  it  prescribes."^**  A  town- 
ship by  act  of  the  legislature  was  converted  into  a  city.  By  subse- 
quent act  of  repeal  the  later  corporation  was  dissolved.  It  was  held 
that  the  effect  of  the  dissolution  of  the  city,  it  embracing  the  same 
inhabitants  and  the  same  boundaries,  was  to  revive  the  township 
municipality,  to  cast  upon  it  the  ownership  of  the  municipal  property, 
and  to  make  it  liable  for  the  debts  of  the  city,  and  that  the  suit  was 

that  approved  accounts  shall  be  pre-  &c.  v.  Society  &c.,  24  N.  J.  L.  386; 

sented  within  four  months  from  the  Von  Hoffman  v.  City  of  Quincy,   4 

date  of  notice  and  not  afterwards.  Wall.  535;  Butz  v.  City  of  Muscatine, 

"-  Rader    v.    Southeasterly    Road  8  Wall.  575. 

Dist,  36  N.  J.  L.  273;  People  v.  Mor-  ^'^^  Rader    v.     Southeasterly    Road 

ris,  13  Wend.   (N.  Y.)   325;   State  v.  Dist,  36  N.  J.  L.  273. 

Branin,  23  N.  J.  L.  484;   President  '"' Amy  v.  Selma,  77  Ala.  103. 


§    487  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  454 

properly  brought  against  the  township  for  a  deht  incurred  by  the 
city.i^^ " 

§  487.  What  does  not  affect  liabilities  and  remedies. — Even  if  a 
municipal  corporation  can  forfeit  its  franchises  by  non-user,  such 
forfeiture  will  not  operate  to  extinguish  del)ts  of  the  corporation 
contracted  before  the  forfeiture  was  incurred  or  declared.  Further- 
more, if  corporate  creditors  are  not  made  parties  to  the  proceeding 
by  which  the  forfeiture  is  ascertained  and  declared,  they  are  not  bound 
by  the  judgment  of  ouster.  Municipal  corporations  can  not  extin- 
guish their  debts  by  changing  their  names  or  reorganizing  under  new 
charters,  or  by  failing  to  exercise  their  corporate  powers;  a  debt 
once  contracted  by  a  municipal  corporation  will  survive  as  a  debt 
against  whatever  corporate  entity  is  subsequently  created  to  take  its 
place  and  exercise  its  power  of  local  government  over  substantially 
the  same  people  and  territory. ^^"^  The  legislation  of  Tennessee,  in 
repealing  the  charters  of  cities  and  providing  subsequently  for  com- 
promise of  their  debts  by  the  "taxing-districts"  formed  in  their  stead, 
and  the  attempts  (as  generally  construed)  to  force  this  by  withholding 
the  power  to  tax  to  meet  the  obligations  of  the  dissolved  corporations, 
has  had  much  attention  in  the  courts.  It  has  been  held  that  any  power 
of  taxation,  provided  as  a  means  of  paying  their  debts,  theretofore 
granted  to  the  original  municipalities,  devolved  as  readily  as  the  obli- 
gation to  pay  them,  and  by  operation  of  the  federal  constitution,  upon 
those  successors,  notwithstanding  the  attempted  statutory  prohibition. 
As  a  sequence,  a  mandamus  might  be  issued  to  the  officials  appointed 
for  the  general  purposes  of  the  local  government,  who  can  exercise 
the  power  of  taxation,  which  was  in  the  inhabitants  of  the  given  terri- 
tory and  which  was  never  taken  away,  as  they  do  all  governmental 

"^  Scaine  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  39  N.  the  change  made  was  the  substitu- 
J.  L.  526;  the  court  saying: — "The  tion  of  other  instrumentalities." 
legal  inference  must  be  that  it  was  '"'''  Hill  v.  City  of  Kahoka,  35  Fed. 
the  intention  of  the  legislature,  by  32 ;  holding  the  city  of  Kahoka  liable 
the  repeal  of  the  city  charter,  not  so  for  bonds  in  aid  of  railroads  issued 
much  to  abolish  the  government  of  by  the  town  of  Kahoka,  the  charter 
the  district  in  question,  as  to  alter  of  which  had  been  forfeited  for  non- 
its  form.  The  charter  was  revoked,  user,  and  the  last  corporation  formed 
but  there  was  no  interregnum,  for  of  the  same  inhabitants  and  terri- 
the  township  organization  instantly  tory;  following  Broughton  v.  Pen- 
revived  and  took  its  place,  the  repeal  sacola,  93  U.  S.  266;  Mobile  v.  Wat- 
and  revival  being  accomplished  uno  son,  116  U.  S.  289;  s.  c.  6  S.  Ct.  398; 
flatu.  The  object  of  the  city  charter  Laird  v.  City  of  De  Soto,  22  Fed.  421; 
was  not  abandoned;  that  object  was  People  v.  Murray,  73  N.  Y.  535;  the 
local  government;  and  to  effect  this  last  as  to  judgment  of  ouster  not 

binding  those  not  parties. 


455  PARTITION    AND    DISSOLUTION.  §    488 

power  of  that  local  character.^"  It  was  also  held  that  where  a  state, 
with  the  deliberate  purpose  of  obstructing  a  creditor,  repeals  a  munici- 
pal charter,  whereby  there  is  no  organization  to  be  sued,  and  the 
creditor  is  disabled  from  proceeding,  the  time  of  such  obstruction  will 
be  excluded  from  the  limitation  of  the  statute,  the  legislative  inten- 
tion to  suspend  it  being  implied  as  in  case  of  war.  Besides,  it  may  be 
set  up  as  an  equitable  defense  in  proceedings  by  mandamus. ^^^ 

§  488.  Repealing  charters. — The  legislation  of  Tennessee  repeal- 
ing the  charters  of  municipal  corporations  and  establishing  taxing- 
districts  was  the  most  extensive  in  this  direction  that  has  ever  been 
resorted  to  in  the  United  States.  There  has  been  much  litigation 
growing  out  of  it  and  important  decisions  made  upon  the  questions 
raised  in  the  various  cases.  We  will  present  here  some  of  the  most 
important  rulings  of  the  supreme  court  of  the  state  upon  the  consti- 
tutionality of  those  acts.  First  on  the  title  of  the  act.  It  was  held 
that  "An  act  to  repeal  the  charters  of  certain  municipal  corporations 
and  to  remand  the  territory  and  inhabitants  thereof  to  the  government 
of  the  state"  is  not  rendered  unconstitutional  by  a  provision  that  the 
property  used  by  such  corporation  for  municipal  purposes  is  trans- 
ferred to  the  custody  and  control  of  the  state  to  remain  public  prop- 
erty for  the  uses  to  which  it  has  been  hitherto  applied. ^-^  And  "A  bill 
to  establish  taxing-districts  in  this  state  and  to  provide  the  means  of 
local  government  for  the  same,"  which  grants  municipal  franchises 
to  the  communities  within  the  territorial  limits  of  the  taxing-districts, 
and  gives  to  the  corporation  thus  created  all  the  necessary  legislative, 
judicial  and  police  powers  of  an  incorporated  city,  and  contains  speci- 
fications of  offenses  committed  against  the  corporation  or  by  its  offi- 
cials with  penalties  and  punishments,  contains  only  one  subject 
within  the  meaning  of  the  constitution.^^''  An  act  which  provides 
"that  the  several  communities  embraced  in  the  territorial  limits  of 
all  such  municipal  corporations  in  the  state  as  have  had  or  may  have 
their  charters  abolished,  or  as  may  surrender  the  same  under  the  pro- 
visions of  the  act,  are  hereby  created  taxing-districts,  in  order  to  pro- 
\dde  the  means  of  local  government  for  the  peace  and  safety  and  gen- 

^"  Devereaux   v.    City   of   Browns-  ery  v.  Hernandez,  12  Wheat.  129,  134. 

ville,  29  Fed.  742;  Loague  v.  Taxing  As  to  equitable  defense,  see  Angell 

Dist.  &c.,  29  Fed.  742.  &   Ames   Corp.    (11th   ed.),    §§    715, 

"8  Cases    cited    in    the    preceding  721;  High  Extr.  Rem.  (2d  ed.),  §§  14, 

note.     See  also,  as  to  the  effect  of  457  et  seq. 

being  disabled  to  sue.  Hanger  v.  Ab-  '*"  Luehrman  v.  Taxing  Dist.  &c.,  2 

bott,  6  Wall.  532;    United  States  v.  Lea  (Tenn.)  425. 

Wiley,  11  Wall.  508,  513;   Braun  v.  ""Luehrman  v.  Taxing  Dist.  &c.,  2 

Sauerwein,  10  Wall.  218;   Montgom-  Lea  (Tenn.)  425. 


§    489  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  456 

eral  welfare  of  such  district,"  and  further  provides  for  the  surrender 
of  all  charters  of  municipal  corporations  in  the  state  to  enable  the 
communities  within  their  limits  to  be  governed  by  the  new  act,  is  in 
form  a  general  law  and  can  not  be  held  to  be  intended  as  a  special 
law,  even  if  the  courts  can  inquire  into  the  intention  of  the  legisla- 
ture, although  mainly  framed  or  designed  for  a  particular  locality, 
Avhere  the  acts  of  the  same  session  of  the  legislature  show  a  repeal  of 
the  charters  of  thirty-seven  municipal  corporations,  all  of  whose  com- 
munities fall  at  once  within  the  provisions  of  the  act.^®^ 

§  489.  The  same  subject  continued. — The  supreme  court  of  Ten- 
nessee held  an  act  constitutional  which  repealed  the  charter  of  a 
single  municipal  corporation,  upon  the  principle  that  municipal  cor- 
porations are  within  the  absolute  control  of  the  legislature,  and  may 
be  abolished  at  any  time  in  its  discretion.^^^  They  further  held  that 
an  act  which  grants  municipal  franchises  to  the  communities  within 
the  territorial  limits  of  certain  districts  in  order  to  provide  the  means 
of  local  government,  and  creates  the  "agencies  and  governing  instru- 
mentalities" of  a  municipal  corporation,  with  the  usual  legislative, 
executive  and  judicial  powers,  although  it  may  style  the  creations 
"taxing-districts,"  in  reality  organizes  the  people  and  territory  of  the 
district  into  municipal  corporations.^®^  It  was  competent  for  the 
legislature,  in  the  act  creating  taxing-districts  of  these  dissolved  cor- 
porations, to  provide  for  the  appointment  of  provisional  officers  to 
hold  for  a  reasonable  time,  and  not  have  them  elected  by  the  people 

"^Luehrman  v.  Taxing  Dist.  &c.,  2  is  a  power  so  essential  to  sovereign- 
Lea  (Tenn.)  425.  ty  and  the  preservation  by  the  state 

^^-  Luehrman  v.  Taxing  Dist.  &c.,  2  of  its  control  over  its  instrumental- 
Lea  (Tenn.)  425.  Cooper,  J.,  gives  ities  of  local  rule,  that  it  can  not 
this  as  the  obvious  reason: — "Being  well  be  considered  as  cut  off  except 
created  as  instrumentalities  or  arms  by  a  positive  provision  to  that  effect. 
of  the  government,  they  can  not  be  The  restriction  is  against  the  powers 
continued  in  that  capacity  whenever  of  a  corporation  being  'diminished' 
the  public  exigency,  of  which  the  leg-  by  special  laws,  not  against  their  en- 
islature  alone  is  judge,  demands  that  tire  abolishment.  And  we  may  con- 
they  should  cease  to  act."  See  also,  ceive  of  cases  where,  by  the  vicissi- 
People  v.  Morris,  13  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  tudes  of  trade,  as  in  the  case  of  old 
325,  331;  City  of  Memphis  v.  Mem-  Sarum  in  England,  and  some  of  the 
phis  Water  Co.,  5  Heisk.  (Tenn.)  495,  mining  towns  of  California,  the  spe- 
527 ;  Governor  v.  McEwen,  5  Humph,  cial  repeal  of  a  particular  charter 
(Tenn.)  241;  McCallie  v.  Mayor  &c.,  might  be  demanded  by  public  policy 
3  Head  (Tenn.)  317;  Lynch  v.  Laf-  when  a  general  repeal  would  be  a 
land,  4  Coldw.  (Tenn.)  96.  In  an-  remedy  worse  than  the  disease." 
other  place  he  speaks  of  the  power  "''  Luehrman  v.  Taxing  Dist.  &c.,  2 
to  repeal  charters  as  follows:— "This  Lea  (Tenn.)  425. 


457  PARTITION    AND   DISSOLUTION.  §    490 

of  the  district;  this  was  merely  to  put  the  new  system  in  motion.^''* 
So  also,  the  legislature  in  this  state  could  reserve  to  itself  the  right  to 
impose  directly  the  necessary  taxes  for  the  support  of  municipal  cor- 
porations.^^^ 

§  490,  Receiver  for  a  city. — The  United  States  circuit  court  on  a 
bill  filed  by  the  bondholders  of  the  city  of  Memphis  appointed  a  re- 
■ceiver  for  the  city,  and  ordered  a  surrender  of  the  property  and  assets 
of  the  city,  and  the  receiver  asked  an  injunction  afterwards  against  the 
officer  appointed  under  the  laws  of  Tennessee  for  the  taxing-district  of 
Shelby  county  to  receive  this  property  and  these  assets  in  order  that 
the  same  might  be  administered  by  the  court  as  a  court  of  equity 
through  its  officer.  The  supreme  court  of  the  United  States  on  appeal 
gave  the  subject  full  consideration.  The  court  was  agreed  upon  the 
propositions  which  follow:  Upon  the  repeal  of  the  charter  of  a  city, 
property  held  for  public  uses,  such  as  public  buildings,  streets,  squares, 
parks,  promenades,  wharves,  landing  places,  fire-engines,  hose  and 
hose-carriages,  engine-houses,  engineering  instruments,  and  generally 
everything  held  for  governmental  purposes,  passes  under  the  imme- 
diate control  of  the  state,  the  power  once  delegated  to  the  city  in  that 
behalf  having  been  withdrawn.^''*'  Nor  could  the  decree  of  the  court 
below,  so  far  as  it  subjected  to  the  payment  of  the  debts  of  the  city 
the  private  property  of  all  persons  within  its  territorial  limits,  be  sus- 
tained.^^'^  But  whatever  property  a  municipal  corporation  holds  sub- 
ject to  the  payment  of  its  debts  will,  after  its  dissolution,  be  adminis- 
tered for  the  benefit  of  the  creditors  of  such  a  corporation,  and 
applied  by  a  court  of  equity.  Private  property  of  the  corporation 
such  as  it  holds  in  its  own  right  for  profit  or  as  a  source  of  revenue 
not  charged  with  any  public  trust  or  use,  and  funds  in  its  possession 
unappropriated  to  any  specific  purpose,  may  be  so  administered.  In 
this  respect  the  position  of  the  extinct  corporation  is  not  dissimilar 
to  that  of  a  deceased  individual;  it  is  only  such  property  as  is  pos- 
sessed free  from  any  trust,  general  or  special,  which  can  go  in  liqui- 
dation of  debts. ^^®  The  majority  of  the  court  reversed  the  court  be- 
low, and  held  that  as  it  involved  the  power  of  the  court  to  levy  taxes 

^"Luehrman  v.  Taxing  Dist.  &c.,  2  der,  36  Pa.  St.  126;   City  of  Daven- 

Lea  (Tenn.)   425.     The  court  in  the  port  v.  Peoria  &c.  Ins.  Co.,  17  Iowa 

foregoing    case    rely    largely    upon  276;     Askins    v.    Commonwealth,    1 

Judge  Cooley's  opinion  in  People  v.  Duv.    (Ky.)    275;    President    &c.    v. 

Hurlbut,  24  Mich.  44.  City   of   Indianapolis,    12    Ind.    620; 

^''"Luehrman  v.  Taxing  Dist.  &c.,  2  Lowe  v.  Board  &c.,  94  Ind.  553. 

Lea  (Tenn.)  425.  ^^  Meriwether  v.  Garrett,  102  U.  S. 

^"^  Meriwether  v.  Garrett,  102  U.  S.  472. 

472.     See  also,  Schaffer  v.  Cadwalla-  ""  Meriwether  v.  Garrett,  supra. 


§    491  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  •  458 

the  appointment  of  the  receiver  could  not  be  sustained.  It  was  their 
judgment  that  taxes  levied  according  to  law  before  the  repeal  of  a 
charter  of  a  city  other  than  such  as  were  levied  in  obedience  to  the 
special  requirement  of  contracts  entered  into  under  the  authority  of 
law,  and  such  as  were  levied  under  judicial  direction  for  the  payment 
of  judgments  recovered  against  such  city,  can  not  be  collected  through 
the  instrumentality  of  a  court  of  chancery  at  the  instance  of  the  cred- 
itors of  the  city.^^^ 

§  491.  The  same  subject  continued. — Upon  the  contention  that  the 
creditors  of  the  city  of  Memphis  would  be  remediless  if  the  federal 
courts  did  not  come  to  their  relief  as  to  the  taxes  levied  before  the 
repeal  of  its  charter,  Field,  Justice,  says:  "But  the  conclusion  does 
not  follow.  The  taxes  levied  pursuant  to  writs  of  mandamus  issued 
by  the  circuit  court  are  still  to  be  collected,  the  agency  only  for  their 
collection  being  changed.  The  receiver  appointed  by  the  governor  has 
taken  the  place  of  the  collecting  officers  of  the  city.  The  funds  re- 
ceived by  him  upon  the  special  taxes  thus  levied  can  not  be  appropri- 
ated to  any  other  use.  The  receiver,  and  any  other  agent  of  the  state 
for  the  collection,  can  be  compelled  by  the  court,  equally  as  the 
former  collecting  officers  of  the  city,  to  proceed  with  the  collection  of 
such  taxes  by  the  sale  of  property  or  by  suit,  or  in  any  other  way  au- 
thorized by  law,  and  to  apply  the  proceeds  upon  the  judgments."^"** 
Justices  Strong,  Swayne  and  Harlan  dissented,  holding  that  the  com- 
plainants were  entitled  to  some  of  the  relief  granted  them  in  the  de- 
cree. A  case  was  made  in  their  opinion  for  the  appointment  of  a  re- 
ceiver to  take  into  the  possession  of  the  court  those  taxes  which  had 
been  levied  by  judicial  direction  for  the  payment  of  judgments  re- 
covered against  the  city — taxes  which  had  been  only  partly  paid. 
They  placed  this  upon  the  principle  that  a  trust  had  been  created  with 
which  those  taxes  had  been  charged ;  that  the  creditors  were  cestuis 
que  trustent — the  city  having  only  the  naked  title  to  this  fund;  that 
the  city  had  been,  in  its  neglect  to  collect  and  apply  these  taxes,  a 
faithless  trustee,  and  the  court,  as  in  other  cases  of  individual  trus- 
tees, in  this  of  a  municipal  corporation  as  trustee,  could  and  should 
appoint   another.-"^      Further,   Justice    Strong   said,    on   page    528: 

""  Meriwether  V.  Garrett,  102  U.  S.  town,    19    Wall.   107,   116;    Heine   v. 

472.    See  also,  as  to  taxes  and  power  Levee  Com'rs,  1  Woods  246;  s.  c.  19 

of  court  to  collect.  City  of  Augusta  Wall.  655. 

V.  North,  57  Me.  392;   City  of  Cam-  -»» Meriwether  v.  Garrett,  102  U.  S. 

den  V.  Allen,  26  N.  J.  L.  398;   Perry  472,  520. 

V.  Washburn,   20   Cal.   318;    City  of  '"  Meriwether  v.  Garrett,  102  U.  S. 

Philadelphia   v.    Greble,    38    Pa.    St.  472,  527.    Justice  Strong  said,  speak- 

339;  Howell  v.  City  of  Philadelphia,  ing  of  the  city: — "Its  character  as  [a 

38  Pa.  St.  471;  Rees  v.  City  of  Water-  municipal  corporation]   does  not  af- 


459  PARTITION    AND    DISSOLUTION-.  §    492 

If  the  city,  as  contended,  by  the  legishitivc  act  of  repeal  of  its  charter 
"ceased  to  have  any  legal  existence,  *  *  *  the  case  then  became 
one  of  a  trust  without  a  trustee,  pre-eminently  fit  for  equitable  inter- 
ference. A  court  of  equity  will  not  permit  a  private  trust  to  fail  for 
want  of  a  trustee.  And  this  rule  is  applicable  to  cases  in  which  a  mu- 
nicipal corporation  has  been  nominated  the  trustee."^°^ 

§  492.  Where  such  a  receiver  was  appointed. — There  has  been  an 
instance  in  which  a  receiver  was  appointed  for  a  city,  a  history  of 
which  we  will  give.  When  the  city  of  Nashville,  Tennessee,  had  been 
in  1869  brought  to  the  verge  if  not  to  a  state  of  bankruptcy  by  reck- 
less issuing  of  money  obligations  and  wasteful  mismanagement  and 
fraudulent  uses  of  its  finances  on  the  part  of  its  regularly  elected 
officials,  there  was  an  attempt  to  have  a  receiver  appointed  through 
a  bill  filed  by  citizens  and  creditors.  The  first  chancellor  dismissed 
the  application.  On  a  second  application  before  another  chancellor 
they  were  more  successful  and  a  receiver  was  appointed.  A  third 
chancellor,  on  application  before  him  to  discharge  the  orders  of  the 
second  chancellor,  approved  the  action  of  his  predecessor  in  interven- 
ing to  annul  the  operation  of  the  charter  of  the  city.  There  was  ex- 
tended the  old  rule  that  in  meeting  emergencies  for  which  the  law 
has  provided  no  remedies,  equity  will  interpose.  Judge  East,  the 
chancellor,  ascribed  to  the  government  of  a  city  a  twofold  character: 
first,  as  an  arm  of  the  legislature;  secondly,  as  a  private  corporation, 
the  creation  of  the  legislature.  Among  other  things  he  said:  "The 
functions  of  a  municipality  are  twofold ;  first,  political,  discretionary, 
legislative;  secondly,  ministerial.  While  acting  within  the  sphere 
of  the  former  they  are  exempt  from  liability,  inasmuch  as  the  corpo- 

fect  the  nature  of  its  obligations  to  obligations   it  has  not."     See  also, 

its  creditors  or  its  cestuis  que  trust,  Bailey  v.  Mayor  &c.,  3  Hill   (N.  Y.) 

or  impair  the  remedies  they  would  531;    Small    v.    Inhabitants    &c.,    51 

have    if    the    city    was    a    common  Maine  359;  Oliver  v.  City  of  Worces- 

debtor  or  trustee.     While  as  a  mu-  ter,  102  Mass.  489. 
nicipal  corporation  the  city  had  pub-        -"-  See  also,  Girard  v.  Philadelphia, 

lie    duties   to   perform,    yet   in   con-  7  Wall.   1;    Philadelphia  v.   Pox,   64 

tracting  debts  authorized  by  the  law  Pa.  St.  169;   Town  of  Montpelier  v. 

of  its  organization,  or  in  performing  Town  of  East  Montpelier,  29  Vt.  12; 

a  private  trust,  it  is  regarded  by  the  Batesville  Institute  v.  Kauffman,  18 

law  as  standing  on  the  same  footing  Wall.  151,  where  it  is  said: — "It  is, 

as    a    private    individual,    with    the  however,  within  the  power  of  a  court 

same  rights  and  duties  and  with  the  of  equity  to  decree  and  enforce  the 

same  liabilities  as  attend  such  per-  execution   of  the  trust  through   its 

sons.    Over  its  public  duties,  It  may  own  officers  and  agents,  without  the 

be    admitted,    the    legislature    has  intervention  of  a  new  trustee;"  cit- 

plenary  authority.     Over  its  private  ing  Story  Eq.  Jur.  976-1060. 


§    493  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  460 

ration  is  a  part  of  the  government  to  that  extent,  and  its  officers  to  the 
same  extent  are  public  officers,  and  as  such  entitled  to  the  protection 
of  this  principle;  but  within  the  sphere  of  the  latter  (ministerial 
duties)  they  drop  the  badges  of  governmental  officers  and  become,  as 
it  were,  the  representatives  of  a  private  corporation  in  the  exercise 
of  private  functions.  The  distinction  between  those  legislative  powers 
which  it  holds  for  public  purposes  as  a  part  of  the  government  of  the 
country  and  those  private  franchises  which  belong  to  it  as  a  creature 
of  the  law  is  well  taken."  The  receiver  appointed  administered  the 
affairs  of  the  city,  receiving  its  revenues  and  disbursing  the  same  to 
whomsoever  entitled  until  there  was  a  change  of  administration,  a 
restoration  of  home  rule,  and  the  city's  representatives  by  act  of  the 
legislature  issued  bonds  with  which  to  compromise  and  settle  the 
fraudulent  debt  imposed  upon  it  by  a  band  of  scheming  conspirators; 
never,  however,  in  any  of  its  actions  conceding  the  justice  or  propriety 
of  paying  one  dollar  of  that  debt.  This  ended  the  receivership  of  the 
city  of  Nashville.2«=' 

-"^  Lucius  S.  Merriam,  Esq.,  in  25  Am.  L.  Rev.  393. 


CHAPTER  XIV. 


ORDINANCES    AND    BY-LAWS. 


Section  Section 

493.  Introductory.  518. 

494.  By-laws,  ordinances  and  resolu-    519. 

tions. 

495.  Distinction   between   ordinance     520. 

and  resolution. 

496.  The   same  subject  continued —     521. 

Illustrations. 

497.  The  province  of  ordinances.  522. 

498.  Power  to  malie  ordinances. 

499.  The  same  subject  continued.  523. 

500.  By  whom  the  power  is  to  be  ex- 

ercised. 524. 

501.  Validity  generally.  525. 

502.  Validity   in   respect  of   form — 

(a)  Meeting  of  council.  526. 

503.  (b)    The   same   subject  contin- 

ued. 527. 

504.  (c)  Quorum  and  votes. 

505.  (d)    The  same   subject  contin- 

ued. 528. 

506.  (e)  Mode  of  enactment.  529. 

507.  (f)  The  same  subject  continued. 

508.  (g)    The    signing   of   the   ordi-     530. 

nance. 

509.  (h)    The  same  subject  contin-    531. 

ued. 

510.  The  veto  power.  532. 

511.  (i)     Publication    of    the    ordi- 

nance— When  mandatory.  533. 

512.  (j)    The   same   subject   contin- 

ued— When  directory.  534. 

513.  (k)    The   same  subject  contin- 

ued— Amendments  and  re-en-    535. 
actments. 

514.  (1)  Manner  of  publication.  536. 

515.  (m)   The  same  subject  contin- 

ued. 537. 

516.  (n)  Time  and  proof  of  publica-     538. 

tion. 

517.  (o)  Title  of  the  ordinance. 

(461) 


(p)  Record  of  the  ordinance. 
Validity  in  respect  of  matter — 
(a)  Constitutionality. 

(b)  The  same  subject  contin- 
ued. 

(c)  Consistency  with  statute 
and  charter. 

(d)  The  same  subject  contin- 
ued. 

(e)  Consistency  with  general 
penal  law. 

(f)  The  same  subject  continued. 

(g)  Reasonableness  of  the  ordi- 
nance. 

(h)  The  same  subject  contin- 
ued— Illustrations. 

(i)  The  same  subject  contin- 
ued— Reasonableness  a  ques- 
tion of  law. 

(j)  Vagueness  of  the  ordinance. 

(k)  Ordinances  void  for  want 
of  notice. 

(1)  Ordinance  granting  arbi- 
trary power. 

(m)  Oi'dinance  delegating  pow- 
er. 

(n)  Ordinances  which  are  con- 
tracts. 

(o)  Ordinances  as  to  improve- 
ments— Valid. 

(p)  Ordinances  as  to  improve- 
ments— Invalid. 

(q)  Miscellaneous  ordinances — 
Valid  and  invalid. 

(r)  Jurisdictional  matters  in 
relation  to  oi^dinances. 

(s)  Curative  ordinances. 

(t)  Scope,  force,  effect,  etc.,  of 
ordinances. 


§    493  PUBLIC    CORPOKATIONS.  462 

Section  Section 

539.  Motives  of  council  not  to  be  im-    550.  Imprisonment  as  a  penalty. 

peached.  551.  Forfeitures. 

540.  Construction  of  ordinances.  552.  The  same  subject  continued. 

541.  The   same   subject  continued —    553.  Cumulative  fines  and  fines  for 

Miscellaneous.  continuous   and   repeated   of- 

542.  Ordinances  void  in  part.  fenses. 

543.  Amendment     and     repeal  —  By     554.  Enforcement     by     complaint — 

subsequent  ordinance.  Nature  of  the  proceeding. 

544.  Repeal  by  act  of  the  legislature.  555.  The   complaint — General   requi- 

545.  Repeals  by  implication.  sites. 

546.  Power  to  impose  penalties.  556.  The   same   subject   continued — 

547.  Mode   of   enforcement   of   ordi-  Pleading. 

nances — By  a  purely  civil  ac-  557.  Pleading  further  considered, 

tion.  558.  Proof  of  ordinances. 

548.  Jurisdiction  of  proceedings.  559.  Right  to  trial  by  jury. 

549.  Imprisonment  in  default  of  pay-  560.  The  same  subject  continued. 

ment  of  fine.  561.  Certiorari  and  habeas  corpus. 

§  493.  Introductory. — The  public  corporation  in  its  usual  accepta- 
tion, excluding  the  state  and  the  federal  governments,  is  for  some 
purposes  a  miniature  state.  Its  council  represents  the  state  legis- 
lature and  the  ordinances  of  that  council  represent  the  statutes  of  the 
state.  These  ordinances,  if  valid,  have,  as  we  shall  see,  upon  those 
subject  to  the  control  of  the  corporation,  the  same  force  and  effect 
that  the  general  statutes  of  the  state  have  upon  the  people  at  large. 
It  is  easy  to  see,  therefore,  the  great  importance  of  the  subject  which 
it  is  proposed  to  discuss  in  this  chapter.  Of  the  cases  concerning 
public  corporations  it  is  probable  that  those  which  relate  to  municipal 
ordinances  are  more  numerous  than  those  which  touch  upon  any  other 
single  point. ^  The  validity  of  the  ordinance  is  generally  the  point  in 
question,  and  consequently  by  far  the  greater  portion  of  the  chapter 
is  devoted  to  the  discussion  of  the  various  questions  which  determine 
the  validity  of  a  particular  ordinance.  These  questions  are  grouped 
under  two  heads:  (1)  validity  in  respect  of  form;  (2)  validity  in 
respect  of  matter.  It  will  be  found  that  while  an  ordinance  has,  if 
valid,  the  force  and  effect  of  a  general  law  upon  those  persons  who 
are  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  council,  still  the  powers  of  the 
council  are  naturally  very  much  more  circumscribed  than  are  those 
of  the  legislature,  and  that  an  ordinance  must  be  most  carefully  ex- 
amined both  in  respect  of  its  form  and  in  respect  of  its  matter  before 
it  can  be  pronounced  undoubtedly  valid. 

§  494.  By-laws,  ordinances  and  resolutions. — The  by-laws  of  a  mu- 
nicipal corporation  are  usually  known  as  ordinances,  while  in  the 

^  For  a  further  treatment  of  the  subject  see  the  chapter  on  The  Po- 
lice Power  in  vol.  2. 


463  ORDINANCES    AND    BY-LAWS.  §    495 

English  cases  and  text-books  the  former  term  is  generally  used.^ 
There  is,  therefore,  little  if  any  distinction  between  the  by-laws  and 
the  ordinances  of  a  municipal  corporation.  The  terms  in  their  ordi- 
nary sense  imply  one  and  the  same  thing. ^  A  resolution  is  generally 
of  a  more  special  and  temporary  character  than  an  ordinance,  and  re- 
quires less  solemnity  of  enactment.*  Where  a  power  is  to  be  exer- 
cised by  a.  municipality,  and  particularly  if  it  is  legislative  in  its 
nature,  it  must  be  done  by  ordinance,  a  mere  resolution  not  being 
suflficient.^  But  where  there  is  no  law  prescribing  whether  a  license 
shall  be  by  ordinance  or  resolution,  it  may  be  by  resolution,  and 
especially  if  the  act  is  a  ministerial  act  rather  than  legislative."  An 
office  created  by  ordinance  can  not  be  abolished  by  resolution.'^  And, 
as  a  rule,  an  ordinance  can  not  be  changed  by  a  resolution.^  It  is  not 
material  whether  an  ordinance  required  to  be  submitted  to  the  electors 
is  submitted  by  an  ordinance  or  a  resolution,  provided  the  latter  has 
all  the  essentials  of  an  ordinance.®  And  it  has  been  held  that  an  elec- 
tion may  be  called  by  a  resolution  as  well  as  ordinance.^"  Concerning 
the  power  of  veto  of  resolutions,  by  the  mayor,  where  the  express 
power  to  veto  resolutions  is  not  given,  it  would  seem  clear  that  if  the 
resolution  is,  in  effect,  an  ordinance  the  right  of  veto  exists,  as  where 
a  resolution  transfers  money  from  one  fund  to  another.^^ 

§  495.  Distinction  between  ordinance  and  resolution. — All  legis- 
lative and  permanent  acts  regulating  the  affairs  of  the  corporation 
should  be  in  the  form  of  ordinances  and  not  in  the  form  of  resolutions. 
Thus,  the  issuing  of  bonds  to  aid  in  constructing  a  sewer  would  be  a 

^  Beach   Priv.   Corp.,   §    510;    Bac.  franchise    is    granted    by    an    ordi- 

Abr.,  tit.  By4aw.     See  Sumley  By-  nance,  but  a  contract  based  upon  a 

laws,  eh.  1;   Gosling  v.  Veley,  19  L.  consideration  in  relation  to  the  same 

J.     (N.    S.)     Q.    B.    Ill,    135,    per  subject-matter  may  be  by  resolution: 

Parke,  B.  State  v.  Cowgill  &c.  Mill  Co.,  156  Mo. 

^National    Bank   &c.    v.    Town    of  620;  s.  c.  57  S.  W.  1008.    A  resolution 

Grenada,  44  Fed.  262;   Bills  v.  City  is  as  effective  as  an  ordinance  in  the 

of  Goshen,  117  Ind.  221,  225;  s.  c.  20  absence  of  a  statute:    Brady  v.  City 

N.  E.  115;  3  L.  R.  A.  261.  of  Bayonne,  57  N.  J.  L.  379;  s.  c.  30 

*A  resolution  is  an  order  of  coun-  Atl.  968. 

cil  of  a  special  and  temporary  char-  '  City  of  San  Antonio  v.   Mickle- 

acter;  an  ordinance  prescribes  a  per-  John,  89  Tex.  79;  s.  c.  33  S.  W.  735. 

manent  rule  of  conduct  or  govern-  *  Hisey  v.  City  of  Charleston,   62 

ment:    Blanchard  v.  Bissell,  11  Ohio  Mo.  App.  381. 

St.  96,  103;  State  v.  City  of  Bayonne,  "  Crebs  v.  City  of  Lebanon,  98  Fed. 

35  N.  J.  L.  335.  549. 

^  City  of  Westport  v.   Mastin,   62  "  Crebs  v.  City  of  Lebanon,  98  Fed. 

Mo.  App.  647.  549. 

^  Babcock  V.  Scranton  Traction  Co.,  "  Baar  v.  Kirby,  118  Mich.  392;  s. 

1  Lack.  Leg.  N.   (Pa.)   223.     Thus  a  c.  76  N.  W.  754. 


§    496  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  464 

legislative  proceeding  such  as  would  have  to  be  by  ordinance.^-  But 
where  a  corporation  only  desires  to  do  some  ministerial  act  a  resolution 
is  sufficient. ^^  An  ordinance  may,  however,  be  in  the  form  of  a  reso- 
lution, and  if  enacted  with  the  formalities  required  by  law  in  the  case 
of  an  ordinance  will  generally  be  valid  and  binding.^*  In  Louisiana 
it  has  been  held  that  where  there  was  a  general  power  to  make  ordi- 
nances and  by-laws  and  no  form  in  which  these  should  be  enacted 
or  passed  was  prescribed,  an  ordinance  containing  a  prohibition  and 
annexing  a  penalty  was  valid,  notwithstanding  it  purported  by  its 
terms  to  be  a  resolution.  In  substance  it  was  an  ordinance  and  the 
form  in  which  it  was  passed  did  not  make  it  void.^^  But  in  Missouri  it 
was  decided  that  in  the  absence  of  an  affirmative  showing  that  a  resolu- 
tion is  passed  with  the  same  formalities,  and  notified  to  the  public  in 
the  same  manner  as  an  ordinance,  an  act  which  a  municipal  charter 
requires  to  be  done  by  ordinance  can  not  be  done  by  resolution;  nor 
can  a  general  ordinance  authorize  it  so  to  be  done.^*^ 

§  496.  The  same  subject  continued — Illustrations.  —  When  the 
charter  of  the  municipality  expressly  requires  a  certain  act  to  be  done 
by  ordinance,  it  is  safer  to  use  the  form  of  an  ordinance  rather  than 
of  a  resolution.^'^  To  decide  whether  a  resolution  is  sufficient  for 
any  certain  purpose,  it  is  necessary  to  consider  the  nature  of  the  act 
sought  to  be  authorized,  the  language  of  the  general  laws  and  of  the 
charter  relating  to  municipal  ordinances,  and  the  question  whether 
the  formalities  required  in  case  of  ordinances  have  been  followed  in 
passing  and  publishing  the  ordinance.  It  has  been  held  in  Pennsyl- 
vania that  a  new  street  could  be  opened  by  resolution.  ^^  In  New 
Jersey  a  resolution  has  been  considered  sufficient  to  bind  the  corpora- 
tion for  the  purchase  of  fire-department  apparatus;^®  and  for  the 

1-  State  V.  Barnet,  46  N.  J.  L.  62.  ^^  First  Municipality  v.  Cutting,  4 

"City  of  Quincy  v.  Chicago  &c.  R.  La.  An.  335. 

Co.,  92  111.  21.    A  resolution  does  not  '"  City  of  Cape  Girardeau  v.  Fou- 

require  the  approval  of  the  mayor:  geu,  30  Mo.  App.  551. 

City  of  Burlington  v.  Dennison,  42  "City  of  Central  v.  Sears,  2  Colo. 

N.  J.  L.  165.  588;  City  of  Delphi  v.  Evans,  36  Ind. 

"  Sower  V.  City  of  Philadelphia,  35  90;  State  v.  Barnet,  46  N.  J.  L.  62; 

Pa.  St.  231;  San  Francisco  &c.  Co.  v.  Cross  v.  Mayor  &c.,  18  N.  J.  Eq.  305; 

City  of  San  Francisco,  6  Cal.  190;  Mayor  &c.  v.  Toney,  10  Lea  (Tenn.) 

Drake   v.    Hudson    River   R.    Co.,    7  643;  City  of  Bryan  v.  Page,  51  Tex. 

Barb.   (N.  Y.)   508;   Town  of  Tipton  532. 

V.  Norman,  72  Mo.  380;  Rumsly  &c.  '^  Sower  v.  City  of  Philadelphia,  35 

Mfg.  Co.  V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  21  Mo.  Pa.  St.  231. 

App.  175.  '"  Green  v.  City  of  Cape  May,  41  N. 

J.  L.  45. 


465 


ORDINANCES    AND    BY-LAWS. 


§  497 


construction  of  a  se.wer;^''  and  for  the  acceptance  of  a  dedication.^* 
In  Iowa  the  amount  of  a  license  previously  authorized  to  be  imposed 
has  been  allowed  to  be  imposed  by  resolution. ^^  In  Indiana  a  reso- 
lution was  sufficient  to  authorize  street  improvements.^^  Eesolu- 
tions  have  been  held  sufficient  by  the  courts  of  Illinois  to  direct  munic- 
ipal agents  to  make  specified  contracts  and  also  to  appoint  municipal 
agents.^*  A  resolution  confirming  certain  acts  of  the  city  of  San 
Francisco  was  held  sufficient."^  On  the  other  hand  in  New  Jersey 
an  ordinance  has  been  held  essential  for  the  following  purposes; 
namely:  for  grading  a  street;^®  for  altering  the  width  of  a  street 
sidewalk;-*'^  and  for  appointing  a  commissioner  to  assess  damages. ^^ 
In  Colorado  the  courts  have  held  that  an  ordinance  was  necessary 
in  fixing  the  compensation  of  city  officers  under  the  charter  of  the 
city.^^ 

§  497.  The  province  of  ordinances. — The  by-laws  of  a  municipal 
corporation  are  in  the  nature  of  local  laws  passed  by  the  proper 
assembly  or  governing  body  of  the  corporation,  and  thus  valid  ordi- 
nances have  the  same  effect  within  the  corporate  limits  and  with 


'"State  V.  Mayor  &c.,  27  N.  J.  L. 
493. 

"  State  v.  City  of  Elizabeth,  37  N. 
J.  L.  432. 

"  City  of  Burlington  v.  Putnam 
Ins.  Co.,  31  Iowa  102.  Under  an  ordi- 
nance authorizing  the  city  council  to 
fix  a  license  fee  from  time  to  time 
as  it  deems  proper  it  may  be  fixed 
by  resolution:  Arkadelphia  Lumber 
Co.  v.  Arkadelphia,  56  Ark.  370;  s.  c. 
19  S.  W.  1053. 

==*  Board  &c.  v.  Silvers,  22  Ind.  491; 
City  of  Indianapolis  v.  Imberry,  17 
Ind.  175. 

=*  City  of  Alton  v.  Mulledy,  21  111. 
76;  Egan  v.  City  of  Chicago,  5  111. 
App.  70. 

^  San  Francisco  &c.  Co.  v.  City  of 
San  Francisco,  6  Cal.  190. 

^^  State  V.  City  of  Bayonne,  35  N.  J. 
L.  335.  The  general  practice  is  that 
the  grade  of  a  street  must  be  fixed 
by  ordinance:  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.  v. 
City  of  Chicago,  174  111.  439;  s.  c.  51 
N.  E.  596;  City  of  Bloomington  v. 
Pollock,  141  111.  346;  s.  c.  31  N.  E. 
146;   Washington  Ice  Co.  v.  City  of 

1  Smith— 30 


Chicago,  147  111.  327;  s.  c.  35  N.  E. 
378;  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  City  of 
Chicago,  172  111.  66;  s.  c.  49  N.  E. 
1006;  State  v.  City  of  Bayonne,  35 
N.  J.  L.  335;  Nazworthy  v.  City  of 
Sullivan,  55  111.  App.  48.  A  resolu- 
tion is  a  much  less  formal  act  than 
an  ordinance:  State  v.  Lambert- 
ville,  45  N.  J.  L.  282;  Kepner  v. 
Commonwealth,  40  Pa.  St.  124. 

-"a  Cross  V.  Mayor  &c.,  18  N.  J. 
Eq.  305. 

"  State  V.  Town  of  Bergen,  33  N. 
J.  L.  39.  Leasing  of  real  estate  must 
be  by  ordinance  and  not  resolution: 
State  V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  58  N.  J.  L. 
506;  s.  c.  33  Atl.  852.  And  so  con- 
sent to  lay  tracks  in  streets  must  be 
by  ordinance:  West  Jersey  Tract. 
Co.  V.  Shivers,  58  N.  J.  L.  124;  s.  c. 
33  Atl.  55.  A  mere  resolution  is  not 
sufficient  in  Kansas:  Edminson  v. 
City  of  Abilene,  7  Kan.  App.  305;  s. 
c.  54  Pac.  568. 

-*  City  of  Central  v.  Sears,  2  Colo. 
588.  See  also.  Walker  v.  City  of  Ev- 
ansville,  33  Ind.  393. 


§    498  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  466 

respect  to  persons  upon  whom  they  hiwfully  operate  that  an  act  of 
the  legislature  has  upon  the  people  at  large. ^'^  A  municipal  ordi- 
nance is  a  "local  law  prescribing  a  general  and  permanent  rule."^° 
As  the  state  has  all  power  necessary  for  the  protection  of  the  prop- 
erty, health  and  comfort  of  the  public,  it  can  delegate  its  power  in 
this  respect  to  local  municipalities  in  such  manner  as  may  be  deemed 
desirable  and  the  state  may  resume  it  when  deemed  expedient.  There- 
fore, legislation  in  respect  to  matters  affecting  only  certain  localities 
and  not  affecting  the  people  at  large  in  any  considerable  degree  will 
be  committed  to  a  local  municipal  government.^ ^  A  municipality 
may  under  the  authority  of  its  charter,  or  of  the  general  law,  or  under 
its  implied  right  to  pass  by-laws,  establish  all  suitable  ordinances  for 
administering  the  government  of  the  city,  for  the  preservation  of  the 
health  of  the  inhabitants  and  the  convenient  transaction  of  business 
within  its  limits,  and  for  the  performance  of  the  general  duties  re- 
quired by  law  of  municipal  corporations.^^  The  particular  instances 
in  which  public  corporations  have  seen  fit  to  exercise  this  power  are, 
of  course,  innumerable.  IMany  examples  will  be  found  under  the 
subsequent  discussion  of  the  validity  of  ordinances.^^ 

§  498.  Power  to  make  ordinances. — It  is  clearly  established  that 
only  the  legislature  of  a  state  is  empowered  to  make  laws;  yet  this 
proposition  must  be  taken  with  the  qualification  that  the  legislature 

^  Village  of  St.  Johnsbury  v.  to  come  within  the  province  of  a  by- 
Thompson,  59  Vt.  300,  305;  s.  c.  9  law  to  declare  dense  smoke  from  any 
Atl.  571;  Des  Moines  Gas  Co.  v.  City  locomotive  or  boat  to  be  a  nuisance, 
of  Des  Moines,  44  Iowa  505,  508;  and  to  prescribe  a  penalty  therefor. 
Bearden  v.  City  of  Madison,  73  Ga.  This  ordinance  was  held  also  not  to 
184;  City  of  St.  Louis  v.  BofRnger,  impose  such  regulation  on  commerce 
19  Mo.  13;  State  v.  Tryon,  39  Conn,  as  to  interfere  with  the  constitu- 
183;  Starr  v.  City  of  Burlington,  45  tional  prerogative  of  congress  to  reg- 
lowa  87;  Jones  v.  Firemen's  &c.  Ins.  ulate  commerce. 

Co.,  2  Daly  (N.  Y.)  307;  McDermott  '=  State  v.   Merrill,   37   Maine   329. 

V.  Board  &c.,  5  Abb.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  422;  A  city  government  has  the  right  un- 

Heland   v.   City  of  Lowell,   3   Allen  der  the  usual  grant  of  power  to  reg- 

(Mass. )   407.     In  England  a  by-law  ulate  the  use  and  enjoyment  of  pri- 

lawfully    passed    has    been    held    to  vate  property  in  the  city  so  as  to 

have  the  same  effects  within  its  lim-  prevent  its  proving  pernicious  to  the 

its  as  an  act  of  parliament:  Hopkins  citizens   generally,   and   may,   when 

V.  Mayor  &c.,  4  M.  &  W.  621,  640;  the  use  to  which  the  owner  devotes 

Pittsburgh  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Bennett,  9  his    property    becomes    a    nuisance, 

Ind.  App.  92;   s.  c.  35  N.  E.  1033.  compel  him  to  cease  so  to  use  it  and 

'""  Citizens'  Gas  &  M.  Co.  v.  Town  of  punish  him  for  refusal  to  obey:  Lou- 

Elwood,  114  Ind.  332;  s.  c.  16  N.  E.  isville  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  City  of  Louis- 

624.  ville,  8  Bush  (Ky.)  415. 

'^^  Harmon  v.  City  of  Chicago,  110  ^^  See  also,  the  chapter  on  The  Po- 

111.  400,  408.    In  this  case  it  was  held  lice  Power,  post,  vol.  2. 


467  ORDINANCES    AND   BY-LAWS.  §    499 

is  empowered  to  delegate  to  municipal  corporations  the  power  to 
make  by-laws  and  ordinances  regulating  such  subjects  as  fall  within 
the  proper  province  of  an  ordinance.  That  such  power  can  be  law- 
fully delegated  is  undoubted.^''  The  power  of  the  corporation  to 
pass  by-laws  is  in  many  English  cases  said  to  be  derived  from  custom — 
ancient  and  long-continued  usage  ripening  into  a  prescriptive  right 
on  the  part  of  the  municipal  corporation.^^  But  no  such  ground  can 
he  urged  in  this  country,  where  the  power  to  pass  by-laws  and  ordi- 
nances proceeds  entirely  from  legislation  of  comparatively  recent 
dates.^"  Consequently  there  is  in  our  courts  no  occasion  to  inquire 
into  these  customs,  their  validity  and  mode  of  proof .^^ 

§  499.  The  same  subject  continued. — This  power  of  the  legislature 
to  delegate  limited  powers  of  local  legislation  to  municipal  corpora- 
tions is  not,  however,  so  extended  as  to  permit  the  delegation  of  any 
power  of  general  state  legislation.^^  "The  power  of  municipal  cor- 
porations to  make  by-laws,"  says  Judge  Cooley,  "is  limited  in  various 
ways:  1.  It  is  controlled  by  the  constitution  of  the  United  States 
and  of  the  state.  The  restrictions  imposed  by  those  instruments 
which  directly  limit  the  legislative  power  of  the  state  rest  equally 
upon  all  the  instruments  of  government  created  by  the  state.  If  a 
state  can  not  pass  an  ex  post  facto  law,  or  law  impairing  the  obliga- 
tion of  contracts,  neither  can  any  agency  do  so  which  acts  under 

^  Hill  V.  Commissioners  &c.,  22  Ga.  ments,"    which    claimed    to    make 

203;    Perdue   v.   Ellis,    18    Ga.    586;  statutes   or   laws   for  the   rule   and 

Markle  v.  Town  Council  &c.,  14  Ohio  government  of  the  miners  in  that 

586;  Metcalf  v.  City  of  St.  Louis,  11  district.     "Some   of   their   rules  or 

Mo.  102;  Ex  parte  Wall,  48  Cal.  279;  ordinances  were  simply  declarations 

Pell  v.  State,  42  Md.  71.  of  the  customs  prevailing  in  the  dis- 

^^  Commonwealth     v.     Stodder,     2  trict,   but  others   contained    regula- 

Cush.  (Mass.)  562,  568.    For  English  tions  as  to  the  modes  of  working, 

cases  bearing  on  these  customs  the  and   as  to  the  conduct  of  the   per- 

reader  is  referred  to  Chamberlain  of  sons  engaged  therein.     They  appear 

London's  Case,   5  Coke  63;    Day  v.  to  have  depended  for  validity  upon 

Savage,  Hob.  212;  Davenant  v.  Hur-  the  ancient  customs  of  the  country." 

dis.    Moor.    576;     Lord    Crumwell's  See  Rogers  v.  Brunton,  10  Q.  B.  26; 

Case   (Taverner's  Case),  Dyer  322;  Harris  v.  Wakeman,  Say.  254. 

Franklin  V.  Cromwell,  Dal.  95;  Earl  '"Commonwealth     v.     Stodder,     2 

of  Excester  v.  Smith,  2  Keb.  367;  3.  Cush.    (Mass.)    562,  575;    Barling  v. 

c.  sub  nom.  Earl  of  Exeter  v.  Smith,  West,  29  Wis.  307;  Taylor  v.  City  of 

Cart.   177;    Lambert  v.   Thornton,   1  Pine  Bluff,  34  Ark.  603;  Napman  v. 

Ld.    Raym.    91;    Scarling   v.    Criett,  People,  19  Mich.  352. 

Moo.   75;    Bricklayers  v.  Plasterers,  "^Commonwealth     v.     Stodder,     2 

Palm.  396.     There  were  ancient  as-  Cush.  (Mass.)  562,  568. 

semblies  in  Cornwall,  termed  "stan-  =^  State  v.  Hayes,  61  N.  H.  264,  314. 
nary      convocations,"      or      "parlia- 


499 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS. 


468 


the  state  with  delegated  authority.  By-laws,  tlierefore,  which  in 
their  operation  would  be  ex  post  facto  or  violate  contracts,  are  not 
within  the  power  of  municipal  corporations;  and  whatever  the  people 
by  the  state  constitution  have  prohibited  the  state  government  from 
doing,  it  can  not  do  indirectly  through  the  local  governments.  2. 
Municipal  by-laws  must  also  be  in  harmony  with  the  general  laws 
of  the  state  and  with  the  provisions  of  the  municipal  charter. 
Whenever  they  come  in  conflict  with  either,  the  by-law  must  give 
way."^''  There  is,  however,  no  constitutional  objection  to  state  legis- 
lation authorizing  a  city  council  to  empower  a  particular  board  of 
officers  who  have  charge  of  the  whole  or  a  portion  of  the  affairs  of  a 
certain  department  to  make  reasonable  police  rules  and  regulations.**^ 
In  such  case,  however,  the  department  regulations  are  ministerial  and 


3»Cooley  Const.  Lim.  238,  239;  cit- 
ing under  the  first  limitation,  Stuy- 
vesant  v.  Mayor  &c.,  7  Cow.  (N.  Y.) 
588;  Brooklyn  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Broolilyn 
&c.  R.  Co.,  32  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  358;  Illi- 
nois Conf.  Female  College  v.  Cooper, 
25  111.  133;  Davenport  &c.  Co.  v.  City 
of  Davenport,  13  Iowa  229;  Western 
Saving  Society  v.  City  of  Philadel- 
phia, 31  Pa.  St.  175;  Haywood  v. 
Mayor  &c.,  12  Ga.  404;  People  v.  Chi- 
cago &c.  R.  Co.,  118  111.  113;  s.  c.  7 
N.  E.  116;  Kansas  City  v.  Corrigan, 
86  Mo.  67.  And  citing  under  the  sec- 
ond limitation.  Wood  v.  City  of 
Brooklyn,  14  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  425; 
Mayor  &c.  v.  Nichols,  4  Hill  (N.  Y.) 
209;  Town  of  Petersburg  v.  Metzker, 
21  111.  205;  Southport  v.  Ogden,  23 
Conn.  128;  Andrews  v.  Union  &c. 
Ins.  Co.,  37  Maine  256;  City  of  Can- 
ton V.  Nist,  9  Ohio  St.  439;  Carr  v. 
City  of  St.  Louis,  9  Mo.  191;  Com- 
monwealth V.  Brie  &c.  R.  Co.,  27  Pa. 
St.  339 ;  City  of  Burlington  v.  Kellar, 
18  Iowa  59;  Conwell  v.  O'Brien,  11 
Ind.  419;  March  v.  Commonwealth, 
12  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  25;  Baldwin  v. 
Green,  10  Mo.  410;  Cowen  v.  Village 
of  West  Troy,  43  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  48; 
State  V.  Georgia  Medical  Society,  38 
Ga.  608;  Pesterfield  v.  Vickers,  3 
Coldw.  (Tenn.)  205;  Weith  v.  City 
of  Wilmington,  68  N.  C.  24.  See  also, 
on  this  subject,  Burgess  &c.  v.  Citi- 


zens' Pass.  R.  Co.,  148  Pa.  St.  87;  s. 
c.  23  Atl.  1062;  "Power  of  Municipal 
Corporations  to  Make  By-laws,"  15 
Sol.  J.  &  Rep.  209  and  230;  "Munici- 
pal Ordinances,"  by  Irving  Browne, 
27  Alb.  L.  J.  284.  An  ordinance 
which  is  invalid  for  want  of  power 
of  the  corporation  to  enact  it  is  le- 
galized by  a  statute  which  expressly 
recognizes  it  as  valid:  State  v. 
Starkey,  49  Minn.  503;  s.  c.  52  N.  W. 
24;  Lennon  v.  Mayor  &c.,  55  N.  Y. 
361;  City  of  Logansport  v.  Crockett, 
64  Ind.  319;  Truchelut  v.  City  Coun- 
cil, 1  N.  &  McC.  (S.  C.)  227;  State  v. 
Town  of  Union,  33  N.  J.  L.  350: 
Town  of  Bergen  v.  State,  32  N.  J.  L. 
490;  State  v.  Mayor  &c.,  34  N.  J.  L. 
236.  Cf.  State  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  38 
N.  J.  L.  95. 

*°  Commonwealth  v.  Plaisted,  148 
Mass.  375;  s.  c.  19  N.  E.  224;  citing 
City  of  Brooklyn  v.  Breslin,  57  N.  Y. 
591;  Birdsall  v.  Clark,  73  N.  Y.  73; 
State  V.  Mayor  &c.,  34  N.  J.  L.  163; 
City  of  Taunton  v.  Taylor.  116  Mass. 
254;  Sawyer  v.  State  Board  &c.,  125 
Mass.  182;  Commonwealth  v.  Young, 
135  Mass.  526;  and  recognizing  as 
sound  but  not  antagonistic  to  the 
foregoing.  Day  v.  Green.  4  Cush. 
(Mass.)  433;  City  of  Lowell  v.  Simp- 
son, 10  Allen  (Mass.)  88;  In  re  Fra- 
zee,  63  Mich.  396;  s.  c.  30  N.  W.  72. 


469  ORDINANCES    AND    BY-LAWS.  §    500 

not  Icijislative.  An  ordinance  may  derive  its  validity  from  several 
dift'erent  grants  of  power  contained  in  the  charter.*^  And  where  the 
statute  authorizes  the  licensing  of  various  kinds  of  business  an  exer- 
cise of  that  power  may  be  in  relation  to  one  kind  of  business  only. 
The  exercise  of  the  power  may  be  assumed  from  time  to  time  as  occa- 
sion may  require.'*" 

§  500.  By  whom  the  power  is  to  be  exercised. — The  ordinances 
which  the  municipality  is  thus  empowered  to  make  mUvSt  be  adopted  by 
the  proper  body  and  in  the  manner  prescribed  by  law.  The  legislative 
assembly  of  the  corporation  is  usually  a  select  or  representative  body 
elected  by  the  qualified  voters  of  the  corporation.  This  representa- 
tive body  is  the  agent  of  the  corporation  and  its  authorized  acts  are 
the  acts  of  the  corporation.  Its  members  are  not  the  municipal  cor- 
poration or  a  corporation  of  any  kind.*^  In  many  New  England 
towns  the  legislative  body  is  not  representative,  but  is  composed  of 
all  the  citizens  of  the  town,  who  meet  in  person  and  administer  the 
public  affairs  of  the  town.'*^  As  the  power  of  a  public  corporation 
to  pass  ordinances  emanates  only  from  the  legislature,  this  power  must 
be  exercised  strictly  within  the  limits  prescribed  by  the  general  and. 
special  legislation  on  the  subject."*^ 

§  501.  Validity  generally. — In  regard  to  the  general  validity 
of  ordinances  it  may  be  stated  that  there  arises  a  presumption  in 
Tefereuce  to  their  validity  unless  their  repugnance  to  the  charter 
clearly  appears.*^     So  where  an  ordinance  is  passed  granting  the  use 

"  Gundling  v.  City  of  Chicago,  176  cable  in  modern  times.     It  is  iden- 

111.  340;  s.  c.  52  N.  E.  44;  Kinsley  v.  tical  in  principle  with  the  system  of 

City  of  Chicago,  124  111.  359;  s.  c.  16  government  of  Athens,  where  all  the 

N.  E.  260.  free  men  met  in  the  'Xyosd  ;   of  the 

*"  Kolb  V.  Mayor  &c.,  64  N.  J.  L.  Teutonic  hamlet,  where  all  freemen 

163;  s.  c.  44  Atl.  873.  voted  in  the  folkmote;  and  of  many 

"  Dillon    Munic.    Corp.    270,    and  medieval     cities,     in     which     every 

cases  cited.  burgher    voted    directly    in    public 

"  For  the   Massachusetts   statutes  meeting  on  all  questions  of  public 

relating  to  these  towns  see  Gen.  St.  welfare.     The     democracy     of     the 

1860,  ch.  18  and  ch.  19.     For  an  elab-  New  England   form  of  government 

orate  discussion  of  the  distinctions  is,   however,   far   pui^er   than   those 

between    towns    and    cities    see    the  mentioned;    for    every   adult    votes, 

learned   opinion   of   Gray,   C.   J.,   in  while  in  the  other   instances  there 

Hill    v.    City    of   Boston,    122    Mass.  was  always  a  large  slave  population 

344;  s.  c.  23  Am.  R.  332.     This  form  which  had  no  voice  in  the  meeting. 

of  government  affords   an   example  ^^  Horr    &    Bemis   Munic.     Police 

of  the  pure  democracy  which  the  in-  Ord.,  in  loco. 

crease  of  population  and  the  consoli-  '"^  Seaboard  Nat'l  Bank  v.  Woesten, 

dation  of  nations  has  made  impracti-  147  Mo.  467;  s.  c.  48  S.  W.  939. 


§    502  PUBLIC    CORrORATIONS.  470 

of  streets  for  electric  lighting,  but  it  is  not  disclosed  whether  it  is 
for  public  or  private  purposes,  it  will  be  presumed  that  it  is  for  public 
purposes,  and  thus  render  valid  the  ordinance.*^  And  the  onus  is 
upon  the  one  who  asserts  the  invalidity  to  show  wherein  the  ordi- 
nance is  invalid.*®  An  ordinance  nia}^  under  some  circumstances,, 
be  given  the  same  force  and  effect  as  a  statute.  Thus  where  a  statute 
provides  that  a  city  may  by  ordinance  fix  the  time  and  manner  of  hold- 
ing an  election,  such  ordinance  has  the  same  power  and  effect,  and 
is  to  be  construed  as  part  of  the  statute  itself.*''  Where  the  formali- 
ties in  regard  to  the  passage  of  an  ordinance  are  not  mandatory,  Imt 
simply  directory,  their  omission  will  not  invalidate  the  ordinance. 
Thus  it  is  not  necessary  to  the  validity  of  an  ordinance  that  the 
minutes  shall  show  notice  required  by  charter.^"  Nor  is  an  ordi- 
nance rendered  invalid  by  the  failure  of  the  clerk  to  certify  when  it 
was  presented  to  and  returned  by  the  mayor. ^^  Nor  by  a  provision- 
that  it  shall  go  into  effect  earlier  than  the  statute  provides.^ ^  Thus 
when  the  statute  provides  that  an  ordinance  shall  not  be  in  force 
until  ten  days  after  its  publication  and  the  ordinance  provides  that 
it  shall  take  effect  on  its  passage,  the  statute  prevails.  ^^ 

§  502.    Validity  in  respect  of  form — (a)  Meeting  of  council. — The 

ordinance  must  be  passed  at  a  legally  convened  meeting  of  the  legis- 
lative body.  The  subject  of  corporate  meetings  is  more  fully  dis- 
cussed elsewhere,^*  but  a  few  illustrations  bearing  on  the  validity  of 
ordinances  may  be  given.  The  provisions  respecting  New  England 
town  meetings  are  peculiar  and  must  be  especially  studied.  ^^  The 
councils  of  ordinary  cities  and  towns  are,  as  has  been  stated,  repre- 
sentative bodies,  elected  by  the  qualified  voters  of  the  corporation, 
and  consisting  of  a  number  of  members  fixed  by  law.  It  is  the  legis- 
lative agent  of  the  corporation,  and  through  it  only  can  the  corpora- 
tion take  legislative  action  and  be  bound.  The  legislative  and  cor- 
porate powers  of  a  municipality  whose  exercise  is  by  the  charter  or 
constituent  acts  committed  to  the  council  or  governing  body  can  be 
exercised  only  at  a  corporate  meeting  duly  held,  and  the  corporate 

"  Levis  v.  City  of  Newton,  75  Fed.  ^-  Anderson  v.  City  Council  &c.,  5S 

884.  N.  J.  L.  515;  s.  c.  33  Atl.  846. 

*'  Wood    V.    City    of    Seattle,    23  =^=  Illinois  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  People,  161 

Wash.  1;  s.  c.  62  Pac.  135.  111.  244;  s.  c.  43  N.  E.  1107. 

^°  City  of  San  Luis  Obispo  v.  Fitz-  ^*  See     the      chapter     on      Public 

gerald,  126  Cal.  279;  s.  c.  58  Pac.  699.  Boards,  ante. 

^^  Barr  v.  Mayor  &c.,  58  N.  J.  L.  ''''  See  the  chapter  on  Meetings  and 

255;  s.  c.  33  Atl.  477.  Elections,  ante. 

"  Boehme  v.  City  of  Monroe,  106 
Mich.  401;  s.  c.  64  N.  W.  204. 


471  ORDINANCES    AND    BY-LAAVS.  §    503 

will  must  be  ascertained  by  vote  and  embodied  in  a  definite  forib.^* 
The  meetings  of  such  legislative  municipal  assemblies  are  either  (1) 
stated  or  regular  meetings  or  (2)  special  meetings.^^  The  charter 
or  some  ordinance  generally  fixes  the  time  for  holding  regular  or  stated 
meetings,  and  the  members  are  thus  charged  with  notice;  and  no 
further  or  special  notice  is  necessary  unless  specially  required  by  law. 
But  notice  of  a  special  meeting  must,  unless  express  provision  to  the 
contrary  is  made  by  law,  be  given  to  each  member  entitled  to  be  pres- 
ent.^^  There  are  frequently  provisions  in  charters  or  in  ordinances 
relating  to  the  calling  of  meetings  of  councils  to  the  effect  that  upon 
assembly  the  mayor  or  other  presiding  officer  shall  specially  state  to 
them  when  assembled  the  objects  for  which  they  have  been  convened, 
and  that  their  action  shall  be  confined  to  such  object.  So  under  a 
charter  containing  such  provisions  it  has  been  decided  that  statements 
in  the  opening  message  that  the  mayor  would  propose  other  legisla- 
tion, and  sul)sequent  messages  proposing  other  legislation  not  spe- 
cifically alluded  to  in  the  first  message,  would  not  authorize  legis- 
lation on  such  subjects  j^**  and  that  the  mayor  could  not  enlarge 
the  scope  of  legislation  by  stating  in  his  message  calling  such  session 
that  "he  was  not  averse  to  submitting  any  measure"  during  the  ses- 
sion, if  deemed  of  public  interest,  and  that  an  ordinance  passed  at 
the  submission  of  the  mayor  during  the  session  was  void.^**  The 
charter  of  Kansas  City  provides  that,  "whenever  a  special  session  of 
the  common  council  shall  have  been  called  by  the  mayor,  he  shall 
state  to  them,  when  assembled,  the  cause  for  which  they  have  been 
convened,  and  their  action  shall  be  confined  to  such  cause  or  causes." 
It  was  held  that  the  common  council  had  power,  at  a  special  session 
called  for  the  purpose  of  acting  upon  a  special  ordinance  to  pave  a 
street,  to  enact  another  ordinance  for  paving  the  same  street,  their 
action  not  being  limited  to  the  ordinance  mentioned  in  the  mayor's 
message,  but  extending  over  the  subject-matter  of  the  ordinance.®^ 

§  503.    (b)  The  same  subject  continued. — The  ordinance  must  be 
passed  by  a  council  which  has  the  legal  authority  and  right  to  pass 

^*  Central    Bridge    Co.    v.    City    of  the    council   does   not   prevent   per- 

Lowell,  15  Gray   (Mass.)  106,  116.  sonal  notice:   Russell  v.  Wellington, 

"See  also,  the  chapter  on  Public  157  Mass.  100;  s.  c.  31  N.  E.  630. 

Boards,  ante.  ^^  City  of  St.  Louis  v.  Withaus,  16 

^*  See   chapter   on   Public   Boards,  Mo.  App.  247. 

ante.     The  provision  of  a  city  char-  ""  City  of  St.  Louis  v.  Withaus,  16 

ter  declaring  that  the  mayor  may  Mo.  App.  247. 

call  special  meetings  of  the  council  "'  Smith  v.  Tobener,  32  Mo.  App. 

"by  causing  notice  to  be  left  at  the  601. 
usual  residence  of  each  member"  of 


§    504  PUBLIC    COKPORATIONS.  472 

such  a  by-law.  Thus  an  ordinance  passed  at  a  meeting  of  a  county 
board  of  supervisors,  held  pursuant  to  an  act  of  the  legislature  which 
had  been  previously  repealed,  is  void.®^  The  meeting  of  the  council 
at  which  the  ordinance  is  passed  must  be  held  at  the  time  prescril)ed 
by  law.  Consequently  under  charter  of  the  city  of  Rochester  in  New 
York,  which  provided  that  at  the  next  meeting  of  the  council  after 
a  disapproval  by  the  mayor,  it  should  proceed  to  reconsider  the  resolu- 
tion disapproved,  and,  if  it  should  be  passed  by  two-thirds  of  all  the 
members,  it  should  have  full  force  and  effect  notwithstanding  the 
disapproval,  the  courts  decided  that  the  council  must  consider  the  reso- 
lution at  the  next  meeting  after  the  disapproval  comes  in,  and  could 
not  postpone  it  until  a  subsequent  meeting.^'^  The  formal  regularity 
of  the  meeting  will  be  generally  presumed;  as  where  in  Nebraska, 
on  certificate  of  the  conviction  of  a  person  for  the  sale  of  liquor  on 
Sunda}^,  a  resolution  revoking  his  license  directed  the  marshal  to 
notify  the  licensee  of  such  revocation  "by  the  mayor  and  council," 
it  was  decided  it  need  not  otherwise  appear  that  the  mayor  was  pres- 
ent, and  that  it  would  not  be  presumed  that  he  was  not,  as  under  the 
Nebraska  statute''*  it  is  his  official  duty  to  preside  at  all  meetings  of 
the  council."^  The  provisions  relating  to  New  England  town  meet- 
ings are  peculiar.  Thus  it  has  been  held  in  New  Hampshire  that  de- 
fendants in  certain  suits  were  not  disqualified  by  interest  from  voting 
in  a  town  meeting  called  to  take  action  on  such  suits.®®  And  it  was 
held  that  a  vote  at  a  meeting  of  citizens,  called  under  the  New  Hamp- 
shire statute®'^  authorizing  the  mayor  and  aldermen  to  call  a  meeting 
on  the  written  request  of  one  hundred  legal  voters,  was  merely  ad- 
visory and  did  not  control  the  action  of  the  city  council.®^ 

§  504.  (c)  Cluorum  and  votes. — Unless  there  be  some  special  pro- 
vision by  charter  or  law  to  the  contrary,  the  common-law  rule  as  to 
quorums  and  majorities  of  bodies  of  definite  number  obtains  with 
reference  to  city  councils.  That  is  to  say,  a  majority  of  the  whole 
number  must  be  present  to  constitute  a  legal  quorum;  and  a  majority 
of  that  quorum  is  necessary  to  do  any  valid  act.""     So  where  a  city 

"-  County   of   San    Luis   Obispo   v.  "'  N.  H.  Gen.  Laws,  ch.  46,  §  18. 

Hendricks,  71  Cal.  242;  s.  c.  11  Pac.  ""  Kelley  v.  Kennard,  60  N.  H.  1. 

682.  "^Regents  &c.  v.  Williams,  9  Gill  & 

«^Peck  V.  City  of  Rochester,  3  N.  J.    (Md.)    365;    In    re   Willcocks,    7 

Y.  S.  872;  s.  c.  18  N.  Y.  St.  244.  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  402;  Buell  v.  Bucking- 

«*Comp.  St.  Neb.,  eh.  13,  §  20.  liam,  16  Iowa  284;  Barnert  v.  Mayor 

•==  Martin  v.  State,  23  Neb.  371;  s.  c.  &e.,  48  N.  J.  L.  395;   s.  c.  6  Atl.  15. 

36  N.  W.  554,  Maxwell,  J.,  dissenting.  See    also,    the    chapter    on    Public 

""  Dorchester  v.  Youngman,  60  N.  Boards,  ante. 
H.  385. 


473 


ORDINAN'CES    AND    BY-LAWS. 


504 


charter  does  not  prescribe  the  number  of  votes  necessary  to  an  elec- 
tion of  a  presiding  officer  by  the  council,  the  votes  of  a  majority  of  a 
quorum  elect. '^'^  If  the  charter  or  statute  contains  no  provision  mak- 
ing a  less  or  greater  number  than  a  majority  of  the  members  a  quorum, 
then  the  council  has  no  power  to  declare  by  ordinance  that  a  number 
less  or  greater  than  the  majority  shall  constitute  a  quorum.  The 
common-law  rule  must  hold  unless  superseded  by  the  express  pro- 
vision of  a  statute  or  the  charter.'^ ^  If  more  than  a  quorum  be  present, 
and  a  majority  of  the  quorum  vote  in  favor  of  a  given  measure,  but  not 
a  majority  of  those  present,  some  members  refraining  from  voting  at 
all,  the  preponderance  of  authority  seems  to  be  that  such  vote  is  suf- 
ficient, although  there  are  decisions  to  the  contrary.  So  in  Indiana  it 
has  been  held  that  a  resolution  may  be  legally  adopted  by  the  vote 
of  three  of  the  six  members  of  a  city  council,  where  the  other  three  are 
present  but  refuse  to  vote,  as  the  vote  of  the  majority  of  the  quorum 
present  is  effective.'^-  In  that  case  it  is  said :  "If  there  is  a  sufficient 
quorum  present,  a  majority  of  those  voting  is  sufficient.""^ 


■»  State  v.  Farr,  47  N.  J.  L.  208. 

"  Heiskell  v.  Mayor  &c.,  65  Md. 
125.  In  this  case  the  council  de- 
clared two-thirds  of  the  members 
elected  to  be  necessary  for  a  quorum, 
although  there  was  no  provision  of 
statute  or  charter  on  the  subject. 
It  was  decided  that  the  ordinance 
was  void  on  the  ground  stated.  See 
also.  Blackett  v.  Blizzard.  9  B.  &  C. 
851;  Barnert  v.  Mayor  &c.,  48  N.  J. 
L.  395;  s.  c.  6  Atl.  15. 

"Rushville  Gas  Co.  v.  City  of 
Rushville,  121  Ind.  206;  s.  c.  23  N.  E. 
72;  16  Am.  St.  388;  6  L.  R.  A.  315. 
See  §§  157,  288,  289,  ante. 

"  Willcock  remarks  to  the  same 
effect: — "After  an  election  has  been 
properly  proposed,  whoever  has  a 
majority  of  those  who  vote,  the  as- 
sembly being  sufficient,  is  elected,  al- 
though a  majority  of  the  entire  as- 
sembly altogether  abstain  from  vot- 
ing, because  their  presence  suffices 
to  constitute  the  elective  body,  and 
if  they  neglect  to  vote  it  is  their 
own  fault,  and  shall  not  invalidate 
the  act  of  the  others,  but  be  con- 
strued as  an  assent  to  the  determina- 


tion of  the  majority  of  those  who  do 
vote:"  Willcock  Munic.  Corp.,  part 
1,  §  546.  "Those  who  were  present, 
and  who  help  to  make  up  the  quo- 
rum, are  expected  to  vote  on  every 
question,  and  their  presence  alone 
is  enough  to  make  the  vote  decisive 
and  binding,  whether  they  actually 
vote  or  not.  The  objects  of  legisla- 
tion can  not  be  defeated  by  the  re- 
fusal of  any  one  to  vote  when  pres- 
ent. If  eighteen  are  present  and 
nine  vote,  all  in  the  affirmative,  the 
measure  is  carried,  the  refusal  of 
the  other  nine  to  vote  being  con- 
strued as  a  vote  in  the  affirmative  so 
far  as  any  construction  is  neces- 
sary:" Horr  &  Bemis  Munic.  Police 
Ord.,  §  43.  See  also.  State  v.  Green, 
37  Ohio  St.  227;  Launtz  v.  People, 
113  111.  137;  Cass  Co.  v.  Johns- 
ton, 95  U.  S.  360;  St.  Joseph  Tp.  v. 
Rogers,  16  Wall.  644;  State  v. 
Remick,  37  Mo.  270;  Everett  v. 
Smith,  22  Minn.  53;  Oldknow  v. 
Wainwright,  2  Burr.  1017;  King  v. 
Bellringer,  4  T.  R.  810;  Inhabitants 
&c.  V.  Stearns,  21  Pick.  (Mass.)  148. 


§    505  PUBLIC    CORPOKATIONS.  474 

^  505.  (d)  The  same  subject  continued. — In  a  Tennessee  case, 
]io\vev(!r,  the  conlrarv  doctrine  was  sustained.'^*  In  that  case  the 
aklermcn  of  the  city  of  Knoxville,  nine  in  number,  and  the  mayor, 
constituted  a  board,  the  majority  of  which  had  the  power  to  elect  a 
certain  city  officiaL  The  mayor  had  no  vote  except  in  case  of  a  tie 
vote  among  the  aklermen,  in  which  case  his  vote  was  final.  Eight 
aldermen  were  present — a  quorum  under  the  statute — of  whom  four 
voted  for  one  LawTence,  three  for  another  candidate,  and  one  cast  a 
blank  ballot.  The  mayor  declared  Lawrence  elected.  The  court  re- 
versed this  decision,  distinguishing  between  elections  by  an  indefinite 
and  a  definite  body  of  voters,  and  holding  that  in  the  latter  case  the 
validity  of  the  act  depends  upon  the  concurrent  votes  of  a  majority  of 
those  present.  In  the  opinion  delivered  it  was  said :  "It  appears 
*  *  *  that  the  rule  is  settled  that  a  majority  of  a  definite  body 
present  and  acting  must  vote  for  a  candidate  in  order  to  elect  him, 
and  that  it  is  not  sufficient  that  he  receive  a  plurality  of  votes  cast, 
or  a  majority  if  blank  ballots  are  excluded.  His  claim  must  not  de- 
pend upon  the  negative  character  of  the  opposition,  but  upon  the 
affirmative  strength  of  his  own  vote;  that  it  is  not  sufficient  that  a 
majority  were  not  cast  against  him,  to  be  elected.  The  majority  must 
be  cast  for  him."  With  reference  to  the  blank  vote  cast,  and  the 
contention  that  it  should  not  count  at  all,  and  that  therefore  only 
seven  ballots  were  cast,  and  a  majority,  four,  elected  Lawrence,  the 
court  said:  "It  is  true  that  the  blank  vote  can  not  be,  in  the  tech- 
nical sense,  a  ballot,  but  it  is  nevertheless  an  act  of  negation, — affirma- 
tive in  showing  that  another  voter  acted,  negative  in  determining  the 
majority.  It  was  one  of  eight  attempted  to  be  cast  with  the  purpose 
of  not  supporting  complainant,  and  is  only  to  be  counted  in  showing 
that  he  did  not  get  a  majority,  just  as  would  have  resulted  had  it  been 
an  illegal  vote,  as  being  for  two  candidates  or  otherwise."'^^     Where 

"  Lawrence  v.  Ingersoll,  88  Tenn.  at  an  election  where  the  number  of 

52;    s.  c.  12  S.  W.  422;    17  Am.  St.  electors  is  indefinite,  or  where  the 

870;  6  L.  R.  A.  308.  law  does  not  require  a  majority  of 

^^  Lawrence  v.  Ingersoll,  88  Tenn.  all  the  members  of  a  body  having  a 
52;  s.  c.  12  S.  W.  422;  17  Am.  St.  definite  number,  as  opposed  to  a  ma- 
870;  6  L.  R.  A.  308.  From  this  view  jority  of  those  voting,  is  by  voting 
of  the  case,  however,  the  chief  jus-  for  another  candidate;  and  the 
tice  dissented,  following  the  rule  as  fact  that  a  majority  enters  a  pro- 
stated  in  the  preceding  section,  and  test  against  the  minority  candidate, 
citing  Rushville  Gas  Co.  v.  City  of  voted  for  at  a  regularly  called  elec- 
Rushville,  121  Ind.  206;  s.  c.  23  N.  tion,  will  not  defeat  the  election  if 
E.  72.  To  this  same  effect  is  the  no  other  candidate  is  voted  for;" 
language  used  in  6  Am.  &  Eng.  citing  Hendrickson  v.  Decow,  1  Saxt. 
Encyc.  of  Law  331:— "The  only  way  577.  See  also,  §§  156,  157,  ante, 
to  defeat  the  election  of  a  candidate 


475  ORDIXAXCES    AXD    BY-LAWS.  §    505 

the  law  express!}'  requires  a  certain  proportion  of  votes  in  order  to 
pass  a  measure,  it  can  not  be  reconsidered  by  a  less  proportion.'*^ 
There  are  very  frequently  special  provisions  in  the  charter  or  in  the 
statutes  prescribing  a  certain  2)roportion  of  votes  in  order  to  pass  any 
measure.  These  requirements  must  be  strictly  observed.  So,  where 
the  charter  of  Hoboken  provided  that  if,  after  the  veto  of  an  ordi- 
nance by  the  mayor,  two-thirds  of  the  members  of  the  common  council 
elected  should  pass  the  same,  it  should  take  effect  as  a  law,  and 
under  the  charter  eight  members  were  elected,  one  of  whom  died,  it 
was  held  that  it  required  the  votes  of  six  members  to  pass  an  ordi- 
nance over  the  mayor's  veto.''  Under  the  Kansas  statute  giving  a 
casting  vote  to  the  mayor  when  the  council  is  equally  divided,  and 
elsewhere  saying  that  he  shall  appoint  by  and  with  the  assent  of  the 
council,  on  the  question  of  the  confirmation  of  an  appointment  he  has 
the  casting  vote.'*  And  under  the  Nebraska  statutes'^  applying  to 
cities  of  the  second  class,  of  less  than  five  thousand  population,  and 
providing  that  "to  pass  or  adopt  any  by-law,  ordinance,  or  resolution 
or  order  to  contract,  a  concurrence  of  the  majority  of  the  whole  num- 
ber of  members  elected  to  the  council  or  trustees  shall  be  required;" 
and  providing  that  the  mayor  shall  preside  at  all  council  meetings  and 
have  a  casting  vote  when  the  council  is  equally  divided,  and  none 
other, — an  ordinance  to  redistrict  the  city,  voted  for  by  two  members 
of  a  council  of  four  and  by  the  mayor,  is  void.®"  The  Florida  munici- 
pal charter  act  provides  that  a  majority  of  the  members  of  the  council 
shall  be  required  to  form  a  quorum  for  the  transaction  of  business. 
A  rule  of  proceeding  adopted  by  a  council  prescribed  that  a  proposed 
ordinance  might  be  passed  on  its  first  reading  by  a  majority  vote  of 
the  members  present,  and  then  placed  on  a  second  reading  by  a  like 
vote,  and  if  passed  on  its  second  reading  might  then  be  read  as  passed 
as  a  whole  on  such  second  reading,  but  no  ordinance  should  be  put  on 
its  third  reading  at  the  same  meeting  at  which  it  was  read  the  first 
time  except  by  "unanimous  consent  of  the  council."  It  was  decided 
that  the  phrase  quoted  means  all  the  members  who  may  be  present  at 
the  time  the  action  as  to  putting  the  ordinance  on  its  third  reading 

'"  A  resolution  of  a  village  coun-  ^^  State  v.  Mayor  &c.,  52  N.  J.  L. 

cil,  to  adopt  which  the  charter  re-  88;  s.  c.  18  Atl.  685. 

quires  a  two-thirds  vote,  can  not  be  '^Carroll  v.  Wall,  35  Kan.  36;  s.  c. 

reconsidered  by  a  majority  less  than  10  Pac.  1. 

two-thirds:      Whitney     v.     Common  '« Comp.  St.  Neb.  1885,  ch.  14,  art. 

Council  &c.,  69   Mich.  189;    s.  c.   37  1,  §  76. 

N.   W.   184.     See   §   297   et  seq.  and  ""State  v.  Gray,  23  Neb.  365;  s.  c. 

§  377  et  seq.,  ante.  36  N.  W.  577. 


§    506  PUBLIC    CORrOKATIONS.  476' 

is  taken,  whether  a  bare  quorum  or  more.     It  does  not  require  that 
every  member  of  the  council  shall  be  present  and  consent.**^ 

§  506.  (e)  Mode  of  enactment. — The  mode  5f  enacting  the  ordi- 
nance is  generally  prescribed  in  the  charter  or  an  ordinance,  and  their 
requirements  should  be  strictly  complied  with.  So  where  the  charter 
prescribes  that  no  by-law  shall  be  passed  unless  introduced  at  a  pre- 
vious meeting,  the  provision  has  been  held  to  be  mandatory,  and  a 
by-law  passed  in  violation  thereof  to  be  void.®-  Where,  however,  a 
city  charter  requires  a  resolution  to  lie  over  "at  least  four  weeks  after 
its  introduction,"  a  resolution  introduced  on  Monday  night  may  be 
acted  on  on  the  fourth  Monday  thereafter.®^  The  rules  relating  to 
the  passage  of  by-laws  must  be  construed  with  reference  to  the  other 
provisions  on  the  subject.  Thus  where  a  clause  in  the  charter  of  the 
city  of  Minneapolis  provided  that  no  ordinance  should  be  passed  at 
the  same  session  at  which  it  was  introduced  except  by  the  unanimous 
consent  of  all  the  members  of  the  council  present,  it  was  decided  that 
this  provision  did  not  require  a  unanimous  vote  upon  the  final  passage 
of  the  ordinance,  but  only  unanimous  consent  that  it  be  put  to  a  vote 
for  its  passage,  since  the  same  section  further  provided  that  all  ordi- 
nances should  be  passed  by  an  affirmative  vote  of  a  majority  of  all  the 
members,  etc.®**  The  charter  frequently  prescribes  that  the  ayes 
and  noes  shall  be  called  and  published  whenever  the  council  votes 
on  an  improvement  requiring  a  tax,  or  on  some  similar  subject.  Such 
a  provision  has  been  held  in  New  York  to  be  merely  directory.®^    And 

"Atkins  V.   Phillips,  26  Fla.  281;  son  v.  Barnett,  20  Ky.  L.  1865;   s.  c. 

s.  c.  8  So.  429.  49  S.  W.  1060. 

"=  State  V.  Town  of  Bergen,  33  N.  ^'^  State  v.  Priester,  43  Minn.  373; 
J.  L.  39,  in  which  case  an  ordinance  s.  c.  45  N.  W.  712. 
for  opening  a  street  was  introduced  '*^  Striker  v.  Kelly,  7  Hill  (N.  Y.) 
at  one  meeting,  and  at  the  next  9,  24,  29.  It  is  to  be  noted  that  in 
meeting  the  name  of  one  of  the  com-  this  case  Mr.  Justice  Bronson  dis- 
missioners  was  changed  and  the  or-  sented,  and  the  case  was  subsequent- 
dinance  was  passed.  The  court  held  ly  reversed  on  other  grounds  in  2 
that  the  ordinance  was  void,  as  the  Denio  (N.  Y.)  323.  Mr.  Justice 
name  of  the  commissioner  who  was  Bronson's  argument  against  the  de- 
substituted  should  have  been  laid  cision  of  the  other  judges  is  as  fol- 
over  to  a  subsequent  meeting.  lows: — "It  is  well  known  that  men 

^^  Wright  V.  Forrestal,  65  Wis.  341;  acting   in   a   body,   especially   when 

s.  c.  27  N.  W.  52.     Where  a  charter  under  the  cover  of  corporate  privi- 

provides    that    at   least   two    weeks  leges,  will  often  do  what  no  one  of 

shall  elapse  between  the  passage  of  them  would  be  willing  to  do  if  act- 

a,n    ordinance    from    one   branch    of  ing  alone  and   upon   his  individual 

the  council  to  another,   from  April  responsibility.     And  they  will  some- 

5  to  April  19  will  be  sufficient:  Glea-  times  say  aye,  or  permit  a  matter  to 


477 


ORDINANCES    AND    BY-LAWS. 


§  506 


so  although  the  code  of  Iowa  requires  the  yeas  and  nays  to  be  taken 
and  recorded  on  the  passage  of  an  ordinance,  it  has  been  considered 
immaterial  that  the  nays  do  not  appear  to  have  been  called  where 
only  five  members  of  a  council  composed  of  eight  were  shown  by  the 
record  to  have  been  present,  all  of  whom  voted  in  the  affirmative.*^ 
In  Wisconsin  it  has  been  held  that  this  requirement  has  no  applica- 
tion to  motions  to  adjourn."  But  in  many  states  the  provision  has 
been  held  mandatory,  and  ordinances  passed  without  due  observance 
of  the  requirement  are  considered  void.®*  When  such  a  provision 
is  considered  mandatory  the  proceeding  must  be  entered  on  the  jour- 


pass  sub  silentio,  when  they  would 
not  venture  to  record  their  names  in 
favor  of  the  measure.  To  guard 
against  such  evils  and  protect  the 
citizens  against  the  imposition  of 
unnecessary  burdens,  it  was  pro- 
vided that  the  ayes  and  noes  should 
be  called  and  published  whenever  a 
vote  of  the  common  council  should 
be  taken  on  any  proposed  improve- 
ment involving  a  tax  or  assessment 
upon  the  citizens.  The  language  is 
imperative — the  ayes  and  noes  shall 
be  called  when  the  particular  mode 
in  which  the  corporation  is  to  act  is 
specially  declared  by  its  charter.  I 
think  it  can  only  act  in  the  pre- 
scribed forms.  The  contrary  doc- 
trine wants  the  sanction  of  legal  au- 
thority, and  is  fraught  with  the  most 
dangerous  consequences.  It  would 
place  corporations  above  the  laws, 
and  there  is  reason  to  fear  that  they 
would  soon  become  an  intolerable 
nuisance."  See  also,  Elmendorf  v. 
Mayor  &c.,  25  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  693;  In 
re  Mount  Morris  Square,  2  Hill  (N. 
Y.)  14;  City  of  St.  Louis  v.  Foster, 
52  Mo.  513;  City  of  Indianola  v. 
Jones,  29  Iowa  282;  §  305,  ante. 

^''Town  of  Bayard  v.  Baker,  76 
Iowa  220;  s.  c.  40  N.  W.  818.  Where 
the  charter  says  the  yeas  and  nays 
on  the  passage  of  all  ordinances 
shall  be  entered  in  the  journal  the 
provision  is  directory:  Village  of 
Belknap  v.  Miller,  52  111.  App. 
617;  Barr  v.  Village  of  Auburn, 
89  111.  362.  Where  the  statute 
requires   ordinances   to    be    submit- 


ted in  writing  at  a  regular  meet- 
ing, and  to  be  enacted  at  a  subse- 
quent meeting,  a  substantial  altera- 
tion of  the  ordinance  at  the  time  of 
its  passage  renders  it  invalid:  Sim- 
merman  v.  Borough  of  Wildwood,  60 
N.  J.  L.  367;  s.  c.  40  Atl.  1132. 
There  is  no  presumption  as  to  the 
regularity  of  the  passage  of  an  ordi- 
nance: City  of  Altoona  v.  Bowman, 
171  Pa.  St.  307;  s.  c.  33  Atl.  187.  In 
pleading  an  ordinance  it  need  not 
set  forth  all  the  formalities  in  ref- 
erence to  the  passage:  Board  &c.  v. 
Henzler  (N.  J.),  41  Atl.  228.  See 
also,  Becker  v.  City  of  Washington, 
94  Mo.  375;  s.  c.  7  S.  W.  291;  Town 
of    Flora   v.    Lee,    5    111.    App.    629. 

"  City  of  Green  Bay  v.  Brauns,  50 
Wis.  204;  s.  c.  6  N.  W.  503. 

^'^  Cutler  V.  Town  of  Russellville, 
40  Ark.  105;  Steckert  v.  City  of  Bast 
Saginaw,  22  Mich.  104;  City  of  Del- 
phi V.  Evans,  36  Ind.  90;  s.  c.  10 
Am.  R.  12;  City  of  Logansport  v. 
Crockett,  64  Ind.  319;  Swindell  v. 
State,  143  Ind.  153;  s.  c.  42  N.  E. 
528;  35  L.  R.  A.  50;  Tracy  v.  People, 
6  Colo.  151;  Rich  v.  City  of  Chicago, 
59  111.  286.  A  statute  requiring  a 
resolution  to  be  read  on  three  sepa- 
rate days  is  mandatory,  and  unless 
so  done,  proceedings  thereunder  are 
void:  Thatcher  v.  City  of  Toledo,  19 
Ohio  C.  C.  311.  A  violation  of  par- 
liamentary rules  in  the  passage  of 
an  ordinance  does  not  render  it 
void:  Hutcheson  v.  Storrie  (Tex. 
Civ.  App.),  48  S.  W.  785. 


§    507  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  478 

nal  or  other  record  of  the  meeting,  and  the  regularity  of  the  vote  can 
be  evidenced  from  no  other  source.**" 

§  507.  (f )  The  same  subject  continued. — These  rules  can  generally 
be  suspended  by  a  unanimous  vote  of  the  council  or  by  a  vote  of  a  large 
proportion  of  that  body.  By  such  suspension  the  usual  formalities 
of  enactments  are  dispensed  with  and  the  ordinance  is  passed  more 
speedily  than  the  ordinary  procedure  would  allow.  A  statutory  re- 
quirement that  all  ordinances  of  a  permanent  nature  shall  be  fully 
and  distinctly  read  on  three  different  days  unless  three-fourths  of  the 
members  elected  dispense  with  the  rule  is  mandatory;  and  where  the 
rule  was  dispensed  with  as  to  several  of  such  ordinances  upon  one 
and  the  same  vote,  which  were  thereupon  passed  by  a  single  vote,  it 
was  held  to  be  a  violation  of  the  provision,  the  latter  being  construed 
to  require  a  separate  suspension  as  to  each  ordinance.'"'  Such  sus- 
pension of  the  rules  is  sometimes  presumed  prima  facie  to  be  regular 
from  the  record  showing  that  the  rules  were  suspended  without 
specifying  the  procedure  of  suspension.  So  when  it  was  provided 
by  the  charter  of  a  city  that  "no  ordinance  shall  be  passed  until  it 
shall  have  been  read  in  such  board  [of  aldermen]  at  two  several  meet- 
ings," etc.,  "unless  this  provision  be  suspended  by  a  vote  of  all  mem- 
bers," etc.,  and  the  record  showed  that  certain  ordinances  were  in- 
troduced "which  were  read  and  ordered  to  be  read  a  second  time,"  etc., 
"the  second  reading  being  dispensed  with,"  etc.,  it  was  decided  that 
the  second  reading  was  properly  shown  to  be  dispensed  with,  although 
it  was  not  dispensed  with  at  a  subsequent  meeting,  and  although  the 
record  of  the  subsequent  meeting  did  not  show  that  the  second  read- 
ing had  been  dispensed  with.**^  Statutory  provisions  as  to  passage, 
where  mere  formalities,  are  construed  as  directory  when  the  language 
of  the  provision  permits."^    Provision  is  often  made  that  no  ordinance 

*'  Rich  v.  City  of  Chicago,  59  111.  pend"  the  rules,  there  being  no  sub- 

286;  Tracy  v.  People,  6  Colo.  151;  In  stantial    difference    in    the    terms: 

re  Carlton   Street,  16  Hun    (N.  Y.)  Town  of  Bayard  v.  Baker,  76  Iowa 

497.     See  §  305,  ante.  220;   s.  c.  40  N.  W.  818,  construing 

""Campbell  v.  City  of  Cincinnati,  code  of  Iowa,  §  489. 

49  Ohio  St.  463;  s.  c.  31  N.  E.  606.  '■'-  So  where  both  houses  adjourn  on 

"^  Nevin  v.  Roach,  86  Ky.  492;  s.  c.  the  day  a  bill  is  presented  to  the 
5  S.  W.  546.  And  it  is  also  held  in  mayor,  and  the  bill  is  signed  by  the 
Iowa  that  under  a  statute  providing  mayor,  and  filed  in  the  city  regis- 
that  an  ordinance  shall  be  read  on  ter's  office,  it  becomes  a  valid  ordi- 
three  different  days  unless  three-  nance,  though  it  is  not  returned  to 
fourths  of  the  council  vote  to  "dis-  the  house  in  which  it  originated,  as 
pense"  with  the  rules,  an  ordinance  required  by  art.  3,  §  23,  of  the  char- 
is  valid  if  passed  by  a  three-  ter;  as  there  is  no  provision  in  the 
fourths  vote  on   a  motion   to   "sus-  charter  which  prescribes  that  no  bill 


479  ORDINANCES    AND   BY-LAWS.  §    508 

shall  be  passed  without  a  certain  publication  beforehand.  This  pro- 
vision has  been  held  in  many  cases  to  be  mandatory,  and  an  ordinance 
passed  without  such  prescribed  publication  is  void.^^  The  formalities 
of  the  passage  of  an  ordinance  must  be  completed  before  the  ordi- 
nance takes  effect.'''*  Where  a  city  has  recognized  an  ordinance,  and 
treated  it  as  adopted,  it  will  be  presumed  to  have  been  approved  by 
the  mayor.^^  The  president  of  the  council  may  approve  an  ordinance 
in  the  absence  of  the  mayor. ""^ 

§  508.  (g)  The  signing  of  the  ordinance. — The  charter  or  statute 
frequently  contains  provisions  that  every  ordinance  must  be  signed 
by  the  mayor  or  other  presiding  officer.  Whether  in  such  a  case  the 
signature  of  the  mayor  is  essential  to  the  validity  of  the  ordinance 
or  not  depends  chiefly  upon  the  language  of  the  charter  or  act.  If 
the  charter  or  act  makes  the  signature  essential,  the  ordinance  is  void 
if  unsigned ;  if  on  the  other  hand  the  charter  does  not  make  the  sig- 
nature of  the  presiding  officer  an  essential  condition  precedent  to  the 
validity  of  the  ordinance,  the  provision  has  frequently  been  regarded 
as  directory.  Thus  an  ordinance  passed  by  the  common  council  of 
the  city  of  East  Portland  could  not  take  effect  until  approved  by  the 
mayor,  and  all  proceedings  had  under  such  ordinance  before  its  ap- 
proval were  held  to  be  nullities.^^    It  has  also  been  decided  that  under 

shall    become    an    ordinance    which  cution    of    a    new    ordinance    takes 

shall  not  be  returned  to  the  house  place  before  it  becomes  operative,  no 

in     which     it     originated:     Barber  charge  made   in   invitum  against  a 

Asphalt  Pav.  Co.  v.  Hunt,  100  Mo.  property-owner  by  virtue  of  the  pro- 

22;  s.  c.  13  S.  W.  98.     And  an  ordi-  ceeding  thereunder  acquires  any  va- 

nance  of  the  city  of  St.  Louis  pro-  lidity:    Keane    v.    Gushing,    15    Mo. 

viding  for  street  improvement  is  not  App.  96. 

invalid  because  the  board  of  public  ^^  Santa  Rosa  City  R.  Co.  v.  Cen- 
improvements,  after  submitting  it  to  tral  St.  R.  Co.  (Cal.),  38  Pac.  986. 
the  municipal  assembly,  by  whom  it  °'^  A  statute  requiring  all  resolu- 
was  returned  amended,  adopted  it  as  tions,  and  other  matters,  to  be  fur- 
amended,  and  recommended  its  pas-  nished  the  mayor  for  consideration 
sage,  instead  of  preparing  a  new  or-  applies  to  acts  which  are  legislative 
dinance:  Bambrick  v.  Campbell,  37  in  character  only:  Erwin  v.  City  of 
Mo.  App.  460.  Jersey  City,  60  N.  J.  L.  141;  s.  c.  37 

^^  So    when    a    statute    prescribes  Atl.   732.     In   Iowa  a   resolution   of 

that  no  assessment  resolution  shall  the  city  council  of  a  city  of  first  or 

be  passed  without  previous  publica-  second  class  must  be  signed  by  the 

tion    for    three    days    a    resolution  mayor    or    passed    over    his    veto: 

passed  without  such  publication   is  Heins  v.  Lincoln,  102  Iowa  69;  s.  c. 

void:  Ex  parte  Smith,  52  N.  Y.  526;  71  N.  W.  189;  Saleno  v.  City  of  Neo- 

In  re  Phillips,  60  N.  Y.  16;   State  v.  sho,  127  Mo.  627;  s.  c.  30  S.  W.  190. 

Mayor  &c.,  38  N.  J.  L.  110;   State  v.  "  Ladd  v.  City  of  East  Portland, 

Smith,  22  Minn.  218.  18  Or.  87;  s.  c.  22  Pac.  533.     For  an- 

°*  If  any  essential  step  in  the  exe-  other  instance  where  the  signature 


§  509 


PUBLIC    CORrORATIONS. 


480 


a  city  charter  requiring  the  mayor  to  "approve"  of  every  vote,  reso- 
lution, order,  etc.,  of  the  common  council  in  order  to  render  it  opera- 
tive, the  approval  must  be  in  writing,  and  a  resolution  will  not  take 
effect  without  the  mayor's  written  approval,  although  it  has  never 
been  customary  for  him  to  express  his  approval  affirmatively  in 
writing  of  any  action  of  the  common  council  except  general  ordi- 
nances.®** 

§  509.  (h)  The  same  subject  continued. — There  are  many  cases, 
however,  where  such  a  provision  has  been  held  directory  only,  and  an 
ordinance  otherwise  legally  passed  has  been  sustained  although  un- 
signed. An  ordinance  of  a  municipal  corporation  that  was  actually 
passed  by  the  council  in  the  exercise  of  its  authority,  and  in  accord- 
ance with  all  legal  requirements,  and  was  duly  promulgated  and 
passed  into  execution,  was  held  in  Louisiana  not  invalid  because  it 
was  not  signed  by  the  mayor  or  president  of  the  council.®^  And  a 
legislative  provision  requiring  the  presiding  officer  of  a  municipal 
council  to  sign  all  ordinances  has  been  considered  in  the  same  state 
directory  merely.  ^""^     If  the  ordinance  is  signed  by  the  proper  person. 


is  made  essential  by  charter,  see 
State  V.  District  Court,  41  Minn.  518; 
s.  c.  43  N.  W.  389.  Tlie  charter  of 
the  city  of  South  St.  Paul,  Minn. 
(Sp.  laws  1887,  ch.  1),  provides  that 
all  ordinances  and  resolutions  shall, 
before  they  take  effect,  be  presented 
to  the  mayor,  and,  if  he  approves 
thereof,  he  shall  sign  the  same; 
and  such  as  he  shall  not  sign  he 
shall  return  to  the  common  council. 
A  resolution  so  returned  can  be 
passed  by  a  two-thirds  vote  of  the 
council.  It  was  decided  that  reso- 
lutions of  the  council  in  proceed- 
ings to  assess  real  estate  for  street 
improvements  were  of  no  effect 
where  not  approved  and  signed  by 
the  mayor,  and  it  did  not  appear 
that  they  were  ever  presented  to 
him. 

»*New  York  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  City  of 
Waterbury,  55  Conn.  19;  s.  c.  10  Atl. 
162.  To  the  same  point,  Whitney  v. 
City  of  Port  Huron,  88  Mich.  268;  s. 
c.  50  N.  W.  316.  See  also.  Striker 
V.  Kelly,  7  Hill  (N.  Y.)  9;  Elmen- 
dorf  V.  Mayor  &c.,  25  Wend.  (N.  Y.) 


693;  Blanchard  v.  Bissell,  11  Ohio 
St.  96;  Mayor  &c.  v.  Dupuis,  30  La. 
An.  1105. 

""  MacKenzie  v.  Wooley,  39  La.  An. 
944;  s.  c.  3  So.  128. 

100  Town  of  Opelousas  v.  An- 
drus,  37  La.  An.  699.  In  ac- 
cordance with  this  principle  an 
ordinance,  published  in  a  news- 
paper, which  was  authenticated 
thus: — "In  board  of  trustees  finally 
passed  this  23d  day  of  January,  1879, 
J.  H.,  President  of  the  Board  of 
Trustees  of  the  City  of  N.  Attest: 
J.  N.  W.,  Clerk." — and  the  copy  of 
which  as  published  contained  the 
following  addition; — "Published  by 
order  of  the  board.  J.  N.  W., 
Clerk," — was  decided  in  a  California 
case  to  be  sufficiently  authenticated: 
City  of  Napa  v.  Easterby,  76  Cal. 
222;  s.  c.  18  Pac.  253.  To  this  effect 
see  also,  State  v.  Henderson,  38  Ohio 
St.  644;  Wain's  Heirs  v.  City  of 
Philadelphia,  99  Pa.  St.  330;  Kepner 
v.  Commonwealth,  40  Pa.  St.  124 
Taylor  v.  Palmer,  31  Cal.  240 
Creighton  v.   Manson,   27   Cal.   613 


481 


ORDINANCES    AND   BY-LAWS. 


510 


even  although  not  expressly  in  the  proper  capacity,  the  validity  of  the 
ordinance  will  be  sustained. ^°^  And  where  a  city  ordinance  author- 
ized a  suit  for  a  penalty  for  carrying  concealed  weapons  on  the  written 
report  of  the  chief  of  police,  a  report  signed  with  the  chief's  name 
by  a  subordinate  is  considered  sufficient.  ^"^  If  the  signature  is 
made  essential,  however,  the  defect  is  vital  and  can  not  be  cured  by 
amendment.  ^"^ 

§  510.  The  veto  power. — Frequently  the  charter,  or  other  statute, 
gives  the  mayor  the  power  to  veto  the  ordinances  and  resolutions  of 
the  council,  in  case  they  shall  not  meet  with  his  approval.  The  wis- 
dom of  conferring  upon  the  chief  executive  authority  in  a  munici- 
pality veto  power  is  not  to  be  questioned  under  our  form  of  gov- 
ernment; and  indeed,  its  peculiar  potency  in  the  administration  of 
municipal  government  ought  not  to  be  questioned  by  any  one  fa- 
miliar with  the  practical  working  and  exercise  of  legislative  functions 
in  our  larger  cities.  And  this  veto  power  should  by  no  means  be 
restricted  to  ordinances  which  are  purely  legislative  in  their  nature. 
The  functions  of  the  municipal  legislative  body  are  dual  in  their 
nature,  and  frequently  its  ministerial  acts  are  quite  as  important  and 


State  V.  Mayor  &c.,  30  N.  J.  L.  93; 
State  V.  Mayor  &c.,  29  N.  J.  L. 
475;  Dey  v.  Mayor  &c.,  19  N.  J.  Eq. 
412;  Martindale  v.  Palmer,  52  Ind. 
411.  Where  the  statute  requires  or- 
dinances to  be  signed  by  the  mayor 
it  is  mandatory,  and  unless  so  done 
the  ordinance  is  of  no  effect:  Chi- 
cago &c.  R.  Co.  v.  City  of  Council 
Bluffs,  109  Iowa  425;  s.  c.  80  N.  W. 
564;  Crane  v.  Siloam  Springs,  67 
Ark.  30;  s.  c.  55  S.  W.  955.  Where 
the  law  requires  the  mayor  to  sign 
or  veto  and  return  all  resolutions 
before  they  shall  take  effect,  the  act 
is  mandatory;  and  a  resolution  for 
improvement  and  the  special  tax  for 
such  purpose  are  void  without  the 
mayor's  action:  Altman  v.  City  of 
Dubuque,  111  Iowa  105;  s.  c.  82  N. 
W.  461. 

101  Thus,  where  revised  statutes  of 
Missouri  1879,  §  4948,  provided  that 
no  bill  should  become  an  ordinance 
until  signed  by  the  president  of  the 
board  of  aldermen  and  the  mayor, 
1  Smith— 31 


and  §  4965  provided  that  the  mayor 
should  preside  at  all  meetings  of  the 
board  of  aldermen,  it  was  decided 
that  an  ordinance  which  had  been 
signed  by  the  mayor  as  such,  and 
not  by  him  as  ex  officio  president  of 
the  board  of  aldermen,  was  valid: 
Becker  v.  City  of  Washington,  94 
Mo.  375;  s.  c.  7  S.  W.  291.  A  con- 
stitutional provision  that  certain  or- 
dinances shall  obtain  the  concurrent 
approval  of  the  board  of  health  is 
satisfied  by  such  approval  although 
it  was  at  first  refused:  Darcantel  v. 
People's  Slaughter  House  &c.  Co.,  44 
La.  An.  632;  s.  c.  11  So.  239. 

^"^  City  of  St.  Louis  v.  Vert,  84  Mo. 
204. 

"^As  where,  under  the  Indiana 
statute  requiring  ordinances  to  be 
signed  by  the  presiding  officer,  and 
attested  by  the  clerk,  and  to  be  re- 
corded, the  defects  can  not  be  reme- 
died by  a  motion:  Bills  v.  City  of 
Goshen,  117  Ind.  221;  s.  c.  20  N.  E. 
115. 


§    511  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  482 

far-reaching  in  their  effects,  so  far  as  the  well-being  of  the  city  is 
concerned,  as  are  its  legislative  acts.  As  a  general  rule  where  the 
veto  power  is  given  to  tlie  mayor  there  is  also  provision  made  for 
overrnling  the  veto  by  a  vote  of  the  council  larger  than  the  ordinary 
quorum,  but  usually  fixed  according  to  the  total  number  of  members. 
The  veto  should  be  in  writing,  addressed  to  the  council,  pointing 
out  specifically  wherein  the  act  is  objectionable,  and  suggesting  such 
amendments  as  may  seem  suitable,  in  case  the  ordinance  is  not  rad- 
ically wrong.^"* 

§  511.    (i)  Publication  of  the  ordinance — When  mandatory. — An 

ordinance,  being  a  law,  must  be  published  in  some  way  in  order  to  give 
notice  to  those  affected  thereby  of  its  existence.  It  is  generally  re- 
quired by  law  that  the  ordinance  shall  be  published,  and  the  statu- 
tory or  charter  regulations  on  this  point  should  be  closely  followed 
in  order  to  avoid  any  question  as  to  the  validity  of  tlie  ordinance. 
When  there  was  no  requirement  as  to  the  publication  of  an  ordinance 
of  an  Alabama  town  except  a  constitutional  provision  that  no  person 
should  be  punished  but  by  virtue  of  a  law  established  and  promul- 
gated prior  to  the  offense  and  legally  applied,  a  publication  of  seven 
days  was  held  sufficient  in  the  absence  of  proof  of  insufficiency  of  such 
publication.  The  court  said:  "The  matter  therefore  is  vested  in 
the  discretion  of  the  municipal  government  but  not  an  arbitrary  dis- 
cretion. A  reasonable  opportunity  must  be  given  to  the  public  within 
the  corporate  limits  to  be  informed  as  to  the  ordinances  they  are 
commanded  to  obey  before  they  can  be  punished  for  their  violation.  ^"^ 
In  general  when  the  charter  or  general  law  requires  publication,  it 
must  be  made  according  to  the  requirement,  else  the  ordinance  will 
be  void  and  no  penalty  can  be  enforced  under  it.^""    Thus  under  a  pro- 

^'^  Where  a  charter  requires  every  ordinance,  see  Oswald  v.  Gosnell,  21 

resolution  to  be  signed,  or  returned  Ky.  L.  1660;  s.  c.  56  S.  W.  165.  After 

with    the    mayor's    objections,    the  a  veto,  a  resolution  by  the  requisite 

mere  writing  of  a  letter  suggesting  number  is  sufficient,  though  in  terms 

amendments    is    not    a    compliance  it  does  not  express  to  be  a  "recon- 

with  the  charter:   Kittinger  v.  Buf-  sideration"  of  the  previous  action: 

falo  Traction  Co.,  160  N.  Y.  377;   s.  Oakley  v.  City  of  Atlantic  City,  63 

c.  54  N.  E.  1081.     The  veto  power  is  N.  J.  L.  127;  s.  c.  44  Atl.  651. 
not    confined    alone    to    legislative        ^"^  Pitts  v.  District  of  Opelika,  79 

acts:    Gleason  v.  Peerless  Mfg.  Co.,  Ala.  527. 

37  N.  Y.  S.  267;  s.  c.  72  N.  Y.  St.  592.  '""Meyer  v.  Fromm,  108  Ind.  208; 
A  resolution  to  expend  money  may  s.  c.  9  N.  E.  84;  City  of  Napa  v.  Eas- 
be  vetoed:  People  v.  Common  Coun-  terby,  61  Cal.  509;  Wain's  Heirs  v. 
cil  &c.,  90  Hun  (N.  Y.)  488;  s.  c.  36  City  of  Philadelphia,  99  Pa.  St.  330; 
N.  Y.  S.  59.  As  to  what  will  not  Higley  v.  Bunce,  10  Conn.  567;  Bar- 
amount  to  a  veto  by  the  mayor  to  an  nett    V.    President   &c.,    28    111.    62; 


483  ORDINANCES   AND   BY-LAWS.  §    513 

vision  in  the  general  town-incorporation  laws  of  Dakota  which  pro- 
vided that  "every  by-law,  ordinance  or  regulation,  unless  in  case  of 
emergency,  shall  be  published  in  a  newspaper  in  said  town,  if  one  be 
printed  therein,  or  posted  in  five  public  places,  at  least  ten  days  before 
the  same  shall  take  effect,"  a  by-law  passed  by  the  town  trustees,  but 
never  published  or  posted,  in  a  case  where  no  emergency  was  alleged  or 
shown,  was  considered  to  be  of  no  force  or  effect,  even  as  to  such  per- 
sons as  had  notice  of  its  passage  by  the  trustees. ^"'^  An  ordinance 
providing  a  penalty  must  be  published  in  Nebraska. ^°^  A  statute 
requiring  an  ordinance  to  be  published  a  specified  time,  with  notice 
of  the  time  of  its  consideration,  is  mandatory.^""  Parol  proof  may 
be  made  where  no  proof  is  on  file  in  the  office  of  the  proper  cus- 
todian.ii" 

§512.    (j)    The  same  subject  continued — When  directory. — But 

under  a  city  charter  providing  that  all  ordinances  passed  by  the  city 
council,  within  thirty  days  after  they  became  laws,  should  be  pub- 
lished, but  that  the  failure  to  publish  should  not  render  void  or  affect 
the  validity  of  any  such  ordinance,  unless  delay  might  cause  the  ordi- 
nance to  act  retrospectively  on  the  rights  of  individuals,  it  was  held 
in  Missouri  that  an  ordinance  went  into  effect  from  the  date  of  pas- 
sage and  became  a  law  without  publication.^^^  And  it  has  been  de- 
cided in  Massachusetts  that  a  requirement  by  ordinance  that  city  or- 
dinances shall  be  published  two  weeks  successively  in  three  daily 
newspapers  published  in  the  city  was  directory;  that  it  contemplated 
publication  after  the  enactment  of  the  ordinance,  and  that  compliance 
with  it  was  not  a  condition  precedent  to  the  validity  of  the  ordinance. 
The  ordinance  in  question  prohibited  any  one  from  delivering  an  ad- 
dress on  the  Boston  common  without  permission  of  a  committee  of 

Schwartz  v.  City  of  Oshkosh,  55  Wis.  ""  Larkin  v.  Burlington  &c.  R.  Co., 

490;  s.  c.  13  N.  W.  450.  91    Iowa    654;    s.    c.    60    N.    W.    195. 

^"^  O'Hara  v.  Town  of  Park  River,  Wliat  is  a  sufficient  publication, — see 

1  N.  D.  279;  s.  c.  47  N.  W.  380;  Na-  De  Loge  v.  New  York  &c.  R.  Co.,  157 

tional  Bank  &c.  v.  Town  of  Grenada,  N.  Y.  688;  s.  c.  51  N.  E.  1090. 

44  Fed.  262.     The  mere  fact  that  the  "'  Sweitzer  v.  Liberty,  82  Mo.  309. 

city    officials    may    have    exceeded  So  also,   under   St.   Mass.   1850,   ch. 

their  authority  in  incurring  a  debt  184,  §  20,  an  ordinance  of  the  city  of 

for  publication  does  not  invalidate  Lynn  need  not  be  published,  as  a 

the   ordinance:    Kimble   v.    City   of  condition  precedent  to  its  validity. 

Peoria.  140   111.  157;   s.  c.  29  N.  E.  It  takes  effect  upon  its  passage,  if 

723.  no  time  therein  is  limited  or  named: 

"^  Union  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Montgom-  Commonwealth    v.    McCafferty,    145 

ery,  49  Neb.  429;  s.  c.  68  N.  W.  619.  Mass.  384;  s.  c.  14  N.  E.  451. 

^"•Herman  v.  City  of  Oconto,  100 
Wis.  391;  s.  c.  76  N.  W.  364. 


§  513 


PUBLIC    COHrORATlONS. 


484 


the  common  council.  The  court,  however,  did  not  support  their  de- 
cision sustaining  the  validity  of  the  ordinance  on  this  ground  alone, 
holding  that  the  ordinance  was  a  re-enactment  or  continuance  of  an 
older  ordinance,  and  that  in  such  cases  publication  was  under  the 
Massachusetts  laws  unnecessary. "- 

§  513.  (k)  The  same  subject  continued — Amendments  and  re-enact- 
ments.— In  considering  the  question  whether  publication  is  requisite 
to  the  validity  of  an  ordinance,  the  decision  must  generally  be  gath- 
ered from  the  language  of  the  legislation  relating  to  that  subject.^ ^^ 
As  the  object  of  publication  is  of  course  to  give  notice  of  the  ordi- 
nance to  those  who  must  obey  it,  the  importance  of  publication  varies 
according  to  the  nature  of  the  ordinance.  Thus,  publication  of  a 
police  ordinance  restricting  personal  liberty  should  be  strictly  carried 
out,  while  an  administrative  ordinance,  even  though  directed  to  be 
published,  has  been  held  valid  in  New  Jersey  before  completion  of 
the  publication  required  by  law.^^*  In  a  recent  Louisiana  case  it  was 
decided  that  an  ordinance  ordering  a  vote  of  the  taxpayers  on  the 
question  of  a  special  tax,  though  supplemented  by  an  amendment  after 
it  was  advertised,  would  not  be  vitiated  thereby,  provided  the  amend- 
ment did  not  materially  affect  its  essential  parts.^^^     Where  an  ordi- 


"^  Commonwealth  v.  Davis,  140 
Mass.  485,  487;  s.  c.  4  N.  E.  577. 

"^  So  where  §  25  of  the  Colorado 
act  concerning  towns  and  cities  pro- 
vides that  "all  by-laws  of  a  general 
or  permanent  nature,  and  those  im- 
posing any  fine,  penalty  or  forfeit- 
ure, shall  be  published,  .  .  .  and 
it  shall  be  deemed  a  sufficient  de- 
fense to  any  suit  or  prosecution  for 
such  fine,  penalty  or  forfeiture  to 
show  that  no  such  publication  was 
made,"  and  enacts  that  "such  by- 
laws and  ordinances  shall  not  take 
effect  and  be  in  force  until  the  ex- 
piration of  five  days  after  they  have 
been  published,"  it  was  decided  that 
the  last  provision  applied  as  well  to 
by-laws  and  ordinances  "of  a  gen- 
eral or  permanent  nature"  as  to 
those  imposing  a  fine,  etc.:  National 
Bank  &c.  v.  Town  of  Grenada,  44 
Fed.  262,  266.  And  it  was  further 
stated  by  Philips,  J.,  quoting  from 
the  opinion  in  Clark  v.  City  of  Janes- 
ville,  10  Wis.  135,  that  "the  object  of 


such  provision  for  publication  was 
the  protection  of  the  people  by  pre- 
venting their  rights  and  interests 
from  being  affected  by  laws  which 
they  have  no  means  of  knowing." 

'''  Stuhr  V.  Mayor  &c.,  47  N.  J.  L. 
147.  In  this  case  the  city  charter 
forbade  any  change  in  the  salaries  of 
municipal  officers  during  their  terms 
of  office;  and  also  required  all  ordi- 
nances to  be  published  twenty  days 
before  taking  effect.  An  ordinance 
was  passed  changing  the  salary  of 
one  of  the  officers.  After  its  enact- 
ment but  before  the  expiration  of 
the  twenty  days  of  publication  a  new 
incumbent  was  elected.  It  was  held 
that  he  was  entitled  to  the  increased 
salary  provided  by  the  ordinance, 
and  that  within  the  intent  of  the 
charter  the  ordinance  took  effect  as 
soon  as  passed.  This  construction 
would  not  perhaps  be  given  in  the 
case  of  a  police  ordinance  restricting 
personal  rights. 

"^  MacKenzie  v.  Wooley,  39  La.  An. 


485 


ORDIXANCES    AND    BY-LAWS. 


§  514 


nance  is  a  mere  re-enactment  or  combination  of  an  older  ordinance 
it  is  not  necessary,  unless  expressly  required  by  law,  that  it  should  be 
republished.^^" 

§  514,  (1)  Manner  of  publication. — In  considering  the  mode  of 
publication  requisite  in  any  particular  case,  reference  must  be  made 
to  the  general  principles  governing  the  interpretation  of  statutes, 
since  the  manner  of  publication  is  almost  always  regulated  by  legis- 
lation. When  alternative  modes  of  publication  are  contemplated  by 
the  statute,  and  it  is  expressly  provided  that  election  between  these 
modes  must  be  made  by  the  corporation,  an  ordinance  published  by 
order  of  the  town  clerk  without  election  by  the  council  as  to  the  mode 
of  publication  is  void.^^'^  But  when  the  law  did  not  expressly  enjoin 
upon  the  council  the  duty  of  designating  the  newspaper  but  was 
silent  upon  that  point,  it  was  concluded  in  New  York  that  the  clerk 
might  properly  designate  the  newspaper.^^^  In  California  the  charter 
of  a  city  required  that  ordinances  be  published.  An  ordinance  con- 
taining an  order  directing  that  the  ordinance  be  published  once  in  a 
city  newspaper,  which  publication  was  duly  made,  was  held  to  be 
sufficiently  published.^^® 


944;  s.  c.  3  So.  128.  This  rule  is 
sometimes  abrogated  by  statutory  re- 
quirements, as  wliere  in  Indiana  the 
courts  declared  that  if  the  defects 
may  be  supplied  by  supplemental 
ordinance,  the  latter  must  be  pub- 
lished before  it  can  take  effect,  the 
ordinance  imposing  a  penalty  for  its 
violation,  and  revised  statutes  of 
Indiana  1881,  §  3100  (Burns  R.  S. 
1901,  §  3535),  requiring  such  a  pub- 
lication of  every  penal  by-law:  Bills 
V.  City  of  Goshen,  117  Ind.  221,  227; 
s.  c.  20  N.  E.  115. 

"•^  Commonwealth  v.  Davis,  140 
Mass.  485;  s.  c.  4  N.  E.  577;  Ex  parte 
Bedell,  20  Mo.  App.  125,  130;  City  of 
St.  Louis  V.  Alexander,  23  Mo.  483, 
509;  City  of  St.  Louis  v.  Foster,  52 
Mo.  513;  City  of  Cape  Girardeau  v. 
Riley,  52  Mo.  424;  State  v.  Heidorn, 
74  Mo.  410.  But  see,  contra,  City  of 
Emporia  v.  Norton,  16  Kan.  236 

"'Higley  v.  Bunce,  10  Conn.  436; 
s.  c.  10  Conn.  567.  This  was  an  ordi- 
nance of  the  town  of  Canaan.  The 
statute     directed     that     publication 


should  be  made  in  a  newspaper 
printed  in  the  town,  or  in  the  town 
nearest  to  such  town  in  which  a 
newspaper  was  printed,  or  in  some 
other  newspaper  generally  circulated 
in  the  town  where  such  by-law  was 
made,  as  the  town  should  direct.  The 
ordinance  in  question  was  published 
in  a  newspaper  printed  in  a  town 
nearest  to  Canaan,  and  which  cir- 
culated generally  in  Canaan,  but 
such  publication  was  made  by  order 
of  the  town  clerk  wholly  without  di- 
rection from  the  council.  The  court 
held  that  the  town  council  alone 
could  elect  in  what  newspaper  pub- 
lication should  be  made. 

"Mn  re  Durkin,  10  Hun  (N.  Y.) 
269. 

"Mn  re  Guerrero,  69  Cal.  88,  93; 
s.  c.  10  Pac.  261.  A  statute  relating 
to  the  printing  of  "legal  notices  and 
advertisements"  was  held  to  have  no 
application  to  city  ordinances:  City 
of  Pittsburg  V.  Reynolds,  48  Kan. 
360;  s.  c.  29  Pac.  757. 


C 


§    515  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS,  486 

§  515.  (m)  The  same  subject  continued. — Under  the  constitution 
of  Illinois,  which  provides  that  "all  olKcial  writings  and  the  executive, 
legislative  and  judicial  proceedings  shall  be  published  in  no  other 
than  the  English  language,"  it  was  decided  that  the  city  of  Chicago 
could  not  publish  its  ordinances  at  the  public  expense  in  a  German 
newspaper.^-"  And  according  to  a  recent  decision  in  New  Jersey, 
under  a  statutory  requirement  that  city  ordinances  shall  be  pub- 
lished in  a  German  newspaper,  they  must,  in  the  absence  of  legis- 
lative direction  to  the  contrary,  be  printed  in  the  English  language, 
since  a  statute  or  ordinance,  as  there  declared,  has  no  legal  existence 
except  in  the  language  in  which  it  is  passed. ^^^  In  Missouri  it  was 
held,  where  the  charter  provided  that  all  municipal  ordinances  should 
be  published  in  some  newspaper  published  in  the  city,  that  the  pro- 
vision was  sufficiently  complied  with  by  distributing  printed  copies 
of  the  ordinances  witli  the  copies  of  a  newspaper,  and  this  although 
the  copies  were  not  printed  in  the  city.^^^  It  is  not  necessary  that  the 
publication  should  be  in  a  newspaper  devoted  entirely  to  current 
general  news.  Newspapers  devoted  exclusively  to  legal  news  have  been 
held  proper  vehicles  for  the  publication  of  ordinances.  ^^^  If  publica- 
tion in  a  newspaper  printed  and  published  in  the  city  is  required,  it 
is  sufficient  if  the  newspaper  be  edited  and  issued  in  the  city,  although 
its  type-work  and  presswork  be  done  elsewhere. ^^*  Under  a  law  re- 
quiring the  publication  of  the  ordinances  of  ^  city  as  an  essential  of 
their  validity,  maps  and  books  referred  to  in  such  ordinances  need  not 
be  published. ^-^  Where  it  is  prescribed  that  the  publication  shall  be 
in  a  paper  of  general  circulation,  it  is  not  considered  necessary  in 
Illinois  that  it  be  a  local  paper.  Publication  in  a  newspaper  issued  in 
a  city  near  at  hand,  and  circulating  generally  in  the  corporation,  is 
sufficient.  ^^"^ 

^-"City  of  Chicago  v.  McCoy,  136  the  term  "newspaper"  in  this  con- 
Ill.  344;  s.  c.  26  N.  E.  363,  Craig,  J.,  nection.  They  hold  that  any  period- 
dissenting,  leal  purveying  news  of  interest  to 

^='  "The  publication  of  the  transla-  any  considerable  class  will  suffice, 

tion  may  be  regarded  as  a  proper  ^-*  State  v.  Mayor  &c.,  44  N.  J.  L. 

explanatory  adjunct  of  the  English  131. 

copy,  but  can  not  be  accepted  as  a  ^--  City   of   Napa   v.    Easterby,    76 

legal    substitute    for   it:"     State    v.  Cal.  222;  s.  c.  18  Pac.  253. 

Mayor  &c.,  54  N.  J.  L.  Ill;   s.  c.  22  i^«  Tisdale  v.  President  &c.,  46  111. 

Atl.  1004.  9.    But  if  the  newspaper  had  no  gen- 

"^  Ex   parte   Bedell,   20    Mo.   App.  eral  circulation  in  the  corporation, 

125,  130.  such    publication    would    be    insuffi- 

^^^Kerr  v.  Hitt,  75  111.  51;  Kellogg  cient:     Haskell  v.  Bartlett,   34  Cal. 

v.    Carrico,   47   Mo.   157.     See  these  281. 
cases  for  discussion  of  meaning  of 


487  ORDINANCES   AND   BY-LAWS.  §    51  fi 

§  516,  (n)  Time  and  proof  of  publication. — The  provisions  as  to 
time  and  proof  of  publication  are  generally  construed  with  liberality 
by  the  courts.  So  where  publication  for  one  week  is  required,  a  single 
insertion  in  a  weekly  newspaper  is  sufficient.^^^  Where  the  law  required 
that  an  ordinance  be  published  for  twenty  days  before  taking  effect,  it 
was  decided  in  New  Jersey  that  the  ordinance  would  take  effect  on  the 
twenty-first  day  after  the  first  publication,  and  that  it  was  not  neces- 
sary that  twenty  days  should  intervene  between  the  first  and  last 
publication.^'^  Where  publication  for  three  weeks  was  required  in 
Indiana,  the  court  considered  publication  for  twenty-one  days  to  be 
necessary,  and  that  three  insertions  in  a  weekly  paper,  covering  a 
period  of  fifteen  days,  did  not  suffice.^ -^  In  a  California  case  it  was 
decided  that  an  ordinance  wliich  provided  for  its  publication  for  five 
successive  days  in  a  daily  newspaper  was  properly  published  by  pub- 
lication for  five  successive  week-days,  although  a  Sunday  intervened 
on  which  there  was  no  issue  of  the  paper.^^°  As  to  the  proof  of  publi- 
cation of  ordinances,  the  cases  hold  that  where  there  is  prima  facie 
evidence  of  such  publication  the  ordinance  will  be  sustained  in  the 
absence  of  rebutting  evidence.  So  where  an  ordinance  was  certified 
by  the  recorder  as  having  been  passed  by  the  council  on  a  given  day, 
and  he  testified  that  it  was  published  in  a  certain  newspaper  on  a  day 
named,  the  publication  was  considered  in  an  Iowa  case  sufficiently 
proved,  though  the  newspaper  was  not  shown  to  be  of  a  general  cir- 
culation in  the  town,  as  required  by  statute ;  as  that  fact  would,  it 
was  said,  be  presumed,  it  being  the  officer's  duty  to  select  such  a  news- 
paper.^^^  And  likewise  when  the  record  of  an  ordinance  had  a  note 
appended  thereto,  stating,  among  other  things,  that  the  ordinance  was 

^'  State  V.  Hardy,  7  Neb.  377;  Com-  occurred  August  10,  1889.    The  pro- 

monwealth  v.   Matthews,  122  Mass.  visions  of  the  city  charter  relative  to 

60;   Mayor  &c.  v.  Gear,  27  N.  J.  L.  the   publication   of  ordinances,   and 

265.  the  time  of  their  taking  effect,  are 

128  Mayor  &c.  v.  Gear,  27  N.  J.  L.  that  "all   ordinances  shall  be   pub- 

265.  lished    for    three    successive    days, 

^^  Loughridge  v.  City  of  Hunting-  .     .     .     and  shall  take  effect  in  ten 

ton,  56  Ind.  253,  260.  days    after    their    enactment;     pro- 

i^"Ex  parte  Piske,  72  Cal.  125;  s.  c.  vided,    however,    that    the    common 

13  Pac.  310.     So  also,  in  Taylor  v.  council  may  fix  and  prescribe  a  dif- 

Palmer,  31  Cal.  240.     In  Ohio  publi-  ferent  period,  and  that  no  ordinance 

cation  in  a  newspaper  printed  only  shall  take  effect  before  one  publica- 

on  Sunday  suffices:    Hastings  v.  Co-  tion  thereof."     It  was  held  that  the 

lumbus,  42  Ohio  St.  585.     An  ordi-  ordinance  was  in  force  at  the  time 

nance  of  the  city  of  Detroit  provided  of  the  act  complained  of:    People  v. 

that  it  should  take  immediate  effect,  Keir,  78  Mich.  98;  s.  c.  43  N.  W.  1039. 
and  was   approved  August   2,   1889.        ^^^  Town   of  Bayard   v.   Baker,   76 

The  violation  thereof  by  defendant  Iowa  220;  s.  c.  40  N.  W.  818. 


§    517  PUBLIC    COllPORATIONS.  488 

duly  published,  and  the  date  of  its  publication,  the  ordinance  was 
decided  to  be  valid,  unless  it  was  shown  that  said  ordinance  was  not 
published,  and  the  burden  of  such  proof  was  held  to  rest  on  the  de- 
fendant.^^- Also  where  the  county-government  act  of  California 
provided  that  an  ordinance  of  the  board  of  supervisors  should  be  pub- 
lished once  a  week  in  some  newspaper  published  in  the  county,  and 
that  an  order  entered  in  the  minutes  should  be  prima  facie  proof  that 
it  had  been  duly  published,  it  was  held  that  the  statute  did  not  re- 
quire that  an  order  for  the  publication  of  an  ordinance  should  be 
made;  but  if  such  order  was  made,  and  a  certain  paper  designated 
therein,  the  fact  that  the  ordinance  was  published  in  another  paper  in 
the  county  did  not  invalidate  it.^^^ 

§  517.  (o)  Title  of  the  ordinance. — The  charter  or  the  general  law 
often  prescribes  that  an  ordinance  shall  have  only  one  subject  and  that 
such  subject  shall  be  clearly  expressed  in  the  title  of  the  ordinance. 
Provisions  such  as  these  are  commonly  construed  with  considerable 
liberality.  So  an  ordinance  which  provided  both  for  the  grading 
and  paving  of  an  alley  was  not  considered  invalid  under  the  provi- 
sion of  the  charter  of  the  city  of  St.  Louis,  relating  to  the  passage  of 
ordinances,  which  prohibited  a  bill  from  containing  more  than  one 
subject,  which  should  be  clearly  expressed  in  its  title. ^^*  And  a  sec- 
tion providing  for  the  giving  of  danger  signals,  and  for  the  equip- 
ment of  railroad-cars,  was  held  in  Missouri  to  be  embraced  in  the  title 

"^  Downing  v.  City  of  Miltonvale,  ly  weapon"  is  valid,  ttie  subject  be- 

36  Kan.  740;  s.  c.  14  Pac.  281.  ing  deadly  weapons,  or  criminal  acts 

"^County  of  San  Luis  Obispo  v.  connected  therewith:  Town  of  Ocean 
Hendricks,  71  Cal.  242;  s.  c.  11  Pac.  Springs  v.  Green,  77  Miss.  472;  s.  c. 
682.  See  also,  as  to  proof  of  ordi-  27  So.  743.  An  ordinance  to  pur- 
nances,  City  of  Atchison  v.  King,  9  chase  an  existing  water-works  plant, 
Kan.  550;  Prell  v.  McDonald,  7  Kan.  and,  in  case  of  a  failure,  to  con- 
426;  Moss  v.  Village  of  Oakland,  88  struct  a  system  of  its  own  and  con- 
Ill.  109;  Block  v.  President  &c.,  36  tract  a  specified  indebtedness,  is  not 
111.  301.  void    as    embracing    two    subjects: 

"*  Weber  v.  Johnson,  37  Mo.  App.  Thomas  v.  City  of  Grand  Junction, 
601.  A  constitutional  provision  that  13  Colo.  App.  80;  s.  c.  56  Pac.  665. 
legislative  acts  shall  embrace  but  An  enacting  clause  is  not  essential 
one  subject  which  shall  be  expressed  to  the  validity  of  an  ordinance:  Chi- 
in  the  title  does  not  apply  to  ordi-  cago  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Hines,  82  111.  App. 
nances:  Ex  parte  Haskell,  112  Cal.  488.  See  contra,  Galveston  &c.  R. 
412;  s.  c.  44  Pac.  725.  Where  the  Co.  v.  Harris,  36  S.  W.  776.  Con- 
statute  provides  that  an  ordinance  struction  of  ordinance  as  to  its  sufR- 
shall  contain  but  one  subject  clearly  ciency  in  expressing  its  purpose, — 
set  forth  in  the  title,  an  ordinance  see  In  re  Beechwood  Ave.,  194  Pa. 
entitled  "An  ordinance  to  prevent  St.  86;  s.  c.  45  Atl.  127. 
the  carrying  or  exhibiting  of  a  dead- 


489  ORDINANCES    AND   BY-LAWS.  §    517 

of  an  ordinance  entitled  "An  ordinance  to  regulate  the  speed  within 
the  city  limits  of  cars  and  locomotives  propelled  by  steam. "^^^  And 
where  the  board  of  trustees  of  a  city  in  California  made  an  order 
directing  certain  work  to  be  done  on  one  of  the  streets,  the  language 
used  being,  "The  board  order,"  etc.,  it  was  held,  under  the  charter 
of  the  city,  which  provided  that  the  enacting  clause  of  ordinances 
should  be,  "The  board  of  trustees  of  the  city  of  N.  do  hereby  ordain 
as  follows,"  and  a  statutory  provision  that  the  board  might  pass 
"by-laws,  resolutions  and  ordinances," — that  the  order  referred  to  was 
valid,  not  being  an  ordinance,  and  the  charter  provision  concerning 
the  enacting  clause  being  merely  directory.  ^^"^  But  on  the  contrary, 
under  the  Washington  statute  which  authorized  the  council  of  a 
city,  by  ordinance,  to  submit  to  the  voters  a  plan  for  the  construc- 
tion of  water,  light  and  sewerage  systems,  "either  or  both,"  it  was 
decided  that  an  ordinance  on  these  subjects  was  clearly  authorized 
to  be  either  single,  double  or  triple;  and  hence  it  suspended  the  re- 
striction imposed  by  the  city  charter  of  Seattle,  that  "no  ordinance 
shall  contain  more  than  one  subject,  which  shall  be  clearly  expressed 
in  its  title."^^''  Also  an  ordinance,  the  title  of  which  was  to  prohibit 
animals  from  running  at  large,  but  which  also  provided  that  no  per- 
son should  keep  a  dog  without  paying  a  tax,  and  directing  the  city 
marshal  to  kill  dogs  running  at  large  whose  owners  had  not  complied 
with  this  regulation  and  making  the  owner  liable  to  criminal  prosecu- 
tion for  failure  to  comply  therewith,  was  held  to  be  void  under  the 
provisions  of  the  Kansas  statutes,  that  no  ordinance  should  contain 
more  than  one  subject,  which  should  be  clearly  expressed  in  the 
title.^^^  And  an  ordinance  of  a  city  of  the  second  class,  whose  title 
and  body  embraced  the  two  distinct  subjects  of  extending  the  limits  of 
the  city,  and  of  appropriating  funds  to  build  a  bridge,  was  considered 
void  under  the  Kansas  statute  providing  that  no  ordinance  of  such 
city  should  contain  more  than  one  subject,  which  should  be  clearly 
expressed  in  its  title;  and  this  though  the  latter  clause  of  the  ordi- 
nance was  of  no  effect  because  the  council  had  no  authority  to  make 
the  appropriation.^^''  An  ordinance  entitled  "An  ordinance  control- 
ling the  keeping  and  use  of  jacks,  stallions  and  bulls,"  which  prohibits 
the  use  of  such  animals  in  public  places,  was  thought  in  Iowa  not  to 
go  beyond  the  object  and  scope  of  its  title.^*^ 

1^  Bergman  v.  St.  Louis  &c.  R.  Co.,  '"*  Stebbins  v.  Mayer,  38  Kan.  573; 

88  Mo.  678;  s.  c.  1  S.  W.  384.  s.  c.  16  Pac.  745. 

"•^City   of   Napa   v.   Easterby,    76  ^=^  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  City  of 

Cal.  222;  s.  c.  18  Pac.  253.  Wyandotte,  44  Kan.  32;  s.  c.  23  Pac. 

^"Yesler    v.     City    of    Seattle,    1  950. 

Wash.  308;  s.  c.  25  Pac.  1014.  ""Town     of     Bayard     v.     Baiter, 


§    518  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  490 

g  518.  (p)  Record  of  the  ordinance. — The  same  principles  apply  in 
discussing  the  necessity  of  recording  ordinances  that  have  been  set 
forth  in  connection  with  our  treatment  of  their  signature  by  the 
mayor  or  other  presiding  officer.  If  the  charter  or  other  statute  makes 
it  essential  that  the  ordinance  should  be  recorded  in  order  to  be  valid, 
it  is  necessary  that  it  should  be  recorded.  If,  however,  the  language 
of  the  charter  or  act,  read  in  connection  with  the  other  legislation  on 
the  subject,  does  not  appear  to  make  the  recording  of  the  ordinance 
an  essential  prerequisite,  the  provisions  relating  thereto  are  considered 
as  directory  only.  Accordingly  when  a  city  charter  provided  that  all 
ordinances  should  be  recorded,  within  thirty  days  after  their  passage, 
in  a  book  to  be  provided  for  the  purpose,  "and  to  be  kept  by  the 
mayor"  for  inspection,  without  charge,  of  all  persons  interested,  and 
that  they  should  not  be  valid  or  in  force  until  so  recorded,  it  was  de- 
cided that  an  ordinance  recorded  in  a  book  provided  for  the  purpose, 
and  temporarily  kept,  at  the  mayor's  request,  in  the  city  office  of  the 
court-house,  at  a  short  distance  from  his  office,  because  he  had  no 
safe  at  his  office,  was  valid.^*^  And  when  an  incorporated  town  was 
changed  into  a  city,  and  the  statute  prescribed  that  the  existing  town 
ordinances  should  continue  valid,  provided  that  they  should  be  re- 
corded within  four  months  thereafter,  the  provision  was  con- 
sidered  merely    directory,    and   the    town    ordinances    were   upheld 

76  Iowa  220;  s.  c.  40  N.  W.  818.  in  statutes  enacted  by  the  legisla- 
An  ordinance  concerning  certain  ture:  Callaghan  v.  Town  of  Alexan- 
licenses  in  the  city  of  Louisville  dria,  52  La.  An.  1013;  s.  c.  27  So.  540. 
is  held  sufficiently  specific  as  to  title,  "'  Beaumont  v.  City  of  Wilkes- 
in  Elliott  V.  City  of  Louisville,  101  Barre,  142  Pa.  St.  198;  s.  c.  21  Atl. 
Ky.  262;  s.  c.  19  Ky.  L.  414;  40  S.  W.  888.  A  statute  requiring  that  all  or- 
690.  The  provision  of  the  constitu-  dinances  shall,  within  a  reasonable 
tion  prohibiting  any  bill  from  con-  time,  be  recorded,  signed,  etc.,  at- 
taining more  than  one  subject  which  tested,  etc.,  is  directory:  Shea  v.  City 
'  shall  be  expressed  in  the  title,  is  not  of  Muncie,  148  Ind.  14;  s.  c.  46  N. 
applied  to  city  ordinances:  City  of  E.  138.  An  ordinance  not  recorded 
Topeka  v.  Raynor,  60  Kan.  860  pursuant  to  the  requirement  of  a 
(mem.);  s.  c.  58  Pac.  557.  Cf.  Ex  charter  which  is  merely  directory  is 
parte  Haskell,  112  Cal.  412;  s.  c.  44  not  void:  Allen  v.  City  of  Daven- 
Pac.  725;  Green  v.  City  of  Indianap-  port,  107  Iowa  90;  s.  c.  77  N.  W.  532; 
olis,  25  Ind.  490;  Baumgartner  v.  Quint  v.  City  of  Merrill,  105  Wis. 
Hasty,  100  Ind.  575;  s.  c.  50  Am.  406;  s.  c.  81  N.  W.  664.  An  ordi- 
R.  830'  City  of  Humboldt  v.  Mc-  nance  is  not  invalid  because  the  min- 
Coy,  23  Kan.  249;  People  v.  Wag-  utes  do  not  show  the  mayor  was 
ner,  86  Mich.  594;  s.  c.  49  N.  W.  609.  present,  when  the  ordinance  was 
It  is  not  essential  to  the  validity  signed  by  him:  Aurora  Water  Co.  v. 
of  an  ordinance  that  it  shall  be  pre-  City  of  Aurora,  129  Mo.  540;  s.  c.  31 
ceded  by  a  title  such  as  is  required  S.  W.  946. 


491  ORDINANCES    AND    BY-LAWS.  §    519 

although  unrecorded."-  But  where  a  city  charter  required  that  all 
ordinances  should  be  recorded,  and  that  no  ordinance  should  be 
carried  into,  operation  in  less  than  two  weeks  after  the  same  should 
be  so  recorded,  an  unrecorded  ordinance  has  been  held  to  be  void.^*^ 
Apart,  however,  from  the  validity  of  the  ordinance,  the  municipal 
records  of  the  transactions  of  the  municipal  council  are  the  best  evi- 
dence of  those  transactions."*  It  is  therefore  important  that  accurate 
and  legible  record  be  made  of  every  legislative  act  of  the  municipality. 
The  recording  of  an  ordinance  is,  however,  a  purely  ministerial  act. 
It  may  be  performed  by  a  subordinate  or  deputy,  and  a  clerical  error 
will  not  operate  so  as  to  invalidate  any  ordinance  properly  and  legally 
enacted."^  The  neglect  of  a  ministerial  duty  is  not  deemed  fatal 
to  the  validity  of  municipal  proceedings.^***  Whatever  is  said  as  to 
the  necessity  of  recording  ordinances  will  apply  equally  well  to  the  ad- 
visability of  recording  every  resolution  or  regulation  which  the  council 
may  make.  But  contractual  relations  may  be  created  by  the  mere 
passage  of  a  resolution,  and  will  be  unaffected  by  its  record,  or  non- 
record.**^ 

§  519.  Validity  in  respect  of  matter — (a)  Constitutionality. — The 
power  of  a  municipal  council  to  enact  by-laws  being  delegated  by  the 
legislature  can  not,  of  course,  be  more  extensive  than  the  power  of  the 
delegating  body.  Consequently  the  by-laws  or  ordinances  enacted 
by  the  council  must  not  be  in  contravention  of  the  constitution  of  the 
United  States  or  of  tlie  state.  Hence  a  by-law  impairing  the  obliga- 
tion of  a  contract  is  void  as  being  unconstitutional.**^  And  if  an  ordi- 
nance is  accepted,  and  thereby  a  contract  is  created,  subsequent  or- 

"- Trustees  &c.  v.  City  of  Erie,  31  Portland,  18  Or.  87;  s.  c.  22  Pac.  533; 

Pa.  St.  515;  Amey  v.  Mayor  &c.,  24  Western  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Young,  83  Ga. 

How.  364.  512;  s.  c.  10  S.  E.  197. 

"^  Verona's  Appeal,  108  Pa.  St.  83.  "'  Parr  v.  President  &c.,  72  N.  Y. 

"*  Stewart  v.   City   of   Clinton,   79  463. 

Mo.  603;  Parsons  v.  Trustees,  44  Ga.  "^Illinois  Conf.  Female  College  v. 

529;  Baker  v.  Schofield,  58  Ga.  182.  Cooper,    25    111.    133;     Haywood    v. 

"'Hutchinson  v.  Pratt,  11  Vt.  402;  Mayor  &c.,  12  Ga.  404;    Saving  So-. 

Houston  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Odum,  53  Tex.  ciety  v.  Philadelphia,  31  Pa.  St.  175; 

343.  Davenport  &c.  Co.  v.  City  of  Daven- 

"•^  Stevenson  v.  Bay  City,  26  Mich,  port,    13    Iowa    229.    An    ordinance 

44;  Conboy  v.  Iowa  City,  2  Iowa  90.  which  impairs  a  contract  is  cogniza- 

Acts  requiring  record  to  be  made  of  ble  under  the  United  States  constitu- 

ordinances  will  usually  be  held  di-  tion  and  laws:  Walla  Walla  City  v. 

rectory,  and  failure  to  observe  will  Walla  Walla  Water  Co.,  172  U.  S.  1; 

not    invalidate    the    ordinance:    Na-  s.  c.  19  S.  Ct.  77.    An  ordinance  at- 

tional  Bank  &c.  v.  Town  of  Grenada,  tempting    to    impair    the    existing 

41  Fed.  87.     See  also,  Terre  Haute  rights  of  a  person  under  a  contract 

&c.  R.  Co.  v.  Voelker,  129  111.  540;  s.  is  unconstitutional:    Neill  v.  Gates, 

c.  22  N.  E.  20;  Ladd  v.  City  of  East  152  Mo.  585;  s.  c.  54  S.  W.  460. 


§  520 


PUBLIC    CORrORATlONS. 


492 


dinances  can  not  impair  its  obligation.^*"  So  an  ordinance  by  whicli 
a  license  tax  was  imposed  on  owners  of  tugboats  running  between 
New  Orleans  and  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  was  declared  void  as  being  a 
regulation  of  commerce  between  the  states. ^°"  But  a  penal  ordinance 
of  Chicago,  pronouncing  steamboats  emitting  dense  smoke  to  be 
nuisances,  is  reasonable  and  not  unconstitutional  as  affecting  vessels 
on  the  Chicago  river.^^^  An  ordinance  making  it  unlawful  to  require 
or  permit  a  day-laborer  or  mechanic  to  work  on  the  public  works 
more  than  eight  hours  in  a  day  is  unconstitutional.^^^  An  ordinance 
which  prohibits  any  person,  firm  or  corporation,  from  selling,  or 
exposing  for  sale,  any  meat  and  other  specified  articles  in  a  place 
where  dry-goods  and  other  specified  property  are  sold  is  unconstitu- 
tional and  void.^^^ 

§  520.  (b)  The  same  subject  continued. — Likewise  ordinances  giv- 
ing the  municipal  authorities  undue  power  in  allowing  or  withhold- 
ing licenses  to  laundries,  by  which  the  Chinese  were  discriminated 
against,  were  held  void  as  being  in  contravention  of  the  fourteenth 
amendment.^^*    A  city  ordinance  of  St.  Louis  affixing  a  penalty  for 


""People  v.  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co., 
118  111.  113;  s.  c.  7  N.  E.  116;  Kan- 
sas City  V.  Corrigan,  86  Mo.  67. 
Where  a  license  is  granted  and  acted 
on  and  money  expended  under  it  a 
subsequent  ordinance  prohibiting 
the  use  of  part  of  the  streets  covered 
by  the  license  is  a  nullity:  Harvey 
V.  Aurora  &c.  R.  Co.,  186  111.  283;  s. 
c.  57  N.  B.  857. 

""Moran  v.  New  Orleans,  112  U. 
S.  69-;  s.  c.  5  S.  Ct.  38.  An  occupa- 
tion tax  against  all  persons  selling, 
or  offering  for  sale,  goods  within  the 
city  is  unconstitutional  and  void  as 
to  non-residents:  Baxter  v.  Thomas, 
4  Olda.  605;  s.  c.  46  Pac.  479. 

^"  Harmon  v.  City  of  Chicago,  110 
111.  400;  s.  c.  51  Am.  R.  698. 

"'City  of  Seattle  v.  Smyth,  22 
Wash.  327;  s.  c.  60  Pac.  1120. 

"^  City  of  Chicago  v.  Netcher,  183 
111.  104;  s.  c.  55  N.  E.  707. 

^^^Yick  Wo  V.  Hopkins,  118  U.  S. 
356;  s.  c.  6  S.  Ct.  1064;  In  re  Tie 
Loy,  26  Fed.  611.  Ordinances  of 
similar  character,  where  reasonable, 
have    been    upheld:     Soon    Hing    v. 


Crowley,  113  U.  S.  703;  s.  c.  5  S.  Ct. 
730;  Barbier  v.  Connolly,.  113  U.  S. 
27;  s.  c.  5  S.  Ct.  357.  An  ordinance 
providing  that  license  shall  not  be 
issued  to  sell  intoxicating  liquors, 
except  on  petition  of  a  certain  num- 
ber of  property-owners  in  the  block, 
is  not  void  as  discriminating  be- 
tween different  blocks  or  diffei'ent 
persons:  Martens  v.  People,  186  111. 
314;  s.  c.  57  N.  E.  871.  An  ordi- 
nance which  is  not  enforced  against 
every  one  is  not  discriminating: 
City  of  Denver  v.  Girard,  21  Colo. 
447;  s.  c.  42  Pac.  662.  But  an  ordi- 
nance which  discriminates  between 
pei'sons  of  the  same  class  is  void: 
City  of  Peoria  v.  Gugenheim,  61  111. 
App.  374.  Where  the  statutes  im- 
pose upon  the  municipality  the  duty 
of  keeping  highways  free  from  ob- 
structions of  snow,  or  other  things 
that  impede  travel  or  render  it  dan- 
gerous, an  ordinance  which  imposes 
upon  property-owners  the  duty  of 
keeping  sidewalks  in  front  of  their 
premises  free  from  snow  imposes  a 
burden  which  does  not  bear  upon  all 


493  ORDINANCES    AND   BY-LAAVS.  §    521 

carrying  concealed  weapons  was  not  considered  unconstitutional.^''"''' 
And  a  penalty  for  violating  a  town  ordinance  has  been  d^ecided  not 
to  be  a  debt  within  the  constitutional  prohibition  against  imprison- 
ment for  debt.^^°  A  Minnesota  city  ordinance  directing  a  certain 
officer  to  arrest  and  detain  until  the  extinguishment  of  a  fire  any  per- 
son refusing  to  obey  his  directions  was  held  unconstitutional  as  de- 
priving the  sufferer  of  his  liberty  without  process  of  law  or  trial  by 
jury.^^"  And  an  ordinance  of  the  city  of  Shreveport  in  Louisiana 
giving  to  one  sect  a  privilege  which  it  denied  to  another  was  held 
unconstitutional  and  void.^^'^  But  constitutional  provisions  securing 
freedom  of  religious  worship  were  not  designed  to  prevent  the  adop- 
tion of  reasonable  rules  and  regulations  for  the  use  of  streets 
and  public  places,  and  a  member  of  a  religious  organization  while 
playing  on  a  cornet  in  a  street-parade  and  creating  no  disturbance  is 
an  itinerant  musician  within  the  meaning  of  an  ordinance  relating  to 
such  persons  and  is  not  protected  by  the  fact  that  his  act  was  done  as 
a  matter  of  religious  worship  only.^^^ 

§  521.  (c)  Consistency  with  statute  and  charter. — As  a  munici- 
pal corporation  can  not  enact  valid  laws  in  contravention  of  the  con- 
stitution of  the  United  States  or  of  the  state,  so  it  can  not  enact  laws 
contrary  to  the  statute  of  the  state.  For  a  legislature  to  delegate 
powers  which  might  be  used  in  hostility  to  the  general  laws  of  the 
state  would  be  a  felo  de  se  that  might  render  all  general  legislation 
inoperative  within  the  limits  of  the  corporation.  Thus  the  ordinances 
of  a  city  council  imposing  upon  the  city  solicitor  the  duties  which  are 
required  by  statute  to  be  performed  by  the  receiver  of  taxes  were  held 
in  a  recent  New  Jersey  case  to  be  unauthorized  and  illegal.^^**  In 
the  same  state,  under  a  statute  authorizing  the  mayor  "in  his  discre- 
tion *  *  *  to  impose  a  fine  not  exceeding  twenty  dollars"  for 
a  certain  offense,  an  ordinance  prescribing  a  fine  of  not  less  than  three 
nor  more  than  twenty  dollars  for  the  same  offense  was  held  to  be  void, 
as  an  additional  limitation  of  the  mayor's  discretion. ^^'^  And  in  gen- 
citizens  alike,  and  is  a  denial  of  the  vasion  of  the  right  of  personal  lib- 
equal  protection  of  the  law;  since  erty  is  void:  Ex  parte  Smith,  135 
a  sidewalk  is  part  of  the  highway:  Mo.  223;  s.  c.  36  S.  W.  628. 
State  V.  Jackman,  69  N.  H.  318;  s.  '''City  of  Shreveport  v.  Levy,  26 
c.  41  Atl.  347;  42  L.  R.  A.  438.  La.  An.  671. 

"'  City  of  St.  Louis  v.  Vert,  84  Mo.         '="  Commonwealth  v.  Plaisted,  148 
204.  Mass.  375;  s.  c.  19  N.  E.  224. 

'=•=  Hardenbrook  v.  Town  of  Ligo-         ''"  State  v.  City  of  Camden,  50  N. 
nier,    95    Ind.    70,    and    cases    there     J.  L.  87;  s.  c.  11  Atl.  137. 
cited.  '"'Landis  v.  Borough  of  Vineland, 

'"Judson    v.    Reardon,    16    Minn.     54  N.  J.  L.  75;  s.  c.  23  Atl.  357. 
431.     An  ordinance  which  is  an  in- 


§  522  PUBLIC  coiU'onATiONs.  494 

eral  all  ordinances  which  irreconcilably  conflict  either  with  the  charter 
or  with  the  state  statutes  are  void. 


1  U2 


§  522.  (d)  The  same  subject  continued. — But  the  by-laws  of  a  mu- 
nicipal corporation,  when  authorized  by  its  charter,  have  the  effect  of 
a  special  law  of  the  legislature,  and  supersede  to  a  great  degree  the 
general  law  within  the  territorial  limits  of  such  corporation.^"' 
This  question  is  discussed  in  an  able  and  thorough  opinion  in  a 
Vermont  case,  where  the  charter  of  a  village  granted  to  the  village 
certain  powers  of  licensing  eating-houses  repugnant  to  the  general 
statute  in  force  at  the  time  of  passage  of  the  charter.  The  court 
said :  "If  the  by-law  is  authorized  by  the  charter  it  has  the  effect  of 
a  special  law  of  the  legislature  within  the  limits  of  the  village  and 
supersedes  the  general  law  on  the  subject  of  victualing-houses  therein ; 
for  the  charter  giving  the  village  power  to  pass  the  by-law  inconsist- 
ent with  and  repugnant  to  the  general  law  operated  to  repeal  the 
general  law  within  the  territorial  limits  of  the  village,  on  the  prin- 
ciple that  provisions  of  different  statutes  which  are  in  conflict  with  one 
another  can  not  stand  together ;  and  in  the  absence  of  anything  show- 
ing a  "different  intent  on  the  part  of  the  legislature,  general  legislation 
upon  a  particular  subject  must  give  way  to  later  inconsistent  special 
legislation  upon  the  same  subject."^*^*     In  Louisiana,  however,  it  has 

"^  State    V.    Georgia    Medical    So-  vides  that  the  city  council  shall  not 

ciety,  38  Ga.  608;   State  v.  Brittain,  have  power  to  pass  any  ordinance 

89  N.  C.  574;  Weith  v.  City  of  Wil-  exempting  any  person  from  the  oper- 

mington,  68  N.  C.  24;  Flood  v.  State,  ation  of  an  ordinance,  or  municipal 

19  Tex.  App.  584;  Bohmy  v.  State,  21  regulation,  an  ordinance  requiring  a 

Tex.  App.  597;    s.   c.   2   S.  W.   886;  license  from  all  milk-sellers  except 

Wood  v.  City  of  Brooklyn,  14  Barb,  those  selling  less  than  twenty  quarts 

(N.   Y.)    425;    Cowen   v.   Village   of  a  day  is  invalid:  Gray  v.  Mayor  &c., 

West   Troy,    43    Barb.    (N.    Y.)    48;  2  Marv.   (Del.)   257;  s.  c.  43  Atl.  94. 

Mayor  &c.  V.  Nichols,  4  Hill  (N.  Y.)  "^Village     of     St.     Johnsbury     v. 

209;    Mays  v.  City  of  Cincinnati,  1  Thompson,  59  Vt.   300;    ^.  c.  9  Atl. 

Ohio  St.  268;  City  of  Canton  v.  Nist,  571;    McPherson  v.  Village  of  Che- 

9  Ohio  St.  439;  Carr  v.  City  of  St.  banse,  114  111.  46;  s.  c.  28  N.  E.  454; 
Louis,  9  Mo.  191;  Baldwin  v.  Green,  Covington  v.  City  of  East  St.  Louis, 

10  Mo.  410;  Town  of  Petersburg  v.  78  111.  548;  State  v.  Dwyer,  21  Minn. 
Metzker,  21  111.  205;  Southport  v.  512;  State  v.  Clarke,  1  Dutch.  (N. 
Ogden,  23  Conn.  128;  Andrews  v.  J.)  54;  Goddard,  Petitioner,  16  Pick. 
Union  &c.  Ins.  Co.,  37  Maine  256;  (Mass.)  504;  Commonwealth  v. 
State  V.  Mayor  &c.,  49  N.  J.  L.  311;  Patch,  97  Mass.  221. 

s.  c.  8  Atl.  295;  Lozier  v.  Newark,  48  ^"'Village     of     St.     Johnsbury    v. 

N.  J.  L.  452;  s.  c.  2  Atl.  815;  State  v.  Thompson,  59  Vt.  300;    s.  c.  9  Atl. 

Mayor  &c.,  47  N.  J.  L.  117;   City  of  571;    citing   1   Dillon   Munic.   Corp., 

Cape  Girardeau  v!  Riley,  72  Mo.  220;  §   88;    4  Kent  Com.   466,  n.;    In   re 

Dubois  v.  City  Council  &c.,  Dudley  Snell,  58  Vt.  207;   s.  c.  1  Atl.  566; 

(Ga.)    30.     Where   the   statute   pro-  State  v.  Mayor  &c.,  33  N.  J.  L.  57; 


495  ORDINANCES    AND    BY-LAWS.  §    523 

been  decided  that  a  grant  of  power  conferred  by  the  legislature  in 
the  charter  of  a  municipal  corporation,  to  pass  and  enforce  ordi- 
nances to  suppress  and  punish  the  sale  of  adulterated  drinks,  was  not 
recalled  by  a  subsequent  general  statute  providing  for  the  prosecution 
of  the  same  olfense  throughout  the  state.^"^  In  many  cases  it  has 
Ijeen  held  that  this  power  given  by  charter  can  be  subsequently  re- 
voked by  the  legislature ;  and  at  any  rate  both  statute  and  ordinance 
may  stand  together  if  not  fatally  inconsistent.^*"' 

§  523.  (e)  Consistency  with  general  penal  law. — It  would  seem  to 
flow  as  a  necessary  consequence  from  the  principles  enunciated  in  the 
last  section  that  the  corporation  can  not  pass  ordinances  imposing 
further  penalties  for  an  act  which  is  already  a  penal  offense  under  the 
general  laws  of  the  state;  but  on  this  question  there  is  great  and 
serious  conflict  of  opinion  in  the  cases.  It  is  the  opinion  of  Judge 
Cooley  that  the  clear  weight  of  authority  is  to  the  effect  that  an  act 
may  be  a  penal  offense  under  the  laws  of  the  state  and  that  further 
penalties,  under  proper  legislative  authority,  may  be  imposed  for  its 
commission  by  municipal  by-laws,  and  the  enforcement  of  the  one 
would  not  preclude  the  enforcement  of  the  other.  ^'^'^  The  arguments 
of  those  who  hold  that  municipal  ordinances  may  impose  further  pen- 
alties for  the  commission  of  acts  already  penal  offenses  under  the 
general  statutes  are  set  forth  by  Collier,  C.  J.,  in  an  Alabama  case 
cited  by  Judge  Cooley,  where  a  city  ordinance  imposed  a  fine  for 
assault  and  battery  committed  within  the  city  limits,  and  its  validity 
was  questioned.  He  said :  "The  object  of  the  power  conferred  by  the 
charter  and  the  purpose  of  the  ordinance  itself  was  not  to  punish  for 
an  offense  against  the  criminal  justice  of  the  country,  but  to  provide 
a  mere  police  regulation  for  the  enforcement  of  good  order  and  quiet 
within  the  limits  of  the  corporation.  So  far  as  an  offense  has  been 
committed  against  the  public  peace  and  morals,  the  corporate  au- 
thorities have  no  power  to  inflict  punishment,  and  we  are  not  informed 
that  they  have  attempted  to  arrogate  it.  It  is  altogether  immaterial 
whether  the  state  tribunal  has  interfered  and  exercised  its  powers  in 
bringing  the  defendant  before  it  to  answer  for  the  assault  and  battery ; 
for  whether  he  has  thus  been  punished  or  acquitted  is  alike  unim- 

State   v.    Clarke,    25    N.    J.    L.    54;  v.  Allaire,  14  Ala.  400;   City  of  St. 

Davies   v.   Fairbairn,    3    How.    636;  Louis  v.  Cafflerata,  24  Mo.  94;   City 

State  v.  Clarke,  54  Mo.  17;  Mark  v.  of   St.   Louis  v.   Bentz,   11   Mo.   61; 

State,  97  N.  Y.  572.  Rogers  v.   Jones,   1   Wend.    (N.   Y.) 

^•=5  State    V.    Labatut,    39    La.    An.  237;  City  of  Elk  Point  v.  Vaughn,  1 

513;  s.  c.  2  So.  550.  Dak.  113;  s.  c.  46  N.  W.  577. 

"^  People   v.   Hanrahan,   75    Mich.        ^"'^  Cooley  Const.  Lim.  239. 
611;   s.  c.  42  N.  E.  1124;   Mayor  &c. 


§    523  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  496 

portant.  The  offense  against  the  corporation  and  the  state,  we  have 
seen,  are  distinguishable  and  wholly  disconnected,  and  the  prosecu- 
tion at  the  suit  of  each  proceeds  upon  a  different  hypothesis:  the  one 
contemplates  the  observance  of  the  peace  and  good  order  of  the  city; 
the  other  has  a  more  enlarged  ol)ject  in  view — the  maintenance  of  the 
peace  and  dignity  of  the  state.""^  There  are  many  cases  upholding 
the  propositions  set  forth  in  the  last-cited  authority;  indeed,  the 
nrmiber  of  American  cases  supporting  this  view  far  exceeds  the  num- 
ber of  the  cases  which  hold  the  contrary.  Thus,  it  has  been  de- 
cided in  New  Jersey  that  certain  acts  which  are  indictable  as  offenses 
against  the  state  may  also  be  by  the  legislature  constituted  offenses 
against  the  police  regulations  of  municipalities  so  as  to  subject  the 
offender  to  the  mode  of  trial  incident  to  proceedings  for  the  violation 
of  ordinances,  and  that  where  in  such  cases  the  legislature  has  not 
made  special  provision  for  a  trial  by  jury  it  can  not  be  demanded  as 
matter  of  right.^*^^  Conformably  to  these  views  it  was  held  in  Mis- 
souri that  although  by  the  state  statutes  it  was  a  misdemeanor  to 
cruelly  beat  any  domestic  animal,  municipal  corporations  might  pro- 
hibit the  same  act  by  ordinance  and  punish  offenders. ^^"^  And  in 
Arkansas,  although  carrying  concealed  weapons,  disturbing  the  peace, 
and  selling  liquor  on  Sunday  are  each  made  offenses  by  statute,  the 
power  to  prohibit  the  same  acts  was  considered  to  be  given  cities  and 
towns  by  the  statute  authorizing  the  passage  of  ordinances,  not  incon- 
sistent with  the  laws  of  the  state,  to  suppress  disorderly  conduct, 
provide  for  the  safety,  preserve  the  health,  promote  the  prosperity, 
and  improve  the  morals,  order,  comfort  and  convenience  of  the  cor- 
poration and  its  inhabitants.^^ ^    Likewise  in  Indiana  the  statute  which 

"s  Mayor   &c.    v.    Allaire,    14   Ala.  City  of  St.  Louis  v.  Bentz,  11  Mo. 

400.  61;    State   v.   Crummery,    17    Minn. 

^''^  State  V.   Inhabitants  &c.,  51  N.  72;    State  v.  Oleson,  26  Minn.  507; 

J.  L.  498;  s.  c.  18  Atl.  116.     See  also,  s.  c.  5  N.  W.  959;  City  of  Elk  Point 

to  the  same  effect,  City  of  Indianapo-  v.  Vaughn,  1  Dak.  113;   s.  c.  46  N. 

lis  V.  Huegele,  115  Ind.  581;  s.  c.  18  W.  577;  Chicago  Packing  Co.  v.  City 

N.  B.  172;  Rogers  v.  Jones,  1  Wend,  of  Chicago,  88  111.  221;    Hankins  v. 

(N.  Y.)   237;   Mclnerney  v.  City  of  People.  106  111.  628;  McRea  v.  Mayor 

Denver,  17  Colo.  302;   s.  c.  29  Pac.  &c.,  59  Ga.  168;  Town  of  Bloomfield 

516;    Mayor  &c.   v.   Hyatt,   3   E.   D.  v.  Trimble,  54  Iowa  399;   s.  c.  6  N. 

Smith  (N.  Y.)  156;  Polinsky  v.  Peo-  W.  586. 

pie,  11  Hun   (N.  Y.)   390;   People  v.        ""City    of    St.    Louis    v.    Schoen- 

Stevens,    13    Wend.     (N.    Y.)     341;  busch,  95  Mo.  618;  s.  c.  8  S.  W.  791. 
Blatchley   v.   Moser,   15   Wend.    (N.        "^  Van    Buren    v.    Wells,    53    Ark. 

Y.)  215;  City  of  St.  Louis  v.  Caffer-  368;    s.   c.    14   S.   W.   38.     See   also, 

ata,  24  Mo.  94;   State  v.  Gordon,  60  State  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  51  N.  J.  L. 

Mo.  383;  City  of  St.  Louis  v.  Schoen-  498;  s.  c.  18  Atl.  116. 
busch,  95  Mo.  618;  s.  c.  8  S.  W.  791; 


497  ORDINANCES    AND   BY-LAWS.  §    524 

prohibited  towns  or  cities  from  making  acts  punishable  by  ordinance 
which  are  made  public  offenses  and  punishable  ])y  the  state  did  not, 
it  was  held,  apply  to  an  ordinance  making  it  an  offense  to  sell  intoxi- 
cating liquors  within  the  limits  of  the  city  without  first  obtaining  a 
city  license,  on  the  ground,  however,  that  such  act  was  not  an  offense 
against  the  state  law.^^^ 

§  524,  (f )  The  same  subject  continued. — With  due  deference  to 
the  weighty  opinion  of  Judge  Cooley,  and  to  the  mass  of  authorities 
submitted  by  him  in  support  of  his  opinion,  to  the  mind  of  the  writer 
the  cases  holding  the  contrary  view  though  fewer  in  number  are  better 
considered,  and  more  truly  founded  on  principle.  In  a  Missouri  ease 
it  was  decided  that  one  who  had  been  punished  under  a  municipal 
ordinance  could  not  be  afterwards  indicted  under  the  state  law.  The 
court  said:  "The  constitution  forbids  that  a  person  shall  be  twice 
punished  for  the  same  offense.  To  hold  that  a  party  can  be  prosecuted 
for  an  act  under  the  state  laws  after  he  had  been  punished  for  the 
same  act  by  the  municipal  corporation  within  whose  limits  the  act 
was  done  would  be  to  overthrow  the  power  of  the  general  assembly 
to  create  corporations  to  aid  in  the  management  of  the  affairs  of  the 
state.  For  a  power  in  the  state  to  punish  after  a  punishment  had 
been  inflicted  by  the  corporate  authorities  could  only  find  a  support 
in  the  assumption  that  all  the  proceedings  on  the  part  of  the  corpora- 
tion were  null  and  void.  The  circumstance  that  the  municipal  au- 
thorities have  not  exclusive  jurisdiction  over  the  acts  which  constitute 
offenses  within  their  limits  does  not  affect  the  question.  It  is  enough 
that  their  jurisdiction  is  not  excluded.  If  it  exists — although  it  may 
be  concurrent — if  it  is  exercised,  it  is  valid  and  binding  as  long  as  it 
is  a  constitutional  principle  that  no  man  may  be  punished  twice  for 
the  same  offense." ^^*  The  logic  of  these  considerations  seems  to 
show  irresistibly  that  to  permit  the  same  act  to  be  punished  under 
the  general  law  and  under  an  ordinance  must  either  lead  to  a  viola- 
tion of  the  constitution  or  must  cause  an  election  to  be  made  between 
the  two  methods  of  procedure,  so  that  in  case  the  act  is  punished 
under  one  provision  the  other  becomes  inoperative  and  void.     This 

"^City  of  Frankfort  v.  Aughe,  114  of  Augusta,  38  Ga.  542;  State  v.  Cor- 

Ind.  77;  s.  c.  15  N.  B.  802.  poration    of   Savannah,    1    T.    U.    P. 

"*  State  v.  Cowan,  29  Mo.  330.    See  Charl.  (Ga.)  235;  s.  c.  4  Am.  D.  708; 

also,  City  of  Corvallis  v.  Carlile,  10  Slaughter  v.  People,  2  Doug.  (Mich.) 

Or.   139;    State  v.  Welch,   36   Conn.  334;    State  v.  Keith,  94  N.  C.   933; 

215;   Menken  v.  City  of  Atlanta,  78  Town  of  Washington  v.  Hammond, 

Ga.  668;  s.  c.  2  S.  E.  559;  Jenkins  v.  76  N.  C.  33. 
Mayor  &c.,  35  Ga.  145;  Vason  v.  City 
1  Smith— 32 


524 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS. 


498 


would  produce  an  anomalous  condition  of  criminal  procedure  in 
such  cases  that  could  hardly  have  been  contemplated  either  by  the 
legislature  or  the  city  council.  In  a  well-considered  North  Caro- 
lina decision  it  was  held  that  an  ordinance  of  a  city  or  town  which 
made  an  act,  which  was  punishable  as  a  criminal  offense  under  the 
general  law  of  the  state,  an  offense  against  the  town,  punishable  by 
fine  or  imprisonment,  was  void.^'^^  On  the  same  line  authority  given 
to  a  city  in  Oregon  "to  prevent  and  restrain  disturbances"  was  not 
thought  to  include  the  right  to  take  jurisdiction  and  punish  for  the 
crime  of  an  assault  with  a  dangerous  weapon. ^'^*'  It  is  not  uncom- 
monly provided  by  statute  that  acts  which  are  public  offenses  punish- 
able by  statute  shall  not  be  punishable  by  city  ordinance.  In  such 
cases  there  is  no  question  that  such  an  ordinance  is  void."'^     Where 

"^  State   v.   Keith,    94   N.   C.    933.     rupt  the  board  of  metropolitan  po- 
Where  there  is  a  penal  statute  pre-     lice    commissioners   in    any    act   of 


scribing  a  punishment  for  certain 
acts  an  ordinance  subsequently 
passed  prescribing  a  penalty  for  the 
same  acts  is  invalid  in  the  absence 
of  an  express  provision  granting  the 
city  power  to  pass  it:  Kassell  v. 
Mayor  &c.,  109  Ga.  491;  s.  c.  35  S.  B. 
147.  An  ordinance  which  is  identi- 
cal in  terms  with  the  penal  code  is 
void.  A  city  has  no  power  to  pass 
an  ordinance  covering  the  same 
acts  as  are  covered  by  the  penal 
code:  Ex  parte  Wickson  (Tex.  Civ. 
App.),  47  S.  W.  643. 

""Walsh  V.  City  of  Union,  13  Or. 
589;  s.  c.  11  Pac.  312. 

"'  So,  under  revised  statutes  of 
Indiana  1881,  §  1640  (Burns  R.  S. 
Ind.  1901,  §  1709),  providing  that 
any  act  made  a  public  offense 
against  the  state,  and  punishable  by 
any  statute,  shall  not  be  made  pun- 
ishable by  any  city  ordinance,  the 
wrongful  interference  with  a  police- 
man in  making  an  arrest,  prohibited 
by  an  ordinance  of  the  city  of  In- 
dianapolis, is  not  punishable  by  that 
ordinance;  such  act  being  made  a 
public  offense,  and  punishable  by 
§  10  of  the  metropolitan  police  act 
(acts  1883,  p.  89,  acts  1897,  p.  90, 
Burns'  R.  S.  Ind.  1901,  §  3726),  pro- 
viding that  any  person  who  shall,  in 
any  manner,  interfere  with  or  inter- 


theirs  while  in  the  legal  discharge 
of  their  duties,  or  of  the  police  force, 
shall,  upon  conviction,  be  fined,  etc.: 
City  of  Indianapolis  v.  Huegele,  115 
Ind.  581;  s.  c.  18  N.  E.  172.  To  the 
same  effect  is  a  California  case.  Sec- 
tion 3  of  ordinance  No.  192  of  the 
city  of  Stockton,  California,  makes  it 
unlawful  for  two  or  more  persons  ta 
assemble,  be  or  remain  in  any  room 
or  place  for  the  purpose  of  smoking 
opium,  or  inhaling  the  fumes  there- 
of. Section  307  of  the  state  penal 
code  declares  that  every  person 
who  visits  or  resorts  to  any  place 
where  opium,  or  any  of  its  prepara- 
tions, is  sold  or  given  away  to  be 
smoked  at  such  place,  for  the  pur- 
pose of  smoking  opium,  or  its  said 
preparations,  is  guilty  of  a  misde- 
meanor, and  punishable  by  fine  or 
imprisonment.  It  was  held  that  the 
ordinance,  in  so  far  as  it  made 
criminal  precisely  the  same  acts 
that  were  declared  a  crime  by  ihe 
state  law,  was  in  conflict  therewith; 
and  under  constitution,  art.  11,  §  11, 
limiting  the  power  of  municipal  cor- 
porations to  the  passage  of  ordi- 
nances not  in  conflict  with  general 
laws,  was  void,  and  that  persons  ac- 
cused of  assembling  in  a  room  for 
the  purpose  of  smoking  opium 
therein     could    not    be    prosecuted 


499 


ORDINANCES   AND   BY-LAWS. 


§  535 


there  is  no  ordinance  shown  justifying  a  sentence  to  hard  labor  the 
court  will  presume  that  any  ordinance  passed  by  the  council  con- 
formed to  the  statute,  and  will  modify  the  judgment  to  conform  to 
it.^^®  The  fact  that  a  general  statute  covers  the  same  subject  as  an 
ordinance  does  not  render  the  latter  invalid. ^''^  But  not  so  if  they 
are  in  conflict.^*"  The  legislature  has  no  power  to  authorize  the  pas- 
sage of  ordinances  contrary  to  the  general  laws  of  the  state  ;^®^  and 
'SO,  ordinances  which  violate  subsequently-enacted  statutes  are  not 
•enforceable  ;^^^  but  it  may  make  additional  requirements.^^^  An  or- 
fdinance  is  not  oppressive  when  in  harmony  with  general  law.^^* 

§  525.  (g)  Reasonableness  of  the  ordinance. — It  is  a  well-settled 
principle  that  a  municipal  by-law  or  ordinance  must  be  reasonable. 
If  it  be  not  reasonable,  the  courts  will  decline  to  enforce  it,  and  it 
will  be  declared  void  as  matter  of  law.^®^     But,  as  was  said  by  Nib- 


thereunder:  In  re  Sic,  73  Cal.  142; 
s.  c.  14  Pac.  405;  Ex  parte  Solomon, 
91  Cal.  440;  s.  c.  27  Pac.  757;  In  re 
Ah  You,  88  Cal.  99;  s.  c.  25  Pac.  974. 

^'^'City  of  Lead  v.  Klatt,  13  S.  D. 
140;  s.  c.  82  N.  W.  391. 

""In  re  John,  55  Kan.  694;  s.  c. 
41  Pac.  956.  See  contra,  State  v. 
McCoy,  116  N.  C.  1059;  s.  c.  21  S.  E. 
690.  But  see  Board  of  Police  v. 
Giron,  46  La.  An.  1364;  s.  c.  16  So. 
190.  It  has  been  held,  however, 
that  a  city  ordinance  prescribing  a 
fine  of  from  $5  to  $100  is  not  void 
where  the  state  law  fixes  a  penalty 
for  the  same  offense  at  not  exceeding 
$1,000:  City  of  St.  Joseph  v.  Vesper, 
59  Mo.  App.  459.  And  see  Kansas 
City  V.  Hallett,  59  Mo.  App.  160. 

'«'' State  V.  Sherrard,  117  N.  C. 
716;  s.  c.  23  S.  E.  157;  Abram  v. 
State  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  28  S.  W.  818: 

^^^  Hewlett  V.  Camp,  115  Ala.  499; 
s.  c.  22  So.  137. 

^^-^  Strauss  v.  Mayor  &c.,  97  Ga. 
475;  s.  c.  25  S.  E.  329. 

"^Foster  V.  Board  &c.,  102  Cal, 
483;  s.  c.  37  Pac.  763. 

"^  State  V.  Payssan,  47  La.  An. 
1029;  s.  c.  17  So.  481.  An  ordinance 
for  drainage  into  Lake  Michigan  is 
not  against  public  policy  and  not, 
therefore,  void:  Rich  v.  City  of  Chi- 


cago, 152  111.  18;  s.  c.  38  N.  E.  255. 
An  ordinance  passed  by  a  council  in 
violation  of  its  rules  is  void:  Swin- 
dell V.  State,  143  Ind.  153;  s.  c.  42 
N.  E.  528.  The  constitution  of  Ida- 
ho prohibits  ordinances  in  conflict 
with  the  general  law:  In  re  Riden- 
baugh  (Idaho),  49  Pac.  12;  Port 
Clinton  &c.  v.  Shafer,  5  Pa.  Dist. 
Rep.  583.  A  charter  which  requires 
the  passage  of  an  ordinance  over 
the  mayor's  veto  on  the  "next  regu- 
lar meeting,"  invalidates  an  ordi- 
nance passed  at  the  same  meeting 
to  which  the  veto  is  returned:  Glea- 
son  V.  Peerless  Mfg.  Co.,  37  N.  Y.  S. 
267;  s.  c.  1  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  257. 

^^^  Atkinson  v.  Goodrich  Transp. 
Co.,  60  Wis.  141;  s.  c.  18  N.  W.  764; 
Clason  V.  City  of  Milwaukee,  30 
Wis.  316;  Barling  v.  West,  29  Wis. 
307;  People  v.  Throop,  12  Wend.  (N. 
Y.)  183;  Dunham  v.  Trustees  &c.,  5 
Cow.  (N.  Y.)  462;  People  v.  City  of 
Rochester,  44  Hun  (N.  Y.)  166; 
Mayor  &c.  v.  Beasly,  1  Humph. 
(Tenn.)  232;  Mayor  &c.  v.  Winfield, 
8  Humph.  (Tenn.)  707;  Long  v. 
Taxing  District  &c.,  7  Lea  (Tenn.) 
134;  Whyte  v.  Mayor  &c.,  2  Swan 
(Tenn.)  364;  State  v.  Mayor  &c.,  37 
N.  J.  L.  348;  State  v.  Lowery,  49  N. 
J.  L.  391;  s.  c.  8  Atl.  513;   State  v. 


525 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS. 


500 


lack,  J.,  in  an  able  opinion  delivered  in  an  Indiana  case:  "An 
ordinance  can  not  be  held  to  bo  unreasonable  which  is  expressly  au- 
thorized by  tlie  legislature.  The  power  of  a  court  to  declare  an  ordi- 
nance unreasonable  and  therefore  void  is  practically  restricted  to 
cases  in  which  the  legislature  has  enacted  nothing  on  the  subject- 
matter  of  the  ordinance,  and  consequently  to  cases  in  which  the  ordi- 
nance was  passed  under  the  supposed  incidental  power  of  the  corpora- 
tion merely."^ ^^  So  when  the  legislature  expressly  authorizes  the 
municipality  to  pass  any  certain  ordinance,  that  ordinance  will  be 
upheld,  regardless  of  the  opinion  of  the  court  as  to  its  reasonableness 
or  unreasonableness.^**'^    This  principle  was  fully  discussed  in  a  cele- 


Mayor  &c.,,  47  N.  J.  L.  286;  State  v. 
East  Orange,  41  N.  J.  L.  127;  Kip 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  26  N.  J.  L.  298; 
Dayton  v.  Quigley,  29  N.  J.  Eq.  77; 
City  of  Chicago  v.  Trotter,  136  111. 
430;  s.  c.  26  N.  E.  359;  Tugman  v. 
City  of  Chicago,  78  111.  405;  City  of 
Clinton  v.  Phillips,  58  111.  102;  In  re 
Frazee,  63  Mich.  396;  s.  c.  30  N.  W. 
72;  Fisher  v.  Harrisburg,  2  Grant 
Cas.  (Pa.)  291;  Commissioners  &c. 
v.  Northern  Liberties  Gas  Co.,  12 
Pa.  St.  318;  O'Maley  v.  Borough  of 
Freeport,  96  Pa.  St.  24;  Kneedler  v. 
Borough  of  Norristown,  100  Pa.  St. 
368;  Commonwealth  v.  Robertson,  5 
Cush.  (Mass.)  438;  City  of  Boston 
V.  Shaw,  1  Met.  (Mass.)  130;  Ped- 
rick  V.  Bailey,  12  Gray  (Mass.)  161; 
Commonwealth  v.  Worcester,  3  Pick. 
(Mass.)  462;  Commonwealth  v.  Da- 
vis, 140  Mass.  485;  s.  c.  4  N.  E.  577; 
Commonwealth  v.  McCafferty,  145 
Mass.  384;  s.  c.  14  N.  E.  451;  Com- 
monwealth V.  Steffee,  7  Bush  (Ky.) 
161;  Ex  parte  Frank,  52  Cal.  606; 
Ex  parte  Chin  Yan,  60  Cal.  78;  State 
V.  Freeman,  38  N.  H.  426;  Mayor 
&c.  V.  Radecke,  49  Md.  217;  Kirkham 
V.  Russell,  76  Va.  956;  Waters  v. 
Leech,  3  Ark.  110;  Davis  v.  Town  of 
Anita,  73  Iowa  325;  s.  c.  35  N.  W. 
244 ;  Town  of  State  Center  v.  Baren- 
stein,  66  Iowa  249;  s.  c.  23  N.  W. 
652;  Meyers  v.  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co., 
57  Iowa  555;  s.  c.  10  N.  W.  896;  Gil- 
ham  V.  Wells,  64  Ga.  192;  City  of 
Cape  Girardeau  v.  Riley,  72  Mo.  220. 


For  English  cases,  see  2  Kyd  Corp. 
107;  Davies  v.  Morgan,  1  Cromp.  & 
J.  587;  Chamberlain  of  London  v. 
Compton,  7  D.  &  R.  597;  Clark  v.  Le 
Cren,  9  B.  &  C.  52;  Gosling  v.  Veley. 
12  Q.  B.  328;  Master  &c.  v.  Brooking, 
3  Q.  B.  95;  Elwood  v.  Bullock,  6  Q. 
B.  383.  In  the  last-cited  case  an  or- 
dinance imposing  uni'easonable  re- 
strictions on  the  licensing  of  booths 
was  held  invalid.  The  reasonable- 
ness and  sufficiency  of  an  ordinance 
are  not  to  be  tested  in  all  cases  by 
its  application  to  extreme  cases: 
Commonwealth  v.  Plaisted,  148 
Mass.  375,  382;  s.  c.  19  N.  E.  224. 
Perhaps  a  proper  construction  might 
not  admit  of  their  being  included 
within  it:  Commonweolth  v.  Cutter, 
156  Mass.  52;  s.  c.  29  N.  E.  1146.  See 
also.  Walker  v.  City  of  Aurora,  140 
111.  402;  s.  c.  29  N.  E.  741. 

^^^  Coal  Float  v.  City  of  Jefferson- 
ville,  112  Ind.  15,  19;   s.  c.  13  N.  E. 

ns. 

^^'  Coal  Float  v.  City  of  Jefferson- 
ville,  112  Ind.  15;  s.  c.  13  N.  E.  115; 
Chamberlain  v.  City  of  Evansville, 
77  Ind.  542;  City  of  Brooklyn  v. 
Breslin,  57  N.  Y.  591;  State  v.  Treas- 
urer &c.,  44  N.  J.  L.  350;  State  v. 
Clarke,  54  Mo.  17;  City  of  Peoria  v. 
Calhoun,  29  111.  317;  City  of  St.  Paul 
V.  Colter,  12  Minn.  41;  Haynes  v. 
City  of  Cape  May,  50  N.  J.  L.  55;  s. 
c.  13  Atl.  231;  District  of  Columbia 
V.  Waggaman,  4  Mackey  328.  A 
reasonable  penalty  being  prescribed 


501  ORDINANCES   AND   BY-LAWS.  §    525 

brated  and  extreme  case  in  Missouri.  The  charter  of  the  city  of  St. 
Louis  authorized  the  city  to  regulate  hawdy-houscs.  The  court  con- 
strued this  provision  to  allow  the  passage  of  an  ordinance  licensing 
bawdy-houses,  and  in  discussing  the  reasonableness  of  such  an  ordi- 
nance it  was  said:  "It  is  naked  assumption  to  say  that  any  matter 
allowed  by  the  legislature  is  against  public  policy.  The  best  indica- 
tions of  public  policy  are  to  be  found  in  the  enactments  of  the  legis- 
lature. To  say  that  such  a  law  is  of  unvisual  tendency  is  disrespectful 
to  the  legislature,  who,  no  doubt,  designed  to  promote  the  morals 
and  health  of  the  citizens.  Whether  the  ordinance  in  question  is  cal- 
culated to  promote  the  object  is  a  question  with  which  the  courts 
have  no  coneern."^*'^  But  the  fact  that  an  ordinance  is  passed  under 
power  conferred  by  statute  does  not  preclude  the  question  of  reasona- 
bleness, where  it  leaves  the  details  to  be  fixed  by  the  ordinance,  for 
the  reason  that  the  exercise  of  a  power  may  be  unreasonable.  The 
reasonableness  of  the  power  granted  is  one  thing,  and  the  reasonable- 
ness of  the  exercise  of  that  power  quite  another  thing.^^^  The  rule 
that  an  ordinance  specifically  authorized  by  a  statute  can  not  be  im- 
peached for  unreasonableness  does  not  apply  to  an  ordinance  for  the 
construction  of  a  sewer,  passed  under  a  general  power  over  the  sub- 
ject. Where  a  grant  of  power  is  general  in  its  nature  and  its  exercise 
may  either  be  reasonable,  or  arbitrarily  unreasonable  and  oppressive, 
the  grant  is  subject  to  the  implied  limitation  that  its  exercise  shall 
be  reasonable,  and  courts  have  power  to  pass  upon  and  determine  that 
question.  ^^"^ 

in  an  ordinance,  it  is  not  unconsti-  Ward,  48  S.  C.  570 ;.s.  c.  26  S,  E.  906; 

tutional  because   the  statute   under  Skaggs  v.  City  of  Martinsville,  140 

which  it  is  enacted  does  not  limit  Ind.  476;  s.  c.  39  N.  E.  241;  Kansas 

the  penalty  the  ordinance  may  im-  City  v.  Trieb,  76  Mo.  App.  478. 
pose:    State  v.  Carpenter,  60  Conn.        ^**' State  v.  Clarke,  54  Mo.  17,  36, 

97;  s.  c.  22  Atl.  497.     It  is  a  part  of  See  Dillon  Munic.  Corp.,  §  328. 
the  common  law  that  an  ordinance         ^^°  Hawes  v.  City  of  Chicago,  158 

not   expressly    authorized    must   be  111.  653;  s.  c.  42  N.  E.  373;  Wice  v. 

reasonable:   Wice  v.  Chicago  &c.  R.  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.,  193  111.  351;  s.  c. 

Co.,    193    111.    351;    s.    c.    61    N.    E.  61  N.  E.  1084;   City  of  St.  Paul  v. 

1084;    Milliken  v.  City  Council  &c..  Colter,    12    Minn.    41;     Dunham    v. 

54  Tex.  388;    Napman  v.  People,  19  Trustees  &c.,  5   Cow.    (N.   Y.)    462; 

Mich.  352;  Hawes  v.  City  of  Chicago,  State  v.  Treasurer  &c.,  44  N.  J.  L. 

158  111.  653;   s.  e.  42  N.  E.  373;   To-  350. 

ledo  &c.  R.  Co.  V.  City  of  Jackson-        ""  Title  &c.  Co.  v.  City  of  Chicago, 

ville,  67  111.  37;  City  of  Grand  Rap-  162  111.  505;  s.  c.  44  N.  E.  832;  Vil- 

ids  v.  Newton,  111  Mich.  48;  s.  c.  69  lage  of  Hyde  Park  v.  Carton,  132  111. 

N.  W.  84;   35  L.  R..A.  226;   Shea  v.  100;    s.   c.  23   N.   E.   590;    Hawes  v. 

City  of  Muncie,  148  Ind.  14;  s.  c.  46  City  of  Chicago,  158  111.  653;  s.  c.  42 

N.  E.   138;    Town  of   Darlington  v.  N.  E.  373. 


§  526 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS. 


502 


§  526.  (h)  The  same  subject  continued — Illustrations. — The  pre- 
sumption is  always  in  favor  of  the  reasonableness  of  the  ordinance, 
and  unless  it  is  unreasonable  on  its  face  or  is  proved  to  be  so  by  proper 
evidence,  the  ordinance  will  be  upheld.^"-  Of  course  each  case  in 
which  the  reasonableness  of  an  ordinance  is  questioned  must  be  de- 
cided on  the  facts  of  that  particular  case.  No  general  rule  can  be 
laid  down  defining  what  ordinances  are  unreasonable  and  what  or- 
dinances are  not.  But  certain  broad  principles  can  be  followed. 
Thus  an  ordinance  must  not  be  so  vague  that  its  precise  mean- 
ing can  not  be  ascertained.  This  question  is  discussed  in  the  suc- 
ceeding section.  Also  the  ordinance  must  not  be  oppressive. ^^^ 
It  must  not  be  in  restraint  of  trade.^^*  It  must  not  be  contrary 
to  common  right.  Thus  an  ordinance  of  a  Texas  city  forbidding 
the  renting  of  private  property  to  lewd  women,  or  to  any  person  for 
their  use,  was  held  to  be  a  prescriptive  denial  of  shelter  to  that  class, 
and  null  and  void  as  in  contravention  of  common  right.^^^     It  must 


"''Van  Hook  v.  City  of  Selma,  70 
Ala.  361;  State  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  53 
N.  J.  L.  132;  s.  c.  20  Atl.  1076;  Com- 
monwealth v.  Patch,  97  Mass.  221. 
Cf.  City  of  St.  Louis  v.  Weber,  44  Mo. 
547;  City  of  St.  Louis  v.  Knox,  6 
Mo.  App.  247;  Clason  v.  City  of  Mil- 
waukee, 30  Wis.  316;  Moore  v.  Dis- 
trict of  Columbia,  12  App.  D.  C.  537. 
An  ordinance  regularly  passed  and 
signed  will  not  be  held  unreasonable 
except  from  its  inherent  character, 
or  from  evidence  of  its  operation: 
State  V.  City  of  Elizabeth,  58  N.  J. 
L.  619;  s.  c.  34  Atl.  146. 

"^  Mayor  &c.  v.  Radecke,  49  Md. 
217;  Mayor  &c.  v.  Winfield,  8  Humph. 
(Tenn.)  707;  City  of  St.  Louis  v. 
Weber,  44  Mo.  547;  Commissioners 
V.  Northern  Liberties  Gas  Co.,  12 
Pa.  St.  318.  An  ordinance  under  im- 
plied power  may  be  declared  by  the 
court  as  unreasonable  and  oppres- 
sive: Skinker  v.  Heman,  2  Mo.  App. 
Repr.  1095;  Pittsburgh  &c.  R.  Co.  v. 
Town  of  Crown  Point,  146  Ind.  421; 
s.  c.  45  N.  B.  587;  35  L.  R.  A.  684; 
City  of  Lamar  v.  Weidman,  57  Mo. 
App.  507. 

^"'Tugman  v.  City  of  Chicago,  78 
111.  405;  Ex  parte  Frank,  52  Cal.  606; 
Caldwell  v.  City  of  Alton,  33  111.  417; 


Borough  of  Sayre  v.  Phillips,  148  Pa. 
St.  482;  s.  c.  24  Atl.  76.  A  license 
fee  of  $10  per  day,  making  no  dis- 
crimination on  account  of  the  extent 
of  business,  or  length  of  time  to  be 
carried  on,  is  unnecessarily  burden- 
some, in  restraint  of  trade  and  pro- 
hibitory: City  of  Carrollton  v.  Baz- 
zette,  159  111.  284;  s.  c.  42  N.  E.  837. 
And  so  an  ordinance  fixing  license 
of  itinerant  merchants  at  $200  per 
month  is  unreasonable  and  exorbi- 
tant: City  of  Peoria  v.  Gugenheim, 
61  111.  App.  374.  A  license  to  tran- 
sients of  $250  per  month,  or  $25  per 
day,  is  unreasonable  and  void:  City 
of  Ottumwa  v.  Zekind,  95  Iowa  622; 
s.  c.  64  N.  W.  646.  And  so  is  a  li- 
cense of  $10  per  day  on  itinerant 
merchants:  City  of  Carrollton  v. 
Bazzette,  159  111.  284;  s.  c.  42  N.  E. 
837. 

^^"Milliken  v.  City  Council  &c.,  54 
Tex.  388.  See  also.  State  v.  Mott,  61 
Md.  297,  and  cases  cited  post.  An 
ordinance  prohibiting  any  person, 
firm  or  corporation  from  keeping 
open,  within  the  limits  of  a  city,  cer- 
tain enumerated  stores,  to  expose, 
or  offer  for  sale,  or  give  away  mer- 
chandise therein  on  Sunday,  is  void 
as  to  dealers  in  clothing:     City  of 


503 


ORDINANCES   AND   BY-LAWS. 


526 


be  impartial  and  general  in  its  operation. ^'^'^  So  far  as  it  restricts  the 
absolute  dominion  of  an  owner  over  his  property  it  should  furnish  a 
uniform  rule  of  action,  and  its  application  can  not  be  left  to  the  arbi- 
trary will  of  the  governing  authorities.^"^     Thus,  an  ordinance  which 


Denver  v.  Bach,  26  Colo.  530;  s.  c. 
58  Pac.  1089.  An  ordinance  prohib- 
iting cars  to  be  run  without  vesti- 
bules during  winter  months  is  in- 
valid: City  of  Yonkers  v.  Yonkers 
R.  Co.,  64  N.  Y.  S.  955;  s.  c.  57  App. 
Div.  (N.  Y.)  271.  An  ordinance  pro- 
hibiting laundries,  except  in  brick 
and  stone  buildings,  is  unreasonable 
in  that  it  does  not  apply  to  other 
kinds  of  business  using  machinery: 
City  of  Shreveport  v.  Robinson,  51 
La.  An.  1314;  s.  c.  26  So.  664.  An 
ordinance  regulating  the  weight  of 
bakers'  bread  is  void:  City  of  Buf- 
falo V.  Collins  Baking  Co.,  57  N.  Y. 
S.  347;  s.  c.  39  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  432. 
And  so  is  an  ordinance  prohibiting 
the  sale  of  loaves  of  bread  weighing 
less  than  one  and  a  half  pounds  and 
providing  a  penalty:  City  of  Buffalo 
V.  Collins  Baking  Co.,  supra.  An 
ordinance  making  it  unlawful  to 
cover  any  package  or  parcel  of  fruit, 
etc.,  with  any  colored  netting  or 
other  material  having  a  tendency  to 
conceal  the  true  color  or  quality  of 
such  goods  sold  or  offered  for  sale 
has  been  held  to  be  unreasonable 
and  void:  Frost  v.  City  of  Chicago, 
178  111.  250;  s.  c.  52  N.  E.  869. 

196  pirst  Municipality  v.  Blineau,  3 
La.  An.  688.  An  ordinance  making 
it  a  misdemeanor  to  drive  faster 
than  an  ordinary  gait  in  the  city 
streets  is  unreasonable  if  applied  to 
a  fire-department  in  driving  to  a 
fire:  City  of  Kansas  City  v.  McDon- 
ald, 60  Kan.  481;  s.  c.  57  Pac.  123. 
An  ordinance  relating  to  the  license 
of  milk-dealers  must  be  uniform; 
and  if  it  undertakes  to  exempt  cer- 
tain persons  of  a  class, — as,  a  milk- 
dealer  having  less  than  two  cows, — 
who  sell  to  their  neighbors  by  hand, 
it  is  void :    Pierce  v.  City  of  Aurora, 


81  111.  App.  670.  An  ordinance  pro- 
hibiting persons  temporarily  resid- 
ing in  a  city  from  selling  goods  at 
auction  without  license  is  void  where 
residents  are  not  required  to  pay 
license:  City  of  Carrollton  v.  Baz- 
zette,  159  111.  284;  s.  c.  42  N.  E.  837. 
It  has  been  held  that  requiring  tran- 
sient merchants  to  pay  a  license 
does  not  discriminate  in  favor  of 
residents:  City  of  Ottumwa  v.  Ze- 
kind,  95  Iowa  622;  s.  c.  64  N.  W.  646. 
An  ordinance  prohibiting  the  pur- 
chase of  lots  for  burial  purposes 
within  the  corporate  limits,  but  per- 
mitting further  burials  on  lots  al- 
ready owned,  is  discriminative  and 
therefore  unreasonable:  Ex  parte 
Bohen,  115  Cal.  372;  s.  c.  47  Pac.  55; 
36  L.  R.  A.  618. 

^"  State  V.  Tenant,  110  N.  C.  609; 
s.  c.  14  S.  E.  387;  citing  Newton  v. 
Belger,  143  Mass.  598;  s.  c.  10  N.  E. 
464;  City  of  Richmond  v.  Dudley, 
129  Ind.  112;  s.  c.  28  N.  E.  312;  Yick 
Wo  V.  Hopkins,  118  U.  S.  356;  s.  c. 
6  S.  Ct.  1064;  May  v.  People,  1  Colo. 
157;  s.  c.  27  Pac.  1010;  Mayor  &c.  v. 
Radecke,  49  Md.  217;  Anderson  v. 
City  of  Wellington,  40  Kan.  173;  s.  c. 
19  Pac.  719;  In  re  Frazee,  63  Mich. 
396;  s.  c.  30  N.  W.  72;  Tugman  v. 
City  of  Chicago,  78  111.  405;  Village 
of  Braceville  v.  Doherty,  30  111.  App. 
645;  Barthet  v.  City  of  New  Orleans, 
24  Fed.  563;  Bills  v.  City  of  Goshen, 
117  Ind.  221;  s.  c.  20  N.  E.  115;  Town 
of  Lake  View  v.  Letz,  44  111.  81;  City 
of  Evansville  v.  Martin,  41  Ind.  145; 
Horr  &  Bemis  Munic.  Police  Ord., 
§  13.  See  also.  State  v.  Webber,  107 
N.  C.  962;  s.  c.  12  S.  E.  598;  State  v. 
Hunter,  106  N.  C.  796;  s.  c.  11  S.  E. 
366.  A  license  fee  of  not  less  than 
$1  and  not  exceeding  $100  for  those 
engaged  in  transient  business  as  au- 


§    526  PUBLIC   CORPORATIONS.  50-i 

proviflos  that  no  person  shall  erect,  add  to,  or  generally  change  any 
building  without  first  obtaining  the  permission  of  the  board  of  alder- 
men, is  void  for  the  reason  indicated.^"®  An  ordinance  prohibiting  any 
carriage,  hack  or  vehicle,  used  to  carry  passengers  or  freight  for  hire, 
from  stopping  or  standing  on  specified  streets  in  front  of  any  public 
hotel,  except  when  actually  engaged  in  receiving  or  delivering  passen- 
gers or  freight,  and  making  it  a  misdemeanor,  is  unreasonable  and 
oppressive.^"''  An  ordinance  requiring  a  street-car  company  to 
sprinkle  its  track,  and  providing  a  penalty  of  twenty-five  dollars  for 
each  breach,  and  twenty-five  dollars  per  day  for  its  continued  viola- 
tion, with  a  further  provision  that  if  the  penalty  is  not  paid  officers 
shall  have  power  to  stop  the  running  of  cars,  is  unreasonable  and 
void.^**"  An  ordinance  imposing  a  fee  of  one-half  cent  per  gallon  for 
inspecting  kerosene  oil  where  no  restrictions  are  imposed  upon  the 
inspector  and  no  rules  prescribed  regulating  his  conduct,  or  the 
frequency  of  inspection,  is  void  as  oppressive  on  trade  and  commerce, 
it  appearing  that  the  fee  is  eight  and  one-third  per  cent,  of  the  value 
of  the  oil  inspected.^"^  An  ordinance  compelling  the  construction  of 
a  cement  sidewalk  in  lieu  of  a  substantial  plank  walk,  comparatively 
new,  is  unreasonable  and  void.^°^  And  so  is  an  ordinance  prohibiting 
the  importation  of  second-hand  clothing  and  furniture  for  the  purpose 
of  sale.^"^  Where  a  license  fee  sufficient  to  pay  the  reasonable  cost  of 
issuing  is  authorized  it  can  not  be  made  for  the  purpose  of  revenue.^"* 
An  ordinance  is  not  invalid  as  oppressive  and  unreasonable  where  the 
improvement  is  in  the  discretion  of  the  city  and  it  is  presumed  de- 
fects in  the  improvement  will  be  remedied.-*'^  An  ordinance  impos- 
ing an  inspection  tax  of  fifty  cents  for  each  pole  of  an  electric  com- 
pany when  the  actual  cost  of  inspection  does  not  exceed  five  cents  is 
unreasonable.^*"'  The  following  ordinances  have  been  held  to  be 
reasonable :  An  ordinance  compelling  a  passenger  to  use  his  transfer 
within  a  time-limit  and  prohibiting  him  from  transferring  or  selling 

thorities  may  direct  is  void:    State  ™' Hawes  v.  City  of  Chicago,  158 

V.  Conlon,  65  Conn.  478;  s.  c.  33  Atl.  111.  653;  s.  c.  42  N.  E.  373. 

519.  -'"^  State  v.  Taft,  118  N.  C.  1190;  s. 

^"^  State  V.  Tenant,  110  N.  C.  609;  c.  23  S.  E.  970. 

s.  c.  14  S.  E.  387.  ="  State  v.  Glavin,  67  Conn.  29;  s. 

"^  Ex  parte  Battis,  40  Tex.  Cr.  App.  c.  34  Atl.  708. 

112;  s.  c.  48  S.  W.  513.  '^"'Chicago   &c.   R.    Co.   v.    City   of 

'°°  Appeal  of  Chester  Traction  Co.,  Chicago,  184  111.  154;   s.  c.  56  N.  E. 

6  Del.  Co.  Ct.    (Pa.)   397,  587;    s.  c.  410. 

40  W.  N.  C.   (Pa.)   183.  '-"•'City  of  Saginaw  v.  Swift  Elec- 

201  Ford  v.  Standard  Oil  Co.,  53  N.  trie  L.  Co.,  113  Mich.  660;   s.  c.  72 

Y.  S.  48;   s.  c.  32  App.  Div.   (N.  Y.)  N.  W.  6. 
596. 


505  ORDINANCES    AND   BY-LAWS.  §    527 

it,  or  giving  it  away;^"'  an  ordinance  prohibiting  the  sale  of  lemon- 
ade, etc.,  by  the  device  of  throwing  at  a  dummy  without  a  license;-"'' 
an  ordinance  requiring  a  railroad  company  to  light  its  track  with 
electricity  within  twenty  days  after  notice  of  the  passage  of  the 
ordinance;-"^  an  ordinance  estahlishing  a  hack-stand ;2i''  an  ordi- 
nance requiring  bicycle  riders  to  ring  a  bell  upon  approach  towards 
cross  walks  ;^^^  an  ordinance  making  it  unlawful  to  make  a  noise  on 
the  streets  and  sidewalks  by  the  use  of  drums  or  musical  instruments, 
or  otherwise,  of  such  character,  extent  and  duration  as  to  annoy  and 
disturb  others  ;^^^  an  ordinance  limiting  the  speed  of  trains  to  five 
miles  an  hour  and  requiring  a  bell  to  be  rung  while  in  the  city  lim- 
its ;-^^  an  ordinance  requiring  a  street-car  company  to  sprinkle  its 
tracks  on  a  street  in  which  its  track  is  laid — not  only  reasonable,  but 
a  proper  exercise  of  police  power  ;^^*  an  ordinance  prohibiting  a 
person  going  on  the  premises  of  a  railroad  company  to  solicit  patron- 
age for  a  hotel  ;^^^  a  license  of  peddlers  exempting  mechanics  of  the 
state  selling  their  own  products  and  farmers  selling  their  produce;-^® 
or  requiring  irregular  dealers,  having  no  regular  place  of  business,  to 
pay  a  license  in  excess  of  that  paid  by  regular  merchants  ;"^^  restrain- 
ing certain  occupations, — such  as  shoddy-  and  carpet-cleaning  in  cer- 
tain locations ;^^'^  or  keeping  a  livery-stable  in  a  certain  locality.^^^ 

§  527.  (i)  The  same  subject  continued — Reasonableness  a  question 
of  law. — It  is,  of  course,  a  question  of  law  and  not  of  fact,  for  the  court 
and  not  for  the  jury,  whether  any  specific  ordinance  is  so  unreasonable 
as  to  be  void."^**    This  is  the  well-established  doctrine  of  the  cases  in 


"""  Ex  parte  Lorenzen,  128  Cal.  431;  =^«  People  v.  Sawyer,  106  Mich.  428, 

s.  c.  61  Pac.  68.  s.  c.  64  N.  W.  333. 

=•>' Jones  V.  Foster,  59  N.  Y.  S.  738;  ="  Ex  parte  Haskell,  112  Cal.  412; 

s.  c.  43  App.  Dlv.  (N.  Y.)  33.  s.  c.  44  Pac.  725. 

^""Village   of   St.    Marys   v.    Lake  -^^^  Ex  parte  Lacey,   108   Cal.   326; 

Erie  &c.  R.  Co.,  60  Ohio  St.  136;  s.  c.  s.  c.  41  Pac.  411. 

53  N.  E.  795.  =^»  City  of  Chicago  v.  Stratton,  58 

-'"City  Council  &c.  v.  Parker,  114  III.  App.  539. 

Ala.  118;  s.  c.  21  So.  452.  --"City  of  Brooklyn  v.  Breslin,  57 

="City  of  Emporia  v.  Wagoner,  6  N.  Y.  591;    Mayor  &c.  v.  Thorne,  7 

Kan.  App.  659;  s.  c.  49  Pac.  701.  Paige  Ch.    (N.  Y.)    261;   Dunham  v. 

='Mn  re  Gribben,  5  Okla.  379;  s.  c.  Trustees  &c.,  5  Cow.    (N.  Y.)    462: 

47  Pac.  1074.  Village   of   Buffalo    v.    Webster,    10 

2'^  Washington  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Lacey,  Wend.   (N.  Y.)   100;  Austin  v.  Mur- 

94  Va.  460;  s.  c.  26  S.  E.  834.  ray,   16  Pick.    (Mass.)   121;    City  of 

="  State  V.  Canal  &c.  R.  Co.,  50  La.  Boston  v.  Shaw,  1  Met.  (Mass.)  130; 

An.  1189;  s.  c.  24  So.  265.  Commonwealth  v.  Worcester,  3  Pick. 

'''City  of  Laddonia  v.  Poor,  73  Mo,  (Mass.)  462;  In  re  Vandine,  6  Pick. 

App.  465.  (Mass.)  187;  Commonwealth  v.  Stod- 


§  528 


PUBLIC    CORrORATlONS. 


506 


England  as  well  as  in  America,  but  the  contrary  view  has  been  as- 
serted in  a  Wisconsin  case  where  the  validity  of  an  ordinance  in- 
tended to  protect  the  city  from  inundation  was  called  into  question. 
The  court  held  that  testimony  relating  to  the  reasonableness  of  the 
ordinance  could  properly  be  presented  to  the  jury.^^^  This  decision 
is  anomalous,  however,  and  is  probably  entitled  to  but  little  weight. 
While  the  question  of  the  reasonableness  of  an  ordinance  is  a  ques- 
tion of  law  for  the  court,  yet  the  facts  which  may  or  may  not  make 
an  ordinance  reasonable,  if  controverted,  must  be  determined  by  the 
jury.---  The  motives  of  members  of  the  council  in  the  passage  of 
an  ordinance,  in  the  absence  of  fraud  will  not  be  inquired  into  if  the 
ordinance  is  lawful  on  its  face,  passed  in  due  form,  and  is  within  the 
scope  of  the  powers  vested  in  the  council;  nor  are  the  motives  of  the 
beneficiaries  important.--^ 

§  528.  (j)  Vagueness  of  the  ordinance. — It  is  manifest  that  an  or- 
dinance must  be  certain  and  definite  in  order  to  be  reasonable.  Accord- 
ingly the  courts  have  often  held  ordinances  void  as  being  vague  and 
indefinite.^^*     An  ordinance  providing  that  for  certain  offenses  the 


der,  2  Cush.  (Mass.)  562;  Commis- 
sioners V.  Nortliern  Liberties  Gas 
Co.,  12  Pa.  St.  318;  Kneedler  v.  Bo- 
rougli  of  Norristown,  100  Pa.  St.  368; 
Fisher  v.  Harrisburg,  2  Grant  Cas. 
(Pa.)  291;  Ex  parte  Frank,  52  Cal. 
606;  State  v.  East  Orange,  41  N.  J. 
L.  127;  State  v.  Mayor  &c.,  37  N.  J. 
L.  348;  Paxson  v.  Sweet,  13  N.  J.  L. 
196. 

--'■  Clason  V.  City  of  Milwaukee,  30 
Wis.  316. 

^--  City  of  Austin  v.  Austin  City 
Cemetery  Ass'n  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  28 
S.  W.  1023. 

'''Wood  V.  City  of  Seattle,  23 
Wash.  1;  s.  c.  62  Pac.  135;  Dreyfus 
V.  Lonergan,  73  Mo.  App.  336;  Moore 
V.  Commissioners  &c.,  62  N.  J.  L. 
386,  792;  s.  c.  41  Atl.  946;  Kittinger 
V.  Buffalo  &c.  Co.,  160  N.  Y.  377;  s.  c. 
54  N.  E.  1081.  It  would  seem  to  be 
a  pertinent  inquiry  whether  the  doc- 
trine laid  down  in  the  text  should  be 
applied  where  the  action  of  the  coun- 
cil is  contractual  in  its  nature, 
rather  than  purely  legislative.  And 
even  where  the  action  is  of  a  mixed 
nature,  as  in  the  granting  of  fran- 


chises, the  strict  application  of  the 
rule  is,  to  say  the  least,  of  doubtful 
propriety. 

"^Tappan  v.  Young,  9  Daly  (N. 
Y.)  357;  San  Francisco  &c.  Factory 
V.  Brickwedel,  60  Cal.  166;  Becker  v. 
City  of  Washington,  94  Mo.  375,  380; 
s.  c.  7  S.  W.  291;  Commonwealth  v. 
Roy,  140  Mass.  432;  s.  c.  4  N.  E.  814; 
Town  of  State  Center  v.  Barenstein, 
66  Iowa  249;  s.  c.  23  N.  W.  652;  Bills 
V.  City  of  Goshen,  117  Ind.  221;  s.  c. 
20  N.  E.  115;  City  of  Helena  v.  Gray, 
7  Mont.  486;  s.  c.  17  Pac.  564.  A 
penal  ordinance  which  fails  to  cast 
on  any  particular  person  or  persons 
the  duty  of  making  repairs  on  leaky 
vaults  is  too  vague  and  uncertain: 
State  V.  Forman,  50  La.  An.  1022;  s. 
c.  24  So.  603.  An  ordinance  impos- 
ing a  fine  of  not  more  than  $50  for 
a  violation  is  void  for  uncertainty: 
State  V.  Irvin,  126  N.  C.  989;  s.  c. 
35  S.  E.  430.  An  ordinance  may  be 
void  for  uncertainty,  as  where  it  pre- 
scribes that  an  awning  may  be  upon 
a  suitable  frame:  State  v.  Clarke, 
69  Conn.  371;  s.  c.  37  Atl.  975. 


507  ORDINANCES    AND    BY-LAWS.  §    529 

offender  should  pay  not  more  than  fifty  dollars  or  suffer  imprisonment 
not  to  exceed  one  month  was  held  in  North  Carolina  to  be  void  for 
vagueness  and  uncertainty.^-^  And  in  the  same  state  an  ordinance 
providing  that  for  certain  disorderly  conduct  the  offender  might  be 
fined  by  the  mayor  not  more  than  five  dollars  was  also  considered 
void  for  uncertainty.^-"  But  in  an  Alabama  case  an  ordinance  which 
imposed  a  penalty  not  exceeding  a  fixed  sum  was  upheld  as  sufficiently 
certain. ^^^  In  accordance  with  these  principles  the  weight  of  author- 
ity is  that  the  amount  of  the  fine  imposed  by  the  ordinance  must  be 
fixed  thereby  and  can  not  be  left  to  the  discretion  of  an  officer.^^^ 
An  ordinance  providing  that  no  occupant  of  land  abutting  on  a  pri- 
vate way  shall  suffer  any  filth  to  remain  on  that  part  of  the  way  ad- 
joining his  land  is  not  open  to  the  objection  of  indefiniteness  because 
it  does  not  fix  a  time  beyond  which  it  shall  not  be  allowed  to  remain. 
The  words  "suffer  to  remain"  imply  an  opportunity  to  remove  and  a 
failure  to  do  so.^^^ 

§  529.  (k)  Ordinances  void  for  want  of  notice. — As  we  have  al- 
ready seen  all  ordinances  are  not  strictly  legislative  in  their  nature, 
and  frequently  they  affect  the  individual  and  property  rights  of  per- 
sons, in  which  case  it  is  essential  that  the  persons  whose  rights  are 
affected  by  the  ordinance  shall  have  notice.  Thus,  an  ordinance 
which  practically  adjudicates  property-rights  is  invalid  unless  all 
persons  who  are  interested  in  the  subject-matter  have  notice,  actual 
or  constructive. ^'^^  An  ordinance  establishing  a  building-line  which 
encroaches  on  private  property,  passed  without  notice,  can  not  be  en- 
forced.^^^  The  charter,  or  general  statute,  frequently  requires  that 
ordinances  of  certain  character,  such  as  granting  permission  to  a 

"^  State  V.  Crenshaw,  94  N.  C.  877.  fine  of  not  more  than  five  pounds,  an 

^-*'  State   V.   Cainan,   94   N.   C.   883.  ordinance  fixing  a  fine  "not  exceed- 

And   a  town  ordinance   which   pro-  ing    51."    was    sustained:     Piper    v. 

vided  that  "any  person  whose  duty  Chappell,  14  M.  &  W.  624. 

it  shall  be  to  make  such  alterations,  --•*  State  v.  Zeigler,  32  N.  J.  L.  262, 

and  who  shall  refuse  to  do  so  after  269;     Commissioners    v.    Harris,    7 

due  notice  thereof,  shall  be  fined  a  Jones  L.  (N.  C.)  281;  State  v.  Cren- 

sum  not  exceeding  five  dollars,  and  shaw,  94  N.  C.  877;  State  v.  Cainan, 

one  dollar  for  each  and  every  day  94  N.  C.  883;  State  v.  Treasurer  &c., 

he   may   neglect  to   make   such   re-  53  N.  J.  L.  329;  s.  c.  21  Atl.  304. 

pairs,"  was  thought  to  leave  the  fine  '--"  Commonwealth    v.    Cutter,    156 

and  penalty  uncertain  in  amount  and  Mass.  52;  s.  c.  29  N.  E.  1146. 

to  be  void:    State  v.  Rice,  97  N.  C,  -™City  of  Cape  May  v.  Cape  May 

421;  s.  c.  2  S.  E.  180.  &c.  R.  Co.,  60  N.  J.  L.  224;   s.  c.  37 

--'  Mayor  &c.  v.  Phelps,  27  Ala.  55.  Atl.  892. 

So  also,  under  the  English  statute  -^^  Byrnes  v.  Mayor  &c.,  64  N.  J.  L. 

authorizing  an  ordinance  imposing  a  210;  s.  c.  44  Atl.  857. 


§    530  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  508 

railway  to  occupy  the  streets,  and  other  franchises  of  a  similar 
nature,  shall  be  based  on  the  consent  of  a  specified  number  of  the 
property-owners  on  the  line  of  street  affected,  or  that  before  an  ordi- 
nance of  a  certain  nature  shall  be  passed  notice  thereof  shall  be  given 
in  advance,  or  that  a  certain  period  shall  elapse  after  the  introduction 
of  an  ordinance  and  its  publication  before  it  shall  be  put  upon  its 
final  passage.  An  ordinance  declaring  that  a  street-railway  might 
locate  its  line  on  certain  streets  without  petition  or  publication  of 
notice  thereof  is  a  nullity.^^-  In  the  very  nature  of  things  it  would 
be  manifestly  unjust,  outside  of  constitutional  guaranties,  that  indi- 
vidual rights  of  persons  should  be  injuriously  affected  without  an 
opportunity  to  be  heard. 

§  530.  (1)  Ordinances  granting  arbitrary  power. — Ordinances 
which  invest  a  city  council,  or  a  board  of  trustees,  or  officers,  with  a 
discretion  which  is  purely  arbitrary,  and  which  may  be  exercised  in 
the  interest  of  a  favored  few,  are  unreasonable  and  invalid.^^^  But 
it  is  only  where  the  municipal  authorities  are  invested  with  a  power 
that  is  purely  arbitrary,  and  which  they  may  exercise  or  not,  as  their 
will  may  dictate,  and  the  beneficiary  appears  to  be  entitled  to  personal 
favors,  that  the  rule  applies.  Ordinances,  however,  must  be  general, 
and  officers  charged  with  the  duty  of  enforcing  them  must  be  vested 
with  more  or  less  discretion.  Many  things  detrimental  to  the  public 
peace  and  enjoyment,  in  one  locality,  may  not  be  so  in  another,  and 
so  as  to  time  and  environments.  Hence  an  ordinance  prohibiting 
awnings  without  the  consent  of  certain  officers  is  valid.-^*  And  so 
as  to  orations  and  harangues  in  a  public  park,  or  common,  or  other 
public  grounds  ;^^^  or  the  beating  of  a  drum  or  tambourine  on  a  street 

=^3=' Harvey  v.  Aurora  &c.  R.  Co.,  186  72;  City  of  Plymouth  v.  Schultheis, 
111.  283;  s.  c.  57  N.  E.  857.  Notice  135  Ind.  701;  s.  c.  35  N.  E.  14;  Town 
of  the  passage  of  an  ordinance  for  of  State  Center  v.  Barenstein,  66 
the  costs  of  an  improvement,  or  es-  Iowa  249;  s.  c.  23  N.  W.  652;  Com- 
tablishing  a  district  sewer,  held  not  missioners  v.  Northern  Liberties  Gas 
required  in  Heman  v.  Allen,  156  Mo.  Co.,  12  Pa.  St.  318;  Austin  v.  Mur- 
534;  s.  c.  57  S.  W.  559.  As  to  what  ray,  16  Pick.  (Mass.)  121,  126;  State 
is  sufficient  notice  of  the  introduc-  v.  Mahner,  43  La.  An.  496;  s.  c.  9  So. 
tion  of  an  ordinance  granting  a  f ran-  480;  State  v.  Dulaney,  43  La.  An. 
chise,  see  Wood  v.  City  of  Seattle,  23  500;  s.  c.  9  So.  481;  Yick  Wo  v.  Hop- 
Wash.  1;  s.  c.  62  Pac.  135.  kins,  118  U.  S.  356;  s.  c.  6  S.  Ct.  1064; 

-■'^  Cicero  Lumber  Co.  v.  Town  of  City  of  Newton  v.  Belger,  143  Mass. 

Cicero,  176  111.  9;  s.  c.  51  N.  E.  758;  598;  s.  c.  10  N.  E.  464;  Mayor  &c.  v. 

City  of  Chicago  v.  Trotter,  136  111.  Radecke,  49  Md.  217. 

430;  s.  c.  26  N.  E.  359;  Rich  v.  City  "'*  Pedrick     v.     Bailey,     12     Gray 

of  Naperville,  42  111.  App.  222;  In  re  (Mass.)  161. 

Frazee,  63  Mich.  396;  s.  c.  30  N.  W.  ='' Commonwealth  v.  Abrahams,  156 


509  ORDINANCES    AND    BY-LAWS,  §    -'531 

or  sidewalk  ;^^*'  or  prohibiting  the  erection  and  repair  of  a  wooden 
building,  or  an}'  building  ;-^^  or  forbidding  the  occupancy  of  a  place 
on  the  street;-^"  or  forbidding  the  keeping  of  swine ;^^^  or  forbidding 
any  one  remaining  in  a  public  market  more  than  twenty  minutes;^**' 
or  prohibiting  the  carrying-on  of  a  laundry  ;~^^  or  retailing  liquor.^*^ 
An  ordinance  is  not  void  for  uncertainty  in  that  it  gives  the  mayor 
the  discretion  to  impose  a  penalty  of  either  fine  or  imprisonment.^*^ 

§  531.  (m)  Ordinances  delegating  power. — Wliere  the  law  has 
placed  in  the  city  council  the  power  of  legislation,  in  so  far  as  its 
local  affairs  are  concerned,  or  in  other  words  has,  by  special  grant, 
permitted  a  part  of  its  sovereign  power  of  legislation  to  be  exercised 
by  the  local  legislative  body,  prescribed  as  to  territory  and  scope, 
this  power  so  delegated  can  not  be  redelegated  to  some  other  body, 
committee,  board,  bureau,  or  officer.  Besides,  it  is  not  possible  for 
an  executive  or  judicial  officer  to  exercise  legislative  functions.  Hence 
the  council  can  not  delegate  general  power  to  the  mayor  to  grant  a 
license,  or  fix  the  fees;^**  and  so  an  order  for  an  assessment  for  an 
improvement  "where  necessary"  is  void;-*^  and  so  is  an  ordinance 
for  an  improvement,  excepting  such  portions  as  have  already  been 
done  in  a  suitable  manner  ;^*^  or  for  improving  such  portions  of  a 
sidewalk  as  the  city  engineer  may  direct  ;^*'^  or  in  such  manner  as  the 
city  superintendent  shall  direct.^*®  The  power  of  assessment  is  ref- 
erable to  the  power  of  taxation,  and  is  itself  a  legislative  power 
which  must  not  only  find  express  authority  for  its  exercise,  but  which 
can  be  neither  exercised  by  an  executive  officer,  nor  delegated  to  such 

Mass.  57;  s.  c.  30  N.  E.  79;  Common-  v.  Bering,  84  Wis.  585;  s.  c.  54  N.  W. 

wealth  V.  Davis,  140  Mass.  485;  s.  c.  1104;   In  re  Frazee,  63  Mich.  396;  s. 

4  N.  E.  577.  c.  30  N.  W.  72. 

^^« Vance  v.  Hadfield,  22  N.  Y.  St.  "'State  v.  Higgs,  126  N.  C.  1014; 

858.  s.  c.  35  S.  E.  473. 

^"Ex  parte  Fiske,  72  Cal.  125;  s.  c.  -"  Naegle  v.  City  of  Centralia,  81 

13   Pac.   310;    Hine  v.   City  of  New  111.  App.  334. 

Haven,  40  Conn.  478;  Commissioners  -"Richardson   v.    Heydenfeldt,   46 

&c.  v.  Covey,  74  Md.  2G2;  s.  c.  22  Atl.  Cal.  68. 

266.  ^^''Foss  V.  City  of  Chicago,  56  111. 

23S  Nightingale,  Petitioner,  11  Pick.  354. 

(Mass.)  168.  =^"Hydes  v.  Joyes,  4  Bush    (Ky.) 

'"'^  Inhabitants  &c.  v.  Kennard,  151  464. 

Mass.  563 ;  s.  c.  24  N.  E.  860.  =**  Thompson   v.    Schermerhorn,   G 

-'"Commonwealth   v.    Brooks,    109  N.  Y.  92;  Phelps  v.  Mayor  &c.,  112  N. 

Mass.  355.  Y.  216,  221;  s.  c.  19  N.  E.  408;  City 

="  Barbier  v.  Connolly,   113  U.   S.  of  Kankakee  v.  Potter,  119  111.  324; 

27;  s.  c.  5  S.  Ct.  357.  s.  c.  10  N.  E.  212;  McCrowell  v.  City 

■■^=Ex   parte   Christensen,    85    Cal.  of  Bristol,  89  Va.  652;  s.  c.  16  S.  E. 

208;  s.  c.  24  Pac.  747.    But  see  State  867. 


§    532  PUBLIC    COUrOKATlONS.  510 

officer,  by  the  legislative  body  of  the  municipality.^*^  An  attempt  to 
delegate  such  power  to  an  executive  officer  is  such  covert,  irresponsi- 
ble, discretionary  power  as  is  wholly  inconsistent  with  a  proper  exer- 
cise of  the  high  and  sovereign  power  of  taxation  or  eminent  domain. 
It  might  be  used,  and  it  does  not  affect  the  principle  whether  it  was 
so  used  or  not,  as  a  cover  to  an  unfair  assessment.  It  might  be  used  as 
an  instrument  of  favoritism  in  letting  contracts  for  work.-^°  A  provi- 
sion in  specifications  for  extra  work,  such  as  the  superintendent  of 
streets  and  the  city  engineer  may  require,  and  to  be  paid  for  pro  rata, 
renders  the  proceedings  void.^^^ 

§  532.  (n)  Ordinances  which  are  contracts. — Where  rights  and 
privileges  have  been  lawfully  granted  to  and  accepted  by  either  a  pri- 
vate or  public  corporation,  and  valuable  improvements  have  been 
made  on  the  faith  of  the  grant,  a  contract  is  thereby  entered  into,  and 
it  can  not  be  impaired  by  a  law  of  the  state,  or  by  a  municipality, 
where  the  right  of  repeal  or  alteration  has  not  been  reserved. ^^^ 
The  passing  of  a  resolution  by  the  council  letting  a  contract  for  light- 
ing is  a  ministerial  act  in  the  nature  of  a  business  transaction.^^* 
Where  an  ordinance  grants  a  franchise  to  a  water  company  and  per- 
mits the  company  to  charge  a  fixed  price  for  water  and  there  is  no 
power  of  repeal  reserved,  it  becomes  a  contract,  or  at  least  the  council 
has  no  right  to  reduce  the  price  one  half.^"*  An  ordinance  passed 
under  power  given  by  the  legislature  which  grants  to  a  railroad  com- 
pany the  right  to  construct  its  road  upon  a  public  landing  and  which 
prohibits  the  use  of  the  track  during  specified  hours  is  not  only  con- 

^^  Bolton  V.  Gilleran,  105  Cal.  244,  leans  &c.  Co.  v.  Louisiana  &c.  Co., 

248;  s.  c.  38  Pac.  881.  115  U.  S.  650;  s.  c.  6  S.  Ct.  252;  New 

^'""Foss  V.  City  of  Chicago,  56  111.  Orleans  Water  Works  Co.  v.  Rivers, 

354.  115  U.  S.  674;  s.  c.  6  S.  Ct.  273;  Sioux 

="  Ferine  &c.  Co.  v.  City  of  Pasa-  City  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Sioux  City,  138  U. 

dena,  116  Cal.  6;   s.  c.  47  Pac.  777;  S.  98;  s.  c.  11  S.  Ct.  226;   St.  Louis 

Bolton  V.  Gilleran,  105  Cal.  244;  s.  c.  v.  Western  U.  Tel.  Co.,  148  U.  S.  92; 

38  Pac.  881.  s.  c.  13  S.  Ct.  485;   Saginaw  Gas  &c. 

''^^  Baltimore  Trust  &c.  Co.  v.  Mayor  Co.  v.  City  of  Saginaw,  28  Fed.  529; 

&c.,  64  Fed.  153;  Dartmouth  College  Coastline   R.   Co.   v.   Mayor  &c.,   30 

V.  Woodward,  4  Wheat.  518;  Chicago  Fed.  646;  Citizens'  St.  R.  Co.  v.  City 


v.  Sheldon,  9  Wall.  50;  Shields  v 
Ohio,  95  U.  S.  319;  New  Jersey  v 
Yord,  95  U.  S.  104;  Railroad  Co.  v 
Richmond,  96  U.  S.  521;  Wright  v 
Nagle,  101  U.  S.  791;  Greenwood  v 
Freight  Co.,  105  U.  S.  13;  New  Or 
leans  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Delamore,  114  U 
S.  501;  s.  c.  5  S.  Ct.  1009;  New  Or 


of  Memphis,  53  Fed.  715;  State  v. 
Corrigan  Con.  St.  R.  Co.,  85  Mo.  263; 
City  of  Burlington  v.  Burlington  St. 
R.  Co.,  49  Iowa  144. 

"'"'■^  Seitzinger  v.  Borough  of  Tama- 
qua,  187  Pa.  St.  539;  s.  c.  41  Atl.  454. 

-^^City  of  Ashland  v.  Wheeler,  88 
Wis.  607;  s.  c.  60  N.  W.  818. 


511 


ORDINANCES   AND   BY-LAWS. 


533 


tractual  but  is  also  an  exercise  of  police  power  for  the  protection  of 
the  public.'^^ 

§  533.  (o)  Ordinances  as  to  improvements — Valid. — Where  an  or- 
dinance describes  the  nature,  character,  locality  and  description  of 
a  proposed  improvement,  with  reasonable  certainty,  it  is  sufficient 
and  is  valid. ^"*^  An  ordinance  for  an  assessment  for  a  street-improve- 
ment is  sufficient  as  to  the  nature,  character,  and  locality  of  an  im- 
provement, if  it  refers  to  the  ordinance  ordering  the  same,  where  the 
description  therein  is  sufficient.^^'^  An  ordinance  specifying  the  ma- 
terial to  be  used,  but  not  the  character  of  the  material  to  be  used,  is  a 
sufficient  compliance  with  the  charter.^ ^®  An  ordinance  for  a  street- 
extension  will  not  be  held  invalid  for  failure  to  designate  the  grade 
of  the  street,  and  whether  it  is  to  be  paved  or  not,  where  the  amount 
apportioned  on  the  property  is  not  left  in  doubt.'^" 


^^^  Pittsburg  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Hood,  94 
Fed.  618;  s.  c.  36  C.  C.  A.  423. 

^•^  Hynes  v.  City  of  Chicago,  175 
111.  56;  s.  c.  51  N.  E.  705;  Delamater 
v.  City  of  Cliicago,  158  III.  575;  s.  c. 
42  N.  E.  444;  Vane  v.  City  of  Evans- 
ton,  150  111.  616;  s.  c.  37  N.  E.  901; 
City  of  Kankakee  v.  Potter,  119  111. 
324;  s.  c.  10  N.  E.  212;  Adams  Co.  v. 
City  of  Quincy,  130  111.  566;  s.  c.  22 
N.  E.  624;  Woods  v.  City  of  Chicago, 
135  111.  582;  s.  c.  26  N.  E.  608;  Kim- 
ble V.  City  of  Peoria,  140  111.  157;  s. 
c.  29  N.  B.  723;  Otis  v.  City  of  Chi- 
cago, 161  111.  199;  s.  c.  43  N.  E.  715; 
Cass  V.  People,  166  111.  126;  s.  c.  46 
N.  E.  729;  Pearce  v.  Village  of  Hyde 
Park,  126  111.  287;  s.  c.  18  N.  E.  824; 
Cramer  v.  City  of  Charleston,  176 
111.  507;  s.  c.  52  N.  E.  73. 

=^'McManus  v.  People,  183  111.  391; 
s.  c.  55  N.  E.  886. 

^«  Barber  Asphalt  Pav.  Co.  v.  He- 
zel,  155  Mo.  391;  s.  c.  56  S.  W.  449. 

'^^  Pearson  v.  City  of  Chicago,  162 
111.  383;  s.  c.  44  N.  E.  739.  An  ordi- 
nance providing  for  the  construction 
of  a  sewer  from  its  outfall  at  the 
north  branch  of  the  Chicago  river  is 
not  ambiguous  where  the  city  had 
by  a  former  ordinance  located  the 
channel  of  the  river,  the  river  be- 
ing a   well-defined   and   well-known 


stream  with  a  natural  bed  and  chan- 
nel: Bickerdike  v.  City  of  Chicago, 
185  111.  280;  s.  c.  56  N.  E.  1096.  The 
description  of  a  street  improvement 
as  extending  on  a  specified  street 
from  the  south  line  of  a  street-rail- 
way right  of  way  to  the  north  line 
of  another  street-railway  right  of 
way  on  another  named  street,  is  not 
void  for  indefiniteness:  Rawson  v. 
City  of  Chicago,  185  111.  87;  s.  c.  57 
N.  E.  35.  The  grade  of  a  street  is 
suflSciently  described  in  an  ordinance 
whereby  it  is  fixed  on  certain  heights 
above  low-water  mark,  by  means  of 
which  it  can  be  definitely  deter- 
mined: Mead  v.  City  of  Chicago,  186 
111.  54;  s.  c.  57  N.  E.  824.  An  ordi- 
nance giving  the  height  of  a  curb  at 
the  back  and  inside  of  the  gutter  at 
certain  points  and  providing  for  a 
uniform  slope,  is  valid:  Mead  v. 
City  of  Chicago,  186  111.  54;  s.  c.  57 
N.  E.  824.  An  ordinance  providing 
for  an  assessment  to  pay  for  an  im- 
provement made  under  an  ordinance 
subsequently  declared  void  is  not 
void  for  a  failure  to  describe  the  na- 
ture and  character  of  the  improve- 
ment: Hull  V.  West  Chicago  Park 
Com'rs,  185  111.  150;  s.  c.  57  N.  E.  1. 
An  ordinance  is  sufficiently  certain 
in  the  description  of  a  sewer  where 


534 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS. 


512 


§  534.    (p)    Ordinances  as  to  improvements — Invalid. — An  ordi- 

naucc  prescribing  that  curbstones  shall  be  imbedded  on  flat  stones 
without  stating  what  kinds  is  not  sufficient  and  is  void;^^"  and  it  must 
also  describe  the  height  of  the  curb.-®^  There  should  be  no  variance 
between  the  ordinance  and  the  estimates  on  which  it  is  based. ^''-  A 
municipal  corporation  can  not  under  guise  of  paying  for  a  street- 
improvement  collect  a  fund  in  advance  to  be  used  at  some  indefinite 
it  places  the  beginning  at  the  inter-     ordinances  were  held  sufficient  as  to 


section  of  the  center  lines  of  two 
streets  and  extends  along  the  center 
lines  of  streets  named  to  a  point  of 
connection  with  another  sewer,  giv- 
ing its  depth  at  the  point  of  begin- 
ning and  at  its  intersections  with 
cross  streets:  Ryder's  Estate  v.  City 
of  Alton,  175  111.  94;  s.  c.  51  N.  E. 
821.  An  ordinance  describing  the 
size,  material  and  manner  of  con- 
struction of  a  catch-basin,  specifying 
that  it  shall  be  built  on  a  bottom  of 
two-inch  pine  plank  spiked  to  im- 
bedded stringers,  is  sufficient  with- 
out describing  the  stringers:  Village 
of  Hinsdale  v.  Shannon,  182  111.  312; 
s.  c.  55  N.  E.  327.  An  ordinance  de- 
scribing a  grade  measured  from  a 
plane  of  low-water  mark  in  Lake 
Michigan  in  1847  as  established  by 
a  certain  board,  was  held  sufficient, 
as  it  was  not  necessary  that  the 
object  from  which  the  survey  was 
to  be  made  should  have  been  es- 
tablished by  ordinance:  Chicago 
&c.  R.  Co.  V.  City  of  Chicago,  184 
111.  154;  s.  c.  56  N.  E.  410.  A 
caption  to  an  ordinance  entitled 
"An  ordinance  for  the  construc- 
tion of  a  pipe  sewer  ....  with 
manholes  and  catch-basins  com- 
plete," is  sufficient:  Village  of  Hins- 
dale V.  Shannon,  182  111.  312;  s.  c. 
55  N.  E.  327.  An  ordinance  pro- 
viding for  sewers  in  several  streets 
is  not  void  as  providing  for  a  double 
improvement:  Beach  v.  People,  157 
111.  659;  s.  c.  41  N.  E.  1117;  City  of 
Springfield  v.  Green,  120  111.  269;  s. 
c.  11  N.  E.  261;  Village  of  Hinsdale 
V.  Shannon,  182  111.  312;  s.  c.  55  N. 
E.  327.     In  the  following  cases  the 


the  description  of  the  improve- 
ment: Sawyer  v.  City  of  Chicago, 
183  111.  57;  s.  c.  55  N.  E.  645;  In  re 
Beech  wood  Ave.,  194  Pa.  St.  86;  s.  c. 
45  Atl.  127;  People  v.  Delaware  &c. 
R.  Co.,  159  N.  Y.  545;  s.  c.  54  N.  E. 
1093;  City  of  Louisville  v.  Western 
Bank,  21  Ky.  L.  1075;  s.  c.  54  S.  W. 
15;  Bickerdike  v.  City  of  Chicago, 
185  111.  280;  s.  c.  56  N.  E.  1096.  That 
the  outlet  of  a  sewer  will  be  insuffi- 
cient does  not  render  the  ordinance 
or  the  assessment  invalid:  Bicker- 
dike  V.  City  of  Chicago,  185  111.  280; 
s.  c.  56  N.  E.  1096.  That  the  com- 
missioners may  at  any  time  before 
final  report  enlarge  or  reduce  the 
taxing-district,  see  City  of  St.  Louis 
V.  Brown,  155  Mo.  545;  s.  c.  56  S.  W. 
298.  Ordinance  for  public  improve- 
ment under  Ky.  Stat,  §  2834,— see 
City  of  Louisville  v.  Selvage,  21  Ky. 
L.  349;  s.  c.  51  S.  W.  447. 

="">  Lusk  V.  City  of  Chicago,  176  111. 
207;  s.  c.  52  N.  E.  54;  Otis  v.  City  of 
Chicago,  161  111.  199;  s.  c.  43  N.  E. 
715;  City  of  Kankakee  v.  Potter,  119 
111.  324;  s.  c.  10  N.  E.  212;  Levy  v. 
City  of  Chicago,  113  111.  650;  City  of 
Sterling  v.  Gait,  117  111.  11;  s.  c.  7 
N.  E.  471;  Cass  v.  People,  166  111. 
126;  s.  c.  46  N.  B.  729. 

^"  Essroger  v.  City  of  Chicago,  185 
111.  420;  s.  c.  56  N.  E.  1086;  Jarrett 
V.  City  of  Chicago,  181  111.  242;  s.  c. 
54  N.  E.  946;  Mills  v.  City  of  Chi- 
cago, 182  111.  249;  s.  c.  54  N.  E.  987; 
Cruickshank  v.  City  of  Chicago,  181 
111.  415;  s.  c.  54  N.  E.  997. 

^''-  Mead  v.  City  of  Chicago,  186  111. 
54;  s.  c.  57  N.  E.  824. 


513  ORDINANCES    AND   BY-LAWS.  §    535 

time.^^^  Where  a  resolution  is  adopted  declaring  a  necessity  for 
certain  improvements,  and  an  ordinance  is  passed  providing  for  the 
improvements  and  a  contract  is  made  and  subsequently  the  grade  is 
established  and  a  substantial  change  made  the  proceedings  prior 
thereto  are  void.-*^* 

§  535.  (q)  Miscellaneous  ordinances — Valid  and  invalid. — An  or- 
dinance giving  a  gas  company  the  right  to  lay  pipes  in  the  streets  is 
not  void  because  it  fails  to  reserve  the  right  in  the  city  to  determine 
what  streets  shall  be  used.^**^  An  ordinance  denying  the  right  of  re- 
newing a  license  is  not  illegal.^*'*^  The  granting  by  ordinance  of 
power  to  a  street-railway  company  to  acquire  by  purchase  or  other- 
wise, any  existing  railway,  or  part  thereof,  does  not  create  a  monopoly 
and  trust.^^'^  The  following  ordinances  have  been  held  invalid :  An 
ordinance  regulating  fares  to  be  charged  by  a  street-railway  outside 
the  city  limits  ;^®^  an  ordinance  providing  for  the  payment  of  inter- 
est on  warrants  for  public  work  to  be  returned  to  the  city  on  final 
payment,  under  a  constitutional  provision  prohibiting  the  city  from 
loaning  its  money  on  credit ;^'^^  an  ordinance  taxing  vehicles  kept  for 
public  use  where  not  taxed  by  the  state  ;^'^*'  an  ordinance  providing 
for  imprisonment  under  a  fine  without  giving  an  opportunity  to  pay 
the  fine  as  provided  by  the  charter  ;^^^  an  ordinance  providing  for  a 
license  and  an  illegal  method  of  enforcement;^"^  an  ordinance  for  the 
sale  of  impounded  stock,  where  no  method  is  provided  for  a  judicial 
hearing  and  judgment.-'^®  An  illegal  ordinance  is  wholly  inoperative, 
and  can  not  be  rendered  valid  by  an  ordinance  continuing  in  force  all 
existing  ordinances  until  altered  or  repealed.-^* 

='«"  State  V.   District  Court  &c.,  80  ^"^  City  of  South  Pasadena  v.  Los 

Minn.  293;  s.  c.  83  N.  W.  183.  Angeles  &c.  R.  Co.,  109  Cal.  315;  s.  c. 

-°*  Whittaker  v.  City  of  Deadwood,  41  Pac.  1093. 

12  S.  D.  608;  s.  c.  82  N.  W.  202.  ^''^  Moran  v.  Thompson,  20  Wash. 

-"'  City  of  Kalamazoo  v.  Kalamazoo  525;  s.  c.  56  Pac.  29. 

&c.  Co.,  124  Mich.  74;  s.  c.  82  N.  W.  "'"Ex   parte   Terrell,    40   Tex.    Cr, 

811.  App.  28;  s.  c.  48  S.  W.  504. 

266  pfg^fgrling  v.  Mayor  &c.,  88  Md.  ="  Calhoun  v.  Little,  106  Ga.  336; 

475;  s.  c.  41  Atl.  778.  s.  c.  32  S.  E.  86.     See  Papworth  v. 

'"Wood    V.    City    of    Seattle,    23  City  of  Fitzgerald,  106  Ga.  378;  s.  c. 

Wash.   1;    s.  c.  62  Pac.   135.     As  to  32  S.  E.  363. 

validity    of    ordinances    under    Ky.  "''-  German  &c.  Ins.  Co.  v.  City  of 

Stat,   §§   2834,   2783,  see  Louisville  Minden,  51  Neb.  870;  s.  c.  71  N.  W. 

Steam  Forge  Co.  v.  Anderson,  22  Ky.  995. 

L.  397;  s.  c.  57  S.  W.  617.    Require-  "'^  Armstrong  v.  Brown,  20  Ky.  L. 

ments  as  to  validity  under  N.  J.  Gen.  1766;  s.  c.  50  S.  W.  17. 

St.,   p.   575, — see   Flood   v.   Atlantic  ""*  City  of  Omaha  v.   Harmon,   58 

City,  63  N.  J.  L.  530;  s.  c.  42  Atl.  829.  Neb.  339;  s.  c.  78  N.  W.  623. 

1  Smith — 33 


§    536  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  514 

§  536.  (r)  Jurisdictional  matters  in  relation  to  ordinances. — A 
court  can  not  enjoin  the  passage  of  an  ordinance  for  non-compliance 
with  the  rules,  as  such  non-compliance  merely  relates  to  the  valid- 
ity.-^®  Neither  will  a  court  of  equity  enjoin  the  enforcement  of  an 
ordinance  on  the  ground  of  its  invalidity,  as  in  such  case  there  is  an 
adequate  and  complete  remedy  at  law.^'^^  As  a  general  rule,  it  may 
be  stated  that  a  court  of  equity  will  not  determine  as  a  matter  of  law 
whether  an  ordinance  is  valid  or  invalid. ^^'''  Where  an  ordinance  is, 
in  effect,  a  contract  entered  into  between  the  municipality  and  a  third 
party,  and  no  fraud  or  palpable  abuse  of  discretion  appears,  the  only 
question  for  judicial  cognizance  is  whether  there  has  been  a  violation 
of  legal  principles,  or  neglect  of  prescribed  legal  formalities  in  enter- 
ing into  the  contract. ^'^®  On  an  appeal  from  a  fine  for  violation  of  a 
city  ordinance  the  supreme  court  can  not  inquire  into  the  legality 
of  the  proceeding,  or  correctness  of  the  judgment,  when  the  legality 
or  constitutionality  of  the  ordinance  is  not  raised.^'^^  Courts  will 
not  review  the  proceedings  of  a  city  council  by  preventing  the  carry- 
ing-out of  an  ordinance  for  public  improvement  unless  it  is  so  unrea- 
sonable as  to  be  void.^^"  A  resolution  of  a  common  council,  modify- 
ing a  contract  procured  by  means  of  fraud  and  corruption,  may  be 
declared  by  the  courts  to  be  void ;  and  such  defense  is  available  by  the 
city  when  sued  by  the  contractor  upon  the  contract.  In  such  case 
the  resolution  is  part  of  the  administrative  duties  of  the  council  and 
not  legislative.^®^  A  member  of  the  city  council  who  has  voted  for 
the  passage  of  an  ordinance  may  assert  its  invalidity  as  a  taxpayer 
and  citizen. ^®^  An  ordinance  though  passed  in  excess  of  power  in 
the  council  can  not  be  collaterally  attacked  by  the  city.^®^ 

§  537.  (s)  Curative  ordinances. — It  sometimes  happens  that  an 
ordinance  is  within  the  scope  of  power,  express  or  implied,  granted  to 
the  council,  but  by  reason  of  some  informality  in  the  passage,  or  of 
some  other  preliminary  step  prescribed  by  the  charter  not  being  taken, 

"^  State  v.  Superior  Court  &c.,  105  "^  State  v.  Hohn,  50  La.  An.  432; 

Wis.  651;  s.  c.  81  N.  W.  1046.  s.  c.  23  So.  966. 

'"'=  Mayor  &c.  v.  Patterson,  109  Ga.  -'"  Field    v.    Village    of    Western 

370;  s.  c.  34  S.  E.  600.  Springs,  181  111.  186;  s.  c.  54  N.  E. 

"-"  Coykendall  v.  Hood,  55  N.  Y.  S.  929. 

718;  s.  c.  36  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  558.  -"Weston  v.  City  of  Syracuse.  158 

^'«  Oakley  v.  City  of  Atlantic  City,  N.  Y.  274;  s.  c.  53  N.  E.  12;  Talcott 

63  N.  J.  L.  127;  s.  c.  44  Atl.  651.    Cf.  V.  City  of  Buffalo,  125  N.  Y.  280;   s. 

State  V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  60  N.  J.  L.  c.  26  N.  E.  263. 

402;  s.  c.  38  Atl.  636;  State  v.  Board  ="  Stadler  v.   Fahey,   87   111.   App. 

&c.,  57  N.  J.  L.  588;  s.  c.  31  Atl.  454;  411. 

State  V.  Mayor  &c.,  58  N.  J.  L.  262;  -'"Vicksburg  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Mayor 

s.  c.  33  Atl.  740.  &c.,  48  La.  An.  1102;  s.  c.  20  So.  664. 


515  ORDINANCES    AND    BY-LAWS.  §    538 

its  validity  as  a  binding  contract  is  open  to  attack.  In  such  case  the 
ordinance  may  be  rendered  valid  by  a  curative  ordinance,  subject,  of 
course,  to  intervening  rights.  Where  the  city  has  authority  to  con- 
tract but  does  not  expressly  do  so,  it  may  ratify  it  after  the  work  has 
been  done.^^*  An  ordinance  is  necessary  to  ratify  an  unauthorized 
act  of  a  council  committee. ^^^  The  charter,  or  statute,  frequently 
provides  in  matters  of  public  improvements  and  special  assessments, 
that  if,  for  any  reason,  the  ordinance  shall  be  found  invalid  on  which 
.the  improvement  is  based,  it  may  be  rendered  valid  by  a  subsequent 
curative  act.  And  in  the  absence  of  a  constitutional  limitation  the 
curative  act  may  be  by  the  legislature.^®*^  A  curative  statute  may  be 
so  construed  although  it  does  not  use  the  words  "ratify,"  "confirm" 
or  "validate."^'^'^ 

§  538.  (t)  Scope,  force,  effect,  etc.,  of  ordinances. — An  ordinance 
may  combine  contractual  as  well  as  police  regulations,^®^  and  may  be 
passed  to  take  effect  in  the  event  of  a  contingency.^^"  Within  the 
corporate  limits  the  police  provisions  of  an  ordinance  have  the  force 
of  a  legislative  enactment.^ ^^  An  ordinance,  adopted  under  author- 
ity given  by  statute,  giving  a  railroad  the  right  to  construct  its 
track  along  certain  streets  subject  to  restrictions  and  limitations, 
when  accepted  becomes  as  binding  as  a  statute  and  is  a  limitation  on 
the  power  of  the  road.^^^  The  legislature  may  provide  that  on  the 
annexation  of  one  corporation  to  another  any  ordinance  in  force  shall 
continue  in  force.^®^  An  ordinance  is  not  retrospective.^^*  To  make 
an  ordinance  applicable  to  a  street-railway,  or  railway  operating  on 
the  city  streets,  it  must  appear  that  the  company  was  existing  at  the 
time  the  ordinance  was  passed  and  was  one  of  the  railroads  desig- 
nated. ^^^  A  railroad  accepting  the  benefits  of  an  ordinance  is  subject 
to  burdens  imposed  by  it.^***^  A  town  ordinance  declaring  a  particular 
thing  a  nuisance  does  not  make  it  so.-"'^ 

="*  City  of  Chester  v.  Eyre,  181  Pa.  -'-  Tudor  v.  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.,  154 

St.  642;  s.  c.  37  Atl.  837.  III.  129;  s.  c.  39  N.  E.  136. 

"""Maudlin  v.  City  of  Trenton,  67  =*' Swift  v.  Klein,  163  111.  269;   s. 

Mo.  App.  452.  c.  45  N.  E.  219. 

""*"  Nottage  v.  City  of  Portland,  35  ^*  City  of  Willow  Springs  v.  Wit- 

Or.  539;  s.  c.  58  Pac.  883.  haupt,  61  Mo.  App.  275;   s.  c.  1  Mo. 

~^'  Nottage    V.    City    of    Portland,  App.  Repr.  388. 

supra.  ="' Thompson    v.    Citizens'    St.    R. 

-"'  Pittsburg  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Hood,  94  Co..  152  Ind.  461;  s.  c.  53  N.  B.  462. 

Fed.  618;  s.  c.  36  C.  C.  A.  423.  =»"  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  People,  79 

=»«  Heman  Constr.  Co.  v.  Loevy,  64  111.  App.  529. 

Mo.  App.  430;  s.  c.  2  Mo.  App.  Repr.  ""'  Board    &c.    v.    Norman,    51    La. 

1123.  An.  736;   s.  c.  25  So.  401;  Walker  v. 

=^^  Pittsburg   &c.   R.    Co.   v.   Hood,  Jameson,  140  Ind.  591;  s.  c.  37  N.  E. 
94  Fed.  618;  s.  c.  36  C.  C.  A.  423. 


§    539  PUBLIC    CORrORATIOXS.  516 

§  539.  Motives  of  council  not  to  be  impeached. — A  city  council 
being  "a  miniature  general  assembly  and  its  authorized  ordinances 
having  the  force  of  laws  passed  by  the  legislature  of  the  state/'^°*  it 
follows  that  when  a  municipal  corporation  passes  an  ordinance  legis- 
lative in  its  character  importing  no  private  contract  or  rights,  the 
meml)ers  of  the  corporation  enjoy  the  same  prerogatives  as  members 
of  a  state  legislature,  and  their  conduct-  or  motives  in  passing  the 
ordinance  can  not  be  questioned  by  way  of  impeaching  the  validity 
of  the  ordinance.^''''  But  in  Ohio  it  has  been  held  that  this  immunity 
from  impeachment  for  fraudulent  motives  or  abuse  of  power  does  not 
attach  to  all  of  the  acts  of  a  city  council  which  may  assume  the  form 
of  an  ordinance;  and  that  wdiere  the  city  council  was  empowered  to 
regulate  the  price  of  gas,  and  under  the  colorable  exercise  of  such 
power  for  a  fraudulent  purpose  passed  an  ordinance  fixing  the  price 
of  gas  at  a  rate  at  which  they  well  knew  that  it  could  not  be  manu- 
factured and  sold  without  loss,  the  motives  of  the  council  could  be 
properly  inquired  into.^*^''  The  officers  of  a  municipal  corporation 
are  of  course  exempt  from  personal  liability  for  the  passage  of  any 
ordinance  within  their  authority;  nor  are  they  personally  liable  for 
any  ordinance  not  within  their  authority,  for  such  an  ordinance  is 
absolutely  void.^*'^ 

§  540.  Construction  of  ordinances. — The  canons  of  construction 
that  are  employed  in  the  interpretation  of  statutes  are  also  used  to 
determine  the  meaning  of  ordinances. ^"^  Provisions  that  are  essen- 
tially penal  are  strictly  construed,^"^  but  ordinary  police  regulations, 

402;   39  N.  E.  869;   49  Am.  St.  222;  adds  the  great  weight  of  his  opin- 

28  L.  R.  A.  679;   City  of  Evansville  ion  to  the  effect  that  the  acts  of  mu- 

V.  Miller,  146  Ind.  613;  s.  c.  45  N.  E.  nicipal  bodies,  whether  in  the  form 

1054.  of  resolutions  or  ordinances,  may  be 

2tis  Taylor  v.  City  of  Carondelet,  22  impeached  for  fraud  at  the  instance 

Mo.  105.  of  persons  injured  thereby:  1  Dillon 

=»=•  Villavaso  v.  Barthet,  39  La.  An.  Munic.  Corp.,  §  311. 
247,  258;  s.  c.  1  So.  599;  Borough  of         ""' 1  Dillon  Munic.  Corp.,  §  313. 
Freeport  v.  Marks,  59  Pa.   St.  253;         '"^  In  re  Yick  Wo,  16  Cal.  294;  s,  c. 

Buell  V.  Ball,  20  Iowa  282.  9  Pac.  139;   58  Am.  R.  12;   State  v. 

=°«  State  V.  Cincinnati  Gas  &c.  Co.,  Kirkley,  29  Md.  85;    Zorger  v.  City 

18  Ohio  St.  262.  300;  citing  Davis  v.  of    Greensburgh,    60    Ind.    1;    Quin- 

Mayor  &c..  1  Duer  (N.  Y.)  451.     But  ette  v.  City  of  St.  Louis,  76  Mo.  402. 

in  the  opinion  in  the  Ohio  case  there  Construction  is  a  question  of  law: 

is  a  dictum  that  inquiry  into  the  mo-  Pennsylvania   Co.   v.   Frana,   13    111. 

tives  of  the  council  in  passing  an  or-  App.  91 ;   Denning  v.  Yount,  9  Kan. 

dinance  for  purposes  of  police  regu-  App.  708;  s.  c.  59  Pac.  1092;  61  Pac. 

lation     or     municipal     government  803. 

would   perhaps  be  incompetent;    as        ^°^  Town   of  Pacific  v.    Seifert,   79 

the  courts  would  have  no  jurisdic-  Mo.  210;  Krickle  v.  Commonwealth, 

tion  to  impeach  such  an  ordinance  1   B.    Mon.    (Ky.)    361;    City   of   St. 

for    such    a    reason.     Judge    Dillon  Louis   v.    Goebel,    32    Mo.    295.     So, 


517 


ORDINANCES    AND   BY-LAWS. 


540 


even  though  a  penalty  be  attached,  are  not  subjected  to  so  close  a 
scrutiny.^"*  It  is  proper  to  consider  the  title  of  the  ordinance^"^  and 
the  mischief  which  it  was  designed  to  remedy/"*'  and  also  in  doubtful 
eases  a  contemporaneous  construction  by  the  parties  interested.^"''' 
General  words  and  sweeping  clauses  are  controlled  by  particular  de- 
scriptions preceding  them.^°^  If  an  ordinance  is  susceptible  of  two 
constructions,  that  one  must  prevail  which  will  preserve  its  validity 
in  preference  to  a  construction  that  will  render  it  invalid;  and  this 
must  be  done  although  the  construction  adopted  may  not  be  the  most 
obvious  or  natural  or  the  literal  one.^°''  Thus,  an  ordinance  making 
it  unlawful  to  ride  a  bicycle  across  a  public  bridge  is  limited  to  the 
footways  of  the  bridge ;  otherwise  it  would  be  void  as  against  common 
right.  ^^"^  And  an  ordinance  providing  that  "no  person  shall  drive  or 
lead  any  horse  or  cart  or  wheel-carriage  on  the  footway  or  sidewalk 
of  any  street"  does  not  prohibit  the  carting  of  earth  from  excavations 
across  the  sidewalk.^  ^^  An  ordinance  is  to  be  resolved  against  the 
city  where  it  is  doubtful  as  to  its  validity  as  conflicting  with  individ- 
ual rights.^^^     Where  an  ordinance  is  clear  and  explicit,  previous 


statutes  imposing  power  to  license 
must  be  construed  strictly:  Ex  parte 
Sims,  40  Fla.  432;  s.  c.  25  So.  280. 

^•^  A  reasonable  construction  is  the 
rule:  First  Municipality  v.  Cutting, 
4  La.  An.  335;  Rounds  v.  Mumford, 
2  R.  I.  154;  Commonwealth  v.  Rob- 
ertson, 5  Cush.  (Mass.)  438;  Merri- 
am  V.  City  of  New  Orleans,  14  La. 
An.  318;  Master  of  Vintners'  Co.  v. 
Passey,  1  Burr.  235;  Poulters'  Co. 
V.  Phillips,  6  Bing.  N.  C.  314.  Lib- 
eral rules  are  applied  to  town  by- 
laws: Whitlock  V.  West,  26  Conn. 
406. 

="'' Martindale  v.  Palmer,  52  Ind. 
411. 

^°®  Ho  Ah  Kow  V.  Nunan,  5  Saw. 
552. 

^^  Wright  V.  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.,  7 
111.  App.  438;  State  v.  Severance,  49 
Mo.  401. 

^"'^Schultz  V.  Cambridge,  38  Ohio 
St.  659;  Snyder  v.  City  of  North 
Lawrence,  8  Kan.  82;  Keokuk  &c. 
Co.  V.  City  of  Quincy,  81  111.  422.  Cf. 
Illinois  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  City  of  Galena, 
40  111.  344;  City  of  St.  Louis  v. 
Herthel,  88  Mo.  128. 

""^  Commonwealth  v.  Dow,  10  Met. 


(Mass.)  382;  Mayor  &c.  v.  Hughes, 
1  Gill  &  J.  (Md.)  480;  Newland  v. 
Marsh,  19  111.  376;  Iowa  &c.  Co.  v. 
Webster  Co.,  21  Iowa  221;  Johnson 
V.  Philadelphia,  60  Pa.  St.  445; 
Roosevelt  v.  Godard,  52  Barb.  (N. 
Y.)  533;  Colwell  v.  May's  Landing 
Co.,  19  N.  J.  Eq.  245;  Bigelow  v. 
West  Wis.  R.  Co.,  27  Wis.  478;  Dow 
V.  Norris,  4  N.  H.  16;  Inkster  v. 
Carver,  16  Mich.  484;  Cooley  Const. 
Lim.  184. 

^'^^  Swift  v.  City  of  Topeka,  43  Kan. 
671;  s.  c.  23  Pac.  1075. 

^"  "If  so  construed,"  said  the 
court,  "it  would  prevent  a  party 
from  building  upon  his  own  lot  and 
would  deny  the  right  of  an  ^abutting 
owner  of  driving  his  carriage  from 
a  stable:  In  re  O'Keefe,  19  N.  Y.  S. 
676;  s.  c.  46  N.  Y.  St.  557.  See  also, 
Gilluly  V.  City  of  Madison,  63  Wis. 
518;  s.  c.  24  N.  W.  137;  Ex  parte 
Ah  Lit,  26  Fed.  512;  Mayor  &c.  v. 
Georgia  R.  Co.,  72  Ga.  800.  Cf.  Com- 
monwealth V.  Curtis,  9  Allen  (Mass.) 
266,  268. 

='=  Slaughter  v.  O'Berry,  126  N.  C 
181;  s.  c.  35  S.  B.  241. 


§    541  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  518 

action  of  the  council  will  not  be  permitted  to  affect  the  construc- 
tion.^ ^^ 

g  541.  The  same  subject  continued — Miscellaneous. — After  a  con- 
tract has  been  forfeited  an  ordinance  extending  the  time  for  the  com- 
pletion of  the  work  thereunder  does  not  give  life  to  the  forfeited  con- 
tract and  render  valid  an  assessment.^^*  An  ordinance  granting  the 
mayor  power  to  determine  whether  a  person  applying  for  a  license  to 
sell  cigarettes  has  good  character  and  reputation,  and  is  a  suitable  per- 
son to  be  entrusted  with  their  sale,  and  requiring  him  to  license  every 
one  complying  with  these  conditions,  vests  in  him  no  arbitrary  power 
to  grant  or  refuse  a  license. ^^^  An  ordinance  which  directs  a  city 
clerk  to  issue  a  license  if  an  applicant  has  complied  with  the  law,  and 
shall  not  be  in  arrears  for  previous  years,  does  not  confer  judicial 
power. ^^"^  Where,  as  a  condition  of  allowing  an  electric  company  to 
occupy  the  streets,  all  city  buildings  occupied  as  police  or  fire  stations 
are  to  be  wired  and  lighted,  it  applies  to  all  police  and  fire  stations 
whether  erected  before  or  after  the  ordinance»was  passed.^ ^'^  An  or- 
dinance providing  that  "the  vault  of  every  privy  which  may  be  con- 
structed," etc.,  applies  only  to  those  constructed  after  its  passage.^^® 
An  ordinance  which  provided  that  it  should  not  go  into  effect  until 
after  receiving  a  majority  of  the  votes  of  the  legal  voters  at  an  election 
held  as  therein  provided,  goes  into  effect,  so  far  as  the  election  is  con- 
cerned, when  it  receives  the  approval  of  the  mayor.^^"  An  ordinance 
requiring  persons  riding  or  driving  to  check  up  or  halt  for  pedestrians 
on  approaching  an  alley  or  street  crossing,  does  not  apply  to  street- 
cars.^^*^  Power  to  a  mayor  to  release  a  person  from  imprisonment 
does  not  give  power  to  release  a  judgment  under  which  the  imprison- 
ment was  made.^-^  A  statute  requiring  the  yeas  and  nays  to  be  called 
on  the  passage  of  ordinances  does  not  apply  to  cities  under  special 
charters.^^-  Where  a  resolution  is  ambiguous  the  construction  placed 
upon  it  by  the  council  which  passed  it,  and  the  acquiescence  of  the  in- 
cumbent of  the  office  affected  by  it,  are  competent  evidence  of  the  in- 

"^Stadler  v.   Fahey,  87   111.  App.  ="' Forbes  v.   Mayor  &c.,   1   Marv. 

411.  (Del.)  186. 

^"Neill  V.  Gates,  152  Mo.  585;  s.  c.  ''^=' Parker  v.  Zeisler,  73  Mo.  App. 

54  S.  W.  460.  537. 

^^^  Gundling  v.  Chicago,  177  U.  S.  '"■"  Citizens'  R.  Co.  v.  Ford,  93  Tex. 

183;  s.  c.  20  S.  Ct.  633.  110;  s.  c.  53  S.  W.  575. 

•■'"'  Baker  v.  City  of  Lexington,  21  ^-'  City   of   Newton   v.   Bergbower, 

Ky.  L.  809;  s.  c.  53  S.  W.  16.  63  111.  App.  201. 

^"  Kensington  Electric  Co.  v.  City  ^"  Preston  v.  City  of  Cedar  Rapids, 

of  Philadelphia,  187  Pa.  St.  446;   s.  95  Iowa  71;  s.  c.  63  N.  W.  577. 
c.  41  Atl.  309. 


519 


ORDINANCES   AND    BY-LAWS. 


§  542 


tention  of  the  coimcil.^-^  An  ordinance  prohibiting  the  placing  of 
merchandise  upon  sidewalks  beyond  the  front  line  of  the  lot  applies  to 
pedlers  as  well  as  storekeepers.^^*  In  an  ordinance  prohibiting  the 
erection  of  wooden  or  frame  buildings,  "wooden"  and  "frame"  mean 
the  same  thing.^-^ 

§  542.  Ordinances  void  in  part. — It  is  well  settled  that  invalid 
provisions  in  an  ordinance  do  not  necessarily  render  the  ordinance 
totally  void.  The  rule  to  be  applied  is  that  if  part  of  a  law  is  void 
other  essential  and  connected  parts  are  also  void,^-®  but  where  that 
part  which  is  void  is  independent  and  not  essentially  connected  with 
the  remainder  the  law  will  stand. ^^^    Thus,  it  was  held  that  where  a 


^'^  Saunders  v.  Nashua,  69  N.  H. 
492;  s.  c.  43  Atl.  620. 

^■*  State  V.  Messolongitis,  74  Minn. 
165;  s.  c.  77  N.  W.  29. 

=^Ward  V.  City  of  Murphysboro, 
77  111.  App.  549.  Construction  of 
ordinances  under  Kan.  Gen.  St. 
1889,  in  relation  to  desecration  of 
the  Sabbath, — see  City  of  Kansas 
City  V.  Grubel,  57  Kan.  436;  s.  c. 
46  Pac.  714.  Under  city  and  village 
act  of  Illinois  the  provision  permit- 
ting an  owner  to  make  a  sidewalk 
in  front  of  his  property  and  thus 
relieve  it  from  assessment  applies 
to  improvements  by  special  taxation 
as  well  as  special  assessment:  Vil- 
lage of  Western  Springs  v.  Hill,  177 
111.  634;  s.  c.  52  N.  E.  959.  Construc- 
tion of  Burns  Rev.  Stat.  Ind.  1901, 
§  1709,  in  reference  to  riding  on 
sidewalks, — see  Town  of  Whiting  v. 
Doob,  152  Ind.  157;  s.  c.  52  N.  E. 
759.  Construction  of  Ky.  St.,  §  3304, 
in  relation  to  ordinances, — see  Rob- 
erts &  Co.  V.  City  of  Paducah,  95 
Fed.  62.  Construction  and  require- 
ments of  Iowa  code  1873,  §  493,  as 
amended, — see  German  Ins.  Co.  v. 
City  of  Manning,  95  Fed.  597.  Con- 
struction of  N.  Y.  code  as  to 
boundary  of  district  under  ordi- 
nance,— see  Farrington  v.  City  of 
Mt.  Vernon,  64  N.  Y.  S.  863;  s.  c. 
51  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  250. 

-'  In  re  Ah  Toy.  45  Fed.  795; 
Town  of  Eldora  v.  Burlingame,  62 


Iowa  32;  s.  c.  17  N.  W.  148;  Town 
of  Cantril  v.  Sainer,  59  Iowa  26;  s. 
c.  12  N.  W.  753;  State  v.  Treasurer 
&c.,  45  N.  J.  L.  288;  Trowbridge  v. 
Mayor  &c.,  46  N.  J,  L.  140;  State  v. 
Mayor  &c.,  38  N.  J.  L.  110;  Common- 
wealth V.  Stodder,  2  Cush.  (Mass.) 
562;  Commonwealth  v.  Dow,  10  Met. 
(Mass.)  382;  Fisher  v.  McGirr,  1 
Gray  (Mass.)  1;  Amesbury  v.  Bow- 
ditch  &c.  Ins.  Co.,  6  Gray  (Mass.) 
596;  Warren  v.  Mayor  &c.,  2  Gray 
(Mass.)  84;  Ex  parte  Christensen, 
85  Cal.  208;  s.  c.  24  Pac.  747;  State 
V.  Cainan,  94  N.  C.  883;  City  of  St. 
Louis  V.  St.  Louis  R.  Co.,  14  Mo. 
App.  221;  City  of  St.  Louis  v.  St. 
Louis  R.  Co.,  89  Mo.  44;  s.  c.  1  S.  W. 
305;  City  of  Pi  qua  v.  Zimmerlin,  35 
Ohio  St.  507;  Rogers  v.  Jones,  1 
Wend.  (N.  Y.)  237;  Rau  v.  Little 
Rock,  34  Ark.  303;  Baker  v.  Town 
of  Normal,  81  111.  108;  City  of  Quin- 
cy  V.  Bull,  106  111.  337;  Harbaugh  v. 
City  of  Monmouth,  74  111.  367;  State 
v.'Chamberlin,  37  N.  J.  L.  388. 

^='  State  V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  45  N. 
J.  L.  318,  325;  s.  c.  46  N.  J.  L.  209; 
Wilcox  V.  Hemming,  58  Wis.  144;  s. 
c.  15  N.  W.  435;  46  Am.  R.  625; 
State  V.  Mayor  &c.,  47  N.  J.  L.  286; 
State  V.  Hardy,  7  Neb.  377;  State  v. 
Kantler,  33  Minn.  69;  s.  c.  21  N.  W. 
856;  State  v.  Cantieny,  34  Minn.  1; 
s.  c.  24  N.  W.  458;  Cooper  v.  Dis- 
trict of  Columbia,  MacArth.  &  M. 
250;  State  v.  Clarke,  54  Mo.  17.  When 


543 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS. 


520 


statute  authorized  the  mayor  to  impose  a  fine  of  not  more  than  $20 
"in  his  discretion"  for  certain  offenses,  an  ordinance  imposing  a  fine 
of  not  less  than  three  nor  more  than  ten  dollars  being  void  as  to 
the  fine,  the  whole  enactment  was  void  and  could  not  be  treated  as 
ordaining  an  offense.^-*'  But  where  the  charter  gave  express  power 
to  prohibit  the  sale  of  certain  articles  except  at  a  public  market, 
an  ordinance  in  pursuance  thereof  was  valid,  although  it  covered  some 
articles  not  included  in  the  enumeration.^-^ 

§  543.    Amendment  and  repeal — By  subsequent  ordinance. — The 

power  of  a  municipal  corporation  to  enact  ordinances  includes  by 
implication  the  power  to  amend  or  repeal  them.^^"    The  general  rules 


it  prohibits  disjunctively  two  or 
more  acts,  the  invalidity  of  one  part 
does  not  affect  the  validity  of  the 
others:  Kettering  v.  City  of  Jack- 
sonville, 50  111.  39.  But  the  parts 
must  be  entire  and  distinct  from 
each  other:  Municipality  v.  Morgan, 
1  La.  An.  Ill,  116;  Rex  v.  Faver- 
sham  Fishermen's  Co.,  8  T.  R.  352; 
Willcock  Mimic.  Corp.  160,  pi.  384; 
City  of  Eureka  v.  Jackson,  8  Kan. 
App.  49;  s.  c.  54  Pac.  5;  City  of 
Rockville  v.  Merchant,  60  Mo.  App. 
365;  s.  c.  1  Mo.  App.  Repr.  84;  Eure- 
ka City  V.  Wilson,  15  Utah  67;  s,  c. 
48  Pac.  150;  In  re  Mansfield,  106 
Cal.  400;  s.  c.  39  Pac.  775;  City  of 
Lamar  v.  Weidman,  57  Mo.  App. 
507;  City  of  Belleville  v.  Citizens' 
Horse  R.  Co.,  152  111.  171;  s.  c.  38  N. 
E.  584;  City  of  Seattle  v.  Pearson, 
15  Wash.  575;  s.  c.  46  Pac.  1053; 
State  V.  Newman,  96  Wis.  258;  s.  c. 
71  N.  W.  438.  If  the  valid  part  can 
not  stand  alone  or  be  separated  it  is 
wholly  void:  City  of  Tampa  v.  Salo- 
monson,  35  Fla.  446;  s.  c.  17  So.  581. 
Where  an  ordinance  creates  two  or 
more  offenses  that  are  severable, 
those  which  are  valid  may  be  en- 
forced and  those  that  are  invalid 
may  not:  Ex  parte  Bizzell,  112  Ala. 
210;  s.  c.  21  So.  371;  Canova  v.  Wil- 
liams, 41  Fla.  509;  s.  c.  27  So.  30. 
Cf.  Baker  v.  City  of  Lexington,  21 
Ky.  L.  809;  s.  c.  53  S.  W.  16. 
^''^Landis  v.  Borough  of  Vineland, 


54  N.  J.  L.  75;  s.  c.  25  Atl.  409.  The 
argument  was  that  the  maximum 
limit  of  ten  dollars  was  opposed  to 
an  inference  that  it  was  intended  to 
create  an  offense  which  might  be 
punishable  by  a  twenty-dollar  fine. 
One  section  of  an  ordinance  making 
it  an  offense  to  continue  or  allow 
the  continuance  of  a  house  of  ill 
fame  for  two  days  after  it  shall  have 
been  so  adjudged  under  a  prior  void 
section,  the  two  are  so  connected 
that  they  must  fall  together:  State 
V.  Webber,  107  N.  C.  962;  s.  c.  12  S. 
E.  598. 

^^Shelton  v.  Mayor  &c.,  30  Ala. 
540.  See  also,  Eureka  Springs  v. 
O'Neal,  56  Ark.  350;  s.  c.  19  S.  W. 
969. 

=>=»  Welch  V.  Bowen,  103  Ind.  252; 
s  c.  2  N.  E.  722;  Bank  of  Chenango 
V.  Brown,  26  N.  Y.  467;  People  v. 
Collins,  3  Mich.  343,  347;  Rex  v. 
Bird,  13  East  367;  Rex  v.  Ashwell, 
12  East  22;  In  re  Great  Western  R. 
Co.,  23  Up.  Can.  C.  P.  28;  Greeley  v. 
City  of  Jacksonville,  17  Fla.  174; 
Bloomer  v.  Stolley,  5  McLean  158; 
Rice  V.  Foster,  4  Harr.  (Del.)  479; 
Santo  V.  State,  2  Iowa  165;  s.  c.  63 
Am.  D.  487;  In  re  Hall,  10  Neb.  537; 
s.  c.  7  N.  W.  287;  City  Council  v. 
Wentworth  &c.  Church,  4  Strobh. 
(S.  C.)  306.  But  where  the  record 
showed  that  a  motion  changing  cer- 
tain provisions  was  adopted  and  that 
"the  maj^or  was   instructed   to  pre- 


521 


ORDINANCES   AND   BY-LAWS. 


§  543 


governing  the  amendment  and  repeal  of  statutes  are  applied  to  the 
legislation  of  municipal  corporations.  An  amendment  of  a  void  or- 
dinance is  ineffectual  to  create  a  valid  and  enforceable  ordinance,^^^ 
l)ut  if  only  a  part  of  the  original  ordinance  is  invalid  an  amendment 
of  that  part  will  stand.^^^  A  repealing  ordinance  may  contain  a  clause 
excepting  from  its  operation  offenses  committed  and  forfeitures  in- 
curred previous  to  the  repeal,^^^  but  if  there  be  no  reservation  all  vio- 
lations of  the  former  ordinance  are  blotted  out,  as  it  were,  and  the 
courts  are  also  powerless  to  proceed  further  in  pending  prosecu- 
tions.^^VxWhere  a  repealing  ordinance  is  itself  repealed  the  original 
ordinance  is  restored  to  full  force  and  efficacy.^^^  The  power  to 
amend  and  repeal  is  subject  to  the  qualification  that  it  can  not  be 
exercised  in  such  a  way  as  to  impair  private  rights  which  have  been 
acquired  under  a  lawful  ordinance. ^^"^    An  ordinance  can  be  amended 


pare  an  ordinance  covering  said 
changes,"  it  was  held  not  to  be  in 
itself  a  complete  legislative  act: 
Jones  V.  McAlpine,  64  Ala.  511. 

^"^  Cowley  V.  Town  of  Rushville,  60 
Ind.  327;  Board  &c.  v.  Markle,  46 
Ind.  96;  Blakemore  v.  Dolan,  50  Ind. 
194;  Ford  v.  Booker,  53  Ind.  395; 
State  V.  Kantler,  33  Minn.  69,  77; 
s.  c.  21  N.  W.  856. 

«'=  State  V.  Kantler,  33  Minn.  69; 
s.  c.  21  N.  W.  856.  An  amending 
ordinance  which  does  not  attempt  to 
amend  the  old  by  adding  to  or  tak- 
ing from  one  of  its  sections,  but  con- 
tains in  full  the  section  as  it  was  de- 
signed to  be  when  amended,  suffi- 
ciently complies  with  a  statutory 
requirement  that  an  amending  ordi- 
nance shall  contain  the  ordinance 
or  part  thereof  which  it  at- 
tempts to  review  or  amend:  Larkin 
V.  Burlington  &c.  R.  Co.,  85  Iowa 
492;  s.  c.  52  N.  W.  480;  Town  of  De- 
corah  V.  Dunstan,  38  Iowa  96. 

^'*  City  of  Kansas  v.  White,  69  Mo. 
26.  See  also,  Pardridge  v.  Village  of 
Hyde  Park,  131  111.  537;  s.  c.  23  N. 
E.  345. 

^*Day  V.  City  of  Clinton,  6  111. 
App.  476;  Barton  v.  Incorporation 
&c.  of  Gadsden,  69  Ala.  495.  And  no 
subsequent  ordinance  or  statute  can 
revive  the  offense  by  attempting  to 


limit  the  effect  of  the  repeal:  City  of 
Kansas  v.  Clark,  68  Mo.  588.  The 
rule  is  not  confined  to  penal  ordi- 
nances: Kaime  v.  Harty,  4  Mo.  App. 
357.  A  statute  abrogating  the  com- 
mon-law rule  in  relation  to  the  re- 
peal of  laws  does  not  apply  to  mu- 
nicipal ordinances:  Naylor  v.  City 
of  Galesburg,  56  111.  285. 

^^^  Mayor  &c.  v.  Broadway  &c.  R. 
Co.,  97  N.  Y.  275;  citing  People  v. 
Davis,  61  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  456;  Van 
Denburgh  v.  President  &c.,  66  N.  Y. 
1.  Day  V.  City  of  Clinton,  6  111.  App. 
476,  cited  in  one  text-book  to  sup- 
port the  contrary  proposition,  mere- 
ly decides  that  the  guilt  of  one 
whose  offense  has  been  wholly  ex- 
pui'gated  by  the  repeal  of  the  law 
creating  it  can  not  be  revived  by  a 
repeal  of  the  repealing  act. 

^'"Rex  V.  Bird,  13  East  367;  Rex  v. 
Ashwell,  12  East  22;  Bigelow  v.  Hill- 
man,  37  Maine  52;  People  v.  O'Brien, 
111  N.  Y.  1;  s.  c.  18  N.  E.  692;  Nel- 
son V.  St.  Martin's  Parish,  111  U.  S. 
716;  Pond  v.  Negus,  3  Mass.  230;  s. 
c.  3  Am.  D.  131;  Cunningham  v.  Cor- 
poration &c.  of  Almonte,  21  Up.  Can. 
C.  P.  459;  In  re  Great  Western  R. 
Co.,  23  Up.  Can.  C.  P.  28;  Louisiana 
V.  Pilsbury,  105  U.  S.  278;  Chicago 
&c.  R.  Co.  V.  Minnesota  &c.  R.  Co., 
14  Fed.  525;  City  of  Terre  Haute  v. 


§    544  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  523 

only  by  an  ordinance  and  not  by  resolution;  thus,  wards  must  be 
changed  by  ordinance/'' ^^  An  ordinance  can  only  be  amended  by  an 
act  of  the  same  grade.  Orders  passed  upon  motion  before  the  council 
changing  the  material  provided  for  in  the  ordinance  are  nullities.^^® 
But  not  all  ordinances  are  repealable  at  the  mere  will  of  the  council. 
Thus  where  an  ordinance  is,  in  fact,  a  contract  and  has  been  accepted, 
it  is  not  repealable  without  the  consent  of  the  other  party  thereto.^^^ 
And  so  after  a  tax  has  been  levied  by  a  council  in  aid  of  a  railroad 
and  the  road  has  been  built  the  ordinance  can  not  be  repealed.^*" 
But  where  legislative  authority  has  been  given  to  a  council  to  grant 
to  a  street-railroad  company  the  right  to  occupy  a  street  on  condi- 
tion of  its  paving  the  street,  the  ordinance  may  be  repealed  if  the 
legislative  act  left  the  paving  regulation  in  the  discretion  of  the  coun- 
cil.^*^  An  ordinance  for  improvements  of  streets,  and  street  inter- 
sections, may  be  repealed  in  part  without  impairing  its  validity  in 
other  respects.^"*^ 

§  544.  Eepeal  by  act  of  the  legislature. — "The  legislature  can  not 
by  express  intendment  repeal  ordinances,  though  a  repeal  may  be 
effected  by  the  passage  of  a  general  law  that  is  inconsistent  with  the 
ordinance."^^^  When  a  city  of  the  second  class  having  lawful  authority 
passed  an  ordinance  to  suppress  houses  of  prostitution,  and  while  it 
was  in  full  force  a  new  law  for  the  government  of  cities  of  that  class 

Lake,  43  Ind.  480;   State  v.  Graves,  ^"  Cascaden   v.   City   of   Waterloo, 

19   Md.   351;    Baldwin  v.   Smith,   82  106  Iowa  673;  s.  c.  77  N.  W.  333. 

111.   162;    People  v.   Chicago  &c.   R.  '^' Gait  v.  City  of  Chicago,  174  111. 

Co.,    18    111.    App.  '125;    Gormley   v.  605;  s.  c.  51  N.  E.  653;  Davis  v.  City 

Day,  114  111.  185;  s.  c.  28  N.  E.  693;  of  Litchfield,  155  111.  390;  s.  c.  40  N. 

City  of  Quincy  v.  Bull,  106  111.  337;  E.  354. 

Cape  May  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  City  of  Cape  ^  Baltimore     Trust     &c.     Co.     v. 

May,  35  N.  J.  Eq.  419;  Reiff  v.  Con-  Mayor  &c.,  64  Fed.  153. 

ner,  10  Ark.  241;    State  v.  Pinto,  7  ''"Missouri  &c.  Trust  Co.  v.  Smart, 

Ohio  St.  355;   Road  in  Augusta  Tp.,  51  La.  An.  416;  s.  c.  25  So.  443. 

17  Pa.  St.  71,  75;  City  of  Des  Moines  ''"City    of    Philadelphia    v.    Bow- 

V.  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.,  41  Iowa  569;  man,  175  Pa.  St.  91;  s.  c.  34  Atl.  353. 

City  of  Burlington  v.  Burlington  St.  ^"  Noonan  v.  People,  183  111.  52;  s. 

R.  Co.,  49  Iowa  144;  s.  c.  31  Am.  R.  c.  55  N.  E.  679. 

145;  City  Council  &c.  v.  Wentworth  ^*''' Horr    &    Bemis    Munic.    Police 

&c.  Church,  4  Strobh.  L.  (S.  C.)  306;  Ord.,  §§  60,  61.     A  statute  regulating 

Mayor  &c.  v.   Lumpkin,   5   Ga.   447.  the  taking-up  of  stray  animals,  and 

But  "no  person  can  claim  immunitj'  providing  that  nothing  in  any  mu- 

from  proper  police  regulation  of  his  nicipal  charter  shall  be  construed  to 

vested  interests  because  they  were  authorize  an  ordinance  dealing  with 

based  upon  the  privileges  or  under  the  subject  in  any  other  manner,  re- 

the  protection  of  a  municipal  ordi-  peals  an  existing  valid  ordinance  of 

nance:"  Horr  &  Bemis  Munic.  Ord.,  that  description:   Town  ot  Marietta 

§  67,  and  cases  cited.  v.  Fearing.  4  Ohio  427. 


523 


ORDINANCES    AXD   BY-LAWS. 


§  545 


was  passed  containing  authority  to  the  city  council  to  "restrain,  pro- 
hibit and  suppress"  houses  of  prostitution,  and  the  former  act  was 
repealed  without  a  saving  clause,  it  was  held  that  the  new  act  did  not 
repeal  existing  ordinances.^**  And  as  a  general  rule  an  ordinance 
will  not  be  deemed  to  be  repealed  by  a  statute  unless  they  are  irrecon- 
cilably inconsistent  with  each  other.^*^  But  where  it  is  the  evident 
design  of  the  legislature  to  assume  the  exclusive  regulation  of  a  sub- 
ject which  had  been  before  permitted  to  be  regulated  by  municipal 
ordinances,  the  latter  must  yield,  and  such  legislative  intent  will  more 
readily  be  inferred  if  the  ordinance  in  question  would  otherwise  be 
unreasonable  and  oppressive. ^*^ 

§  545.  Repeals  by  implication. — It  has  been  laid  down  as  law  that 
a  general  statute  without  negative  words  will  not  repeal  the  particular 
provisions  of  a  former  statute  unless  the  two  are  plainly  inconsist- 
ent.^*^ It  is  also  a  doctrine  that  a  subsequent  statute  revising  the 
whole  subject-matter  of  a  former  one  will  operate  as  a  repeal  of  it, 
though  it  contains  no  express  words  of  repeal.^*®  Both  these  rules 
are  without  doubt  as  applicable  to  ordinances  as  to  statutes.^*®    Where 


344  "There  has  been  no  attempt  on 
the  part  of  the  legislature  to  repeal 
the  law  creating  cities  of  the  second 
class  and  destroy  the  organization 
of  the  same.  It  is  true  that  a  new 
act  has  taken  the  place  of  the  for- 
mer and  continues  the  organization 
of  such  cities  with  new  and  modified 
powers.  But  this  is  very  different 
from  an  entire  repeal.  The  doc- 
trine is  well  settled  that  a  change  in 
the  form  of  government  of  a  com- 
munity does  not  ipso  facto  abrogate 
pre-existing  laws:"  In  re  Hall,  10 
Neb.  537;  s.  c.  7  N.  W.  287;  citing 
Trustees  v.  Erie,  31  Pa.  St.  515-517. 
See  also,  Waring  v.  Mayor  &c.,  24 
Ala.  701. 

'''Mayor  &c.  v.  Hyatt,  3  E.  D. 
Smith  (N.  Y.)  156,  holding  that  a 
statute  by  which  a  violation  of  the 
ordinances  of  New  York  was  de- 
clared a  misdemeanor  and  punish- 
able by  fine  or  imprisonment  did  not 
operate  as  a  repeal  of  the  penalty 
given  by  those  ordinances  nor  take 
away  the  right  of  the  corporation  to 
prosecute  a  civil  action  for  the  pen- 


alty. See  also,  March  v.  Common- 
wealth, 12  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  25;  State 
V.  Labatut,  39  La.  An.  513;  s.  c.  2 
So.  550;  Baldwin  v.  Murphy,  82  111. 
485;  Quinette  v.  City  of  St.  Louis, 
76  Mo.  402;  Franklin  v.  Westfall,  27 
Kan.  614;  Chamberlain  v.  City  of 
Evansville,  77  Ind.  542. 

"'"  Southport  V.  Ogden,  23  Conn. 
128. 

^"Conley  v.  Supervisors  &c.,  2  W. 
Va.  4]?6;  Brown  v.  County  Com'rs, 
21  Pa.  St.  37;  Bank  of  Louisiana  v. 
Farrar,  1  La.  An.  49,  54;  Lenz  v. 
Sherrott,  26  Mich.  139;  CroU  v.  Vil- 
lage of  Franklin,  40  Ohio  St.  340; 
Barker  v.  Smith,  10  S.  C.  226. 

''*  Inhabitants  &c.  v.  Estlow,  43  N. 
J.  L.  13;  Bartlett  v.  King,  12  Mass. 
537;  Town  of  Decorah  v.  Dunstan, 
38  Iowa  96;  Goodenow  v.  Buttrick, 
7  Mass.  140;  Booth  v.  Town  of  Car- 
thage, 67  111.  102;  Commonwealth  v. 
Cooley,  10  Pick.  (Mass.)  37;  Ellis 
V.  Page,  1  Pick.  (Mass.)  43,  45; 
Wakefield  v.  Phelps,  37  N.  H.  295; 
Farr  v.  Brackett,  30  Vt.  344. 

'^''City  of  Providence  v.  Union  R. 


545 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS. 


524 


the  final  chapter  of  a  revising  ordinance  recited  a  long  list  of  ordi- 
nances which  were  expressly  repealed,  the  omission  of  certain  ordi- 
nances from  the  list  was  held  to  preserve  them  in  full  force,  although 
the  title  of  the  ordinance  imported  to  comprise  all  former  enact- 
ments.^?*' The  general  ordinances  of  a  city  were  revised  and  consoli- 
dated for  publication  and  were  thus  adopted  and  re-enacted.  An  ordi- 
nance under  which  a  prosecution  had  been  begun  was  re-enacted  in 
substantially  the  same  language  without  any  words  of  repeal  or  any 
clause  saving  pending  prosecutions.  The  effect  of  the  re-enactment 
was  declared  to  be  to  continue  in  force  the  provisions  of  the  original 
ordinance  and  not  to  abate  or  affect  the  prosecution. ^'^^  The  rule  is 
that  where  two  ordinances  are  inconsistent  with  each  other  and  there 
is  no  express  language  repealing  the  earlier  ordinance  and  both  relate 
to  the  same  subject-matter  the  later  repeals  the  former.^^^  But  an 
ordinance  will  not  be  construed  as  repealing  by  implication  a  prior 
ordinance  unless  there  is  an  irreconcilable  repugnancy  between  the 
two,  or  it  clearly  appears  that  the  new  ordinance  was  intended  to  su- 


Co.,  12  R.  I.  473;  Booth  v.  Town  of 
Carthage,  67  111.  102. 

^"City  of  Providence  v.  Union  R. 
Co.,  12  R.  I.  473.  The  case  did  not, 
however,  turn  upon  this  circum- 
stance alone. 

=^1  City  of  Junction  City  v.  Webb, 
44  Kan.  71;  s.  c.  23  Pac.  1073;  citing 
State  V.  Cumber,  37  Wis.  298;  State 
V.  Wish,  15  Neb.  448;  s.  c.  19  N.  W. 
686;  Kesler  v.  Smith,  66  N.  C.  154; 
Fullerton  v.  Spring,  3  Wis.  667; 
Scheftels  v.  Tabert,  46  Wis.  439;  s.  c. 
1  N.  W.  156;  Cheezen  v.  State,  2  Ind. 
149;  Martindale  v.  Martindale,  10 
Ind.  566;  Cordell  v.  State,  22  Ind.  1; 
State  V.  Baldwin,  45  Conn.  134;  Mid- 
dleton  V.  Railroad  Co.,  26  N.  J.  Eq. 
269;  United  Hebrew  Ass'n  v.  Benshi- 
mol,  130  Mass.  325;  Lisbon  v.  Clark, 
18  N.  H.  234. 

=""  Button  V.  City  of  Aurora,  114 
111.  138;  s.  c.  28  N,  E.  461;  Union 
Trust  Co.  V.  Trumbull,  137  111.  146; 
s.  c.  27  N.  E.  24;  Korah  v.  City  of 
Ottawa,  32  111.  121;  Culver  v.  Third 
Nat.  Bank,  64  111.  528;  Von  Der 
Leith  V.  State,  60  N.  J.  L.  46;  s.  c.  37 
Atl.  436;  Von  Der  Leith  v.  State,  60 


N.  J.  L.  590;  s.  c.  40  Atl.  1132;  Smyrk 
V.  Sharp,  82  Md.  97;  s.  c.  35  Atl. 
411;  City  of  Grand  Rapids  v.  Nor- 
man, 110  Mich.  544;  s.  c.  68  N.  W. 
269;  Knight  v.  Town  of  West  Union, 
45  W.  Va.  194;  s.  c.  32  S.  E.  163.  A 
later  ordinance  relating  to  the  same 
subject-matter  as  a  former  one  and 
being  identical  in  language  except  as 
to  the  number  of  feet  repeals  the 
former,  although  the  later  ordinance 
is  called  a  "building  ordinance  and 
the  prior  one  a  fire  ordinance,  the 
purpose  of  each  being  the  same: 
Cook  V.  Sanitary  Dist.  &c.,  177  111. 
599;  s.  c.  52  N.  E.  870.  An  amended 
ordinance  purporting  to  amend  "as 
follows"  (giving  schedule  of  li- 
censes) and  not  referring  to  other 
sections  does  not  by  implication  re- 
peal the  original  ordinance:  Gold- 
smith V.  Mayor  &c.,  120  Ala.  182;  s. 
c.  24  So.  509.  An  ordinance  provid- 
ing for  an  improvement  may  repeal 
a  former  ordinance  relating  to  the 
manner  of  letting  contracts:  Barber 
&c.  Co.  V.  Ullman,  137  Mo.  543;  s.  c. 
38  S.  W.  458. 


525  ORDINANCES   AND   BY-LAWS.  §    545 

persedo  all  others,  and  embrace  the  entire  regulation  on  the  siibject.^^^ 
An  ordinance  providing  for  the  issuance  of  licenses  to  sell  liquors, 
restrictions  in  regard  thereto,  requiring  bonds  conditioned  for  the 
payment  of  license  at  such  rate  as  might  from  time  to  time  be  estab- 
lished, and  repealing  all  ordinances  in  relation  to  the  subject-matter 
or  inconsistent  therewith,  does  not  repeal  a  prior  ordinance  in  rela- 
tion to  the  amount  of  the  license  fee.^^*  The  provision  of  a  charter 
authorizing  a  council  to  punish  persons  who  knowingly  sell  food  which 
is  unwholesome  is  a  repeal,  in  effect,  of  an  existing  ordinance  provid- 
ing punishment  for  such,  offense  but  not  requiring  it  to  be  done  know- 
ingly.^^^  The  reasons  which  induced  the  repealing  of  an  ordinance 
are  not  a  proper  matter  for  investigation  by  thecourts.^^^  The  sav- 
ing clause  of  a  statute  providing  that  a  repeal  shall  not  affect  any  right 
accrued,  or  duty  imposed,  or  penalty  incurred  thereunder  is  not  to 
be  applied  to  ordinances  which  are  mere  by-laws  of  the  city.^^^  The 
repeal  of  an  ordinance  without  a  saving  clause  is  not  retrospective 
and  does  not  render  valid  an  act  which  was  illegal  when  done.^^^  A 
mere  resolution  not  passed  or  published  as  an  ordinance  will  not 
repeal  a  valid  ordinance  duly  enacted.  The  principle  involved  is 
that  an  ordinance  can  only  be  repealed  by  an  ordinance.^^"  An  ordi- 
nance can  only  be  amended,  repealed  or  suspended  by  action  of  the 
same  dignity  as  the  ordinance  itself.^ ^°  And  so,  as  a  rule,  an  ordinance 
that  can  be  adopted  only  by  a  certain  vote  must  be  repealed  by  a  similar 
vote.^**^  The  effect  of  a  repeal  of  an  ordinance  imposing  a  penalty 
has  the  effect  of  and  operates  as  a  pardon  of  the  offense  as  to  any  suit 
pending.^''^ 

'=^  People  V.  Harrison,  185  111.  307;  ^^9  p^opig   y    Mount,    87    111.   App. 

s.  c.  56  N.  E.  1120.  194;  Backhaus  v.  People,  87  111.  App. 

^'•^ People    v.    Mount,    87    111.    App.  173;  Swindell  v.  State,  143  Ind.  153; 

194;  s.  c.  affirmed  186  111.  560;  58  N.  s.  c.  42  N.  E.  528. 

E.  360.     Ky  St.  §  3350  repeals  ordi-  =™  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  City  of  Chi- 

nances  of  city  of  Owensboro  in  rela-  cago,  174  111.  439;  s.  c.  51  N.  E.  596. 

tion  to  payment  of  fees  of  city  mar-  ^""^  Naegely  v.  City  of  Saginaw,  101 

shal:    Wethington  v.  City  of  Owens-  Mich.   532;    s.   c.   60  N.  W.   46.     An 

boro,  21  Ky.  L.  960;   s.  c.  53  S.  W.  ordinance  fixing  a  fiscal  year  is  re- 

644.  pealable:    First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Keith, 

''^^  People  v.  Brill,  120  Mich.  42;  s.  84  111.  App.  103.    A  second  ordinance 

c.  78  N.  W.  1013.  held  to  not  repeal  a  prior  ordinance, 

-""Southern    Bell    Tel.    &c.    Co.    v.  in  Thomson  v.  People,  184  111.  17; 

City  of  Richmond,  98  Fed.  671.  s.  c.  56  N.  E.  383. 

^"  Denning  v.  Yount,  9  Kan.  App.  ^"-  Rutherford  v.  Swink,  96  Tenu. 

708;  s.  c.  61  Pac.  803.  564;  s.  c.  35  S.  W.  554. 

s^s  Denning  v.  Yount,  9  Kan.  App. 
708;  s.  c.  61  Pac.  803. 


§  546  ruBLic  couroHATiONS.  526 

§  546.  Power  to  impose  penalties. — Since  an  ordinance  without  a 
penalty  would  be  nugatory,  a  corporation  that  has  the  power  to  pass 
the  ordinance  has  an  implied  power  to  provide  for  its  enforcement 
by  proper  and  reasonable  fines  against  those  who  break  it.^"-'  Thus,  a 
power  to  "open,  widen,  *  *  *  and  keep  in  repair  streets,"  etc., 
and  to  pass  ordinances  necessary  to  carry  into  effect  the  power 
granted,  confers  authority  to  punish  by  fine  any  person  who  may 
obstruct  a  public  street.^*'*  And  under  a  power  to  suppress  bawdy- 
houses  the  corporation  has  by  implication  and  of  necessity  the  power 
to  adopt  proper  means  to  accomplish  it.^^^  So,  also,  the  power  to 
"restrain  and  prohibit"  an  act  implies  power  to  punish  its  commis- 
sion.^'^'^  But  the  right  to  impose  fines  can  not  exist  in  conflict  with  a 
reasonable  interpretation  of  the  charter;  and  although  authority  to 
"prevent"  will  support  an  ordinance  prohibiting  under  proper  penal- 
ties,^®^ the  general  rule  that  all  doubtful  grants  must  be  resolved 
against  the  corporation  has  been  held  to  forbid  the  extension  of  the 
power  "to  abate"  nuisances  to  the  enactment  of  ordinances  pre- 
scribing a  punishment  for  the  maintenance  of  a  nuisance. ^•'^  And 
where  the  charter  specifically  enumerates  various  powers  which  the 
council  may  render  effectual  by  means  of  penal  prosecutions,  it  is  an 
implied  exclusion  of  the  right  to  impose  penalties  in  other  cases.^*"* 

^®' Village  of  Winooski  V.  Gokey,  49  wise:    People  v.  Sacramento,  6  Cal. 

Vt.  282;  Grover  v.  Huckins,  26  Mich.  422.      In    the    absence    of    statutory 

476;  Mason  v.  City  of  Shawneetown,  power  a  municipality  can  not  create 

77  111.  533;  Korah  v.  City  of  Ottawa,  offenses  by  ordinance  of  a  penal  na- 

32  111.  121;  s.  c.  83  Am.  D.  255;  Eyer-  ture:    City  of '  Owensboro  v.  Sparks, 

man  v.  Blaksley,  78  Mo.  145;  City  of  18  Ky.  L.  269;  s.  c.  36  S.  W.  4. 

Independence  v.  Moore,  32  Mo.  392;  "i"  Toledo  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  President 

Town  of  Tipton  v.  Norman,  72  Mo.  &c.,  43  111.  209. 

380;  Hooksett  v.  Amoskeag  &c.  Co..  ™^  Which  included  the  imposition 

44  N.  H.  105;  Mayor  &c.  v.  Yuille,  3  of    a    fine:     City    of    Shreveport    v. 

Ala.   137;    Trigally  v.   Mayor  &c.,   6  Roos,  35  La.  An.  1010.    See  also,  Cor- 

Coldw.  (Tenn.)  382;  City  of  Shreve-  poration  of  Amite  City  v.  Clements, 

port  V.  Roos,  35  La.  An.  1010;  State  24  La.  An.  27. 

V.  Boneil,  42  La.  An.  1110;   s.  c.  8  '""'State  v.  Grimes,  49  Minn.  443; 

So.  298;  Barter  v.  Commonwealth,  3  s.  c.  52  N.  W.  42. 

P.  &  W.  (Pa.)  253;  Fisher  v.  Harris-  ="  City  of  Centerville  v.  Miller,  57 

burg,  2  Grant  Cas.  (Pa.)  291;  Mount  Iowa  56;  s.  c.  10  N.  W.  293;  Respub- 

Pleasant    v.    Breeze,    11    Iowa    399;  lica  v.  Duquet,  2  Yeates  (Pa.)  493. 

Reinhard  v.  Mayor  &c.,  2  Daly   (N.  ■"*  City  of  Knoxville  .v.  Chicago  &c. 

Y.)    243;   Horr  &  Bemis  Munic.  Po-  R.  Co.,  83  Iowa  636;  s.  c.  50  N.  \Y.  61. 

lice  Ord.,  §  147.    Contra,  Farnsworth  ^^  City  of  Grand  Rapids  v.  Hughes, 

v.  Pawtucket,  13  R.  I.  83.    Such  fines  15   Mich.   54,   per  Cooley,   J.;    citing 

must  as  a  general  rule  be  paid  into  Child    v.    Hudson's    Bay    Co.,    2    P. 

the  treasury   of  the   city,   town   or  Wms.  207;  State  v.  Ferguson,  33  N. 

other  municipal  corporation,  unless  H.  424. 
the    law    specifically    directs    other- 


527  ORDINANCES    AND   BY-LAWS.  §    547 

In  order  that  an  ordinance,  penal  in  its  natnre,  may  be  valid  there 
must  be  an  appropriate  and  legal  penalty.^'"  Where  the  section  of 
an  ordinance  providing  a  penalty  is  void  the  entire  ordinance  is  a 
nullity.^'' ^  Where  a  council  is  authorized  to  impose  a  penalty  it  must 
fix  the  penalty  to  be  imposed  and  not  leave  it  to  the  discretion  of  the 
trial  court. ^'^^  Where  the  constitution  prohibits  a  penalty  fixed  by 
ordinance  less  than  that  fixed  by  the  statute  the  penalty  may  be  fixed 
greater  than  the  minimum  fixed  by  the  statute.^'^^  Where  the  statute 
provides  for  a  penalty,  in  the  discretion  of  the  magistrate,  not  to  ex- 
ceed a  certain  sum  an  ordinance  fixing  a  uniform  penalty  at  that  sum 
is  void,^"''  and  where  the  statute  requires  the  ordaining  of  fixed  penal- 
ties an  ordinance  fixing  the  penalty  at  not  less  than  ten  dollars  nor 
more  than  twenty-five  dollars  is  unauthorized.^''^  Where  an  ordinance 
is  passed  mitigating  a  penalty  pending  a  prosecution  under  the  origi- 
nal ordinance  the  defendant  can  not  be  heard  to  complain  that  the 
penalty  under  the  original  ordinance  is  exorbitant.^ ''^  An  ordinance 
can  not  create  a  civil  liability  for  a  violation.^''' 

§  547.  Mode  of  enforcement  of  ordinances — By  a  purely  civil  ac- 
tion.— If  the  manner  of  enforcing  ordinances  is  prescribed  by  statute 
or  charter  it  is  a  cardinal  rule  that  no  other  method  can  be  resorted 
to.^'^^     In  the  absence  of  statutory  provisions,  at  common  law  the 

^'OTomlin  v.  City  of  Cape  May,  63  Co.,  134  Mo.  641;  s.  c.  36  S.  W.  659. 

N.  J.  L.  429 ;    s.  c.  44  Atl.  209.     Cf .  '"  Ewbanks  v.  President  &c.,  36  111. 

State   v.    Zeigler,   32   N.   J.   L.   262;  177;  King  v.  President  &c.,  3  111.  305; 

State  v.  Treasurer  &c.,  53  N.  J.  L.  Israel   v.   President  &c.,   2    111:  290; 

329;  s.  c.  21  Atl.  304;  State  v.  Cleve-  "Weeks  v.  Porman,  16  N.  J.  L.  237; 

land,  3  R.  I.  117;    State  v.  Gouldy,  Williamson  v.  Commonwealth,  4  B. 

58  N.  J.  L.   562;    s.  c.   34  Atl.   748;  Men.  (Ky.)  146;  State  v.  Zeigler,  32 

Massinger  v.  City  of  Millville,  63  N.  N.  J.  L.  262;    Hart  v.  Mayor  &c.,  9 

J.  L.  123;  s.  c.  43  Atl.  443.  Wend.    (N.   Y.)    571;    Mayor  &c.   v. 

^'^  Massinger  v.   City  of  Millville,  Murphy,  40  N.  J.  L.  145.     So,  too, 

63  N.  J.  L.  123;  s.  c.  43  Atl.  443.  where    a    city    council    invested    by 

^'- Young   &c.   Amuse.    Co.    v.    At-  statute    with    authority    to    require 

lantic  City,  60  N.  J.  L.  125;  s.  c.  37  payment  of  license  fees,  and  to  pass 

Atl.  444.  such  ordinances  as  are  necessary  for 

="  City  of  Owensboro  v.  Sparks,  18  that   purpose,   enacts   an   ordinance 

Ky.  L.  269;  s.  c.  36  S.  W.  4.  prescribing  a  penalty  for  failure  to 

^^*  Massinger  v.   City  of  Millville,  pay  a  license,  it  is  confined  to  that 

63  N.  J.  L.  123;  s.  c.  43  Atl.  443.  mode   of  enforcement  and   can  not 

^"^  City  of  Poughkeepsie  v.  King,  57  maintain  a  suit  to  recover  license 

N.  Y.  S.  116;  s.  c.  38  App.  Div.  (N.  fees:    City  Council  &c.  v.  Ashley  &c. 

Y.)  610.  Co.,  34  S.  C.  541;  s.  c.  13  S.  E.  845. 

='«  Baker  v.  City  of  Lexington,  21  See  also,  City  of  Santa  Cruz  v.  Santa 

Ky.  L.  809;  s.  c.  53  S.  W.  16.  Cruz  R.  Co..  56  Cal.  143.     Upon  the 

=*"  Moran   v.   Pullman   Palace   Car  question,    which    has   not   been    ex- 


547 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIOXS. 


528 


recovery  of  fines  and  penalties  is  by  an  action  of  debt  or  assumpsit, 
and  where  these  forms  have  been  abolished  the  remedy  is  by  a  civil 
action  of  the  same  nature ;^^*^  and  it  is  competent  for  the  corporation 
to  provide  by  ordinance  for  a  recovery  by  an  action  of  debt.^^^  The 
suit  should  be  brought  in  the  name  conferred  upon  the  corporation 
by  its  charter.  Thus,  if  the  "mayor  and  council  of  the  town/'  etc., 
constitute  the  corporate  body,  the  names  of  the  individual  officers 
should  not  be  set  out  in  the  declaration.^**-  Several  penalties  may  be 
included  in  the  declaration  and  recovered  in  one  suit;^^^  but  it  has 
been  held  that  when  ordinances,  though  relating  to  the  same  subject, 
are  entirely  different  in  the  specification  of  offenses  and  the  amounts 
of  the  penalties,  each  presents  a  distinct  cause  of  action,  and  for  the 
enforcement  of  each  a  separate  suit  must  be  brought.^^*  It  is  not 
necessary,  as  in  actions  on  contract,  to  join  all  the  defendants  in 


pressly  decided,  whether  the  remedy 
provided  by  the  English  municipal 
corporations  act  of  1835,  by  distress 
and  imprisonment  for  non-payment 
of  fines,  precludes  the  common-law 
action  of  debt  or  assumpsit,  see 
Grant  Corp.  364;  Rawlison  Corp. 
(5th  ed.)  167;  Bodwie  v.  Fennell,  1 
Wils.  233;  Adley  v.  Reeves,  2  Mau. 
&  S.  53,  61. 

='°  Ewbanks  v.  President  &c.,  36  111. 
177;  State  v.  Treasurer  &c.,  53  N.  J. 
L.  329;  s.  c.  21  Atl.  304;  State  v.  Pas- 
saic, 42  N.  J.  L.  429;  Israel  v.  Presi- 
dent &c.,  2  III.  290;  Coates  v.  Mayor 
&c.,  7  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  585;  Corporation 
of  Columbia  v.  Harrison,  2  Treadw. 
Const.  (S.  C.)  213,  215;  Heeney  v. 
Sprague,  11  R.  I.  456;  Town  of 
Brookville  v.  Gagle,  73  Ind.  177;  City 
of  Monett  v.  Beatty,  79  Mo.  App.  315; 
City  of  Lead  v.  Klatt,  13  S.  D.  140; 
s.  e.  82  N.  W.  391;  City  of  Cassville 
V.  Jimerson,  75  Mo.  App.  426;  Wal- 
ton V.  City  of  Canon  City,  13  Colo. 
App.  77;  s.  c.  56  Pac.  671.  Where  the 
charter  prescribes  that  it  shall  be 
sufficient  to  declare  generally  in 
debt,  it  is  not  necessary  to  file  a 
written  declaration  in  the  common- 
law  form:  Deitz  v.  City  of  Central, 
1  Colo.  323,  holding  also,  that  in  such 


an  action  a  verdict  of  guilty  is  sub- 
stantially responsive  to  the  issue. 

^^  Barter  v.  Commonwealth,  3  P. 
&  W.  (Pa.)  253;  Hesketh  v.  Brad- 
dock,  3  Burr.  1847,  1858.  See  also, 
State  V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  45  N.  J.  L. 
318.  But  not  by  distress  and  sale  of 
goods:  Willcock  Munic.  Corp.  164- 
181;  Adley  v.  Reeves,  2  Mau.  &  S. 
53,  60;  2  Wheat.  Selw.  Nisi  Prius 
1178. 

^-  Powers  V.  Mayor  &c.,  54  Ala. 
214.  See  also,  Charleston  v.  Oliver, 
16  S.  C.  47;  Williamson  v.  Common- 
wealth, 4  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  146;  State 
V.  Treasurer  &c.,  45  N.  J.  L.  288; 
Graves  v.  Colby,  9  Ad.  &  El.  356; 
Master  of  Vintner's  Co.  v.  Passey,  1 
Burr.  235.  The  suit  for  the  violation 
of  an  ordinance  should  be  in  the 
name  of  the  city  and  not  the  state: 
State  V.  Faber,  50  La.  An.  952;  s.  c. 
24  So.  662.  Suits  for  violation 
of  ordinances  in  Washington  are 
brought  in  name  of  the  state  under 
the  constitution:  State  v.  Fountain, 
14  Wash.  236;  s.  c.  44  Pac.  270. 

^^  City  of  Brooklyn  v.  Cleves,  1 
Hill  &  D.  (N.  Y.)  231.  But  that  it 
is  not  necessary  to  join  them,  see 
Whitehall  v.  Meaux,  8  111.  App.  182. 

"'*  Kensington  v.  Glenat,  1  Phila. 
(Pa.)  393. 


529  ORDINANCES    AND    BY-LAWS.  §    548 

interest.     The  cause  of  action  is  assimilated  to  a  case  of  tort,  in  which 
one  or  more  of  the  offending  parties  vaay  be  sued.^^^ 

§  548.  Jurisdiction  of  proceedings. — If  a  special  tribunal  is  pro- 
vided by  law  for  the  trial  of  proceedings  based  upon  municipal  ordi- 
nances, as  is  usually  the  case  in  this  country,  that  tribunal  has  ex- 
clusive jurisdiction  unless  the  legislature  has  plainly  indicated  an 
intention  to  the  contrary,^*^*^  and  the  corporation  can  not  by  ordinance 
create  a  court  or  confer  upon  it  a  jurisdiction  not  expressly  authorized 
by  statute  or  charter.^'^^  Of  course,  the  charter  itself  can  not  give 
power  to  a  judicial  officer  not  recognized  by  the  organic  law;  but 
where  the  latter  vested  all  judicial  authority  in  certain  courts,  in- 
cluding justices  of  the  peace,  and  a  charter  provided  for  the  election 
of  a  justice  of  the  peace,  "to  be  denominated  police  judge,"  and  de- 
fined his  jurisdiction,  it  was  held  that  although  the  title  was  unwar- 
ranted he  was  lawfully  possessed  of  the  powers  of  a  justice  of  the 
peace. ^^^  The  invalidity  of  an  ordinance  is  not  an  objection  that 
goes  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court. ^^'^  And  it  is  also  well  settled 
that  a  magistrate's  personal  interest  in  a  fine  from  the  fact  that  he 
is  a  citizen  of  the  municipality  to  which  it  is  payable  is  too  remote  to 
disqualify  him  to  try  the  action.^''"  An  objection  to  the  jurisdiction 
on  account  of  defects  in  the  process  should  be  made  at  the  earliest 
moment;  it  comes  too  late  if  made  for  the  first  time  on  appeal. ^^^ 

§  549.  Imprisonment  in  default  of  payment  of  fine. — We  have  seen 
that  the  power  to  impose  pecuniary  penalties  is  deemed  a  necessary 
adjunct  to  the  power  to  enact  ordinances  unless  restrained  expressly 

=«^  President  &c.  v.  Holland,  19  111.  =^'^  Deitz  v.  City  of  Central,  1  Colo. 

271.  323. 

''«  Horr    &    Bemis    Munic.    Police  ^«  Woodruff  v.  Stewart,  63  Ala.  206, 

Ord.,  §  166.     In  the  same  section  it  208. 

is  said  that  "remedies  under  ordi-  '"'"  Deitz  v.  City  of  Central,  1  Colo, 

nances  will,   however,  never  be  al-  323;  Commonwealth  v.  Worcester,  3 

lowed  to  fail  for  want  of  a  tribunal.  Pick.  (Mass.)  462;  Mayor  &c.  v.  Mc- 

and   if   no   special   tribunal   is  pro-  Kee,  2  Yerg.  (Tenn.)  167;  Thomas  v. 

vided,   actions   to   enforce   penalties  Town   of   Mt.   Vernon,    9   Ohio   290; 

may  be  brought  in  the  established  City  Council  v.  Pepper,  1  Rich.  L. 

courts  of  the  state;"  citing  Corpo-  (S.  C.)  364;  Queen  v.  Milledge,  L.  R. 

ration   of   Columbia   v.   Harrison,   2  4  Q.  B.  D.  332;  Queen  v.  Justices,  L. 

Treadw.  Const.  (S.  C.)  213.  R.  4  Q.  B.  D.  522.     It  was  formerly 

^'^' State  V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  45  N.  held  otherwise  in  England:  Hesketh 

J.  L.  318;  Deel  v.  City  of  Pittsburgh,  v.  Braddock,  3  Burr.  1847. 

3  Watts   (Pa.)   363;   Barter  v.  Com-  ^^'^  Tisdale  v.  President  &c.,  46  111. 

monwealth,  3  P.  &  W.  (Pa.)  253.  9.    See  also,  Wiggins  v.  City  of  Chi- 
cago, 68  111.  372. 
1  Smith — 34 


§    549  PUBLIC    CORPORATIOXS.  530 

cr  by  fair  implication,  and  that  their  collection  may  be  enforced  by 
an  action  of  debt  or  assumpsit  or  an  equivalent  civil  remedy.  But  as 
this  sanction  would  be  futile  against  impecunious  offenders,  it  is 
generally  provided  that  imprisonment  may  be  inflicted  in  default  of 
payment  of  the  fine  and  the  costs  of  prosecution.^^^  Only  express 
and  precise  authority  will  justify  such  imprisonment.^®^  Payment  of 
fines  can  not  be  coerced  in  that  manner  under  a  power  to  fine  or 
imprison  ;^^*  but  where  a  charter  conferred  the  power  to  enact  ordi- 
nances with  penalties,  and  provided  that  upon  conviction  for  a  breach 
thereof  and  failure  to  pay  the  fine  the  offender  might  be  placed  at 
labor  for  the  city,  it  was  held  that  an  ordinance  requiring  payment 
of  a  license  tax  on  certain  occupations  might  lawfully  annex  a  fine  for 
violation  of  its  provisions,  which  might  be  enforced  in  the  same 
manner  as  any  other  ordinance. ^^^  In  all  cases  the  terms  of  the 
judgment  must  be  in  exact  conformity  with  the  language  of  the  stat- 
ute or  charter  relating  to  the  penalty.  Under  authority  to  commit 
to  the  county  jail  a  commitment  to  any  other  prison  is  void.^^®  So, 
where  the  statute  provided  that  imprisonments  should  not  exceed  six 
months,  a  judgment  that  the  defendant  should  be  confined  in  jail 
until  such  time  as  would  at  a  certain  rate  per  day  make  the  amount 
of  the  fine  and  costs  was  pronounced  invalid.^'^^ 

^^-  The  costs  are  no  part  of  the  pen-  Sachs,  64  Ind.  155.  Cf.  Ex  parte 
alty  and  are  not  computed  in  deter-  Reed,  4  Cranch  C.  C.  582;  City  of 
mining  whether  the  jurisdictional  Philadelphia  v.  Duncan,  4  Phila. 
amount  has  been  exceeded:  State  v.  (Pa.)  145;  Hall  v.  Corporation  of 
Herdt,  40  N.  J.  L.  264.  And  the  au-  Washington,  4  Cranch  722. 
thority  to  imprison  for  non-payment  ■'"■'  Brieswick  v.  Mayor  &c.,  51  Ga. 
of  fine  includes  the  costs:  Horr  &  639;  City  of  Burlington  v.  Kellar,  18 
Bemis  Munic.  Police  Ord.,  §  203.  Iowa  59;  City  of  London's  Case,  8 
Contra,  State  v.  Cantieny,  34  Minn.  Coke  241;  Clark's  Case,  5  Coke  319. 
1 ;  s.  c.  24  N.  W.  458.  A  penalty  ac-  ='^  Brieswick  v.  Mayor  &c.,  51  Ga. 
cruing  from  a  breach  of  an  ordi-  639.  Cf.  Ex  parte  Green,  94  Cal.  387; 
nance  of  a  municipal  corporation  is  s.  c:  29  Pac.  783,  where  it  was  held 
not  a  debt  within  the  meaning  of  a  by  a  divided  court  that  under  a 
constitutional  provision  which  for-  power  to  impose  a  fine  or  imprison- 
bids  imprisonment  for  debt:  Harden-  ment,  or  both,  a  fine  and  imprison- 
brook  v.  Town  of  Ligonier,  95  Ind.  ment,  and  imprisonment  in  default 
70;  citing  McCool  v.  State,  23  Ind.  of  payment  of  the  fine,  might  be  im- 
127;  Lower  v.  Wallick,  25  Ind.  68;  posed  in  one  sentence. 
Turner  v.  Wilson,  49  Ind.  581;  Mcll-  ='' Ex  parte  City  Council  of  Mont- 
vain  V.  State,  87  Ind.  602;  Lane  Co.  gomery,  64  Ala.  463. 
V.  Oregon,  7  Wall.  71;  Dunlop  v.  '"'"Merkee  v.  City  of  Rochester,  13 
Keith,  1  Leigh  (Va.)  430;  Caldwell  Hun  (N.  Y.)  157. 
V.  State,  55  Ala.  133;  Hibbard  v.  ="  Kanouse  v.  Town  of  Lexington, 
Clark,  56  N.  H.  155;  City  of  Camden  12  111.  App.  318.  The  court  said:  — 
V.  Allen,  26  N.  J.  L.  398;   Flora  v.  "It  does  not  appear  from  the  record 


531  ORDINANCES    AND    BY-LAWS.  §    550 

§  550.  Imprisonment  as  a  penalty. — The  right  to  inflict  imprison- 
ment as  a  penalty  for  a  violation  of  an  ordinance  mnst  be  given  by 
charter  or  statute,  otherwise  no  such  penalty  can  be  legally  annexed 
or  enforced.  The  rule  is  that  they  can  only  be  enforced  by  a  pecuni- 
ary penalty  unless  there  is  some  express  act  giving  power  to  inflict 
other  punishment.^®®  The  power  to  imprison  must  be  strictly  con- 
strued. In  a  Colorado  case  it  appeared  that  a  city  charter  gave 
the  council  power  to  enforce  ordinances  "by  a  proper  fine,  impris- 
onment, or  other  penalties."  The  question  at  issue  was  whether 
this  provision  would  sanction  a  fine  and  imprisonment.  The  con- 
clusion that  it  would  not  was  based  on  the  following  argument :  "If 
the  words  'other  penalties'  were  omitted,  a  single  offense  could  be 
punished  by  either  fine  or  imprisonment,  but  not  by  both  fine  and 
imprisonment.  Therefore,  if  the  council  had  power  to  provide  for 
'fine  or  imprisonment,'  such  power  must  be  conferred  by  the  words 
'other  penalties.'  But  this  language  was  in  our  judgment  employed 
in  contradistinction  to  'fines  and  imprisonments.'  The  expression  is, 
'or  other  penalties,' — that  is,  penalties  other  than  fines  or  imprison- 
ments. To  say  that  the  phrase  'other  penalties'  may  in  a  given  case 
include  'fine  and  imprisonment,'  together,  whereas  it  could  not  in- 
clude either  fine  or  imprisonment  separately,  would  be  at  least  para- 
doxical. *  *  *  rpj^g  "^other  penalties'  referred  to  are  penalties 
that  do  not  include  either  of  the  two  previously  designated,  such  as 
revocation  of  licenses,  forfeitures,  distress  and  sale,  and  the  like."^®® 
Before  the  power  to  imprison  can  be  exercised  there  must  be  an 
appropriate  by-law  and  a  trial  and  judicial  ascertainment  that  such 
by-law  has  been  violated.**'" 

§  551.  Forfeitures. — A  municipal  corporation  can  not  impose  a  for- 
feiture of  property  without  express  authority.    Such  an  extraordinary 

what  amount  of  costs  was  taxed  in  would  have  discharged  the  prisoner 
this  case,  but  it  is  argued  by  counsel  at  once."    See  also,  In  re  Greystock, 
that   when   the   fine   and   costs   are  12  Up.  Can.  Q.  B.  458;  Queen  v.  Gil- 
added   together   they   could   not   be  bert,    2    Pug.    &   B.    619;    Ex   parte 
discharged  in  six  months  at  the  rate  Trask,  1  Pug.  &  B.  277. 
[prescribed  by  law].   It  is  enough  to  ''^^  City  of  Burlington  v.  Kellar,  18 
say  that  such  might  be  the  effect,  Iowa  59;   City  of  Kinmundy  v.  Ma- 
and  if  so  the  defendant  at  the  end  of  ban,  72  111.  462;  State  v.  Ruff,  30  La. 
six  months  would  be  driven  to  an-  An.  497.     See  also.  Clerk  v.  Tucket, 
other  proceeding  in  order  to  obtain  3  Lev.  281;  s.  c.  2  Vent.  182;  Adley 
his   discharge.     We  are  of  opinion  v.  Reeves,  2  Mau.  &  S.  53,  60;  Lee  v. 
the   judgment   should   have    limited  Wallis,  1  Kenyon  292,  295. 
the  imprisonment  to  six  months,  so  ^"^  Mclnerney  v.  City  of  Denver,  17 
that  when  that  period  should  have  Colo.  302;  s.  c.  29  Pac.  516,  521. 
arrived    the    keeper    of    the    prison  *""  Ex  parte  Burnett,  30  Ala.  461. 


551 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS. 


532 


power  can  not  be  exercised  under  the  general  power  to  make  by-laws.*"^ 
Where  the  only  penalties  which  a  town  council  was  authorized  to 
impose  for  violation  of  ordinances  were  fines  not  exceeding  $50,  an 
ordinance  declaring  that  any  retailer  who  should  sell  or  give  any 
spirituous  liquors  to  a  slave  without  a  written  permit  should  forfeit 
his  license  was  held  to  be  void.  A  distinction  was  urged  by  counsel 
between  the  forfeiture  of  a  license  and  the  forfeiture  of  goods  and 
chattels,  but  the  court  replied  that  the  oppression  and  hardship  of  a 
forfeiture  does  not  depend  on  the  nature  but  the  value  of  the  thing 
forfeited.  "It  may  be  better  for  the  retailer,"  said  Frost,  J.,  "to 
have  his  stock  in  trade  forfeited  than  his  license  to  retail.  *  *  * 
If  the  town  council  can  forfeit  it  for  the  offense  of  selling  spirits  to 
a  slave,  they  may  declare  it  forfeited  for  any  other  offense ;  and  thus 
convert  a  license  to  retail  into  a  recognizance  of  the  retailer  for  the 
observance  of  all  their  by-laws."*°' 


^"  Taylor  v.  City  of  Carondelet,  22 
Mo.  105.  In  Kirk  v.  Nowill,  1  T.  R. 
118,  124,  Lord  Mansfield  held  that 
such  a  power  must  be  expressly 
given,  as  otherwise  it  was  against 
Magna  Charta;  and  Mr.  Justice 
Buller  also  held  the  ordinance  cre- 
ating a  forfeiture  to  be  bad  for  the 
additional  reason  that  the  act  of  par- 
liament had  prescribed  in  what  man- 
ner by-laws  should  be  enforced, 
namely,  by  fine  or  amercement,  and 
that  therefore  the  corporation  was 
precluded  from  inflicting  any  other 
punishm.ent.  This  case  has  been 
cited  by  subsequent  elementary 
writers  as  establishing  both  these 
positions:  2  Kyd  Corp.  110;  Will- 
cock  Munic.  Corp.  180,  pi.  449;  An- 
gell  &  Ames  Corp.,  §  360.  See  also. 
Hart  v.  Mayor  &c.,  9  Wend.  (N.  Y.) 
571;  Clerk  v.  Tucket,  3  Lev.  281;  s. 
c.  2  Vent.  182;  Lee  v.  Wallis,  1  Ken- 
yon  292,  295;  Phillips  v.  Allen,  41 
Pa.  St.  481;  State  v.  Town  Council, 
6  Rich.  L.  (S.  C.)  404;  Rosebaugh  v. 
Saffin,  10  Ohio  31;  Cotter  v.  Doty,  5 
Ohio  394;  Kneedler  v.  Borough  of 
Norristown,  100  Pa.  St.  368;  White 
V.  Tallman,  26  N.  J.  L.  67;  Bergen  v. 
Clarkson,  6  N.  J.  L.  428;  Slessman 
V.  Crozier,  80  Ind.  487;  Town  of  New 


Hampton  v.  Conroy,  56  Iowa  498;  s. 
c.  9  N.  W.  417;  Henke  v.  McCord,  55 
Iowa  378;  s.  c.  7  N.  W.  623;  Varden 
V.  Mount,  78  Ky.  86;  Mayor  &c.  v. 
Odrenan,  12  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  122; 
Dunham  v.  Trustees  &c.,  5  Cow.  (N. 
Y.)  462;  Mayor  &c.  v.  Yuille,  3  Ala. 
137;  City  of  Cincinnati  v.  Bucking- 
ham, 10  Ohio  257;  Wilcox  v.  Hem- 
ming, 58  Wis.  144;  s.  c.  15  N.  W. 
435;  Donovan  v.  Mayor  &c.,  29  Miss. 
247.  But  an  ordinance  imposing  a 
pecuniary  penalty  and  also  a  for- 
feiture may  be  good  as  to  the  pen- 
alty and  void  as  to  the  forfeiture: 
Kneedler  v.  Borough  of  Norristown, 
100  Pa.  St.  368. 

'"-  State  V.  Town  Council,  6  Rich. 
L.  (S.  C.)  404,  415,  417.  See  also, 
Ridgeway  v.  West,  60  Ind.  371;  State 
V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  44  N.  J.  L.  610. 
An  ordinance  providing  that  upon  a 
second  conviction  for  violation  of  a 
Sunday  closing  of  tippling-houses 
law  the  defendant's  license  and  the 
money  paid  therefor  shall  be  for- 
feited and  remain  forfeited,  though 
upon  appeal  and  trial  de  novo  he  is 
acquitted,  is  void  for  unreasonable- 
ness: Mclnerney  v.  City  of  Denver, 
17  Colo.  302;  s.  c.  29  Pac.  516. 


533  ORDINANCES    AND   BY-LAWS.  §    552 

§  552.  The  same  subject  continued. — When  the  power  to  denounce 
a  forfeiture  of  property  is  clear  it  must  not  be  exercised  in  contraven- 
tion of  constitutional  provisions  looking  to  the  security  of  property 
from  condemnation  without  "due  process  of  law."  Most  of  the  cases 
in  which  the  validity  of  ordinances  in  this  particular  has  been  dis- 
cussed were  those  enacted  for  the  impounding  and  sale  of  animals 
running  at  large.  "The  cases  agree,"  said  Judge  Dillon,  "that  when 
the  power  to  denounce  the  forfeiture  against  such  animals  is  given 
there  should  be  notice  either  actual  or  constructive,  or  prior  legal  pro- 
ceedings."*"^ But  this  alternative  requirement  has  afforded  ground 
for  much  contention  among  the  courts.  The  law  was  laid  down  by 
the  supreme '  court  of  Kansas  as  follows :  "Where  the  law  or  an 
ordinance  provides  that  the  owner  of  the  cattle  shall,  in  addition  to 
the  cost  of  taking  them  up,  impounding  and  keeping  them,  pay  for 
the  damages  that  they  may  do  to  private  individuals  while  unlaw- 
fully running  at  large,  the  question  of  damages  and  the  amount 
thereof  can  be  determined  only  by  judicial  investigation,  and  generally 
in  a  suit  between  the  parties  interested.*"*  And  it  will  also  be  ad- 
mitted that  where  fines  or  forfeitures,  or  anything  of  a  penal  or 
criminal  nature  or  character,  is  imposed,  the  question  of  whether  the 
owner  of  the  stock  is  liable  for  the  same  can  only  be  determined  by 
judicial  investigation.*"^  But  when  nothing  is  attempted  to  be  im- 
posed upon  the  owner  of  the  stock  as  damages  or  penalty,  but  only 
the  reasonable  cost  of  taking  up,  impounding  and  keeping  the  same, 
and  sufficient  notice  is  provided  for,  and  the  ordinance  is  authorized 
by  the  city  charter,  it  is  believed  that  no  court  has  ever  held  the  law, 
or  the  ordinance  founded  thereon,  to  be  unconstitutional  or  invalid, 
although  there  may  be  no  provision  for  a  judicial  investigation,  ex- 
cept the  general  remedies  to  determine  whether  the  law  or  the  ordi- 
nance has  been  complied  with,  and  although  the  notice  provided  for 
""  may  not  be  a  personal  notice,  but  only  a  notice  by  publication  or  by 
posting."*"®  But  the  court  of  appeals  of  Kentucky  declare  that  a 
judicial  investigation  is  essential  to  the  validity  of  such  proceedings. 
"The  constitution  provides  that  the  citizen  shall  not  be  deprived  of 

^"■"l  Dillon  Munic.  Corp.,  §  348.  Gosselink  v.  Campbell,  4  Iowa  296T 

*•"  Bullock  V.  Geomble,  45  111.  218.  McKibbin  v.  Port  Scott,  35  Ark.  352; 

^"^Poppen  V.  Holmes,  44  111.  360;  Hellen  v.  Noe,  3  Ired.  L.  (N.  C.)  493; 

Willis  V.  Legris,  45  111.  289.  McKee  v.  McKee,  8  B.  Mon.    (Ky.) 

*»« Gilchrist  v.  Schmidling,  12  Kan.  433;   Shaw  v.  Kennedy,  N.  C.  Term 

263,    272;    quoted    and    approved    in  R.  158;   Davies  v.  Morgan,  1  C.  &  J. 

Fort  Smith  v.  Dodson,  46  Ark.  296.  587;    Grover   v.    Huckins,    26    Mich. 

See    also,    Whitfield    v.    Longest,    6  476;    Campau  v.   Langley,   39   Mich. 

Ired.  L.  (N.  C.)  268;  Wilcox  v.  Hem-  451;  Moore  v.  State,  11  Lea  (Tenn.) 

ming,  58  Wis.  144;  s.  c.  15  N.  W.  435;  35;  Mayor  &c.  v.  Lanham,  67  Ga.  753. 


§    553  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS,  534 

liis  property  except  by  ilie  law  of  tlie  land.  The  meaning  of  the  pro- 
vision has  generally  been  construed  a  law  that  hears  before  condemn- 
ing and  arrives  at  a  judgment  for  the  divestiture  of  the  rights  of 
property  through  what  is  ordinarily  understood  to  be  judicial  process 
— general  rules  that  govern  society  in  reference  to  the  rights  of  prop- 
erty. This  is  the  general  rule,  and  it  is  only  in  extreme  cases,  when 
the  preservation  and  repose  of  society  or  the  protection  of  the  property 
rights  of  a  large  class  of  the  community  absolutely  require  a  departure, 
that  the  courts  recognize  any  exception.  When,  for  instance,  it  be- 
comes necessary  to  destroy  private  property  to  prevent  the  spread  of 
fire  or  pestilence  in  a  city  or  the  advance  of  an  army,  the  rule  is  silent, 
bending  to  an  overwhelming  necessity."  The  court  insists  that  the 
right  to  proceed  without  citation  and  without  hearing  should  not  be 
extended  beyond  the  impounding  of  the  animals.  "When  that  is  done 
the  necessity  for  summary  and  precipitate  action  ceases  and  judicial 
proceedings  looking  to  a  forfeiture  may  then  properly  begin."**'^ 

§  553.  Cumulative  fines  and  fines  for  continuous  and  repeated 
oifenses. — A  municipal  corporation  having  power  to  enforce  ordi- 
nances by  fines  may  distinguish  between  a  first  and  second  offense, 
and  mark  that  distinction  by  a  graduation  of  the  penalty,  provided  the 
penalty  in  no  case  exceeds  that  authorized  to  be  imposed. '^'^^  Where 
the  acts  are  distinct  repetitions  of  an  offense  and  not  merely  a  con- 
tinuation of  a  misconduct  which  may  be  treated  as  an  entirety  the  full 
penalty  may  be  inflicted  in  each  case.  Unlawful  sales  of  liquor  on  the 
same  day  may,  for  instance,  be  punishable  separately.^*"'  But  where 
a  person  was  charged  in  one  complaint  with  one  hundred  violations 
of  an  ordinance  "prohibiting  any  person  from  cutting  down  and 
making  use  of  cedar  and  other  trees,"  it  was  held  to  set  forth  only  a 
single  offense.*^  °  It  was  also  held  that  an  ordinance  imposing  a  fine 
of  $125  on  each  hundred  pounds  of  gunpowder  kept  in  store,  the  limit 
of  power  to  punish  being  $250,  could  not  be  enforced  beyond  the 
limit.*^^     So,  too,  an  ordinance  prescribing  a  penalty  "of  not  less 

«'Varden  v.  Mount,  78  Ky.  86,  and  215;    State  v.  Town  Council  &c.,   6 

cases  there  cited.    See  also,  in  favor  Rich.  (S.  C.)  404. 

oE  this  view,   Lanfear  v.   Mayor,   4  *'"  State  v.  Town  Council  &c.,  Rice 

La.  97  (cf.  Guillotte  v.  City  of  New  (S.  C.)  158. 

Orleans,  12  La.  An.  432) ;  Cincinnati  "^  Mayor  &c.  v.  Odrenan,  12  Johns. 

V.  Buckingham,  10  Ohio  257.  (N.   Y.)    122.     The   court  remarked 

^•^  State  V.   Inhabitants  &c.,  45  N.  that  if  a  contrary  construction  were 

J.  L.  318;  citing  Master  of  Butchers'  to    prevail    a    penalty    to    the    full 

Co.  v.  Bullock,  3  Bos.  &  Pul.  434.  amount  might  be  repeated,  not  upon 

*°*  Corporation  of  Columbia  v.  Har-  the  offense  itself  but  upon  the  quan- 

rison,  2  Treadw.  Const.   (S.  C.)  213,  tity   of  the   offense,   and  that  with 


535 


ORDINANCES    AND   BY-LAWS. 


554 


than  one  dollar  nor  more  than  five  dollars  for  every  hour"  that  a 
pei'son  shall  keep  his  wagon  within  the  limits  of  a  market  without 
the  authority  of  the  clerk  of  the  market  is  in  violation  of  a  statute 
conferring  power  to  pass  reasonable  by-laws  with  penalties  not  ex- 
ceeding $20  for  one  offense.*^^ 

g  554.    Enforcement  by  complaint — Nature  of  the  proceeding. — 

There  is  great  confusion  among  the  authorities  as  to  the  rules  of  pro- 
cedure and  evidence  applicable  to  the  prosecution  of  offenders  against 
municipal  ordinances  by  complaint.  The  decisions  are  influenced 
in  a  great  measure,  but  not  wholly,  by  local  statutory  or  constitutional 
provisions.^^^  By  the  code  of  Wyoming  civil  procedure  in  all  such, 
actions  is  expressly  enjoined."*^*  Substantially  the  same  rule  has 
been  judicially  adopted  in  some  other  states,  while  in  many  jurisdic- 
tions they  are  deemed  to  possess  in  whole  or  in  part  the  character- 
istics of  criminal  prosecutions.  A  summary  of  the  doctrine  in  various 
states  is  given  in  a  recent  and  much-quoted  treatise,  and  the  authori- 
ties there  cited  will  be  found  in  the  note.*^^ 


equal  propriety  the  penalty  might  be 
imposed  on  every  pound  or  on  every 
grain.  See  also,  City  of  Chicago  v. 
Quimby,  38  111.  274;  Hart  v.  Mayor 
&c.,  9  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  571;  Stokes  v. 
Corporation  of  New  York,  14  Wend. 
(N.  Y.)  87;  Marshall  v.  Smith,  L.  R. 
8  C.  P.  416;  Zylstra  v.  Corporation  of 
Charleston,  1  Bay  (S.  C.)  382; 
Crepps  V.  Burden,  Cowp.  640. 

412  "Tjig  offense  thus  punished  is  a 
single  continuous  offense,  and  the 
ordinance  affixing  a  penalty  which, 
computed  according  to  its  terms, 
may  exceed  $20  for  a  single  offense 
upon  one  and  the  same  day  is  void:" 
Commonwealth  v.  Wilkins,  121  Mass. 
356.  Cf.  Horr  &  Bemis  Munic.  Police 
Ord.,  §  152. 

*"  These  must  be  strictly  followed 
so  far  as  they  go:  People  v.  Presi- 
dent &c.,  32  Hun  (N.  Y.)  508.  And 
generally  the  case  is  controlled  by 
the  procedure  which  obtains  in  sim- 
ilar cases  before  the  same  tribunal: 
People  V.  Cox,  76  N.  Y.  47;  State  v. 
City  of  Passaic,  42  N.  J.  L.  87. 

^"  Jenkins  v.  City  of  Cheyenne,  1 
Wyom.  Ter.  287. 


"^Horr  &  Bemis  Munic.  Police 
Ord.,  §  170.  Alabama: — Stricter 
rules  than  in  civil  cases:  Mayor  &c. 
V.  Jones,  42  Ala.  630;  Fuhrman  v. 
Mayor  &c.,  54  Ala.  263.  California:  — 
Criminal:  City  of  Santa  Barbara  v. 
Sherman,  61  Cal.  57 ;  People  v.  John- 
son, 30  Cal.  98.  Colorado : —For  the 
rule  in  Colorado,  see  the  succeeding 
section.  Georgia: — Not  criminal: 
Williams  v.  City  Council  &c.,  4  Ga. 
509;  Floyd  v.  Commissioners  &c.,  14 
Ga.  354.  Illinois: — Not  criminal: 
City  of  Quincy  v.  Ballance,  30  111. 
185;  President  &c.  v.  Holland,  19  III. 
271;  Town  of  Lewiston  v.  Proctor, 
23  111.  483.  Indiana: — Not  criminal: 
Town  of  Brookville  v.  Gagle,  73  Ind. 
177;  Quigley  v.  City  of  Aurora,  50 
Ind.  28;  City  of  Greensburgh  v.  Cor- 
win,  58  Ind.  518;  City  of  Goshen  v. 
Croxton,  34  Ind.  239;  Board  &c.  v. 
Chissom,  7  Ind.  688:  Miller  v.  O'Reil- 
ly, 84  Ind.  168.  Iowa: — Not  crimi- 
nal: City  of  Davenport  v.  Bird,  34 
Iowa  524.  Kansas: — In  some  cases 
civil,  in  others  criminal:  Neitzel  v. 
City  of  Concordia,  14  Kan.  446.  Cf. 
City  of  Emporia  v.  Volmer,  12  Kan. 


555 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS. 


536 


§  555.  The  complaint — General  requisites. — At  common  law  no 
trial  for  any  offense  except  contempts  could  ever  be  had  without  a  writ- 
ten complaint.*^*  It  is  a  part  of  the  technical  meaning  of  the  term 
"complaint"  that  it  is  verified  by  the  oath  or  affirmation  of  the  person 
who  informs.*^^  The'  complaint  ought  regularly  to  be  entitled  in 
behalf  of  the  proper  party,  which  in  most  cases  is  the  corporation  ;*^* 
but  mere  irregularities  not  affecting  any  substantial  right  of  the  de- 
fendant, and  where  the  record  of  the  proceedings  is  sufficiently  full 
and  specific  to  protect  him  against  another  prosecution  for  the  same 
offense,  will  be  disregarded.*^  **     There  must  be  a  distinct  allegation 


622.  Massachusetts:  —  Criminal: 
Commonwealth  v.  Worcester,  3  Pick. 
(Mass.)  462;  In  re  Goddard,  16  Pick. 
(Mass.)  504.  Michigan: — Not  crim- 
inal: Cooper  V.  People,  41  Mich.  403; 
s.  c.  2  N.  W.  51;  People  v.  Controller 
&c.,  18  Mich.  445.  Minnesota: — Not 
criminal:  State  v.  Lee,  29  Minn.  445; 
s.  c.  13  N.  W.  913.  Missouri:— Not 
criminal:  City  of  St.  Louis  v.  Vert, 
84  Mo.  204;  Ex  parte  Hollwedell,  74 
Mo.  395;  Ex  parte  Kilburg,  10  Mo. 
App.  442.  Nebraska: — Criminal: 
City  of  Brownville  v.  Cook,  4  Neb. 
101.  New  Hampshire:  — Criminal: 
State  v.  Stearns,  31  N.  H.  106.  New 
Jersey: — Not  criminal:  Brophy  v. 
City  of  Perth  Amboy,  44  N.  J.  L. 
217;  Kip  V.  Mayor  &c.,  26  N.  J.  L. 
298;  Keeler  v.  Milledge,  24  N.  J.  L. 
142.  New  York: — Not  criminal: 
Wood  V.  City  of  Brooklyn,  14  Barb. 
(N.  Y.)  425,  431.  See  also.  City  of 
Buffalo  V.  Schliefer,  25  Hun  (N.  Y.) 
275.  Ohio: — In  some  cases  civil,  in 
others  criminal:  City  of  Cincinnati 
V.  Gwynne,  10  Ohio  192;  Markle  v. 
Town  Council  &c.,  14  Ohio  586.  See 
also,  Larney  v.  City  of  Cleveland,  34 
Ohio  St.  599.  Wisconsin: — The  rule 
is  now  nearly  or  quite  the  same  as 
that  in  Colorado  (see  the  following 
section) :  President  &c.  v.  McKernan, 
54  Wis.  487;  s.  c.  11  N.  W.  798;  Pres- 
ident &c.  V.  Bell,  43  Wis.  488;  Fink 
V.  City  of  Milwaukee,  17  Wis.  26; 
City  of  Oshkosh  v.  Schwartz,  55  Wis. 
483;  s.  c.  13  N.  W.  533;  Sutton  v. 
McConnell,  46  Wis.  269;   s.  c.  50  N. 


W.  414;  Chafin  v.  Waukesha  Co.,  62 
Wis.  463;  s.  c.  24  N.  W.  732. 

""  4  Bl.  Com.  280;  Barbour  Cr.  Law 
614;  1  Bishop  Crim.  Proc,  §  894: 
Chitty  Cr.  Law  34;  Archbold  Cr. 
Prac.  &  PI.  31,  n.  1;  Allen  v.  Gray, 
11  Conn.  95,  102;  Tracy  v.  Williams, 
4  Conn.  107;  Prell  v.  McDonald,  7 
Kan.  426;  Campbell  v.  Thompson,  16 
Me.  117.  On  appeal,  city  ordinances 
will  not  be  presumed  to  require  a 
written  complaint:  City  of  Alton  v. 
Kirsch,  68  111.  261. 

"^  Campbell  v.  Thompson,  16  Maine 
117,  120.  A  slight  error  in  the  jurat 
will  not  vitiate  the  affidavit:  City  of 
Cherokee  v.  Pox,  34  Kan.  16;  s.  c. 
7  Pac.  625.  If  the  charter  requires 
an  information  by  the  city  attorney, 
a  complaint  made  by  a  deputy, 
though  afterwards  adopted  by  him, 
is  not  sufficient:  City  of  Kansas  v. 
Flanagan,  69  Mo.  22. 

"3  Williamson  v.  Commonwealth,  4 
B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  146;  Smith  v.  Mar- 
ston,  5  Tex.  426;  Webster  v.  City  of 
Lansing,  47  Mich.  192;  s.  c.  10  N.  E. 
196.  Any  form  of  complaint  in  this 
respect  which  is  prescribed  by  stat- 
ute must  be  strictly  obeyed:  State 
V.  Zeigler,  32  N.  J.  L.  262;  State  v. 
Bartlett,  35  Wis.  287;  Exeter  v. 
Starre,  2  Show.  158;  Harris  v.  Wake- 
man,  Say.  254;  Commonwealth  v. 
Fahey,  5  Cush.  (Mass.)  408. 

"=•  State  V.  Graffmuller,  26  Minn.  6; 
s.  c.  46  N.  W.  445;  Farrel  v.  Mayor 
&c.,  12  Up.  Can.  Q.  B.  343;  State  v. 
Treasurer  &c.,  45  N.  J.  L.  288;  City 


537 


ORDINANCES  AND  BY-LAWS. 


§  556 


of  the  offense,*^**  a  reference  to  the  ordinance  violated,  and  a  conclu- 
sion.*-"^ 

§  556.  The  same  subject  continued — Pleading. — The  precision  re- 
quired in  common-law  informations  or  indictments  is  not  required 
in  affidavits  for  violation  of  municipal  ordinances.  "It  is  sufficient 
if  they  set  out  with  clearness  the  offense  charged,  and  the  substance 
of  that  part  of  the  ordinance  which  has  been  violated,  with  a  reference 
to  the  title,  the  date  and  the  section."*^^  It  is  generally  held  suffi- 
cient to  set  out  the  substance  of  the  ordinance  or  the  section  of  it 
which  is  alleged  to  have  been  violated.'*^ ^     But  a  simple  charge  of 


of  Alton  v.  Kirsch,  68  111.  261;  State 
v.  King,  37  Iowa  462. 

""Roberson  v.  Lambertville,  38  N. 
J.  L.  69;  Horr  &  Bemis  Munlc.  Police 
Ord.,  §  173. 

^"a  See  the  following  two  sections. 

^^^Keeler  v.  Milledge,  24  N.  J.  L. 
142,  145.  Continuing,  the  court 
said:  — "This  much,  however,  it 
ought  to  contain,  for  the  office  of 
the  complaint  is  not  only  to  give  the 
magistrate  jurisdiction,  but  event- 
ually to  apprise  the  party  of  what 
offense  he  is  charged  with,  and  it 
answers  neither  of  these  purposes 
with  certainty  unless  it  contains 
these  particulars.  I  am  inclined  to 
think  this  complaint  is  defective, 
inasmuch  as  it  does  not  give  the  date 
and  the  section  of  the  ordinance 
alleged  to  have  been  violated;  but 
as  it  refers  to  the  ordinance  relating 
to  markets,  and  gives  the  literal 
words  of  the  section,  and  as  there 
is  no  pretense  that  the  defendant 
was  surprised,  I  should  have  some 
hesitation  in  reversing  for  this  cause 
alone."  See  also.  Inhabitants  &c.  v. 
O'Connor,  53  Mo.  468;  Common- 
wealth V.  Rowe,  141  Mass.  79;  s.  c. 
6  N.  E.  645;  State  v.  Dunbar,  43  La. 
An.  836;  s.  c.  9  So.  492;  State  v. 
Baker,  44  La.  An.  79;  s.  c.  10  So.  405; 
City.  Council  &c.  v.  Ashley  Phosphate 
Co.,  34  S.  C.  541;  s.  c.  13  S.  E.  845. 

^^Kip  v.  Mayor  &c.,  26  N.  J.  L. 
298;  Goldthwaite  v.  City  Council  &c., 
50  Ala.  486;    Case  v.  Mayor  &c.,  30 


Ala.  538;  City  Council  &c.  v.  Chur, 
2  Bailey  (S.  C.)  164;  Clevenger  v. 
Town  of  Rushville,  90  Ind.  258;  City 
Council  &c.  V.  Milwaukee  &c.  R.  Co., 
7  Wis.  484;  People  v.  Justices,  12 
Hun  (N.  Y.)  65;  City  Council  v. 
Seeba,  4  Strobh.  L.  (S.  C.)  319; 
O'Malia  v.  Wentworth,  65  Maine  129. 
In  Ex  parte  Lane,  76  Cal.  587;  s.  c. 
18  Pac.  677,  a  description  of  the 
offense,  and  a  reference  to  the  sec- 
tion of  the  ordinance,  were  held  in- 
sufficient. See  also,  to  the  same 
point.  City  of  Faribault  v.  Wilson, 
34  Minn.  254;  s.  c.  25  N.  W.  449; 
Town  of  Auburn  v.  Eldridge,  77  Ind. 
126;  City  of  Huntington  v.  Pease, 
56  Ind.  305;  City  of  Goshen  v.  Kern, 
63  Ind.  468;  Whitson  v.  City  of 
Franklin,  34  Ind.  392;  West  v.  City 
of  Columbus,  20  Kan.  633;  State  v. 
Merritt,  83  N.  C.  677;  State  v.  Cai- 
nan,  94  N.  C.  880.  In  some  cases  it 
has  been  held  unnecessary  to  refer 
to  the  ordinance:  City  of  Rochester 
V.  Upman,  19  Minn.  108;  State  v. 
Reckards,  21  Minn.  47;  City  of  Osh- 
kosh  V.  Schwartz,  55  Wis.  483;  s.  c. 
13  N.  W.  552.  See  also.  Information 
of  Oliver,  21  S.  C.  318;  and  contra. 
City  of  Winona  v.  Burke,  23  Minn. 
254;  Inhabitants  &c.  v.  Inhabitants 
&c.,  47  Maine  481.  But  the  prevail- 
ing rule  is  that  the  courts  will  take 
judicial  notice  of  the  charter,  and 
the  power  to  make  by-laws,  but  not 
of  the  by-laws  themselves:  Case  v. 
Mayor  &c.,  30  Ala.  538;  Goodrich  v. 


55^ 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS. 


538 


violating  an  ordinance  by  a  more  recital  of  the  number  of  the  section 
is  insufficient.*^^  The  complaint  should  state  briefly  but  clearly  the 
acts  done  or  omitted  to  be  done  which  constitute  a  violation  of  the 
ordinance,  together  with  the  time  when  and  place  where  the  offense 
was  committed.*^*  The  general  rule  undoubtedly  is  that  it  is  suffi- 
cient to  describe  the  offense  in  the  language  of  the  ordinance  ;*^^  but 
Avhere  the  words  of  the  ordinance  by  their  generality  embrace  within 
their  literal  terms  cases  which  are  not  within  their  equity  and  spirit 
or  the  obvious  intention  of  the  framers,  the  rules  of  good  pleading 
require  all  the  circumstances  and  ingredients  of  the  ofEense  to  be 
set  out.*'*^ 

§  557.  Pleading  further  considered. — While  some  latitude  must  be 
allowed  in  the  construction  of  complaints  charging  violations  of  ordi- 
nances, all  the  common  safeguards  and  requirements  of  criminal 
pleading  ought  not  to  be  disregarded.  A  complaint  for  wilfully  re- 
fusing, as  the  agent  of  a  water  company,  to  supply  the  complainant 
with  water,  a  tender  being  made  in  actual  money  for  that  purpose, 


Brown,  30  Iowa  291;  Garvin  v.  Wells, 
8  Iowa  286  (cf.  Conboy  v.  Iowa  City, 
2  Iowa  90);  Trustees  &c.  v.  Lefler, 
23  111.  88,  90;  Harker  v.  Mayor,  17 
Wend.  (N.  Y.)  199;  People  v.  Mayor 
&c.,  7  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  81;  Mooney 
V.  Kennett,  19  Mo.  551;  Cox  v.  City 
of  St.  Louis,  11  Mo.  431;  City  of  Aus- 
tin V.  Walton,  68  Tex.  507;  s.  c.  5 
S.  W.  70;  City  of  New  Orleans  v. 
Boudro,  14  La.  An.  303;  City  of  Miles 
City  V.  Kern,  12  Mont.  119;  s.  c.  29 
Pac.  720;  People  v.  Buchanan,  1 
Idaho  681;  Green  v.  City  of  Indian- 
apolis, 22  Ind.  192;  Wheeling  v. 
Black,  25  W.  Va.  266;  Garland  v. 
City  of  Denver,  11  Colo.  534;  s.  c. 
19  Pac.  460.  In  Town  of  Mounds- 
ville  V.  Velton,  35  W.  Va.  217;  s.  c. 
13  S.  E.  373,  it  is  said  to  be  "well 
settled"  that  the  courts  of  the  mu- 
nicipality will  take  judicial  notice 
of  its  ordinances  without  pleading 
or  proof, — citing  Dillon  Munic.  Corp., 
§  413,  and  Wheeling  v.  Black,  25  W. 
Va.  266.  But  cf.  Horr  &  Bemis  Mu- 
nic. Police  Ord.,  §  174,  and  Bishop 
Stat.  Crimes  (2d  ed.),  §  106,  and 
cases  cited;  Downing  v.  City  of  Mil- 


tonvale,  36  Kan.  740;  s.  c.  14  Pac. 
281. 

^'  City  of  Huntington  v.  Pease,  56 
Ind.  305;  City  of  Huntington  v. 
Cheesbro,  57  Ind.  74. 

'-'  City  of  Huntington  v.  Pease,  56 
Ind.  305;  Inhabitants  &c.  v.  O'Con- 
nor, 53  Mo.  468;  Lippman  v.  City  of 
South  Bend,  84  Ind.  276;  City  of  St. 
Louis  V.  Fitz,  53  Mo.  582. 

*-''  City  of  St.  Louis  v.  Knox,  74  Mo. 
79;  State  v.  Carpenter,  60  Conn.  97; 
Commonwealth  v.  Cutter,  156  Mass. 
52;  s.  c.  29  N.  E.  1146. 

^^^  State  V.  Goulding,  44  N.  H.  284; 
State  V.  Beirce,  27  Conn.  319;  Com- 
monwealth V.  Stark,  2  Cush.  (Mass.) 
556;  Rex  v.  Home,  2  Cowp.  672,  682; 
State  V.  Follet,  6  N.  H.  53;  2  Hawk. 
P.  C,  ch.  25,  §§  111,  115;  3  Bac.  Abr. 
113;  State  v.  Robinson,  29  N.  H.  274; 
Rex  V.  Mason,  2  T.  R.  581;  Davey  v. 
Baker,  4  Burr.  2471;  Rex  v.  Spar- 
ling, 1  Str.  497;  Anthony  v.  State,  29 
Ala.  27:  State  v.  Fleetwood,  16  Mo. 
448;  Horr  &  Bemis  Munic.  Police 
Ord.,  §  173.  "A  complaint  properly 
concludes  against  the  form  of  the 
statute:"  State  v.  Cruickshank,  71 
Vt.  94;  s.  c.  42  Atl.  983. 


539  ORDINANCES    AND   BY-LAWS.  §    558 

which  does  not  state  that  the  water  company  was  nnder  a  legal  ohli- 
gation  by  ordinance  to  supply  such  water,  and  does  not  in  express 
words  or  by  fair  implication  allege  that  the  tender  was  sufficient  or 
was  the  amount  of  the  legal  or  contract  price  of  the  water  supply 
desired,  is  bad  and  should  be  quashed  on  motion. *^'^  But  a  general 
allegation  that  an  ordinance  has  been  duly  passed  is  sufficient  without 
alleging  that  every  antecedent  act  requisite  to  its  legal  passage  has 
been  done  ;*-■''  or  that  the  officers  were  duly  elected  and  authorized 
to  pass  the  ordinance. '^^^  As  a  general  rule  exceptions  need  not  be 
negatived/^"  If  an  offense  be  cumulative  with  respect  to  the  acts 
done,  although  any  one  of  the  acts  be  sufficient  to  constitute  the  offense, 
the  cumulative  offense  may  be  charged  without  making  the  pleading 
bad  for  duplicity. ^^^  A  complaint  for  allowing  swine  to  go  upon  the 
sidewalk  is  not  objectionable  in  describing  a  continuous  street  by  the 
names  of  its  different  parts. *^-  Where  the  complaint  is  brought  in 
the  name  of  the  corporation,  it  is  proper  to  conclude  "contrary  to  the 
form  of  the  ordinance,"  etc;^^^  but  when  it  is  required  to  be  prose- 
cuted in  the  name  of  the  state,  it  ought  to  conclude  "contrary  to  the 
statute,"  or  to  both  statute  and  ordinance. *•''* 

§  558.  Proof  of  ordinances. — The  method  of  proving  ordinances 
is  frequently  provided  for  by  statute  ;*^^  but  where  the  matter  is  not 
thus  regulated,  the  common-law  rule  requires  the  production  of  the 

*"''  Johnson  v.  City  of  Winfield,  48         *  -  Commonwealth  v.  Curtis,  9  Al- 

Kan.  129;  s.  c.  29  Pac.  559.  len  (Mass.)  266,  268. 

^^*  Becker  v.  City  of  Washington,        *'^  Village   of  Winooski  v.   Gokey, 

94  Mo.  375;   s.  c.  7  S.  W.  291.     See  49  Vt.  282. 

also.  Board  &c.  v.  Henzler    (N.  J.),        ^^*  Horr    &    Bemis    Munic.    Police 

41  Atl.   228;   Town  of  Flora  v.  Lee,  Ord.,  §  176.     In  a  prosecution  for  vi- 

5  111.  App.  629.  olation  of  an  ordinance  under  a  stat- 

^^  Hardenbrook  v.  Town  of  Ligo-  iite  providing  that  "it  shall  be  suffi- 

nier,  95  Ind.  70.     See  also.  Village  of  cient  to  set  forth  the  offense  fully, 

Winooski  v.  Gokey,  49  Vt.  282;  City  plainly,  substantially  and  formally, 

of    Janesville    v.    Milwaukee   &c.    R.  and  no  part  of  such  ordinance  need 

Co.,  7  Wis.  484.     Cf.  Commissioners  be  set  forth,"  a  conclusion  "against 

&c.  V.  Frank,  1  Jones  L.  (N.  C.)  436.  the  revised  ordinances  of  said  city 

*^"  McGear  v.  Woodruff,  33  N.  J.  L.  in   such   case   made   and    provided," 

213;  Lynch  v.  People,  16  Mich.  472;  is  sufficient  to   embrace  an   amend- 

Town  of  Martinsville  v.  Frieze,  33  ment  to  a  section  included  in  a  vol- 

Ind.  507.  ume  entitled  "Revised  Ordinances:" 

^■■^  Commonwealth  v.  Curtis,  9  Al-  Commonwealth    v.    Odenweller,    156 

len      (Mass.)      266,     268;     State     v.  Mass.  234;  s.  c.  30  N.  E.  1022. 
Haney,  2  Dev.  &  B.  (N.  C.)  390,  403.         ^==*  Napman  v.  People,  19  Mich.  352; 

See  also,  Reg.  v.  Bowen,  1  Denison  City  of  St.  Louis  v.  St.  Louis  R.  Co., 

23;     Stevens    v.    Commonwealth.    6  89  Mo.  44;    s.  c.  1  S.  W.   305.     See 

Met.   (Mass.)   241;   State  v.  Morton,  also,  Downing  v.  City  of  Miltonvale, 

27    Vt.     310;     Hinkle    v.     Common-  36  Kan.  740;  s.  c.  14  Pac.  281. 
wealth,  4  Dana   (Ky.)   518. 


§  558 


rUBLIO    COUPOKATIONS. 


640 


originals  or  the  books  in  which  they  are  reeorded.^^®  If  the  regular 
enactment  of  the  ordinance  is  not  questioned,  it  is  not  necessary  to 
show  that  fact  in  addition  to  its  production  to  sustain  a  conviction.*^'' 
But  where  it  becomes  necessary  to  prove  a  compliance  with  all  formali- 
ties, none  must  be  omitted  which  are  requisite  to  its  validity/^^  A 


«6  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Engle,  76 
111.  317;  City  Council  v.  Dunn,  1 
McC.  (S.  C.)  333;  Fitch  v.  Pinckard, 
5  111.  69;  Prell  v.  McDonald,  7  Kan. 
426;  State  v.  King,  37  Iowa  462; 
Barr  v.  Village  of  Auburn,  89  111. 
361;  Lindsay  v.  City  of  Chicago,  115 
111.  120;  s.  c.  3  N.  E.  443;  City  of  In- 
dependence v.  Trouvalle,  15  Kan.  70. 
As  to  attestation  and  identifica- 
tion of  the  book,  see  Town  of  Tipton 
v.  Norman,  72  Mo.  380;  City  of  Ot- 
tumwa  v.  Schaub,  52  Iowa  515;  s.  c. 
3  N.  W.  529.  Where  there  is  no  rec- 
ord the  original  or  a  certified  copy 
is  admissible:  Pugh  v.  City  of  Little 
Rock,  35  Ark.  75;  Bailey  v.  State,  30 
Neb.  855;  s.  c.  47  N.  W.  208;  King- 
horn  V.  Corporation  &c.  of  Kingston, 
26  Up.  Can.  Q.  B.  130;  Block  v.  Presi- 
dent &c.,  36  111.  301.  An  ordinance 
purporting  to  have  been  passed  by 
the  city  council  and  coming  from 
the  city  secretary,  who  is  the  cus- 
todian, is  admissible,  although  there 
is  an  interlineation  therein:  Hutchi- 
son V.  Storrie  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  48  S. 
W.  785.  The  clerk's  certificate  re- 
citing that  the  document  was  a  true 
and  correct  copy  of  an  ordinance 
passed  by  the  council  and  deposited 
in  his  office  is  prima  facie  proof  of 
its  passage:  McChesney  v.  City  of 
Chicago,  159  111.  223;  s.  c.  42  N.  E. 
894.  Where  the  charter  provides 
that  the  ordinances  published  in 
book  form  shall  be  received  in  evi- 
dence without  further  proof,  an  or- 
dinance so  published  will  be  pre- 
sumed to  have  been  signed  by  the 
mayor:  Allen  v.  City  of  Davenport, 
107  Iowa  90;  s.  c.  77  N.  W.  532. 
A  book  of  ordinances  published  by 
authority  of  the  city  council,  though 
not  precisely  as  prescribed,  is  com- 


petent evidence:  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co. 
V.  Winters,  65  111.  App.  435.  But 
not  so  if  not  published  by  authority 
of  the  council:  Louisville  &c.  R.  Co. 
V.  Patchen,  167  111.  204;  s.  c.  47  N. 
E.  368.  It  is  prima  facie  proof  of  an 
ordinance  to  introduce  the  ordi- 
nance-book with  the  vote  thereon 
and  the  proper  authentication  thei"e- 
of  with  evidence  of  due  publication: 
Merced  Co.  v.  Fleming,  111  Cal.  46; 
s.  c.  43  Pac.  392.  An  ordinance  of  a 
city  providing  protection  from 
blasting  is  admissible  in  evidence  in 
an  action  for  injury  caused  by  loose 
fragments  of  rock  thrown  upon 
plaintiff's  house  from  blasting:  Ma- 
honey  V.  Dankwart,  108  Iowa  321; 
s.  c.  79  N.  W.  134;  Ex  parte  Davis, 
115  Cal.  445;  s.  c.  47  Pac.  258. 

*^^  Town  of  Flora  v.  Lee,  5  111.  App. 
629.  See  also,  Becker  v.  City  of 
Washington,  94  Mo.  375;  s.  c.  7  S. 
W.  291;  Board  &c.  v.  Henzler  (N. 
J.),  41  Atl.  228. 

^^"'Willard  v.  Warden  &c.,  8  Conn. 
247;  Trustees  &c.  v.  Lefler,  23  111. 
88;  Schott  v.  People,  89  111.  195.  The 
record-book  is  the  best  evidence  of 
the  ordinance  and  can  not  be  con- 
tradicted by  parol:  People  v.  Mur- 
ray, 57  Mich.  396;  s.  c.  24  N.  W.  118; 
City  of  Solomon  v.  Hughes,  24  Kan. 
211;  City  of  Lexington  v.  Headley,  5 
Bush  (Ky.)  508;  Ball  v.  Fagg,  67 
Mo.  481;  City  of  Covington  v.  Lud- 
low, 1  Met.  (Ky.)  295;  City  of  St. 
Louis  V.  Foster,  52  Mo.  513.  Cf. 
Knight  V.  Kansas  City  &c.  R.  Co.,  70 
Mo.  231;  Barton  v.  City  of  Pitts- 
burgh, 4  Brewst.  (Pa.)  373;  City  of 
Troy  V.  Atchison  &c.  R.  Co.,  11  Kan. 
519.  But  it  is  generally  held  that 
parol  proof  of  publication  is  compe- 
tent:   Horr  &  Bemis  Munic.   Police 


541 


ORDINANCES    AND   BY-LAWS. 


§  559 


town  or  city  court  takes  judicial  notice  of  the  ordinances  of  such 
town  or  city.'*''"'  But  courts  other  than  municipal  courts  will  not 
take  judicial  notice  that  there  is  an  ordinance  on  a  given  subject,  and 
such  ordinance  must  be  pleaded  and  proved.**" 

§  559.  Right  to  trial  by  jury. — Constitutional  provisions  relating 
to  trial  by  jury,  being  twice  put  in  jeopardy,  proceedings  by  indict- 
ment or  information  and  the  like,  in  criminal  cases,  are  generally  held 
to  have  been  adopted  with  reference  to  the  procedure  previously  exist- 
ing. If  in  a  given  class  of  offenses  trials  without  a  jury  were  formerly 
the  prevailing  rule,  this  rule  is  not  abrogated  by  the  constitution.**^ 
Both  in  this  country  and  in  England  the  trangressions  of  municipal 
regulations  enacted  under  the  police  power  for  the  purpose  of  pre- 
serving the  health,  peace  and  good  order,  and  otherwise  promoting 
the  general  welfare  within  cities  and  towns,  have  for  considerably 
more  than  a  century  been  generally  prosecuted  without  a  jury.**^  It 
is  certainly  true  that  where  the  judgment  against  the  defendant 
entails  a  fine,  even  if  its  collection  may  by  virtue  of  the  statute  and 
ordinance  be  enforced  by  imprisonment,  the  proceeding  remains  a 


Ord.,  §  187,  and  cases  there  cited; 
Town  of  Eldora  v.  Burlingame,  62 
Iowa  32;  s.  c.  17  N.  W.  148;  Newlan 
v.  President  &c.,  14  111.  364;  Teft  v. 
Size,  10  111.  432.  See  also.  Raker  v. 
Village  of  Maquon,  9  111.  App.  155; 
Schwartz  v.  City  of  Oshkosh,  55 
Wis.  490;  s.  c.  13  N.  W.  450;  Village 
of  Betholto  v.  Conley,  9  111.  App.  339. 

*^^  Incorporated  Town  of  Scranton 
v.  Danenbaum,  109  Iowa  95;  s.  c.  80 
N.  W.  221. 

^"'Munson  v.  Fenno,  87  111.  App. 
655;  Watt  v.  Jones,  60  Kan.  201;  s. 
c.  56  Pac.  16;  Field  v.  Malster,  88 
Md.  691;  s.  c.  41  Atl.  1087;  City  of 
St.  Louis  V.  Roche.  128  Mo.  541;  s.  c. 
31  S.  W.  915;  Shanfelter  v.  Mayor 
&c.,  80  Md.  483;  s.  c.  31  Atl.  439; 
Weaver  v.  Snow,  60  111.  App.  624; 
People  V.  Casegeanda,  37  N.  Y.  S. 
768;  s.  c.  73  N.  Y.  St.  445. 

*"Cooley  Const.  Lim.  (5th  ed.) 
390,  n.  3;  Sedgwick  Stat.  &  Const. 
Law  487,  n.,  491,  n.,  497;  State  v. 
Glenn,  54  Md.  572;  Shafer  v.  Mum- 
ma,  17  Md.  331;  Williams  v.  City 
Council  &c.,  4  Ga.  509;  Hill  v.  Mayor 
&c.,  72  Ga.  314,  319;   Ward  v.  Far- 


well,  97  111.  593;  Floyd  v.  Commis- 
sioners, 14  Ga.  354,  356;  McGear  v. 
Woodruff,  33  N.  J.  L.  213,  215;  Howe 
V.  Treasurer,  37  N.  J.  L.  145;  State 
v.  City  of  Topeka,  36  Kan.  76;  s.  c. 

12  Pac.  310;  Inwood  v.  State,  42  Ohio 
St.  186;  People  v.  McCarthy,  45  How. 
Pr.  (N.  Y.)  97;  Ex  parte  Kiburg.  10 
Mo.  App.  442,  447;  Mclnerney  v.  City 
of  Denver,  17  Colo.  302;  s.  c.  29  Pac. 
516. 

"=  State  V.  Lee,  29  Minn.  445;  s.  c. 

13  N.  W.  913;  City  of  Greeley  v. 
Hamman,  12  Colo.  94;  s.  c.  12  Pac.  1; 
Ex  parte  Hollwedell,  74  Mo.  395,  400; 
State  V.  Sly,  4  Or.  277;  State  v.  Con- 
lin,  27  Vt.  318;  Wong  v.  City  of  As- 
toria, 13  Or.  538;  s.  c.  11  Pac.  295; 
State  v.  Noble,  20  La.  An.  325;  By- 
ers  v.  Commonwealth,  42  Pa.  St.  89; 
Shafer  v.  Mumma,  17  Md.  331;  Peo- 
ple V.  Van  Houten,  35  N.  Y.  S.  186; 
s.  c.  69  N.  Y.  St.  265;  Board  of  Po- 
lice &c.  V.  Giron,  46  La.  An.  1364;  s. 
c.  16  So.  190;  Hunt  v.  City  of  Jack- 
sonville, 34  Fla.  504;  s.  c.  16  So.  398; 
and  cases  cited  in  the  preceding 
note.  But  see  State  v.  Larkins,  44 
S.  C.  362;  s.  c.  22  S.  E.  409. 


§  560 


PUBLIC    COKPOKATIONS. 


542 


civil  action  so  far  as  a  jury  trial  is  concerned 
name  of  the  state  or  not."**^  And  in  a  number 
cisions  the  same  rule  is  held  to  apply  where  the 
imprisonment  in  the  first  instance  and  not  mere 
There  is  excellent  authority  for  the  i)roposition 
viding  for  summary  proceedings  without  a  jury 
if  the  offense  be  also  a  statutory  misdemeanor 
ment  and  jury  trial.^*^ 


,  whether  it  be  in  the 
of  well-considered  de- 
judgment  may  include 
ly  as  an  alternative.*** 
that  an  ordinance  pro- 
is  in  that  respect  void 
punishable  by  indict- 


§  560,  The  same  subject  continued. — It  is  believed  that  no  court 
has  gone  further  in  supporting  summary  convictions  than  the  supreme 
court  of  Colorado,  in  a  case  where  the  defendant  was  prosecuted 
for  violating  an  ordinance  regulating  dram-shops.  By  general  statute 
the  act  was  made  a  misdemeanor  punishable  by  indictment  or  informa- 
tion, trial  by  jury,  etc.,  and  it  was  strenuously  insisted  by  counsel  for 


"^  Natal  v.  Louisiana,  139  U.  S. 
621;  s.  c.  11  S.  Ct.  636;  City  of  Osh- 
kosh  v.  Schwartz,  55  Wis.  483,  487; 
s.  c.  13  N.  W.  552;  President  &c.  v. 
Bell,  43  Wis.  488;  State  v.  Smith,  52 
Wis.  134;  s.  c.  8  N.  W.  870;  Chafin  v. 
Waukesha  Co.,  62  Wis.  463;  s.  c.  22 
N.  W.  732;  Baldwin  v.  City  of  Chi- 
cago, 68  111.  418;  Ex  parte  Hollwe- 
dell,  74  Mo.  395;  Horr  &  Bemis 
Munic.  Police  Ord.,  §  181. 

«^  McGear  v.  Woodruff,  33  N.  J.  L. 
213,  215.  In  Hill  v.  Mayor,  72  Ga. 
314,  the  court  said: — "If  no  man 
could  be  fined  or  imprisoned  for  vio- 
lation of  city  police  ordinances  ex- 
cept by  a  jury  trial  on  indictment, 
away  would  go  all  power  in  our  mu- 
nicipal authorities  to  preserve  peace 
and  good  order  within  their  corpo- 
rate limits."  In  affirming  the  same 
doctrine  the  supreme  court  of  Colo- 
rado used  the  following  vigorous 
language: — "The  public  welfai'e  de- 
mands summary  and  speedy  prose- 
cution of  offenders  against  munici- 
pal ordinances.  To  hold  that  unless 
there  be  presentation  by  indictment, 
trial  by  jury,  and  unless  all  the  oth- 
er constitutional  rights  and  priv- 
ileges accorded  to  defendants  in 
criminal  cases  be  extended  to  each 
and  every  person  charged  with  these 


petty  offenses,  and  imprisonment 
could  not  follow  conviction,  would 
be  disastrous  beyond  measure  to  the 
welfare  of  those  living  within  cities 
and  towns,  and  would  largely  de- 
stroy the  usefulness  of  such  corpora- 
tions:" Per  Justice  Helm,  in  City  of 
Greeley  v.  Hamman,  12  Colo.  94;  s. 
c.  12  Pac.  1.  . 

**^  Some  of  these  cases  declare, 
however,  that  if  the  defendant  is  en- 
titled on  appeal  to  a  trial  by  jury 
and  there  be  no  unreasonable  limita- 
tion connected  with  the  appeal,  the 
constitutional  provisions  are  satis- 
fied. See  In  re  Dana,  7  Ben.  1,  4; 
Callan  v.  Wilson,  127  U.  S.  540;  s.  c. 
8  S.  Ct.  1301,  confining  this  qualifi- 
cation to  petty  offenses.  Where  the 
defendant  was  required,  as  a  condi- 
tion precedent  to  the  right  of  appeal, 
to  execute  a  bond  with  approved 
sureties,  not  merely  for  his  appear- 
ance in  the  police  court,  but  also  for 
the  payment  of  any  judgment  ren- 
dered on  the  appeal,  and  likewise  as 
a  further  condition  to  pay  all  costs 
accrued  in  the  police  court,  the  act 
would  be  unconstitutional  in  cases 
where  the  right  of  trial  by  jury  ex- 
ists: Mclnerney  v.  City  of  Denver, 
17  Colo.  302;  s.  c.  29  Pac.  516. 


543  ORDINANCES    AND   BY-LAWS.  §    561 

the  defense  that  it  does  not  follow,  because  an  act  might  be  punishable 
under  each  of  two  different  laws,  that  the  procedure  might  be  differ- 
ent— that  the  defendant  was  at  least  entitled  to  trial  by  jury.  The 
court  decided  that  a  summary  proceeding  for  violation  of  a  munici- 
pal by-law  is  not  necessarily  unconstitutional,  though  it  be  a  statutory 
misdemeanor.  "The  inquiry,"  said  the  court,  "is  not.  Was  the  act 
complained  of  a  public  misdemeanor  by  statute  or  at  the  common  law  ? 
but,  Does  the  offense  charged  belong  to  a  class  of  offenses  that  were 
usually  proceeded  against  summarily  ?"**^ 

§  561.  Certiorari  and  habeas  corpus. — Where  no  appeal  is  given  by 
statute  or  charter  from  the  decision  of  the  municipal  authorities, 
certiorari  will  issue  for  the  purpose  of  a  judicial  review  of  their 
action.'**'^  In  the  United  States  the  office  of  this  writ  has  been  ex- 
tended beyond  the  practice  in  England,  and  it  is  used  not  only  to 
review  the  decisions  of  courts,  properly  so  called,  but  also  the  pro- 
ceedings of  special  tribunals,  commissioners,  magistrates  and  officers 
of  municipal  corporations  exercising  judicial  powers,  affecting  the 
rights  of  property  of  the  citizen,  when  they  act  in  a  summary  way,  or 
in  a  new  course  different  from  that  of  the  common  law.  The  authori- 
ties are  almost  uniform  in  holding  that  mere  legislative  or  ministerial 
acts,  as  such,  can  not  be  reviewed  on  certiorari.**^  There  is  no  ground 
for  the  remedy  unless  it  be  made  to  appear  that  the  plaintiff  may 
suffer  injury  in  case  of  non-intervention.**^    And  it  must  also  appear 

^  Mclnerney  v.  City  of  Denver,  17  trial  is  not  de  novo,  and  conclusions 

Colo.   302;    s.   c.   29   Pac.   516.     The  of  fact  can  not  be  revised:  Town  of 

court  also  recognized  the  converse  of  Camden   v.   Bloch,    65   Ala.   236.     If 

the  proposition;  that  is  to  say,  that  there  is  a  statutory  remedy  it  is  ex- 

though    a    particular    offense    may  elusive:   City  Council  &c.  v.  Belser, 

have  been  unknown  to  the  common  53  Ala.  379;  Intendant  v.  Chandler,  6 

or  statutory  law  before  the  adoption  Ala.  899;  Jackson  v.  People,  9  Mich, 

of  the  constitution,  yet  if  it  clearly  111;  Taylor  v.  Mayor  &c.,  39  Ga.  59; 

belongs  to  a  class  of  offenses  there-  State  v.  Bill,  13  Ired.  L.  (N.  C.)  373. 

tofore  triable  by  jury  the  constitu-  Where  the  time  for  appeal  has  been 

tional  guaranty  applies.     This  is  the  allowed  to  expire,  there  is  no  relief 

doctrine    of   the    United    States    su-  unless     in     special     circumstances: 

preme  court,  where,  however,  it  was  Beasley  v.  Town  of  Beckley,  28  W. 

held  that  a  person  charged  with  con-  Va.  81;    Poe  v.  Machine  Works,  24 

spiracy  to  prevent  another  from  pur-  W.  Va.  517. 

suing    a    lawful    vocation    was    en-  "^  In  re  Wilson,  32  Minn.  145;   s. 

titled  to  a  jury  trial:  Callan  v.  Wil-  c.    19    N.    W.    723.     Contra   in    New 

son,  127  U.  S.  540;  s.  c.  8  S.  Ct.  1301.  Jersey:  Treasurer  &c.  v.  Mulford,  26 

So,  too,  on  a  charge  of  libel:   In  re  N.  J.  L.  49;   State  v.  Mayor  &c.,  29 

Dana,  7  Ben.  1.  N.  J.  I^.  170. 

"'  Errors  of  law  apparent  on  the  ""  Davison  v.  Otis,  24  Mich.  23. 
record    may    be    reviewed,    but   the 


§    561  PUBLIC    CORl'OKATIONS.  544 

that  he  has  some  substantial  interest  in  the  subject-matter,  on  which 
the  judgment  of  the  court  can  act  effectively  and  work  advantage  to 
him.*°°  Where  the  plaintiff  was  convicted  on  his  plea  of  not  guilty 
and  satisfied  the  judgment  by  paying  the  fine,  he  was  not  entitled  to 
a  review  of  the  proceedings/"^^  It  is  not  the  province  of  the  writ  of 
habeas  corpus  to  retry  any  questions  of  fact  upon  which  the  findings 
of  the  court  of  original  jurisdiction  must  be  presumed  to  have  been 
based.  Unless  it  appears  as  a  matter  of  law  that  an  ordinance  is  void, 
the  remedy  of  review  must  be  had  by  other  appropriate  proceedings.^ ^^ 

'^^  Golden  v.  Botts,  12  Wend.    (N.  erty,  and  if  the  change  of  grade  is 

Y.)  234.  justified   only  as  part  of  an  entire 

*"  People  V.  Leavitt,  41  Mich.  470;  scheme  he  may  question  the  legality 
s.  c.  2  N.  W.  812.  The  writ  does  not  of  the  scheme:  Read  v.  City  of  Cam- 
lie  in  favor  of  the  corporation  after  den,  54  N.  J.  L.  347;  s.  c.  24  Atl.  549. 
trial  and  acquittal:  Cranston  v.  Au-  *^- Question  of  reasonableness  de- 
gusta,  61  Ga.  572.  An  abutting  own-  pending  on  facts  will  not  be  thus  re- 
er  may  maintain  certiorari  to  re-  tried:  In  re  Wright,  29  Hun  (N.  Y.) 
view  an  ordinance  changing  the  357.  See  also.  Madden  v.  Smeltz,  2 
grade  of  a  street  in  front  of  his  prop-  Ohio  C.  C.  168. 


CHAPTEE  XV. 


EXPRESS    CORPOEATE   POWERS. 


Section 

562.  Powers  of  a  municipal  corpora- 

tion generally. 

563.  Delegation  of  powers. 

564.  Delegation    of    power    by    the 

municipality. 

565.  Power  which  may  be  delegated. 

566.  The  same  subject  continued. 

567.  Exercise  of  powers. 

568.  Mode  of  exercise. 

569.  Proceedings  not  reviewable. 

570.  The  same  subject  continued. 

571.  Constitutionality  of  acts  grant- 

ing powers. 

572.  The  same  subject  continued. 

573.  "Validity  of  acts  granting  pow- 

ers. 

574.  Power  to  "trade"  should  not  be 

granted. 

575.  Power  of  towns  as  to  villages 

within  them. 

576.  Power  as  to  issue  of  commer- 

cial paper. 

577.  As  to  trusts. 

578.  Purchase  at  tax  sales. 

579.  Granting  exclusive  franchises. 

580.  The  same  subject  continued. 

581.  Contracts  not  exclusive. 

582.  Improvements  generally. 

583.  Costs  of  improvements. 

584.  Gas  and  water  supply. 

585.  Natural-gas  companies. 

586.  Establishment  of  electric  plant. 

587.  Public  property. 

588.  The  same  subject  continued. 

589.  Parks. 

590.  Wharves. 

591.  The  same  subject  continued. 

592.  Markets. 

593.  The  same  subject  continued. 

594.  Streets  generally. 

1  Smith— 35 


Section 

595.  Construction  of  statutory  pro- 
visions. 

596.  Protection  of  streets. 

597.  Obstructions  in  streets. 

598.  Use    of    streets    by    street-rail- 
ways. 

599.  Telegraph-  and  telephone-poles 
in  streets — Removal. 

600.  Vacation  of  streets. 

601.  Grading  of  streets. 

602.  Allowing  the  use  of  streets  by 
railroads. 

603.  The  same  subject  continued. 

604.  Regulations  as  to  railroads  us- 
ing streets. 

605.  The  same  subject  continued. 

606.  Crossings  of  railways. 

607.  Miscellaneous  matters  relating 
to  streets, 

608.  Sewers. 

609.  Fire-limits— Public  health. 

610.  Directions  as  to  buildings. 

611.  Police  power. 

612.  The  same  subject  continued. 

613.  Regulation  of  liquor  traffic. 

614.  To  promote  health. 

615.  General  welfare,  etc. 

616.  To  license. 

617.  Occupations. 

618.  The  same  subject  continued. 
•619.  Public  offenses. 
620.  The  same  subject  continued. 
621.,  Nuisances. 

622.  Holidays,  etc. 

623.  Power   to   purchase,   lease   and 
convey  real  estate. 

624.  Power  to  subscribe  for  stock. 

625.  Power  over  watercourses. 

626.  Power  to  aid  private  charities. 

627.  Miscellaneous. 
(545) 


§  563 


PUBLIC    CORPOIJATIONS. 


546 


§  562.  Powers  of  a  municipal  corporation  generally. — The  powers 
of  a  municipal  corporation  are  those  granted  in  express  words  by  its 
charter  or  the  general  statutes  under  which  it  is  incorporated;  the 
powers  necessarily  or  fairly  implied  in  or  incident  to  the  powers  thus 
expressly  granted;  and  the  powers  essential  to  the  declared  purposes 
of  the  corporation,  not  only  convenient  but  indispensable.^  These 
corporations  being  mere  instrumentalities  of  the  state  for  the  more 
convenient  administration  of  local  government,  their  powers  are  such 
as  the  legislature  may  confer,  and  these  may  be  enlarged,  abridged  or 
entirely  withdrawn  at  its  pleasure.^  Only  such  powers  and  rights  can 
be  exercised  under  municipal  charters  as  are  clearly  comprehended 
within  their  words,  or  derived  therefrom  by  necessary  implication, 
regard  being  had  to  the  object  of  the  grant.  Any  ambiguity  or  doubt 
arising  out  of  the  words  used  by  the  charter  must  be  resolved  in  favor 
of  the  public.^     Grants  of  power  to  supply  water  or  gas  have  been 


^Dillon  Munic.  Corp.  (4th  ed.), 
§  89;  Richards  v.  Clarksburg,  30  W. 
Va.  491;  s.  c.  4  S.  E.  774;  Gas  Co.  v. 
Parkersburg,  30  W.  Va.  435;  s.  c.  4 
S.  B.  650;  Kelly  v.  Town  of  Milan,  21 
Fed.  842;  Cook  Co.  v.  McCrea,  93 
111.  236;  City  of  Portland  v.  Schmidt, 
13  Or.  17;  s.  c.  6  Pac.  221;  City  of 
Somerville  v.  Dickerman,  127  Mass. 
272;  Henke  v.  McCord,  55  Iowa  378; 
s.  c.  7  N.  W.  623;  City  of  Richmond 
V.  McGirr,  78  Ind.  192;  Oilman  v. 
City  of  Milwaukee,  61  Wis.  588;  s.  c. 
21  N.  W.  640;  Town  of  Danville  v. 
Shelton,  76  Va.  325;  Smith  v.  City  of 
Newbern,  70  N.  C.  14;  Blake  v. 
Walker,  23  S.  C.  517;  City  of  St. 
Louis  v.  Bell  Tel.  Co.,  96  Mo.  623;  s. 
c.  10  S.  W.  197;  City  of  Eufaula  v. 
McNab,  67  Ala.  588;  Parish  of 
Ouachita  v.  City  of  Monroe,  42  La. 
An.  782;  s.  c.  7  So.  717;  City  of 
Brenham  v.  Brenham  Water  Co., 
67  Tex.  542;  s.  c.  4  S.  W. 
143;  State  v.  Swift,  11  Nev. 
128.  The  court  in  Los  Angeles 
&c.  Co.  V.  City  of  Los  Angeles,  88 
Fed.  720,  state  the  doctrine  of  the 
text  as  follows: — "The  general  prop- 
osition is  that  a  municipal  corpora- 
tion possesses  and  can  exercise  the 
following  powers  and  no  others:  (1) 
those    granted    in    express    words; 


(2)  those  necessarily  or  fairly  im- 
plied in  or  incident  to  the  powers  ex- 
pressly granted;  (3)  those  essential 
to  the  declared  objects  and  purposes 
of  the  corporation,  not  simply  con- 
venient, but  indispensable.  And 
therefore  it  follows  that  any  fair 
reasonable  doubt  concerning  the  ex- 
istence of  the  power  is  resolved  by 
the  courts  against  the  corporation 
and  the  power  denied."  To  the 
same  effect  are  Von  Schmidt  v. 
Widber,  105  Cal.  151,  157;  s.  c.  38 
Pac.  682;  City  of  Joplin  v.  Leckie, 
78  Mo.  App.  8. 

-  Barnes  v.  District  of  Columbia, 
91  U.  S.  540. 

^  Minturn  v.  Larue,  23  How.  435, 
holding  that  the  legislature  may 
grant  exclusive  control  over  ferries 
to  a  municipality,  but  that  the  char- 
ter of  Oakland  did  not  confer  such 
exclusive  privileges  upon  the  city. 
In  case  of  reasonable  doubt  as  to  the 
power  of  a  municipal  corporation 
under  a  charter  the  power  is  re- 
solved against  the  corporation:  City 
of  Joplin  V.  Leckie,  78  Mo.  App.  8. 
Power  to  reprint  and  publish  a  mu- 
nicipal charter  does  not  include 
power  to  publish  in  connection 
therewith  the  ordinances:  Quint  v. 
City  of  Merrill,  105  Wis.  406;  s.  c.  81 


547 


EXPRESS    CORPORATE    POWERS. 


563 


upheld  upon  the  ground  that  the  power  is  a  business  or  proprietary 
power,  as  distinguislied  from  a  governmental  or  legislative  power.* 
And  so  is  the  power  to  construct  sewers.""^  In  their  business  transac- 
tions municipal  and  quasi-municipal  corporations  are  governed  by  the 
same  rules  that  govern  private  individuals  and  corporations.^ 

§  563.  Delegation  of  powers. — The  legislature  having  delegated 
some  portion  of  its  power  to  a  municipal  corporation,  the  latter  must 
hold  those  powers  in  subordination  to  the  general  power.  »Such 
powers  given  for  local  purposes  are  regarded  as  trusts  confided  to  the 
hands  in  which  they  are  placed,  and  are  not  subject  to  be  delegated 
by  the  departments  in  the  control  of  which  they  are  placed,''  The 
subject  of  delegation  of  power  may  be  properly  treated  from  two 
standpoints:  (a)  delegation  of  power  by  the  legislature  to  the 
municipality,  and  (b)  delegation  of  power  by  the  municipality  to  its 
municipal  departments  and  officers.  The  municipal  government  es- 
tablished by  the  legislature,  through  the  instrumentality  of  the  char- 
ter, is,  in  effect,  a  transfer  by  the  state  of  the  functions  of  the  state 
in  so  far  as  they  are  general  and  for  the  public  welfare,  and  vests  in 


N.  W.  664.  The  power  of  the  city 
does  not  extend  to  the  protection  of 
subcontractors  under  contracts  made 
with  it:  City  of  Philadelphia  v.  Mad- 
den, 8  Pa.  Dist.  R.  532. 

*  Los  Angeles  &c.  Co.  v.  City  of  Los 
Angeles,  88  Fed.  720;  Illinois  Trust 
&c.  Bank  v.  City  of  Arkansas  City, 
76  Fed.  271;  s.  c.  22  C.  C.  A.  171;  40 
U.  S.  App.  257;  City  of  Cincinnati  v. 
Cameron,  33  Ohio  St.  336;  Safety  In- 
sulated Wire  &c.  Co.  v.  Mayor  &c., 
66  Fed.  140;  s.  c.  13  C.  C.  A.  375; 
State  v.  Mayor  &c.,  19  Mont.  518;  s. 
c.  49  Pac.  15. 

^  City  of  Cincinnati  v.  Cameron, 
33  Ohio  St.  336. 

"Speer  v.  Board  &c.,  88  Fed.  749; 
s.  c.  32  C.  C.  A.  101;  Illinois  Trust 
&c.  Bank  v.  City  of  Arkansas  City, 
40  U.  S.  App.  257;  s.  c.  22  C.  C.  A. 
171;  76  Fed.  271. 

'  Thompson  v.  Schermerhorn,  6  N. 
Y.  92;  Birdsall  v.  Clark,  73  N.  Y.  73; 
s.  c.  29  Am.  R.  105;  City  of  Brook- 
lyn v.  Breslin,  57  N.  Y.  591;  Lyon  v. 
Jerome,  26  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  485;  s.  c. 
37  Am.  D.  271;    Bibel  v.  People,  67 


111.  172,  175;  City  of  Kinmundy  v. 
Mahan,  72  111.  462;  State  v.  Fiske,  9 
R.  I.  94;  State  v.  City  of  Trenton, 
42  N.  J.  L.  72,  74;  State  v.  Mayor 
&c.,  47  N.  J.  L.  117;  Hitchcock  v. 
Galveston,  96  U.  S.  341;  Schenley  v. 
Commonwealth,  36  Pa.  St.  62;  State 
v.  Bell,  34  Ohio  St.  194;  Whyte  v. 
Mayor  &c.,  2  Swan  (Tenn.)  364; 
Smith  V.  Morse,  2  Cal.  524;  Cooley 
Const.  Lim.  204;  Sedgwick  Stat.  & 
Const.  Law  164;  City  of  Oakland  v. 
Carpentier,  13  Cal.  540  (declaring  an 
ordinance  giving  the  exclusive  priv- 
ilege of  laying  out,  constructing, 
etc.,  wharves  within  the  city  for 
thirty-seven  years,  void  as  being  a 
transfer  of  the  corporate  powers  of 
the  board) ;  City  of  East  St.  Louis  v. 
Wehrung,  50  111.  28  (holding  that 
prosecution  could  not  be  maintained 
for  a  violation  of  an  ordinance 
which  attempted  to  delegate  the 
power  of  the  city  council  to  the  city 
treasurer  by  authorizing  him  to 
grant  licenses  to  retail  liquor  and  to 
fix  the  amount  to  be  paid  for  it). 
See  also,  §  286  et  seq.,  ante.  , 


§    563  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  548 

local  officers  the  exercise  of  the  general  powers  of  the  state,  and  in 
addition  to  this  the  municipality  is  made  the  depository  of  a  twofold 
power  of  local  legislation,  and  a  proprietary  power  not  unlike,   in 
many  respects,  the  power  of  a  private  corporation.    The  scope  of  the 
legislative  functions  of  the  municipality  relate  (1)  to  those  subjects 
which  are  general  in  their  nature  but  circumscribed  as  to  territory, 
and  which  would  otherwise  be  exercised  by  the  legislature,   (2)   to 
those  matters  which  are  purely  of  a  local  nature,  not  common  to  the 
state  at  large  and  are  the  embodiment  of  the  idea  of  pure  local  self- 
government,  and  (3)  those  things  which  are  incidental  to  the  corpo- 
rate entity,  as  such,  and  have  been  appropriately  styled  proprietary  or 
of  a  corporate  business  nature.     The  first  naturally  fall  under  the 
head  of  delegated  powers  while  the  latter  are  grants  pure  and  simple. 
All  power  vested  in  the  municipality  which  relates  to  the  exercise  of 
what  is  generally  termed  the  police  power  is  delegated;  that  which 
relates  to  the  local  self-government  of  the  corporation,  and  the  inci- 
dental matters  relating  thereto  are  not.    A  grant  of  legislative  power 
to  do  a  certain  thing  carries  with  it  power  to  use  all  necessary  and 
proper  means  to  accomplish  the  end ;  and  the  legislature  may  author- 
ize others  to  do  things  which  it  might  properly,  but  can  not  con- 
veniently or  advantageously  do  itself.^     Where  powers  are  delegated 
to  a  municipal  body  which  are  beyond  the  scope  of  usual  and  ordinary 
powers   and   which   may  result   in   a   public   burden,   they   must  be 
strictly  pursued.^    The  legislature  can  delegate  to  municipal  corpora- 
tions the  power  to  tax  for  public  purposes  only.    Beyond  this  it  would 
be  public  plunder.^"    A  municipal  corporation  can  not  be  authorized 
to  tax  its  citizens  for  the  support  of  a  school,  hospital  or  library, 
.  although  its  doors  are  open  to  the  public,  and  a  great  number  are 
accommodated,  unless  it  is  a  public  agency,  and  controlled  by  the 
state  or   county.^^     It  is   inherent  in  the   idea   of  taxation   that   it 
should  be  for  public  good,  and  a  law  taxing  one  class  of  citizens  for 
the  benefit  of  another,  or  in  furtherance  of  an  industrial  enterprise,  is 
confiscation  in  all  civilized  countries.     Almshouses  and  hospitals  may 
be  for  public  or  private  uses  according  to  circumstances.    Wlien  con- 

*City  of  Chicago  v.  Stratton,  162  Wis.  616;  Hasbrouck  v.  City  of  Mil- 
Ill.  494,  503;  s.  c.  44  N.  E.  853;  Chi-  waukee,  13  Wis.  37;  Brodhead  v. 
cago  &c.  R.  Co.  V.  Jones,  149  111.  361;  City  of  Milwaukee,  19  Wis.  624; 
s.  c.  37  N.  E.  247.  Curtis    v.    Whipple,    24    Wis.    350; 

»Ex  parte  Sims,  40  Pla.  432;  s.  c.  Whiting  v.  Sheboygan  &c.  R.  Co.,  25 

25  So.  280.  Wis.  167. 

^^  Knowlton  v.   Board   &c.,   9   Wis.         "  Wisconsin   Keeley    Institute   Co. 

410;    Soens  v.    City   of   Racine,    10  v.  Milwaukee  Co.,  95  Wis.  153;  s.  c. 

Wis.  271;  Lumsden  v.  Cross,  10  Wis.  70  N.  W.  68;  36  L.  R.  A.  55. 
282;   Foster  v.  City  of  Kenosha,  12 


549  EXPRESS    CORPORATE    POWERS.  §    564 

trolled  by  the  commonwealth  and  open  to  all  who  need  such  aid,  they 
are  for  public  uses,  and  may  be  sustained  by  taxation.  But  any  institu- 
tion, however  admirable  or  useful,  which  is  in  the  hands  of  private 
persons  not  accountable  to  the  government  is  not  for  public  use.^^ 
The  legislature  has  power  without  express  constitutional  grant  to 
confer  upon  a  city  power  to  enact  and  enforce  an  ordinance  against 
carrying  concealed  weapons.  ^^  The  legislature  has  the  power  to  take 
from  the  municipality  a  power  previously  vested  in  it  and  vest  such 
power  in  a  board  created  by  it  for  such  purpose. ^^^  A  state  may  dele- 
gate power  to  license  a  calling  or  business  when  it  may  fairly  be 
deemed  detrimental  to  the  public  welfare  or  against  public  policy  and 
might  be  prohibited  entirely,  and  the  exercise  of  such  power  is  not  tax- 
ation but  a  legitimate  exercise  of  police  power  and  not  subject  to  ju- 
dicial control.^*  The  legislature  can  not  delegate  power  to  try  offenses 
against  the  state  to  courts  created  for  municipal  offenses. ^^  Power  of 
control  over  streets  in  a  city  may  be  delegated  by  the  legislature,^*'  and 
so  may  the  power  to  regulate  weights  and  measures.  ^^  The  legislature 
having  power  to  impose  terms  and  conditions  on  foreign  corporations 
before  they  can  do  business  in  this  state,  may  delegate  this  power  to 
cities.  ^^ 

§  564.  Delegation  of  power  by  the  municipality. — The  rule  is  that 
power  delegated  to  a  municipality  can  not  be  delegated  by  it  to  some 
other  body,  officer  or  set  of  officers.  The  reason  for  this  rule  is  illus- 
trated by  analogy  in  the  law  of  agency,  but  rests  mainly  in  the  idea 
that  power  vested  in  one  department  of  government  can  not  be  trans- 
ferred to,  assumed  or  exercised  by  another  department.  The  public 
powers  or  trusts  devolved  by  law,  or  charter,  upon  the  council  or  gov- 
erning body  to  be  exercised  by  it  when  and  in  such  manner  as  it  shall 
judge  best,  can  not  be  delegated  to  others.  ^^  Where  the  charter  em- 
powers the  council  to  pass  ordinances  and  prescribe  penalties  for  a 

"Loan  Ass'n  v.  Topeka,  87  U.  S.  "Humes  v.  City  of  Ft.  Smith,  93 

655;    Lowell  v.  City  of  Boston,  111  Fed.  857. 

Mass.    454;     St.    Mary's    Industrial  ^^  Grant  v.  Camp,  105  Ga.  428;  s.  c. 

School  V.  Brown,  45  Md.  310;  Phila-  31  S.  E.  429. 

delphia  Assn.   &c.  v.  Wood,   39   Pa.  ^^  City  Council  &c.  v.  Parker,  114 

St.    73;     Hitchcock    v.    City    of    St.  Ala.  118;  s.  c.  21  So.  452. 

Louis,  49  Mo.  484;  State  v.  Osawkee  "Ford  v.  New  York  &c.  R.  Co.,  53 

Tp.,  14  Kan.  418.  N.  Y.  S.  764;   s.  c.  33  App.  Div.   (N. 

^^  Town  of  Ocean  Springs  v.  Green,  Y.)  474. 

77  Miss.  472;  s.  c.  27  So.  743.  '"  Hartford  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  City  of 

^'•aSee  ch.  41,  vol.   2.     But  it  can  Peoria,  156  111.420;  s.  c.  40  N.  E.  967; 

not   take   from   a   municipality   the  Walker  v.  City  of  Springfield,  94  111. 

control  of  its  fire-department:   State  364. 

V.  Fox  (Ind.),  63  N.  E.  19.  ^»  City  of  Chicago  v.  Stratton,  162 

111.  494,  500;  s.  c.  44  N.  E.  853. 


§    564  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS,  550 

violation  not  exceeding  a  certain  sum,  or  imprisonment  not  exceeding 
a  certain  period,  the  specific  fine  and  imprisonment  must  be  fixed 
in  the  ordinance.  This  power  can  not  be  delegated  to  the  court  before 
whom  proceedings  are  had.^°  The  city  council  can  not  delegate  power 
to  a  board  of  health  so  as  to  make  the  regulations  of  the  latter  ordi- 
nances the  violation  of  which  will  be  a  misdemeanor,^^  nor  delegate 
power  to  another  to  make  a  rule  which  will  prohibit  the  slaughter  of 
animals  within  the  city  limits,^^  nor  can  power  to  grade  a  street  be 
delegated  to  the  city  engineer.-^  But  an  ordinance  giving  a  city  engi- 
neer supervision  of  an  improvement  in  order  to  secure  compliance 
with  the  ordinance  as  to  work  done  and  material  used,  is  not  a  delega- 
tion of  power  vested  in  a  council.^*  If  the  ordinance,  however,  directs 
that  the  engineer  shall  designate  where  inlets  and  catch-basin  covers 
shall  be  placed  at  street  corners,  and  that  cross-walks  be  built  in 
form  as  designated  by  him,  it  is  invalid.  And  so,  also,  as  to  changes 
authorized  which  will  increase  or  diminish  the  costs. ^^  The  power  to 
determine  what  articles  of  merchandise  are  injurious  to  public 
health  or  a  fraud  on  the  public  can  not  be  delegated  f^  and  where  the 
entire  control  of  finances  is  vested  in  a  city  council  it  can  not  delegate 
the  power  to  the  mayor  to  sell  its  bonds  and  give  him  discretion  as  to 
the  price  ;^'^  and  so  where  the  council  has  power  to  regulate  the  com- 
pensation of  officers,  etc.,  it  can  not  delegate  to  the  mayor  power  to  con- 
tract for  the  collection  of  taxes.^®  But  delegation  of  power  to  sell 
water  and  fix  rates  to  the  department  of  public  works  for  use  outside 
the  city  is  not  void  for  the  reason  that  the  city  is  not  obliged  to 
sell  for  that  purpose.^**  Power  lodged  in  a  common  council  can  not 
be  delegated  to  a  committee;^"  nor  can  power  to  prescribe  penalties 
be  delegated  to  a  justice  of  the  peace  before  whom  a  prosecution  is 
had.=*^ 

^oTomlin  v.  City  of  Cape  May,  63  354;    Rich  v.   City   of  Chicago,   152 

N.  J.  L.  429;  s.  c.  44  Atl.  209.  111.  18;  s.  c.  38  N.  E.  255. 

"  State  V.  Beacham,  125  N.  C.  652;  ==«  City  of  Cairo  v.  Coleman,  53  111. 

s.  c.  34  S.  B.  447.  App.  680. 

"  Cocker    v.    Du    Coteau    Landing  '"  Blair  v.  City  of  Waco,  75  Fed. 

Co.,  16  Rap.  Jud.  Que.  S.  C.  72.  800;  s.  e.  21  C.  C.  A.  517. 

-^  City  of  Westport  v.   Martin,  62  =^  Brand   v.   City   of   San   Antonio 

Mo.  App.  647.  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  37  S.  W.  340. 

"*  Bradford  v.  City  of  Pontiac,  165  ^  Cooper  v.  City  of  Brooklyn,   42 

111.  612;  s.  c.  46  N.  E.  794;  Jackson-  N.  Y.  S.  762;   s.  c.  11  App.  Div.   (N. 

ville  R.  Co.  v.  City  of  Jacksonville,  Y.)  71. 

114  111.  562;  s.  c.  2  N.  B.  478.  ""Foster  v.  City  of  Cape  May,  60 

'=*  Bradford    v.     City    of    Pontiac,  N.  J.  L.  78;  s.  c.  36  Atl.  1089. 

supra;  Lake  Shore  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  City  ^^  State     v.     Ocean     Grove     Camp 

of  Chicago,  144  111.  391;  s.  c.  33  N.  E.  Meeting,  59  N.  J.  L.  110;  s.  c.  35  Atl. 

602;  Foss  v.  City  of  Chicago,  56  111.  794.     Construction    of    Kansas    City 


551  EXPRESS    CORPORATE    POWERS.  §    565 

§  565.  Power  which  may  be  delegated. — There  are  many  powers 
which  may  be  legally  and  judiciously  delegated  by  the  municipality. 
Thus  power  to  perform  a  ministerial  act  may  be  delegated,  but  when 
delegated  can  not  be  again  delegated  by  that  body  to  another. ^^  It 
is  not  a  delegation  of  power  to  prohibit  the  maintenance  of  a  livery- 
stable  in  certain  blocks  unless  a  majority  of  the  lot-owners  consent  in 
writing  to  the  location  there. ^^  And  so  it  is  not  a  delegation  of 
130wer  to  provide  that  an  ordinance  shall  not  go  into  effect  unless 
petitioners  shall  pay  into  the  treasury  a  specified  sum.^*  Power  given 
to  a  contractor  to  construct  a  sidewalk  of  pine,  white  or  burr  oak, 
is  not  a  delegation  of  power. ^^  Submitting  the  question  of  whether  a 
proposed  irrigation  district  shall  be  organized  under  a  statute  to  a 
vote  of  the  citizens  of  the  district  is  not  a  delegation  by  the  legislature 
of  power  to  create  a  public  corporation.^^  A  town  may  delegate  to 
the  mayor  and  clerk  the  duty  of  taking  up  warrants,  and  issuing  new 
ones  in  their  stead.  ^'''  Leaving  the  execution  of  work  to  a  street  com- 
mittee is  not  a  delegation  of  power  belonging  to  the  council,  where  the 
council  has  ordered  the  work  to  be  done.^^  Power  to  contract  for  the 
construction  of  water-works  is  not  delegated  to  the  commissioners  of 
the  water  department  by  a  resolution  authorizing  them  to  prepare 
plans  and  to  advertise  for  bids.^^ 

§  566.  The  same  subject  continued. — The  legislature  had  the  con- 
stitutional right  to  authorize  the  council  of  a  city  to  empower  the 
board  of  police  to  make  rules  and  regulations  respecting  the  use  of  the 
streets  of  Boston.^"    The  court  said:     "The  several  towns  and  cities 

charter  in  reference  to  delegation  of  N.    W.    115;    In    re    North    Terrace 

power:   Kansas  City  v.  Duncan,  135  Park,  147  Mo.  259;  s.  c.  48  S.  W.  860; 

Mo.  571;  s.  c.  37  S.  W.  513.  Kansas  City  v.  Bacon,  147  Mo.  259; 

^-  City   of   Tampa   v.    Salomonson,  s.  c.  48  S.  W.  860. 

35  Fla.  446;  s.  c.  17  So.  581.  ="  Continental  Const.  Co.  v.  City  of 

=*^City  of  Chicago  v.  Stratton,  162  Altoona,  92  Fed.  822;  s.  c.  35  C.  C.  A. 

111.  494;    s.  c.  44  N.  E.  853;   revers-  27.     What  is  not  delegation  of  pow- 

ing  s.  c.  58  111.  App.  539.  er, — see   In   re  House,   23  Colo.  87; 

^^  Heman  Const.  Co.  v.  Loevy,  64  s.  c.  46  Pac.  117. 

Mo.  App.  430.  « Commonwealth  v.   Plaisted,   148 

^=Gallaher  v.  Smith,  55  Mo.  App.  Mass.  375,   383;    s.  c.  19  N.  E.   224. 

116.  where  it  was  held  that  under  this 

^^  Fallbrook  Irr.  Dist.  v.  Brodley,  power,  delegated  to  the  police  board 

164  U.  S.  112;  s.  c.  17  S.  Ct.  56.  by  the  council,  the  board  was  em- 

^' State  V.  Winter,  15  Wash.  407;  powered  to  require  an  itinerant  mu- 

s.  c.  46  Pac.  644.  sician  to  take  out  a  license  and  pay 

^  Town  of  Harrisonburg  v.  Roller,  a  small  fee  therefor.     See  also,  as  to 

97  Va.  582;  s.  c.  34  S.  E.  523.    Cf .  In  re  reasonableness    of    ordinance,    Com- 

Taxes  Delinquent  &c.,  75  Minn.  456;  monv/ealth    v.    Worcester,    3    Pick. 

s.  c.  78  N.  W.  115;  State  v.  West  Du-  (Mass.)    462;    Pedrick  v.  Bailey,  12 

luth  Land  Co.,  75  Minn.  456;  s.  c.  78  Gray    (Mass.)    161;    Vandine,    Peti- 


§    567  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  55^^ 

are  agencies  of  government  largely  under  the  control  of  the  legisla- 
ture. The  powers  and  duties  of  all  the  towns  and  cities,  except  so 
far  as  they  are  specifically  provided  for  in  the  constitution,  are  created 
and  defined  by  the  legislature,  and  we  have  no  doubt  that  it  has  the 
right  in  its  discretion  to  change  the  powers  and  duties  created  by  itself 
and  to  vest  such  powers  and  duties  in  officers  appointed  by  the  gov- 
ernor, if  in  its  judgment  the  public  good  requires  this,  instead  of 
leaving  such  officers  to  be  elected  by  the  people  or  appointed  by  the 
municipal  authorities."*^  County  officers  authorized  by  law  to  con- 
tract for  the  building  of  a  court-house  can  not  delegate  such  authority 
to  a  private  individual. •*- 

§  567.  Exercise  of  powers. — Where  a  city  council  has  power  to  act 
in  a  given  case  and  the  mode  of  action  is  not  prescribed  by  charter, 
it  may  proceed  either  by  resolution  or  by  ordinance.*^  Where  it  is 
intended  to  pay  for  an  electric  plant  by  the  issuance  and  sale  of  city 
bonds,  and  the  statute  empowers  the  city  to  erect  such  a  plant  upon 
the  approval  of  a  majority  of  the  voters  of  the  city,  it  is  proper  to 
submit  to  vote  the  entire  matter  of  erecting  the  plant  and  issuing 
the  bonds  in  one  proposition.**  Under  that  provision  of  the  same  act 
which  provides  that  the  city  council  may  order  the  submission  of  the 
question  of  electric  lighting  to  a  vote,  or  that  the  mayor  may  do  so 
upon  petition  of  a  certain  number  of  taxpayers,  the  adoption  of  an 
ordinance  providing  for  the  erection  of  an  electric  plant  is  not  a  con- 
dition precedent  to  the  submission  of  the  question.  Though  the  issu- 
ance of  the  bonds  at  the  time  they  were  authorized  by  vote  would 
have  been  in  violation  of  the  constitutional  limitation  as  to  the  amount 
of  municipal  indebtedness  allowed,  yet,  if  when  they  were  issued  they 

tioner,   6   Pick.    (Mass.)    187;    Com-  powers  to  the  police  board  or  other 

monwealth  v.  Bean,  14  Gray  (Mass.)  boards,  see  Heland  v.  City  of  Lowell, 

52;  Commonwealth  V.  Curtis,  9  Allen  3  Allen  (Mass.)   407;   City  of  Taun- 

(Mass.)   266;   Commonwealth  v.  Mc-  ton  v.   Taylor,   116   Mass.   254,   260; 

Cafferty,  145  Mass.  384;   s.  c.  14  N.  Sawyer  v.  State  Board  &c.,  125  Mass. 

E.  451.     As  to   requiring  a  license,  182,  196;    Commonwealth  v.  Young, 

see    Commonwealth    v.    Stodder,    2  135  Mass.  526;   City  of  Brooklyn  v. 

Cush.  (Mass.)  562,  573;  Nightingale,  Breslin,   57    N.   Y.   591;    Birdsall   v. 

Petitioner,    11    Pick.    (Mass.)    168;  Clark,  73  N.  Y.  73;   State  v.  Mayor 

Pedrick  v.  Bailey,  12  Gray   (Mass.)  &c.,  34  N.  J.  L.  163. 

161;   Commonwealth  v.  Brooks,  109  ''^Commonwealth  v.   Plaisted,   148 

Mass.  355.     As  to  the  fee,  see  Com-  Mass.  375;  s.  c.  19  N.  E.  224. 

monwealth     v.     Stodder,     2     Cush.  "Russell  v.  Cage,  66  Tex.  428;  s.  c. 

(Mass.)  562;  Welch  v.  Hotchkiss,  39  1  S.  W.  270. 

Conn.  140;   Cooley  Const.  Lim.   (5th  "  City  of  Crawfordsville  v.  Braden, 

ed.)    242,  n.;    1  Dillon  Munic.  Corp.  130  Ind.  149;  s.  c.  28  N.  E.  849. 

(4th  ed.),  §  357.     As  to  the  legality  **  Thompson-Houston   Electric   Co. 

and    propriety    of    delegating    such  v.  City  of  Newton,  42  Fed.  723. 


553  EXPRESS    CORPORATE    POWERS.  §    568 

■were  not  in  excess,  they  are  not  void,  no  debt  being  created  until  the 
bonds  are  issued.  That  such  bonds  were  sold  and  delivered  before  the 
ordinance  providing  for  issuing  them  took  effect  was  no  ground  for 
enjoining  their  payment  at  the  suit  of  a  taxpayer.  A  city,  by  grant- 
ing the  privilege  to  a  private  corporation  to  erect  an  electric  plant  for 
the  purpose  of  lighting  the  city  without  any  grant  of  exclusive  rights 
is  not  estopped  from  erecting  such  a  plant  itself  when  power  has  been 
granted  it  by  statute  to  do  so.*^  A  natural-gas  company  entering 
into  business  under  an  ordinance  of  a  city  having  power  to  regulate 
its  prices,  but  silent  on  the  subject  of  rates,  is  not  exempted  from  the 
provisions  of  a  subsequent  ordinance  with  reference  thereto.*®  The 
provisions  of  an  ordinance  denying  gas  companies  the  right  to  carry 
on  their  business  unless  they  execute  a  bond,  and  declaring  the  execu- 
tion of  the  bond  of  itself  a  full  acceptance  of  the  ordinance  with  all 
its  requirements,  is  invalid  as  to  a  company  already  in  business  under 
an  ordinance  requiring  no  such  bond.*^  The  power  to  erect  water- 
works under  a  statute  which  provides  for  the  approval  of  the  voters  of 
the  city  by  a  majority  vote  may  be  exercised  by  the  council  passing  an 
ordinance,  in  advance  of  an  election,  prescribing  the  character  of  the 
water-works  and  the  tax  to  be  levied  to  meet  its  cost,  and  afterwards 
submitting  the  question  to  the  electors.*^  If  a  charter  of  a  city  re- 
quires any  sale  or  lease  of  its  real  estate  to  be  made  at  public  auction 
to  the  highest  bidder,  an  ordinance  of  its  council  making  a  lease  of 
any  of  such  property  to  a  corporation  upon  the  payment  of  a  rent 
reserved  has  been  held  to  be  void  and  to  pass  no  title  to  the  corpora- 
tion.*^ 

§  568.  Mode  of  exercise. — The  powers  of  a  municipal  corporation, 
whether  regarded  as  political  or  governmental,  or  those  of  a  mere 
private  corporation,  can  be  exercised  only  in  conformity  with  the 
provisions  of  its  charter.  The  legislature  can  impose  such  restrictions 
as  it  thinks  proper,  as  in  the  case  cited  it  saw  fit  to  require  the  for- 
malities of  legislation  for  the  disposition  of  the  city  property,  for  the 
imposition  of  taxes,  the  regulation  of  the  fire-department  and  matters 
connected  with  the  general  welfare  of  the  city.^''    All  contracts  made 

*'^  Thompson-Houston   Electric   Co.  ment  of  this  void  ordinance  by  pros- 

V.  City  of  Newton,  42  Fed.  723,  for  edition  of  the  company's  employes 

this  and  preceding  propositions.  was  properly  enjoined. 

"  City   of   Rushville   v.    Rushville  ^'  Taylor    v.    McPadden,    84    Iowa 

&c.  Gas  Co.,  132  Ind.  575;  s.  c.  28  N.  262;  s.  c.  50  N.  W.  1070. 

E.  853.  ^^  San  Francisco  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  City 

"  City    of    Rushville   v.    Rushville  of  Oakland,  43  Cal.  502. 

&c.  Gas  Co.,  132  Ind.  575;  s.  c.  28  N.  "°  McCracken  v.  City  of  San  Fran- 

E.    853,    holding    that   the    enforce-  cisco,  16  Cal.  591. 


§    569  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  554 

by  a  municipal  corporation  must  conform  to  the  mode  prescribed  in 
its  charter  for  making  contracts.'^^  The  provisions  of  a  statute 
authorizing  an  act  by  a  municipal  corporation  must  be  strictly  fol- 
lowed.''-  Where  no  method  is  prescribed  by  law  in  which  a  mu- 
nicipality shall  exercise  its  powers,  but  it  is  left  free  to  determine 
the  method  for  itself,  it  may  act  either  by  resolution  or  ordinance.^^ 
Bonds  issued  by  a  corporation  under  the  corporate  seal,  but  without 
the  passage  of  a  resolution  authorizing  the  issue,  have  been  held  void 
where  the  legislature  authorized  the  issue  "at  such  time  or  times  as 
the  board  of  trustees  may  by  resolution  direct."^*  Where  the  power 
to  perform  an  act  is  in  a  municipal  corporation,  and  in  the  execution 
thereof  the  prescribed  form  is  not  followed,  the  corporation  has  the 
power  to  subsequently  ratify  and  confirm  the  informal  act,  so  as  to 
make  it  as  binding  as  if  originally  done  in  the  proper  manner.^^ 
Property  of  a  municipal  corporation  can  only  be  conveyed  in  the 
mode  of  conveying  its  property  particularly  pointed  out  in  its  char- 
ter. ^*^ 

§  569.  Proceedings  not  reviewable. — The  action  of  a  county  board 
of  supervisors  in  borrowing  money,  and  issuing  county  bonds  therefor, 
for  the  purpose  of  improving  highways  in  a  town,  is  legislative  and 
not  judicial,  and  can  not  be  reviewed  on  certiorari.^^  There  need  be 
no  failure  of  justice  if  the  power  is  wrongly  used.  Any  aggrieved 
taxpayer  could  arrest  all  proceedings. ^^^  Though  the  proceedings 
of  county  commissioners  in  establishing  highways  may  be  irregular, 
as  the  boards  are  usually  composed  of  men  unskilled  in  the  law,  such 
irregularities  not  affecting  the  substantial  rights  of  the  parties  affected 
will  be  disregarded.^^     The  New  York  statute  providing  for  the  dis- 

"Zottman    v.    San    Francisco,    20  Morris  Square,  2  Hill   (N.  Y.)    14; 

Cal.  96,  98.  People  v.  Board  of  Health,  33  Barb. 

■s^  Glass  V.   Ashbury,   49   Cal.   571;  (N.  Y.)  344;  People  v.  Board  &c.,  43 

McCoy  V.  Briant,  53  Cal.  247.  Barb.   (N.  Y.)   232;   s.  c.  affirmed  34 

=>=Halsey  v.  Rapid  Transit  St.  R.  N.  Y.  516;  People  v.  Walter,  68  N.  Y. 

Co.,  47  N.  J.  L.  380;  s.  c.  20  Atl.  859.  403;  People  v.  Jones,  112  N.  Y.  597; 

''  McCoy  V.  Briant,  53  Cal.  247.  s.  c.  20  N.  E.  577. 

^^  Lucas  V.  City  of  San  Francisco,        "^^  People  v.  Board  &c.,   131   N.  Y. 

7  Cal.  463.  468;  s.  c.  30  N.  E.  488.    See  also,  Bar- 

^  Holland  v.  City  of  San  Francisco,  ker  v.  Town  of  Oswegatchie,  16  N. 

7  Cal.  361.    See  §  258  et  seq.,  ante.  Y.  S.  727;  s.  c.  62  Hun  (N.  Y.)  208. 

"People  v.  Board  &c.,   131  N.  Y.  Remedies  are  provided   in  Code  of 

468;    s.    c.    30    N.    E.    488;    rev'g   s.  New  York,  §§  1925,  1968  et  seq..  Laws 

c.  16  N.  Y.  S.  705;   62  Hun   (N.  Y.)  N.  Y.  1881,  ch.  521,  as  amended  by 

620  (mem.) ;  construing  Laws  N.  Y.  Laws  N.  Y.  1887,  ch.  673. 
1869,  ch.  855,  §  1.    See  also.  People  v.         ™  Fulton    v.    Cummings,    132    Ind. 

Mayor,  2  Hill  (N.  Y.)  9;  In  re  Mount  453;  s.  c.  30  N.  E.  949.     Proceedings 


555  EXPRESS    CORPORATE    POWERS.  §    570 

continuance  of  proceedings  to  open  a  street  on  objection  of  abutting 
owners""  has  been  construed  not  to  apply  to  the  opening  of  streets 
of  the  first  class,  which  by  provision  of  the  act  is  to  be  whenever  the 
board  of  street  opening  shall  think  the  public  interest  requires  it,  but 
only  to  the  opening  of  streets  of  the  second  and  third  classes,  which 
the  act  provides  shall  be  on  request  of  a  certain  proportion  of  the 
owners  of  the  frontage.  It  was  held  that  the  power  to  discontinue 
was  express  and  complete,  and  that  the  decision  was  final  and  con- 
clusive, not  subject  to  review.^^  In  determining  what  property  would 
be  benefited  by  an  improvement,  and  hence  should  be  assessed,  the 
action  of  the  common  council  of  a  city  is  conclusive.''^  Under  the 
provision  of  the  constitution  of  Michigan*'^  the  legislature  may  confer 
upon  boards  of  supervisors  the  power  to  determine  when  there  exist 
the  prerequisite  facts  authorizing  a  special  election  of  the  people  of 
the  municipal  corporation  upon  any  question.^*  Where  a  board  of 
commissioners  is  required  by  statute  to  erect  a  court-house  where  the 
same  has  not  been  done,  and  to  keep  the  county  building  in  repair, 
and  authorized  to  provide  the  means  to  construct,  complete  or  repair 
the  court-house  or  other  public  buildings  whenever  it  shall  be  neces- 
sary to  do  so,  it  is  for  them  alone  to  determine  whether  an  old  court- 
house should  be  replaced  by  a  new  one ;  and  in  the  absence  of  an  abuse 
of  discretion  amounting  to  fraud,  they  will  not  be  enjoined  from 
carrying  out  their  plans,  though  it  may  seem  to  taxpayers  that  the 
old  building  is  suificient.*'^ 

§  570.  The  same  subject  continued. — The  jurisdiction  of  boards 
of  supervisors  in  the  exercise  of  their  powers  under  the  provisions  of 
the  Iowa  code*"*  has  been  held  to  be  exclusive,  and  an  injunction  will 

for  establishing  highways  are  pro-  91  Mich.  504;  s.  c.  52  N.  W.  18,  where 

vided  for  in  Burns  R.  S.  Ind.  1901,  it  was  held  that  a  board  of  county 

§  6859.  supervisors  having  examined  a  peti- 

""  Consolidation  Act,  Laws  of  New  lion  for  a  special  election  on  local 

York,  ch.  410,  §  990.  option  and  declared  that  the  election 

"^  In  re  Alexander  Avenue,  133  N.  had  been  prayed  for  by  the  requisite 

Y.  436;  s.  c.  31  N.  E.  316;  dismissing  number  of  electors,  such  declaration 

appeal  from  17  N.  Y.  S.  933.  by  them  was  final,  and  that  it  was 

"-  Teegai'den  v.  City  of  Racine,  56  not  competent  afterwards  to   show 

Wis.  545;  s.  c.  14  N.  W.  614.  that  a  certain  number  of  the  peti- 

"'  Constitution  of  Michigan,  art.  4,  tioners  were  not  qualified  voters. 

§  38,  authorizes  the  conferring  upon  '^'^  Kitchel   v.    Board   &c.,   123    Ind. 

boards  of  supervisors  of  such  powers  540;  s.  c.  24  N.  E.  366. 

of  a  local   legislative  and  adminis-  ""^  Code  Iowa,  §§  281,  287,  regulates 

trative  character  as  the  legislature  elections  for  the  relocation  of  county 

may  deem  proper.  sites  and  vests  in  the  board  of  su- 

•"Friesner  v.  Common  Council  &c.,  pervisors  of  counties  full  power  to 


571 


PUBLIC    CORPOKATIONS. 


55G 


not  lie  to  restrict  the  board  in  the  exercise  of  its  power,  even  though 
the  petition  is  an  attempt  to  perpetrate  a  fraud  on  the  board  (it  con- 
taining in  the  case  cited  thousands  of  names  of  persons  who  were  not 
"legal  voters").  The  board  has  no  power  to  investigate  the  alleged 
fraud,  being  bound  by  the  facts  as  they  appear  on  the  face  of  the  pro- 
cedings.®^  The  court  distinguished  and  held  not  applicable  to  this 
case  several  cases  cited  in  favor  of  the  complainant.^^  In  Mississippi 
the  power  of  a  board  of  supervisors  over  court-houses  and  sites  for 
court-houses  is  exclusive,  and  no  court  can  interfere  with  the  exercise 
of  this  power  so  long  as  it  is  exercised  only  unwisely  and  without  dis- 
cretion ;  and  the  purchase  of  a  site  for  a  court-house,  the  county  having 
already  a  court-house  site,  is  not  such  a  usurpation  of  power  as  will 
warrant  the  interference  of  courts.*''^  Where  the  question  of  the  neces- 
sity of  taking  land  for  a  road  was  settled  by  a  board  of  supervisors  it 
is  not  a  question  for  the  court  to  pass  upon.'^" 

§  571.  Constitutionality  of  acts  granting  powers. — An  Ohio  stat- 
ute providing  that  in  any  village  in  any  county  containing  a  city  of 
the  first  grade  of  the  first  class,  in  which  no  sidewalks  have  already 


determine  the  sufficiency  of  the  peti- 
tion, and  to  authorize  the  submis- 
sion of  the  question  of  relocation  to 
a  vote. 

"Luce  V.  Fensler,  85  Iowa  596;  s. 
c.  52  N.  W.  517,  the  court  denying 
the  right  to  review  a  decision  of  the 
board  upon  such  matter.  See  also, 
Herrick  v.  Carpenter,  54  Iowa  340; 
s.  c.  6  N.  W.  574  (as  to  the  power  of 
the  legislature  to  provide  for  reloca- 
tion of  county  sites  by  a  general  law 
and  giving  exclusive  authority  to 
a  special  tribunal  in  such  matters) ; 
4  Amer.  &  Eng.  Encyc.  Law  403; 
Alexander  v.  People,  7  Colo.  155;  s. 
c.  2  Pac.  894;  Dudley  v.  Mayhew,  3 
N.  Y.  9;  Heiser  v.  Mayor  &c.,  104  N. 
Y.  68,  72;  s.  c.  9  N.  E.  866;  Phillips 
V.  Ash's  Heirs,  63  Ala.  414,  418; 
Chandler  v.  Hanna,  73  Ala.  390; 
Commonwealth  v.  Leech,  44  Pa.  St 
332;  Sedgwick  Stat.  &  Const.  Law 
94;  Baker  v.  Board,  40  Iowa  226,  228. 
As  to  courts  of  equity  interposing  to 
control,  see  1  High  Injunctions,  §  50; 
2  High  Injunctions.  §  1311;  Hyatt  v. 
Bates,  40  N.  Y.  164. 


««"Rice  V.  Smith,  9  Iowa  570, 
[where]  a  vote  to  relocate  the  coun- 
ty seat  had  been  taken,  and  the 
question  involved  was  the  right  of 
the  county  judge  to  erect  an  ex- 
pensive public  building  which  was 
required  to  be  at  the  county  seat, 
while  the  matter  of  location  was  in 
controversy.  The  question  involved 
in  Sweatt  v.  Faville,  23  Iowa  321, 
326,  was  whether  the  county  seat 
had  been  relocated,  and  arose  un- 
der the  revision  of  1860  and  not  un- 
der the  present  law.  The  question 
involved  in  this  case  was  not  con- 
sidered in  that.  The  case  of  Sinnett 
V.  Moles,  38  Iowa  25,  arose  under  a 
statute  which  provided  for  the  vot- 
ing of  a  tax  in  aid  of  the  construc- 
tion of  a  railway.  The  statute,  the 
facts  and  the  principles  involved  [in 
that  case]  were  in  many  respects  so 
unlike  those  [here  that  they  need 
no  consideration]." 

"'■'  Rotenberry  v.  Board  &c.,  67  Miss. 
470;  s.  c.  7  So.  211. 

™  Butte  Co.  V.  Boydstun,  68  Cal. 
189;  s.  c.  8  Pac.  835;  11  Pac.  781. 


557  EXPRESS    CORPORATE    POWERS,  §    573 

been  constructed,  etc.,  the  council  of  sucli  village  may  construct,  etc./^ 
was  held  not  to  be  a  sufficient  classification  to  satisfy  the  constitu- 
tional requirement  that  laws  of  a  general  nature  shall  have  a  uniform 
operation  throughout  the  state. '^^  Upon  this  subject,  Beasley,  C.  J., 
of  New  Jersey,  said  that  a  law  may  be  general  in  its  provisions,  and 
may  apply  to  the  whole  of  a  group  of  objects  having  characteristics 
sufficiently  manifest  and  important  to  make  them  a  class  by  them- 
selves, and  yet  the  marks  of  distinction  on  which  the  classification  is 
founded  may  be  such  that  the  law  may  be  in  contravention  of  a  consti- 
tutional provision  prohibiting  the  enactment  of  special  laws  which 
regulate  the  internal  affairs  of  towns  and  cities.'^^  The  Minnesota 
court  said:  "The  true  practical  limitation  of  the  legislative  power 
to  classify  is  that  the  classification  shall  be  upon  some  apparent  natural 
reason — some  reason  suggested  by  necessity,  by  such  a  difference  in 
the  situation  and  circumstances  of  the  subjects  placed  in  different 
classes  as  suggests  the  necessity  or  propriety  of  different  legislation 
with  respect  to  them."'^*  The  New  Jersey  chief  justice  said:  "The 
marks  of  distinction,  on  which  the  classification  is  founded,  must  be 
such  in  the  nature  of  things  as  will,  in  some  reasonable  degree  at  least, 
account  for  or  justify  the  restriction  of  the  legislation.""  The 
classification  must  be  just  and  reasonable,  and  not  arbitrary."^ 

§  572.  The  same  subject  continued. — It  was  held  in  Wisconsin 
that  where  a  city  charter  gave  to  every  lot-owner  a  right  to  compensa- 
tion for  injury  resulting  from  change  of  grade  of  a  street,  a  legisla- 
tive act  which  undertook  to  suspend  and  declare  that  provision^  ^  in- 
applicable to  certain  streets  was  repugnant  to  the  constitution  of  Wis- 
consin, which  entitles  every  person  to  a  certain  remedy  in  the  law  for 
all  injuries  he  may  receive  in  his  person,  property  or  character  ;'^^  also 

"  "An  act  to  authorize  villages  to  '"  Bronson  v.  Oberlln,  41  Ohio  St. 

levy  special  assessments  for  the  con-  476. 

struction  and  improvement  of  side-  "  Laws  of  Wisconsin  of  1891,  ch. 

walks  and   to   be   s^upplementary   to  254,  entitled  "An  act  to  authorize  the 

§   2328  of  the  revised  statutes  and  city    of    Milwaukee    to    change    the 

known  as  §  2328a:"  88  Ohio  L.  311.  grade  of  streets,"  which  amended  a 

'-Const.  Ohio,  art.  2,  §  26;  Costello  law  providing  that  the  owner  of  any 

V.  Wyoming,  49  Ohio  St.  202;  s.  c.  30  lot     affected     or     injured     thereby 

N.  E.  613.  should  be  "entitled  to  compensation" 

"  State   V.    Hammer,    42    N.   J.    L.  by  authorizing  the  common  council 

435,  440.  of  that  city  to  change  the  grade  of 

'*  Nichols  V.  Walter,  37  Minn.  264,  certain  streets  in  designated  wards 

272;  s.  c.  33  N.  W.  800,  802.  "without  paying  for  any  injury  or 

"  State   V.   Hammer,   42   N.   J.   L.  damage  thereby  occasioned." 

435,  440.  ^'^  Anderton  v.  City  of  Milwaukee, 

82  Wis.  279;  s.  c.  52  N.  W.  95.     The 


§    573  PUBLIC    COJJl'OKATIONS.  658 

to  the  constitution  of  the  United  States,  amendment  14,  section  1, 
which  declares  that  no  state  shall  "deny  to  any  person  within  its 
jurisdiction  the  equal  protection  of  its  laws;"'^"  also  to  the  state  con- 
stitution, on  the  ground  that  it  was  a  local  act  and  related  to  a  sub- 
ject not  expressed  in  its  title.'**' 

§  573.  Validity  of  acts  granting  powers. — In  exercising  the  power 
to  levy  assessments  upon  property-owners  for  improvements  the  tax 
proceedings  required  by  the  charter  must  be  regarded,  when  taken 
together,  as  "due  process  of  law,"  within  the  principles  sanctioned 
by  the  supreme  court  of  the  United  States.  ^^ 

§  574.  Power  to  "trade"  should  not  be  granted. — The  justices  of 
the  supreme  judicial  court  of  Massachusetts  have  given  an  opinion  to 
the  general  court  that  the  legislature  can  not  authorize  a  city  to  buy 
coal  and  wood  as  fuel  and  sell  them  to  its  inhabitants.  Parker,  J., 
modified  his  assent  to  this  so  far  as  to  say  it  might  if  the  necessities  of 
society  as  now  organized  could  be  met  only  by  the  adoption  of  such 
measures.  Holmes,  J.,  dissented  upon  the  ground  that  the  purpose 
was  no  less  public  when  the  article  (proposed  to  be  furnished  the  pub- 
lic) is  wood  or  coal  than  when  it  is  water  or  gas  or  electricity  or  edu- 
cation, to  say  nothing  of  cases  like  the  support  of  paupers  or  the  taking 

court    considered    this    act    special  United    States    constitution    amend- 

class  legislation,  and  that  such  dis-  ment.     Cf.  Scott  v.  City  of  Toledo, 

criminate  exercise  of  arbitrary  legis-  36  Fed.  385. 

lative    power    was    void.     See    also,  ^"Anderton  v.  City  of  Milwaukee, 

Bull  V.  Conroe,  13  Wis.  233;  Durkee  82  Wis.  279;  s.  c.  52  N.  W.  95.     See 

V.  City  of  Janesville,  28  Wis.  464;  also,  Durkee  v.  City  of  Janesville,  26 

Hincks  V.  City  of  Milwaukee,  46  Wis.  Wis.   697;    Yellow  River  &c.   Co.   v. 

559;  s.  c.  1  N.  W.  230;  Culbertson  v.  Arnold,  46  Wis.  214;  s.  c.  49  N.  W. 

Coleman,  47  Wis.  193;  s.  c.  2  N.  W.  971. 

124;  Hughes  v.  City  of  Fond  du  Lac,  *'  Meggett  v.  City  of  Eau  Claire,  81 

73  Wis.  380,  382;  s.  c.  41  N.  W.  407;  Wis.  326;  s.  c.  51  N.  W.  566,  holding 

City  of  Janesville  v.  Carpenter,  77  the  charter  not  repugnant  to  Amend. 

Wis.  288;  s.  c.  46  N.  W.  128;  Wilder  Const.  U.  S.,  art.  14,  §  1.     See  also, 

V.  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.,  70  Mich.  382;  as  to  power  of  legislature  to  author- 

s.  c.  38  N.  W.  289;   State  v.  Sheriff  ize,  Warner  v.  Knox,  50  Wis.  429;  s. 

&c.,  48  Minn.  236;  s.  c.  51  N.  W.  112.  c.  7  N.  W.  372;  Weeks  v.  City  of  Mil- 

™Anderton  v.  City  of  Milwaukee,  waukee,  10  Wis.  242;    Soens  v.  Ra- 

82  Wis.  279;  s.  c.  52  N.  W.  95.     The  cine,  10  Wis.  271;  Lumsden  v.  Cross, 

court  said: — "It  [this  act]  attempts  10  Wis.  282;  State  v.  City  of  Portage, 

to  make  an  arbitrary  classification  12  Wis.  562;   Bond  v.  City  of  Keno- 

and  distinction  in  regard  to  such  an  sha,  17  Wis.  284;   Blount  v.  City  of 

established  grade  between  lots  simi-  Janesville,  31  Wis.  648;  May  v.  Hold- 

larly    situated    and    subject    to    the  ridge,  23  Wis.  93;  Mills  v.  Charleton, 

same  or  substantially  the  same  con-  29  Wis.  400;  Evans  v.  Sharp,  29  Wis. 

ditions,"  and  therefore  violates  the  564;    Dill  v.  Roberts,  30  Wis.   178; 


559 


EXPRESS    CORrORATE    ROWERS. 


574 


of  land  for  railroads  or  public  markets.**-  The  principle  which  con- 
trolled the  majority  of  the  court  was  that  if  this  bill  was  passed  it 
would  authorize  a  carrying  on  of  business  which  must  be  with 
money  raised  by  taxation,  and  the  legislature  could  authorize  a  city  or 
town  to  tax  its  inhabitants  only  for  public  purposes.®^     The  court 


Dean  v.  Borchsenius,  30  Wis.  236, 
247;  Johnson  v.  City  of  Milwaukee, 
40  Wis.  315.  As  to  "due  process  of 
law,"  see  Hagar  v.  Reclamation 
Dist,  111  U.  S.  701;  s.  c.  4  S.  Ct. 
663;  Kentucky  Railroad  Tax  Cases, 
115  U.  S.  321;  s.  c.  6  S.  Ct.  57;  Spen- 
cer V.  Merchant,  125  U.  S.  345;  s.  c. 
8  S.  Ct.  921;  Palmer  v.  McMahon, 
133  U.  S.  660;  s.  c.  10  S.  Ct.  324; 
Lent  V.  Tillson,  140  U.  S.  316;  s.  c. 
11  S.  Ct.  825;  Fass  v.  Seehawer,  60 
Wis.  525;  s.  c.  19  N.  W.  533;  Bald- 
win V.  Ely,  66  Wis.  171,  188,  191;  s. 
c.  28  N.  W.  392;  Murphy  v.  Hall,  68 
Wis.  202;  s.  c.  31  N.  W.  754;  David- 
son V.  New  Orleans,  96  U.  S.  97,  104. 
In  Lent  v.  Tillson,  140  U.  S.  316;  s. 
c.  11  S.  Ct.  825,  the  court  said:  — 
"But  errors  in  the  mere  administra- 
tion of  the  statute  [granting  the 
power  to  widen  a  street],  not  involv- 
ing jurisdiction  of  the  subject  and  of 
the  parties,  could  not  justify  this 
court,  in  its  re-examination  of  the 
judgment  of  the  state  court  upon 
writ  of  error,  to  hold  that  the  state 
had  deprived  or  was  about  to  de- 
prive the  plaintiffs  of  their  property 
without  'due  process  of  law.'  " 

^-  Opinion  of  Justices,  155  Mass. 
598;  s.  c.  30  N.  E.  1142. 

*^  Kingman  v.  City  of  Brockton, 
153  Mass.  255;  s.  c.  26  N.  E.  998; 
Opinion  of  Justices,  150  Mass.  592; 
s.  c.  24  N.  E.  1084;  Mead  v.  Inhabit- 
ants &c.,  139  Mass.  341;  s.  c.  1  N.  E. 
413;  Lowell  v.  City  of  Boston,  111 
Mass.  454;  State  v.  Osawkee  Tp.,  14 
Kan.  418;  Mather  v.  City  of  Ottawa, 
114  111.  659;  s.  c.  3  N.  E.  216;  Loan 
Ass'n  V.  Topeka,  20  Wall.  655;  Cole 
V.  La  Grange,  113  U.  S.  1;  s.  c.  5  S. 
Ct.  416;  Ottawa  v.  Carey,  108  U.  S. 
110;  s.  c.  2  S.  Ct.  361;  Attorney-Gen- 


eral v.  City  of  Eau  Claire,  -37  Wis. 
400;  State  v.  City  of  Eau  Claire,  40 
Wis.  533;  Allen  v.  Inhabitants  &c., 
60  Maine  124;  Opinion  of  Judges,  58 
Maine  590.  The  court  said: — "Up  to 
the  present  time,  however,  none  of 
the  purposes  for  which  cities  and 
towns  have  been  authorized  to  raise 
money  has  included  anything  in  the 
nature  of  what  is  commonly  called 
"trade"  or  "commercial  business." 
Instances  can  be  found  of  some  very 
curious  legislation  by  towns  in  the 
colonial  and  provincial  times,  some 
of  which  would  certainly  now  be 
thought  to  be  beyond  the  powers  of 
towns  under  the  constitution.  What- 
ever the  theory  was,  towns,  in  fact, 
under  the  colony  charter,  and  for 
some  time  under  the  province  char- 
ter, often  acted  as  if  their  powers 
were  limited  only  by  the  opinion  of 
the  inhabitants  as  to  what  was  best 
to  be  done.  This  was  the  result  of 
their  peculiar  situation  and  condi- 
tion, and  the  powers  of  towns  or  of 
the  general  court  were  not  much 
considered.  The  exercise  of  these 
extraordinary  powers,  however, 
gradually  died  out."  The  only  in- 
stance referred  to  of  a  town  pur- 
chasing articles  for  its  inhabitants 
is  that  of  Boston,  in  March,  1713-14, 
voting  to  lay  in  a  stock  of  grain  to 
the  amount  of  five  thousand  bushels 
of  corn,  and  to  store  it  in  some  con- 
venient place,  and  it  was  left  to  the 
selectmen  to  dispose  of  it  as  they 
saw  fit.  This  followed  the  prohibi- 
tion by  the  general  court  of  the  ex- 
portation of  grain  on  account  of  its 
scarcity  in  the  fall  of  1713.  Of  t^is 
the  court  said:— -"It  is  apparent  that 
the  •riginal  purpose  was  to  provide 
against  a  famine,  and  that  it  was 


§    575  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  560 

sanction  the  rule  as  expressed  in  another  opinion,  that  "it  must  often 
be  a  question  of  kind  and  degree  whether  the  promotion  of  the  interests 
of  many  individuals  in  the  same  community  constitutes  a  public  service 

or  not."«* 

§  575.  Power  of  towns  as  to  villages  within  them. — A  Wisconsin 
statute  provided  that  "all  powers  relating  to  villages  and  conferred 
upon  village  boards  by  the  provisions  of  chapter  40  of  the  revised 
statutes  and  all  acts  amendatory  thereof,  excepting  those  the  exercise 
of  which  would  conflict  with  the  provisions  of  law  relative  to  towns 
and  town  boards,  are  hereby  conferred  upon  towns  and  town  boards 
of  towns  containing  one  or  more  unincorporated  villages  having  each 
a  population  of  not  less  than  one  thousand  inhabitants,  and  are  made 
applicable  to  such  unincorporated  village  or  villages,  and  may  be 
exercised  therein  when  directed  by  resolution  of  the  qualified  electors 
of  the  town  at  the  last  preceding  annual  town  meeting."^ ^  This  act 
was  held  not  void  for  uncertainty,  as  the  powers  granted  to  the  town 
boards  are  defined  by  the  act  therein  referred  to  as  governing  villages. 
Nor  was  it  void  for  attempting  to  incorporate  a  village  or  villages  by 
a  special  act.  It  did  not  incorporate  a  village  as  a  separate  munici- 
pality; it  simply  enlarged  the  powers  of  town  boards.  Nor  did  it 
violate  the  constitution,  article  11,  section  3.  Even  though  the  legis- 
lature may  in  its  discretion  enforce  the  incorporation  of  communi- 
ties as  cities  or  villages,  under  proper  limitations,  this  power  does  not 
deprive  the  legislature  of  the  power  to  legislate  for  the  control  and 
government  of  such  communities  before  it  is  deemed  wise  to  incorpo- 
rate them.®*'  Nor  did  it  violate  the  section  of  the  constitution  provid- 
ing that  "the  legislature  shall  establish  but  one  system  of  town  and 
county  government."*"     It  was  held  that  the  exercise  of  the  power 

not  the  intention  of  the  town  to  as-  and    during   the    revolution,   or   not 

sume   the   business   of   buying   and  long  after  it,  it  was  discontinued." 

selling  all  the  grain  which  the  in-  ^*  Opinion   of   Justices,    150   Mass. 

habitants    needed,    but    of    keeping  592;  s.  c.  24  N.  E.  1084. 

such  an  amount  in  store  as  was  nee-  *^  Laws  Wis.  1883,  ch.  292. 

essary  in  order  that  small  quantities  ™  Land  &c.  Co.  v.  Brown,  73  Wis. 

might  be   obtained,   particularly  by  294;  s.  c.  40  N.  W.  482. 

the  poorer  inhabitants,  at  what  the  "  Land   &c.   Co.   v.   Brown,   supra, 

selectmen,    or   a   committee    of   the  The  court  said: — "[This  law]  is  an 

town,    or    the   town    itself,    deemed  amendment  of  the  laws  concerning 

reasonable  prices.     On  May  25,  1795,  towns  and  the  government  thereof, 

the  town  voted  to  sell  the  granary.  Like  many  other  laws  of  the  state, 

This  action  of  the  town  of  Boston  it  provides  for  the  exercise  of  differ- 

was  an  exception  to  the  usages  of  ent  powers  by  the  boards  of  differ- 

towns,  and  it  appears  from  the  re-  ent  towns,  when  there  is  anything  in 

ports  of  committees  that  before  the  a  town  which  calls  for  the  exercise 

revolution    it  had   come   to   be   con-  of  such  different  or  additional  pow- 

sidered   as   of  doubtful   expediency,  ers.       The  act  is  as  general  as  any 


561 


EXPRESS    CORPORATE    POWERS. 


57G 


under  this  act  by  the  town  board  in  providing  for  water-works,  pro- 
tection against  fire  and  making  police  regulations  for  a  village  within 
the  limits  of  the  town  was  proper  and  fully  authorized.  An  objection 
was  made  to  thife  that  the  law  should  be  declared  void  under  some 
supposed  rule  of  public  policy  forl)idding  taxation  of  persons  for  pur- 
poses of  expenditure  which  would  not  benefit  their  property.  The 
court  overruled  this  objection.^® 

§  576.  Power  as  to  issue  of  commercial  paper. — Charter  power  to 
borrow  money  "for  general  purposes"  "on  the  credit"  of  a  city  only 
includes  authority  to  borrow  money  for  ordinary  governmental  pur- 
poses, such  as  are  generally  carried  out  with  revenues  derived  from 
taxation ;  and  the  presumption  is  that  the  power  was  intended  to  con- 
fer the  right  to  borrow  money  in  anticipation  of  the  receipt  of  taxes.  ^"^ 
Neither  does  this  charter  power  include  the  power  to  issue  and  sell 
negotiable  bonds,  nor  can  such  power  be  inferred  from  the  provision 
that  "bonds  of  the  city  shall  not  be  subject  to  tax  under  this  act."*"* 
The  court  relies  mainly  for  the  correctness  of  its  conclusion  upon  a 
case  in  which  it  was  held  that  the  implied  power  of  a  municipal  corpo- 


other  general  act.  It  provides  for 
the  exercise  of  the  additional  powers 
in  all  towns  in  which  villages  are 
situated  having  a  given  number  of 
inhabitants.  It  is  not  subject  to  the 
criticism  that  though  general  in 
form  it  is  special  in  fact,  as  it  is  a 
matter  of  public  notoriety  that  there 
are  and  have  been  sevei'al  towns  in 
the  state  to  which  the  act  can  be  ap- 
plied. .  .  .  Such  act  is  not  a 
violation  of  the  system  of  town 
government,  but  a  part  of  the  sys- 
tem, in  order  to  adapt  the  system  to 
the  peculiar  wants  of  certain  towns 
in  the  state."  As  to  the  constitu- 
tionality of  laws  applying  to  cities 
and  towns  on  the  basis  of  popula- 
tion, situation,  etc.,  as  being  local 
and  special  laws,  see  State  v.  Circuit 
Court  (N.  J.),  15  Atl.  272  and  note; 
Atlantic  City  &c.  Co.  v.  Atlantic 
City  &c.  Co.  (N.  J.),  15  Atl.  581; 
Cross  V.  Cherry,  122  Pa.  St.  417;  s.  c. 
15  Atl.  782. 

«»Land  &c.  Co.  v.  Brown,  73  Wis. 
294;  s.  c.  40  N.  W.  482.     These  prin- 
1  Smith — 36 


ciples  controlled  the  ruling.  The 
village  was  not  by  the  act  made  a 
separate  village,  but  remained  a  part 
of  the  town.  The  town  constituted 
the  taxing-district,  and  the  legisla- 
ture had  full  power  to  establish  tax- 
ing-districts, and  the  courts  can  not 
question  the  justice  or  injustice  of 
the  limits  thereof  when  fixed  by  the 
legislature.  See  also,  Teegarden  v. 
City  of  Racine,  56  Wis.  545;  s.  c.  14 
N.  W.  614;  Dickson  v.  City  of  Ra- 
cine, 61  Wis.  545,  549;  s.  c.  21  N.  W. 
620;  T.  B.  Scott  Lumber  Co.  v. 
Oneida  Co.,  72  Wis.  158;  s.  c.  39  N. 
W.  343;  State  v.  Board  &c.,  70  Wis. 
485;  s.  c.  36  N.  W.  396. 

*"  Brenham  v.  German-American 
Bank,  144  U.  S.  173;  s.  c.  12  S.  Ct. 
559;  rev'g  s.  c.  35  Fed.  185. 

"» St.  Laws  Tex.  1873,  ch.  2,  art.  3, 
§  2;  Brenham  v.  German-American 
Bank,  144  U.  S.  173;  s.  c.  12  S.  Ct. 
559;  overruling  Rogers  v.  Burling- 
ton, 3  Wall.  654,  and  Mitchell  v. 
Burlington,  4  Wall.  270. 


§  576 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS. 


56^ 


ration  to  borrow  money  to  enable  it  to  execute  the  power  expressly 
conferred  upon  it  by  law,  if  existing  at  all,  did  not  authorize  it  to 
create  and  issue  negotiable  securities  to  be  sold  in  the  market  and  to 
be  taken  by  the  purchaser  freed  from  the  equities  that  might  be  set 
up  by  the  maker. ^^  The  provision  in  the  charter  of  Chattanooga, 
Tenn.,  that  the  corporation  "shall  have  full  power  to  borrow  money 
on  its  bonds,"  etc.,  did  not  authorize  it  to  issue  warrants  on  the  treas- 
urer or  city  scrip  for  the  purpose  of  raising  money  for  the  ordinary 
expenses  of  the  corporation. **- 


"Merrill  v.  Monticello,  138  U.  S. 
673;  s.  c.  11  S.  Ct.  441.  The  court 
further  said; — "It  is  admitted  that 
the  power  to  borrow  money,  or  to  in- 
cur indebtedness,  carries  with  it  the 
power  to  issue  the  usual  evidences 
of  indebtedness  by  the  corporation 
to  the  lender  or  other  creditor.  Such 
evidences  may  be  in  the  form  of 
promissory  notes,  warrants,  and 
perhaps,  most  generally,  in  that  of 
a  bond.  But  there  is  a  marked 
legal  difference  between  the  power 
to  give  a  note  to  a  lender  for  the 
amount  of  money  borrowed,  or  to  a 
creditor  for  the  amount  due,  and  the 
power  to  issue  for  sale,  in  open  mar- 
ket, a  bond,  as  a  commercial  secur- 
ity, with  immunity  in  the  hands  of 
a  bona  fide  holder  for  value  from 
equitable  defenses."  The  court  cited 
and  approved  Police  Jury  v.  Britton, 
15  Wall.  566;  Claiborne  Co.  v. 
Brooks,  111  U.  S.  400;  s.  c.  4  S.  Ct. 
489;  Kelley  v.  Milan,  127  U.  S.  139; 
s.  c.  8  S.  Ct.  1101;  Young  v.  Claren- 
don Tp.,  132  U.  S.  340;  s.  c.  10  S.  Ct. 
107;  Hill  V.  Memphis,  134  U.  S.  198, 
203;  s.  c.  10  S.  Ct.  562.  In  this  last 
case  the  court  said: — "The  inability 
of  municipal  corporations  to  issue 
negotiable  paper  for  their  indebted- 
ness, however  incurred,  unless  au- 
thority for  that  purpose  is  expressly 
given  or  necessarily  implied  for  the 
execution  of  other  express  powers, 
has  been  affirmed  in  repeated  deci- 
sions of  this  court."  See  also.  Con- 
cord V.  Robinson,  121  U.  S.  165;  s.  c. 
7  S.  Ct.  937;    Norton  v.  Dyersburg, 


127U.  S.  160;  s.  c.  8  S.  Ct.  1111.  The 
case  of  Dwyer  v.  Hackworth,  57 
Tex.  245,  was  distinguished  by  the 
court's  referring  to  the  fact  that  the 
supreme  court  of  Texas,  while  re- 
versing the  court  below,  said  that  it 
could  not  enjoin  the  collection  of  the 
taxes  on  the  ground  of  the  invalid- 
ity of  these  same  bonds  without 
making  the  holders  of  those  bonds 
parties  to  the  suit,  and  citing  Board 
V.  Texas  &c.  R.  Co.,  46  Tex.  316;  and 
then  the  United  States  supreme 
court  say: — "There  was,  therefore, 
no  adjudication  in  that  case  as  to 
the  validity  of  the  bonds,  and  the  re- 
mark of  the  court  that  the  city  bor- 
rowed money  by  selling  its  bonds  to 
the  amount  of  $15,000  is  of  no  force 
on  the  question  of  the  validity  of 
the  bonds,"  and  cite  Lewis  v.  City  of 
Shreveport,  108  U.  S.  282;  s.  c.  2  S. 
Ct.  634.  Cities  have  no  power  to  in- 
cur debts  and  issue  negotiable  in- 
struments unless  specially  author- 
ized to  do  so  by  their  charters,  or  by 
statute,  or  the  power  to  do  so  is 
clearly  implied  from  some  power  ex- 
pressly given,  which  can  not  fairly 
be  exercised  without  it:  Watson  v. 
City  of  Huron,  97  Fed.  449;  s.  c.  38 
C.  C.  A.  264.  The  city  may  execute 
a  note  for  a  just  and  legal  indebted- 
ness: City  of  Mineral  Wells  v.  Darby 
(Tex.  Civ.  App.),  51  S.  W.  351. 

"^Colburn  v.  Mayor  &c.  (Tenn.), 
17  Am.  L.  Reg.  191,  the  court  order- 
ing perpetual  injunction  against  the 
officers  issuing  such  paper.  The 
court  said: — "If  there  be  not  money 


563 


EXPRESS    CORPORATE    POWERS. 


577 


§  577.  As  to  trusts. — In  the  absence  of  an  express  grant  of  power, 
a  municipal  corporation  can  not  accept  and  hold  property  upon  a 
purely  private  trust. ^^  Under  its  charter  power  to  "receive  in  trust 
and  control  for  the  purpose  of  such  trust  all  money  or  other  property 
*  *  *  bestowed  upon  such  corporation  *  *  *  f^j.  ^]^g  general 
purposes  of  education/'  it  has  been  held  that  the  city  of  Baltimore 
could  take  in  trust  property  given  it  by  will  "to  establish  a  chair  in  the 
McDonogh  Educational  Fund  and  Institute,  *  *  *  to  promulgate 
such  a  course  of  instruction  in  said  institute  as  will  aid  in  the  prac- 
tical application  of  the  mechanical  arts,  *  *  *  to  give  boys  in  that 
institution  such  useful  and  practical  mechanical  education  as  will 
enable  them  to  gain  a  livelihood  by  skilful  manual  labor."®^  Aside 
from  this  provision  in  its  latest  charter,  the  court  declared  that  accord- 
ing to  the  great  weight  of  authority  the  corporation  would  seem  to  be 
entirely  capable  of  taking  property  in  trust  for  purposes  germane  to 
the  objects  of  the  corporation  or  which  would  promote,  aid  or  assist 
in  carrying  out  or  perfecting  those  objects.®^     There  is  no  statute  law 


in  the  treasury,  then  the  corpora- 
tion should  borrow,  as  provided  in 
the  charter  or  by  existing  law,  or 
they  should  levy  and  collect  such 
tax  as  is  necessary  to  raise  what- 
ever sum  is  needed,  and  if  they  can 
neither  borrow  nor  raise  the  money 
by  taxation  to  meet  their  expendi- 
tures, then  they  should  cease  their 
expenditures  until  they  can  thus 
realize  according  to  law." 

^^  In  re  Franklin's  Estate,  Appeal 
of  Gillespie,  150  Pa.  St.  437;  s.  c.  24 
Atl.  626.  The  court  said:— "In- 
stances are  not  wanting  in  which 
municipal  corporations  have  exe- 
cuted trusts  committed  to  them  by 
private  persons,  germane  to  the  ob- 
jects of  the  corporation,  and  they 
have  been  upheld  for  that  reason." 
See  also,  Philadelphia  v.  Fox,  64  Pa. 
St.  169  (commept  of  Sharswood,  J., 
on  Corporation  &c.  of  Gloucester  v. 
Osborn,  1  H.  L.  Gas.  272,  in  which 
it  was  said  that  a  municipality  may 
take  and  hold  for  purposes  altogeth- 
er private) ;  Mayor  v.  Elliott,  3 
Rawle  (Pa.)  170.  A  town  may  act 
as  a  trustee  of  a  charitable  bequest 
and  execute  the  trust:  Higginson  v. 


Turner,  171  Mass.  586;  s.  c.  51  N.  E. 
172.  A  city  may  take  a  devise  in 
trust  for  religious  societies  without 
regard  to  denomination:  Phillips  v. 
Harrow,  93  Iowa  92;  s.  c.  61  N.  W. 
434.  A  devise  of  land  to  a  city  was 
legal  in  South  Carolina  after  1872; 
Mcintosh  V.  City  of  Charleston,  45 
S.  C.  584;  s.  c.  23  S.  E.  943.  In 
Pennsylvania  a  municipal  corpora- 
tion is  capable  of  taking  and  hold- 
ing property  under  a  will  and  ca- 
pable of  acting  as  trustee  for  public 
purposes  germane  to  the  purposes  of 
its  creation:  Handley  v.  Palmer,  91 
Fed.  948. 

"'Barnum  v.  Mayor  &c.,  62  Md. 
275. 

'=2  Kent  Com.  280;  2  Dillon 
Munic.  Corp.  (4th  ed.),  §  716.  See 
also,  Jackson  v.  Hartwell,  8  Johns. 
(N.  Y.)  422;  Green  v.  Rutherforth,  1 
Ves.  Sr.  462;  Trustees  &c.  v.  King, 
12  Mass.  546;  Pickering  v.  Shotwell, 
10  Barr  (Pa.)  23,  27;  Chambers  v. 
City  of  St.  Louis,  29  Mo.  543;  Execu- 
tors &c.  V.  Murdoch,  15  How.  367; 
State  V.  Executors  &c.,  8  La.  An. 
171;  Girard  v.  City  of  New  Orleans, 
2  La.  An.  898;  Vidal  v.  Mayor  &c.,  2 


§    578  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  564 

of  New  York  which  can  be  construed  to  give  a  municipal  corporation 
the  right  to  hold  lands  in  trust  for  pious  uses  or  for  religious 
purposes.**®  A  municipal  corporation  can  not,  in  the  absence  of 
statute,  accept  a  testamentary  trust  to  establish  and  maintain  a  poor- 
house  for  the  support  of  the  poor  of  the  county. ^^ 

§  578.  Purchase  at  tax  sales. — A  city  having  power  under  its  char- 
ter to  purchase  property  within  or  without  its  borders  can  purchase 
land  for  non-payment  of  taxes  levied  by  the  city.^*  Where  a  statute 
gives  the  power  to  make  such  purchase,  a  municipality  must  strictly 
pursue  its  statutory  authority.  It  is  confined  to  the  express  provision 
of  the  statute  conferring  the  power ;  and  where  there  is  no  authority 
for  it  to  purchase  jointly  with  another  person,  a  tax  deed,  from  which 
it  appears  that  land  was  sold  to  the  municipality  and  a  private  indi- 
vidual, has  been  held  void.**®  So,  where  a  city  charter  limits  to  fifty 
years  the  terms  for  which  lands  should  be  sold  to  the  city  for  taxes 
and  the  city  took  such  lands  for  nine  hundred  years,  the  title  was  held 
to  be  void;  but  if  the  tax  was  lawful,  the  landowner  must  pay  the 
tax  with  interest  as  the  condition  of  a  decree  in  his  favor  in  a  pro- 
ceeding to  set  aside  or  annul  the  deed.^*"*  Per  contra:  It  has  been 
said  by  the  supreme  court  of  Illinois  that  since  municipal  corporations 
can  only  exercise  such  powers  as  are  expressly  conferred,  or  as  arise 
by  implication  from  general  powers  granted,  the  charter  power  of  a 

How.  127;  Girard  v.  Philadelphia,  7  sonal  property  to   such  as  may  be 

Wall.   1;    Perin  v.   Carey,   24   How.  necessary  to  the  exercise  of  corpo- 

465;   Bell  Co.  v.  Alexander,  22  Tex.  rate  or  administrative  powers. 

350;   Columbia  Bridge  Co.  v.  Kline,  "City  Council  v.  Walton,  77  Ga. 

Bright.  (Pa.)  320;  Miller  v.  Lerch,  1  517. 

Wall.  Jr.  210;  Webb  v.  Neal,  5  Allen  ■'"  Keller  v.  Wilson,  90  Ky.  350;  s. 
(Mass.)  575;  Oxford  &c.  Society  v.  c.  14  S.  W.  332.  The  court  said:  — 
West  &c.  Society,  55  N.  H.  463;  Sar-  "This  [the  provision  in  the  charter] 
gent  v.  Cornish,  54  N.  H.  18;  Cres-  should  be  construed  to  mean  for  gov- 
son's  Appeal,  30  Pa.  St.  437.  ernmental  purposes;  but  in  purchas- 
""  Village  of  Corning  v.  Rector  &c.,  ing  it  for  its  taxes  it  was  executing 
33  N.  Y.  St.  766;  s.  c.  11  N.  Y.  S.  such  a  purpose,  and,  in  our  opinion, 
762.  In  In  re  Underbill's  Will,  3  N.  no  valid  distinction  can  be  drawn 
Y.  S.  205;  s.  c.  6  Dem.  Sur.  (N.  Y.)  between  a  purchase  by  the  city  at  a 
466,  it  was  held  that  a  town  can  not  sale  for  taxes  under  a  levy  by  its  col- 
receive  a  bequest  to  be  devoted  un-  lecting  officer  and  under  a  decretal 
der  certain  conditions  to  the  erec-  sale  for  a  like  purpose." 
tion  of  a  town  hall,  inasmuch  as  §  2  ""  Sprague  v.  Coenen,  30  Wis.  209. 
of  revised  statutes  of  New  York,  p.  ""  Baldwin  v.  City  of  Elizabeth,  42 
337,  provides  that  no  town  shall  pos-  N.  J.  Eq.  11 ;  s.  c.  6  Atl.  275.  See 
sess  or  exercise  any  corporate  pow-  also.  In  re  Report  of  Commissioners 
ers  except  as  enumerated,  and  §  1  &c.,  49  N.  J.  L.  488;  s.  c.  10  Atl.  363; 
limits  the  power  of  towns  in  pur-  23  Am.  &  Eng.  Corp.  Cas.  484. 
chasing  and   holding  lands  or  per- 


565 


EXPRESS    CORPORATE    POWERS, 


579 


corporation  to  buy  and  hold  real  property  should  be  understood  to 
include  purchases  made  in  the  ordinary  way,  and  not  a  tax  sale.^"^ 
In  Indiana  it  has  also  been  held  that  there  could  be  no  purchase  at  a 
sale  for  taxes  due  by  the  corporation  without  express  power  conferred 
by  statute,  and  that  it  could  not  bind  itself  by  an  agreement  to  warrant 
the  title  of  a  purchaser  at  such  sale.^^^  Such  a  sale  to  a  corporation 
had  before  been  held  void  in  Wisconsin. ^^^  A  power  to  sell  lands  for 
taxes  imposed  upon  such  lands  does  not  authorize  selling  of  lands 
for  taxes  imposed  upon  the  owners  or  occupants  merely,  and  not  upon 
their  lands.^°* 

§  579.  Granting  exclusive  franchises. — A  village  has  no  power  to 
grant  an  exclusive  franchise  so  as  to  disable  itself  for  the  period  of 
thirty  years  from  establishing  for  itself  a  system  of  water-works,  under 
a  power  to  provide  for  and  control  the  erection  of  water-works,  and 
to  grant  the  right  to  one  or  more  private  companies  to  erect  water- 
works to  supply  such  village  and  the  inhabitants  with  water,  etc.^**^ 


"^  City  of  Champaign  v.  Harmon, 
98  111.  491. 

"^  City  of  Logansport  v.   Humph- 
rey, 84  Ind.  467. 

^"^Knox  v.  Peterson,  21  Wis.  247. 
In  Bruck  v.  Broesigks,  18  Iowa  393, 
Lowe,  J.,  has  given  the  following 
reason  for  denying  such  powers  to 
counties  and  municipal  corporations 
generally: — "The  relations  which 
counties  or  municipal  corporations 
sustain  to  the  state  and  their  own  in- 
habitants is  of  a  fiduciary  nature. 
The  duties  required  and  the  respon- 
sibilities imposed  in  the  matter  of 
assessing  and  collecting  taxes  are 
such  as  to  render  it  inexpedient,  not 
to  say  unwise,  and  against  the  pur- 
pose and  the  policy  of  the  revenue 
law  of  the  code  of  1851  (under 
which  the  land  in  controversy  was 
sold  for  taxes),  to  allow  counties  to 
traffic  in  the  purchase  and  sale  of 
tax  titles  in  the  absence  of  an  ex- 
press statute  authorizing  the  same. 
They  are  intermediate  agencies  be- 
tween the  state  and  the  people,  cre- 
ated for  civil  and  political  purposes; 
and  whilst  it  would  be  competent  for 
counties  to  buy  and  hold  real  estate 
as  a  means  to  an  end  in  effecting  or 


carrying  out  the  objects  of  their  cre- 
ation, it  would  not  be  within  the 
scope  of  their  powers  to  buy  and  sell 
delinquent  lands  at  tax  sales  as  a 
mere  pecuniary  operation." 

^'^  Sharp  V.  Speir,  4  Hill  (N.  Y.) 
76. 

'»"  Long  V.  City  of  Duluth,  49  Minn. 
280;  s.  c.  51  N.  W.  913.  The  court 
said: — "If  there  is  any  ambiguity  or 
reasonable  doubt,  arising  from  the 
terms  used  by  the  legislative  or 
granting  body,  as  to  whether  an  ex- 
clusive franchise  has  been  conferred 
or  authorized  to  be  conferred,  the 
doubt  is  to  be  resolved  against  the 
corporation  or  individual  claiming 
such  a  grant.  Public  policy  does 
not  permit  an  unnecessary  inference 
of  authority  to  make  a  contract  in- 
consistent with  the  continuance  of 
the  sovereign  power  and  duty  to 
make  such  laws  as  the  public  wel- 
fare may  require."  On  this  point 
see  also,  Nash  v.  Lowry,  37  Minn. 
261,  263;  s.  c.  33  N.  W.  787;  Proprie- 
tors &c.  V.  Proprietors  &c.,  11  Pet. 
420,  443,  444;  Minturn  v.  Larue,  23 
How.  435;  Wright  v.  Nagle,  101  U. 
S.  791,  796;  Panning  v.  Gregoire.  16 
How.  524    (where  it  was  held  that 


579 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS. 


566 


The  fact  tliat  the  law  in  another  section  provides  that  every  grant 
to  a  private  company  of  the  right  to  erect  water-works  shall  provide 
for  the  sale  of  such  works  to  the  village  after  fifteen  years  does  not 
affect  this  construction  of  the  law,  as  it  merely  requires  that  the  right 


the  earlier  grant  of  a  ferry  fran- 
chise was  not  exclusive,  and,  al- 
though "no  court  or  board  of  county 
commissioners"  [they  having  been 
prohibited  by  the  act  granting  the 
first]  could  subsequently  grant  an- 
other franchise,  the  legislature 
could  do  it,  or  empower  the  city  of 
Dubuque  to  do  so,  thus  sustaining  a 
subsequent  ferry  franchise  granted 
by  the  city  under  its  charter  pow- 
ers) ;  Richmond  Co.  &c.  Co.  v.  Town 
of  Middletown,  59  N.  Y.  228  (holding 
that  a  legislative  act  authorizing  a 
town  to  cause  its  streets  to  be 
lighted  with  gas  and  to  enter  into  a 
contract  with  the  gas  company  for 
that  purpose  did  not  confer  power 
to  make  an  absolute  contract  for  a 
term  of  years;  that  the  legislature 
could  not  thus  be  deprived  of  its 
power  to  subsequently  legislate 
upon  the  subject,  and  its  repeal  of 
the  authority  to  light  with  gas  was 
effectual  to  terminate  the  contract 
so  made) ;  Syracuse  Water  Co.  v. 
City  of  Syracuse,  116  N.  Y.  167;  s.  c. 
22  N.  E.  381.  The  state  in  its  sov- 
ereign capacity  may  grant  an  ex- 
clusive franchise  which  amounts  to 
a  monopoly  which  will  be  protected 
against  a  subsequent  conflicting 
grant:  Saginaw  Gaslight  Co.  v.  City 
of  Saginaw,  28  Fed.  529;  New  Or- 
leans Gaslight  Co.  v.  Louisiana  &c. 
Mfg.  Co.,  115  U.  S.  650;  s.  c.  6  S.  Ct. 
252;  Louisville  Gas  Co.  v.  Citizens' 
Gaslight  Co.,  115  U.  S.  683;  s.  c. 
6  S.  Ct.  265.  But  in  the  absence  of 
legislative  power  vested  in  the  mu- 
nicipality, so  to  do,  it  can  not  grant 
a  monopoly:  Saginaw  Gaslight  Co.  v. 
City  of  Saginaw,  supra;  State  v. 
Cincinnati  Gas  &c.  Co.,  18  Ohio  St. 
262,  293.  A  grant  of  an  exclusive 
franchise  is  a  monopoly  and  can  be 
exercised  only  by  the  sovereign  pow- 


er of  the  state.  A  city  council  has 
no  authority  to  grant  to  any  one  a 
monopoly,  even  where  no  express 
prohibition  is  found  in  the  charter, 
or  other  legislative  act:  Los  Angeles 
Water  Co.  v.  City  of  Los  Angeles,  88 
Fed.  720;  Illinois  Trust  &c.  Bank  v. 
City  of  Arkansas  City,  76  Fed.  271, 
279;  s.  c.  22  C.  C.  A.  171.  The  grant 
of  an  exclusive  franchise  is  not  an 
indispensable,  or  even  an  appropri- 
ate means  to  the  procurement  of 
water,  and,  besides,  creates  a  monop- 
oly, and  upon  this  ground  many 
courts  hold  such  grants  to  be  void: 
Los  Angeles  Water  Co.  v.  City  of 
Los  Angeles,  88  Fed.  720.  The  state 
may  delegate  to  a  municipality  the 
power  to  grant  a  street-railway 
franchise  and  the  granting  of  such 
franchise  by  the  council  is  the  act 
of  the  state:  City  R.  Co.  v.  Citizens' 
St.  R.  Co.,  166  U.  S.  557;  s.  c.  17  S. 
Ct.  653.  The  common  council  has 
no  right  to  authorize  a  railroad  com- 
pany to  erect  a  building  upon  the 
batture  in  front  of  riparian  prop- 
erty on  a  public  river  within  the 
city  limits  for  99  years:  Louisiana 
Const.  &c.  Co.  V.  Illinois  &c.  R.  Co., 
49  La.  An.  527;  s.  c.  21  So.  891.  An 
ordinance  granting  greater  rights 
than  authorized  may  be  valid  to  the 
extent  authorized:  City  of  St.  Paul 
V.  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.,  63  Minn.  330; 
s.  c.  68  N.  W.  458.  The  city  has  no 
power  to  grant  to  certain  drivers  of 
vehicles  the  exclusive  use  of  the 
streets:  Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  City  of 
Chicago,  181  111.  289;  s.  c.  54  N.  E. 
825.  The  grant  of  a  franchise  is  oiot 
exclusive  unless  so  specified:  Jack- 
son Co.  &c.  R.  Co.  V.  Interstate  &c.  R. 
Co.,  24  Fed.  306.  See  Citizens'  Gas 
&c.  Co.  V.  Town  of  Elwood,  114  Ind. 
332;  s.  c.  16  N.  E.  624. 


567  EXPRESS    CORPORATE    POWERS.  §    580 

to  purchase  shall  be  a  condition  of  the  grant,  but  imposes  no  require- 
ment or  dut}^  to  purchase,  and  does  not  justify  the  inference  that  the 
village  could  only  provide  itself  with  water-works  by  purchasing  from 
the  company.^"®  A  water  company  was  incorporated  in  1860  to  supply 
the  borough  of  Easton  with  water.  In  1867  the  borough  was  author- 
ized to  construct  water-works  and  to  purchase  the  works  of  any  exist- 
ing company.  This  authority  became  effectual  in  1881,  being  ap- 
proved by  a  popular  vote.  The  water  company  in  the  meanwhile  had 
accepted  the  benefits  of  an  act  of  1874  which  declared  that  "the  right 
to  have  and  enjoy  the  franchises  and  privileges  of  such  incorporation 
within  the  district  or  locality  covered  by  its  charter  shall  be  an  exclu- 
sive one,  and  no  other  company  shall  be  incorporated  for  that  pur- 
pose" until  the  corporation  should  have  realized  profits  to  a  specified 
amount.  It  was  held  that  the  franchise  was  exclusive  only  as  respects 
other  companies,  and  that  the  borough  was  not  prohibited  from  sup- 
plying water  by  works  constructed  by  itself,  even  though  that  might 
impair  the  value  of  the  franchise  of  the  water  company.  ^"'^ 

§  580.  The  same  subject  continued. — It  was  held  that  the  granting 
of  the  exclusive  privilege  of  supplying  a  city  with  water  "from  the 
Three-mile  Creelr"  did  not  prevent  a  subsequent  grant  of  a  right  to 
supply  water  from  another  source.  ^"^  Under  authority  to  a  municipal 
corporation  to  cause  its  streets  to  be  lighted  and  to  make  reasonable 
regulations  with  reference  thereto,  it  is  empowered  to  enter  into  a  con- 
tract to  accomplish  that  end,  but  it  has  no  authority  to  thus  confer 
an  exclusive  right  to  furnish  gas  for  a  period  of  thirty  years.  ^"^  A 
city  was  empowered  by  its  charter  to  provide  itself  with  water,  and  was 
deemed  to  be  authorized  to  do  so  by  contract.  A  water  company  was 
expressly  authorized  to  contract  with  the  city  for  that  purpose,  and 
a  contract  was  entered  into  which  the  court  deemed  to  have  been 
intended  to  confer  an  exclusive  right  upon  the  company  for  a  period 
of  twenty-five  years.  It  was  held  that  the  city  had  no  such  power. ^^^ 
The  facts  that  a  water  company  is  required,  when  requested,  to  furnish 
water  to  a  city  for  the  extinguishment  of  fires,  etc.,  and  that  such 
request  has  been  made,  and  contracts  entered  into  for  that  purpose 
between  the  company  and  the  city,  do  not  constitute  a  contract  bind- 
ing the  city  perpetually  while  the  company  retains  its  charter  and 

""  Long    V.    City    of    Duluth,    49  '""  Stein  v.  Bienville  Water  &c.  Co., 

Minn.  280;   s.  c.  51  N.  W.  913.     See  34  Fed.  145. 

also,  Syracuse  Water  Co.  v.  City  of  '"*  Saginaw  Gaslight  Co.  v.  City  of 

Syracuse,  116  N.  Y.  167,  187;  s.  c.  22  Saginaw,  28  Fed.  529. 

N.  E.  381.  ""City    of    Brenham    v.    Brenham 

'"'Lehigh    Water    Company's    Ap-  Water  Co.,  67  Tex.  542;  s.  c.  4  S.  W. 

peal,  102  Pa.  St.  515.  143. 


§  581 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS. 


568 


preventing  the  city  from  making  contracts  with  others.  The  city 
could  bind  itself  by  such  contracts  only  as  it  was  authorized  by  statute 
to  make.  It  has  no  power  to  grant  exclusive  privileges  to  put  mains, 
pipes  and  hydrants  in  its  streets,  nor  can  it  lawfully,  by  contract, 
deny  to  itself  the  right  to  exercise  the  legislative  powers  vested  in  its 
common  council.^^^ 

§  581.  Contracts  not  exclusive. — A  city  has  power  to  contract  for 
a  supply  of  gas  or  water  for  a  stated  period  of  time  extending  beyond 
the  tenure  of  office  of  the  individual  members  of  the  common  council 
making  such  contract."^  A  contract  by  ordinance  to  pay  for  twenty- 
five  years  for  the  gas  furnished  by  the  lamps  provided  for  therein  and 
by  those  afterwards  directed  was  upheld.  The  ordinance  was  con- 
strued to  be  a  grant  so  far  as  it  conferred  upon  the  gas  company  the 
right  to  lay  its  mains  and  pipes  in  the  public  streets.  But  it  was  held 
that  in  that  far  it  was  in  the  nature  of  a  license  and  not  exclusive.^ ^^ 


"^  Syracuse  Water  Co.  v.  City  of 
Syracuse,  116  N.  Y.  167;  s.  c.  22  N. 
E.  381,  sustaining  ttie  power  of  the 
city  to  authorize  another  water  com- 
pany to  construct,  maintain  and 
operate  water-works  in  the  city,  but 
not  denying  the  right  of  the  com- 
pany first  receiving  the  contract  con- 
tinuing to  furnish.  See  also,  Le- 
high Water  Co.  v.  Easton,  121  U.  S. 
388,  391;  s.  c.  7  S.  Ct.  916;  Mohawk 
Bridge  Co.  v.  Utica  &c.  R.  Co.,  6 
Paige  (N.  Y.)  554;  Oswego  Falls 
Bridge  Co.  v.  Fish,  1  Barb.  Ch.  (N. 
Y.)  547;  Thompson  v.  New  York  &c. 
R.  Co.,  3  Sand.  Ch.  (N.  Y.)  625;  Au- 
burn &c.  Plank  Road  Co.  v.  Doug- 
lass, 9  N.  Y.  444,  452;  Fort  Plain 
Bridge  Co.  v.  Smith,  30  N.  Y.  44,  61; 
Power  V.  Village  of  Athens,  99  N.  Y. 
592;  s.  c.  2  N.  E.  609;  Dermott  v. 
State,  99  N.  Y.  101;  s.  c.  1  N.  E.  242; 
Milhau  V.  Sharp,  27  N.  Y.  611; 
Mayor  &c.  v.  Second  Ave.  R.  Co.,  32 
N.  Y.  261;  Gale  v.  Village  of  Kala- 
mazoo, 23  Mich.  344;  s.  c.  9  Am.  R, 
80;  Logan  v.  Pyne,  43  Iowa  524;  s. 
c.  22  Am.  R.  261;  Des  Moines  Gas 
Co.  V.  City  of  Des  Moines,  44  Iowa 
505;  s.  c.  24  Am.  R.  756;  Norwich 
Gas  Light  Co.  v.  Norwich  City  Gas 
Co.,   25   Conn.    19;    State   v.    Cincin- 


nati Gas  &c.  Co.,  18  Ohio  St.  262; 
Gas  Co.  V.  Parkersburg,  30  W.  Va. 
435;  s.  c.  4  S.  E.  650;  Birmingham 
&c.  St.  R.  Co.  V.  Birmington  St.  R. 
Co.,  79  Ala.  465  (where  it  was  held 
that  neither  the  charter  of  the  city 
of  Birmingham  nor  the  general  stat- 
utes conferred  on  that  corporation 
the  power  to  grant,  by  ordinance  in 
the  nature  of  a  contract,  the  exclu- 
sive franchise  in  perpetuity  of  run- 
ning a  street-railway  through  cer- 
tain designated  streets  and  avenues; 
and  further,  that  if  such  power  were 
granted  to  the  corporation  by  its 
charter  or  public  statute,  it  would  be 
violative  of  the  constitutional  pro- 
vision (Const.  Ala.,  art.  1,  §  23) 
against  the  passage  of  any  law 
"making  any  irrevocable  grant  of 
special  privileges  or  immunities") ; 
City  of  Chicago  v.  Rumpff,  45  111.  90; 
Davis  V.  Mayor  &c.,  14  N.  Y.  506. 

"'  City  of  Vincennes  v.  Citizens' 
Gas  Light  Co.,  132  Ind.  114;  s.  c.  31 
N.  E.  573.  See  also,  City  of  Indian- 
apolis V.  Indianapolis  &c.  Co.,  66  Ind. 
396;  City  of  Valparaiso  v.  Gardner, 
97  Ind.  1;  s.  c.  49  Am.  R.  416. 

"'^  City  of  Vincennes  v.  Citizens' 
Gas  Light  Co.,  132  Ind.  114;  s.  c.  31 
N.    E.    573.     See    also,    Crowder    v. 


569  EXPRESS    CORPORATE    POWERS.  §    582 

Nor  was  a  monopoly  of  supplying  the  city  with  gas  for  street-light- 
ing given  by  such  contract,  there  being  nothing  in  the  ordinance 
preventing  the  city  from  taking  gas  from  others.^^*  Had  the  ordi- 
nance contained  a  provision  by  which  the  city  agreed  to  take  gas  from 
no  other  company,  or  prohibiting  any  other  company  from  engaging 
in  the  business  of  making  and  selling  gas,  the  cases  mentioned  in  the 
note  would  be  in  point.^^^  The  arrangement  provided  by  the  ordi- 
nance being  purely  a  business  matter  there  was  no  surrender  by  the 
council  of  any  legislative  power."®  The  statute  which  authorized 
the  common  councils  of  cities  to  contract  for  light  for  its  streets  and 
alleys  for  a  period  not  exceeding  ten  years  did  not  affect  this  contract. 
By  the  same  act  existing  contracts,  except  such  as  conferred  exclusive 
privileges,  were  declared  valid.  This  one  was  held  not  to  be  ex- 
clusive.^^^ 

§  582.  Improvements  generally. — The  charter  of  a  city  provided 
that,  if  sidewalks  are  not  built  Avithin  the  prescribed  period  of  time 
after  notice,  the  city  council  may  order  the  same  to  be  done  "at  the 
expense  of  the  lots  adjoining."  It  has  been  held  that  a  resolution  of 
the  council,  after  the  expiration  of  the  time  fixed  by  the  notice,  di- 
recting the  city  recorder  to  advertise  for  bids  to  furnish  the  material 
and  construct  the  walk,  was  a  sufficient  compliance  with  the  charter 
provision.  It  was  not  necessary  that  they  should  have  directed  that 
the  walks  be  built  "at  the  expense  of  the  lots"  adjoining.^^^  A  pro- 
vision in  a  city  charter  that  the  expense  of  constructing  sidewalks 
in  a  certain  contingency  should  be  assessed  against  the  "lots  and  par- 
cels of  land  adjoining  said  sidewalks"  was  held  to  conform  to  the 
state  constitution,  which  authorized  and  provided  that  such  assess- 
ments might  be  made  "upon  the  property  fronting  upon  such  improve- 
ments."^^''    Under  the  code  of  North   Carolina,  relative  to  towns 

Town  of  Sullivan,  128  Ind.  486;  s.  c.  31  N.  E.  573,  as  to  its  being  purely 

28   N.   E.   94;    City  of  Rushville  v.  a  business  power.     See  also,  in  addi- 

Rushville  Natural  Gas  Co.,  132  Ind.  tion   to  cases  supra,   Dillon  Munic. 

575;  s.  c.  28  N.  E.  853.  Corp.    (4th   ed.),    §§    608,   609;    New 

"*  City    of   Vincennes  v.    Citizens'  Orleans  &c.  Co.  v.  City  of  New  Or- 

Gas    Light    Co.,    132    Ind.    114;     s.  leans,  42  La.  An.  188;  s.  c.  7  So.  559. 

c.     31     N.     E.     573.     Cf.     Citizens'  "^  City   of   Vincennes   v.   Citizens' 

Gas  &c.  Co.  V.  Town  of  Blwood,  114  Gas  Light  Co.,  132  Ind.  114;  s.  c.  31 

Ind.  332;  s.  c.  16  N.  E.  624.  N.   E.    573.     See   also,   cases   supra; 

"^  Davenport    v.    Kleinschmidt,    6  Louisville   Gas  Co.  v.   Citizens'   &c. 

Mont.   502;    s.   c.   13    Pac.   249;    and  Co.,  115  U.  S.  683;  s.  c.  6  S.  Ct.  265. 

cases  collected  in  In  re  Union  Perry  "^  Scott   Co.    v.    Hinds,    50    Minn. 

Co.,  98  N.  Y.  139,  150.  204;  s.  c.  52  N.  W.  523. 

""  City   of   Vincennes   v.    Citizens'  "'^  Scott    Co.    v.    Hinds,    50    Minn. 

Gas   Light   Co.,   132   Ind.    114;    s.   c.  204;  s.  c.  52  N.  W.  523. 


§    583  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  570 

and  cities,  providing  that  the  commissioners  or  aldermen  may 
cause  necessary  improvements  to  be  made,  and  '^apportion  them 
equally  among  the  inhabitants  by  assessments,"  a  city  authorized  by 
its  charter  to  charge  abutting  owners  with  the  cost  of  improvements 
may  apportion  them  according  to  the  front-foot  rule,  though  the 
charter  is  silent  as  to  the  method  of  apportionment.^^*'  An  amend- 
ment to  the  charter  of  a  city  providing  that  the  common  council 
should  not  take  stock  "in  any  public  improvement,  or  effect  a  loan 
for  any  purpose,  without  first  obtaining  the  consent  of  the  people  at 
an  election  held  for  that  purpose,"  can  not  be  extended  to  improve- 
ments other  than  municipal  in  their  character.  The  legislature  did 
not  intend  to  invest  the  city  with  authority  to  embark  in  speculative 
enterprises  of  improvement. ^^^  For  like  reasons  a  city  charter  was 
construed  not  to  authorize  the  levying  and  collection  of  a  tax  for 
making  a  survey  of  a  railroad-route  from  that  city  to  another.^^^  It 
has  been  held  that  although  an  act  empowering  a  county  to  improve 
the  navigation  of  a  navigable  stream,  and  to  issue  bonds,  the  proceeds 
of  which  were  to  be  applied  for  such  purpose,  might  not  provide 
any  means  or  method  for  paying  the  principal  and  interest  on  the 
bonds,  such  fact  was  not  a  good  objection  to  the  validity  of  the  act 
or  to  the  issue  of  the  bonds  thereunder,  nor  was  the  fact  that  such 
provision  might  not  be  otherwise  made.^^^ 

§  583.  Cost  of  improvements. — When  municipal  corporations  seek 
to  impose  upon  property-owners  the  burden  of  the  cost  of  street-im- 
provements, and  to  hold  the  property  of  abutting  owners  liable  there- 
for, the  statute  or  charter  authorizing  such  improvements  to  be  made 
must  be  strictly  pursued.  ^^*  Under  the  Dakota  statute,  which  grants 
the  powers  in  this  respect  to  cities,  the  resolution  adopted  and  pub- 
lished must  specifically  designate  the  work  declared  necessary  to  be 

""City  of  Raleigh  v.  Peace,  110  N.         "^Stockton  v.  Powell,  29  Fla.  1;  s. 

C.  32;  s.  c.  14  S.  E.  521.  c.  10  So.  688. 

^^1  Low  v.   Mayor  &c.,   5   Cal.   214,        ^"*  Mason  v.  City  of  Sioux  Falls,  2 

where   it  was   held   the   city   under  S.   D.   640;    s.   c.   51   N.   W.   770;    2 

that  provision  had  no  power  to  sub-  Desty     Taxation     1241;      2     Dillon 

scribe  to  stock  in  a  steam  naviga-  Munic.  Corp.,  §  769;  1  Blackwell  Ta'x 

tion  company.  Titles,  §  612;   Merritt  v.  Village  of 

^"Douglas  v.   Mayor   &c.,    18   Cal.  Port  Chester,  71  N.  Y.  309;  Hewes  v. 

643.     That     a     railroad     extending  Reis,  40  Cal.  255;  McLauren  v.  City 

from    the   city   was   as   much   of   a  of  Grand  Forks,  6  Dak.  397;  s.  c.  43 

means    of    municipal    benefit    as    a  N.  W.  710;    White  v.  City  of  Sagi- 

street   in   the    city,    gas-   or    water-  naw,  67  Mich.  33;  s.  c.  34  N.  W.  255; 

works,   does  not  meet  the   require-  Hoyt  v.   City  of  East   Saginaw,   19 

ments  of  this   case.     It  was   not   a  Mich.  39;  Pound  v.  Supervisors  &c., 

work  which  the  charter  authorized.  43  Wis.  63. 


571  EXPRESS    CORPORATE    POWERS.  §    584 

done,  and  propert3^-owners  and  the  property  will  only  be  liable  for 
the  cost  of  snch  improvements  as  are  specifically  designated  in  the 
resolution  and  published  in  the  official  paper.^-^  But  owners  of  prop- 
erty abutting  upon  a  street  that  has  been  used  by  the  public  as  a  street 
for  a  number  of  years  can  not  defeat  the  city  in  enforcing  the  collec- 
tion of  street-assessments  for  the  cost  of  improving  such  street  on  the 
ground  that  the  title  to  such  street  or  some  part  of  it  is  not  in  the 
city.^-° 

§  584.  Gas  and  water  supply. — A  charter  of  an  electric-light  com- 
pany authorizing  it  to  "furnish  any  city  *  *  *  with  gas,  *  *  * 
etc.,"  and  the  charter  of  a  city  giving  it  power  to  control  and  its 
board  of  councilmen  power  "to  construct,  maintain  and  operate  gas- 
and  water-works,  and  to  pass  all  ordinances  necessary  to  regulate  the 
same,  "have  been  held  to  authorize  a  contract  between  the  two  as  to 
lighting  the  city  by  gas,  electricity,  or  any  other  mode.^^'^  Under  the 
power  to  make  all  needful  police  regulations  for  the  welfare,  con- 
venience and  safety  of  its  citizens,  the  power  to  light  the  streets  of  a 
city  may  be  lawfully  exercised  and  the  council  may  purchase  and 
operate  an  electric-light  plant  for  that  purpose. ^^®  Authority  in  a  city 
to  make  a  permanent  and  exclusive  contract  with  a  water  company 
to  build  water-works  and  supply  it  with  water  can  not  be  implied  from 
the  general  power  conferred  by  its  charter  to  contract  for  the  needs 
of  the  municipality.^""  The  city  of  New  Orleans  was  held  to  have 
the  power  to  contract  for  a  water  supply  under  the  provisions  of  its 
charter :  and  having  this  power  to  contract,  it  was  held  that  the  price, 

'^  Mason  v.  City  of  Sioux  Falls,  2  White's  Lessees,  6  Pet.  431;   Jarvis 

S.  D.  640;  s.  c.  51  N.  W.  770.  v.  Dean,  3  Bing.  447;  Case  v.  Favier, 

>='■•  Mason  v.  City  of  Sioux  Falls,  2  12  Minn.  89;    Hobbs  v.  Inhabitants 

S.  D.  640;  s.  c.  51  N.  W.  770,  laying  &c.,   19   Pick.    (Mass.)    405;    City  of 

down   this  rule   as   to   evidence   re-  Chicago  v.  Wright,  69  111.  318;  Ceme- 

quired  on  the  part  of  the  city: — "It  tery  Ass'h  v.  Meninger,  14  Kan.  312; 

is  sufficient  for  the  city  to  show  that  2    Dillon   Munic.    Corp.,    §    638    and 

the  street,  avenue  or  alley  sought  to  cases  cited;    2   Greenleaf  Evidence, 

be  improved  is  one  that  has,  for  a  §   662.     As  to  estoppel  of  owner  of 

considerable    length    of    time,    been  land,  see  Holmes  v.  Village  of  Hyde 

used  as  a  public  street  and  is  such  Park,  121  111.  128;  s.  c.  13  N.  E.  540; 

property  as  can  be  appropriated  by  Village  of  Hyde  Park  v.  Borden,  94 

the  city,  and  is,  in  the  language  of  111.  26. 

Chief  Justice  Shaw  in  Hobbs  v.  In-        ^"^  City    of    Newport    v.    Newport 

habitants  &c.,  19  Pick.    (Mass.)   405,  Light  Co.,  89  Ky.  454;  s.  c.  12  S.  W. 

a  street  de  facto."     See  also,  as  to  1040. 

uses  of  the  street  by  the  city,  and        "*  Mauldin  v.  City  Council  &c.,  33 

what  amounts  to  a  dedication.   El-  S.  C.  1;  s.  c.  11  S.  E.  434. 
liott    Roads    &    Streets     (2d    ed.),        ^-^ Greenville  Water  Works  Co.  v. 

§§    123,    162,    163;    President  &c.    v.  City  of  Greenville  (Miss.).  7  So.  409. 


§    584  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  572 

the  kind  of  water,  and  the  amount,  were  matters  of  legislative  dis- 
cretion vested  in  the  city  council;  and  that  when  the  city  confined 
itself  within  the  limits  of  its  power  to  contract,  this  legal  discretion 
exercised  by  the  city  council  would  not  l)e  inquired  into  by  the  courts 
in  the  absence  of  fraud  and  corrupt  and  extravagant  legishition.^^* 
Under  the  general  statutes  of  Kansas,  cities  of  the  second  class  have 
the  right  to  provide  for  supplying  themselves  and  their  inhabitants 
Avith  water  by  granting  the  privilege  of  furnishing  water  to  a  person, 
natural  or  artificial/ ^^  A  charter  which  enumerates  among  the 
powers  of  a  city  one  "to  provide  the  city  with  water  by  water-works" 
authorizes  the  corporation  to  furnish  the  inhabitants  of  the  city  with 
water.^'^-  Power  conferred  by  the  legislature  upon  a  common  council 
to  prescribe  regulations  for  the  laying  of  gas-pipes  through  the  streets 
can  not  be  delegated;  and  a  resolution  authorizing  all  companies  to 
lay  pipes  upon  such  conditions  as  may  be  prescribed  by  the  mayor, 
comptroller  and  commissioner  of  public  works  confers  no  authority 
on  the  latter  and  their  permits  are  void.^^^  Under  a  general  power 
to  contract  a  city  may  incur  indebtedness  for  the  construction  of 
water-works  and  issue  bonds  therefor. ^^*  And  it  has  even  been  held 
that  a  city  has  inherent  power  to  build  water-works. ^^^  A  charter 
which  authorizes  bonds  for  water  and  light  may  issue  bonds  for 
a  water  plant  alone."*'  The  question  of  necessity  for  water-works 
will  not  be  inquired  into  by  courts."^     The  legislature  may  regulate 

""Conery  v.   New   Orleans  Water  also,  as  to  liability  for  taxes,  Town 

Works  Co.,  41  La.  An.  910;    s.  c.  7  of  West  Hartford  v.  Board  &c.,  44 

So.  8.     See  also.  Mayor  &c.  v.  Cabot,  Conn.    361 ;     City    of    Rochester    v. 

28  Ga.  50;    Wells  v.   Mayor  &c.,   43  Town  of  Rush,  80  N.  Y.  302;  City  of 

Ga.  67;  Watson  v.  Turnbnll,  34  La.  Louisville  v.  Commonwealth,  1  Duv. 

An.  856;  Pickles  v.  Dry  Dock  Co.,  38  (Ky.)  295;  In  the  Matter  of  the  Ap- 

La.  An.  412.  peal  of  Des  Moines  Water  Company, 

"'Burlington  Water  Works  Co.  v.  48  Iowa  324. 

City  of  Burlington,  43  Kan.  725;   s.  '-'' Anderson      v.      Equitable      Gas 

c.   23  Pac.  1068.     See  also,  Wood  v.  Light  Co.,  12  Daly  (N.  Y.)  462.    See 

National  Water  Works  Co.,  33  Kan.  also,  Thompson  v.  Schermerhorn,  6 

590,  597;  s.  c.  7  Pac.  233.  N.  Y.  92;   Tappan  v.  Young,  9  Daly 

"=  Smith    v.    Nashville,    88    Tenn.  (N.  Y.)    357;    Birdsall  v.  Clark,  73 

464;   s.  c.  12  S.  W.  924.     The  court  N.  Y.  73;    Index,  tit.  Delegation  of 

said: — [In   exercising  its   authority  Powers. 

the   city  could   not  be   held   to  be]  "'  Heilbron  v.  Mayor  &c.,   96  Ga. 

"engaging  in  a  private  enterprise  or  312;  s.  c.  23  S.  E.  206. 

performing  a  municipal  function  for  "''  Gas  &c.  Co.  v.  Borough  of  Dow- 

a  private  end.     It  is  the  use  of  cor-  ringtown,  175  Pa.  St.  341;    s.  c.  34 

porate  property   for   corporate   pur-  Atl.  799. 

poses  in  the  sense  of  the  revenue  ""Janeway  v.  City  of  Duluth,  65 

law  of  1887,"  and,  therefore,  it  may  Minn.  292;  s.  c.  68  N.  W.  24. 

not  be  liable  for  a  privilege  tax.    See  "'  Janeway  v.  City  of  Duluth,  65 


573 


EXPRESS    CORPORATE    POWERS. 


585 


the  rates  at  which  water  shall  be  supplied  by  a  private  corporation.^^* 
Power  to  provide  for  lighting  streets  implies  power  to  maintain  an 
electric-lighting  system.^ ^^  The  power  given  to  a  municipality  to 
make  and  vend  gas  carries  with  it  the  right  to  fix  the  price.^*"  And 
so  where  the  grant  is  to  supply  the  city  with  water  it  includes  the 
power  to  fix  the  price.  Power  to  light  by  gas,  or  in  any  other  man- 
ner, is  authority  for  an  electric-light  plant,^*^  but  it  does  not  convey 
power  to  furnish  electric  lights  to  private  houses.^*^  A  city  has  no 
power  to  compel  an  assignee  to  furnish  gas  at  less  than  the  rate 
fixed  in  its  consent  to  the  assignment  of  the  franchise,  the  latter 
providing  that  the  assignee  shall  furnish  at  a  price  not  to  exceed  a 
specified  rate.^*^ 

§  585.  Natural-gas  companies. — "An  act  empowering  cities  and 
towns  within  the  state  *  *  *  to  regulate  the  supply,  consump- 
tion and  distribution  of  natural  gas  therein,  and  declaring  an  emer- 
gency," has  been  held  to  authorize,  not  merely  such  regulations  as 
conduce  to  safety,  but  to  confer  full  power  to  regulate  the  supply,  dis- 
tribution and  consumption  of  natural  gas,  including  the  power  to  fix 
reasonable  maximum   rates  that  may  be   charged  to   consumers.^'** 


Minn.  292;  s.  c.  68  N.  W.  24.  A 
house  of  correction  under  Detroit 
city  charter  not  entitled  to  supply 
of  water  fi'ee  of  expense:  City  of  De- 
troit v.  Board  &c.,  108  Mich.  494;  s. 
c.  66  N.  W.  377.  Power  of  commis- 
sioner of  public  works  to  cut  elec- 
tric wires  under  N.  Y.  laws  of  1884, 
ch.  534;  Laws  1885,  ch.  499;  Laws  of 
1887,  ch.  716, — see  Electric  Power 
Co.  V.  Mayor  &c.,  60  N.  Y.  S.  590;  s. 
c.  29  Misc.  (N.  Y.)  48. 

^■■*  City  of  Danville  v.  Danville 
Water  Co.,  180  111.  235;  s.  c.  54  N.  E. 
224. 

'^^  Christensen  v.  City  of  Fremont, 
45  Neb.  160;  s.  c.  63  N.  W.  364. 

""  State  v.  Laclede  Gas-Light  Co., 
102  Mo.  472,  485;  s.  c.  14  S.  W.  974; 
15  S.  W.  383. 

"^  Jacksonville  Elec.  Light  Co.  v. 
City  of  Jacksonville,  36  Pla.  229;  s. 
c.  18  So.  677. 

"2  Village  of  Ladd  v.  Jones,  61  111. 
App.  584. 

"^  In  re  Pi-yor,  55  Kan.  724 ;  s.  c. 
41  Pac.  958.     Under  Wash.  Act  1890 


the  city  can  not  regulate  the  price 
of  gas:  Tacoma  Gas  &c.  Co.  v.  City 
of  Tacoma,  14  Wash.  288;  s.  c.  44 
Pac.  655.  Municipalities  have  pow- 
er to  make  contracts  for  street 
lighting:  State  v.  Board  &c.,  57  N. 
J.  L.  588;  s.  c.  31  Atl.  454. 

"*City  of  Rushville  v.  Rushville 
Natural  Gas  Co.,  132  Ind.  575;  s.  c. 
28  N.  E.  853.  This  construction  was 
based  upon  the  title  and  the  inten- 
tion of  the  legislature.  The  court 
said: — "We  can  not  think  that  it 
was  the  purpose  of  the  legislature  to 
leave  municipal  corporations  abso- 
lutely without  power  of  control  or 
regulation  over  the  holders  of  such 
franchises  [using  the  streets  for  the 
supply  of  natural  gas],  except  as 
they  may  be  able  to  reach  and  con- 
trol them  in  the  exercise  of  their  im- 
plied police  powers.  To  give  to  the 
statute  such  construction  would  be 
to  say  that  after  such  franchises 
have  been  acquired,  no  matter  what 
conduct  their  holders  may  be  guilty 
of  tending  to  the  discomfort  or  in- 


§    586  PUBLIC    COKI'OU/TIONS.  574 

Where  an  owner  of  property  devotes  it  lo  a  use  in  which  the  public 
have  an  interest,  he  musi:  to  the  extent  of  the  interest  thus  acquired 
by  the  public  submit  to  the  control  of  such  property  by  the  public 
for  the  common  good."'^  The  supreme  court  of  Ohio,  applying  the 
doctrine  just  stated  on  the  subject  of  regulating  prices,  said:  "Be- 
cause prior  to  any  legislation  on  the  subject  it  [a  gaslight  com- 
pany] may  have  possessed  the  common-law  right  of  fixing  its  own 
prices,  it  does  not  place  it  beyond  the  reach  of  any  legislative  control 
on  the  subject  whenever  in  the  interest  of  the  public  good  it  becomes 
necessary  that  such  control  should  be  had."""  The  only  restriction 
upon  the  right  to  fix  maximum  prices  which  follows  the  right  to  con- 
trol, and  which  is  delegated  by  statute  to  the  municipality,  is  some 
provision  in  the  charter  or  grant  of  the  license  which  amounts  to  a 
contract."'^  Where  a  corporation  fails  to  have  a  stipulation  from 
the  municipality  reserving  to  itself  the  right  to  regulate  its  charges, 
or  otherwise  to  contract  for  a  restraint  pf  the  powers  of  the  city,  it  acts 
in  full  view  of  the  power  of  the  city  to  regulate  its  prices  by  fixing 
a  maximum  and  is  bound  by  an  ordinance  on  the  subject.^^^  A  provi- 
sion in  an  ordinance  that  natural-gas  companies  shall  supply  all 
individuals  along  their  lines  requiring  it,  on  payment  or  reasonable 
security,  is  valid,  and  within  the  power  of  a  city  to  impose  by  ordi- 
nance.^*^ 

§  586.  Establishment  of  electric  plant. — Under  a  general  authority 
to  establish  electric-light  plants  a  city  may  erect  an  electric  plant  for 
the  purpose  of  furnishing  light  to  its  inhabitants  in  their  stores  and 
houses  as  well  as  for  lighting  the  streets  and  public  places  of  the 
city.^^*^     In  upholding  a  similar  power  in  a  city  under  a  statute,^^**^ 

convenience  of  the  citizen,  and  no  Natural  Gas  Co.,  132  Ind.  575;  s.  c. 

matter  how  extortionate  they  may  28  N.  E.  853. 

be,  unless  their  acts  tend  to  endan-  ""  City   of  Rushville  v.   Rushville 

ger  the   safety,   or  otherwise   come  Natural  Gas  Co.,  132  Ind.  575;  s.  c. 

within  the  purview  of  the  inherent  28  N.  E.  853. 

police   powers  of  the  municipality,  ""  So   held   in   Thompson-Houston 

there  is  no  remedy,  as  the  legisla-  Electric  Co.  v.  City  of  Newton,  42 

ture  has  left  them  independent  of  Fed.  723.     The  court  said: — "It  has 

municipal  supervision."  been  the  uniform   rule  that  a  city 

"^  Munn  V.  Illinois,  94  U.  S.  113;  in  erecting  gas-works  or  water-works 

Hockett  V.  State,  105  Ind.  250;  s.  c.  is  not  limited  to  furnishing  gas  or 

5  N.  B.  178.  water  for  use  only  upon  the  streets 

"^Zanesville  v.  Gas  Light  Co.,  47  and  other  public  places  of  the  city, 

Ohio  St.  1 ;  s.  c.  23  N.  B.  55.  but  may  furnish  the  same  for  pri- 

"'Munn  V.  Illinois,  94  U.  S.  113;  '  vate  use;   and  the  statutes  of  Iowa 

Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Iowa,  94  U.  S.  now  place  electric-light  plants  in  the 

155;   Peik  v.  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.,  94  same  category." 

U.  S.  164.  '•■%  Elliott's  Supp.  Ind.  1889,  §  794 

"'"City   of  Rushville   v.   Rushville  et    seq.     (Burns    R.    S.    Ind.    1901, 


575 


EXPRESS    CORPORATE   POWERS. 


586 


the  supreme  court  of  Indiana  said:  "There  can  be  little  or  no  doubt 
that  the  power  to  light  the  streets  and  public  places  of  a  city  is  one  of 
its  implied  and  inherent  powers,  as  being  necessary  to  properly  protect 
the  lives  and  property  of  its  inhabitants,  and  as  a  check  on  immor- 
ality."^^^  Incidental  to  the  ordinary  powers  of  a  municipal  corpo- 
ration, and  necessary  to  a  proper  exercise  of  its  functions,  is  the  power 
of  enacting  sanitary  regulations  for  the  preservation  of  the  lives  and 
health  of  those  residing  within  its  corporate  limits.^^^  "It  follows 
[from  this  principle],"  continued  the  court  in  the  Indiana  case,  "that 
to  concede  to  municipal  corporations  the  possession  of  such  powers 
does  not  involve  any  extension,  either  by  intendment  or  implication, 
of  the  powers  expressly  conferred  by  statute;  but  that  by  the  act 
authorizing  the  organization  of  the  corporation,  the  legislature  ex- 
pressly delegates  to  the  municipality  the  power  to  take  such  steps  as 
are  necessary  to  preserve  the  health  and  safety  (and  we  will  add  the 
property)  of  its  inhabitants.     The  inference  of  the  delegation  of  such 


§§  4301-4305).  Section  4301  provides 
tliat  the  common  council  of  a  city 
shall  have  power  to  light  its  streets 
and  public  places  with  electric  light 
and  may  contract  with  individuals 
or  corporations  for  supplying  such 
light.  Section  4302  provides  for  the 
erection  in  the  streets  of  necessary 
poles  and  appliances  for  supplying 
electric  light  to  the  inhabitants  of 
the  city.  Section  4305  provides  for 
the  appropriation  of  lands  and  rights 
of  way  by  corporations  engaged  in 
lighting  the  city  or  the  public  and 
private  places  for  the  inhabitants 
with  electric  light.  Of  such  power 
the  court,  in  City  of  Crawfordsville 
V.  Braden,  130  Ind.  149;  s.  c.  28  N. 
E.  849,  said:  "The  so-called  inferred 
or  inherent  police  powers  of  such 
corporations  are  as  much  delegated 
power  as  are  those  conferred  in  ex- 
press terms,  the  inference  of  their 
delegation  growing  out  of  the  fact 
of  the  creation  of  the  corporation, 
and  the  additional  fact  that  the  cor- 
poration can  only  fully  accomplish 
the  objects  of  its  creation  by  exer- 
cising such  power.  Special  charters 
as  well  as  general  statutes  for  the 
incorporation    of    cities    and    towns 


usually  contain  a  specific  enumera- 
tion of  powers  granted  to  and  which 
may  be  exercised  by  such  corpora- 
tions. In  many  cases  the  powers 
thus  enumerated  are  such  as  would 
be  implied  by  the  mere  fact  of  the 
incorporation.  Where  powers  are 
thus  enumerated  in  a  statute  which 
would  belong  to  the  corporation 
without  specific  enumeration,  the 
specific  statute  is  to  be  regarded, 
not  as  the  source  of  the  power,  but 
as  merely  declaratory  of  a  pre-ex- 
isting power,  or  rather  of  a  power 
which  is  inherent  in  the  very  nature 
of  a  municipal  corporation,  and 
which  is  essential  to  enable  it  to  ac- 
complish the  end  for  which  it  was 
created.  And  the  enumeration  of 
powers,  including  a  portion  of  those 
usually  implied,  does  not  necessarily 
operate  as  a  limitation  of  corporate 
powers,  excluding  those  not  enumer- 
ated." See  also,  Clark  v.  City  of 
South  Bend,  85  Ind  276;  s.  c.  44  Am. 
R.  13;  First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Sarlls,  129 
Ind.  201;  s.  c.  28  N.  E.  434. 

"^  City  of  Crawfordsville  v.  Bra- 
den, 130  Ind.  149;  s.  c.  28  N.  E.  849. 

"=City  of  St.  Paul  v.  Laidler,  2 
Minn.  190. 


S    587  PUBLIC    CORPORATIOXS.  576 

o 

powers  follows  inevitably  and  irresistibly,  because  their  exericse  is 
necessary  to  the  accomplishment  of  the  objects  of  the  incorpora- 
tion/'i'3 

.^  587.  Public  property. — A  patent  was  issued  by  the  state  of  Illi- 
nois to  the  county  commissioners  conveying  all  the  lots  in  a  certain 
block  known  as  the  ''Public  Square"  at  Ottawa,  on  which  a  statute 
had  directed  the  public  buildings  should  be  erected,  "to  aid  in  the 
erection  of  public  buildings.''  It  was  held  that  the  county  commis- 
sioners, after  using  as  much  of  such  block  for  public  buildings  as 
they  deemed  necessary,  might  sell  and  convey  the  rest  of  it  for  the 
purpose  of  raising  money  to  pay  for  such  buildings.^ ^^  Under  an  act 
authorizing  a  county  to  issue  bonds  for  a  building  for  a  court-house. 
It  has  no  authority  to  issue  bonds  for  the  erection  of  a  jail  and  court- 
house combined  which  is  to  be  permanently  used  as  a  jail  and  is  to  be 
used  as  a  court-house  only  until  a  separate  court-house  should  be 
built.^^^  A  statute  authori2dng  the  supervisor  of  a  cotmty  to  cause 
the  commons  to  be  surveyed  and  platted,  and  to  lease  the  same  for 
ninety-nine  years,  was  held  to  apply  to  leases  in  possession  only,  and 
not  in  reversion  or  future ;  and  a  subsequent  act  giving  to  the  person 
entitled  to  any  portion  of  such  title  by  an  existing  lease  the  right  to 
acquire  the  fee  by  paying  a  certain  sum,  vested  in  the  lessee  a  property- 
right  which  could  not  be  disturbed  or  abridged  by  any  future  lease 
to  another.^^®  Under  authority  "to  prevent  and  extinguish  fires,"  a 
town  may  erect  a  fire-engine  house,  and,  under  its  general  authority 
to  provide  a  suitable  place  for  town  business,  may  provide  for  a  public 
hall  over  said  house.^'" 

"^  City  of   Crawfordsvllle  v.   Bra-  the  municipal  corporation  should  be 

den,  130  Ind.  149:  s.  c.  28  X.  E.  S49.  relieved   from   a  condition  to   erect 

This  court  referred  to  the  Iowa  stat-  structures    of    certain    kinds    upon 

ute  involved  in  Thompson-Houston  realty  conveyed  to  it.  and  thus  avoid 

Electric  Co.  v.  City  of  Newton,   42  a  restoration  of  the  property  to  the 

Fed.  723,  supra,  and  said: — "'It  will  grantor   on   the   ground   of   lack   of 

be  observed  that  this  [that]  statute  power  to  perform  the  condition.   See 

does  not  in  terms  confer  any  power  also,  as  to  the  power  to  erect  the 

not,  in  our  opinion,  as  above  stated,  hall.  State  v.  Haynes.  72  Mo.  377; 

included  among  the  implied  powers  Ketchum  v.  City  of  Buffalo,  14  N.  Y. 

of  municipal  corporations."  356:    Allen   v.    Inhabitants    &c.,    19 

^" Lyman  v.  Gedney,  114  111.  3SS;  Pick.   (Mass.)  4S5:  Hardy  v.  Inhab- 

s.  c.  29  N.  E.  2S2.  itants  &c.,  3  Met.  (Mass.)  163;  Rich- 

"' Nolan  Co.  v.  State,  S3  Tex.  1S2;  ardson    v.    Boston,     24    How.    188; 

s.  c.  17  S.  W.  823.  Board    &c.    v.    Woods.    77    Mo.    197. 

'^Rutz  V.  Kehn,  143  111.  558;  s.  v.  Where  by  charter  a  city  council  has 

29  N.  E.  553.  power  to  erect  necessary  buildings 

^'Clarke  v.  Inhabitants  &c..  81  Mo.  it  has  authority  to  erect  a  city  hall: 

503,   where   it   was   contended   that  Wright    v.     City    of    San    Antonio 


577  EXPKESS    CORPORATE   POWERS.  §    588 

§  588.  The  same  subject  continued. — The  code  of  Iowa  authorizes 
cities  and  towns  to  acquire  lands  for  various  municipal  purposes,  and 
provides  that  they  shall  have  power  "to  dispose  of  and  convey  such 
lands  if  deemed  unsuitable  for  the  purposes  for  which  they  were 
purchased;"  and  also  authorizes  the  purchase  by  a  city  of  lands  sold 
under  execution,  when  the  city  has  any  interest  in  the  proceeding,  and 
empowers  the  corporation  "to  dispose  of  the  property,"  or  of  any  real 
estate  or  any  interest  therein,  "in  such  manner  and  upon  such 
terms  as  the  city  council  shall  deem  just  and  proper."  The  provi- 
sions have  been  held  not  to  confer  upon  a  city  the  authority  to  donate 
land  and  buildings  to  the  county  in  which  they  are  situate  in  order 
to  induce  a  relocation  of  the  county  seat  in  such  city.  Such  authority 
could  only  exist  by  legislative  grant.^^^  So  a  statute  declaring  that 
when  a  piece  or  parcel  of  land  held  for  public  use  shall  not  be  needed 
for  public  use  the  land  may  be  sold  by  the  city,  has  been  construed 
to  refer  to  such  property  as  is  held  by  a  city  in  full  use  and  owner- 
ship, as  the  commons,  in  this  instance,  acquired  by  confirmation  under 
various  acts  of  congress,  and  not  to  apply  to  property  which  has 
been  dedicated  by  the  owner  to  the  public  use.^^^  A  deed  of  a  home- 
stead to  a  county  is  not  invalid  because  the  land  was  not  acquired  for 
any  public  purpose,  such  as  a  site  for  a  court-house,  jail,  etc.  This 
holding  was  in  Texas,  where  the  statutes^ ^°  recognize  the  rights  of 
counties  to  take  title  to  and  enjoy  real  estate  without  any  limitation 
as  to  the  purpose  for  which  it  shall  be  used.^®^  The  legislature  may 
regulate  the  use  of  any  property  dedicated  to  a  public  use  in  a  city, 
or  promote  its  improvement,  but  can  not  divert  or  subject  it  to  any 
use  clearly  inconsistent  with  the  contract  of  dedication.  The  property 
or  easement  which  a  city  has  in  its  streets  or  public  places  is  not  private 
property  in  the  sense  that  it  can  not  be  taken  for  a  public  use  except 
upon  just  compensation ;  but  it  is  public,  and  the  power  of  regulating 
the  use  thereof,  as  such,  resides  in  the  legislature.  The  power  is  not, 
however,  absolute,  but  is  limited  as  above  stated."^    The  authority  of 

(Tex.),  50  S.  W.  406.    Property  held  absolute:    Potter  v.  Collis,  46  N.  Y. 

by  a  municipality  for  the  purpose  S.   471;    s.  c.   19  App.   Div.    (N.  Y.) 

of   furnishing   its    inhabitants   with  392. 

water  is  not  held  as  a  private  corpo-  ^=^  Brockman   v.    City   of   Creston, 

ration  and  the  legislature  may  su-  79  Iowa  587;  s.  c.  44  N.  W.  822. 

pervise    the    management    at    will.  ''"  Cummings  v.  City  of  St.  Louis, 

Coyle  V.  Gray,  7  Houst.    (Del.)    44;  90  Mo.  259;  s.  c.  2  S.  W.  130. 

s.  c.  30  Atl.  728.    Except  for  constitu-  '<''>  Rev.  Stat.  Tex.,  arts.  680-682. 

tional    restrictions,    legislative    con-  ^"  Scalf  v.  Collins  Co.,  80  Tex.  514; 

trol  over  the  property  of  municipal  s.  c.  16  S.  W.  314. 

corporations  held  for  public  use  is  '^=  Portland  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  City  of 
1  Smith— 37 


§    589  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  578 

a  municipality  as  such  to  donate  the  right  of  way  for  a  railroad  com- 
pany other  than  through  its  streets,  and  appropriate  money  to  pay 
for  such  right  of  way,  does  not  exist  under  the  constitution  of 
Texas."3 

§  589.  Parks. — An  act  providing  that  cities  acting  under  special 
charters  may  provide  for  the  election  of  park  commissioners  who  shall 
have  exclusive  power  over  public  parks,  and  authorizing  the  councils  of 
such  cities  to  submit  to  a  vote  the  question  whether  there  shall  be  levied 
a  tax  for  the  purpose  of  purchasing  real  estate  for  parks  and  their 
improvement,  has  been  held  in  Iowa  not  to  divest  the  common  council 
of  the  cities  of  power  under  the  code,  when  such  commissioners  have 
not  been  elected,  to  "purchase  or  condemn  and  pay  for  out  of  the 
general  fund  lands  for  the  use  of  public  squares,  streets  and  parks,'' 
and  the  necessity  therefor  is  to  be  determined  solely  by  the  city.^®* 
A  Minnesota  statute  providing  for  a  system  of  public  parks  and  park- 
ways in  Minneapolis  was  construed  not  to  authorize  the  board  created 
by  it  to  vacate  or  close  or  exclude  any  class  of  vehicles  from  any  street 
except  such  as  might  run  through  any  tract  of  lands  taken  for  a 
park,  and  it  could  not  acquire  that  power  over  a  street  by  merely 
widening  it  by  acquiring  title  to  a  strip  on  each  side.^^^  But  authority 
*'to  make  rules  for  the  use  and  government"  of  a  park  will  sustain  a 
rule  forbidding  all  persons  "to  make  orations,  harangues  or  loud 
outcries"  therein. ^^®  Wliere  park  commissioners  have  power  to  con- 
trol and  lay  out  parks  it  must  be  done  in  the  manner  prescribed  by  the 
charter  and  they  have  no  power  to  close  a  street  by  resolution.^® ^  A 
lease  of  a  building  on  park  premises  is  not  illegal  where  the  lease  is 
subject  to  such  regulations  as  are  or  may  be  afterwards  prescribed.^*'^ 

Portland,   14  Or.  188;    s.  c.   12  Pac.  ^"^  Holtz  v.  Diehl,  56  N.  Y.  S.  841. 

265,  where  a  license  by  the  legisla-  ^'^  Gushee  v.  City  of  New  York,  58 

ture  to  a  railroad  company  to  use  a  N.  Y.  S.  967;  s.  c.  42  App.  Div.   (N. 

levee  or  public  landing  for  certain  Y.)  37.    Park  commissioners  of  Buf- 

property  was  sustained  as  being  in  falo  are  not  precluded   from  using 

aid  of  the  use  to  which  this  property  money  granted   for  repairs  for  the 

had  been  dedicated  by  the  grantor  construction  of   a   speedway  where 

to  the  city.  they   have    power   to    improve    and 

'"^ Const,   of  Texas,   1875,   art.    10,  make  repairs:    Holtz  v.  Diehl,  56  N. 

§  9,  and  art.  11,  §  3.    So  held  in  City  Y.  S.  841.     Under  laws  of  1893  and 

of  Cleburne  v.  Gulf  &c.  R.  Co.,  66  the   charter   of   Greater   New   York 

Tex.  457;  s.  c.  1  S.  W.  342.  the  department  of  public  parks  have 

"*  In  re  City  of  Cedar  Rapids,  85  no  right  to  prohibit  the  use  of  speed- 
Iowa  39;  s.  c.  51  N.  W.  1142.  ways  by  equestrians  nor  the  use  of 

^■"^  State  V.  Waddell,  49  Minn.  500;  driveways   by   carriages   in   the   ab- 

s.  c.  52  N.  W.  213.  sence    of    evidence    that    the    latter 

^''"'^  Commonwealth     v.     Abrahams,  would  injure  the  driveway  or  render 

156  Mass.  57;  s.  c.  30  N.  E.  79.  it  unfit  or  inconvenient  for  the  pur- 


579  EXPRESS    CORPORATE   POWERS.  §    590 

§  590.  Wharves. — A  municipal  corporation  may,  unless  restricted 
by  positive  law,  dedicate  property  irrevocably  to  public  uses.^^^  It 
may,  under  its  power  to  regulate  wharves,  authorize  the  erection  of  a 
public  grain-elevator  upon  a  wharf  so  dedicated  to  public  uses.^'^**  But 
it  can  not,  without  express  authority  from  the  legislature,  by  ordinance 
surrender  to  a  private  corporation  its  control  of  a  public  wharf  for  a 
fixed  term,  nor  the  right  to  regulate  prices  chargeable  for  such  use.^'^^' 
A  power  to  regulate  them  does  not  include  the  power  to  surrender  con- 
trol of  them.^'^^  Authority  conferred  by  charter  upon  a  city  "to  pur- 
chase and  hold  real,  personal  and  mixed  property,  and  to  dispose  of  the 
same  for  the  benefit  of  the  city,"  is  limited  to  the  purchase  of  such 
property  as  may  be  necessary  for  the  purposes  of  the  corporation,  such 
as  the  house  for  the  public  offices  and  furniture  to  fit  them  up.  It  doe's 
not  embrace  power  to  subscribe  for  railway-stocks  or  to  any  other  work 
of  internal  improvement.  To  do  this,  special  authority  from  the 
legislature  is  required.^'^^ 

§  591.  The  same  subject  continued. — A  municipal  corporation  hav- 
ing, by  its  charter,  an  exclusive  right  to  make  wharves  on  the  banks 
of  a  navigable  river  upon  which  it  is  situated,  collect  wharfage  and 
regulate  wharfage  rates,  can,  consistently  with  the  constitution  of  the 
United  States,  charge  and  collect  from  the  owner  of  enrolled  and 
licensed  steamboats,  which  move  and  land  at  a  wharf  constructed  by 
it,  wharfage  proportioned  to  their  tonnage. ^'^* 

pose  for  which  it  was  created:    Doll  ^^*  Packet  Company  v.  Keokuk,  95 

V.  Devery,  57  N.  Y.  S.  767.  U.  S.  80.     The  court  said:— "It  is  a 

^'^^  Illinois  &c.  Canal  Co.  v.  City  of  tax  or  duty  that  is  prohibited   [by 

St.  Louis,   2   Dill.  70;    Board  &c.  v.  the     constitution];     something     im- 

Risley,  40  Mo.  356;  Schools  v.  Risley,  posed  by  virtue  of  sovereignty,  not 

10  Wall.  91.  claimed   in  right  of  proprietorship. 

^'^  Illinois  &c.  Canal  Co.  v.  City  of  Wharfage  is  of  the  latter  character. 

St.  Loiiis^  2  Dill.  70.  Providing  a  wharf  to  which  vessels 

"*  Illinois  &c.  Canal  Co.  v.  City  of  may   make   fast,   or   at   which  they 

St.  Louis,  2  Dill.  70.  may  conveniently  load  or  unload,  is 

"'  Illinois  &c.  Canal  Co.  v.  City  of  rendering  them  a  service.    The  char- 

St.  Louis,  2  Dill.  70.    See  also,  Davis  acter    of    the    service    is    the    same 

V.  Mayor  &c.,  14  N.  Y.  506,  532;  Mil-  whether  the  wharf  is  built  and  of- 

hau  V.  Sharp,  27  N.  Y.  611;  Goszler  fered  for  use  by  a  state,  a  municipal 

V.     Corporation    of    Georgetown,     6  corporation  or  a  private  individual; 

Wheat.  593,  597,  where,  in  the  Ian-  and  when  compensation  is  demanded 

guage  of  Chief  Justice  Marshall,  it  for  the  use  of  the  wharf,  the  demand 

is  held  that  a  mvinicipal  "corpora-  is  an  assertion,  not  of  sovereignty, 

tion  can  not  abridge  its  own  legisla-  but   of   a   right   of   property."     Cf. 

five  power."  Cannon  v.  New  Orleans,  20  Wall.  577, 

"=■  City  of  Wheeling  v.  Mayor  &c.,  where  the  court  carefully  guarded 

1  Hughes  90.  the  right  to  exact  wharfage.     Any 


593 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS. 


580 


§  592.  Markets. — An  oi'dinancc  pi'oliibiting  the  keeping  of  a  pri- 
vate market  within  six  blocks  of  a  public  market  is  a  valid  exercise 
of  the  power  to  "regulate"  private  markets."^  The  authority  of  a 
city  to  provide  for  the  inspection  and  to  regulate  the  sale  of  meats  and 
other  things  does  not  give  power  to  tax  for  revenue  the  occupation  of 
selling  them,  but  justifies  such  fees  and  charges  as  will  cover  the 
expense  of  inspection  and  police  supervision.^'^''  And  under  such 
authority  a  city  may  prohibit  the  sale  of  such  articles  except  at  markets 
duly  established  under  its  power  to  establish  and  regulate  markets."^ 


law  or  ordinance  savoring  of  a  tax 
on  tonnage,  though  ostensibly  passed 
to  collect  wharfage,  has  been  held 
prohibited.  See  also.  Northwestern 
Packet  Co.  v.  St.  Paul,  3  Dill.  454 
(where  an  ordinance  imposing  a 
wharfage  tax  each  trip  upon  every 
boat  and  vessel  loading  or  anchor- 
ing, etc.,  was  held  in  conflict  with 
the  constitution  and  void.  Nelson, 
J.,  said: — "It  is  not  a  charge  for  the 
use  of  a  wharf,  but  for  the  privilege 
of  arriving  at  and  departing  from 
the  port");  Steamship  Co.  v.  Port 
Wardens,  6  Wall.  31  (where  the  stat- 
ute imposing  a  tax  upon  every  ship 
entering  the  port  was  held  to  be 
void,  as  "a  regulation  of  commerce 
and  a  duty  of  tonnage," — "a  sover- 
eign exaction,  not  a  charge  for  com- 
pensation"); Peete  v.  Morgan,  19 
Wall.  581  (holding  a  tax  of  the  same 
character  void);  Northwestern  &c. 
Packet  Co.  v.  City  of  Louisiana,  4 
Dill.  17,  n.;  Kennedy  v.  Corporation 
of  Washington,  3  Cr.  C.  C.  595 
(where  it  was  held  that  the  making 
of  rules  for  the  regulation  of  private 
wharves  was  discretionary,  and  that 
the  commissioners  could  not  be  com- 
pelled to  exercise  the  power). 

"=  Natal  V.  Louisiana,  139  U.  S. 
621;  s.  c.  11  S.  Ct.  636;  affirming  s. 
c.  42  La.  An.  612;  1  So.  923.  The 
court  said: — "By  the  law  of  Louisi- 
ana, as  in  states  where  the  common 
law  prevails,  the  regulation  and  con- 
trol of  markets  for  the  sale  of  pro- 


visions, including  the  places  and  the 
distances  from  each  other  at  which 
they  may  be  kept,  are  matters  of 
municipal  police,  and  may  be  in 
trusted  by  the  legislature  to  a  city 
council  to  be  exercised  as  in  its  dis- 
cretion the  public  health  and  con- 
venience may  require."  Morano  v. 
Mayor,  2  La.  217;  First  Municipality 
V.  Cutting,  4  La.  An.  335;  City  of  New 
Orleans  v.  Stafford,  27  La.  An.  417; 
Bush  V.  Seabury,  8  Johns.  (N.  Y.) 
419;  Village  of  Buffalo  v.  Webster, 
10  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  99;  Nightingale's 
Case,  11  Pick.  (Mass.)  168;  Com- 
monwealth V.  Rice,  9  Met.  (Mass.) 
253.  Where  a  city  has  power  to  es- 
tablish markets,  it  has  power  to  pro- 
hibit the  sale  at,  or  near,  such  mar- 
kets of  articles  for  sale  in  such 
markets:  City  of  New  Orleans  v. 
Kientz,  52  La.  An.  950;  s.  c.  27  So. 
344.  The  action  of  a  city  council 
in  establishing  a  market  is  not  sub- 
ject to  question  on  the  ground  of 
necessity:  Miller  v.  Webster  City, 
94  Iowa  162;  s.  c.  62  N.  W.  648. 
Power  granted  to  regulate  markets 
authorizes  the  prohibiting  under  a 
penalty  the  sale  of  fresh  meat  by 
retail  during  market  hours  at  other 
places  than  those  set  apart  for  such 
purpose:  Keck  v.  City  of  Cincinnati, 
6  Ohio  Dec.  97. 

^'''  City  of  Jacksonville  v.  Ledwith, 
26  Pla.  163;  s.  c.  7  So.  885. 

"^  City  of  Jacksonville  v.  Ledwith, 
26  Fla.  163;  s.  c.  7  So.  885. 


581  EXPRESS    CORPORATE    POWERS.  §    593 

§  593.  The  same  subject  continued. — A  municipal  corporation  has 
the  power  to  contract  with  an  individual,  to  authorize  him  to  build 
a  market-house,  rent  stalls  and  collect  dues  during  a  specified  period, 
with  the  consideration  that  the  land,  which  is  his  property,  and  the 
improvements  upon  it,  shall  be  conveyed  to  the  city,  and  that  the  same 
at  the  expiration  of  the  term,  shall  be  turned  over  absolutely  in  good 
order  to  the  corporation.^^^  An  act  which  gives  to  cities  power  "to 
provide  for  and  regulate  the  inspection  of  meats,  poultry,"  etc.,  and 
"to  do  all  acts  and  make  all  regulations  which  may  be  necessary  or 
expedient  for  the  promotion  of  health  or  the  suppression  of  disease," 
does  not  confer  power  to  establish  a  public  slaughter-house  for  the 
purpose  of  securing  proper  inspection  of  fresh  meats,^^"  although 
under  the  special  provisions  of  the  statute,  incorporated  towns  have 
power  to  prohibit  slaughter-houses  or  any  unwholesome  business  or 
establishment  within  the  incorporation,  and  the  common  council  by 
appropriate  ordinance  may  regulate  the  location  of  any  unwholesome 
business,  and  may  cleanse,  abate  or  remove  the  same.^®"  The  estab- 
lishment and  regulation  of  markets  is  the  exercise  of  the  police  .power 
of  a  city  for  the  preservation  of  the  health  of  its  citizens.^^^  But  the 
legislature  has  not  given  to  the  city  of  New  Orleans  power  to  establish 
a  market-bazaar  as  distinguishable  from  a  market.^*-  Under  a  char- 
ter which  confers  authority  upon  a  city  "to  regulate  the  erection,  use 
and  continuance  of  market-houses,"  the  city  has  power  to  pass  an 
ordinance  prohibiting  the  sale  of  fresh  meats  outside  the  market- 
house.^®^  The  exclusive  police  power  over  the  whole  subject  of 
slaughtering  animals  within  its  corporate  limits  is  delegated  by  the 
constitution  of  Louisiana^®*  to  the  city  of  New  Orleans,  subject  to 

™  State  V.  Natal,  41  La.  An.  887;  by  the  special  provisions  of  the  stat- 

s.  c.  6  So.  722  (the  court  based  this  ute  which  followed  it,  and  the  spe- 

decision  on  the  city's  charter  giving  cial  powers  conferred  alone  should 

it   all    the    power   necessary    for    a  be  exercised) ;  State  v.  Fergeson,  33 

proper  administration  of  a  munici-  N.  H.  424;  1  Dillon  Munic.  Corp.  (2d 

pal  government,  and  its  recognized  ed.),  §  250;   City  of  Cairo  v.  Bross, 

rights    of    establishing    public    mar-  101  111.  475. 

kets);   Moran  v.  Mayor,  2  La.  217;  ""Huesing  v.  City  of  Rock  Island, 

Cougot  V.  City  of  New  Orleans,  16  128  111.  465;  s.  c.  21  N.  E.  558. 

La.   An.   21;    Weymouth   v.   City  of  ^"^^  City  of  New  Orleans  v.  Morris, 

New  Orleans,  40  La.  An.  344;  s.  c.  4  3  Woods  103. 

So.  218.  ^*'-  City  of  New  Orleans  v.  Morris, 

""  Huesing  v.  City  of  Rock  Island,  3  Woods  103. 

128  111.  465;   s.  c.  21  N.  E.  558;   re-  '^'^  Ex   parte   Canto,    21   Tex.   App. 

versing  s.   c.   25   111.   App.   600    (the  61;  s.  c.  17  S.  W.  155. 

court  holding  that  the  general  pro-  '^^  Const.   La.,   art.   248,   relates  to 

vision  as  to  the  promotion  of  health  regulating  the  slaughter  of  live  ani- 

did  not  enlarge  the  power  conferred  mals. 


594 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS, 


582 


no  limitation  except  that  imposed  by  the  article  of  the  constitution 
itself.^«^ 

§  594.  Streets  generally. — Lands  used  as  a  private  cemetery  may 
be  seized  by  a  city  under  authority  to  enter  on  and  condemn  "any  and 
all  lands."^^*^  It  would  not  have  been  authorized  to  take  lands  pre- 
viously taken  and  devoted  to  a  public  purpose.^^^  The  cemetery 
land  was  devoted  to  a  private  and  not  a  public  use.^^*^  The  construc- 
tion of  a  sewer  in  a  public  street,  if  done  in  a  lawful  manner,  is 
authorized ;  sewerage  being  one  of  the  legitimate  uses  to  which  public 
streets  may  be  devoted. ^^^  The  word  "building,"  used  in  a  statute 
authorizing  cities  to  improve  streets  by  "macadamizing,  building," 
etc.,  includes  "paving,"  and  such  cities  are  not  thereby  restricted  to 
macadamizing  their  streets,  but  may  pave  them  with  asphalt.^^"  The 
provisions  of  a  city  charter  as  to  the  removal  of  obstructions  from  its 
streets  gave  comprehensive  powers  of  quasi-legislative  character  to 
the  common  council,  and  extended  to  the  cutting  down  and  removal 
of  shade  trees  which  had  been  growing  on  the  sidewalks. ^®^  A  city 
has  inherent  power  to  construct  or  reconstruct  sewers  of  all  kinds  and 
to  pay  therefor  out  of  the  general  revenue  of  the  city.^''^ 


^'^  Darcantel  v.  People's  Slaughter 
House  &c.  Co.,  44  La.  An.  632;  s.  c. 
11  So.  239. 

"^n  re  St.  John's  Cemetery,  133 
N.  Y.  329;  s.  c.  31  N.  E.  102;  affirm- 
ing s.  c.  16  N.  Y.  S.  894. 

^"In  re  New  York  &c.  R.  Co.,  99 
N.  Y.  12;  s.  c.  1  N.  E.  27;  Suburban 
&c.  Transit  Co.  v.  Mayor,  128  N.  Y. 
510;  s.  c.  28  N.  E.  525. 

^^*  In  re  Deansville  Cemetery  Ass'n, 
66  N.  Y.  569. 

i^^Elster  V.  Springfield,  49  Ohio  St. 
82;  s.  c.  30  N.  E.  274. 

"» Morse  v.  City  of  West  Port,  110 
Mo.  502;  s.  c.  19  S.  W.  831. 

"1  Chase  v.  City  of  Oshkosh,  81 
Wis.  313;  s.  c.  51  N.  V/.  560.  The 
court  said: — "A  permanent  obstruc- 
tion, such  as  trees  standing  within 
a  sidewalk  or  traveled  street,  or 
stone  columns  which  may  interfere 
with  public  travel,  constitutes  per  se 
a  public  nuisance,  and  may  be  sum- 
marily removed  by  direction  of  the 
common  council."    See  also.  State  v. 


Leaver,  62  Wis.  387,  392;  s.  c.  22  N. 
W.  576. 

^^-  Commonwealth  v.  George,  148 
Pa.  St.  463;  s.  c.  24  Atl.  59.  This 
act  was  not  repealed  by  act  of  May 
16,  1891  (P.  L.  Pa.  1891,  p.  75),  as 
there  is  nothing  inconsistent  with 
the  former  act  in  its  provisions.  In 
In  re  Private  Road  in  Borough  of 
Huntingdon,  Appeal  of  Huntingdon 
&c.  R.  Co.,  149  Pa.  St.  133;  s.  c.  24 
Atl.  189,  it  was  held  that  the  act  of 
April  3,  1851  (Brightly  Purd.  Dig. 
Pa.  202  et  seq. ),  giving  boroughs 
power  "to  survey,  lay  out,  enact  and 
ordain  such  roads,  streets,  lanes, 
alleys,  etc.,"  "as  they  may  deem  nec- 
essary," and  all  "needful  jurisdic- 
tion over  the  same,"  has  been  held 
not  to  repeal,  as  to  boroughs,  the  act 
of  June,  1836  (Brightly  Purd.  Dig. 
Pa.  1499),  which  authorizes  courts 
of  quarter  sessions  to  lay  out,  upon 
the  petition  of  one  or  more  persons, 
"a  road  from  their  respective  dwell- 
ings or  plantations  to  a  highway  or 


583    •  EXPRESS    CORPORATE    POWERS.  §    595 

§  595.  Construction  of  statutory  provisions. — A  recent  Pennsylva- 
nia statute  relative  to  laying  out  and  opening  streets^ ''^  has  been  con- 
strued to  be  an  affirmative  act,  conferring  additional  and  cumulative 
powers  on  municipalities  of  all  grades,  but  repealing  no  prior  .statute 
expressly,  nor  any  portion  thereof  by  implication,  "unless  the  system 
provided  by  it  is  so  inconsistent  with  that  previously  existing  as  to 
make  it  impracticable  for  them  to  stand  together."^^*  In  the  case 
cited  it  was  held  that  the  power  exercised  in  passing  the  ordinance 
under  the  former  statute  remained,  but  the  proceedings  to  carry  out 
the  improvement  might  be  under  the  later  statute, ^^^  Where  a  city 
charter  requires  the  board  of  public  works  to  prepare  a  general  plan 
of  laying  out  into  streets  and  alleys  all  of  the  city  not  already  laid 
out,  a  provision  that  "no  private  plan  shall  be  allowed  *  *  *  which 
does  not  conform  thereto,  and  no  plat  shall  hereafter  be  recorded,  or 
be  of  any  validity,  unless  before  such  record  the  approval  of  such 
board  shall  be  duly  indorsed  thereon,"  does  not  empower  the  board 
to  refuse  to  approve  a  plat  without  a  dedication  by  the  owner  of  the 
land  platted  of  a  portion  of  his  land  for  the  extension  of  certain 
streets.  ^'^'^  And  where  the  plat  does  not  interfere  with  the  general 
plan  established  for  streets,  a  writ  of  mandamus  will  be  granted  on 
petition   of   such  owner,   compelling  the  board   to   indorse  its   ap^ 

place  of  necessary  public  resort,  or  wishes  of  the  multitude  of  munici- 

to  any  private  way  leading  to  a  high-  pal   organizations   in   the  state.    In 

way."  the   effort   some   well-intended   acts 

^"^  May  16,  1891,  P.  L.  Pa.  75,  in  re-  had  come  to  naught,  and  others  had 

lation  to   laying  out,   opening,   etc.,  been  shorn  of  sections  that  left  in- 

of  streets,  etc.,  in  the  several  munic-  convenient  gaps  here  and  there  in 

ipalities  of  the  commonwealth.  the   whole   system.      It   was   to   fill 

^"^  Borough   of   Hanover's   Appeal,  these    gaps,    to    support    the    casus 

150   Pa.   St.   202;    s.   c.   24   Atl.   669,  omissi,    and    to   supplement   powers 

holding  the  act  of  April  3,  1851  (P.  doubtful   or  defective,  that  the  act 

L.   320),   which   authorizes  borough  of  1891  was  passed.     It  took  away 

councils  of  their  own  motion  to  pass  no  power  in   any  municipality  that 

ordinances  for  widening  streets,  to  existed   before   nor   interfered   with 

be   unrepealed;    following   Hand   v.  any    mode    of    its    exercise,    except 

Fellows,  148  Pa.  St.  456;  s.  c.  23  Atl.  where  there  is  an  irreconcilable  re- 

1126;   McCall  v.  Coates,  148  Pa.  St.  pugnancy." 

462;    s.  c.  23  Atl.  1127.     The  court  "^Borough    of   Hanover's   Appeal, 

said:  —"In    the    task    of    steering  150  Pa.  St.  202;  s.  c.  24  Atl.  669. 

through    constitutional    restrictions,  ^°°  Van  Husan  v.  Heames,  91  Mich, 

well  meant,  but  destructive  of  nee-  519;   s.  c.  52  N.  W.  18.     The  court 

essary     governmental    powers,    the  said: — "The  power  conferred  goes  no 

legislature  had  found  it  difficult  to  further  than  to  prevent  landowners 

construct  statutes  conferring  powers  from  laying  out  streets  contrary  to 

and  modes  of  procedure  suitable  to  the  general  plan." 
all  the  diverse  needs,  situations  and 


§    596  PUBLIC   CORPOEATIONS.  •    584 

proval.^^^  An  act  providing  for  the  consent  of  the  municipal  au- 
thorities as  a  condition  precedent  to  the  incorporation  of  a  company 
to  supply  the  city  with  water  was  construed  to  require  a  consent 
to  the  formation  of  a  company  by  the  very  persons  and  in  the  manner 
proposed.  The  consent  could  be  given  by  ordinance  and  might  be 
wholly  refused,  but  would  be  defective  if  given  in  general  terms/®* 
and  permission  might  be  granted  to  more  than  one  company. ^'^^ 

§  596.  Protection  of  streets. — The  council  of  the  city  of  Kingston 
had  the  authority,  under  the  provisions  of  its  charter  giving  the 
council  powers  of  commissioners  of  highways,  "to  lay  out,  make  and 
open  streets  *  *  *  and  cause  the  same  to  be  repaired;  *  *  * 
to  cause  any  street  *  *  *  to  be  graded,  paved  or  repaired;"  to 
prescribe  "of  what  materials"  the  same  shall  consist,  and  its  power  to 
pass  ordinances  for  the  purpose  of  executing  the  foregoing  and  other 
powers  conferred  upon  it,  authorized  an  ordinance  prohibiting  any 
person  from  drawing  a  load  weighing  from  two  and  one-half  to  five 
tons  over  any  paved  street  of  a  city.^°^  Under  a  power  to  make 
ordinances  to  prevent  encroachments  on  and  obstructions  to  the  city 
streets  and  to  regulate  the  use  of  streets  and  sidewalks  for  signs, 
awnings  and  other  purposes,  the  council  may  by  ordinance  authorize 
the  erection  and  maintenance  of  awnings  over  the  sidewalks.^"^  An 
ordinance  which  purports  to  grant  permission  to  erect  poles  and  stretch 
wires  in  a  public  street  as  a  part  of  a  system  of  electrical  railroading 
is  illegal. ^°^  The  laying  out  of  drives,  etc.,  along  any  beach  within 
a  city's  limits,  which  is  flowed  by  ocean  tides,  whether  a  beach  of 
the  ocean  proper  or  of  an  outlet,  is  authorized  by  a  statute  jDro- 
viding  that  cities  located  on  "or"  near  the  ocean,  and  embracing  within 
their  limits  any  "beach"  or  ocean  front,  to  lay  out  streets,  drives  or 
walks  "along  the  beach  or  ocean  front."^°^    A  common  council  has  no 

"'Van  Husan  v.  Heames,  91  Mich.  ="1  Hoey  v.  Gilroy,  129  N.  Y.  132; 

519;  s.  c.  52  N.  W.  18.  s.  c.  29  N.  E.  85,  reversing  s.  c.  14 

^"^  State  V.  City  of  Plainfleld,  54  N.  N.  Y.  Supp.  159.    It  is  not  authorized 

J.  L.  526;  s.  c.  24  Atl.  493.  by  Supp.  Rev.  N.  J.  369.  §  30,  which 

'°^  State  V.  Consumers'  Water  Co.,  empowers  street-railways,  with  the 

51  N.  J.  L.  420;  s.  c.  17  Atl.  824.   See  consent  of  municipal  authorities,  to 

also,  Proprietors  &c.  v.   Proprietors  use  electric  or  chemical  motors  or 

&c.,  11  Pet.  420;  Mohawk  Bridge  Co.  grip  cables  as  the  propelling  power 

v.  Utica  &c.  Bridge  Co.,  6  Paige  (N.  of  its  cars  instead  of  horses. 

Y.)  554;  Proprietors  &c.  v.  Hoboken  -"-State  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  54  N. 

Land   &c.   Co.,   2   Beas.    (N.   J.)    81;  J.  L.  92;   s.  c.  23  Atl.  281;   State  v. 

Delaware  &c.  Canal  Co.  v.  Camden  Mayor  &c.,  54  N.  J.  L.  102;  s.  c.  23 

&c.  R.  Co.,  1  C.  E.  Green  (N.  J.)  321.  Atl.  284. 

^""People   v.   Wilson,   16   N.   Y.    S.  ="' State  v.  Wright,  54  N.  J.  L.  130; 

583;  s.  c.  41  N.  Y.  St.  765.  s.  c.  23  Atl.  116. 


585  EXPRESS    CORPORATE    POWERS.  §    597 

power  or  authority  to  authorize  the  permanent  possession  of  a  public 
highway,  street  or  alley  for  private  purposes.^''*  The  court  said: 
"The  erection  of  a  structure  of  the  character  and  permanency  de- 
scribed in  the  complaint,  for  purely  private  purposes,  upon  or  across 
the  public  streets,  alleys,  highways  or  wharves  of  a  city,  is  unlawful, 
and  such  as  the  common  council  can  not  authorize  and  should  not  tol- 
erate. Where  a  street  or  other  public  way  is  used  for  public  purposes, 
such  as  for  street-railways  or  other  improved  methods  of  travel,  the 
common  councils  have  authority  to  permit  permanent  structures  to  be 
placed  on  the  streets,  but  they  have  no  such  power  when  the  purpose 
is  strictly  private  and  the  public  in  no  manner  served."-"^ 

§  597.  Obstructions  in  streets. — A  city  has  no  power  in  the  ab- 
sence of  legislation  by  contract  or  ordinance  to  confer  the  right  to 
obstruct  its  streets,  or  to  grant  franchises  or  privileges  in  the  same 
which  will  tend  to  impair  the  public  uses  in  the  same.^"*'  Where  the 
city  is  charged  with  the  duty  of  removing  all  nuisances  from  the 
streets  it  may  file  a  bill  to  remove  obstructions  down  to  a  wharf-line, 
although  the  legislature  may  have  placed  the  wharves  in  the  hands 
of  a  trustee  for  the  benefit  of  certain  bondholders. ^°^  In  the  absence 
of  statutory  power  a  city  has  no  power  to  license  the  erection  and 
maintenance  of  stock-weighing  scales,  in  a  public  street,  for  the 
personal  profits  of  the  licensee.^"^  A  city  has  power  to  summarily 
abate  obstructions  in  its  streets  which  are  dangerous  to  the  public 
without  an  ordinance.*""  Where  a  state  has  power  to  attach  condi- 
tions to  a  charter  beneficial  to  the  public,  the  city  may  do  so  as  part 
of  its  delegated  authority  in  granting  a  permit  for  the  use  of  its 
streets  by  a  corporation. -^° 

§  598.  Use  of  streets  by  street-railways. — Where  by  its  charter  a 
street-railway  company  has  power  to  construct  its  road  in  the  streets 

-« Adams   v.   Ohio   Palls   Car   Co.,  Louisville  &c.   R.   Co.,   84   Ala.   115, 

131  Ind.  375;   s.  c.  31  N.  E.  57.     Cf.  121;  s.  c.  4  So.  106;  Costello  v.  State, 

State  v.  Berdetta,  73  Ind.  185;  Sims  108   Ala.    45,   49;    s.    c.    18    So.    820; 

V.   City  of  Frankfort,   79   Ind.   446;  Grand  Lodge  v.  Waddill,  36  Ala.  313, 

Elliott   Roads    &    Streets    (2d    ed.),  318;    Pennsylvania  R.   Co.  v.   Canal 

§  653;  Pettis  v.  Johnson,  56  Ind.  139.  Com'rs,  21  Pa.  St.  9;   Richmond  &c. 

="'  Adams   v.   Ohio   Falls   Car   Co.,  R.  Co.  v.  Louisa  R.  Co.,  13  How.  81. 

131  Ind.  375;  s.  c.  31  N.  E.  57.     For  -°^  City  of  Mobile  v.  Louisville  &c. 

illustration  of  this  distinction,   see  R.  Co.,  124  Ala.  132;  s.  c.  26  So.  902. 

Mikesell  v.  Durkee,  34  Kan.  509;  s.  =<**  State  v.  Stroud  (Tenn.  Ch.),  52 

c.  9  Pac.  278.  S.  W.  697. 

^'^  City  of  Mobile  v.  Louisville  &c.  -"^  Bitzer  v.  Leverton,  9  Kan.  App. 

R.  Co.,  124  Ala.  132;  s.  c.  26  So.  902.  76;  s.  c.  57  Pac.  1045. 

Cf.  Birmingham  &c.  R.  Co.'s  Cases,  -"  People  v.  Suburban  R.  Co.,  178 

79  Ala.  465,  472;    Port  of  Mobile  v.  111.  594;  s.  c.  53  N.  E.  349. 


§    599  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  586 

of  a  city,  consent  may  be  given  by  the  city  authorities  to  the  use  of 
its  streets  without  express  authority  in  the  charter.^"  Where  a 
city  pursuant  to  a  statute  on  petition  of  the  property-owners  grants 
permission  to  a  railroad  company  to  lay  its  tracks  it  has  no  power  to 
extend  the  privilege  beyond  the  time  fixed  in  the  petition. ^^- 

§  599.    Telegraph-   and   telephone-poles   in   streets — Removal. — A 

statute  providing  that  no  poles  shall  be  erected  in  the  streets  without 
the  consent  of  the  landowners,  does  not  apply  to  the  public  lighting 
of  the  streets  by  a  city  or  town.-^'^  Where  a  city  is  vested  with  power  of 
supervision  and  control  of  its  streets,  all  grants  and  privileges  granted 
by  it  are  subject  to  its  right  to  enact  such  legislation  from  time  to 
time  as  the  public  may  require,  and  so  when  a  telephone  company  has 
been  granted  the  right  to  use  a  street  in  the  maintenance  of  its  line, 
and  subsequently  such  use  becomes  dangerous  and  inconvenient  to  the 
jjublic,  the  city  may  require  the  removal  of  the  line  to  another  street 
which  is  a  reasonable  substitute."^*  Under  the  Kentucky  constitution, 
§  163,  telephone-wires  are  not  permitted  to  be  erected  in  the  streets 
without  a  city's  consent,  and  if  erected  after  the  adoption  of  the  con- 
stitution without  such  consent  the  city  may  compel  the  removal. ^^^ 

§  600.  Vacation  of  streets. — Where  a  city  by  its  charter  has  power 
to  vacate  its  streets  it  may  vacate  a  portion  of  a  street  where  it  has 
title  and  convey  the  same  to  abutting  owners  for  .the  purpose  of 
having  a  factory  erected  thereon  by  a  private  corporation.-^^  If  a 
city  has  made  an  ineffectual  attempt  to  vacate  a  street  it  is  not 
estopped  from  claiming  that  the  street  is  a  public  highway.-^^ 

"^Almand    v.    Atlanta   &c.    St.    R.  St.   R.   Co.   v.   City  of  Covington,   9 

Co.,  108  Ga.  417;  s.  c.  34  S.  E.  6.    Cf.  Bush  (Ky.)  127. 

City  Council  &c.  v.   Port  Royal  &c.  ''"City  of  Chester  v.  Wabash  &c. 

R.  Co.,  74  Ga.  658;  Kavanagh  v.  Mo-  R.  Co.,  182  111.  382;  s.  c.  55  N.  B.  524. 

bile  &c.  R.  Co.,  78  Ga.  271;  s.  c.  2  S.  ='=  Meyers  v.  Hudson  Co.  Elec.  Co., 

E.  636;    Augusta  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  City  63  N.  J.  L.  573;  s.  c.  44  Atl.  713. 

Council  &c.,  100  Ga.  701;  s.  c.  28  S.  ^^  Michigan    Tel.    Co.    v.    City    of 

E.  126;   Daly  v.  Georgia  &c.  R.  Co.,  Charlotte,  93  Fed.  11. 

80  Ga.  793;  s.  c.  7  S.  E.  146;   Davis  =">  East  Tenn.   Tel.   Co.  v.  City  of 

v.  East  Tennessee  &c.  R.  Co.,  87  Ga.  Russellville,  21  Ky.  L.  305;   s.  c.  51 

605;  s.  c.  13  S.  E.  567;  Beekman  v.  S.  W.  308. 

Third  Ave.   R.   Co.,   153   N.  Y.   144;  =''' Knapp,  Stout  &  Co.  v.  St.  Louis, 

s.  c.  47  N.  E.  277;  Milhau  v.  Sharp,  153  Mo.  560;  s.  c.  55  S.  W.  104.     Cf. 

17  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  435;  Attorney-Gen-  Clough  v.  Holden,  115  Mo.  336;  s.  c. 

eral  v.  Lombard  &c.  R.  Co.,  10  Phila.  21  S.  W.  1071;    Hoester  v.  Sammel- 

(Pa.)  352;  Eichels  v.  Evansville  St.  raann,  101   Mo.  619;    s.  c.  14   S.  W. 

R.  Co.,  78  Ind.  261;  s.  c.  41  Am.  R.  728;  Nichols  v.  Stevens,  123  Mo.  96, 

561;    City  of  Boston  v.  Richardson,  117;  s.  c.  25  S.  W.  578;  27  S.  W.  613. 

13    Allen     (Mass.)     146;     Davis    v.  ="City  of  Ashland  v.  Chicago  &c. 

Mayor  &c.,  14  N.  Y.  506;  Covington  R.  Co.,  105  Wis.  398;   s.  c.  80  N.  W. 


587  EXPRESS    COErORATE    POWERS.  §    601 

§  601.  Grading  of  streets. — An  act  authorizing  a  city  council  to 
fix  the  district  benefited  by  a  local  improvement  and  to  apportion  and 
assess  the  benefits  is  not  open  to  the  objection  that  it  confers  an  arbi- 
trary power  on  the  council.^ ^^  This  form  of  taxation  has  been  re- 
peatedly held  valid  and  the  discretionary  power  is  properly  lodged  in 
the  council.-^**  Where  in  the  exercise  of  its  power  a  city  has  changed 
the  grade  in  a  street  to  the  damage  of  the  property  upon  which  it 
abuts,  on  a  trial  of  an  appeal  by  the  owner  from  the  assessment  of 
damages  the  city  should  not  be  allowed  ,to  plead  irregularities  in  its 
proceedings  to  defeat  the  owner's  claim  for  fair  damages. ^^"  A  city 
council  having  general  authority  to  establish  the  grades  of  streets 
may,  under  peculiar  circumstances,  fix  the  grade  for  one  side  of  a 
street  on  a  materially  different  level  or  plane  from  that  of  the  other 
side;  and  if  this  renders  it  incidentally  necessary  to  construct  a  re- 
taining-wall  along  the  center  of  the  street,  to  support  the  earth  on  the 
higher  grade,  that  may  be  done.  Such  an  exercise  of  public  rights  is 
not  an  infringement  of  the  rights  of  an  adjacent  proprietor  whose 
property  may  be  injured  thereby.^^^  A  right  to  lay  pipes  in  the  streets 
of  a  city  is  subordinate  to  the  power  of  the  city  to  establish  grades  and 
grade  the  streets. ^-^  A  statute  conferring  upon  cities  the  power  to 
change  grades  of  streets,  whereby  railroads  entering  said  cities  may 
relocate,  change  or  elevate  their  railroads,  has  been  held  not  to 
be  limited  to  railroads  in  existence  at  the  time  of  the  passage  of  the 
act.^^^  But  under  that  act  a  change  of  grade  must  be  confined  to  such 
limits  as  are  necessary  for  the  accomplishment  of  its  purpose.--* 
Where  the  power  to  grade  a  street  is  in  the  city  council  a  court  of 
equity  has  no  power  to  fix  the  grade.^-^ 

1101.    Cf.  Trester  v.  City  of  Sheboy-  Minn.  331,  334;  Henderson  v.  City  of 

gan,  87  Wis.  496;  s.  c.  58  N.  W.  747;  Minneapolis,  32  Minn.  319;   s.  c.  20 

James  v.  City  of  Darlington,  71  Wis.  N.  W.  322. 

173;  s.  c.  36  N.  W.  834.  ---Stillwater  Water  Co.  v.  City  of 

^i^Beecher  v.   City  of  Detroit,  92  Stillwater,  50  Minn.  498;  s.  c.  52  N. 

Mich.  268;  s.  c.  52  N.  W.  731.  W.  893. 

^i^Beecher  v.   City  of  Detroit,  92  -^  State  v.  Mayor  &c.,  54  N.  J.  L. 

Mich.  268;   s.  c.  52  N.  W.  731.     See  293;  s.  c.  23  Atl.  648. 

also.  City  of  Detroit  v.  Daly,  68  Mich.  ^-*  State  v.  Mayor  &c.,  54  N.  J.  L. 

503,  509;  s.  c.  37  N.  W.  11.  293;   s.  c.  23  Atl.  648. 

--"  Second  Cong.  Church  Soc.  &c.  v.  -^  Town  of  Harrisonburg  v.  Roller, 

City  of  Omaha,  35  Neb.  103;  s.  c.  52  97  Va.  582;  s.  c.  34  S.  E.  523;  Gosz- 

N.  W.  829.  ler  v.  Corporation  of  Georgetown,  6 

^^^Yanish  v.   City  of  St.  Paul,  50  Wheat.  593;  Roanoke  Gas  Co.  v.  City 

Minn.  518;   s.  c.  52  N.  W.  925.     See  of  Roanoke,  88  Va.  810;  s.  c.  14  S.  B. 

also,  O'Brien  v.  City  of  St.  Paul,  25  665. 


§    603  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  588 

§  602.  Allowing  the  use  of  streets  by  railroads. — A  city  council 
has  no  power  to  condemn  hind  for  a  street  for  the  express  purpose  of 
giving  a  railroad  company  the  use  of  a  street  in  such  manner  as  to 
exclude  all  other  travel  therefrom.^-"  The  power  conferred  on  the 
common  council  by  the  charter  of  Buffalo--^  "to  permit  the  track  of 
a  railroad  to  be  laid  in,  along  or  across  any  street  or  public  ground" 
is  subject  to  the  qualification  that  no  property-rights  of  abutting 
owners  are  thereby  invaded,  even  in  cases  where  the  city  has  acquired 
the  fee  of  the  street  in  which  it  authorizes  such  track  to  be  laid.^^^ 
The  laws  of  Kentucky  allow  municipal  corporations  to  grant  rights 
of  way  over  the  public  streets  and  alleys  only  on  condition  that  the  use 
of  the  easement  shall  not  obstruct  or  "unreasonably"  impede  the  pas- 
sage of  persons  or  vehicles.  It  has  been  held  that  the  fact  that  while 
cars  are  passing  along  a  railroad  laid  in  a  public  alley,  four  hundred 
feet  long  and  sixteen  feet  wide,  the  passage  of  vehicles  drawn  by 
horses  is  totally  prevented,  though  for  only  a  few  minutes  at  a  time, 
renders  the  use  of  the  alley  by  the  railroad  company  an  "unreason- 
able" obstruction.--" 

§  603.  The  same  subject  continued. — A  statute^^"  authorizing  the 
common  council  to  discontinue  and  close  a  portion  of  Liberty  street 
in  the  city  of  Schenectady  for  the  purposes  of  a  railroad-depot  "to 
the  passage  of  vehicles,  horses  and  cattle"  has  been  held  sufficient 
authority  for  an  ordinance  of  the  council  authorizing  the  railroad 
company  to  construct  and  maintain  an  iron  foot-bridge  for  pedestrians 
over  the  railroad-track  on  the  discontinued  portion  of  the  street  and 
to  close  the  surface  of  the  street  to  pedestrians  by  the  erection  of  a 
fence.^^^  An  order  of  the  board  of  public  works  requiring  a  railroad 
company  which,  under  legislative  permission,  laid  its  tracks  in  a  city 
and  continuously  used  them  for  eighteen  years,  to  remove  its  tracks 
on  twenty-five  days'  notice,  has  been  held  beyond  its  authority,  though 
a  statute,  passed  after  the  construction  of  the  tracks,  empowered  the 

-2"  Ligare  v.  City  of  Chicago,   139  *"'  Reining  v.  New  Yorlv  &c.  R.  Co., 

111.  46;  s.  c.  28  N.  E.  934.     See  also,  128  N.  Y.  157;  s.  c.  28  N.  E.  640;  af- 

Moses  V.  Pittsburg  &c.  R.  Co.,  21  111.  firming  s.  c.  13  N.  Y.  S.  238. 

515;  Stack  v.  City  of  East  St.  Louis,  '     ""Commonwealth  v.  City  of  Frank- 

85  111.  377;  Canal  Co.  v.  Garrity,  115  fort,  92  Ky.  149;   s.  c.  17  S.  W.  287, 

111.  155;    s.  c.  3  N.  E.  448;    City  of  holding  that  the  city  had  no  author- 

Olney  v.   Wharf,   115   111.   523;    s.  c.  ity  to  grant  the  right  to  a  railroad 

5  N.  E.  366;  Dubach  v.  Railroad  Co.,  company  to  use  such  an  alley  for  a 

89  Mo.  483;  s.  c.  1  S.  W.  86;  Railway  branch  railroad. 

Co.    V.    City    of    Louisville,    8    Bush  =""  Laws  of  New  York,  1884,  ch.  187. 

(Ky.)  415.  -^^  Weinckie   v.    New   York   &c.   R. 

^"  Laws  N.  Y.  1870,  ch.  519,  tit.  3,  Co.,  15  N.  Y.  S.  689;  s.  c.  39  N.  Y.  St. 

§  19.  584. 


589  EXPRESS    CORPORATE    POWERS,  §    604 

city  council  to  "direct  and  control  railroad-tracks"  within  the  city.^^^ 
It  is  competent  for  the  legislature  to  give  a  board  of  trustees  of  an 
incorporated  town  power  to  grant  the  use  of  its  streets  to  a  railroad 
for  a  side-track.  And  when  once  granted  it  is  not  revocable  at  the 
mere  pleasure  of  the  board,  but  there  must  be  failure  on  part  of  the 
road  to  comply  with  the  terms  of  the  grant  before  the  privilege  can 
be  recalled. ^^^  Cities  and  villages  incorporated  under  the  general 
incorporation  law  of  Illinois  are  made  the  representatives  of  the  state 
with  respect  to  the  control  of  streets  and  highways  and  bridges  within 
their  limits,  and  are  invested  with  power  to  lay  out,  alter  or  vacate 
streets,  regulate  the  use  of  the  same,  and  to  construct  and  keep  in  re- 
pair bridges,  viaducts,  etc.,  and  regulate  the  use  thereof.  And  where 
the  city  has  the  right  to  bridge  a  river  it  may  empower  a  railroad 
company  to  do  so.*^* 

§  604.  Regulations  as  to  railroads  using  streets. — A  municipal 
corporation  may  regulate  within  its  limits  the  running  and  stopping 
of  cars  propelled  by  steam  by  virtue  of  its  power  over  the  streets  and 
to  protect  the  safety  of  citizens  and  their  property.^^^  But  it  has  been 
held  that  in  the  absence  of  a  legislative  grant  of  power  to  that  end  the 
police  juries  of  Louisiana  have  no  authority  to  prohibit  by  ordinance 
the  running  of  railroad-trains  through  the  villages  of  their  parish 
at  a  greater  speed  than  six  miles  an  hour.^^*^  A  charter  which  gives 
the  mayor  and  council  authority  to  lay  out  streets  and  pass  all  ordi- 
nances respecting  them,  and  to  make  any  other  regulation  that  shall 
appear  to  them  necessary  and  proper  for  the  security,  welfare  and 
interest  of  the  city,  confers  no  authority  to  make  a  contract  to  obtain 
the  right  of  way  through  the  city  for  a  railway. -^^  The  power  to  grade 
and  improve  streets  is  a  legislative  power  and  a  continuing  one  unless 
there  is  some  special  restraint  imposed  in  the  charter  of  the  corpora- 
tion.^^^  The  power  granted  to  a  city  to  "regulate  the  use  of  streets" 
has  been  held  to  extend  to  public  uses  only,  and  not  to  authorize 
an  ordinance  permitting  a  private  corporation  to  build  a  railroad- 
track  and  run  trains  across  streets  of  the  city  for  the  transaction  of 

^'^Sinnott  v.  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.,  81  ='«  State  v.  Miller,  41  La.  An.  53; 

Wis.  95;  s.  c.  50  N.  W.  1097.  s.  c.  7  So.  672.     These  police  juries 

233  Town  of  Areata  v.  Areata  &c.  R.  have    no    general    grant    of    police 

Co.,  92  Cal.  639;  s.  c.  28  Pac.  676.  power. 

=^*  McCartney  v.  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co..  '"  Covington  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  City  of 

112  111.  611.  Athens,  85  Ga.  367;  s.  c.  11  S.  E.  663. 

^^^Merz  V.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  88  ==' Estes  v.  Owen,  90  Mo.  113;  s.  c. 

Mo.  672;  s.  c.  1  S.  W.  382.  2  S.  W.  133. 


§    605  PUBLIC   CORPORATIONS.  590 

its  business.^^®  The  charter  of  a  city  authorizing  the  adoption  of 
ordinances  to  prevent  the  incumbering  of  streets  with  carriages  au- 
thorizes an  ordinance  to  prevent  the  obstruction  of  streets  by  railroad- 
cars.^*''  An  ordinance  requiring  a  railroad  company  to  light  its  line 
by  electricity  within  twenty  days  after  notice  of  the  passage  of  the 
ordinance  is  not  necessarily  unreasonable.^*^  Where  an  ordinance 
grants  a  right  of  way  to  a  railroad  company  through  a  city  the  ac- 
ceptance of  the  benefits  and  privileges  by  the  corporation  makes  it  also 
subject  to  the  burdens.^*^ 

§  605.  The  same  subject  continued. — A  statute  which  gave  au- 
thority to  the  mayor  and  council  of  a  city  to  permit  and  sanction 
encroachments  upon  its  streets  for  a  fair  and  reasonable  compensa- 
tion paid  in  money  into  the  city  treasury  was  held  not  to  empower  the 
city  authorities  to  grant  a  railroad  company  a  block  of  land  eighty 
feet  wide  and  four  hundred  and  eighty  feet  long  in  one  of  the  city 
streets.^*^  Nor  did  they  have  the  power  to  make  a  donation  of  ten 
acres  of  land  of  the  city  commons  to  a  railroad  corporation,  and  after- 
wards grant  to  such  corporation  large  encroachments  upon  a  street  of 
the  city^  the  consideration  therefor  being  the  return  of  this  ten  acres 
of  land  to  the  city.^**  Nor  did  the  general  clause  in  the  charter  of 
the  city,  giving  it  power  to  control  its  streets,  authorize  the  grant  to 
a  railroad  company  of  the  privilege  of  laying  its  tracks  along  its 
streets.^*^ 

^^  Glaessner     v.     Anheuser-Busch  out."     This   was  an   obstruction,   a 

Brewing  Ass'n,  100  Mo.  508;  s.  c.  13  nuisance,  not  an  encroachment. 
S.  W.  707.  -''  Daly  v.  Georgia  &c.  R.  Co.,  80 

^'''City    of    Duluth    v.    Mallet,    43  Ga.  793;  s.  c.  7  S.  E.  146.    The  legis- 

Minn.  204;  s.  c.  45  N.  W.  154.  lative   intention   could   not  be   thus 

*"  Village    of    St.    Marys    v.    Lake  circumvented. 
Erie  &c.  R.  Co.,  60  Ohio  St.  136;  s.  c.         =^' Daly  v.  Georgia  &c.  R.   Co.,   80 

53  N.  E.  795.  Ga.  793;   s.  c.  7  S.  E.  146;    2  Dillon 

-'^  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  People,  79  Munic.  Corp.,  §  724.     See  also.  State 

111.  App.  529.  V.  Corrigan  &c.  R.  Co.,  85  Mo.  263; 

-*^  Daly  V.  Georgia  &c.  R.  Co.,   80  Hinchman  v.  Paterson  Horse  R.  Co., 

Ga.  793;  s.  c.  7  S.  E.  146.    The  court  17  N.  J.  Eq.  75;   Jersey  City  &c.  R. 

construed  the  act  to  allow  the  gi-ant  Co.  v.  Jersey  City  &c.  R.  Co.,  20  N. 

of  "small  encroachments  to  property  J.  Eq.  61;   2  Wood  Ry.  Law,  §  273; 

holders  along  the   whole   length   of  Kavanagh  v.   Mobile  &c.  R.  Co.,  78 

the  street  and  on  both  sides  thereof  Ga.  271;  s.  c.  2  S.  E.  636;  Eichels  v. 

in     order     to     narrow     the     street.  Evansville  St.  R.  Co.,  78  Ind.  261; 

.     .     .     Such  a  grant  as  this  was  not  s.  c.  41  Am.  R.  561;    Davis  v.  East 

an   encroachment,   but  a  dedication  Tennessee  &c.  R.  Co.,  87  Ga.  605;  s. 

of  the  major  part  of  the  street  for  c.  13  S.  E.  567;   Cooley  Const.  Lim. 

purposes  entirely  foreign  to  the  ob-  556;    Elliott  v.    Fair   Haven   &c.    R. 

ject  for  which  the  street  was  laid  Co.,  32  Conn.  579;  Cincinnati  &c.  St. 


591 


EXPRESS    CORPORATE   POWERS. 


606 


§  606.  Crossings  of  railways. — An  act  declaring  that  "the  city 
council  shall  have  power  by  condemnation  or  otherwise  to  extend  any 
street  over  or  across  any  railroad-track,  right  of  way,  or  land  of  any 
railroad  company,"  gives  the  power  to  extend  streets  across  a  rail- 
road-track, even  though  such  extension  would  subject  the  railroad 
company  to  great  inconvenience  and  hindrance  in  the  operation  of  its 
road ;  also  to  extend  a  street  across  a  railroad  "yard"  consisting  merely 
of  a  collection  of  tracks.^* ^  And  a  court  of  equity  will  not  compel 
the  city  to  extend  the  street  across  the  track  by  means  of  a  viaduct  for 
the  convenience  of  the  railroad  company,  since  under  the  statute  the 
city  council  has  the  option,  in  its  discretion,  of  creating  a  crossing  at 
grade  or  above  grade,  and  its  discretion  should  not  be  interfered 
with  by  the  courts. ^*'^    The  rule  in  such  cases  is  that  in  the  exercise 


R.  Co.  V.  Incorporated  Village  of 
Cumminsville,  14  Ohio  St.  523;  Ho- 
bart  V.  Milwaukee  City  R.  Co.,  27 
Wis.  194;  s.  c.  9  Am.  R.  461;  Attor- 
ney-General V.  Metropolitan  R.  Co., 
125  Mass.  515;  s.  c.  28  Am.  R.  264; 
Brown  v.  Duplessis,  14  La.  An.  842; 
Savannah  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Mayor  &c., 
45  Ga.  602;  Peddicord  v.  Baltimore 
&c.  R.  Co.,  34  Md.  463;  Hiss  v.  Balti- 
more &c.  R.  Co.,  52  Md.  242;  s.  c.  36 
Am.  R.  371;  Stanley  v.  City  of 
Davenport,  54  Iowa  463;  s.  c.  6  N. 
W.  706;  37  Am.  R.  216. 

^''  Illinois  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  City  of  Chi- 
cago, 141  111.  586;  s.  c.  30  N.  E.  1044. 
See  also,  Illinois  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  City  of 
Chicago,  138  111.  453;  s.  c.  28  N.  E. 
740;  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  City  of 
Chicago,  140  111.  309;  s.  c.  29  N.  E. 
1109.  As  to  the  "yard,"  see  Dela- 
ware &c.  Canal  Co.  v.  Village  of 
Whitehall,  90  N.  Y.  21.  In  the  exer- 
cise of  its  governmental  power  the 
city  has  a  right  to  open  and  use  a 
disused  crossing  over  a  railroad,  and 
the  statute  of  limitations  has  no  ap- 
plication: Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  City 
of  Council  Bluffs,  109  Iowa  425;  s.  c. 
80  N.  W.  564. 

^"  Illinois  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  City  of  Chi- 
cago, 141  111.  586;  s.  c.  30  N.  E.  1044. 
See  also.  Lake  Shore  &c.  R.  Co.  v. 
Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.,  97  111.  506;  Curry 
V.  President  &c.,  15  111.  320;  Railroad 
Co.   V.   Town   of  Lake,   71    111.    333; 


Durham  v.  Hyde  Park,  75  111.  371; 
Brush  V.  City  of  Carbondale,  78  111. 
74;  Sheridan  v.  Colvin,  78  111.  237; 
1  Dillon  Munic.  Corp.  (4th  ed.), 
§  95;  Lewis  Eminent  Domain,  §  238; 
Boom  Co.  V.  Patterson,  98  U.  S.  403; 
Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Wiltse,  116  111. 
449;  s.  c.  6  N.  E.  49;  People  v.  New 
York  &c.  R.  Co.,  74  N.  Y.  302;  Mil- 
waukee &c.  R.  Co.  V.  City  of  Fari- 
bault, 23  Minn.  167;  National  &c.  R. 
Co.  V.  Central  R.  Co.,  32  N.  J.  Eq. 
755;  National  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  State,  53 
N.  J.  L.  217;  s.  c.  21  Atl.  570;  Struth- 
ers  V.  Railway  Co.,  87  Pa.  St.  282; 
Central  R.  Co.  v.  State,  32  N.  J.  L. 
220;  2  Wood  Ry.  Law  981;  Elliott 
Roads  and  Streets  (2d  ed.),  §§  778, 
779;  Railroad  Co.  v.  Bentley,  64  111. 
438;  People  v.  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co., 
67  111.  118;  Railroad  Co.  v.  City  of 
Dayton,  23  Ohio  St.  510;  Town  Coun- 
cil &c.  V.  Railroad  Co.,  10  R.  I.  365; 
People  V.  Boston  &c.  R.  Co.,  70  N. 
Y.  569;  Drexel  v.  Town  of  Lake,  127 
111.  54;  s.  c.  20  N.  E.  38,  where  the 
question  to  be  determined  by  the 
trustees  of  the  town  was,  which  one 
of  two  modes  of  carrying  off  the  sew- 
age of  a  district  should  be  adopted 
as  the  best  and  most  expedient  mode, 
and  the  court  said: — "The  choice  of 
expedients  is  within  the  legislative 
discretion  of  the  trustees  of  the 
town — a  discretion  with  which  the 


§    607  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  592 

of  tlie  power  of  the  municipal  corporation  in  this  respect  there  should 
be  no  unreasonable  impairment  of  the  usefulness  of  the  railroad  right 
of  way.^**  The  governing  authorities  of  a  municipal  corporation  may, 
in  furtherance  of  the  object  of  a  statute  empowering  them  to  alter 
streets  which  were  to  be  crossed  by  railroads  looking  generally  to  the 
safety  of  life  of  citizens,  vacate  any  street  or  any  part  of  the  street, 
and  change  the  grade  upon  any  street  or  part  of  a  street  without  the 
consent  of  abutting  owners.  They  may  also  construct  bridges  as  parts 
of  streets  to  carry  the  public  way  above  intersecting  railroads.^*^  The 
council  of  a  borough  organized  under  an  act  conferring  powers  to  be 
exercised  by  ordinance  has  no  right,  by  a  mere  resolution,  to  enter 
into  a  contract  by  which  the  public  moneys  are  to  be  expended,  and 
borough  bonds  are  to  be  issued,  to  pay  for  grading  and  tilling  a 
street.  ^^"^  A  resolution  by  the  common  council  of  a  city  authorizing 
a  person  to  grade  a  portion  of  a  street  and  build  a  bridge  thereon 
across  a*  private  canal  has  been  held  invalid.  Such  authorization 
should  have  been  by  ordinance.^ ^^ 

§  607.  Miscellaneous  matters  relating  to  streets. — An  ordinance 
prohibiting  the  cutting,  trimming,  or  breaking  of  any  tree-limb  or 
twig  without  permission  and  providing  a  penalty  for  so  doing,  is  a 
valid  exercise  of  police  power.^^^  The  mere  declaration  by  the  com- 
mon council  that  a  street  exists  does  not  give  the  city  a  right  of  entry 
as  against  the  private  rights  based  on  ownership  and  actual  posses- 
sion.^^^  Ejectment  by  the  city  is  the  proper  remedy  againt  one  unlaw- 
fully encroaching  on  the  public  highway  under  its  control. ^^*    Power 

courts  will  not  interfere  unless  clear-  -^°  State  v.  Mayor  &c.,  54  N.  J.  L. 

ly  abused."  476;  s.  c.  24  Atl.  481. 

"» Wood  Ry.  Law.  §  271,  p.  975,  n.  ''^'  State  v.  Mayor  &c.,  54  N.  J.  L. 

3,  and  cases;  Commonwealth  v.  Erie  474;  s.  c.  24  Atl.  448.    See  also,  Pack- 

&c.  R.  Co.,  27  Pa.  St.  339;  People  v.  ard  v.  Railroad  Co.,  48  N.  J.  Bq.  281; 

Dutchess  &c.  R.  Co.,  58  N.  Y.  152;  s.  c.  22  Atl.  227;    State  v.  Common 

Town   Council   &c.   v.   Railroad   Co.,  Council  &c.,  45  N.  J.  L.  279,  282. 

10  R.  I.  365;   Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  =^*  Consolidated     Traction     Co.     v. 

Moffitt,  75  111.  524;    City  of  Bridge-  East  Orange  Tp.,  63  N.  J.  L.  669;  s. 

port    V.    New    York    &c.    R.    Co.,    36  c.  44  Atl.  1099.    Under  provisions  of 

Conn.  255;   2  Wood  Ry.  Law,  §  271,  charter  the  council  of  Cape  May  by 

p.   981,  n.   1;    People  v.  Boston  &c.  ordinance  regulate  the  use  of  streets, 

R.  Co.,  70  N.  Y.  569;  State  v.  St.  Paul  or    portions    thereof,    by    hucksters 

&c.  R.  Co.,  35  Minn.  131;  s.  c.  28  N.  and  other  vendors:    Tomlin  v.  City 

W.  3.  of  Cape  May,  63  N.  J.  L.  429;   s.  c. 

=^»Read  v.  City  of  Camden,  54  N.  44  Atl.  209. 

J.  L.  347;  s.  c.  24  Atl.  549.    See  also,  ^'^^  State  v.  Judge  &c.,  51  La.  An. 

State  v.  City  of  Elizabeth,  54  N.  J.  1768;  s.  c.  26  So.  374. 

L.  462;  s.  c.  24  Atl.  495.  "*City  of  Cleveland  v.  Cleveland 


593  EXPKESS   CORPORATE   POWERS.  §    608 

may  be  conferred  on  a  city  by  the  legislature  to  use  streams  within 
the  state  as  outlets  for  public  sewers.^^^ 

§  608.  Sewers. — A  complaint  in  an  action  to  set  aside  a  special 
assesment  to  pay  for  the  construction  of  a  sewer  and  a  pavement  on 
the  street  in  front  of  plaintilf's  land  was  held  insufficient,  as  it 
alleged  facts  which  only  showed  mere  irregularities  and  failures  to 
comply  with  some  minor  statutory  requirements  and  did  not  allege 
an  offer  to  pay  the  amount  of  such  assessments  justly  chargeable  to 
plaintiff's  property.-^"  In  Pennsylvania  it  has  been  held  that  a  lot- 
owner  can  not  defend  against  an  assessment  under  the  front-foot  rule, 
for  the  construction  of  a  sewer  in  front  of  his  lot,  on  the  ground  that 
such  sewer  was  neither  a  private  benefit  to  him  or  his  property  nor  a 
matter  of  necessity  to  the  public. ^^^  It  is  not  enough  for  the  complaint 
to  allege  in  direct  terms  the  inequality  and  injustice  of  such  assess- 
ment; it  must  also  allege  facts  showing  such  inequality  and  injustice 
or  going  to  the  groundwork  of  the  assessment.^^^  Nor  could  the  plain- 
tiff limit  his  liability  to  the  improvement  of  that  portion  of  the  street 
immediately  in  front  of  his  property,  and  then  only  to  the  extent  it 
was  benefited.  The  city  was  empowered  by  its  charter  to  apportion 
the  entire  cost  of  the  sewer  and  pavement  respectively  upon  that  street 
among  the  several  lots  fronting  thereon,  under  the  front-foot  rule.^^* 

&c.  R.  Co.,  93  Fed.  113;  Ocean  Grove     Pa.  St.  255;   Lipps  v.  City  of  Phila- 

&c.  Assn.  v.  Berthall,  63  N.  J.  L.  312;  delphia,  38  Pa.  St.  503;  City  of  Phil- 

s.  c.  43  Atl.  887.  adelphia  v.   Tryon,  35  Pa.   St.   401; 

==^  Sayre  v.  Mayor  &c.,  60  N.  J.  Eq.  Brientnall   v.   City  of  Philadelphia, 

361;  s.  c.  45  Atl.  985.  103  Pa.  St.  156. 

='«Meggett  v.  City  of  Eau  Claire,        ^''^  Pratt  v.  Lincoln  Co.,  61  Wis.  62; 

81  Wis.  326;  s.  c.  51  N.  W.  566.  s.  c.  20  N.  W.  726;   Fifield  v.  Mari- 

'"Michener    v.    City    of    Philadel-  nette  Co.,  62  Wis.  532;  s.  c.  22  N.  W. 

phia,  118  Pa.  St.  535;    s.  c.  12  Atl.  705;  Wisconsin  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Ashland 

174;    City  of  Harrisburg  v.   McCor-  Co.,  81  Wis.  1;    s.  c.  50  N.  W.  937, 

mick,  129  Pa.  St.  213;    s.  c.  18  Atl.  939,  940.    See  also,  Wisconsin  &c.  R. 

126;    City  of  Chester  v.  Black,  132  Co.  v.  Lincoln  Co.,  67  Wis.  478;  s.  c. 

Pa.  St.  568;   s.  c.  19  Atl.  276.     See  30  N.  W.  619;    Canfield  v.  Bayfield 

also,  as  to  power  to  construct  sewers,  ^o.,  74  Wis.  60,  64;   s.  c.  41  N.  W. 

etc.,    Hammett    v.    Philadelphia,    65  437;    42  N.  W.  100;    Green  Bay  &c. 

Pa.   St.   146;    Pennock  v.   Hoover,  5  Co.  v.  Outagamie  Co.,  76  Wis.  588; 

Rawle    (Pa.)    291;    Northern   Liber-  s.    c.    45    N.    W.    536,— this   last   ap- 

ties  v.  St.  John's  Church,  13  Pa.  St.  proved  and  sanctioned  in  Farrington 

104;  City  of  Philadelphia  v.  Wistar,  v.  New  England  &c.  Co.,  1  N.  D.  102; 

35    Pa.    St.    427;    Commonwealth    v.  s.   c.   45   N.   W.    191,   194;    Avant  v. 

Woods,    44    Pa.    St.    113;    Magee    v.  Flynn,  2  S.  D.  153;  s.  c.  49  N.  W.  15. 
Commonwealth.     46     Pa.     St.     358;         ==^»  Pratt  v.  Lincoln  Co.,  61  Wis.  62; 

Wray  v.  Mayor  &c.,  46  Pa.  St.  365;  s.  c.  20  N.  W.  726.     See  also.  State 

Stroud  V.   City  of  Philadelphia,   61  v.  City  of  Portage,  12  Wis.  562. 

1  Smith — 38 


§    GOO  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  594 

§  609.  Fire-limits — Public  health. — A  provision  in  a  charter  to 
prevent  the  reconstruction  in  wood  of  old  buildings  within  certain 
limits  does  not  include  the  power  to  prevent  the  repairing  with 
shingles  the  roof  of  buildings  originally  covered  with  similar  ma- 
terials.-*^" An  ordinance  establishing  fire-limits  is  not  inconsistent 
with  the  general  laws  of  Georgia.-"^  Power  by  charter  to  pass  or- 
dinances necessary  for  the  preservation  of  the  health,  good  order,  etc., 
of  the  town,  authorizes  an  ordinance  limiting  the  maximum  quantity 
of  land  lawful  to  be  cultivated  within  the  corporate  limits.-'^-  And 
an  ordinance  imposing  a  proper  and  reasonable  restriction  upon  the 
enjoyment  of  property  to  prevent  its  becoming  injurious  to  public 
health  is  a  legal  exercise  of  the  police  power  of  the  state  which  it  is 
competent  for  the  legislature  to  delegate  by  charter  to  the  municipal 
authorities;'"^  also  to  compel  a  railway  company  to  water  its  tracks  so 
as  to  lay  the  dust.""'*  A  municipal  corporation  can  not  control  the 
owners  of  property  in  the  mode  or  manner  of  constructing  their  build- 
ings, within  certain  designated  limits,  in  the  absence  of  express  legisla- 
tive authority.^""  The  grant  to  a  municipal  corporation  of  power  to 
provide  for  the  prevention  and  extinguishment  of  fires  necessarily 
implies  the  right  to  establish  fire-limits  and  prohibit  the  erection  of 
wooden  buildings  therein.^"'''  A  statute  giving  power  to  commissioners 
of  a  town  to  pass  "such  ordinances  as  they  may  deem  necessary  and 

'""  State  v.  Schuchardt,  42  La.  An.  ^"^  Town  Council  &c.  v.  Pressley,  33 

49;  s.  c.  7  So.  67.  S.  C.  56;  s.  c.  11  S.  E.  545.    See  also, 

281  pord   v.   Thralkill,   84   Ga.   169;  as  to  the  power  to  regulate,  restrain 

s.  c.  10  S.  E.  600,  as  Ga.  Code,  §  786,  and    suppress    particular    kinds    of 

expressly    authorizes    mayors    and  business,  1  Dillon  Munic.  Corp.   (3d 

councils  of  towns  and  villages  "to  ed.),  §  144;  Harrison  v.  Mayor  &c., 

make      regulations      for      guarding  1   Gill    (Md.)    264;    City  Council  v. 

against  danger  or  damage  by  fire."  Wentworth    St.    Baptist    Church,    4 

See    also,    1    Dillon    Munic.    Corp.,  Strob.    (S.  C.)    306;    State  v.  Mayor 

§§  145,  405,  n.;  Horr  &  Bemis  Munic.  &c.,  10  Rich.  L.  (S.  C.)  491. 

Police  Ord.,   §§   222,  223;    Wadleigh  =^^  Town  Council  &c.  v.  Pressley,  33 

v.  Gilman,  12  Maine  403;  Mayor  &c.  S.  C.  56;  s.  c.  11  S.  E.  545.    See  also, 

V.  Hoffman,  29  La.  An.  651;   Baum-  1  Dillon  Munic.  Corp.,  §  146;   Com- 

gartner  v.  Hasty,  100  Ind.  575;  s.  c.  monwealth  v.  Alger,  7  Cush.  (Mass.) 

50  Am.  R.  830;   dictum  of  Shaw,  C.  53. 

J.,  in  Commonwealth  v.  Tewksbury,  ""■'  City  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Mayor  &c.,  77 

11    Met.     (Mass.)    55,    58;    City    of  Ga.  731. 

Charleston  v.  Reed,  27  W.  Va.  681;  =''■•  State  v.  Schuchardt,  42  La.  An. 

Williams  v.  City  Council  &c.,  4  Ga.  49;  s.  c.  7  So.  67. 

509 ;  Kneedler  v.  Borough  of  Norris-  '""  Hubbard   v.    Town   of   Medford, 

town,  100  Pa.  St.  368;  City  of  Troy  20  Or.   315;    s.  c.   25  Pac.  640.     See 

v.  Winters,  2  Hun  (N.  Y.)  63;  Pye  v.  also.   City   of   Olympia   v.    Mann,    1 

Peterson,  45  Tex.  312;   s.  c.  23  Am.  Wash.  389;  s.  c.  25  Pac.  337. 
R.  608. 


595  EXPRESS    CORPORATE    POWERS.  §    610 

beneficial  for  said  town"  confers  on  them  authority  to  prohibit  by 
ordinance  any  person  erecting  any  building  within  the  limits  of  the 
town  without  a  permit  from  them.-^'^ 

§  610.  Directions  as  to  buildings. — Ordinances  relating  to  fire- 
limits,  enacted  without  authority,  may  be  expressly  validated  by  a 
subsequent  revision  of  the  charter.-"^  An  ordinance  of  a  city  impos- 
ing a  penalty  on  persons  erecting  a  certain  class  of  buildings  made 
of  combustible  materials  within  certain  fire-limits,  declaring  such 
buildings  nuisances,  and  giving  the  council  power  to  tear  them  down, 
has  been  held  not  void  where  the  city  charter  empowered  the  city 
to  prohibit  such  buildings  and  to  provide  for  their  removal.-""  The 
charter  of  a  city  authorizing  the  making  of  ordinances  "to  prescribe 
the  limits  within  which  wooden  buildings  shall  not  be  erected"  per- 
tains to  the  future,  and  an  ordinance  made  thereunder  prohibiting, 
without  the  council's  permission,  the  erection  of  "any  building  con- 
structed in  whole  or  in  part  of  wood"  within  certain  limits,  refers  to 
buildings  to  be  erected  in  the  future,  and  not  to  buildings  in  ex- 
istence and  erected  by  such  permission.^''*'  A  city  has  power  to 
pass  an  ordinance  prohibiting  the  blasting  of  rock  with  explosive 
comjDounds  under  a  statute  providing  that  towns  may  make  by-laws 
to  protect  persons  from  dangers  incident  to  the  maintenance,  occupa- 
tion or  use  of  buildings  on  streets.^'^  A  city  is  not  justified  in  de- 
stroying a  building  because  it  is  used  for  illegal  and  unlawful  purposes 
and  thereby  becomes  an  annoyance  to  other  residents  of  the  neighbor- 
hood. The  wrongful  use  can  be  stopped. ^^^  When  the  statute  au- 
thorizes the  city  council  to  prescribe  the  manner  of  constructing 

"°^  Commissioners  &c.  v.  Covey,  74  s.  c.  7  N.  Y.  S.  501.    See  also,  Peiople 

Md.  262;  s.  c.  22  Atl.  266.    And  it  is  v.  O'Brien,  111  N.  Y.  1-62;   s.  c.  18 

within  their  discretion  to  refuse  a  N.  E.  692;    In  re  Union  El.  R.  Co. 

permit.  &c.,  112  N.  Y.  61,  75;  s.  c.  19  N.  E. 

='*«Brunner  v.  Downs,  17  N.  Y.  S.  664;  People  v.  Otis,  90  N.  Y.  48,  52; 

633;  s.  c.  43  N.  Y.  St.  824.  Stuart  v.  Palmer,  74  N.  Y.  183;  City 

'"^Baxter    v.    City    of    Seattle,    3  of  Detroit  v.   Detroit  &c.  Plank  R. 

Wash.  352;  s.  c.  28  Pac.  537.  Co.,  43  Mich.  140;  s.  c.  5  N.  W.  275. 

"°  City   of   Buffalo   v.    Chadeayne,        -"'  Commonwealth    v.    Parks,    155 

134  N.  Y.  163;  s.  c.  31  N.  E.  443,  hold-  Mass.  531;   s.  c.  30  N.  E.  174.     The 

ing  that  the  defendant,  who  had  a  court    said: — "Such    prohibition    is 

permit  from  the  city  council  to  erect  not  such  a  taking  of  property  as  to 

frame  buildings  within  the  fire-lim-  be  beyond  the  police  power,"  under 

its,  and  had  made  contracts  and  in-  Miller  v.  Horton,  152  Mass.  540,  647; 

curred   liabilities   thereon   before   a  s.  c.  26  N.  E.  100. 
rescission  of  such  permit,  acquired  a         -'-  Bristol  &c.  Co.  v.  City  of  Bris- 

private  property-right  of  which   he  tol,  97  Va.  304;  s.  c.  33  S.  E.  588. 
was  entitled  to  pi'otection;  affirming 


§    611  PUBLIC    COKrOILVTIONS.  596 

stone,  brick  and  other  buildings,  and  fix  the  limits  in  which  wooden 
buildings  may  be  erected,  the  council  is  not  authorized  to  prohibit 
the  erection  of  buildings  within  certain  limits  unless  the  buildings, 
or  the  outside  walls,  shall  be  composed  of  stone  or  brick.-"  A  city 
has  power  to  cause  to  be  erected  a  roofed  passageway  in  front  of  a 
building,  on  the  sidewalk,  during  process  of  construction.-^*  The 
city  is  not  liable  for  revoking  a  building-permit  where  an  express  pro- 
vision of  the  permit  has  been  violated.-^ °  An  ordinance  empowering 
a  building  commissioner  to  grant  or  refuse  permits  for  buildings 
from  which  no  appeal  is  provided  is  void."'^*'  A  permit  which  unjustly 
discriminates  between  citizens  is  void.-'^^  Before  the  city,  or  any  one 
representing  it  can  remove  a  building  in  process  of  erection  in  the  fire- 
limits,  it  must  give  the  owner  notice  to  remove  it  himself,  and  if  this 
is  not  done  the  owner  may  recover  damages.- '^'^ 

§  611.  Police  power. — Under  a  city  charter  giving  the  council 
power  to  pass  all  ordinances  necessary  for  the  due  administration  of 
justice  and  the  better  government  thereof,  and  "to  cause  the  removal 
or  abatement  of  any  nuisance,"  the  passage  of  an  ordinance  requiring 
a  street-car  company  to  put  "a  driver  and  conductor"  on  each  car 
is  a  proper  exercise  of  the  city's  police  power,  and  not  an  impairment 
of  the  company's  rights,  not  being  unreasonable  or  oppressive.^'^^ 
And  a  provision  in  such  an  ordinance,  requiring  the  police  to  cause 
every  car  not  provided  with  a  "driver  and  conductor"  to  be  returned 
to  the  stable,  is  not  an  attempt  at  enforcement  without  trial,  but 
merely  a  means  of  preventing  a  nuisance  by  blockading  travel.^^** 
Acts  of  a  territorial  legislature  empowering  county  commissioners 
to  grant  ferry  licenses  and  regulate  the  ferries  have  been  upheld 
as  containing  a  valid  exercise  of  police  power.^^^     An  ordinance  of 

2"  City  of  Marion  v.  Robertson,  84  "^»  South  Covington  &c.   R.   Co.  v. 

111.  App.  113.  Berry,  13  Ky.  L.  943;  s.  c.  18  S.  W. 

-'*  Smith  v.  Milwaukee  Builders'  1026.  See  also.  Railroad  Co.  v.  Rich- 
fee.  Exch.,  91  Wis.  360;  s.  c.  64  N.  W.  mond,  96  U.  S.  521,  where  it  was 
1041.  said  an  ordinance  as  to  running  cars 

-"Harper  v.  Mayor  &c.,  94  Ga.  801;  in  the  streets  "was  a  mere  regula- 

s.  c.  22  S.  E.  139.  tion  of  the  use  of  its  [the  railroad 

°™  City  of  Sioux  Falls  v.  Kirby,  6  company's]  property  in  the  city,  and 

S.  D.  62;  s.  c.  60  N.  W.  156.  not  a  'taking'  within  the  meaning  of 

"'  City  of  Brooklyn  v.   Furey,   30  the  constitutional  prohibition." 

N.  Y.  S.  349;  s.  c.  61  N.  Y.  St.  287.  "'Evans    v.    Hughes    Co.,    6    Dak. 

2'*  Ward  V.   City  of  Murphysboro,  102;    s.   c.   50   N.   W.   720.     Nor   are 

77  111.  App.  549.  such  acts  repugnant  to  the  revised 

-'"  South   Covington  &c.   R.   Co.  v.  statutes  of  the  United  States,  §  1889, 

Berry,  13  Ky.  L.  943;  s.  c.  18  S.  W.  which  provides  that  the  legislative 

1026.  assemblies  of  the  several  territories 


597 


EXPRESS    CORrORATE    POWERS. 


613 


a  town  to  prohibit  peddling  within  the  corporate  limits  without  a 
license  is  within  the  police  power,  and  is  not  void  as  discriminating 
in  favor  of  citizens  of  the  town,  since  it  applies  to  all  persons  alike, 
whether  they  reside  in  the  town  or  elsewhere.^^^ 

§  612.  The  same  subject  continued. — Applying  the  provision  of  the 
constitution  of  California,  which  authorizes  the  city  and  county  of 
San  Francisco  to  make  and  enforce  within  its  limits  such  police  regu- 
lations as  are  not  in  conflict  with  general  laws,  the  supreme  court  of 
California  has  held  an  ordinance  of  the  city  prohibiting  the  sale 
of  pools,  etc.,  on  horse  races,  "except  within  the  inclosure  of  a  race- 
track where  such  trial  or  contest  is  to  take  place,"  to  be  valid;  for 
though  its  incidental  efl'ect  may  be  to  confer  special  privileges  on  the 
owners  of  race-tracks,  its  purpose  is  to  restrain  gambling  of  the 
character  mentioned,  which  is  a  proper  subject  of  police  regulation. -^^ 


shall  not  grant  private  charters  or 
special  privileges.  In  Common- 
wealth V.  Page,  155  Mass.  227;  s.  c. 
29  N.  E.  512,  a  rule  of  the  board  of 
police  of  Boston,  providing  that  no 
person  shall  use  "any  hackney-car- 
riage unless  he  is  licensed  thereto 
by  the  board,"  and  that  every  ve- 
hicle "used  for  the  conveyance  of 
persons  for  hire  from  place  to  place 
within  the  city,  except  a  horse-car, 
shall  be  deemed  a  hackney-car- 
riage," has  been  held  to  be  a  reason- 
able exercise  of  the  authority  con- 
ferred on  the  board,  under  various 
acts  which  placed  the  power  in 
their  hands,  to  act  under  Pub.  St., 
ch.  28,  §  25,  empowering  the  mayor 
and  aldermen  of  a  city  to  regulate 
all  vehicles  used  therein.  This 
rule  was  also  held  to  apply  to 
all  vehicles  used  in  the  city  for  the 
conveyance  of  persons  for  hire, 
whether  the  vehicles  stood  in  public 
places  or  in  the  stables  of  their  own- 
ers. Authority  to  a  town  on  a  navi- 
gable stream  to  operate  a  ferry  de- 
pends wholly  upon  special  grants: 
Hoggard  v.  Mayor  &c.,  51  La.  An. 
683;  s.  c.  25  So.  349. 

^=  Martin  v.  Town  of  Rosedale,  130 
Tnd.  109;  s.  c.  29  N.  E.  410.  See 
Elliott's  Supp.   Ind.,   §   826    (Burns' 


R.  S.  Ind.  1901,  §  4357)  pursuant  to 
which  it  was  passed.  In  Common- 
wealth V.  Cutter,  156  Mass.  52;  s.  c. 
29  N.  E.  1146,  an  ordinance  by  the 
city  of  Boston,  providing  that  "no 
owner  or  occupant  of  land  abutting 
on  a  private  way,  and  having  the 
right  to  use  such  way,  shall  suffer 
any  filth,"  etc.,  to  remain  on  that 
part  of  the  way  adjoining  such 
land,  was  held  to  be  authorized  as  a 
proper  exercise  of  police  power,  un- 
der Pub.  St.,  ch.  27,  §  15,  which  pro- 
vides that  towns  may  make  by-laws 
for  preserving  peace  and  good  or- 
der within  their  limits,  and  St.  1854, 
ch.  448,  §  35,  which  gives  the  city 
council  of  Boston  "power  to  make  all 
such  needful  and  salutary  by-laws 
and  ordinances  ...  as  towns 
.  .  .  have  power  to  make  and  es- 
tablish." See  also,  as  to  the  power 
of  cities  and  towns  to  adopt  ordi- 
nances and  by-laws  for  the  preserva- 
tion and  promotion  of  the  health  of 
their  inhabitants,  as  an  exercise  of 
police  power,  Commonwealth  v. 
Patch,  97  Mass.  221;  Commonwealth 
V.  Curtis,  9  Allen  (Mass.)  266;  Van- 
dine,  Petitioner,  6  Pick.  .(Mass.) 
187;  1  Dillon  Munic.  Corp.  (3d  ed.) 
369. 
=''Ex  parte  Tuttle,  91  Cal.  589;  s. 


§    612  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  598 

Nothing  passes  by  a  grant  of  power  to  a  municipal  corporation  to 
establish  and  regulate  ferries  across  a  navigable  stream  but  what 
is  granted  in  clear  and  explicit  terms.  Power  conferred  on  a  munici- 
pality "to  lay  out,  make,  open,  widen,  regulate  and  keep  in  repair 
all  *  *  *  ferries,"  etc.,  does  not  include  the  power  to  con- 
fer upon  any  individual  the  exclusive  right  to  keep  and  operate  a 
ferry.  If  by  such  a  grant  power  to  establish  ferries  is  conferred  at 
all,  such  power  is  held  by  the  trustees  of  the  city  as  a  public  trust, 
to  be  exercised  as  the  public  good  may  require.^^*  Where  the  only 
legislative  authority  conferred  by  the  charter  of  a  city  with  reference 
to  billiard-saloons  and  pool-rooms  is  to  license  such  places  by  or- 
dinance, the  power  to  license  is  to  be  construed  as  a  power  to  regulate, 
and  the  city  council  may  impose  such  reasonable  terms  and  con- 
ditions as  may  be  necessary  to  make  the  license  issued  efficacious 
as  a  police  regulation ;  but  in  the  absence  of  further  authority  to 
regulate  or  control  such  places,  the  council  would  not  be  authorized, 
as  against  existing  licenses  at  least,  to  impose  new  or  additional 
conditions  not  required  or  contemplated  under  the  original  ordinance, 
or  to  provide  and  enforce  penalties  for  the  violation  thereof.-^ ^ 
WTiere  a  corporation  is  authorized  to  enact  ordinances  to  prohibit 
practices  which  are  against  good  morals,  or  contrary  to  public  decency, 
and  its  legislative  body  determines  that  any  particular  practice,  such 
as  the  uttering  of  profane  language,  is  against  good  morals,  and 
prohibits  it,  its  decision  is  final  and  will  not  be  reviewed.^^''  An 
ordinance  enacting  that  it  shall  not  be  lawful  for  any  horse-railroad 
company  to  run  any  car  without  having  an  agent,  in  addition  to  the 
driver,  to  assist  in  the  control  of  the  car  and  passengers,  and  to  pre- 
vent accidents  and  disturbances  of  the  good  order  and  security  of  the 
streets,  is  a  reasonable  regulation  and  a  valid  exercise  of  the  general 
police  power  vested  in  a  city  by  its  charter.^^^  The  subject  of  police 
power  is  treated  generally  in  another  chapter  and  is  only  briefly  no- 
ticed in  this  connection.  The  power  of  taxation  is  the  exercise 
of  one  of  the  sovereign  powers  of  the  state,  and  is  not  permitted  as 
an  exercise  of  police  power.^^®  Under  general  power  to  preserve 
peace,  good  order,  health  and  safety,  a  city  may  prohibit  domestic 

c    27  Pac.  933.     A  business  carried  People    v.    Meyers,    95    N.    Y.    223; 

on  to  enable  persons  to  bet  on  horse-  Schwuchow  v.  City  of  Chicago,   68 

races    is   against   public   policy   and  111.  444;  Gilham  v.  Wells,  64  Ga.  192. 
may  be  prohibited,  though  not  crimi-         "*'*'  Ex  parte  Delaney,  43  Cal.  478. 
nal,  by  statute:  Odell  v.  City  of  At-         ="' State  v.   Inhabitants  &c.,  53  N. 

lanta,  97  Ga.  670;  s.  c.  25  S.  E.  173.  J.   L.   132;    s.   c.   20   Atl.   1076.     See 

'■*  Minturn  v.  Larue,  1  McAl.  370.  also,  §  611,  ante. 

="'  State    V.    Pamperin,    42    Minn.         =""  Pitts  v.   City   of  Vicksburg,   72 

320;    s.  c.  44  N.  W.  251.     See  also,  Miss.  181;  s.  c.  16  So.  418. 


599  EXPEESS    CORPORATE   POWERS.  §    613 

animals  from  rimning  at  large,^^^  and  may  regulate  the  storage  of 
petroleum,-'"'  and  the  power  to  regulate  burials  of  human  bodies 
includes  the  power  to  prohibit  burials  in  certain  localities  within  the 
corporate  limits,-^^  and  may  prohibit  boisterous  assemblies,^ ®^  and 
power  to  preserve  the  public  peace  and  morals  includes  power  to 
prescribe  penalties  for  non-observance  of  Sunday,'^^  but  power  to 
provide  ordinances  for  the  general  welfare  does  not  authorize  an  or- 
dinance contrary  to  the  express  provisions  of  the  charter.^"'*  Police 
power  does  not  justify  an  ordinance  in  restraint  of  trade,^^^  nor  is 
authority  to  prohibit  gambling-houses  authority  to  prohibit  all  gam- 
jjjg_296  rpi^g  g-^y  |-^.^g  power  to  establish  hack-stands  in  front  of  public 
buildings  such  as  a  railway-station.-^^ 

§  613.  Regulation  of  liquor  traffic. — Where  by  charter  a  city  is 
authorized  to  adopt  such  ordinances  as  may  be  necessary  to  secure  order 
and  quiet  in  the  city,  and  protect  the  morals  thereof,  it  may  by  ordi- 
nance prohibit  the  keeping  for  sale,  bartering  or  exchange  of  vinous, 
spirituous  or  malt  liquors  within  its  limits.^^®  But  it  has  been  held 
that  a  charter  conferring  power  to  pass  ordinances  to  preserve  the  peace 
and  good  order,  or  for  the  more  effectual  suppression  of  immorality, 
does  not  justify  the  licensing  of  the  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors,  or 
the  imposition  of  penalties  for  sale  without  license.-""  There  is  no 
doubt,  however,  that  the  legislature  may  grant  control  over  the  sale 
of  liquors.^""     Under  power  to  regulate  health  a  city  has  power  to 

^*  Cochrane  v.  Mayor  &c.,  81  Md.  tomers  with  certificates  of  weight  at 

54;  s.  c.  31  Atl.  703;  Chamberlain  v.  the    expense    of    dealers:    Sylvester 

City  of  Litchfield,  56  111.  App.  652.  Coal   Co.  v.   City  of   St.   Louis,    130 

=^  Waters  Pierce  Oil  Co.  v.  Mayor  Mo.  323;   s.  c.  32  S.  W.  649.     There 

&c.,  47  La.  An.  863;  s.  c.  17  So.  343.  is,  in  absence  of  statute,  no  power  to 

^^  City  of  Austin  v.  Austin  City  prohibit  the  use  of  profane  Ian- 
Cemetery  Ass'n,  87  Tex.  330;  s.  c.  28  guage:  State  v.  Home,  115  N.  C, 
S.  W.  528.  739;  s.  c.  20  S.  E.  443. 

^^  Village  of  Vicksburg  v.  Briggs,         ^^  Cunningham  v.  City  of  GriflSn, 

102  Mich.  551;  s.  c.  61  N.  W.  1.  107  Ga.  690;  s.  c.  33  S.  E.  664. 

=*^  Theisen    v.    McDavid,    34    Fla.        =™  Schlachter  v.  Stokes,  63  N.  J.  L. 

440;  s.  c.  16  So.  321.  138;  s.  c.  43  Atl.  571. 

=^City  of  Brooklyn  v.  Furey,  30  N.        ">"  State  v.  Haines,  35  Or.  379;  s.  c. 

Y.  S.  349;  s.  c.  61  N.  Y.  St  287.  58  Pac.  39.     See  Cunningham  v.  City 

=^' Borough  of  Warren  v.  Lewis,  16  of  Griffin,  107  Ga.  690;  s.  c.  33  S.  E. 

Pa.  Co.  R.  176.  664.     But  see  Schlachter  v.   Stokes, 

='"' City  of  Owensboro  V.  Sparks,  18  63   N.   J.   L.   138;    s.   c.   43  Atl.   571. 

Ky.  L.  269 ;  s.  c.  36  S.  W.  4.  Under  power  to  protect  health,  prop- 

^'^  Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  City  of  Chi-  erty  and  person  of  citizens  and  to 

cago,  181  111.  289;  s.  c.  54  N.  E.  825.  preserve  peace  and  good  order  a  mu- 

The  city  of  St.  Louis  has  power  to  nicipal  ordinance  may  prohibit  the 

require  coal-dealers  to  furnish  cus-  keeping  of   a   "blind   tiger"   or   the 


§    614  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  600 

disinfect  second-hand  clothing  at  specified  prices. ^"^  If  not  infring- 
ing vipon  constitutional  rights,  the  question  of  reasonableness  of  pro- 
hibiting slaughter-houses  within  the  city  limits  will  not  be  considered 
by  the  courts.^*^-  An  order  to  remove  and  destroy  animal  and  vegeta- 
ble matter  is  within  the  express  power  to  protect  health  and  main- 
tain cleanliness/"^  and  so  is  an  ordinance  to  prevent  the  sale  of  impure 
milk,  and  direct  its  destruction.^"*  A  statute  which  gives  a  munici- 
pality power  over  the  safety,  health  and  comfort  of  its  inhabitants, 
empowers  it  to  create  the  office  of  city  scavenger  and  prohibit  others 
than  the  city  scavenger  from  doing  scavenger-work.^"^  An  ordinance 
requiring  the  immediate  removal  of  dead  animals  without  giving 
the  owner  opportunity  to  dispose  of  them,  is  void.^"^ 

§  614.  To  promote  health. — Under  the  general  police  power  the 
legislature  may  delegate  to  a  municipality  the  authority  to  pass 
ordinances  for  the  preservation  of  the  health  or  the  promotion  of  the 
comfort,  convenience,  good  order  and  general  welfare  of  its  citizens, 
provided,  always,  that  they  are  not  in  conflict  with  the  provisions 
of  the  federal  and  state  constitutions,  framed  for  the  protection  of 
the  citizens  in  the  enjoyment  of  equal  rights,  privileges  and  immuni- 
ties.^"'^ A  municipality  authorized  by  the  legislature  to  pass  any 
ordinance  in  the  nature  of  a  police  regulation  that  is  consistent  with 
the  laws  of  the  land  may  prohibit  the  exposing  of  any  produce,  mer- 
chandise, cooked  provisions,  poultry,  fruit,  vegetables  or  other  com- 
modities on  the  space  between  stores  and  the  sidewalk,  as  well  as  upon 
the  sidewalk.^"^  • 

sale   of   vinous,   spirituous  or   malt  c.  10  S.  E.  143;  State  v.  Pendergrass, 

liquors:    Bagwell  v.   Town   of  Law-  106  N.  C.  664;  s.  c.  10  S.  E.  1002. 

renceville,  94  Ga.  654;  s.  c.  21  S.  E.  ^°*  State  v.  Summerfield,  107  N.  C. 

903.  895;    s.  c.  12  S.  E.  114.     The  court 

="^  Rosenbaum  v.  City  of  Newbern,  said: — "The  fact  that  produce,  mer- 

118  N.  C.  83;  s.  c.  24  S.  E.  1.  chandise,    meats,    etc.,    exposed    in 

^"-Rund   V.   Town   of   Fowler,    142  front  of  stores  might,  in  the  opinion 

Ind.  214;  s.  c.  41  N.  E.  456;  Belling  of  the  commissioners,  based  on  rea- 

V.  City  of  Evansville,  144  Ind.  644;  sonable      grounds,      endanger      the 

s.  c.  42  N.  E.  621.  health  of  the  citizens  of  the  town  or 

^"^  State   V.    Payssan,    47    La.    An.  incommode   them   in   passing   by   a 

1029;  s.  c.  17  So.  481.  way  left  open  for  them  by  the  own- 

"'"  Deems  v.  Mayor  &c.,  80  Md.  164;  er,    or    might    frighten    horses    at- 

s.  c.  30  Atl.  648.  tached  to  vehicles  driven  along  the 

'•^  City    of    Ouray    v.    Corson,    14  streets,  would  be  sufficient  to  war- 
Colo.  App.  345;  s.  c.  59  Pac.  876.  rant  the  enactment  under  the  gen- 

^'"'  State  V.  Morris,  47  La.  An.  1660;  eral  authority  to  prohibit  nuisances, 

s.  c.  18  So.  710.  protect  health  and  prevent  individu- 

^•^  State  V.  Moore,  104  N.  C.  714;  s.  als  from  so  using  their  own  prop- 


601  EXPRESS    CORPORATE   POWERS.  §    615 

§  615.  General  welfare,  etc. — A  general  statute  empowering  city 
councils  "to  enact  and  make  all  such  ordinances,  by-laws,  rules  and 
regulations  not  inconsistent  with  the  laws  of  the  state  as  may  be 
expedient  for  maintaining  the  peace,  good  government  and  welfare 
of  the  city  and  its  trade  and  commerce"  authorizes  the  enactment  of 
an  ordinance  regulating  the  sale  of  cider  by  prohibiting  such  sales 
in  less  quantities  than  a  gallon,  and  forbidding  it  to  be  drunk  on  the 
premises. ^"^  Neither  was  such  ordinance  unconstitutional  as  vio- 
lating private  rights  or  unreasonably  or  improperly  restraining 
trade. ^^^  The  general-welfare  clause  has  been  held  to  confer  power 
upon  a  city  council  to  prohibit  the  keeping  open  of  stores,  shops  and 
other  places  of  business  on  Sunday.^ ^^  Under  it  an  ordinance  to  pre- 
vent the  keeping  of  a  bawdy-house  has  been  held  valid  ;^^^  also  an  or- 
dinance prohibiting  saloons,  restaurants  and  other  places  of  public 
entertainment  being  kept  open  after  ten  o'clock  at  night.^^^  So  under 
it  a  municipality  may  fix  the  time  or  places  of  holding  public  markets 
for  the  sale  of  food.^^*  The  establishment  of  a  by-law  imposing  a 
penalty  for  mutilating  any  ornamental  tree  planted  in  any  of  the 
streets  or  public  places  of  a  city  has  been  held  within  the  authority 
to  pass  such  ordinances  as  "shall  be  needful  to  the  good  order  of  tJie 
city.'^^^^  Under  the  power  to  make  regulations  which  may  be  neces- 
sary or  expedient  for  the  promotion  of  health  or  the  suppression  of 
disease  an  incorporated  city  has  the  right  to  require  sellers  of  meats 
to  take  out  licenses.^ ^^ 

erty  as  to  subject  others  to  serious  S.  678;  s.  c.  8  S.  Ct.  992,  1257;  Stokes 

and    unnecessary    inconvenience    or  v.  Corporation  &c.  of  New  York,  14 

danger."     See  also,  State  v.  Stovall,  Wend.    (N.    Y.)    88;    Mayor    &c.    v. 

103  N.  C.  416;  s.  c.  8  S.  E.  900;   In-  Yuille,  3  Ala.  137;  State  v.  Campbell, 

tendant  &c.  v.  Sorrell,  1  Jones  L.  (N.  64  N.  H.  402;    s.  c.  13  Atl.  585  and 

C.)  49;  Cooley  Const.  Lim.  *58.  note. 

^'^  Monroe  v.  City  of  Lawrence,  44  ^^^  City  of  St.  Louis  v.  Cafferata,  24 

Kan.   607;    s.   c.   24   Pac.   1113.     The  Mo.  94. 

court  said: — "Instead  of  specifically  ^'^  State  v.  Williams,  11  S.  C.  288. 

defining     every     regulation     which  ^"'^  State  v.  Freeman,  38  N.  H.  426. 

might  be   necessary   to   the   health,  ^"  Wartman    v.    City    of   Philadel- 

safety,  peace  and  convenience  of  the  phia,  33  Pa.  St.  202. 

public,   the   legislature   enacted   the  ^'=  State  v.  Merrill,  37  Maine  329. 

general  welfare  clause;  and  it  seems  ""Kinsley  v.  City  of  Chicago,  124 

to  us  that  it  furnishes  sufficient  au-  111.  359;  s.  c.  16  N.  E.  260.     See  also, 

thority  for  the  council  to  pass  an  Williams  v.  City  Council  &c.,  4  Ga. 

ordinance  so  clearly  in  the  interest  509;  Matter  of  Yick  Wo,  68  Cal.  294; 

of  peace,  good  order  and  health  as  s.  c.  9  Pac.  139;  City  of  St.  Louis  v. 

the  one  in  question."  Schoenbusch,  95  Mo.  618;   s.  c.  8  S. 

""Monroe  v.  City  of  Lawrence,  44  W.   791;    Mayor  v.   Williams,   15   N. 

Kan.   607;    s.   c.   24   Pac.   1113.     See  Y.    502;    State    v.    Welch,    36    Conn, 

also,  Powell  v.  Pennsylvania,  127  U.  215;    Commonwealth  v.   McCafferty, 


§    616  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  602 

§  616.  To  license. — A  contract  between  a  council  and  a  corporation 
for  the  extension  of  pipes  into  the  municipal  territory  from  a  neighbor- 
ing city,  which  leaves  for  an  indefinite  period  to  other  parties  the 
regulation  of  the  price  to  be  paid  or  the  quantity  or  quality  of  gas 
to  be  furnished,  and  which  confers  exclusive  rights,  has  bc^n  held 
to  be  ujiauthorized,  under  a  statute  which  prohibits  the  granting  of 
exclusive  privileges. ^^^  The  general  legislation  of  1887  in  Minnesota, 
regulating  the  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors,  although  applicable  to 
cities,  has  been  held  not  to  have  had  the  effect  of  repealing  by  impli- 
cation existing  municipal  ordinances  upon  the  subject,  or  the  charter 
power  to  enact  ordinances  not  inconsistent  with  the  general  law.^^* 
An  act  giving  a  city  power  to  assess  a  license  tax  upon  all  persons 
carrying  on  "any  business,  trade  or  profession"  within  the  city  au- 
thorizes the  assessment  of  a  tax  for  retailing  cigars,  although  the 
cigars  are  sold  in  connection  with  a  grocery  business  and  the  grocer 
has  taken  out  a  general  license  for  such  business. ^^^  A  city  ordinance 
declaring  it  a  misdemeanor  punishable  by  fine  to  keep  stallions, 
etc.,  within  the  city  limits  for  service  has  been  held  invalid.^-"  The 
board  of  county  supervisors  has  authority  to  appoint  a  license-col- 
lector under  a  valid  ordinance  referring  to  the  selling  of  liquor  at 
retail.^  ^^ 

§  617.  Occupations. — A  power  to  license  and  regulate  hack-owners 
and  drivers,  and  to  prohibit  unlicensed  persons  and  vehicles  from 
engaging  in  such  capacities  warrants  the  imposition  of  a  reasonable 
pecuniary  penalty  for  a  violation  of  an  ordinance  requiring  such  a 
license.^- ^     A  similar  power  in  a  charter  extending  to  public  grounds 

145   Mass.  384;    s.  c.   14  N.  E.   451;  See  also,   Moore  v.   City   of   Minne- 

Commonwealth  v.  Davis,   140  Mass.  apolis,  43  Minn.  418;   s.  c.  45  N.  W. 

485;  s.  c.  4  N.  E.  577;  Dillon  Mimic.  719. 

Corp.   (4th  ed.),  §§  396-407.  '"City  of  Mobile  v.  Craft,  94  Ala. 

''"Cincinnati  Gas  Light  &c.  Co.  v.  156;  s.  c.  10  So.  534. 

Avondale,  43  Ohio  St.  257;  s.  c.  1  N.  ^^^Ex  parte   Robinson    (Tex.),   17 

E.  527.  S.    W.    1057,    as    such    keeping    was 

™  State  V.  Harris,  50  Minn.  128;  not  a  nuisance  per  se  and  its  prohi- 
s.  c.  52  N.  W.  387.  The  court  said,  bition  not  authorized  either  by  re- 
in addition  to  "repeals  by  implica-  vised  statutes  of  Texas,  arts.  403, 
tion"  not  being  "favored": — "This  408,  empowering  cities  to  abate  nui- 
principle  has  peculiav  force  from  the  sances,  or  by  art.  383,  empowering 
fact  that  the  laws,  the  implied  re-  cities  to  "regulate"  occupations  and 
peal  of  which  is  in  question,  were  callings. 

principally  special  laws,  enacted  to  ''"'  Amador  Co.  v.  Kennedy,  70  Cal. 

meet  the  needs  of  particular  locali-  458;  s.  c.  11  Pac.  758. 

ties,    while    the    repealing    act    was  '"  Haynes  v.  City  of  Cape  May,  52 

general,    and    not   thus   particular."  N.  J.  L.  180;   s.  c.  19  Atl.  176;   City 


G03  EXPRESS    CORrOEATE    POWERS.  §    618 

and  spaces  has  been  held  to  authorize  the  enactment  of  an  ordinance 
forbidding  farmers,  huclcsters,  pedlers,  etc.,  from  standing  with  their 
vehicles  and  carts  on  the  streets  adjacent  to  the  city  market,  within 
five  hundred  feet  of  such  market. ^-^  But  provisions  conferring  pow- 
ers to  license  persons  in  such  lines  of  business  have  been  held  to 
apply  only  to  those  who  are  engaged  in  business  as  carriers  of  persons 
or  property  for  hire,  and  not  to  those  who,  not  being  engaged  in  such 
business,  merely  hire  out  teams  and  vehicles  to  those  who  have  prop- 
erty to  transport,  the  hirer  himself  using  and  controlling  the  team 
and  vehicle.^-*  Under  a  power  granted  to  a  city  to  regulate  hack- 
men,  porters,  etc.,  a  city  may  by  ordinance  prohibit  their  soliciting 
custom  at  the  depot  or  on  the  .platform  of  any  railroad  within  its 
corporate  limits. ^^^  An  ordinance  prohibiting  a  transfer  company 
from  soliciting  business  in  a  depot  does  not  impair  the  obligation 
of  a  contract  between  the  transfer  company  and  the  depot  company, 
whereby  the  former  was  given  the  exclusive  privilege  of  soliciting 
patronage  in  the  trains  and  depots  so  far  as  lawful.^-*' 

§  618.  The  same  subject  continued. — An  ordinance  requiring  pawn- 
brokers to  take  out  licenses  is  not  authorized  by  a  statute  empowering 
the  council  to  pass  ordinances  not  inconsistent  with  the  laws  of  the 
state  and  necessary  to  carry  out  the  objects  of  the  corporation. ^^^ 

of  St.  Louis  v.  Weitzel,  130  Mo.  600;  724.     But  power  to  license  drays  is 

s.   c.   31    S.   W.    1045.     Ttiere   is  no  not     power     to     tax     milk-wagons: 

power  to  require  a  license  from  an  Reading  City  v.  Bitting,  167  Pa.  St. 

expressman  carrying  parcels  from  a  21;  s.  c.  31  Atl.  359. 

place  within  to  a  place  without  the  ^"People  v.  Keir,  78  Mich.  98;  s.  c. 

city  or  vice  versa:   City  of  Cairo  v.  43  N.  W.  1039. 

Adams  Exp.  Co.,  54  111.  App.  87.     It  =***  State  v.  Robinson,  42  Minn.  107; 

is    a    legitimate    exercise    of    police  s.  c.  43  N.  W.  833. 

power  to  require  all  persons,  dairy-  «^  City  of  Chillicothe  v.  Brown,  38 

men  or  herdsmen,  supplying  cities,  Mo.  App.  609. 

towns  and  villages  with  milk,  to  reg-  ""  Lindsay  v.  Mayor  &c.,  104  Ala. 

ister   their   herds   or   cattle   with    a  257;  s.  c.  16  So.  545. 

live-stock  sanitary  board  whose  duty  ^"  Shuman  v.  City  of  Fort  Wayne, 

it  shall  be  to  inspect  at  least  annu-  127  Ind.  109;   s.  c.  26  N.  E.  560,  the 

ally,    without    notice,    the    premises  court  putting   the   ruling   upon   the 

wherein  cows  are  kept,  and  if  found  principle    that    the    right    to    exact 

in  an  unsanitary  condition  to  pro-  that  they  should  take  out  a  license 

hibit  the  sale  of  milk  or  its  ship-  must  be  expressly  conferred  by  stat- 

ment  until  such  time  as  the  prem-  ute;    it  not  being  unlawful  to  con- 

ises  shall  conform  to  sanitary  condi-  duct  such  business,  and  there  being 

tions  prescribed:  State  v.  Broodbelt,  no  power  to  prohibit  it  in  the  coun- 

89  Md.  565;   s.  c.  43  Atl.  771.     A  11-  cil,  they  could  not  require  of  him  a 

cense  of  $10  per  annum  for  the  sale  license  as  a  condition  precedent  to 

of  milk  is  reasonable:   Littlefield  v.  carrying  on  the  business. 

State,  42   Neb.   223;    s.  c.   60   N.  W. 


§    618  PUBLIC    CORPOKATIONS.  604 

But  all  the  authorities  agree  that  the  business  of  the  pawnbroker  is 
a  proper  matter  for  regulation  by  the  police  power,^^^  Under  the  police 
power  a  city  council  may  forbid  the  keeping  or  storing  of  petroleum, 
naphtha,  benzine,  gasoline,  or  any  inflammable  or  explosive  oils,  within 
the  corporate  limits  in  quantities  greater  than  five  barrels  at  a  time. 
Licensing  the  sale  of  an  article  is  a  legitimate  means  of  regulating 
its  sale,^-''  and -the  power  to  regulate  the  inspection  of  an  article 
includes  power  to  license.^^°  To  render  a  license  valid  there  must 
be  no  discrimination  between  persons  engaged  in  the  same  line  of 
business.  An  ordinance  attempting  to  discriminate  between  those 
having  license  for  a  dramshop  and  a  druggist's  permit  is  invalid. ^^^ 
There  is  no  power  to  impose  a  license  on  non-residents  which  is  not 
applicable  to  residents.^^-  A  license  must  be  uniform  and  equal  as 
to  time.  Hence  a  tax  of  $150  from  the  date  of  application  to  the 
following  January  is  void.^^^  A  council  may  require  a  license  of  $3 
on  telegraph-poles  under  power  to  regulate  streets,^ ^*  but  not  so  if 
the  license  fee  is  unreasonable  and  disproportionate.^^^  A  license 
must  not  only  bear  equally  upon  all  affected  thereby,  but  it  must  also 
be  reasonable,  but  reasonableness  depends  on  the  nature  of  the  busi- 
ness and  other  circumstances.  A  license  of  $50  per  annum  on  pawn- 
brokers  and   $25   on   junk-dealers   has   been   held   reasonable.^^®     A 

=>=**  Shuman  V.  City  of  Port  Wayne,  and    sale-stable:    Carson    v.    Mayor 

127  Ind.  109;  s.  c.  26  N.  E.  560.     See  &c.,  94  Ga.  617;  s.  c.  20  S.  E.  116. 

also,  Van  Baalen  v.  People,  40  Mich.  "'  Gundling  v.  City  of  Chicago,  176 

258;  Launder  v.  City  of  Chicago,  111  111.  340;  s.  c.  52  N.  E.  44;  Farwell  v. 

111.   291.     It  is  not  unreasonable  to  City  of  Chicago,  71  111.  269;  Chicago 

require    pawnbrokers,    junk-dealers.  Packing  Co.  v.  City  of  Chicago,  88 

etc.,  to  keep  a  record  of  purchases  111.  221;  Kinsley  v.  City  of  Chicago, 

and  sales  and  furnish  statement  to  124  111.  359;  s.  c.  16  N.  E.  260. 

police-department:     City    of    Grand  ==°  City  of  Cairo  v.  Coleman,  53  111. 

Rapids  v.  Brandy,  105  Mich.  670;   s.  App.    680;    Farwell   v.   City   of   Chi- 

c.  64  N.  W.  29.     Nor  is  it  unreason-  cago,  71  111.  269;  Kinsley  v.  City  of 

able  to  require  the  application  to  be  Chicago,  124  111.  359,  362;  s.  c.  16  N. 

signed  by  twelve  freeholders  certi-  E.  260. 

fying  to  the  good  character  and  rep-  "'  Popel  v.  City  of  Monmouth,  81 

utation  of  the  applicants:  Ibid.   And  111.  App.  512. 

see  City  of  St.  Joseph  v.  Levin,  128  ^'-  City    of    Saginaw    v.    Saginaw 

Mo.  588;  s.  c.  31  S.  W.  101.     A  city  Circuit  Judge,  106  Mich.  32;  s.  c.  63 

may  require  dealers  in  fresh  meats  N.  W.  985. 

and  dressed  poultry  to  take  out  a  li-  '''  Moore   v.   City   of   St.    Paul,    61 

cense  and  prohibit  the  sale  thereof  Minn.  427;  s.  c.  63  N.  W.  1087. 

except  in  a  public  market:   State  v.  ^='*  Postal  Tel.  &c.  Co.  v.  Mayor  &c., 

McMahon,  62  Minn.  110;   s.  c.  64  N.  79  Md.  502;  s.  c.  29  Atl.  819. 

W.    92.     The    city    of    Forsyth,    Ga.,  '■"*  City  of  St.  Louis  v.  Western  U. 

has  power  to  require  tax  on  livery-  Tel.  Co.,  63  Fed.  68. 

^™  City  of  Grand  Rapids  v.  Braudy, 


605  EXPRESS    CORPORATE    POWERS,  §    618 

license  may  provide  for  revocation  at  the  will  of  the  council,^^^ 
except  by  permission  as  in  the  ordinance  provided. ^^^  A  statute 
empowering  city  councils  to  regulate  the  use  of  the  public  streets 
does  not  authorize  an  ordinance  that  no  processions  shall  be  allowed 
upon  the  streets  until  a  permit  shall  be  obtained  from  the  superin- 
tendent of  police,  leaving  the  issuance  of  such  permits  to  his  discre- 
tion, since  the  power  conferred  upon  the  council  can  not  be  delegated 
by  them.^^^  Nor  was  such  an  ordinance  authorized  by  the  grant  of 
power  in  the  general  incorporation  act  "to  regulate  and  prohil)it  the 
exhibition  or  carrying  of  banners;  *  *  *  to  declare  what  shall 
be  a  nuisance  and  abate  the  same;  *  *  *  to  prevent  and  suppress 
riots,  routs,  affrays,  noises,  disturbance,  disorderly  assemblies  in  any 
public  or  private  place."^*"'  An  incorporated  town  has  power,  under 
a  statute  authorizing  it  "to  provide  for  the  measuring  or  weighing  of 
hay,  coal,"  etc.,. to  grant  to  individual  dealers  the  right  to  set  scales 
in  the  public  streets  in  front  of  their  places  of  business  in  such  a  way 
as  not  to  be  an  obstruction  to  travel.^* ^  In  Iowa  the  board  of  super- 
visors may  employ  counsel  to  institute  an  action  in  behalf  of  the 
county,  and  their  right  to  do  so  is  not  dependent  on  the  consent  of 
the  county  attorney.^*-  County  supervisors  in  Michigan  have  no 
authority,  by  resolution,  to  vote  the  sheriff  a  salary  in  lieu  of  all 

105  Mich.  670;  s.  c.  64  N.  W.  29.  And  ties  within  the  limits  of  a  city  is  so 

see,  as  to  millt-dealers,  Littlefield  v.  great  as  to  invite  legislative  control 

State,  42  Neb.  223;    s.  c.  60  N.  W.  of    the    same    by    the    city    govern- 

724.  ment." 

=•"  City  of  Grand  Rapids  v.  Brandy,        339  cj^y  ^f  Chicago  v.  Trotter,  136 

105  Mich.  670;  s.  c.  64  N.  W.  29.  And  m.  430;  s.  c.  26  N.  E.  359.     See  also, 

see  Economides  v.  Hinricks,  48  La.  Bills  v.  City  of  Goshen,  117  Ind.  221; 

An.  370;    s.  c.  19  So.  124.     May  re-  s.  c.  20  N.  E.  115;  Mayor  v.  Radecke, 

quire  license-plate  on  vehicle:    City  49  Md.  217;  Barthet  v.  City  of  New 

of  St.  Louis  v.  Weitzel,  130  Mo.  600;  Orleans,  24  Fed.  563;   State  v.  Mah- 

s.  c.  31  S.  W.   1045.     A  charter  au-  ner,  43  La.  An.  496;  s.  c.  9  So.  480; 

thorizing  a  city  to  levy  a  license  tax  City  of  Newton  v.  Belger,  143  Mass. 

on   railroads  is  not  in  violation  of  598;  s.  c.  10  N.  E.  464. 
Alabama  constitution:   Alabama  &c.        ^"Trotter  v.   City  of  Chicago,   33 

R    Co.  V.  City  of  Bessemer,  113  Ala.  111.  App.  206;  s.  c.  sub  nom.  City  of 

668;    s.  c.   21   So.   64.     N.   J.  act  of  Chicago  v.   Trotter  affirmed  in   136 

March  28,  1892,  does  not  authorize  111.    430;    26    N.    E.    359.     See    also, 

tax  on  groceries:  Guerin  v.  Borough  Matter  of  Frazee,  63  Mich.  396;  s.  c. 

of  Asbury  Park,  57  N.  J.  L.  292;  s.  c.  30   N.   W.   72;    Anderson  v.  City  of 

30  Atl.  472.  Wellington,    40    Kan.    173;    s.    c.    19 

^^  City    of    Richmond    v.    Dudley,  Pac.  719. 
129  Ind.  112;  s.  c.  26  N.  E.  184.    The        ^"  Incorporated   Town   of   Spencer 

court  said: — "The  danger  to  be  ap-  v.  Andrew,  82  Iowa  14;   s.  c.  47  N. 

prehended  to  life  and  property  from  W.  1007. 

the   storing   of    inflammable   or   ex-        ^"  Taylor  Co.  v.  Standley,  79  Iowa 

plosive  substances  in  large  quanti-  666;  s.  c.  44  N.  W.  911. 


§    G19  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  606 

statutory  fees  for  services  rendered  the  county,  and  include  sucli  sal- 
ary in  the  yearly  tax  levy.^''^ 

§  619.  Public  offenses. — An  ordinance  imposing  a  fine  of  $25  for 
the  use  of  "any  abusive  or  indecent  language,  cursing,  swearing, 
or  any  loud  or  boisterous  talking,  holloaing,  or  any  other  disorderly 
conduct,"  is  reasonable  and  authorized  under  a  statutory  power  to 
abate  nuisances.^**  But  the  same  provision  would  not  authorize  an 
ordinance  making  it  an  offense  for  the  occupant  or  owner  of  any 
room  to  suffer  or  allow  prostitution  therein,  or  males  and  females  to 
cohabit  therein  without  being  lawfully  married. ^*^  Authority  to  sup- 
press bawdy-houses  does  not  include  power  to  provide  by  ordinance 
that  "circumstances  from  which  it  may  reasonably  be  inferred  that 
any  house  is  frequented  by  disorderly  persons  or  persons  of  notoriously 
bad  character  shall  be  sufficient  to  establish  that  such  house  is  a  dis- 
orderly house  or  house  of  ill  fame.^*®  An  ordinance  making  a  mere 
private  trespass  on  land  penal  is  not  authorized  by  a  statute  which 
confers  on  the  common  council  authority  to  "declare  what  shall  be 
considered  nuisances  in  the  *  *  *  }Q^g  a,nd  places  in  said  borough 
and  remove  all  obstructions,"  etc.^*" 

§  620.  The  same  subject  continued. — Ordinances  prohibiting  the 
carrying  of  concealed  weapons,  disturbing  the  peace  and  selling  liquor 
on  Sunday  are  not  "inconsistent  with  the  laws  of  the  state,"  although 
the  prohibited  acts  are  made  offenses  by  general  statute.^*^     Author- 

^'^  Hewitt  v.  White,  78  Mich.  117;  =>*"  Mansf .  Dig.  Arlc.,  §  764,  which 

s.  c.  43  N.  W.  1043.  authorizes  the  passage  of  ordinances 

^^  State   v.    Earnhardt,    107    N.   C.  by  cities  not  inconsistent  with  the 

789;    s.   c.   12    S.   E.    426.     See   also,  laws  of  the  state,  to  suppress  disor- 

State  v.  Cainan,  94  N.  C.  883;  State  derly     conduct,     provide     for     the 

v.  McNinch,  87  N.  C.  567;    State  v.  safety,  preserve  the  health,  promote 

Merritt,  83  N.  C.  677.  the    prosperity,    and     improve    the 

^"  State  V.  Webber,  107  N.  C.  962;  morals,  order,  comfort  and  conveni- 

s.  c.  12  S.  E.  598.  ence  of  the  corporation  and  its  in- 

^^^  State  V.  Webber,  107  N.  C.  962;  habitants:    Van   Buren  v.  Wells,  53 

s.  c.  12   S.  E.   598.     The  court  said  Ark.    368;    s.   c.    14    S.   W.    38.     The 

this  would  be  prescribing  new  rules  court    said: — "The    only    limitation 

of  evidence.     See  also.  City  of  Char-  upon  this  power  is  that  the  by-laws 

iton  V.  Barber,  54  Iowa  360;   s.  c.  6  and  ordinances  must  'not  be  incon- 

N.  W.  528;    Darst  v.  People,  51  111.  sistent  with  the  laws  of  the  state.' 

286;  City  of  Mt.  Pleasant  v.  Breeze,  The  ordinances  in  question  do  not 

11     Iowa     399;      Wood     Nuisances,  fall  within  the  limitation,  and  are 

§§  740,  741;    1  Dillon  Munic.  Corp.,  wholesome  provisions  for  the  prose- 

§§  309,  310.  cution    [promotion?]    and    improve- 

="  Bregguglia  v.  Borough  of  Vine-  ment   of   the    order   and    morals   of 

land,  53  N.  J.  L.  168;    s.  c.  20  Atl.  the    inhabitants    for    whose    benefit 

1082,  they  were  designed,  and  a  proper  ex- 


607 


EXPRESS    CORPORATE   POWERS. 


§  621 


ity  given  to  a  city  "to  prevent  and  restrain  disturbances"  does  not 
include  the  right  to  take  jurisdiction  and  punish  for  the  crime  of  an 
assault  with  a  dangerous  weapon.^'*®  The  power  given  a  city  council 
to  restrain  and  prohibit  all  descriptions  of  gambling  and  fraudulent 
devices  and  practices  authorizes  an  ordinance  prohibiting  the  keeping 
or  setting  up  of  any  gambling  device  designed  to  be  used  in  gambling, 
and  imposing  a  penalty  for  its  violation.^ ^"^ 

§  621.  Nuisances. — Under  a  power  in  a.  charter  to  define  and  abate 
nuisances  a  city  was  held  authorized  to  declare  by  ordinance  the 
running  at  large  of  domestic  animals  a  nuisance  ;^^^  and  this  power 
was  not  abrogated  by  a  statute  providing  that  it  should  be  lawful  for 
stock  to  run  at  large  where  the  inliabitants  of  the  county  adopted  the 
stock  law,  which  was  done  in  the  county  where  the  city  was  situated. 
Under  authority  to  maintain  the  public  health  and  to  suppress  all 
nuisances  the  city  of  New  Orleans  has  been  held  empowered  to  pass 
an  ordinance  prohibiting  smoking  in  street-cars  under  penalty  of 


ercise  of  the  power  conferred."  See 
also,  Mayor  &c.  v.  Allaire,  14  Ala. 
400;  Town  of  Bloomfield  v.  Trimble, 
54  Iowa  399;  s.  c.  6  N.  W.  586;  37 
Am.  R.  212;  St.  Louis  v.  Bentz, 
11  Mo.  61;  St.  Louis  v.  Cafferata,  24 
Mo.  94;  State  v.  Williams,  11  S.  C. 
288;  Hamilton  v.  State,  3  Tex.  App. 
643;  McLaughlin  v.  Stephens,  2  Cr. 
C.  C.  148;  United  States  v.  Wells,  2 
Cr.  C.  C.  45;  City  of  St.  Louis  v. 
Schoenbush,  95  Mo.  618;  s.  c.  8  S. 
W.  791;  State  v.  Beattie,  16  Mo.  App. 
131;  Brownville  v.  Cook,  4  Neb.  101. 
The  court  further  approved  the  doc- 
trine laid  down  by  Judge  Cooley 
that  "an  act  may  be  a  penal  offense 
under  the  laws  of  the  state,  and 
further  penalties,  under  proper  leg- 
islative authority,  be  imposed  for  its 
commission  by  municipal  by-laws, 
and  the  enforcement  of  the  one 
would  not  preclude  the  enforcement 
of  the  other,"  of  which  the  author 
says: — "Such  is  the  clear  weight  of 
authority,  though  the  decisions  are 
not  uniform:"  Cooley  Const.  Lim. 
(6th  ed.)  239;  Hughes  v.  People,  8 
Colo.  536;  s.  c.  9  Pac.  50;  Wragg  v. 
Penn  Tp.,  94  111.  11;  Ambrose  v. 
State,  6  Ind.  351;   Williams  v.  City 


of  Warsaw,  60  Ind.  547;  Shafer  v. 
Mumma,  17  Md.  331;  Wayne  Co.  v. 
City  of  Detroit,  17  Mich.  390;  State 
V.  Oleson,  26  Minn.  507;  s.  c.  5  N. 
W.  959;  State  v.  Lee,  29  Minn.  445; 
s.  c.  13  N.  AV.  913 ;  City  of  Linneus  v. 
Duskey,  19  Mo.  App.  20;  City  of 
Kansas  v.  Clark,  68  Mo.  588;  Ex 
parte  Hollwedell,  74  Mo.  395;  City  of 
St.  Louis  V.  Vert,  84  Mo.  204;  Howe 
V.  Treasurer  of  Plainfield,  37  N.  J. 
L.  145;  State  v.  Bergman,  6  Or.  341; 
Greenwood  v.  State,  6  Baxt.  (Tenn.) 
567;  State  v.  Taxing  District  &c.,  16 
Lea  (Tenn.)  240;  United  States  v. 
Holly,  3  Cr.  C.  C.  656.  On  similar 
principle.  Fox  v.  Ohio,  5  How.  410; 
Moore  v.  Illinois,  14  How.  13;  Briz- 
zolari  v.  State,  37  Ark.  364;  Bishop 
Stat.  Crimes  (1st  ed.),  §  23. 

^^^  Walsh  V.  City  of  Union,  13  Or. 
589;  s.  c.  11  Pac.  312. 

'="  State  V.  Grimes,  50  Minn.  123; 
s.  c.  52  N.  W.  42,  holding  a  "stock 
clock"  under  the  evidence  to  be  a 
gambling  device. 

^^^  City  of  Quincy  v.  O'Brien,  24 
111.  App.  591.  See  also,  Roberts  v. 
Ogle,  30  111.  459;  Seeley  v.  Peters,  5 
Gilm.  (111.)  130. 


§    623  PUBLIC    CORrORATIONS.  608 

fine  and  imprisonment.^''''-  A  provision  in  the  charter  of  a  city  em- 
powering the  mayor  and  council  to  abate  nuisances  public  and  private, 
and  to  pass  all  ordinances  they  may  deem  necessary  for  preserving 
the  good  order  and  good  government  of  the  city,  confers  on  them 
by  necessary  implication  authority  to  establish  fire-limits.^'^^  But 
a  city  has  no  authority  to  pass  an  ordinance  imposing  a  tine  for  the 
maintenance  of  a  nuisance  under  a  statute  providing  that  incorpoTated 
towns  shall  have  power  to  prevent  injury  or  annoyance  from  anything 
dangerous,  offensive  or  unhealthy,  and  to  cause  any  nuisance  to  be 
abated.  3^^ 

§  622.  Holidays,  etc. — It  was  held  that  a  statute  authorizing  a 
"town"  to  raise  money  by  taxation  "for  the  purpose  of  celebrating 
any  centennial  anniversary  of  its  incorporation"  referred  to  the  act 
which  was  the  beginning  of  its  corporate  existence,  whether  as  a  dis- 
trict or  as  a  town.^^^  A  city  council  may  appropriate  money  for 
public  concerts  by  a  band  under  a  statute  authorizing  the  city  council 
of  the  city  in  a  manner  specified  to  appropriate  money,  not  exceeding 
a  certain  amount,  for  armories,  for  the  celebration  of  holidays,  "and 
for  other  purposes."^^*' 

§  623.  Power  to  purchase,  lease  and  convey  real  estate. — A  city 
may  lawfully  purchase  and  hold  all  real  estate  necessary  for  corporate 

"^^  State  V.  Heidenhain,  42  La.  An.  passage  of  needful  ordinances  and 

483;  s.  c.  7  So.  621.  The  court  said: —  prescriptions  of  fines  and  penalties 

"The  city  council  of  New  Orleans  is  to  carry  the  first  grant  of  power  into 

to  a  limited  extent  clothed  with  leg-  effect,  the  council  could  provide  for 

islative   authority   and    it   is   vested  the   taking   up   and    impounding   of 

with  that  discretion  within  its  pow-  cattle  found  running  at  large  in  the 

ers  common  to  all  legislative  bodies,  public  streets,  and  for  selling  them 

Within  the  exercise  of  this  legisla-  to  pay  charges. 

tive  discretion  it  has  the  authority        ^'-^  Hill  v.  Selectmen  &c.,  140  Mass. 

to  determine  what  is  a  nuisance  and  381;  s.  c.  4  N.  E.  811. 
to  enact  the  necessary  ordinances  to        ^'•'^  Hubbard  v.  City  of  Taunton,  140 

suppress  it."     See  also,  Kennedy  v.  Mass.  467;    s.  c.   5  N.  E.   157.     The 

Phelps,   10  La.  An.  227;    Mayor  &c.  court  said: — "The  word  'other'  im- 

V.  Gerspach,  33  La.  An.  1011.  plies  that  the  celebration  of  holidays 

353  pord   V.   Thralkill,   84   Ga.   169;  is  a  public  purpose  within  the  mean- 

s.  c.  10  S.  E.  600.    Under  "such  gen-  ing  of  the   act,   and   indicates  that 

eral  welfare"  clauses,  said  the  court,  purposes  which  are  public  only  in 

^**  City  of  Knoxville  v.  Chicago  &c.  that  sense  are  included  within   its 

R.  Co.,  83  Iowa  636;   s.  c.  50  N.  W.  scope;    although    they    look    rather 

61.     In  Burdett  v.  Allen,  35  W.  Va.  more    obviously    to    increasing    the 

347;  s.  c.  13  S.  E.  1012,  it  was  held  picturesqueness  and  interest  of  life 

that  under  W.  Va.  code,  ch.  47,  §  28,  than  to  the  satisfaction  of  rudimen- 

empowering  the  council  of  a  city  to  tary  wants,  which  alone  we  gener- 

prevent  cattle  from  going  at  large  ally  recognize  as  necessary." 
in  the  city,  and  §  29,  empowering  the 


609  EXPRESS    CORPORATE    POWERS.  §    624 

purposes.^^^  Where  the  city  has  power  to  purchase  land  for  public 
buildings,  and  does  so,  and  having  no  power  to  sell,  it  can  not  pur- 
chase other  lands  not  adjoining  for  the  same  purpose.^^^  It  may, 
like  an  individual,  acquire  land  by  adverse  possession.^^^  Where  the 
constitution  prohibits  the  state  from  becoming  interested  in  any  in- 
ternal improvement,  it  is  prohibitive  of  a  city  purchasing,  leasing  or 
otherwise  acquiring  by  conveyance  a  street-railway.^^''  Property  held 
in  trust,  as  water-works  property,  can  not  be  sold  by  a  city  without 
legislative  authority. ^"^^  Where  a  city  has  power  to  lease  land  for 
city  purposes  it  may  lease  land  for  a  public  park.^*^^  The  right  to  lease 
to  a  steamship  company  a  small  portion  of  its  water  front  has  been 
recognized.  ^"^^ 

§  624.  Power  to  subscribe  for  stock. — Without  authority  given  in 
the  statute  or  charter  a  municipality  has  no  power  to  subscribe  for 
stock  in  a  private  corporation,  and  with  such  power  there  must  be 
found  some  constitutional  warrant.  A  statute  authorizing  cities  to 
take  stock  in  a  mineral  corporation,  organized  to  develop  mineral 
resources,  is  unconstitutional  and  void;^®*  but  it  has  been  held  that 
an  act  which  authorizes  a  municipality  to  subscribe  for  stock  in  a 
canal  company  and  levy  taxes  to  pay  therefor  is  not  unconstitutional 
in  that  it  takes  property  without  due  process  of  law.^®^  Power  in  the 
charter  to  take  stock  in  chartered  companies  for  making  roads  author- 
izes taking  stock  in  a  railroad,^""  but  there  must  be  charter  power 
to  do  so.^*^^ 

^■''  Richmond   &c.   Co.   v.   Town   of  ^^°  Attorney-General  v.  Pingree,  120 

West  Point,  94  Va.  668;  s.  c.  27  S.  E.  Mich.  550;  s.  c.  79  N.  W.  814. 

460.  '"'  Huron  Water  Works  Co.  v.  City 

="^McGuire  v.  Atlantic  City,  63  N.  of  Huron,  7  S.  D.  9;   s.  c.  62  N.  W. 

J.  L.  91;  s.  c.  42  Atl.  781.  975. 

==*"  Stephens    v.    Murray,    132    Mo.  ■"'=  Holder  v.   City  of  Yonkers,   56 

468;  s.  c.  34  S.  W.  56.  Commissioners  N.  Y.  S.  912;   s.  c.  39  App.  Div.   (N. 

having  power  by  statute  to  buy  land  Y. )   1. 

may  do  so  under  Mass.  St.  1886,  ch.  ="3  Pacific  Coast  S.  S.  Co.  v.  Kim- 

240,  §  10:     Inhabitants  &c.  v.  Paul,  ball,  114  Cal.  414;  s.  c.  46  Pac.  275. 

173   Mass.   148;    s.   c.   53   N.   E.   272.  ^'^^  City  of  Geneseo  v.  Geneseo  &c. 

Construction  of  N.  Y,  laws  of  1892,  Co.,  55  Kan.  358;    s.  c.  40  Pac.  655. 

ch.  466,  §§  1,  2,  8,  in  relation  to  pur-  And  see,  as  to  Kansas,  ^tna  L.  Ins. 

chase   of   land:     Choate   v.    City   of  Co.  v.  City  of  Burrton,  75  Fed.  962. 

Buffalo,  57  N.  Y.  S.  383;  s.  c.  39  App.  ^"^  Goddin  v.  Crump,  8  Leigh  (Va.) 

Div.    (N.   Y.)    379.     Water   commis-  120. 

sioners    have    power    under    Mass.  ^"^  Evansville  v.  Dennett,  161  U.  S. 

laws  of  1886,  ch.  240,  §§  2,  10  &  15,  434;  s.  c.  16  S.  Ct.  613. 

to    purchase    land    which    will    bind  ^^'  Higgins  v.   City  of   San  Diego, 

the  town:     Inhabitants  &c.  v.  Paul,  115  Cal.  170;    s.  c.  45  Pac.  824.     In 

173  Mass.  148;  s.  c.  53  N.  E.  272.  South   Carolina  municipalities  may 

1  Smith— -39 


§    625  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  610 

I 

§  625.  Power  over  watercourses. — A  law  giving  a  city  exclusive 
power  to  control  watercourses  leading  to  a  city,  and  to  regulate  and 
control  them  within  the  city,  where  persons  prior  thereto  had  acquired 
paramount  title,  would  deprive  such  jDcrson  of  property  without  due 
process  of  law,  and  is  therefore  void.^**^  A  city  may  lawfully  use  from 
a  river  within  its  limits  such  an  amount  of  water  as  may  be  necessary 
to  supply  the  wants  of  its  citizens  and  of  the  city.^^^  A  town  has  no 
power  to  divert  water  from  private  streams  to  the  detriment  of  lower 
riparian  owners.^^"  A  municipality  may  change  the  flow  of  water 
and  cause  it  to  empty  in  the  same  watercourse  at  a  different  point  if, 
in  its  judgment,  for  the  benefit  of  the  municipality,  and  if  such  change 
does  not  create  a  nuisance  to  those  injured,  will  not  be  enjoined.^'' ^ 

§  626.  Power  to  aid  private  charities. — The  law  will  not  permit 
a  municipality  to  invoke  the  power  of  taxation,  or  contribute  its 
funds,  in  support  of  charities  under  private  control,  no  matter  how 
laudable  their  object.  A  law  which  provides  for  the  treatment  of 
habitual  drunkards  at  the  expense  of  the  counties  is  for  the  benefit 
of  private  individuals,  or  a  corporation,  not  the  legitimate  objects 
of  public  charity,  and  void.^''^  It  is  clearly  beyond  corporate  power 
to  appropriate  public  funds  in  aid  of  private  educational  institutions 
over  which  the  corporation  has  no  control.^ ^^ 

take   stock   in   railroads:     Town   of  ^""^  City  of  Los  Angeles  v.  Los  An- 

Darlington   v.    Atlantic    Tr.    Co.,    68  geles  Water  Co.,  124  Cal.  368;   s.  c. 

Fed.  849.    S.  Car.  laws  of  1896,  legal-  57  Pac.  571. 

izing  elections,  held  void  in  Cudd  v.  ''"  Sparks  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Town  of 
Calvert,  54  S.  C.  457;  s.  c.  32  S.  E.  Newton  (N.  J.),  45  Atl.  596. 
503.  There  is  no  power  to  become  "■'■  Commissioners  &c.  v.  Village  of 
stockholder  in  a  corporation  except  East  Peoria,  75  111.  App.  450. 
on  vote  of  three-fourths  of  voters  ^'-  Wisconsin  Keeley  Inst.  Co.  v. 
participating,  in  Tennessee,  since  Milwaukee  Co.,  95  Wis.  153;  s.  c.  70 
adoption  of  constitution  of  1870:  N.  W.  68;  36  L.  R.  A.  55. 
Fidelity  &c.  Co.  v.  Lawrence  Co.,  '"  Whiting  v.  Sheboygan  &c.  R. 
92  Fed.  576;  s.  c.  34  C.  C.  A.  553.  W.  Co.,  25  Wis.  167,  187;  State  v.  Tap- 
Va.  code  1891,  ch.  39,  construed  with  pan,  29  Wis.  664;  Attorney-General 
reference  to  aid  to  railroads:  Neale  v.  City  of  Eau  Claire,  37  Wis.  400, 
v.  County  Court  &c.,  43  W.  Va.  90;  s.  436.  See  Curtis  v.  Whipple.  24  Wis. 
c.  27  S.  E.  370.  An  act  of  Kan.  1887,  350.  Under  N.  Y.  Const.  1877,  a  mu- 
ch. 114,  authorizing  counties  and  in-  nicipality  can  not  pay  money  to 
corporated  cities  to  subscribe  for  charitable  institutions  wholly  or 
stock,  develop  coal,  natural  gas,  etc.,  partly  under  private  control  for  the 
unconstitutional :  Vail  v.  City  of  At-  benefit  of  any  inmate  not  therein 
tica,  8  Kan.  App.  668;  s.  c.  57  Pac.  pursuant  to  the  rules  of  the  state 
137.  board  of  charities:  People  v.  Comp- 
''«  Fisher  v.  Bountiful  City,  21  troller  &c.,  42  N.  Y.  S.  657;  s.  c.  11 
Utah  29;  s.  c.  59  Pac.  520.  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  114. 


611  EXPRESS    CORPORATE    POWERS.  §    G27 

§  627.  Miscellaneous. — Under  the  power  to  "regulate"  a  city  coun- 
cil ma}^  prohibit  "the  burial  of  the  dead"  within  the  city  limits.^''* 
A  city  charter  authorizing  the  city  "to  erect,  repair  and  regulate 
public  wharves  and  docks,  and  fix  the  rates  of  wharfage  thereat," 
has  been  held  not  to  give  the  city  power  to  create  a  harbor  or  to  im- 
prove one  by  obtaining  an  increased  supply  of  water.^^^  The  power 
to  fill  up  slips  is  not  given  to  cities  by  an  act  authorizing  cities  to  con- 
struct and  keep  in  repair  canals  and  slips  for  the  accommodation  of 
commerce. ^^^  County  commissioners  are  not  empowered  to  order  the 
payment  of  attorneys'  fees  for  services  rendered  to  the  petitioners 
for  gravel  roads  under  a  statute  which  provided  that  "the  cost  and 
expense  of  the  preliminary  survey,  proceedings  and  report  of  the 
improvement  shall  be  paid  out  of  the  county  treasury,  and  be  refunded, 
as  well  as  all  other  amounts  advanced  by  the  county  for  the  prelimi- 
nary expense  of  such  improvement. ^^^  Although  the  statute  pro- 
vides for  the  election  of  a  city  attorney,  the  mayor  and  council  of  a 
municipal  corporation  may  employ  counsel  to  commence  and  prose- 
cute suits  for  violations  of  city  ordinances  in  case  of  vacancy  in  the 
office  of  city  attorney.^"^  Where  the  corporate  existence  is  at  stake 
the  municipality  has  power  to  employ  counsel  to  defend.^^^  Where 
the  constitution  prohibits  the  legislature  from  passing  any  special 
acts  conferring  corporate  powers,  an  act  providing  for  the  govern- 
ment management  and  control  of  fire-  and  police-departments  in 
cities  having  a  population  of  over  forty  thousand  is  a  special  act 
and  void.^^°  An  agreement  by  which  an  ordinance  is  permitted  to 
be  violated  at  pleasure,  made  by  a  city  council  and  giving  assur- 
ance against  prosecution  by  future  councils,  is  a  nullity.^*^  The  board 
of  aldermen  can  not  validate  a  claim  which  arises  under  a  void  con- 
tract.^^^  A  person  can  not  by  lapse  of  time  acquire  a  vested  right 
under  an  illegal  permit.^^^     Where  there  is  no  lien  to  contractors 

5'*  People  V.  Pratt,  129  N.  Y.  68;  ='' Board  «S:c.  v.  Cole,  2  Ind.  App. 

s.  c.  29  N.  E.  7.     See  also,  Cronin  v.  475;  s.  c.  28  N.  E.  772. 

People,   82   N.   Y.   318;    Corporation  ^'*  City  of  Roodhouse  v.  Jennings, 

&c.  V.  Mayor  &c.,  5  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  538;  29  111.  App.  50. 

Coates  V.  Mayor  &c.,  7  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  ^^' Village  of  Harvey  v.  Wilson,  78 

585;  In  re  Ryers,  72  N.  Y.  1.  111.  App.  544. 

""Spengler  V.  Trowbridge,  62  Miss.  ='"  State  v.  Downs,  60  Kan.  788;  s. 

46,  where  it  was  held  that  the  pay-  c.  57  Pac.  962. 

ment  from  the  city  treasury  of  mon-  ''''  City   of   Marshall   v.    Cleveland 

ey  for  expenses  of  persons  to  go  to  &c.  R.  Co.,  80  111.  App.  531. 

Washington   City  to   influence   con-  ^'-  Berka   v.    Woodward,    125    Cal. 

gressional  action  to  that  end  should  119;  s.  c.  57  Pac.  777. 

have  been  enjoined.  '*'  City  of  Brooklyn   v.  Furey,   30 

^«Ligare  v.  City  of  Chicago,  139  N.  Y.  S.  349;  s.  c.  61  N.  Y.  St.  287. 
111.  46;  s.  c.  28  N.  E.  934. 


§    627  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  613 

or  subcontractors  given  on  public  buildings  and  no  right  of  attachment 
of  money  in  the  hands  of  the  city,  the  city  can  not  provide  a  new  rem- 
edy by  attachment  or  trust  in  favor  of  subcontractors  on  money  due 
from  the  city  to  the  contractor. ^'^^  Where  the  city  council  is  sole 
judge  of  the  election  returns  and  qualification  of  its  members,  and 
after  investigation  it  seats  a  member,  a  subsequent  council  can  not 
review  its  action.^ ^^  An  ordinance  providing  for  the  sale  of  im- 
pounded animals  is  invalid  if  it  does  not  provide  for  a  judicial  de- 
termination of  the  question  of  violation,^ -'^  The  city  has  no  power  to 
compel  a  citizen  to  buy  material  from  it  for  connecting  with  its  sewer- 
age or  pay  for  the  work  of  making  such  connection.^^^  From  the  fact 
that  a  municipality  has  power  to  levy  taxes,  acquire  sites  and  construct 
such  levees  as  are  required  by  the  public,  it  does  not  follow  that  it 
must  exercise  that  authority  in  protecting  low  lands  from  overflow 
by  natural  watercourses.^*^  Statutory  power  to  establish,  alter, 
widen,  extend  and  vacate  public  parks  and  grounds  does  not  authorize 
the  construction  of  a  county  court-house  in  one  of  its  parks.^^^  The 
legislature  may  confirm  and  ratify  corporate  acts  which  are  void  by 
reason  of  the  law  being  unconstitutional.^"*'  A  city  may  require 
insurance  companies  to  pay  two  per  cent,  of  their  premiums  to  it  for 
the  use  of  the  fire-department.  It  is  not  a  license  tax,  as  it  does  not 
grant  permission  to  do  business.^"^  It  is  an  invasion  of  personal  lib- 
erty to  make  it  a  penal  offense  to  knowingly  and  unlawfully  associate 
with  persons  having  the  reputation  of  thieves. ^"^ 

^'^^  Lesley  v.  Kite,  192  Pa.  St.  268;  ="«"  Mclntyre  v.  B6ard  &c.,  15  Colo. 

s.  c.  43  Atl.  959.  App.  78;  s.  c.  61  Pac.  237. 

=>'=  State  V.  City  of  Camden,  63  N.  «'"  State  v.  Winter,  15  Wash.  407; 

J.  L.  186;  s.  c.  42  Atl.  848.  s.  c.  46  Pac.  644. 

^^  Armstrong  v.  Brown,  20  Ky.  L.  ^^  Hartford  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  City  of 

1766;  s.  c.  50  S.  W.  17.  Peoria,  156  111.   420;    s.  c.  40  N.  E. 

=^^  Slaughter  v.  O'Berry,  126  N.  C.  967. 

181;  s.  c.  35  S.  B.  241.  ='^- City  of  St.  Louis  v.  Roche,  128 

='«»City  of  Hamilton  v.  Ashbrook,  Mo.  541;  s.  c.  31  S.  W.  915. 
62  Ohio  St.  511;  s.  c.  57  N.  E.  239. 


CHAPTER  XVI. 


ULTRA   VIRES. 


Section 

628.  General  statement  of  the  rule. 

629.  Purchase  of  land  for  use  of  a 

railroad. 

630.  Illustrations  of  the  general  rule. 

631.  Grant    of    power    to    regulate 

highways  construed. 

632.  Contracts    for    exclusive    privi- 

leges in  highways. 

633.  Strictly  official  duties  not  to  be 

confided    to    non-official    per- 
sons. 

634.  Police      ordinances  —  Wooden 

buildings. 

635.  The  same   subject  continued — 

Railroad  crossings. 

636.  The   same   subject  continued — 

Markets,  etc. 

637.  Donations. 

638.  The  same  subject  continued. 

639.  Subscribing   to    stock    of    rail- 

roads. 

640.  City  council   as  judge  of  elec- 

tions. 

641.  Governing  authorities  of  school 

districts. 
The  same  subject  continued. 
Purchase     of    real    estate    for 

school    purposes — Texas    rul- 
ing. 
Condemnation   of  land   outside 

of  territorial  limits. 
Diversion  of  lands  dedicated  to 

public  uses. 
646.  Sale  of  real  estate — Prescribed 

mode  controls. 
Appropriations     for     highways 

and  school-buildings. 


642. 
643. 


644. 


645. 


647. 


Section 

648.  Power  to  purchase  realty  does 

not  authorize  giving  notes. 

649.  Work  on  public  buildings,  etc. 

650.  Issuing  of  bonds. 

651.  The   same   subject  continued — 

Municipal  aid. 

652.  The  same   subject  continued — 

Public  improvements. 

653.  Contracts  abrogating  control  of 

streets. 

654.  General    legislation  —  Offers   of 

rewards. 

655.  Contracts  for  water  supply. 

656.  The  same  subject  continued. 

657.  Contracts  for  lighting  streets. 

658.  Grant  of  exclusive  privileges. 

659.  Curative  legislation. 

660.  Ratification. 

661.  Estoppel. 

662.  Purchasers  of  bonds  are  bound 

to  take  notice. 

663.  Corporations  may  contest  ultra- 

vires  contracts. 

664.  Liability  upon  ultra-vires  con- 

tracts. 

665.  The  same  subject  continued. 

666.  Ultra  vires,  when  not  a  defense 

to  actions  by  the  corporation. 

667.  Taxpay^ers'  resistance. 

668.  Taxpayers'  suits. 

669.  The  same  subject  continued. 

670.  Suits   to    restrain    the    enforce- 

ment of  contracts. 

671.  Injunction   the   proper  remedy. 

672.  The  same  subject  continued. 


§  628.    General  statement  of  the  rule. — Acts  of  municipal  corpora- 
tions which  are  clone  without  power  expressly  granted,  or  fairly  to  be 

(613) 


§  628 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS. 


614 


iniplicd  from  the  powers  granted  or  incident  to  the  purposes  of  their 
creation,  are  ultra  vires.  So,  also,  are  acts  of  the  otticers  of  such  cor- 
porations which  are  done  without  the  prescribed  preliminaries  to  ac- 
tion, which  are  conditions  precedent  to  their  being  authorized.  So, 
also,  are  the  acts  which  are  specially  prohibited  to  them  by  statute,  or 
where  for  special  reasons  the  power  to  do  such  acts  in  general  is 
withdrawn  from  them  in  particular  instances.  It  was  held  that  there 
was  no  power  in  a  city  council  to  authorize  one  whose  term  as  mayor 
had  expired  to  sign  bonds  as  of  a  date  during  his  term  of  office.^ 


^Coler  V.  Cleburne,  131  U.  S.  162; 
s.  c.  9  S.  Ct.  720.  The  statute  pro- 
vided that  the  bonds  should  be 
signed  by  the  mayor.  "This  clearly 
means  that  they  shall  be  signed  by 
the  person  who  is  mayor  of  the  city 
when  they  are  signe^,  and  not  by 
any  other  person,"  said  Justice 
Blatchford.  In  State  v.  Mayor  &c., 
54  N.  J.  L.  437;  s.  c.  24  Atl.  571,  it 
was  held  that  a  resolution  of  the 
board  of  aldermen  to  publish,  under 
a  statute  requiring  it,  the  names, 
residences  and  places  of  business  of 
persons  applying  for  licenses  to  sell 
liquors,  in  a  German  newspaper,  was 
void.  The  presumptions  in  such  a 
case,  where  there  is  no  express  inti- 
mation in  the  statute  as  to  the  lan- 
guage in  which  the  notice  is  to  be 
given  or  the  newspaper  is  to  be 
printed,  are  that  the  legislature  de- 
signed the  notice  to  be  published  in 
the  same  language  as  the  newspaper 
itself  (see  State  v.  Mayor  &c.,  54  N. 
J.  L.  Ill;  s.  c.  22  Atl.  1004),  and  that 
the  notice  was  to  be  given  in  the 
ordinary  language  of  the  state  (see 
Road  in  Upper  Hanover,  44  Pa.  St. 
277),  and  requires  the  notice  to  be 
given  in  English,  in  a  newspaper 
printed  in  the  same  tongue.  The 
court  also  sustained  a  taxpayer's 
right  to  intervene  by  certiorari  to 
prevent  this  as  an  illegal  expendi- 
ture of  municipal  funds,  deficiencies 
in  which  must  be  made  up  by  gen- 
eral taxation.  In  Citizens'  Gas  &c. 
Co.  V.  Town  of  Elwood,  114  Ind.  332; 
s.  c.  16  N.  E.  624,  it  was  held  that 


the  Indiana  act  of  1887,  p.  36  (Burns 
R.  S.  Ind.  1901,  §  4306),  with  ref- 
erence to  natural-gas  companies, 
forbade  the  grant  of  special  privi- 
leges by  special  contract  or  license 
to  any  company;  and  that  under  the 
rules  of  common  law  as  well  as  un- 
der the  provisions  of  the  statute,  the 
subject  of  supplying  towns  and  cities 
with  natural  gas  must  be  regulated 
by  a  general  ordinance,  and  that  the 
ordinance  must  not  unfairly  dis- 
criminate between  competing  com- 
panies. The  ordinance  must  be  gen- 
eral in  its  nature  and  impartial  in 
its  operation.  See  also,  Graffty  v. 
City  of  Rushville,  107  Ind.  502;  s.  c. 
8  N.  E.  109;  Whyte  v.  Mayor,  2  Swan 
(Tenn.)  364;  City  of  Chicago  v. 
Rumpff,  45  111.  90;  Tugman  v.  City 
of  Chicago,  78  111.  405;  Ex  parte 
Frank,  52  Cal.  606;  1  Dillon  Munic. 
Corp.  322.  In  State  v.  Baxter,  50 
Ark.  447;  s.  c.  8  S.  W.  188,  it  was 
held  that  under  Mansfield's  Digest 
of  Arkansas,  §  1407,  allowing  county 
courts  to  dispose  of  real  and  per- 
sonal property  belonging  to  the 
county  and  appropriate  the  proceeds 
to  the  county's  use,  such  courts  are 
trustees  of  the  county;  and  where  it 
appears  that  land  donated  by  con- 
gress to  a  county  for  public  build- 
ings was  leased  by  such  court  for 
ninety-nine  years,  without  regard  to 
the  statute  requiring  that  sales  of 
county  lands  should  be  by  a  com- 
missioner appointed  by  the  county 
court,  and  without  advertising  that 
the  land  was  to  be  leased  to  persons 


615 


ULTRA    VIRES. 


629 


§  629.  Purchase  of  land  for  use  of  a  railroad. — The  purchase  of 
land  by  a  town  for  the  use  of  a  railroad  for  a  right  of  way,  though 
ostensibly  for  a  public  street,  is  ultra  vires,^^  and  the  purchase  price 
can  not  be  collected  by  one  having  knowledge  of  the  facts  and  aiding 
in  the  transaction.- 


paying  an  inadequate  consideration 
therefor,  such  lease  may  be  set  aside 
by  the  county  on  the  ground  of 
fraud.  See  also,  Andrews  v.  Pratt, 
44  Cal.  309;  United  States  v.  Arre- 
dondo,  6  Pet.  691;   §  743,  post. 

^a  Strahan  v.  Town  of  Malvern,  77 
Iowa  454;  s.  c.  42  N.  W.  369.  In 
Huesing  v.  City  of  Rock  Island,  128 
111.  465;  s.  c.  21  N.  E.  558,  it  was  held 
that  while  under  paragraphs  83  and 
84  of  §  1,  art.  5,  of  the  general  incor- 
poration law  of  Illinois,  there  is  con- 
ferred upon  cities  and  villages  power 
to  prohibit  slaughter-houses  or  any 
unwholesome  business  or  establish- 
ments within  the  incorporation,  and 
the  common  council  may  regulate 
by  appropriate  ordinance  the  loca- 
tion of  unwholesome  business,  and 
may  cleanse,  abate  or  remove  the 
same,  this  power  does  not  authorize 
appropriating  public  funds  for  the 
erection  and  maintenance  of  a  pub- 
lic slaughter-house.  In  City  of  St. 
Louis  V.  Bell  Tel.  Co.,  96  Mo.  623; 
s.  c.  10  S.  W.  197,  it  was  held  that 
the  power  to  regulate  charges  for 
telephone  service  was  neither  in- 
cluded in  nor  incidental  to  the  power 
to  regulate  the  uses  of  the  streets; 
and  that  while  the  city,  under  that 
provision  of  its  charter  which  gave 
the  mayor  and  assembly  power  to 
license,  tax  and  regulate  "telegraph 
companies  as  corporations,  etc., 
.  .  .  and  all  other  business,  trades, 
avocations  or  professions  whatever," 
had  the  power  to  make  police  regula- 
tions as  to  the  mode  in  which  the 
business  of  telephone  companies 
shall  be  exercised,  it  did  not  derive 
therefrom  any  power  to  pass  the  or- 
dinance regulating  charges  for  the 
service;  nor  could  it  do  the  same 
under  the  general-welfare  clause  of 


its  charter  as  to  maintaining  peace, 
good  government,  health  or  welfare 
of  the  city.  See  also.  City  of  St. 
Louis  V.  Laughlin,  49  Mo.  559;  City 
of  St.  Louis  V.  Herthel,  88  Mo.  128. 
In  Tilyou  v.  Town  of  Gravesend,  104 
N.  Y.  356;  s.  c.  10  N.  E.  542,  543.  it 
was  shown  that  a  resolution  was 
passed  at  a  town  meeting  providing 
that  the  common  lands  of  the  town 
should  be  let  only  at  public  auction 
after  notice,  and  that  no  lot  should 
be  let  at  a  time  more  than  one  year 
prior  to  th-e  expiration  of  any  exist- 
ing lease  thereon,  and  providing  for 
compensation  to  be  made  by  incom- 
ing to  outgoing  tenants  in  case  a 
lot  previously  under  lease  should  be 
let  to  another  than  the  former  lessee. 
A  later  resolution  amended  the  for- 
mer one  by  adding  thereto  that  the 
commissioners  were  "also  authorized 
to  renew  any  existing  lease  .  .  . 
upon  terms  as  they  may  deem  most 
advantageous  for  said  town."  It  was 
held  that  the  amendment  did  not  au- 
thorize the  renewal  of  a  lease  before 
the  last  year  of  the  unexpired  lease. 
In  Millsaps  v.  Mayor  &c.,  37  La.  An. 
641,  it  was  held  that  in  the  absence 
of  special  authority  given  in  its 
charter  or  by  statute  a  municipal 
corporation  had  no  power  to  lease  a 
ferry.  Municipal  corporations  can 
not  legally  contract  debts  for  imag- 
inary necessities  or  real  conveni- 
ences. They  are  not  permitted  to 
exercise  powers  not  specially  dele- 
gated to  them  in  their  charters  un- 
less such  powers  are  incident  to 
those  granted  or  flow  from  them  by 
necessary  implication.  See  also, 
Lisso  V.  Parish  of  Red  River,  29  La. 
An.  590. 

=  Mt.  Adams  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  City  of 
Cincinnati,  25  Wkly.  Law  Bull.  91. 


§    C30  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  G16 

^  630.  Illustrations  of  the  general  rule. — In  Ohio  a  municipal 
corporation  has  no  power  to  borrow  money  except  in  conformity  with 
the  statute  which  provides  that  "all  bonds  issued  under  authority 
of  this  chapter  shall  express  upon  their  face  the  purpose  for  which 
they  were  issued  and  under  what  ordinance,"  and  that  such  bonds 
shall  be  advertised  and  sold  at  auction  to  the  highest  bidder.  There- 
fore a  contract  by  a  city  to  levy  an  assessment  to  repay  money  ad- 
vanced by  an  individual  has  been  held  to  be  void.^^  A  municipal  cor- 
poration organized  under  the  general  statutes  of  Alabama  has  been 
held  not  liable  in  an  action  against  it  for  services  rendered  as  cap- 
tain of  a  quarantine  guard  under  a  contract  made  with  the  intendant.^ 
A  municipal  corporation  can  not  any  more  than  any  other  corporation 
or  private  person  escape  the  taxes  due  on  its  property,  whether  ac- 
quired legally  or  illegally,  and  it  can  not  make  its  want  of  legal 
authority  to  engage  in  a  particular  transaction  or  business  a  shelter 
from  the  taxation  imposed  by  the  government  on  such  business  or 
transaction  by  whomsoever  conducted.*  In  New  Hampshire  it  has 
been  held  that  as  a  town  has  possession  of  the  volumes  of  New  Hamp- 
shire reports,  statutes,  pamphlet  laws,  and  other  books  and  docu- 
ments by  law  distributed  to  the  several  towns  for  the  use  of  its 
inhabitants,  and  to  enable  them  and  its  officers  to  become  informed 
of  the  laws  and  official  business  of  the  state,  it  has  no  power  nor  can 
its  selectmen  lawfully  make  any  disposition  or  use  of  the  books  incon- 
sistent with  that  object.^ 

^a  Mt.  Adams  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  City  of  count  of  liquors  distilled  by  the  city; 

Cincinnati,  25  Wkly.  L.  Bui.  (Ohio)  the  city  basing  its  right  to  recover 

91.  upon  the   claim   that  as   it  had   no 

^  New   Decatur   v.   Berry,    90   Ala.  power  to  engage  in  this  business  it 

432;   s.  c.  7  So.  838.     These  general  was   not   legally   bound   to   pay  the 

statutes  neither  gave  the  town  au-  taxes.    See  also,  McCready  v.  Guard- 

thorities    expressly    the    power    to  ians  &c.,  9  S.  &  R.  (Pa.)  94. 

make    quarantine    regulations,    nor  ^  Litchfield  v.  Parker,  64  N.  H.  443; 

could  such  power  be  implied;  neither  s.  c.  14  Atl.  725— an  action  to  test 

was  it  incident  to  the  power  granted  the  right  of  an  attorney  in  another 

or  the  objects  and  purposes  of  the  town  to  retain  those  books  for  his 

corporation.    Therefore,  the  contract  own  use  by  au  arrangement  he  had 

of  employment  of  a  guard  was  an  made  with  the  selectmen.     In  City 

act  ultra  vires,  and  not  binding  upon  of  Fort  Wayne  v.    Shoaff,   106   Ind. 

the  town;  and  an  attempt  to  ratify  66;  s.  c.  5  N.  B.  403,  it  was  held  that 

the  contract  of  the  intendant  was  the  common  council  of  the  city  had 

also  futile.  no  jurisdiction  to  assess  the  cost  of 

*  Salt  Lake  City  v.  Hollister,  118  improving    property    owned    by   the 

U.  S.  256;  s.  c.  6  S.  Ct.  1055 — an  ac-  city  for  market  purposes  upon  ad- 

tion  instituted  by  the  city  to  recover  joining   property-owners,   the   juris- 

taxes  which  it  claimed  to  have  paid  diction    in    such    matters   extending 

under  protest  to  a  collector  of  United  only  to  streets  and  alleys,  and  not  to 

States  internal-revenue  taxes  on  ac-  property  owned  by  the  city  for  other 


617 


ULTRA    VIRES. 


631 


§  631.  Grant  of  power  to  regulate  highways  construed. — A  city 
has  no  power  through  its  city  council  to  prohibit  circulating,  distrib- 
uting or  giving  away  circulars,  hand-bills  or  advertising-cards  of  any 
description  in  or  upon  any  of  its  public  streets  or  alleys,  as  it  is 
neither  expressly  conferred  nor  to  be  fairly  implied  from  a  charter 
providing  for  cleaning  the  highways,  for  the  prevention  of  obstruc- 
tions thereon,  and  conferring  power  to  regulate  their  use.® 


municipal  purposes.  Therefore  the 
proceedings  here  were  void,  and  in- 
junction was  the  appropriate  rem- 
edy. See  also,  Goring  v.  McTaggart, 
92  Ind.  200;  Wilson  v.  Poole,  33  Ind. 
443.  The  provisions  of  a  contract- 
or's bond  that  he  shall  pay  for  all 
labor  and  material  for  city  work, 
and  comply  with  a  certain  ordinance 
for  the  protection  of  subcontractors, 
is  not  ultra  vires  on  the  part  of  the 
city:  Philadelphia  v.  Stewart,  195 
Pa.  St.  309;  s.  c.  45  Atl.  1056.  Appro- 
priations to  charitable  institutions 
are  not  based  on  a  contract  express 
or  implied  and  are  ultra  vires:  State 
V.  City  of  New  Orleans,  50  La.  An. 
880;  s.  c.  24  So.  666. 

'^  People  V.  Armstrong,  73  Mich. 
288;  s.  c.  41  N.  W.  275.  In  State  v. 
Johnson,  41  Minn.  Ill;  s.  c.  42  N.  W. 
786,  it  was  held  that  a  charter  which 
authorized  the  city  council  by  the 
proper  ordinance  to  restrain  the  run- 
ning at  large  of  cattle  and  other 
domestic  animals  within  the  city 
limits  did  not  authorize  an  ordi- 
nance providing  a  penalty  for  tres- 
passes committed  by  herdsmen  and 
stock-owners  in  herding  their  cattle 
upon  the  lands  of  private  owners. 
In  State  v.  Hammond,  40  Minn.  43; 
s.  c.  41  N.  W.  243,  an  ordinance  of 
a  city  imposing  a  penalty  upon  "any 
person  who  commits  any  act  of  lewd- 
ness or  indecency  within  the  limits 
of  said  city"  was  held  to  be  void  as 
in  excess  of  the  power  vested  in  the 
city  council  by  the  city  charter.  The 
power  to  enact  this  ordinance,  it 
was  claimed,  was  conferred  by  the 
section  which  authorized  the  passage 


of  ordinances  "for  the  government 
and  good  order  of  the  city,  for  the 
suppression  of  vice  and  intemper- 
ance, and  for  the  prevention  of 
crime;"  and  "to  prevent  open  or  no- 
torious drunkenness  and  obscenity 
in  the  streets  or  public  places  of  this 
city."  The  court  said: — "[These 
sections  of  the  charter  refer]  only 
to  such  [acts]  as  may  affect  the  pub- 
lic peace,  decency  and  good  order; 
and  do  not  authorize  punishment  for 
private  conduct,  however  reprehen- 
sible it  may  be  in  the  matter  of 
morals."  In  State  v.  Mayor  &c.,  52 
N.  J.  L.  65;  s.  c.  18  Atl.  586,  696,  it 
was  held  that  the  common  council  of 
that  city,  under  its  power  to  pass 
ordinances  to  regulate  or  prevent 
the  use  of  streets  for  any  other  pur- 
poses than  public  travel,  had  no 
power  by  ordinance  to  confer  upon  a 
railroad  company  a  right  to  occupy 
exclusively  twelve  feet  of  a  street 
by  the  erection  thereon  of  a  freight- 
platform  and  roof.  This  was  an  ap- 
propriation of  the  public  highway 
to  private  interests,  of  which  Justice 
Van  Syckle,  in  State  v.  Inhabitants 
&c.,  36  N.  J.  L.  79,  thus  speaks:  — 
"An  appropriation  of  [streets]  to 
private  individual  uses,  from  which 
the  public  derived  no  convenience, 
benefit  or  accommodation,  is  not  a 
regulation  but  a  perversion  of  them 
from  their  lawful  purposes,  and  can 
not  be  regarded  as  an  execution  of 
the  trust  imposed  in  the  city  author- 
ities." So  in  Metropolitan  &c.  Co. 
V.  Newton.  4  N.  Y.  S.  593;  s.  c.  51 
Hun  (N.  Y.)  639,  it  was  held  that 
the  common  council  had  no  power 


§  632 


PUBLIC    COKPOUATIONS. 


618 


§  632.  Contracts  for  exclusive  privileges  in  highways. — A  mu- 
nicipal corporation  can  bind  itself  only  by  such  contracts  as  it  is 
by  statute  authorized  to  make.  It  has  no  power  to  grant  exclusive 
privileges  to  put  mains,  pipes  and  hydrants  in  its  streets,  nor  can 
it  lawfully  by  contract  deny  to  itself  the  right  to  exercise  the  legisla- 
tive powers  vested  in  its  common  council.'^  Public  policy  will  not 
permit  the  inference  of  authority  to  make  a  contract  inconsistent  with 
the  continuously  operative  duty  to  make  such  by-laws,  rules  and  regu- 
lations as  the  public  interest  or  welfare  of  a  city  may  require. '^^ 


to  appropriate  any  portion  of  any 
street  to  private  use  to  the  exclusion 
of  the  public,  and  a  license  from  the 
council  to  use  and  occupy  a  street 
for  amusement  purposes  was  void. 

'  Syracuse  Water  Co.  v.  City  of 
Syracuse,  116  N.  Y.  167;  s.  c.  22  N. 
E.  381;  5  L.  R.  A.  546;  26  N.  Y.  St. 
364;  29  Am.  &  Eng.  Corp.  Cas.  307. 

•aMilhau  V.  Sharp,  27  N.  Y.  611; 
Mayor  &c.  v.  Second  Ave.  R.  Co.,  32 
N.  Y.  261;  Richmond  Co.  &c.  Co.  v. 
Town  of  Middletown,  59  N.  Y.  228; 
Gale  V.  Village  of  Kalamazoo,  23 
Mich.  344;  s.  c.  9  Am.  R.  80;  Logan 
V.  Pyne,  43  Iowa  524;  s.  c.  22  Am.  R. 
261;  Des  Moines  Gas  Co.  v.  City  of 
Des  Moines,  44  Iowa  505;  s.  c.  24  Am. 
R.  756;  Norwich  &c.  Co.  v.  Norwich 
City  Gas  Co.,  25  Conn.  19.  In  School 
Dist.  v.  Sullivan,  48  Kan.  624;  s.  c. 
29  Pac.  1141,  it  was  held  that  a  con- 
tract for  building  a  schoolhouse, 
void  because  made  by  only  one  mem- 
ber of  the  school  board,  may  be  rati- 
fied and  made  binding  by  the  action 
of  the  school  district  in  completing 
the  building  left  unfinished  by  an 
absconding  contractor,  by  the  fur- 
nishing the  same  with  seats,  desks 
and  other  necessary  schoolhouse 
furniture,  by  occupying  the  same  for 
school  purposes  and  by  insuring  the 
same.  In  Widner  v.  State,  49  Ark. 
172;  s.  c.  4  S.  W.  657,  it  was  held 
that  the  school  directors  have  no 
power  to  authorize  the  cutting  of 
timber  from  school  lands.  In  Fluty 
V.  School  Dist,  49  Ark.  94;  s.  c.  4 
S.  W.  278,  a  contract  made  with  the 
directors  of  the  school   district  for 


building  a  schoolhouse  under  au- 
thority conferred  at  a  special  meet- 
ing of  the  electors  of  the  district 
held  in  June  was  held  to  be 
void,  and  no  recovery  could  be  had 
upon  it  because  they  had  no  power 
to  build  a  schoolhouse  under  the 
statutes  unless  authorized  to  do  so 
by  the  annual  meeting  on  the  third 
Saturday  in  May:  Mansf.  Dig.  Ark., 
§§  6197,  6199,  6210,  6213,  6223.  See 
also,  Argenti  v.  City  of  San  Fran- 
cisco, 16  Cal.  255;  s.  c.  Field  Ultra 
Vires  352.  In  Everts  v.  District  Tp. 
&c.,  77  Iowa  37;  s.  c.  41  N.  W.  478, 
it  was  held  that  if  a  school  board 
exceeded  its  powers  in  making  a 
contract  the  action  of  the  electors  in 
authorizing  a  settlement  of  the  con- 
troversy growing  out  of  it  was  a 
ratification  of  their  act,  and  the  di- 
rection of  a  verdict  against  the  dis- 
trict for  the  amount  agreed  to  be 
paid  by  the  compromise  settlement 
was  sustained.  In  Buchanan  v. 
School  District,  25  Mo.  App.  85,  the 
court  held  that  the  directors  of  a- 
school  district  of  a  town,  incorpo- 
rated under  the  school  law,  should 
be  enjoined  from  changing  the  site 
of  a  schoolhouse  or  from  building 
a  new  schoolhouse  on  a  new  site 
without  having  first  obtained  the 
sanction  of  the  voters  at  an  election 
held  therefor  under  the  law,  that 
being  the  sole  mode  in  which  it 
could  be  done.  See  also,  Newmeyer 
V.  Missouri  &c.  R.  Co.,  52  Mo.  81; 
Ranney  v.  Bader,  67  Mo.  476,  479; 
Ruby  V.  Shain,  54  Mo.  207. 


619 


ULTRA    VIKES. 


633 


§  633.  Strictly  official  duties  not  to  be  confided  to  non-official  per- 
sons.— A  contract  made  by  a  municipal  corporation  with  one  of  its 
officers  for  the  collection  of  taxes  in  arrears  during  an  indefinite 
period,  under  terms  which  are  onerous  to  the  corporation,  is  ultra 
vires  when  the  corporation  relieves  one  of  its  officers  from  the  duty 
of  collection,  which  is  one  of  his  functions  without  additional  pay.* 
A  city  charter  authorized  the  council  to  make  ordinances  for  certain 
purposes,  and  to  "make  any  other  by-laws  and  regulations  which  may 
seem  for  the  well-being  of  said  city,"  with  "power  to  provide  for  the 
appointment  or  election  of  all  necessary  officers  for  the  good  govern- 
ment of  the  city  not  otherwise  provided  for,"  etc.  It  was  held  that 
a  city  council  could  not  deprive  a  board  of  supervisors  of  the  power 
of  determining  when  they  would  choose  one  of  themselves  clerk  of 
the  board. ^ 

§  634.  Police  ordinances — Wooden  buildings. — An  ordinance  of  a 
city  prohibiting  the  owners  of  a  wooden  building  within  the  fire-limits 
from  repairing  the  roof  with  the  same  materials  with  which  it  was 
covered  at  the  date  of  the  passage  of  the  ordinance  has  been  held 
void,  as  being  ultra  vires,  and  not  enforceable. ^'^ 


*  Gurley  v.  City  of  New  Orleans, 
41  La.  An.  75;  s.  c.  5  So.  659. 

» Weeks  v.  Dennett,  62  N.  H.  2. 
This  incidental  power  was  left  to  the 
discretion  of  the  board  of  assessors 
by  the  legislature  and  can  not  be 
controlled  by  the  city.  In  Dickinson 
Hardware  Co.  v.  Pulaski  Co.,  55  Ark. 
437;  s.  c.  18  S.  W.  462,  it  was  held 
that  the  county  was  not  liable  on  an 
order  of  the  county  judge  guaran- 
teeing payment  for  goods  to  be  sold 
a  person  who  had  a  contract  for  the 
..construction  of  a  turnpike  for  the 
county.  He  had  no  power  to  give 
such  a  guaranty.  In  Sexton  v.  Cook 
Co.,  114  111.  174;  s.  c.  28  N.  E.  608, 
it  was  held  that  where  a  county 
board,  in  the  exercise  of  the  power 
which  it  has  to  clothe  its  officers,  or 
agents,  or  committees,  by  resolution 
X)r  vote,  with  power  to  act  for  it,  by 
resolution  directed  a  party  to  build 
so  much  of  the  dome  of  a  court- 
house in  process  of  erection  as  was 
necessary  to  inclose  the  building, 
under  the  architect's  supervision  and 


subject  to  his  valuation  of  the  same, 
the  architect  under  this  resolution 
had  authority  only  to  supervise  the 
work  directed  to  be  done  and  make 
a  schedule  of  prices  for  the  same, 
and  that  any  order  of  the  architect 
for  work  outside  of  the  terms  of  the 
resolution  was  not  binding  on  the 
county:  Dillon  Munic.  Corp.,  §  450; 
Rice  V.  Plymouth  Co.,  43  Iowa  136; 
Bouton  V.  Board  &c.,  84  111.  384. 

'"State  V.  Schuchardt,  42  La.  An. 
4,9;  s.  c.  7  So.  67.  The  court  said:  — 
"Now  the  power  in  a  municipal  cor- 
poration to  control  the  owners  of 
property  within  its  limits  in  using 
or  building  their  property  in  the 
manner  different  from  their  inclina- 
tion, desire  or  convenience,  can  not 
be  ranked  among  the  implied  and 
incidental  powers  which  such  corpo- 
rations may  exercise  in  the  absence 
of  express  legislative  mandate.  It 
if  a  useful  power,  presumably  neces- 
sary to  provide  for  the  greatest  good 
of  the  greatest  number;  but  it  is  at 
the  same  time  a  power  in  derogation 


G35 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS, 


G20 


§  635.  The  same  subject  continued — Railroad  crossings. — A  mu- 
nicipal corporation  has  not  the  power  by  ordinance  to  compel  a  rail- 
road company  to  maintain  at  a  street  crossing  within  the  corporate 


of  common  right,  and  unless  it  be 
expressly  conferred  it  will  never  be 
presumed  to  exist."  See  also,  Suc- 
cession of  Irwin,  33  La.  An.  63.  In 
Coonley  v.  City  of  Albany,  57  Hun 
(N.  Y.)  327;  s.  c.  32  N.  Y.  St.  411; 
10  N.  Y.  S.  512,  it  was  held  that  an 
ordinance  of  the  city  council  with 
leference  to  boats  sunken  at  the 
dock,  wharf,  slip  or  anywhere  in  the 
Hudson  river  opposite  the  city  of 
Albany,  so  far  as  it  authorized  a 
sale  of  the  boat  in  a  certain  contin- 
gency was  ultra  vires,  as  the  city 
was  only  authorized  to  enforce  its 
ordinances  by  ordinary  penalties 
for  their  violation.  See  also.  Hart 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  9  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  571. 
In  Hoey  v.  Gilroy,  37  N.  Y.  St.  754; 
s.  c.  14  N.  Y.  S.  159,  an  iron  awning 
one  hundred  and  ten  feet  long,  sup- 
ported by  Iron  pillars  placed  along 
the  inside  of  the  curbstone,  the  roof 
being  ten  feet  above  the  sidewalk, 
was  held  to  be  essentially  a  perma- 
nent structure,  and  an  unlawful  en- 
croachment upon  the  highway,  as 
the  common  council  of  the  city  of 
New  York  had  no  power  under  the 
consolidation  act  to  authorize  the 
erection  or  maintenance  of  such  a 
structure.  In  Trenor  v.  Jackson,  15 
Abb.  Pr.  (N.  S.)  (N.  Y.)  115,  Mon- 
ell,  J.,  said: — "It  is  claimed  that  the 
power  given  by  the  charter  to  pass 
ordinances  for  the  regulation  of  the 
use  of  the  sidewalks  for  awnings, 
etc.,  necessarily  implies  a  power  to 
allow  or  permit  the  continuance  of 
awnings  by  individuals  for  private 
purposes.  The  difficulty  in  the  posi- 
tion is  that,  even  if  it  was  competent 
for  the  legislature  to  give  such  pow- 
er, it  is  not  given  in  express  terms, 
and  being  subversive  of  clear  public 
right  it  can  not  and  should  not  be 
Implied.     It  is,  I  think,  very  clear 


that  a  trust,  created  by  law  for  a 
strictly  public  purpose,  can  not  be 
diverted  from  such  purpose  and  con- 
verted into  a  private  use.  But,  even 
if  it  can  be  at  all,  it  must  be  done  by 
express  enactment  and  never  can  be 
inferred  from  or  as  being  incidental 
to  other  powers."  See  also,  People 
V.  Mallory,  46  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  281; 
Kingsland  v.  Mayor  &c.,  110  N.  Y. 
569;  s.  c.  18  N.  E.  435;  18  N.  Y.  St. 
701;  People  v.  Baltimore  &c.  R.  Co., 
117  N.  Y.  150;  s.  c.  22  N.  E.  1026; 
27  N.  Y.  St.  153;  Farrell  v.  Mayor 
&c.,  20  N.  Y.  St.  12;  s.  c.  5  N.  Y.  S. 
672;  s.  c.  affirmed  in  22  N.  Y.  St.  469; 
5  N.  Y.  S.  580;  People  v.  Mayor,  18 
Abb.  N.  C.  (N.  Y.)  123;  Ely  v.  Camp- 
bell, 59  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  333;  People 
V.  Mayor,  59  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  277; 
Story  V.  New  York  &c.  R.  Co.,  90 
N.  Y.  122;  Lahr  v.  Metropolitan  &c. 
R.  Co.,  104  N.  Y.  268;  s.  e.  10  N.  E. 
528.  In  Turner  v.  Mayor  &c.,  78  Ga. 
683;  s.  c.  3  S.  E.  649,  it  was  held  that 
after  the  passage  of  an  act  prohibit- 
ing the  sale  of  spirituous  or  malt 
liquors  in  the  county  in  which  the 
city  was  situate,  a  section  of  which 
provided  "that  the  provisions  of  this 
act  shall  not  prevent  practicing  phy- 
sicians furnishing  liquors  them- 
selves as  medicines  to  the  patients 
under  treatment  by  them,"  the 
mayor  and  council  of  the  town  had 
no  authority  to  pass  an  ordinance 
directing  that  all  physicians  prac- 
ticing medicine  therein  should  make 
monthly  returns  to  the  council,  giv- 
ing a  monthly  statement  of  their 
business,  and  for  whom  they  fur- 
nished liquor,  and  providing  a  pen- 
alty for  failing  to  comply  with  such 
ordinances.  All  power  under  the 
charter  of  the  town  as  to  regulating 
the  liquor  traffic  was  taken  from  it 
by  the  general   law  prohibiting  its 


621 


ULTRA   VIRES. 


635 


limits  a  watchman  for  the  purpose  of  giving  warning  to  passers-by 
of  the  approach  of  trains.^^ 


sale.  Besides,  its  power  under  the 
charter  to  regulate  barrooms  and 
saloons  did  not  include  the  power 
to  regulate  physicians  and  require 
returns  from  them  as  to  their  prac- 
tice and  to  whom  they  furnished 
liquors.  At  the  same  time  the  court 
held  there  was  no  error  in  refusing 
the  writ  of  prohibition,  as  there  was 
a  remedy  by  a  defense  before  the 
mayor  and  council,  and  if  adverse  to 
the  petitioners  a  writ  of  certiorari 
was  their  right  to  review  the  case. 

"  Ravenna  v.  Pennsylvania  Co.,  45 
Ohio  St.  118;  s.  c.  12  N.  E.  445,  this 
not  being  a  power  which  may  be  im- 
plied as  essential  to  carry  into  ef- 
fect those  expressly  granted,  and  not 
being  expressly  granted  to  the  cor- 
poration.    In  Grand  Rapids  &c.  Co. 
V.  Grand  Rapids  &c.  Co.,  33  Fed.  659, 
it  was  held  that  an  ordinance  grant- 
ing exclusive  vise  of  the  streets  for 
wires  and  poles  for  electric  lights 
for  fifteen  years  was  ultra  vires  and 
void.     The  city  charter  which  gave 
the  council  power  to  make,  amend 
and    repeal   any   ordinance    deemed 
desirable  for  lighting  the  streets  and 
taking  charge  of  them  did  not  confer 
in    express    terms    exclusive    power 
over  them,  and  it  did  not  give  the 
city,  by  implication,  control  of  the 
streets  to  the  exclusion  of  the  sov- 
ereign power  of  the  state.    In  James 
V.  City  of  Darlington,  71  Wis.  173; 
s.  c.  36  N.  W.  834,  an  ordinance  va- 
cating a  street  at  a  certain   point 
without  first  having  a  petition  of  the 
lot-owners  at  that  point  in  favor  of 
it,  and  posting  notice  as  required  by 
the  statute  conferring  the  power  to 
vacate  streets,  was  held  to  be  invalid 
and  ineffectual;   that  without  those 
preliminary  steps  there  was  no  ju- 
risdiction or  power  in  the  council  to 
vacate  the  street.     In  City  of  Bur- 
lington V.  Dankwardt,  73  Iowa  170; 


s.  c.  34  N.  W.  801,  it  was  held  that 
the  passage  of  an  ordinance  to  pre- 
vent  the   pedling  of   meats   in   the 
streets  of  the  city  was  beyond  the 
powers  of  the  city  authorities — they 
not  being  entitled  to  go  beyond  the 
power  given  by  statute  to  estal;)lish 
and  regulate  markets.     In   City  of 
St.  Paul  v.  Gilfillan,  36  Minn.  298; 
s.  c.  31  N.  W.  49,  it  was  held  that  an 
ordinance  passed  by  the  city  council, 
declaring    the     emission    of     dense 
smoke  from  smokestacks  and  chim- 
neys a  public  nuisance,  was  unau- 
thorized and  void,  as  the  charter  of 
the   city   conferred   no   power   upon 
the  city  council  to  declare  what  acts 
or  omissions  should  constitute  a  nui- 
sance;    distinguishing    Harmon     v. 
City  of  Chicago,  110  111.  400,  411.    In 
City  of  Newton  v.  Belger,  143  Mass. 
598;  s.  c.  10  N.  E.  464,  it  was  held 
that  in  passing  an  ordinance  as  fol- 
lows:  "No  person  shall  erect,  alter 
or  rebuild,  or  essentially  change  any 
building  or  any  part  thereof,  for  any 
purpose  other  than  a  dwelling-house, 
without  first  obtaining  in  writing  a 
permit  from  the  board  of  aldermen. 
The    application    for    such    permit 
shall  specify  the  location  and  size  of 
the  building,  the  material  of  which 
it  is  to  be  constructed,  and  the  use 
for  which  it  is  intended," — the  gov- 
erning authorities  exceeded  the  pow- 
ers conferred  upon  the  city  by  the 
legislature    and    imposed    unauthor- 
ized restrictions  upon  the  right  of 
the  citizen  to  the  use  of  his  prop- 
erty.    The  ordinance  was  broader  in 
its  scope  than  the  statute  providing 
that  any  city  or  town  except  Boston 
"may,  for  the  prevention  of  fire  and 
the    preservation    of    life,    by    ordi- 
nances or  by-laws  not  repugnant  to 
law  and  applicable  throughout  the 
whole  or  any  defined  part  of  its  ter- 
ritory, regulate  the  inspection,  ma- 


§    636  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  632 

§  636.  The  same  subject  continued — Markets,  etc. — Under  a  stat- 
ute granting  to  the  mayor  and  council  tlio  ''power  to  erect  and  regu- 
late markets,"  and  providing  that  "the  mayor  and  city  council  may 
lease,  sell  or  dispose  of  the  stalls  and  stands  in  any  market  in  any 
manner  and  for  any  term  they  may  think  proper,"  the  governing 
power  of  a  city  can  not  set  apart  by  ordinance  a  certain  portion  of 
the  market  for  the  sale  of  any  class  of  products — as  various  kinds  of 
fish — and  require  a  license  fee  to  be  paid  by  every  one  before  engaging 
in  that  business  in  the  market.  ^^  An  ordinance  of  a  city  to  compel 
a  bridge  company  to  sell  one  hundred  tickets  for  $1,  according  to  its 
contract  with  the  corporation,  was  held  void  as  not  relating  to  the 
morals,  health  or  safety  of  the  people.  ^^  A  provision  in  an  act  of  a 
legislature  conferring  the  power  on  a  city  council  to  "license,  tax 
and  regulate  grocers,  merchants,  retailers,"  etc.,  confers  no  power  to 
prohibit  the  sale  of  liquors.^^ 

§  637.  Donations. — A  county  has  no  power  to  donate  its  lands  to 
a  railroad  company  in  consideration  of  its  constructing  a  railroad 
through  the  county.  And  the  legislature  having  no  power  to  au- 
thorize such  a  donation  in  the  first  instance  can  not  by  a  subsequent 
statute  validate  a  conveyance  of  lands  in  pursuance  of  such  a  dona- 
tion. ^^     A  town  council  has  no  power  to  appropriate  funds  of  the 

terials,  construction,  alteration  and  the  power  to  regulate  the  markets 

use   of   buildings   and    other   struc-  was  held  to  intend  to  give  reason- 

tures     within     its     limits,"     under  able   police    powers   with    reference 

which    statute   it   was   claimed   the  thereto.     The  taxing  power  belongs 

city  had  such  power.  to  the  legislature,  and  it  will  not  be 

'^  State  v.  Rowe,  72  Md.  548;  s.  c.  held    as   conferred    on    a    municipal 

20  Atl.  179.     This  was  an  effort  to  corporation  unless  it  be  by  express 

raise  revenue  under  the  guise  of  ex-  and    unequivocal    language,    or    by 

ercising  the  police  power,  and  the  necessary  implication, 

ordinance  was,  therefore,  void.    Un-  "  City  of  Newport  v.  Newport  &c. 

der  the  rule  in  Van  Sant  v.  Harlem  Co.,  90  Ky.  193;   s.  c.  13  S.  W.  720; 

Stage  Co.,  59  Md.  330,  which  was  that  12  Ky.  L.  39;  8  L.  R.  A.  484;  29  Am. 

"if  under  the  guise  of  licensing  and  &  Eng.  Corp.  Cas.  491.     Passing  the 

regulating,    the    municipal    corpora-  ordinance    was    not    an    exercise    of 

tlon  should  attempt  to  raise  revenue  police  power  but  related  merely  to 

or  clearly  violate  the  rule  requiring  a  contract  in  respect  to  a  financial 

a  reasonable  exercise  of  its  powers,  matter. 

the   courts   will   declare   such   ordi-  "Ex  parte  Reynolds,  87  Ala.  138; 

nances  unlawful  and  void,"  the  court  s.  c.  6  So.  335;  29  Am.  &  Eng.  Corp. 

in  State  v.  Rowe,  supra,  construed  Cas.  1.    See  also,  Miller  v.  Jones,  80 

the  statutes  to  give  to  the  city  an-  Ala.  89. 

thorities  as  the  owners  of  the  mar-  ^=  Ellis  v.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  77 

ket-houses  the  power  only  of  selling  Wis.  114;   s.  c.  45  N.  W.  811.     See 

and  leasing  the  stalls  in  their  build-  also,  Whiting  v.   Sheboygan  &c.   R. 

ings  as  they  may  judge  best;    and  Co.,   25   Wis.   167,  holding  that  the 


633 


ULTRA    VIRES. 


638 


town  to  aid  in  building  a  county  court-house  therein. ^^*  A  town  can 
not  ratify  and  validate  what  it  lias  previously  done  without  authority, 
and  what  is  absolutely  void  for  that  reason.^"  It  is  not  within  the 
power  of  a  city  to^  bind  itself  by  contract  either  to  forbear  to  impose 
taxes  or  to  impose  them  under  certain  given  limitations  or  on  certain 
conditions.^*'^ 


§  638.    The  same  subject  continued. — A  city  has  no  power  to  con- 
vey its  real  estate  to  the  county  in  which  it  is  located,  in  consideration 


power  of  taxation  could  not  be  ex- 
erted to  raise  money  for  the  pur- 
pose of  donating  it  to  a  railroad 
company,  even  when  the  legislature 
authorized  it.  Approved  in  Phillips 
V.  Town  of  Albany,  28  Wis.  340;  Ro- 
gan  V.  City  of  Watertown,  30  Wis. 
259;  Bound  v.  Wisconsin  Cent.  R. 
Co.,  45  Wis.  543.  The  court  in  Ellis 
V.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  supra,  re- 
ferring to  the  Whiting  case,  supra, 
said:— "In  that  case  the  county  au- 
thorities were  restrained  from  issu- 
ing negotiable  securities,  which  cre- 
ated a  county  debt  to  be  paid  by  tax- 
ation, though  the  court  had,  upon  the 
strength  of  adjudications  elsewhere, 
sustained  the  validity  of  municipal 
subscriptions  to  the  stock  of  railroad 
corporations.  But  such  subscrip- 
tions were  sustained  solely  on  the 
ground  that  their  validity  had  been 
affirmed  by  many  of  the  highest  and 
most  respectable  courts  in  the  land, 
and  such  vast  pecuniary  interests 
had  become  involved  and  were  de- 
pendent upon  these  decisions  that 
the  court  felt  bound  to  follow  them 
while  regarding  as  unsound  the 
principle  which  they  laid  down. 
And  while  the  distinction  between  a 
stock  subscription  and  the  donation 
or  other  appropriation  of  public 
money  or  corporate  property  to  a 
railroad  corporation  is  not  very  dis- 
tinct and  obvious,  yet  we  are  un- 
willing to  extend  a  bad  rule  of  law 
a  particle  beyond  where  the  courts 
had  carried  it,  and  shall,  therefore, 
adhere  to  the  doctrine  of  the  Whit- 
ing case." 


^=a  Russell  V.  Tate,  52  Ark.  541;  s. 
c.  13  S.  W.  130;  7  L.  R.  A.  180. 

'"  Dullanty  v.  Town  of  Vaughn,  77 
Wis.  38;  s.  c.  45  N.  W.  1128. 

'"a  Augusta  Factory  v.  City  Coun- 
cil &c.,  83  Ga.  734;  s.  c.  10  S.  E.  359. 
See  also,  State  v.  Hannibal  &c.  R. 
Co.,  75  Mo.  208;  Mack  v.  Jones,  21 
N.  H.  393;  Cooley  Taxation  200; 
Desty  Taxation  466.  In  Gray  v. 
Baynard,  5  Del.  Ch.  499,  it  was  held 
that  while  the  legislature  had  con- 
ferred upon  the  city  council  of  Wil- 
mington very  full  powers  touching 
its  public  streets,  it  was  not  compe- 
tent for  the  city  council  to  author- 
ize the  erection  of  a  private  building 
in  such  a  manner  as  to  create  a  pub- 
lic nuisance.  In  Snyder  Tp.  v. 
Bovaird,  122  Pa.  St.  442;  s.  c.  15  Atl. 
910;  22  W.  N.  C.  (Pa.)  563,  it  was 
held  that  the  supervisors  of  a  town- 
ship have  no  power  to  give  to  the 
assignee  of  a  township  order  a  new 
order  in  his  own  name  as  a  substi- 
tute for  the  old  one.  In  State  v. 
Harris,  96  Mo.  29;  s.  c.  8  S.  W.  794, 
it  was  held  that  a  subscription  to 
stock  of  a  railroad  company  by  a 
county  court  for  the  county,  where 
it  appeared  that  two-thirds  of  the 
qualified  voters  of  the  county,  at  a 
regular  or  special  election,  had  not 
assented  to  such  subscription,  which 
was  required  by  general  statutes  of 
Missouri,  1865,  p.  338,  §  17,  to  au- 
thorize such  subscription,  was  with- 
out authority  and  void.  County 
courts  in  this  state  are  only  the 
agents  of  the  counties. 


S   G39 


PUBLIC    CORrOEATIONS. 


621 


of  the  location  of  the  county-seat  in  such  city.^'^  A  municipal  cor- 
poration can  not  incur  a  liability  and  levy  and  collect  taxes  on  the 
property  of  a  citizen  to  aid  in  the  development  of  mere  private  en- 
terprises.^^ 

§  639.  Subscribing  to  stock  of  railroads. — Acts  authorizing  appro- 
priations l)y  towns  and  cities  as  aid  to  railroad  corporations  in  con- 
sideration of  their  constructing  the  roads  through  their  limits  if 
approved  by  a  majority  of  the  electors  of  the  town  or  city,  but  also 
requiring  the  authorities  of  the  corporation  "to  levy  and  collect  a 
tax  and  make  such  provisions  as  may  be  necessary  and  proper  for  the 
prompt  payment  of  the  appropriation,"  neither  expressly  nor  by  impli- 
cation invest  such  corporations  with  the  power  to  issue  commercial 


"  Brockman  v.  City  of  Creston,  79 
Iowa  587;  s.  c.  44  N.  W.  822;  29  Am. 
&  Eng.  Corp.  Cas.  69.  The  rule  is 
thus  stated  by  the  Iowa  court:  — 
"[Cities]  have  power  to  dispose  of 
their  real  property  for  purposes  au- 
thorized by  law  and  for  no  other 
purpose.  The  purpose  of  the  dispo- 
sition of  lands  deterniines  the  ques- 
tion of  authority.  A  city  may  sell 
its  lands  when  its  interests  require 
that  they  be  sold;  but  it  possesses 
no  authority  to  give  away,  or  to 
convey  without  consideration,  or  for 
a  purpose  which  it  has  no  authority 
to  advance,  any  of  its  property." 
See  also.  District  Tp.  v.  Thomas,  59 
Iowa  50;  s.  c.  12  N.  W.  767. 

^"Maher  v.  City  of  Ottawa,  114 
111.  659;  s.  c.  3  N.  E.  216;  2  West.  R. 
46,  holding  that  the  city  had  no  pow- 
er to  incur  a  debt  and  issue  bonds, 
and  levy  and  collect  taxes  for  the 
payment  of  bonds  issued  to  raise 
money  to  build  a  dam  across  a  river 
within  its  limits,  for  the  purpose  of 
introducing  the  water  of  such  river 
into  the  city,  with  the  view  of  de- 
veloping the  natural  advantages  of 
the  city  for  manufacturing  pur- 
poses. See  also,  as  to  such  power 
being  confined  to  corporate  pur- 
poses, Johnson  v.  Campbell,  49  111. 
316;  Harward  v.  St,  Clair  &c.  Co., 
51  111.  130;  County  Court  v.  People, 
58   111.  456;    People  v.  Du  Puyt,  71 


111.  651,  653;  Johnson  v.  Stark  Co., 
24  111.  75  (where  the  court  said:  — 
"All  will  perceive  that  the  building 
of  our  court-houses,  jails,  poor- 
houses,  the  opening  and  keeping  in 
repair  of  common  highways,  and  the 
erection  and  maintenance  of  bridges, 
by  which  they  are  rendered  useful 
to  the  people,  are  'county  purposes' 
for  which  the  people  of  the  county 
may  be  taxed;  and  that  the  erection 
of  hotels,  mercantile,  manufactur- 
ing, trading  and  banking  houses,  al- 
though of  great  importance  to  the 
prosperity  of  the  community,  are 
not  such  purposes  as  were  contem- 
plated by  the  constitution.  These  are 
properly  regarded  as  matters  of  in- 
dividual enterprise  and  can  not,  in 
any  reasonable  or  just  sense,  be  re- 
garded as  public  or  county  pur- 
poses"); Bissell  V.  City  of  Kanka- 
kee, 64  111.  249  (holding  city  bonds 
issued  to  aid  a  company  so  as  to  en- 
able it  to  embark  in  the  manufac- 
ture of  linen  fabrics  in  the  city  to 
be  void);  English  v.  People,  96  111. 
566  (holding  that  a  city  tax  levied 
to  pay  bonds  issued  in  aid  of  a  man- 
ufacturing company  could  not  be 
enforced);  Ohio  Val.  I.  Works  v. 
Moundsville,  11  W.  Va.  1;  Loan 
Ass'n  V.  Topeka,  20  Wall.  655.  In 
Ottawa  V.  Carey,  108  U.  S.  110;  s.  c. 
2  S.  Ct.  361;  27  L.  ed.  669,  the  bonds 
were  held  to  be  void. 


625 


ULTRA   VIRES. 


640 


paper  in  payment  of  an  appropriation  so  voted.^^  The  adoption  of 
the  constitution  of  1870  in  Illinois,  which  provides  that  "no  county, 
city,  township  or  other  municipality  shall  ever  become  subscriber  to 
the  capital  stock  of  any  railroad  or  private  corporation,  or  make 
donations  to  or  loan  its  credit  in  aid  of  such  corporations,"  withdrew 
from  municipal  corporations  all  power  to  subscribe  to  stock  or  make 
donations  except  in  cases  where  they  had  before  its  adoption,  as  the 
law  then  existed,  been  authorized  to  do  so  by  a  vote  of  the  people 
of  such  municipalities.  In  that  case  they  could  complete  the  mat- 
ter.^" 

§  640.  City  council  as  judge  of  elections. — A  statute  describing  the 
duties  and  powers  of  a  city  council,  declaring  that  it  shall  "be  the 
judge  of  the  election  and  qualification  of  its  own  members,"  does  not 
confer  upon  such  council  the  power  to  hear  and  determine  a  contest 
of  an  election  for  the  city  marshalship ;  nor  does  it  include  the  power 
to  enact  ordinances  for  such  purpose. ^^ 


1^  Concord  v.  Robinson,  121  U.  S. 
165;  s.  c.  7  S.  Ct.  937,  holding  bonds 
issued  by  the  town  invalid.  See 
also,  Claiborne  Co.  v.  Brooks,  111  U. 
S.  400,  406;  s.  c.  4  S.  Ct.  489;  Wells 
V.  Supervisors,  102  U.  S.  625,  631, 
632;  Ogden  v.  Daviess  Co.,  102  U.  S. 
634,  639. 

'"Concord  v.  Robinson,  121  U.  S. 
165;  s.  c.  7  S.  Ct.  937.  See  also, 
Town  of  Middleport  v.  ^tna  Life 
Ins.  Co.,  82  111.  562,  568;  Aspinwall 
v.  Daviess  Co.,  22  How.  364;  Wads- 
worth  V.  Supervisors,  102  U.  S.  534. 
In  Hardin  Co.  v.  Louisville  &c.  R. 
Co.,  92  Ky.  412;  s.  c.  14  Ky.  L.  401; 
17  S.  W.  860,  it  was  held  that  the 
presence  of  one  of  the  sinking-fund 
commissioners  of  the  county  at  a 
meeting  of  the  stockholders  of  the 
railroad  corporation,  when  a  resolu- 
tion was  passed  declaring  a  stock 
dividend  for  the  purpose  of  stopping 
interest  on  payment  of  stock  sub- 
scriptions, and  his  action  in  voting 
for  the  resolution  being  unauthor- 
ized either  by  statute,  by  the  county 
court  or  by  the  county  commission- 
ers, did  not  estop  the  county  from 
demanding  interest  on  a  stock  sub- 

1  Smith — 40 


scription  it  had  made  up  to  the  time 
when  a  cash  dividend  was  declared. 
"^  Vosburg  V.  McCrary,  77  Tex. 
568;  s.  c.  14  S.  W.  195.  This  last 
was  claimed  under  revised  statutes 
of  Texas,  342,  that  municipal  corpo- 
rations "may  ordain  and  establish 
such  acts,  laws,  regulations  and  or- 
dinances not  Inconsistent  with  the 
constitution  and  laws  of  this  state 
as  may  be  needful  for  the  govern- 
ment, interest,  welfare  and  good  or- 
der of  said  body  politic;"  and  §  418, 
that  "the  city  council  shall  have 
power  to  pass,  publish,  amend  or  re- 
peal all  ordinances,  rules  and  police 
regulations  not  contrary  to  the  con- 
stitution of  this  state  for  the  good 
government,  peace  and  order  of  the 
city  and  the  trade  and  commerce 
thereof,  that  may  be  necessary  or 
proper  to  carry  into  effect  the  pow- 
ers vested  by  this  title  in  the  corpo- 
ration, the  city  government  or  in 
any  department  or  officer  thereof."' 
To  this  the  court  said: — "The  power 
of  a  municipal  corporation  or  of  a 
city  council  can  not  exceed  that  con- 
ferred by  the  charter  and  all  ordi- 
nances   must    be    in    subordination 


§  641 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS. 


626 


§  641.  Governing  authorities  of  school  districts. — Town  trustees 
having  authority  to  "build  or  otherwise  provide  suitaljle  houses,  furni- 
ture, apparatus  and  other  articles  and  educational  appliances  neces- 
sary for  the  thorough  organization  and  efficient  management"  of 
schools,  can  not  purchase,  at  the  expense  of  the  township,  text-l)ooks 
for  the  use  of  the  pupils  attending  the  public  schools  of  the  town- 
ship.^^ 


thereto.  Ordinances  when  author- 
ized by  the  charter  are  but  munici- 
pal laws  intended  to  regulate  and 
provide  for  the  orderly  exercise  of 
powers  conferred  by  the  charter." 
In  Gregory  v.  Mayor  &c.,  113  N.  Y. 
416;  s.  c.  21  N.  E.  119;  22  N.  Y.  St. 
703,  it  was  held  that  the  power  of  a 
board  of  commissioners  to  remove 
employes  did  not  include  the  power 
to  suspend  indefinitely  and  without 
.pay.  The  position  of  the  court  was, 
that  there  is  nothing  in  the  power 
to  remove  or  expel  which  necessari- 
ly and  in  all  cases  includes  the  pow- 
er to  suspend,  and  the  latter  power 
may  not  be  implied  from  the  mere 
grant  of  the  former.  Shannon  v. 
Portsmouth,  54  N.  H.  183,  distin- 
guished. See  also,  State  v.  Lingo, 
26  Mo.  496;  State  v.  Chamber  of 
Commerce  &c.,  20  Wis.  63;  State  v. 
Common  Council  &c.,  25  N.  J.  L.  536. 
"Honey  Creek  School  Tp.  v. 
Barnes,  119  Ind.  213;  s.  c.  21  N.  E. 
747,  in  which  Jackson  School  Tp.  v. 
Hadley,  59  Ind.  534,  where  the  in- 
debtedness was  for  Webster's  Dic- 
tionaries, is  distinguished.  In  State 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  49  N.  J.  L.  308;  s.  c.  8 
Atl.  114,  it  was  held  that  school- 
houses  were  not  included  in  the  ex- 
pression "public  buildings"  in  §  79 
of  the  charter  of  Bayonne,  which  au- 
thorizes the  mayor  and  council  to 
purchase  sites,  markets,  public 
buildings  and  wharves,  and  to  erect 
suitable  buildings  or  wharves,  or 
other  structures  or  improvements 
on  said  sites  and  for  said  purposes, 
or  for  the  purpose  of  purchasing 
sites     for     schoolhouses,     to     issue 


bonds;  therefore,  a  resolution  to  is- 
sue bonds  to  enlarge  a  schoolhouse 
was  illegal.  In  Roseboom  v.  Jeffer- 
son School  Tp.,  122  Ind.  377;  s.  c.  23 
N.  E.  796,  it  was  held  that  a  con- 
tract made  by  a  township  trustee  for 
building  a  schoolhouse  beyond  the 
fund  in  hand,  and  that  to  be  de- 
rived from  the  tax  levy  for  the  year, 
without  an  order  from  the  board  of 
county  commissioners,  was  without 
authority.  See  also,  Middleton  v. 
Greeson,  106  Ind.  18;  s.  c.  5  N.  E. 
755.  In  Briggs  v.  Borden,  71  Mich. 
87;  s.  c.  38  N.  W.  712,  the  action  of 
school  inspectors  in  the  destruction 
by  division  of  a  school  district  and 
attaching  the  parts  to  other  dis- 
tricts, without  having  obtained  the 
consent  of  a  majority  of  the  resident 
taxpayers  of  the  district,  which  was 
required  by  Howell's  statutes  of 
Michigan,  §  5041,  before  such  divi- 
sion could  be  made,  was  decreed  to 
be  null  and  void  for  lack  of  author- 
ity. See  also,  Doxey  v.  Board  &c., 
67  Mich.  601,  604;  s.  c.  35  N.  W.  170. 
172.  In  Dartmouth  Sav.  Bank  v. 
School  Districts,  6  Dak  332;  s.  c.  43 
N.  W.  822,  it  was  held  that  a  petition 
by  a  majority  of  the  districts  af- 
fected being  a  condition  precedent 
to  the  establishment  of  a  new  dis- 
trict, the  formation  of  a  new  dis- 
trict by  the  county  superintendent, 
under  Dakota  police  code  of  1877, 
ch.  40,  relating  to  the  division  of 
school  districts  and  rearrangement 
of  their  boundaries,  without  such  a 
petition,  would  be  beyond  his  au- 
thority. Also,  that  districts  which 
are    its    successors    would    not    be 


€27 


ULTRA   VIRES. 


642 


§  642.  The  same  subject  continued. — Under  an  act  conferring 
power  on  school  trustees  to  lay  out  roads,  streets  and  alleys,  the  power 
of  school  trustees  was  confined  to  cases  where  they  laid  out  school  lands 
into  town  or  village  lots.  In  other  eases  they  had  no  power  to  lay  out 
roads  or  to  appropriate  or  dedicate  any  part  of  such  land  for  public 
highways.  ^^ 


estopped  to  deny  the  incorporation 
of  their  predecessor  by  showing  a 
failure  to  present  such  a  petition  in 
an  action  upon  a  bond  of  this  prede- 
cessor. In  Farmers'  &c.  Bank  v. 
School  Dist.,  6  Dak.  255;  s.  c.  42  N. 
W.  767,  the  court  held  that  the  pow- 
er to  select  a  site  for  a  schoolhouse 
belonged  alone  to  the  legal  voters  of 
the  district,  under  the  Dakota  stat- 
utes, and  until  they  have  selected  it 
ty  vote  the  district  board  has  no  au- 
thority whatever  to  acquire  the  site 
or  erect  a  schoolhouse.  And  in  this 
case  the  school  district  was  held  not 
to  be  liable  on  warrants  issued  with- 
out authority  by  the  board  of  direc- 
tors for  the  purchase  of  a  school 
site. 

''"Seeger  v.  Mueller,  133  111.  86;  s. 
c.  24  N.  E.  513;  affirming  s.  c.  28  111. 
App.  28,  holding  that  any  attempt 
of  the  school  trustees  to  lay  out  a 
road  was  ultra  vires  and  void.  The 
court  said: — "The  power  granted  by 
[these]  sections  [of  the  act]  to  trus- 
tees of  schools  will  not  be  extended 
by  implication,  but  in  determining 
their  extent  and  scope  a  strict  in- 
terpretation will  be  adopted.  The 
thirtieth  section  of  [the]  act  de- 
clares trustees  of  schools  bodies  cor- 
porate and  politic,  thus  constituting 
them  municipal  or  quasi-municipal 
corporations,  and  the  same  rule  of 
interpretation  should  apply  to  the 
statute  from  which  they  derive  their 
powers  which  obtains  in  case  of 
other  municipal  corporations.  Such 
bodies  act  wholly  under  a  delegated 
authority,  and  can  exercise  no  pow- 
ers which  are  not  in  express  terms 
or    by    fair    implication    conferred 


upon  them."  See  also,  Buchanan  v. 
School  Dist.,  25  Mo.  App.  85;  Thomp- 
son V.  Lee  Co.,  3  Wall.  327;  Minturn 
V.  Larue,  23  How.  435.  Revised 
statutes  of  Maine,  ch.  11,  §  1,  for- 
bid the  alteration  of  school  dis- 
tricts except  upon  the  recommenda- 
tion of  municipal  and  school  offi- 
cers. In  Parker  v.  Titcomb,  82 
Maine  180;  s.  c.  19  Atl.  162,  it  was 
held  that  an  attempt,  in  the  absence 
of  such  recommendation,  to  alter  by 
uniting  or  disuniting,  was  ultra 
vires.  In  State  v.  Compton,  28  Neb. 
485;  s.  c.  44  N.  W.  660,  it  was  held 
that  the  presentation  of  a  petition 
in  writing  duly  signed  to  a  county 
superintendent  of  schools  being 
necessary  to  give  him  jurisdiction  to 
detach  a  part  of  the  territory  of  a 
school  district  and  attach  the  same 
to  an  adjoining  district,  a  change  of 
the  boundaries  of  districts  in  that 
respect  without  such  petition  was 
without  authority.  The  court  said: 
— "The  duties  of  superintendents 
are  alone  those  prescribed  in  the 
statute."  See  also,  State  v.  County 
Board  &c.,  20  Neb.  595;  s.  c.  31  N. 
W.  117  (where  it  was  held  that  the 
board  of  equalization  of  taxes  of  a 
county  possessed  no  powers  save 
those  conferred  by  statute,  and  that 
the  filing  of  a  complaint  was  neces- 
sary to  give  it  jurisdiction  to  in- 
crease the  valuation  of  a  taxpayer's 
property,  and  unless  this  appeared 
upon  the  face  of  the  proceedings 
there  was  no  authority  to  act) ;  Peo- 
ple V.  Flint,  39  Cal.  670;  People  v. 
Goldtree,  44  Cal.  323;  Black  v.  Cor- 
nell, 30  Mo.  App.  641  (where  it  was 
held  that  no  power  exists  in  a  board 


643 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS. 


628 


§  643.    Purchase  of  real  estate  for  school  purposes — Texas  ruling.— - 

An  incorporated  town  in  Texas  exceeds  its  powers  by  contracting  to 
issue  its  bonds  in  tlie  purcbasc  of  grounds  for  public  free  school  pur- 
poses. Should  such  a  town  afterwards,  by  adopting  the  provisions 
of  the  statutes,  become  under  general  law  a  city,  the  purchase  of  such 
grounds  would  not  be  ratified  by  this  act  of  adoption  of  the  permission 
of  the  statute  and  becoming  a  city.^^ 

§  644.  Condemnation  of  land  outside  of  territorial  limits. — Pro- 
ceedings by  a  village  to  condemn  land  outside  of  its  jurisdiction  are 
unlawful  unless  the  village  charter  expressly  gives  the  power  to  do 
so.  A  power  can  not  be  implied  where  by  the  proceedings  it  is  pro- 
posed to  take  land  against  the  will  of  the  owners.^^ 


of  public-school  directors,  without 
authority  from  the  voters  of  the  dis- 
trict, to  rent  buildings  or  rooms 
separate  from  the  district  school- 
house,  and  to  employ  teachers  for  a 
supplemental  school  therein)  ;  Sei- 
bert  V.  Botts,  57  Mo.  430;  Board  of 
Education  v.  Roehr,  23  111.  App.  629 
(where  it  was  held  that  a  school  dis- 
trict having  become  organized  un- 
der revised  statutes  of  Illinois,  ch. 
122,  §  80,  the  board  of  education 
had  no  power  to  enter  into  a  con- 
tract for  the  erection  of  a  school- 
house  without  a  petition  of  a  ma- 
jority of  the  voters  of  a  district). 

^*  City  of  Waxahachie  v.  Brown,  67 
Tex.  519;  s.  c.  4  S.  W.  207.  See  also, 
Robertson  v.  Breedlove,  61  Tex.  316, 
where  it  was  held  that  commission- 
ers' courts,  though  charged  with  the 
duty  of  providing  court-houses, 
could  not  issue  bonds  for  that  pur- 
pose in  absence  of  an  express  legis- 
lative grant.  In  City  of  Waxa- 
hachie V.  Brown,  supra,  the  court 
said: — "The  power  to  borrow  money 
or  to  create  debt  is  not  a  necessary 
incident  of  the  power  to  buy 
grounds  and  build  schoolhouses, 
and  hence  should  not  be  implied 
against  the  spirit  and  policy  so 
clearly  manifested  by  contempo- 
raneous legislation  as  well  as  by  the 
organic  law  in  force  at  the  time  this 


legislation  was  enacted."  It  was 
also  held  that  the  city  had  no  power 
to  ratify  a  purchase  involving  the  is- 
suance of  bonds  in  contravention  of 
the  authority  of  the  town  when  the 
contract  was  made,  and  which,  if 
ratified,  would  involve  the  issuance 
of  bonds  in  excess  of  the  amount 
the  city  could  lawfully  issue. 

^  Common  Council  &c.  v.  Huron 
Copper  Min.  Co.,  57  Mich.  547;  s.  c. 
24  N.  W.  820.  See  also,  Dillon 
Munic.  Corp.,  §  469;  Cooley  Const. 
Lim.  528-541;  Kroop  v.  Forman,  31 
Mich.  144;  Detroit  &c.  Ass'n  v.  High- 
way Com'rs,  34  Mich.  36;  Powers' 
Appeal,  29  Mich.  504;  Specht  v.  City 
of  Detroit,  20  Mich.  168;  Wright  v. 
Town  of  Victoria,  4  Tex.  375  (where 
it  was  held  that  citizens  who  had 
purchased  of  the  corporation  lots 
upon  the  faith  of  an  ordinance  pur- 
porting to  make  a  dedication  of  the 
timbered  lands  to  the  free  and  com- 
mon use  of  the  citizens  were  not  en- 
titled to  an  injunction  to  restrain 
the  sale  of  such  timbered  lands, 
which  the  corporation  by  act  of  the 
legislature  had  been  empowered  to 
sell,  and  use  the  proceeds  for  erec- 
tion of  public  buildings,  school- 
houses,  etc.,  for  the  reason  that  the 
corporation  had  no  power  to  dedi- 
cate these  timbered  lands  so  as  to 
restrain  a  future  sale  under  the  pow- 


629 


ULTRA    VIRES. 


645 


§  645.  Diversion  of  lands  dedicated  to  public  uses. — The  authori- 
ties of  a  municipal  corporation  can  not  lawfull}^  appropriate  to  otlier 
uses  land  which  has  been  dedicated  by  the  owner  as  a  street;  nor  can 
they  divert  it  to  uses  and  purposes  foreign  to  those  for  which  it  was 
dedicated ;  nor  is  it  within  the  power  of  the  legislature  to  authorize 
such  a  disposal  or  diversion  of  it."'' 


ers  given  in  the  statute) ;  Kings  Co. 
&c.  Ins.  Co.  V.  Stevens,  101  N.  Y. 
411;  s.  c.  5  N.  E.  353;  Roper  v.  Mc- 
Whorter,  77  Va.  214.  In  Town  of 
Searcy  v.  Yarnell,  47  Ark.  269;  s.  c. 
1  S.  W.  319,  where  a  contract  of  sale 
had  been  executed,  the  corporation 
was  held  estopped  from  setting  up 
the  plea  of  ultra  vires.  As  to  dis- 
posal of  property  dedicated  to  public 
uses  in  violation  of  trusts  upon 
which  it  is  held,  or  without  legisla- 
tive authority,  see  Reynolds  v.  Com- 
missioners &c.,  5  Ohio  204;  Meri- 
wether V.  Garrett,  102  U.  S.  472; 
Trustees  &c.  v.  Perkins,  3  B.  Mon. 
(Ky.)  437;  Alves  v.  Town  of  Hen- 
derson, 16  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  131,  168; 
Bowlin  V.  Furman,  28  Mo.  427;  Ken- 
nedy V.  Trustees  &c.,  8  Dana  (Ky.) 
50;  Town  Council  &c.  v.  Elliott,  5 
Ohio  St.  113;  Ransom  v.  Boal,  29 
Iowa  68;  Still  v.  Trustees  &c.,  16 
Barb.  (N.  Y.)  107;  Commissioners 
&c.  v.  McCombs,  19  Ohio  St.  320; 
City  of  Philadelphia  v.  Philadelphia 
&c.  R.  Co.,  58  Pa.  St.  253;  Holladay 
V.  Frisbie,  15  Cal.  630;  Shannon  v. 
O'Boyle,  51  Ind.  565;  Matthews  v. 
City  of  Alexandria,  68  Mo.  115;  Lord 
V.  City  of  Oconto,  47  Wis.  386;  s. 
c.  2  N.  W.  785;  Board  &c.  v.  Patter- 
son, 56  111.  111. 
—  ^'^  Packet  Co.  v.  Sorrels,  50  Ark. 
466;  s.  c.  8  S.  W.  683;  In  re  John 
and  Cherry  Streets,  19  Wend.  (N. 
Y.)  659;  Warren  v.  Mayor  &c.,  22 
Iowa  351;  Le  Clerq  v.  Trustees  &c., 
7  Ohio  217;  Trustees  &c.  v.  Mayor 
&c.,  33  N.  J.  L.  13;  Trustees  &c.  v. 
Perkins,  3  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  437;  Buck- 
ner  v.  Trustees  &c.,  1  A.  K.  Marsh. 
(Ky.)    9;    Alves   v.   Town   of   Hen- 


derson, 16  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  131, 
168;  Police  Jury  v.  McCoi-mack,  32 
La.  An.  624;  Matthews  v.  City  of 
Alexandria,  68  Mo.  115;  Kennedy  v. 
Trustees  &c.,  8  Dana  (Ky.)  50; 
Rutherford  v.  Taylor,  38  Mo.  315; 
Price  V.  Thompson,  48  Mo.  361,  363; 
City  of  Alton  v.  Illinois  Transp.  Co., 
12  111.  38;  San  Antonio  v.  Lewis,  15 
Tex.  388;  Mayor  &c.  v.  United  States, 
10  Pet.  662;  Ransom  v.  Boal,  29  Iowa 
68;  Branham  v.  Mayor  &c.,  24  Cal. 
585;  Brooklyn  Park  Com'rs  v.  Arm- 
strong, 45  N.  Y.  234;  City  of  Jack- 
sonville V.  Jacksonville  R.  Co.,  67  111. 
450;  Town  of  Cromwell  v.  Connecti- 
cut &c.  Quarry  Co.,  50  Conn.  470; 
West  Carroll  Parish  v.  Gaddis,  34 
La.  An.  928;  Cummings  v.  City  of 
St.  Louis,  90  Mo.  259;  s.  c.  2  S.  W. 
130;  Hart  v.  Burnett,  15  Cal.  530; 
City  of  San  Francisco  v.  Canavan, 
42  Cal.  541;  Pickett  v.  Hastings,  47 
Cal.  269;  Commonwealth  v.  Rush,  14 
Pa.  St.  186;  Commonwealth  v.  Al- 
burger,  1  Whart.  (Pa.)  469;  Board 
&c.  V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  18  Ohio  St. 
221;  Seebold  v.  Shitler,  34  Pa.  St. 
133;  President  &c.  v.  City  of  Indian- 
apolis, 12  Ind.  620;  Mayor  &c.  v. 
Stockton,  44  N.  J.  Eq.  179;  s.  c.  14 
Atl.  630;  New  Orleans  &c.  R.  Co.  v. 
City  of  New  Orleans,  26  La.  An.  478; 
s.  c.  26  La.  An.  517;  Franklin  Co. 
Com'rs  V.  Lathrop,  9  Kan.  453; 
Woodruff  V.  Neal,  28  Conn.  165.  As 
to  power  of  municipal  corporation 
to  alien  public  places  with  the  con- 
sent of  the  legislature,  see  Herbert 
V.  Lavalle,  27  111.  448;  Bell  v.  Ohio 
&c.  R.  Co..  25  Pa.  St.  161;  s.  c.  1 
Grant  Cas.  (Pa.)  105:  In  re  Philadel- 
phia &c.  R.  Co.,  6  Whart.   (Pa.)  25; 


§    646  rUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  630 

§  646.  Sale  of  real  estate — Prescribed  mode  controls. — The  cases 
in  California  which  involved  the  sale  of  real  estate  of  the  city  under 
an  invalid  ordinance  necessitated  rulings  upon  various  points  perti- 
nent to  the  subject  we  are  now  considering.  The  legislature  had  re- 
stricted the  governing  authorities  in  the  charter  to  a  sale  of  such 
property  by  ordinance  or  resolution  authorizing  it,  the  only  mode  of 
city  legislation,  and  prescribed  how  many  votes  should  be  required  to 
pass  such  ordinance.  The  power  of  the  legislature  to  prescribe  a 
mode  M^as  sustained  by  the  court,  and  the  ordinance  was  held  void  be- 
cause it  was  not  adopted  by  a  proper  vote ;  in  short,  there  was  no  power 
to  sell  because  the  necessary  steps  to  give  such  power  had  not  been 
taken.  It  was  therefore  held  that  the  sales  were  never  properly  made 
and  that  no  title  to  the  purchasers  passed  from  the  city.  The  court 
held  the  city,  inasmuch  as  it  had  through  its  officers  received  the  money 
of  these  purchasers  paid  upon  their  contracts  of  purchase,  and  used  the 
same  for  corporate  municipal  purposes,  liable  in  actions  for  its  re- 
covery to  return  it.  Field,  C.  J.,  said:  "[The  facts]  show  an  appro- 
priation of  the  proceeds,  and  the  liability  of  the  city  arises  from  the 
use  of  the  moneys  or  her  refusal  to  refund  them  after  their  receipt. 
The  city  is  not  exempted  from  the  common  obligation  to  do  justice 
which  binds  individuals.  Such  obligation  rests  upon  all  persons 
whether  natural  or  artificial.  If  the  city  obtain  the  money  of  another 
by  mistake,  or  without  authority  of  law,  it  is  her  duty  to  refund  it, 
from  this  general  obligation.  If  she  obtain  other  property  which  does 
not  belong  to  her,  it  is  her  duty  to  restore  it,  or  if  used,  to  render  an 
equivalent  therefor,  from  the  like  obligation.-'  The  legal  liability 
springs  from  the  moral  duty  to  make  restitution.  And  we  do  not 
appreciate  the  morality  which  denies  in  such  cases  any  rights  to  the 
individual  whose  money  or  other  property  has  been  thus  appropriated. 

Hart  v.  Burnett,  15  Cal.  530;  Payne  be  conveyed  to  private  persons,  and 
V.  Tread  well,  16  Cal.  220  (distin-  is  effectually  withdrawn  from  com- 
guished  in  Grogan  v.  City  of  San  merce;  and  the  city  having  no  au- 
Francisco,  18  Cal.  590,  614);  City  thority  to  convey  the  title,  private 
and  County  of  San  Francisco  v.  It-  persons  are  virtually  precluded  from 
sell,  80  Cal.  57;  s.  c.  22  Pac.  74  acquiring  it");  approved  and  fol- 
( where  it  was  held  that  the  city  held  lowed  in  Sawyer  v.  City  of  San  Fran- 
its  public  squares  in  trust  for  the  cisco,  50  Cal.  370,  and  in  Hoadley  v. 
public,  and  the  municipal  authori-  City  of  San  Francisco,  70  Cal.  320; 
ties  had  no  authority  to  dispose  of  s.  c.  12  Pac.  125,  which  was  affirmed 
them  by  way  of  compromise  or  oth-  on  writ  of  error  in  Hoadley  v.  City 
erwise);  Hoadley  v.  San  Francisco,  of  San  Francisco,  124  U.  S.  639,  646; 
50  Cal.  265  (where  the  court  said  of  s.  c.  8  S.  Ct.  659. 

this  same  square: — "It  was  granted         "' Argenti  v.  City  of  San  Francis- 

to  the  city  for  public  use  and  is  held  co,  16  Cal.  255. 
for  that  purpose  only.     It  can  not 


631  ULTRA    VIRES.  §    647 

The  law  countenances  no  such  wretched  ethics:  its  command  always 
is  to  do  justice.'"-^  It  was  held  that  where  an  authority  to  do  any 
particular  act  on  the  part  of  the  corporation  could  only  be  conferred 
by  ordinance,  a  ratification  of  such  an  act  could  only  be  by  ordinance. 
And  further,  that  even  if  the  city  would  be  estopped  from  denying 
the  sale  and  from  asserting  title  to  the  property  sold,  it  did  not  follow 
that  the  purchasers  would  be  estopped  from  claiming  a  return  of  the 
money  they  paid.  The  general  doctrine  of  estoppel  in  pais  is  not 
applicable  to  these  purchasers,  they  not  being  wrong-doers.  The  sale 
of  the  city's  property  here  being  without  authority  and  void,  these 
purchasers  were  not  required  to  surrender  possession  before  they 
could  maintain  an  action  to  recover  back  the  purchase-money.  The 
rule  as  to  rescission  does  not  apply.  The  contract  being  void,  there 
was  nothing  to  rescind;  no  rights  were  acquired,  and  there  were  in 
consequence  no  rights  to  restore. ^^ 

§  647.  Appropriations  for  highways  and  school-buildings. — Town 
supervisors  have  no  authority  to  appropriate  or  expend  in  the 
construction  or  repair  of  highways  any  funds  raised  for  ordinary 
town  charges.^"  Nor  have  the  electors  of  a  town  power  to  appropriate 
any  sum  for  such  construction  or  repair  of  highways,  except  when  they 
have  voted  to  raise  the  sum  by  taxation.  The  power  to  appropriate  is 
limited  to  the  sum  voted  to  be  raised.  They  have  no  control  over  any 
other  fund  for  that  purpose. '^^, 

^  Pimental  v.  City  of  San  Francis-  their  annual  town  meeting  to  keep 

CO,  21  Cal.  351,  361,  362.  all  the  funds  of  the  town  in  one  gen- 

^  McCracken  v.  City  of  San  Fran-  eral  fund  was  without  authority  of 

Cisco,  16  Cal.  591;  Grogan  v.  City  of  law  and  void.     In  Brown  v.  School 

San  Francisco,  18  Cal.  590;  Satterlee  Dist,  64  N.  H.  303;  s.  c.  10  Atl.  119, 

V.   City   of   San   Francisco,   23    Cal.  a  vote  of  a  school  district  to  raise 

314;  Herzo  v.  City  of  San  Francisco,  money  for  the  erection  of  a  school- 

33  Cal.  134;  Zottman  v.  City  of  San  house  upon  a  lot  other  than  the  one 

Francisco,    20    Cal.    96;     People    v.  designated    by   the    county    commis- 

Swift,  31  Cal.  26,  28.  sioners,  upon  a  proper  appeal  from 

^^  Aldrich  v.  Collins,  3  S.  D.  154;  s.  the  action  of  the  district  was  held 

s.  c.  52  N.  W.  854.  As  the  constitution,  to   be  unauthorized   and  void.     The 

art.    10,    §    2,    provides    that    funds  court  said: — "If  the  school  district 

raised  "by  taxation,  loan  or  assess-  were  permitted  to  abrogate  or  dis- 

ment  for  one  purpose  shall  not  be  continue    a    location    made    by    the 

diverted  to  any  other,"  the  acts  of  commissioners,  which  would  be  a  re- 

the  board  in  this  case  making  such  fusal  to  procure  the  land  designated, 

appropriations   were   held   to  be   il-  and  to  build  a  schoolhouse  upon  it, 

legal  and  void.  they  could  nullify  the  statutes  de- 

"  Aldrich  v.  Collins,  3  S.  D.  154;  signed  to  compel  the  purchase  of  the 

.  s.   c.   52   N.   W.   854,  holding  that  a  land  located  for  a  lot  by  the  commis- 

resolution  adopted  by  the  electors  at  sioners  and  the  building  upon  it  of 


§   G48 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS. 


632 


§  648.    Power  to  purchase  realty  does  not  authorize  giving  notes. — 

While  a  county  in  Nebraska  is  empowered  by  statute  to  purchase 
realty  for  a  poor-farm,  it  is  beyond  the  power  of  the  governing  au- 
thorities of  the  corporation  to  give  promissory  notes  and  mortgages 
of  the  land  to  secure  their  payment.'"'^  The  United  States  supreme 
court  accepted  this  as  a  correct  ruling  upon  the  statute  as  to  the  pur- 
chase of  a  poor-farm  for  a  county,  but  held  that  parties  who  had  sold 
such  to  a  county  for  a  cash  payment  and  notes  with  mortgages  for 
the  deferred  payments,  upon  the  failure  of  the  county  to  meet  these 
notes  were  entitled  to  have  the  contract  of  purchase  rescinded  and  the 
property  reconveyed  to  them.^^ 


a  schoolhouse."  See  also,  Holbrook 
V.  Faulkner,  55  N.  H.  311,  315,  316; 
Blake  v.  Orford,  64  N.  H.  299;  s.  c. 
10  Atl.  117,  where  it  was  held  that 
such  a  tax  would  be  abated  on  peti- 
tion of  the  taxpayers  of  the  district. 
In  Andrews  v.  School  Dist.,  37  Minn. 
96;  s.  c.  33  N.  W.  217,  it  was  held 
that  where  goods  were  •  received  un- 
der a  contract  made  by  the  trustees 
in  a  manner  unauthorized  and 
which  would  not  bind  the  district, 
and  used  for  the  benefit  of  the  dis- 
trict under  such  circumstances  and 
for  such  length  of  time  as  to  raise 
the  presumption  that  it  was  with 
the  common  consent  of  the  district, 
the  law  would  impose  on  the  district 
the  obligation  to  pay  for  them.  In 
Town  of  Winamac  v.  Huddleston, 
132  Ind.  217;  s.  c.  31  N.  E.  561,  it 
was  held  that  a  town  could  not  issue 
bonds  to  procure  funds  with  which 
to  rebuild  a  schoolhouse,  where  the 
bonds,  if  issued,  would  create  an  in- 
debtedness In  excess  of  two  per  cent, 
of  the  taxable  value  of  the  property 
within  the  town  limits,  to  which 
limit  of  taxation  it  is  restricted  by 
the  constitution  of  Indiana,  art.  13, 
§  1.  The  court  said: — "The  debt 
created  by  a  bond  executed  by  a  pub- 
lic corporation  is  not  an  obligation 
payable  out  of  a  specific  fund,  but  is 
a  contract  to  pay  money  generally." 
This  case  is  not  within  the  doctrine 
of  Quill  V.  City  of  Indianapolis,  124 
Ind.  292;  s.  c.  23  N.  B.  788;  Strieb  v. 


Cox,  111  Ind.  299;  s.  c.  12  N.  E.  481; 
Board  &c.  v.  Hill,  115  Ind.  316;  s.  c. 
16  N.  E.  156.  These  bonds  would 
create  a  debt,  this  case  radically  dif- 
fering from  City  of  Valparaiso  v. 
Gardner,  97  Ind.  1;  s.  c.  49  Am.  R. 
416.  That  there  was  a  provision  or 
promise  to  levy  taxes  to  pay  these 
bonds  was  no  reason  why  the  con- 
stitutional resriction  would  not 
apply. 

"'  Stewart  v.  Otoe  Co.,  2  Neb.  177. 
The  court  said: — "The  statutes  pro- 
vide the  only  security  that  can  be 
given.  The  public  faith  is  pledged, 
and  a  tax  not  exceeding  one  per 
cent,  may  be  levied  upon  all  the  tax- 
able property  of  the  county  annu- 
ally, and  when  collected  paid  to  the 
person  entitled  thereto  by  an  order 
upon  the  treasurer  of  the  county, 
payable  out  of  that  special  fund." 

^^  Chapman  v.  Douglass  Co.,  107  U. 
S.  348;  s.  c.  2  S.  Ct.  62.  The  court 
said: — "The  agreement,  ...  so 
far  as  it  relates  to  the  time  and 
mode  of  payment,  is  void;  but  the 
contract  for  the  sale  itself  has  been 
executed  on  the  part  of  the  vendor 
by  delivery  of  the  deed,  and  his  title 
at  law  has  actually  passed  to  the 
county.  As  the  agreement  between 
the  parties  has  failed  by  reason  of 
the  legal  disability  of  the  county 
to  perform  its  part,  according  to  its 
conditions,  the  right  of  the  vendor 
to  rescind  the  contract  and  to  a  res- 
titution of  his  title  would  seem  to  be 


633 


ULTRA   VIRES. 


649 


§  649.  Work  on  public  buildings,  etc. — The  people  of  a  county 
voted  seventy-five  thousand  dollars  to  build  a  court-house,  and  a  con- 
tract was  entered  into  by  a  contractor  to  build  it  by  tlie  plans  and 
specifications  for  that  sum.  Changes  were  made  in  the  plans  by 
which  the  cost  was  much  increased  in  some  respects,  but  no  corre- 
sponding changes  were  made  to  decrease  the  cost  in  other  respects.  It 
was  held  in  such  a  case  that  all  the  agreements  whereby  the  total  cost 
of  the  work  was  to  exceed  the  sum  of  seventy-five  thousand  dollars 
were  in  excess  of  the  authority  of  the  supervisors,  and  therefore  void, 
and  there  could  be  no  recovery  upon  them ;  and  that  the  case  was  not 
altered  by  the  fact  that  the  people  afterwards  voted  an  additional 
sum  to  complete  the  building  which  the  contractor  failed  to  finish 
under  his  contract.^*  Boards  of  supervisors  have  no  power  to  con- 
struct bridges  over  navigable  lakes,  no  such  power  having  been  con- 
ferred upon  them  by  statute.  ^^ 


as  clear  as  it  would  be  just,  unless 
some  valid  reason  to  the  contrary 
can  be  shown."  (See  also,  Marsh  v. 
Fulton  Co.,  10  Wall.  676,  684;  Louisi- 
ana V.  Wood,  102  U.  S.  294;  Milten- 
berger  v.  Cooke,  18  Wall.  421.)  Fur- 
ther on  the  court  said: — "The  pur- 
chase itself  .  .  .  was  expressly 
authorized.  The  agreement  for  defi- 
nite times  of  payment  and  for  se- 
curity alone  was  not  authorized.  It 
was  not  illegal  in  the  sense  of  being 
prohibited  as  an  offense;  the  power 
in  that  form  was  simply  withheld. 
The  policy  of  the  law  extends  no 
further  than  merely  to  defeat  what 
it  does  not  permit  and  imposes  upon 
the  parties  no  penalty.  It  thus  falls 
within  the  rule  stated  in  Pollock  on 
Contracts  264."  See  also,  as  to  the 
application  of  this  principle,  Mor- 
ville  V.  American  Tract  Society,  123 
Mass.  129,  137;  Hitchcock  v.  Galves- 
ton, 96  U.  S.  341,  350,  which  allowed 
a  recovery  for  the  value  of  the  bene- 
fit conferred  upon  the  municipal  cor- 
poration, notwithstanding  the  con- 
tract to  pay  in  bonds  was  held  to  be 
illegal  and  void.  The  court  said:  — 
"It  matters  not  that  the  promise  was 
to  pay  in  a  manner  not  authorized 
by  law.  If  payment  can  not  be 
made  in  bonds  because  their  issue  is 


ultra  vires,  it  would  be  sanctioning 
rank  injustice  to  hold  that  payment 
may  not  be  made  at  all.  Such  is  not 
the  law." 

^^King  V.  Mahaska  Co.,  75  Iowa 
329;  s.  c.  39  N.  W.  636;  Lancaster 
Co.  V.  Fulton,  128  Pa.  St.  48;  s.  c.  18 
Atl.  384;  24  W.  N.  C.  (Pa.)  401  (a 
contract  made  by  the  commissioners 
of  a  county,  to  give  to  the  county 
solicitor,  whose  salary  is  fixed  by 
law,  an  additional  compensation  for 
services  to  be  rendered  by  him  lying 
within  the  sphere  of  his  official  au- 
ties  as  prescribed  by  statute, 
was  held  to  be  ultra  vires;  and  that 
being  in  its  effect  evasive  and  sub- 
versive of  law,  and  contrary  to  pub- 
lic policy,  it  was  void,  irrespective 
of  intent,  and  was,  therefore,  in- 
capable of  being  ratified  after  the 
expiration  of  the  solicitor's  term) ; 
Hunter  v.  Nolf,  71  Pa.  St.  282;  Ches- 
ter Co.  V.  Barber,  97  Pa.  St.  455. 

^^  Snyder  v.  Foster,  77  Iowa  638; 
s.  c.  42  N.  W.  506.  The  court  said: 
— "It  is  true  that  boards  of  super- 
visors have  power  to  provide  for  the 
erection  of  all  bridges  'which  may 
be  necessary  and  which  the  public 
convenience  may  require,  within 
their  respective  counties,'  but  they 
can  provide  for  the  erection  of  such 


650 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS. 


634 


§  650.  Issuing  of  bonds. — Where  there  is  a  total  want  of  power  un- 
der tlie  law  in  the  ollicers  or  board  who  issue  bonds  of  a  municipal  cor- 
poration, the  bonds  will  be  void  in  the  hands  of  innocent  holders. 
There  is  a  distinction  between  irregularities  in  the  exercise  of  the 
power  conferred  and  the  total  want  of  power  to  do  the  act,  the  distinc- 
tion being  between  questions  of  fact  and  questions  of  law.  If  it  is  a 
question  of  fact  and  the  board  of  officers  are  authorized  by  law  to  de- 
termine the  fact,  then  their  determination  is  final  and  conclusive.  And 
although  it  may  be  contrary  to  the  fact,  yet  if  recited  in  the  bond  that 
the  necessary  and  proper  steps  required  by  law  to  be  taken  had  been 
taken,  then  the  municipality  is  estopped  from  denying  that  they  were 
taken.^*'  But  all  persons  are  presumed  to  know  the  law,  and  if  the 
law  creates  conditions  precedent  upon  which  the  right  to  act  at  all 
depended,  and  these  conditions  were  not  complied  with,  and  the  law 
appointed  no  board  or  officer  to  determine  that  fact,  then  there  can 
not  be  an  innocent  holder  of  such  bonds. ^'^  Where  a  bond  upon  its 
face  does  not  show  authority  on  the  part  of  the  township  to  issue  it, 
the  doctrine  of  bona-fide  holder  does  not  apply,  but  the  holder  takes 
it  subject  to  the  defense  of  entire  illegality.^^ 


bridges  only  in  public  high- 
ways. They  may  establish  high- 
ways only  'as  provided  by  law.' 
But  the  law  does  not  authorize  the 
establishment  of  a  highway  until 
the  right  to  use  the  land  over  which 
it  is  to  pass  for  that  purpose  has 
been  obtained.  In  this  case  the 
state  holds  the  title  to  the  bed  of  the 
lake  for  the  use  and  benefit  of  its 
citizens.  It  has  not,  by  express  stat- 
ute, authorized  any  obstruction  of 
such  use."  See  also,  as  to  how  far 
powers  conferred  may  be  extended 
by  implication,  Hickok  v.  Hine,  23 
Ohio  St.  523;  Inhabitants  &c.  v. 
County  Com'rs,  3  Met.  (Mass.)  202; 
Commonwealth  v.  Coombs,  2  Mass. 
489;  Inhabitants  &c.  v.  Railway  Co., 
4  Cush.  (Mass.)  63;  Attorney-Gen- 
eral V.  Stevens,  1  Saxt.  Ch.  (N.  J.) 
369;  s.  c.  22  Am.  D.  526. 

^^  Spitzer  v.  Village  of  Blanchard, 
82  Mich.  234;  s.  c.  46  N.  W.  400; 
Dixon  Co.  V.  Field,  111  U.  S.  83;  s. 
c.  4  S.  Ct.  315. 

^''  Bernards  Tp.  v.  Morrison,  133 
U.  S.  523;  s.  c.  10  S.  Ct.  333. 


="  Bogart  V.  La  Motte  Tp.,  79  Mich. 
294;  s.  c.  44  N.  W.  612.  And  a  mu- 
nicipal corporation  can  not  ratify  or 
be  estopped  by  an  act  void  in  its  in- 
ception and  wholly  ultra  vires: 
Highway  Com'rs  v.  Van  Dusan,  40 
Mich.  429.  In  Rogers  v.  Burlington, 
3  Wall.  654,  the  court  held  that 
when  the  power  was  shown  in  the 
municipal  corporation  to  issue  the 
bond,  but  there  were  irregularities 
in  its  execution,  the  corporation 
might  be  estopped  to  deny  that  the 
power  was  properly  executed.  In 
Town  of  Hackettstown  v.  Swack- 
hamer,  37  N.  J.  L.  191,  it  was  held 
that  municipal  corporations  in  the 
absence  of  a  specific  grant  of  power 
do  not  in  general  possess  the  ca- 
pacity to  borrow  money;  and  a  note 
given  by  such  corporation  for  an 
unauthorized  loan  can  not  be  en- 
forced, even  though  the  money  bor- 
rowed has  been  expended  for  mu- 
nicipal purposes.  In  Portsmouth 
Sav.  Bank  v.  Village  of  Ashley,  91 
Mich.  670;  s.  c.  52  N.  W.  74,  it  was 
held  that  the  village  was  not  bound 


635 


ULTRA    VIRES. 


651 


§  651.  The  same  subject  continued — Municipal  aid. — A  municipal 
corporation  can  not  create  a  debt  and  issue  negotiable  bonds  repre- 
senting it  in  order  to  pay  for  a  subscription  to  a  railway  corporation 
under  a  power  conferred  by  the  legislature  upon  it  to  subscribe  for 
stock  in  that  corporation.^^  Seven-year  bonds  issued  by  a  township 
board,  bearing  interest,  in  lieu  of  township  orders  which,  were  payable 
on  presentation,  have  been  held  void.*"  The  power  of  township  boards 
in  Michigan  to  audit  and  allow  claims  and  issue  obligations  ends 
wath  issuing  orders  for  what  they  allow  to  be  signed  by  the  clerk  and 
countersigned  by  the  chairman.''^ 


to  pay  water-works  bonds,  the  sign- 
ing of  which  by  the  president  and 
clerk  had  been  authorized  by  resolu- 
tion of  the  village  council,  but 
which  were  delivered  by  the  presi- 
dent without  any  authority  con- 
ferred by  resolution.  -  -  -  The  pub- 
lic can  act  only  through  authorized 
agents,  and  it  is  not  bound  until  all 
who  are  required  to  participate  in 
what  is  to  be  done  have  performed 
their  respective  duties:  Brown  v. 
Bon  Homme  Co.,  1  S.  D.  216;  s.  c. 
46  N.  W.  173.  The  Michigan  court 
also  said: — "The  statute  of  this 
state  in  reference  to  the  issuing  of 
the  water-works  bonds  vests  that 
power  in  the  village  council,  and 
until  that  body  has  met  at  a  legal 
meeting  and  voted  to  issue  the 
bonds  or  authorized  their  issue,  one 
of  the  essential  requirements  of  the 
statute  has  not  been  complied  with; 
and  these  bonds  being  issued  with- 
out such  direction  are  not  binding 
against  the  village." 

^''Hill  V.  Memphis,  134  U.  S.  198; 
s.  c.  33  L.  ed.  887;  10  S.  Ct.  562;  7 
R.  R.  &  Corp.  L.  J.  470:  29  Am.  & 
Eng.  Corp.  Cas.  135.  All  grants  of 
power  of  this  kind  must  be  con- 
strued strictly.  Under  a  grant  like 
this  the  corporation  might  give 
written  evidence  of  the  subscrip- 
tions, but  that  only.  The  rule  for 
municipal  corporations  differs  from 
that  of  private  corporations.  Pri- 
vate corporations  created  for  pri- 
vate purposes  may  contract  debts  in 
connection  ■^vith  their  business,  and 


issue  evidences  of  them  in  such 
form  as  may  best  suit  their  con- 
venience. But  municipal  corpora- 
tions, being  established  for  purposes 
of  local  government,  in  the  absence 
of  specific  delegation  of  power  can 
not  engage  in  undertakings  not  di- 
rected immediately  to  the  accom- 
plishment of  those  purposes.  The 
provisions  in  the  general  railroad 
law  of  Missouri  which  went  into 
effect  January  1,  1866,  respecting 
the  loan  of  municipal  credit  to  a 
railroad  company,  and  the  act  of 
the  state  of  March  24,  1868,  respect- 
ing the  funding  of  the  debts  of  mu- 
nicipalities, are  to  be  construed  in 
subordination  to  the  provisions  of 
the  constitution  of  the  state  then  in 
force,  prohibiting  the  legislature 
authorizing  any  town  to  loan  its 
credit  to  any  corporation  except 
with  the  assent  of  two-thirds  of  the 
qualified  voters  at  a  regular  or  spe- 
cial election:  Hill  v.  Memphis,  su- 
pra. 

'"  Bogart  V.  La  Motte  Tp.,  79  Mich. 
294;  s.  c.  44  N.  W.  612;  for  neither 
townships  of  this  state  nor  their  of- 
ficers have  any  power  to  borrow 
money  or  to  issue  bonds  unless  that 
power  is  conferred  upon  them  by 
act  of  the  legislature. 

"  Comp.  L.  Mich.,  §  708.  As  to  the 
rule  of  strictly  construing  acts 
granting  corporate  powers  involv- 
ing the  imposing  of  public  burdens, 
see  1  Dillon  Munic.  Corp.,  §§  507- 
509;  Starin  v.  Town  of  Genoa,  23  N. 
Y.   439;    Police   Jury  v.   Britton,   15 


653 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS. 


636 


§  652.    The    same    subject     continued — Public    improvements. — 

While  police  juries  may  contract  for  improvements  which  they  are 
authorized  to  make  to  be  paid  out  of  the  taxes  which  they  are  author- 
ized to  levy  for  parochial  expenses,  and  which  are  set  apart  for  this 
special  improvement,  they  can  not  issue  any  promissory  note,  draft 
or  warrant  in  advance  to  cover  this  amount  which  may  go  into  the 
treasury.  It  must  be  there  before  the  warrant  issues,  unless  by  legis- 
lative authority  they  are  authorized  to  issue  the  same  in  advance.*^ 
A  town  in  Indiana  had  issued  its  negotiable  bonds  to  a  certain 
amount,  the  proceeds  of  which  were  to  be  used  in  the  construction  of 
a  sehoolhouse,  and  sold  them  in  open  market.  When  they  matured 
there  was  a  new  issue  of  similar  bonds  and  they  were  also  sold  in  open 
market.  The  supreme  court  of  the  United  States  held  the  new  issue 
to  be  void  for  want  of  authority,  and  that  the  municipality  was  not 
estopped  from  setting  up  that  defense.*^ 


Wall.  566;  Gause  v.  City  of  Clarks- 
ville,  5  Dill.  165.  In  City  of  New- 
port V.  Newport  &c.  Co.,  84  Ky.  166, 
it  was  held  that  when  a  municipat 
corporation  has  the  power,  express 
or  implied,  to  contract  with  others 
to  furnish  its  inhabitants  with  the 
means  of  obtaining  gas  at  their  own 
expense,  it  has  the  power  to  make  a 
contract  granting  to  a  corporation 
the  exclusive  rights  to  the  use  of 
its  streets  for  that  purpose  for  a 
term  of  years.  This  opinion  rested 
upon  this,  among  other  grounds, — 
that  the  power  given  the  municipal- 
ity to  provide  for  lighting  the  city 
included  the  power  to  grant  that  ex- 
clusive right. 

*-  Snelling  v.  Joffrion,  42  La.  An. 
886;  s.  c.  8  So.  609,  in  which  the 
court  sustained  the  rights  of  tax- 
payers to  maintain  the  action  to  an- 
nul the  contract  so  far  as  to  prevent 
the  issuing  of  evidences  of  indebted- 
ness against  a  fund  not  yet  in  the 
parish  treasury,  this  being  prohibit- 
ed by  express  legislative  enactment: 
La.  acts  1877,  No.  30,  §  5;  Breaux  v. 
Parish  of  Iberville,  23  La.  An.  232; 
Sterling  v.  Parish  of  West  Felici- 
ana, 26  La.  An.  59.  See  also,  New- 
gass  V.  City  of  New  Orleans,  42  La. 
An.  163;    s.  c.  7  So.  565    (the  court 


would  not  interfere  with  the  discre- 
tion of  a  police  jury  so  as  to  dictate 
what  particular  contract  should  or 
should  not  be  made) ;  State  v.  City 
of  New  Orleans,  41  La.  An.  91;  s.  c. 
5  So.  262;  Conery  v.  New  Orleans 
Water- Works  Co.,  41  La.  An.  910; 
s.  c.  7  So.  8. 

"Merrill  v.  Monticello,  138  U.  S. 
673;  s.  c.  11  S.  Ct.  441.  The  im- 
plied power  of  a  municipal  corpora- 
tion to  borrow  money  to  enable  it 
to  execute  the  powers  expressly 
conferred  upon  it  by  law,  if  it  ex- 
ists at  all,  does  not  authorize  it  to 
create  and  issue  negotiable  securi- 
ties to  be  sold  in  the  market  and  to 
be  taken  by  a  purchaser  freed  from 
equities  that  might  be  set  up  by  the 
maker.  To  borrow  money  and  to 
give  a  bond  or  obligation  therefor 
which  may  circulate  in  the  market 
as  a  negotiable  security  freed  from 
any  equities  that  may  be  set  up  by 
the  maker  of  it  are  essentially  dif- 
ferent tran-sactions  ■  in  their  nature 
and  legal  effect.  See  also.  Marsh  v. 
Fulton  Co.,  10  Wall.  676;  East  Oak- 
land Tp.  V.  Skinner,  94  U.  S.  255; 
Buchanan  v.  Litchfield,  102  U.  S.  278; 
Dixon  Co.  V.  Field,  111  U.  S.  83;  s. 
c.  4  S.  Ct.  315;  Hayes  v.  Holly 
Springs,  114  U.  S.  120;  s.  c.  5  S.  Ct. 


637 


ULTRA   VIRES. 


653 


§  653.  Contracts  abrogating  control  of  streets. — The  laying  out' 
and  opening  streets  by  the  common  council  of  a  city  being  the  exercise 
of  its  legitimate  functions,  any  contract  made  by  the  city  with  an 
individual  or  corporation,  by  which  it  agrees  that  it  will  not  in  the 
future  open  or  extend  a  street  in  any  particular  place  or  part  of  the 
city,  is  an  abrogation  of  its  legislative  powers  and  ultra  vires.*'*  A 
contract  by  a  city  to  straighten  the  course  of  a  large  stream  running 
in  a  zigzag  direction  through  it  has  been  held  not  to  be  ultra  vires.* ^ 


785;  Daviess  Co.  v.  Dickinson,  117 
U.  S.  657;  s.  c.  6  S.  Ct.  897;  Gause  v. 
City  of  Clarksville,  5  Dill.  165;  Hop- 
per V.  Covington,  118  U.  S.  148,  151; 
s.  c.  6  S.  Ct.  1025;  McCracken  v.  City 
of  San  Francisco,  16  Cal.  591,  619; 
Police  Jury  v.  Britton,  15  Wall.  566; 
Mayor  v.  Ray,  19  Wall.  468;  Clai- 
borne Co.  v.  Brooks,  111  U.  S.  400, 
406;  s.  c.  4  S.  Ct.  489  (wtiere  it  was 
held  that  the  statutes  of  Tennessee 
which  conferred  upon  counties  in 
that  state  power  to  erect  a  court- 
house, jail  and  other  necessary 
county  buildings  did  not  authoi'ize 
the  issue  of  commercial  paper  as 
evidence  of  or  security  for  a  debt 
contracted  for  the  construction  of 
such  a  building)  ;  Young  v.  Claren- 
don Tp.,  132  U.  S.  340,  347;  s.  c.  10 
S.  Ct.  107;  Kelley  v.  Milan,  127  U. 
S.  139;  s.  c.  8  S.  Ct.  1101;  Hill  v. 
Memphis,  134  U.  S.  198,  203;  s.  c.  10 
S.  Ct.  562. 

"  Matter  of  Opening  of  First 
Street,  66  Mich.  42;  s.  c.  sub  nom. 
In  re  City  of  Grand  Rapids  v.  Grand 
Rapids  &c.  R.  Co.,  33  N.  W.  15.  See 
also.  Gale  v.  Village  of  Kalamazoo, 
23  Mich.  344;  Toledo  &c.  R.  Co.  v. 
Detroit  &c.  R.  Co.,  62  Mich.  564;  s. 
0.  29  N.  W.  500;  Milhau  v.  Sharp,  27 
N.  Y.  611;  Coleman  v.  Second  Ave. 
R.  Co.,  38  N.  Y.  201;  Hood  v.  Mayor 
&c.,  1  Allen  (Mass.)  103;  Backus  v. 
Lebanon.  11  N.  H.  19;  State  v.  Hud- 
son &c.  R.  Co.,  38  N.  J.  L.  548;  New- 
castle &c.  R.  Co.  V.  Peru  &c.  R.  Co., 
3  Ind.  464;  Brimmer  v.  Boston,  102 
Mass.  19;  Trustees  &c.  v.  Salmond, 
11   Maine   109;    West  River   Bridge 


Co.  V.  Dix,  6  How.  507;  Dillon 
Munic.  Corp.,  §  567;  Davis  v.  Mayor, 
14  N.  Y.  506,  532;  People's  R.  Co.  v. 
Memphis  R.  Co.,  10  Wall.  38. 

^^  McGuire  v.  City  of  Rapid  City, 
6  Dak.  346;  s.  c.  43  N.  W.  706;  the 
court  holding  such  power  in  the  city 
to  arise  from  its  power  to  drain, 
improve,  keep  in  repair  and  prevent 
obstructions  in  its  streets.  In  Ben- 
ton V.  Hamilton,  110  Ind.  294;  s.  c. 
11  N.  E.  238,  a  contract  between  a 
town  treasurer  and  the  town  for  the 
improvement  by  the  former  of  a 
public  street  was  void  under  the 
revised  statutes  of  Indiana  ■  1881, 
§  2049  (Burns'  R.  S.  Ind.  1901, 
§  2136),  which  prohibited  it;  and  it 
was  further  held  that  contracts  by 
a  municipal  corporation  with  one  of 
its  own  officers,  by  which  a  burden 
is  imposed  on  property-owners,  are 
opposed  to  tlie  policy  of  the  law. 
In  Lyddy  v.  Long  Island  City,  104 
N.  Y.  218;  s.  c.  10  N.  E.  155,  a  con- 
tract with  an  attorney  made  with 
the  authorities  of  a  city  for  profes- 
sional services  was  void,  as  the 
amended  charter  of  the  city  (N.  Y. 
laws  1871,  ch.  461)  placed  the  com- 
mon council  under  an  absolute  dis- 
ability to  cre&,te  any  debt  or  liabil- 
ity on  the  part  of  the  city  for  legal 
services;  also,  that,  having  no  au- 
thority to  create  a  liability  against 
the  city  by  express  contract,  it  could 
not  legalize  such  a  claim  by  ac- 
knowledgment, ratification  or  other- 
wise.   Power  of  village  trustees 

in  relation  to  vacation  of  streets  and 
acts   declared   ultra   vires,    in   New 


§    654  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  638 

§  654.  General  legislation — Offers  of  rewards. — The  contracts  of 
niuuicipalities  obtain  validity  only  by  force  of  the  law  authorizing 
their  making.  There  is  no  authority  for  contracts  that  the  law  does 
not  empower  the  governing  hoards  to  enter  into.*"  In  holding  that 
a  county  court  in  Oregon  had  no  power  to  order  the  offer  of  a  reward 
for  information  leading  to  a  conviction  of  bribery  at  a  coming  elec- 
tion, the  court  said:  "The  county  courts,  in  the  management  of 
county  affairs,  have  no  power  except  that  which  is  expressly  given 
them  by  statute,  or  which  is  necessary  to  carry  out  those  so  given 
them.  They  have  no  authority  to  legislate.  Their  province  is  to 
administer  the  law  as  the  legislature  has  directed."*^  An  incorpo- 
rated village  has  power  to  offer  a  reward  for  the  conviction  of  incen- 
diaries for  offenses  committed  within  its  limits  where  it  is  author- 
ized to  provide  for  the  preservation  of  public  property  and  for  the 
safety  and  general  welfare  of  the  inhabitants.*^  It  has  been  held  that 
under  power  to  preserve  order  and  protect  the  city  from  fire,  and  the 
danger  from  the  same,  the  city  council  has  no  power  to  offer  rewards 
for  the  detection  of  incendiaries.*"  In  the  absence  of  express  charter 
or  statutoT}^  power  a  municipal  corporation  has  no  power  to  offer  and 
pay  a  reward  for  the  apprehension  and  conviction  of  a  criminal.^ **  In 
the  absence  of  a  statute  a  town  has  not  power  to  grant  bounties. ^^ 

York  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Village  of  New  Loker   v.    Inhabitants   &c.,   13    Pick. 

Rochelle,   60  N.  Y.   S.  904;    s.  c.  29  (Mass.)  343;  City  of  Philadelphia  v. 

Misc.  (N.  Y.)  195.  Flanigan,  47  Pa.  St.  21;   Johnson  v. 

'"  Therefore    a    contract   let   by    a  Santa  Clara  Co.,  28  Cal.  545. 
board  of  commissioners  of  a  county,  "  Mountain  v.  Multnomah  Co.,  16 
for  the  care  of  the  "poor,"  at  a  cer-  Or.    279;    s.    c.   18    Pac.   464.     They 
tain  price  per  capita,  and   for  the  have  no  powers  except  those  granted 
care  of  the  "sick  and  infirm"  at  an-  and  defined  by  law,  and  like  other 
other  price  per  capita,  was  held  to  agents  must  pursue  their  authority 
be  void  in  Lebcher  v.  Board  &c.,  9  and   act  within   the   scope   of   their 
Mont.  315;   s.  c.  23  Pac.  713,  as  the  power.     See   also,    Wolcott   v.    Law- 
law  only  authorized  a  contract  for  rence  Co.,  26  Mo.  272;  Book  v.  Earl, 
the   care   of   such   persons  as   were  87  Mo.  246;    Sturgeon  v.  Hampton, 
poor  and  therewith  sick  and  infirm.  88  Mo.  203;    State  v.  Brossfield,  67 
See  also,  Parr  v.  President  &c.,  72  N.  Mo.  331;  Webb  v.  La  Payette  Co.,  67 
Y.  463;  Head  v.  Providence  Ins.  Co.,  Mo.  353;    Ranney  v.  Bader,   67    Mo. 
2  Cranch  127;  Bonestell  v.  Mayor,  22  476;  State  v.  Walker,  85  Mo.  41. 
N.    Y.    162;    Poster   v.    Coleman,    10  "People  v.  Village  of  Holly,  119 
Cal.    278;    Zottman   v.   City   of    San  Mich.  637;  s.  c.  78  N.  W.  665. 
Francisco,  20  Cal.  96;    s.  c.  81  Am.  '"  Crofut  v.   City   of   Danbury,   65 
D.  96;  Argenti  v.  City  of  San  Fran-  Conn.  294;  s.  c.  32  Atl.  365. 
Cisco,  16  Cal.  255;   City  of  Alton  v.  '"City  of  Winchester  v.  Redmond, 
Madison    Co.,    21    111.    115;     Dillon  93  Va.  711;  s.  c.  25  S.  B.  1001. 
Munic.  Corp.,  §  381;  Thomas  v.  City  "O'Connor  v.  Town  of  Waterbury, 
of  Richmond,  12  Wall.  349;  Clark  v.  69  Conn.  206;  s.  c.  37  Atl.  499. 
City  of  Des  Moines,   19   Iowa   199; 


639 


ULTRA   VIRES. 


8  655 


§  655.  Contracts  for  water  supply. — An  act,  the  material  parts  of 
which  are  quoted  in  the  note,^"  for  the  annexation  of  a  town  to  a  city, 
was  held  to  give  to  the  city  a  power  to  purchase  the  property  and 
franchises  of  the  water-works  company,  but  by  the  terms  of  the  act 
that  right  expired  with  the  expiration  of  the  two  years.  ^^  Any  con- 
tract by  a  city  council  with  a  private  corporation,  impairing  the 
exercise  of  its  power  and  duty  to  keep  the  streets  in  repair,  safe  and 
convenient  for  public  use,  is  void  as  against  public  policy.^*  Upon  a 
contention  that  a  contract  by  a  city  with  a  water  company,  in  extend- 
ing through  a  period  of  twenty-one  years  and  depriving  subsequent 
city  councils  of  legislative  control  over  the  matter  embraced  in  it,  was 
ultra  vires,  it  was  held  that  the  objection  did  not  require  that  the 
contract  should  be  held  void,  but  only  voidable  so  far  as  it  was  execu- 
tory.^*^ 


§  656.  The  same  subject  continued. — Authority  to  make  a  perma- 
nent and  exclusive  contract  with  a  water  company  to  build  water- 
works and  supply  a  city  with  water  can  not  be  implied  from  the 


52  Laws  of  New  York  1886,  ch. 
335,  §  5,  read:  "The  mayor,  comp- 
troller and  auditor  of  the  city 
,  .  .  are  hereby  authorized  .  .  . 
to  purchase  the  reservoir,  .  .  . 
and  all  other  property,  of  [a  water- 
works company]  .  .  .  when  and 
at  such  price  as  may  be  agreed 
upon,  .  .  .  and  in  case  said  par- 
ties shall  be  unable  to  agree  upon  a 
price  for  the  purchase,  .  .  .  then 
in  that  case  the  power  to  acquire 
said  property  and  franchises  by  the 
right  of  eminent  domain  is  hereby 
expressly  delegated  to  said  city, 
.  .  .  and  the  said  officers  in  the 
name  of  and  for  said  city  within 
two  years  thereafter  may  proceed 
to  acquire     .     .     ." 

^^Zeigler  v.  Chapin,  126  N.  Y.  342; 
s.  c.  27  N.  E.  471;  affirming  s.  c.  59 
Hun  (N.  Y.)  214;  13  N.  Y.  S.  783, 
in  which  case  the  court  held  the 
action  of  a  taxpayer  to  annul  a  con- 
tract which  had  been  entered  into 
by  the  city  authorities  for  the  pur- 
chase of  this  property,  on  the 
ground  that  the  contract  having 
been  made  after  the  two  years  had 


expired  was  illegal  and  void,  there 
being  no  power  in  the  city  authori- 
ties to  make  it,  was  maintainable, 
and  that  the  injunction  restraining 
the  officials  from  carrying  out  the 
contract  pending  the  litigation  was 
properly  granted. 

"City  Council  &c.  v.  Capital  City 
Water  Co.,  92  Ala.  361;  s.  c.  9  So. 
339.  The  court  said: — "If  conceded 
that  the  city  council  has  authority 
to  contract  for  a  supply  of  water  for 
fire  and  sanitary  purposes,  yet  the 
city  council  has  no  power,  in  the 
absence  of  legislative  authority,  to 
make  contracts  or  pass  ordinances 
relinquishing  or  abandoning  the  leg- 
islative or  governmental  powers  or 
divesting  the  corporation  of  its  leg- 
islative discretion,  or  disabling  it 
to  perform  its  public  duties:  1  Dil- 
lon Munic.  Corp.,  §  97." 

"a  Carlyle  Water  &c.  Co.  v.  City  of 
Carlyle,  31  111.  App.  325;  City  of 
East  St.  Louis  v.  East  St.  Louis 
Gas  &c.  Co.,  98  111.  415;  Decatur 
Gas  &c.  Co.  V.  City  of  Decatur,  24 
111.  App.  544. 


657 


PUBLIC  .  COKPOEATIONS. 


640 


general  power  conferred  by  its  charter  to  contract  for  the  needs  of  a 
municipality.^^ 

§  657.  Contracts  for  lighting  streets. — Cities  and  towns  in  Massa- 
chusetts have  been  held  to  have  no  authority  under  the  statutes  to 
erect  and  maintain  works  for  the  manufacture  and  distribution  of 
electric  light  for  lighting  the  public  streets  or  for  this  and  the  addi- 
tional purpose  of  furnishing  light  to  their  inhabitants.^®    A  city  has 


°=  Greenville  Water-Works  Co.  v. 
City  of  Greenville  (Miss.),  7  So.  409. 
In  City  of  Brenham  v.  Brenham 
Water  Co.,  67  Tex.  542;  s.  c.  4  S.  W. 
143,  it  was  iield  that  the  city  had  no 
power  to  grant  to  this  water  com- 
pany an  exclusive  privilege  of  sup- 
plying it  with  water  for  twenty-five 
years,  such  power  not  being  express- 
ly granted  to  it,  and  for  the  further 
reason  that  the  power  of  a  city  gov- 
ernment to  make  such  a  contract 
as  would  disable  it  from  controlling 
in  future,  as  it  might  deem  best, 
municipal  affairs  to  which  it  refers, 
can  not  be  implied  from  the  express 
delegation  of  power  to  contract  re- 
garding the  particular  subject-mat- 
ter. The  ruling  was  based  upon  the 
general  principle  that  powers  are 
conferred  on  municipal  corpora- 
tions for  public  purposes,  and  they 
can  neither  be  delegated  nor  bar- 
tered away.  Such  corporations 
have  no  power  either  to  cede  away 
or  embarrass  their  legislative  or 
governmental  powers,  either  through 
the  agency  of  by-laws  or  contracts 
with  others,  so  as  to  disable  them 
from  the  performance  of  their  pub- 
lic duties.  Applying  these  princi- 
ples, the  contract  here  would  have 
the  effect  not  only  to  embarrass  the 
city  government  in  the  exercise  of 
the  power  conferred  on  it  but  to 
withdraw  from  it  the  right  to  pro- 
vide water  in  any  other  authorized 
way  for  public  purposes  and  for  the 
inhabitants  of  the  city,  which  was 
the  sole  purpose  for  which  the  pow- 
er to  erect,  maintain  and  regulate 
water-works  was  given  to  it.     This 


would  result  from  the  exclusive 
right  which,  from  the  terms  of  the 
ordinance,  it  intended  to  confer.  In 
Waterbury  v.  City  of  Laredo,  68 
Tex.  565;  s.  c.  5  S.  W.  81,  it  was  held 
that  a  contract  between  the  city  and 
an  attorney,  which  gave  to  him  an- 
nually for  twenty  years  one-third  of 
the  rents  of  the  ferry  privileges  and 
ferries  or  of  any  bridge  or  bridges 
built  across  the  Rio  Grande  river  at 
that  point,  the  contract  being  de- 
clared to  be  irrevocable,  and  which 
mutually  bound  the  contracting 
parties  to  do  no  act  and  to  enter 
into  no  engagement  or  contract  that 
would  interfere  with  its  terms,  in 
connection  with  certain  suits  he  had 
conducted  pertinent  to  this  ferry, 
for  which  he  had  been  reasonably 
compensated,  was  in  contravention 
of  public  policy  and  not  enforce- 
able. It  would,  if  enforced,  place  it 
beyond  the  power  of  the  city  to  es- 
tablish a  free  ferry  or  to  charge 
such  tolls  only  as  would  defray  the 
expenses  of  operating  the  franchise 
if  it  so  desired.  In  City  of  Cle- 
burne V.  Brown,  73  Tex.  443;  s.  c. 
11  S.  W.  404,  it  was  held  that  a  con- 
tract between  the  city  and  a  water 
and  ice  company,  which,  if  carried 
out,  would  have  amounted  to  a  loan 
by  the  city  of  its  credit  to  a  pri- 
vate corporation,  was  ultra  vires. 
It  had  not  the  power  to  do  it  under 
the  constitution  of  Texas,  art.  11, 
§3. 

"^  Spaulding  v.  Inhabitants  &c., 
153  Mass.  129;  s.  c.  26  N.  B.  421;  10 
L.  R.  A.  397;  33  Am.  &  Eng.  Corp. 
Cas.  638.     Such  a  power  can  not  be 


641 


ULTRA    VIRES. 


658 


no  power  to  loan  the  moneys  arising  from  a  sale  of  bonds  issued  to 
construct  water-works.'*'^  The  treasurer  being  by  law  the  proper  cus- 
todian of  such  moneys,  his  bondsmen,  in  such  a  case,  could  maintain 
a  suit  to  restrain  his  carrying  out  the  order  of  the  city  council,  as  it 
would  be  a  misappropriation  of  the  fund.^^ 

§  658.  Grant  of  exclusive  privileges. — The  powers  of  municipal 
corporations  are  limited  to  the  express  terms  of  the  grant  and  will 
not  be  extended  by  inference.  A  municipal  corporation  can  confer 
exclusive  privileges  for  the  prosecution  of  business  only  under  an 
express  grant  of  power  from  the  legislature.  Monopolies  being  preju- 
dicial to  the  public  welfare,  the  courts  will  not  infer  grants  thereof, 
but  will  refuse  to  presume  the  existence  of  legislative  intention  in 
conflict  with  public  policy.^" 


implied  as  an  incident  to  power  ex- 
pressly granted  them  to  erect  and 
maintain  street  lamps — at  least 
where  it  has  been  the  custom  of  the 
legislature  to  specifically  define 
from  time  to  time  the  purposes  for 
which  towns  may  raise  money  by 
taxation  of  their  inhabitants.  See 
also,  as  to  construing  strictly  all 
such  statutes,  Minot  v.  Inhabitants 
&c.,  112  Mass.  1;  Coolidge  v.  Inhabi- 
tants &c.,  114  Mass.  592;  Connolly  v. 
Inhabitants  &c.,  151  Mass.  437;  s.  c. 
24  N.  E.  404;  Anthony  v.  Inhabitants 
&c.,  1  Met.  (Mass.)  284.  The  legis- 
lature of  Massachusetts  has,  since 
this  decision,  enacted  "an  act  to 
enable  cities  and  towns  to  manufac- 
ture and  distribute  gas  and  elec- 
tricity:" Mass.  St.  1891,  ch.  370,  ap- 
proved June  4,  1891. 

"City  of  Bonham  v.  Taylor,  81 
Tex.  59;  s.  c.  16  S.  W.  555;  33  Am.  & 
Eng.  Corp.  Cas.  647.  The  court 
said: — "Municipal  corporations  ex- 
isting under  the  general  law  have 
power  to  raise  funds  for  special  pur- 
poses, enumerated  in  the  statute, 
and  to  use  such  funds  for  the  pur- 
poses for  which  they  were  raised, 
but  we  know  of  no  power  conferred 
on  them  to  become  money-lenders 
except  of  a  sinking-fund  raised  to 
1  Smith — 41 


meet  the  payment  of  a  debt."  It 
was  contended  that  the  revised 
statutes  of  Texas,  art.  370,  which 
declares  that  "the  city  council  shall 
have  the  management  and  control 
of  the  finances  and  other  property, 
real,  personal  and  mixed,  belonging 
to  the  corporation,"  conferred  on 
the  city  the  power  to  lend  the  spe- 
cial fund  raised  for  constructing 
the  water-works.  This  contention 
was  overruled,  the  court  holding 
that  the  statute  meant  a  control  in 
accordance  with  law  and  not  in  vio- 
lation of  law,  and  as  to  art.  420, 
which  gave  to  the  city  power  to  ap- 
propriate money  raised  to  enumer- 
ated purposes,  this  was  not  one  of 
them.  Nor  would  art.  424,  which 
relates  to  the  investment  of  a  sink- 
ing fund,  apply.  The  money  ,in 
question  was  not  the  sinking  fund, 
which  the  city  would  have  power  to 
lend,  for  the  entire  fund  was  money 
borrowed,  and  not  money  raised  by 
taxation  for  a  sinking  fund. 

°*  City    of   Bonham   v.    Taylor,    81 
Tex.  59;  s.  c.  16  S.  W.  555;  33  Am.  &  . 
Eng.  Corp.  Cas.  647. 

'^^  Logan  V.  Pyne,  43  Iowa  524;  s.  c. 
22  Am.  R.  261.  In  City  of  Brenham 
V.  Brenham  Water  Co.,  67  Tex.  542; 
s.  c.  4  S.  W.  143,  the  court  consid- 


650 


PUBLIC    CORPOKATIOXS. 


642 


§  659.  Curative  legislation. — The  United  States  supreme  court 
h'ave  lield  and  adhered  to  it  that  wlicre  municipal  corporations  have 
issued  evidences  of  indebtedness,  which  at  the  time  of  issue  were  un- 
authorized, it  is  in  the  power  of  the  legislature  to  validate  their 
issue  by  curative  legislation."" 


ered  a  grant  to  a  water  company  of 
the  right  and  privilege,  for  the  term 
of  twenty-five  years,  of  furnisliing 
the  city  with  water,  and  thus 
summed  up  their  conclusion: — "We 
do  not  wish  to  be  understood  to  hold 
that  a  municipal  corporation  has  no 
power  in  any  event  to  contract  for 
such  things  as  are  consumed  in 
their  daily  use,  for  a  period  longer 
than  the  official  term  of  the  officers 
who  make  the  contract;  but  we  do 
intend  to  be  understood  to  hold  that 
such  corporations  have  no  power  to 
make  contracts  continuous  in  char- 
acter in  reference  to  such  things  or 
any  others,  by  which  they  will  be, 
in  effect,  precluded  from  exercising, 
from  time  to  time,  any  power,  legis- 
lative in  character,  conferred  upon 
them  by  law."  In  Gale  v.  Village  of 
Kalamazoo,  23  Mich.  344;  s.  c.  9  Am. 
R.  80,  in  which  a  contract  to  build 
and  control  a  market-house  for  the 
period  of  ten  years  was  held  to  be 
void  because  it  created  a  monopoly. 
Judge  Cooley  said: — "It  is  impossi- 
"ble  to  predicate  reasonableness  of 
any  contract  by  which  the  govern- 
ing authority  abdicates  any  of  its 
legislative  powers,  and  precludes 
itself  from  meeting  in  the  proper 
way  the  emergencies  that  may  arise. 
Those  powers  are  conferred  in  order 
to  be  exercised  again  and  again,  as 
may  be  found  needful  or  politic; 
and  those  who  hold  them  in  trust 
to-day  are  vested  with  no  discretion 
to  circumscribe  their  limits  or  di- 
minish their  efficiency,  but  must 
transmit  them  unimpaired  to  their 
successors.  This  is  one  of  the  fun- 
damental maxims  of  government, 
and  it  is  impossible  that  free  gov- 
ernment   with    restrictions   for   the 


protection  of  individual  or  munici- 
pal rights  could  long  exist  without 
its  recognition."  In  Davenport  v. 
Kleinschmidt,  6  Mont.  502;  s.  c.  13 
Pac.  249,  it  was  held  that  a  city 
council  has  no  authority  to  grant  to 
any  person  a  monopoly  even  where 
no  express  prohibition  is  found  in 
the  charter  or  other  acts  of  the  leg- 
islature. In  Minturn  v.  Larue,  23 
How.  435,  Justice  Nelson  gives  this 
rule  of  construction  of  grants  by 
the  legislature  to  corporations:  — 
"That  only  such  powers  and  rights 
can  be  exercised  under  them  as  are 
clearly  comprehended  within  the 
words  of  the  act,  or  derived  there- 
from by  necessary  implication,  re- 
gard being  had  to  the  objects  of  the 
grant.  Any  ambiguity  or  doubt 
arising  out  of  the  terms  used  by  the 
legislature  must  be  resolved  in 
favor  of  the  public."  In  Richmond 
Co.  Gas-Light  Co.  v.  Town  of  Middle- 
town,  59  N.  Y.  228,  the  New  York 
court  of  appeals  held  that  there  was 
no  power  conferred  upon  the  town 
auditors  to  contract  with  a  gas  com- 
pany to  light  the  streets  of  the  town 
for  five  years.  In  City  of  Chicago 
V.  Rumpff,  45  111.  90,  a  right  to  do 
all  slaughtering  of  animals  in  Chi- 
cago for  a  specified  period  was  held 
to  be  void,  because  creating  a  mon- 
opoly. 

"^Bolles  V.  Brimfield,  120  U.  S. 
759;  s.  c.  7  S.  Ct.  736;  Grenada  Co. 
Supervisors  v.  Brogden,  112  U.  S. 
261,  262;  s.  c.  5  S.  Ct.  125  (the  court 
saying  in  this  case: — "Since  what 
was  done  in  this  case  by  the  consti- 
tutional majority  of  qualified  elec- 
tors and  by  the  board  of  supervisors 
of  the  county  would  have  been  legal 
and  binding  upon  the  county  had  it 


643 


ULTRA    VIRES. 


§    660 


§  660.  Ratification. — Corporate  ratification,  without  authority 
from  the  legislature,  can  not  make  a  municipal  bond  valid  which 
was  void  when  issued  for  want  of  legislative  power  to  make  it.^^     An 


been  done  under  legislative  author- 
ity previously  conferred,  it  is  not 
perceived  why  subsequent  legisla- 
tive ratification  is  not,  in  the  ab- 
sence of  constitutional  restrictions 
upon  such  legislation,  equivalent  to 
original  authority");  Thompson  v. 
Perrine,  103  U.  S.  806,  815;  Ritchie 
V.  Franklin  Co.,  22  Wall.  67;  Thom- 
son V.  Lee  Co.,  3  Wall.  327,  330; 
City  V.  Lamson,  9  Wall.  477,  485; 
Campbell  v.  City  of  Kenosha,  5 
Wall.  194;  Otoe  Co.  v.  Baldwin,  111 
U.  S.  1,  15;  s.  c.  4  S.  Ct.  265;  St. 
Joseph  Tp.  V.  Rogers,  16  Wall.  644, 
663;  Anderson  v.  Santa  Anna  Tp., 
116  U.  S.  356;  s.  c.  6  S.  Ct.  413; 
United  States  Mort.  Co.  v.  Gross,  93 
111.  483,  494,  where  the  court  said:  — 
"Unless  there  be  a  constitutional  in- 
hibition, a  legislature  has  power, 
when  it  interferes  with  no  vested 
right,  to  enact  retrospective  stat- 
utes to  validate  invalid  contracts  or 
to  ratify  and  confirm  any  act  it 
might  lawfully  have  authorized  in 
the  first  instance."  In  Katzenber- 
ger  V.  Aberdeen,  121  U.  S.  172;  s.  c. 
7  S.  Ct.  947,  it  was  held  that  when, 
by  reason  of  a  change  in  the  consti- 
tution of  a  state,  its  legislature  had 
no  constitutional  authority  to  au- 
thorize a  municipal  corporation  to 
issue  negotiable  bonds,  it  could  not 
validate  an  issue  of  bonds  by  such  a 
corporation  made  before  the  change 
in  the  constitution,  and  when  the 
legislature  had  such  power.  The 
court  was  controlled  by  Sykes  v. 
Mayor  £c.,  55  Miss.  115,  where  Chief 
Justice  Simrall  said  about  this  at- 
tempted curative  act: — "The  act  of 
1872  is  not  relied  on  to  waive  mere 
irregularities  in  the  execution  of  the 
power,  but  as  conferring  power  by 
retrospective  operation.  If  the 
bonds  are  obligatory  on  the  city  of 


Columbus,  they  became  so  for  the 
first  time  by  virtue  of  this  statute. 
The  legislature  of  1872  could  not,  by 
relation,  put  itself  back  to  1869  and 
exercise  power  not  denied  or  re- 
stricted by  the  constitution  of  1832. 
The  measure  of  its  power  was  the 
constitution  of  December,  1869,  and 
it  could  not  ratify  an  act  previously 
done  if,  at  the  date  it  professed  to 
do  so,  it  could  not  confer  power  in 
the  first  instance.  It  could  author- 
ize a  municipal  loan  conditionally. 
In  order  to  ratify  and  legalize  a 
loan  previously  made,  it  was  bound 
by  the  constitutional  limitation  of 
its  power."  This  doctrine  was  as- 
sented to  in  Grenada  Co.  Supervis- 
ors V.  Brogden,  112  U.  S.  261;  s.  c.  5 
S.  Ct.  125. 

'1  Lewis  V.  City  of  Shreveport,  108 
U.  S.  282;  s.  c.  2  S.  Ct.  634  (which 
held  bonds  of  the  city  issued  to 
grant  pecuniary  aid  to  a  railroad 
without  legislative  authority  void 
as  beyond  the  power  of  the  city  to 
issue,  and,  as  they  bore  evidence  on 
their  face  of  the  purpose  for  which 
they  were  issued,  void  in  the  hands 
of  bona-fide  holders.  The  holder  of 
the  bonds  insisted  that  as  the  city 
had  employed  agents  to  sell  these 
bonds,  and  its  law  officer  had  given 
an  opinion  in  favor  of  their  validity, 
and  as  they  had  been  recognized  in 
official  statements  as  binding  obli- 
gations, and  as  taxes  had  been 
levied  to  pay  principal  or  interest, 
this  amounted  to  a  ratification.  The 
court  held  that  it  mattered  not  that 
such  things  had  been  done) ;  Otta- 
wa V.  Gary,  108  U.  S.  110;  s.  c.  2  S. 
Ct.  361.  See  also,  as  to  the  inability 
of  subsequent  acts  of  a  corporation 
to  make  an  ultra-vires  contract  ef- 
fective, Highway  Com'rs  &c.  v.  Van 
Dusen,  40  Mich.  429;   Board  &c.  v. 


§  GGl 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS. 


644 


act  performed  by  a  public  corporation  in  violation  of  the  terms  of  a 
statute  can  not  be  validated  by  a  subsequent  ratification  by  the  corpo- 
ration.'"'- An  act  of  a  municipal  corporation,  void  for  want  of  author- 
ity to  do  it,  can  not  be  validated  by  an  estoppel  incurred  by  the  corpo- 
ration; otherwise  all  limitations  on  the  power  of  such  corporation 
imposed  by  the  legislature  for  the  public  good  might  be  evaded  at  the 
mere  volition  of  the  corporation/^^  A  municipal  corporation  has  no 
vested  right  of  property  in  a  defense  of  ultra  vires  to  a  contract  it 
has  entered  into,  and  hence  a  retroactive  statute  conferring  upon  a 
corporation  power  it  lacked  in  making  the  contract,  and  thus  legaliz- 
ing the  contract,  does  not  deprive  the  corporation  of  its  property  with- 
out due  process  of  law.*'*  There  is  a  marked  distinction  between  the 
incidental  powers  that  are  implied  in  favor  of  the  acts  of  a  business 
corporation  and  those  of  a  municipal  corporation.  The  inability  of 
a  business  corporation  to  avoid  its  obligations  upon  the  plea  of  ultra 
vires  when  it  has  received  and  retained  the  consideration  for  its  obli- 
gation has  no  application  to  a  municipal  corporation.^^ 

§  661.    Estoppel. — In  general,  a  municipal  corporation  is  not  es- 
topped from  denying  the  validity  of  a  contract  with  its  officers,  when 

Arrighi,  54  Miss.  668;  Nash  v.  City  32  N.  H.  118;  Kingman  v.  Inhabit- 
of  St.  Paul,  11  Minn.  174;  Hague  v. 
City  of  Philadelpliia,  48  Pa.  St.  527; 
Brady  v.  Mayor,  20  N.  Y.  312;  City 
of  Bryan  v.  Page,  51  Tex.  532;  Pe- 
terson V.  Mayor,  17  N.  Y.  449;  Cow- 
en  V.  Village  of  West  Troy,  43  Barb. 
(N.  Y.)  48;  Brown  v.  Mayor,  63  N. 
Y.  239;  Hodges  v.  City  of  Buffalo,  2 
Denio  (N.  Y.)  110;  McDonald  v. 
Mayor,  68  N.  Y.  23;  Smith  v.  City  of 
Newburgh,  77  N.  Y.  130;  Green  v. 
City  of  Cape  May,  41  N.  J.  L.  45; 
Taymouth  Tp.  v.  Koehler,  35  Mich. 
22;  Marsh  v.  Fulton  Co.,  10  Wall. 
676;  Horton  v.  Town  of  Thompson, 
71  N.  Y.  513;  Scott  v.  City  of  Shreve- 
port,  20  Fed.  714;  San  Diego  Water 
Co.  V.  City  of  San  Diego,  59  Cal. 
517;  Bank  v.  Town  of  Statesville,  84 
N.  C.  169;  City  of  Laredo  v.  Mac- 
donell,  52  Tex.  511.  As  to  effect  of 
use  of  a  schoolhouse  which  has  been 
constructed  at  an  expense  beyond 
the  authority  reposed  in  the  build- 
ing committee  by  the  vote  of  the 
district,  or  similar  cases  as  a  ratifi- 
cation, see  Wilson  v.   School  Dist., 


ants  &c.,  2  Cush.  (Mass.)  426;  Da- 
vis V.  School  Dist,  24  Maine  349; 
Lane  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  10  Met. 
(Mass.)  462;  Chaplin  v.  Hill,  24  Vt. 
528;  Fisher  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  4 
Cush.  (Mass.)  494;  Taft  v.  Inhabit- 
ants &c.,  14  Mass.  282;  Keyser  v. 
School  Dist,  35  N.  H.  477;  Pratt  v. 
Town  of  Swanton,  15  Vt.  147. 

"Platter  v.  Board  &c.,  103  Ind. 
360;  s.  c.  2  N.  E.  544;  1  West  Rep. 
235. 

"'  Hoey  V.  Gilroy,  37  N.  Y.  St  754; 
s.  c.  14  N.  Y.  S.  159;  Peterson  v. 
Mayor,  17  N.  Y.  449,  454  (holding 
that  no  sort  of  a  ratification  can 
make  good  an  act  without  corporate 
authority) ;  New  York  &c.  R.  Co.  v. 
Van  Horn,  57  N.  Y.  473  (holding 
that  a  statute  can  not  be  evaded  by 
estoppel) ;  Northern  Bank  &c.  v. 
Porter  Tp.  Trustees,  110  U.  S.  608, 
619;  s.  c.  4  S.  Ct  254. 

"Steele  County  v.  Ersklne,  98 
Fed.  215. 

«^  Von  Schmidt  v.  Widber,  105  Cal. 
151,  157;  s.  c.  38  Pac.  682. 


G45 


ULTRA    VIRES. 


Gfil 


there  has  been  no  authority  for  making  such  a  contract.  The  doctrine 
of  ultra  vires  is  applied  with  greater  strictness  to  municipal  bodies 
than  to  private  corporations.''*'  The  supreme  court  of  Minnesota,  with 
reference  to  this  doctrine,  said':  "A  different  rule  of  law  would,  in 
effect,  vastly  enlarge  the  power  of  public  agents  to  bind  a  munici- 
pality by  contracts,  not  only  unauthorized  but  prohibited  by  the  law. 
It  would  tend  to  nullify  the  limitations  and  restrictions  imposed  with 
respect  to  the  powers  of  such  agents ;  and  to  a  dangerous  extent  expose 
the  public  to  the  very  evils  and  abuses  which  such  limitations  are 
designed  to  prevent.""^ 


''"Newbery  v.  Fox,  37  Minn.  141; 
s.  c.  33  N.  W.  333,  which  held  a  con- 
tract for  making  certain  street-im- 
provements made  by  the  municipal 
officers  in  the  first  instance  without 
having  called  upon  the  adjacent  pro- 
prietor to  make  them,  and  a  default 
upon  his  part,  which  the  charter 
required,  to  have  been  unauthor- 
ized ;  also  that  the  contracting  party 
could  not  recover  after  he  per- 
formed the  contract,  he  not  having 
been  misled  as  to  any  fact.  He  was 
legally  chargeable  with  notice  of  the 
restricted  power  of  the  municipal 
authorities  under  the  charter.  See 
also,  as  to  being  chargeable  with  no- 
tice, McDonald  v.  Mayor,  68  N.  Y. 
23;  Schumm  v.  Seymour,  24  N.  J. 
Eq.  143.  As  to  applying  the  doc- 
trine of  ultra  vires,  see  Mayor  v. 
Ray,  19  Wall.  468;  Brady  v.  Mayor 
&c.,  20  N.  Y.  312;  Hague  v.  City  of 
Philadelphia,  48  Pa.  St.  527;  1  Dil- 
lon Munic.  Corp.,  §  457;  Nash  v. 
City  of  St.  Paul,  8  Minn.  172;  Con- 
cord V.  Robinson,  121  U.  S.  165,  170; 
s.  c.  7  S.  Ct.  937;  Crow  v.  Oxford, 
119  U.  S.  215;  s.  c.  7  S.  Ct.  180; 
Lyddy  v.  Long  Island  City,  104  N. 
Y.  218;  s.  c.  10  N.  B.  155;  Donovan 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  33  N.  Y.  291,  293. 

"  Nash  V.  City  of  St.  Paul,  8  Minn. 
172.  In  State  v.  Atlantic  City,  49 
N.  J.  L.  558;  s.  c.  9  Atl.  759,  where 
the  city  had  entered  into  a  contract 
with  a  water-works  company  for  a 
supply  of  water,  and  after  some  de- 
lay an   action  was  brought  by  the 


company  to  enforce  its  contract,  it 
was  held  that  neither  the  city  nor  a 
taxpayer  was  estopped  from  con- 
testing the  authority  of  the  city  to 
enter  into  such  contract,  and  that 
the  writ  of  certiorari  was  properly 
allowed,  it  having  been  applied  for 
within  a  reasonable  time  after  it 
had  become  apparent  that  by  the 
proceedings  a  burden  might  be  im- 
posed on  the  taxpayers.  See  also. 
State  V.  Mayor  &c.,  30  N.  J.  L.  303; 
State  V.  City  of  Hudson,  29  N.  J.  L. 
475;  State  v.  Mayor  &c.,  29  N.  J.  L. 
115;  State  v.  Water  Com'rs,  30  N. 
J.  L.  247;  State  v.  Mayor  &c.,  36  N. 
J.  L.  159;  State  v.  Inhabitants  &c., 
36  N.  J.  L.  499;  State  v.  City  of 
Perth  Amboy,  38  N.  J.  L.  425; 
Haines  v.  Campion,  18  N.  J.  L. 
49;  State  v.  Blake,  35  N.  J.  L. 
208;  State  v.  Logan,  43  N.  J.  L.  421. 
When,  however,  a  municipal  corpo- 
ration had  power  to  borrow  money 
if  certain  facts  existed,  and  the  leg- 
islature had  manifested  an  inten- 
tion to  invest  certain  officials  or 
agents  with  authority  to  detertnine 
the  existence  of  such  facts,  and  they 
have  solemnly  asserted  their  exist- 
ence, the  corporation  has  been  held 
to  be  estopped  from  contesting  its 
obligations  when  in  the  hands  of 
those  who  loaned  thereon  in  good 
faith  and  without  knowledge  of  the 
lack  of  power  on  the  ground  that 
the  facts  did  not  exist:  Mutual  &c. 
Ins.  Co.  V.  City  of  Elizabeth,  42  N. 
J.  L.  235. 


063 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS. 


646 


v^  662.  Purchasers  of  bonds  are  bound  to  take  notice. — The  power 
of  a  municipal  corporation  to  issue  coupon  bonds  is  derived  from  the 
legislative  authority  of  the  state,  and  the  laws  conferring  such  power 
form  a  part  of  the  bonds  themselves.  Accordingly,  every  person 
dealing  with  such  corporation  must,  at  his  peril,  take  notice  of  the 
existence  and  terms  of  the  law  by  which  it  is  claimed  the  power  to 
issue  such  bonds  is  conferred.*^-  Parties  dealing  with  a  municipal 
corporation  are  bound  to  know  the  extent  of  the  powers  lawfully 
confided  to  the  officers  with  whom  they  are  dealing  in  behalf  of  such 
corporation  and  they  must  guide  their  conduct  accordingly.*'^ 

§  663.  Corporations  may  contest  ultra-vires  contracts. — Where 
contracts  are  not  authorized  by  the  charter  or  by  other  legislative  act, 
and  are  clearly  without  the  scope  of  the  power  of  the  corporation,  and 
therefore  void,  in  actions  thereon  the  corporation  may  interpose  the 
plea  of  ultra  vires,  setting  up  as  a  defense  its  own  want  of  power  to 
enter  into  the  contract. ''°     The  acts  of  officers  can  not  bind  the  local 


•'^  National  Bank  &c.  v.  City  of  St. 
Josepli,  31  Fed.  216.  In  this  case  it 
was  a  condition  of  tliese  bonds  that 
interest  should  cease  upon  a  tender 
of  the  principal  by  the  governing  au- 
thorities of  the  city  at  any  time. 
And  the  court  held  that  it  was  be- 
yond the  power  of  the  mayor  and 
councilmen  to  curtail  or  impair  the 
effect  of  this  condition  by  issuing 
bonds  of  a  different  tenor.  See  also, 
Anthony  v.  Jasper  Co.,  101  U.  S.  693, 
697;  Ogden  v.  Daviess  Co.,  102  U.  S. 
634;  Northern  Bank  v.  Porter  Tp. 
Trustees,  110  U.  S.  608,  618;  s.  c.  4 
S.  Ct.  254.  In  Duke  v.  Brown,  96 
N.  C.  127;  s.  c.  1  S.  B.  873,  it  was 
held  that  where  there  is  an  inherent 
constitutional  defect  in  the  statute 
authorizing  the  issue  of  municipal 
bonds,  a  purchaser  of  the  bonds 
takes  them  with  notice  of  their  ille- 
gal origin,  for  purchasers  must  in- 
quire into  the  authority  by  which 
the  bonds  are  issued,  and  are  held 
to  notice  of  any  defect  therein.  See 
also,  as  to  the  duty  of  persons  to 
take  notice  of  the  scope  of  power  of 
officers  in  contracting  for  municipal- 
ities, Mayor  &c.  v.  Reynolds,  20  Md. 
1;  State  v.  Kirkley,  29  Md.  85;  Horn 


V.  Mayor  &c.,  30  Md.  218;  Mayor  &c. 
V.  Musgrave,  48  Md.  272;  City  of 
Leavenworth  v.  Rankin,  2  Kan.  357; 
City  of  Wyandotte  v.  Zeitz,  21  Kan. 
649;  City  of  Bridgeport  v.  Housa- 
tonic  R.  Co.,  15  Conn.  475,  493; 
Haynes  v.  Covington,  21  Miss.  408; 
Taft  V.  Town  of  Pittsford,  28  Vt. 
286;  City  Council  &c.  v.  Montgom- 
ery &c.  R.  Co.,  31  Ala.  76;  Hodges  v. 
City  of  Buffalo,  2  Denio  (N.  Y.)  110; 
Dill  V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  7  Met. 
(Mass.)  438;  Branham  v.  Mayor  &c., 
24  Cal.  585,  602;  McCoy  v.  Braint, 
53  Cal.  247;  Wallace  v.  Mayor  &c.. 
29  Cal.  180;  State  v.  Mayor,  29  Md. 
85,  111;  State  v.  Haskell,  20  Iowa. 
276;  People  v.  Treasurer  &c.,  39 
Mich.  554;  Neely  v.  Yorkville,  10  S. 
C.  141;  Craycraft  v.  Selvage,  10 
Bush  (Ky.)  696;  Treadway  v. 
Schnauber,  1  Dak.  236;  s.  c.  46  N. 
W.  464;  Laycock  v.  City  of  Baton 
Rouge,  35  La.  An.  475;  Keating  v. 
City  of  Kansas,  84  Mo.  415. 

"^  Stone  V.  Bank  of  Commerce,  174 
U.  S.  412;  s.  c.  19  S.  Ct.  747;  Murphy 
V.  City  of  Louisville.  72  Ky.  189.  To 
the  same  effect  is  Village  of  Marys- 
ville  V.  Schoonover,  78  111.  App.  189. 

"■1    Dillon    Munic.    Corp.,    §    457; 


647 


ULTRA    VIRES. 


664 


public  by  estoppel  where  the  officers  performing  these  acts  can  not 
bind  them  by  a  direct  contract.'^  A  municipal  corporation  incurs 
no  liability  for  work  done  under  a  void  contract,  and  where  there  is 
no  guaranty  on  its  part  that  the  forms  of  law  have  been  complied 
with,  and  its  officers,  without  authority,  attempt  to  contract,  those 
dealing  with  it  must  see  to  it  that  its  agents  have  power  to  act.'^^ 

§  664,  Liability  upon  ultra-vires  contracts. — Where  a  contract  is 
void  because  of  the  express  declaration  of  a  statute,  or  because  prohib- 
ited in  terms,  the  retention  by  a  municipality  of  the  fruits  of  such  a 
contract  will  not  subject  it  to  liability,  either  under  the  contract  or 
upon  a  quantum  meruit.'^^    No  estoppel  can  ordinarily  arise  from  the 


Cheeney  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  60  Mo. 
53;  Burrill  v.  City  of  Boston,  2  Cliff. 
590;  Martin  v.  Mayor  &c.,  1  Hill  (N. 
Y.)  545;  Overseers  &c.  v.  Overseers 
&c.,  18  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  382;  Seibrecht 
V.  City  of  New  Orleans,  12  La.  An. 
496;  Loker  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  13 
Pick.  (Mass.)  343,  348;  City  of  Phil- 
adelphia V.  Planigen,  47  Pa.  St.  21; 
Cuyler  v.  Trustees  &c.,  12  Wend. 
(N.  Y.)  165;  Mayor  &c.  v.  Cunliff,  2 
N.  Y.  165;  Halstead  v.  Mayor  &c..  3 
N.  Y.  430;  Boom  v.  City  of  Utica, 
2  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  104;  Cornell  v.  Town 
of  Guilford,  1  Denio  (N.  Y.)  510; 
Boyland  v.  Mayor  &c.,  1  Sandf.  (N. 
Y.)  27;  Vincent  v.  Inhabitants  &c., 
12  Cush.  (Mass.)  103,  105;  Stetson 
V.  Kempton,  13  Mass.  272;  Parsons  v. 
Inhabitants  &c.,  11  Pick.  (Mass.) 
396;  Hood  v.  Mayor  &c.,  1  Allen 
(Mass.)  103;  Spalding  v.  City  of 
Lowell,  23  Pick.  (Mass.)  71;  Mitchell 
v.  City  of  Rockland,  45  Maine  496; 
Board  &c.  v.  Cox,  6  Ind.  403;  Inhab- 
itants &c.  V.  Weir,  9  Ind.  224;  Ap- 
pleby V.  Mayor  &c.,  15  How.  Pr.  (N. 
Y.)  428;  Brady  v.  Mayor  &c.,  20  N. 
Y.  312;  Estep  v.  Keokuk  Co.,  18  Iowa 
199;  Maupin  v.  Franklin  Co.,  67  Mo. 
327;  Lincoln  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  75 
Maine  141.  If  the  city  accept  the 
benefit  under  a  contract  for  street 
lighting  it  will  not  be  heard  to  plead 
ultra  vires:  City  of  Kansas  City  v. 
Wyandotte  Gas  Co.,  9  Kan.  App.  325: 
s.  c.  61  Pac.  317. 

'"  Platter    v.    Board    &c.,    103    Ind. 


360;  s.  c.  2  N.  E.  544;  1  West.  Rep. 
235.  A  public  corporation,  such  as 
a  county  or  a  city,  is  composed  of 
the  inhabitants  of  a  locality,  and 
the  officers  are  not  agents  in  the 
strict  sense  of  the  term,  but  are  per- 
sons acting  in  an  official  capacity. 
See  also,  Baumgartner  v.  Hasty,  100 
Ind.  575;  s.  c.  50  Am.  R.  830;  Stros- 
ser  V.  City  of  Fort  Wayne,  100  Ind. 
443;  City  of  Valparaiso  v.  Gardner, 
97  Ind.  1;  s.  c.  49  Am.  R.  416. 

'-  Daly  V.  City  of  San  Francisco, 
72  Cal.  154;  s.  c.  13  Pac.  321.  The 
supreme  court  of  the  United  States 
have  thus  stated  the  rule: — "Indi- 
viduals as  well  as  courts  must  take 
notice  of  the  extent  of  authority  con- 
ferred by  law  upon  a  person  acting 
in  an  official  capacity:"  Hawkins 
V.  United  States,  96  U.  S.  689;  s.  c. 
24  L.  ed.  607;  Whiteside  v.  United 
States,  93  U.  S.  247;  s.  c.  23  L.  ed. 
882.  See  also.  Union  School  Tp.  v. 
First  Nat'l  Bank,  102  Ind.  464;  s.  c. 
2  N.  E.  194;  1  West.  Rep.  107;  Reeve 
School  Tp.  V.  Dodson,  98  Ind.  497; 
Axt  V.  Johnson  School  Tp.,  90  Ind. 
101;  Pine  Civil  Tp.  v.  Huber  Mfg. 
Co.,  83  Ind.  121;  Cummins  v.  City  of 
Seymour,  79  Ind,  491;  Driftwood  &c. 
Co.  V.  Board  &c.,  72  Ind.  226;  Mur- 
phy V.  City  of  Louisville,  9  Bush 
(Ky.)  189. 

"  Goose  River  Bank  v.  Willow 
Lake  School  Tp.,  1  N.  D.  26;  s.  c. 
44  N.  W.  1002;  Dickinson  v.  City  of 
Poughkeepsie,  75  N.  Y.  65;  McBrian 


665 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS. 


648 


act  of  a  municipal  corporation  or  officer  done  in  violation  of  or  without 
authority  of  law.  Every  person  is  presumed  to  know  the  nature  and 
extent  of  the  powers  of  municipal  officers  and  therefore  can  not  be 
deemed  to  have  been  deceived  or  misled  by  acts  done  without  legal 
authority.'^' 

§  665.  The  same  subject  continued. — In  a  case  where  the  United 
States  supreme  court  held  that  under  the  charter  power  of  a  city  it 
was  vested  with  power  to  cause  sidewalks  to  be  erected,  and  could 
delegate  its  power  to  the  mayor  and  chairman  of  the  committee  on 
streets  and  alleys,  to  make,  in  its  behalf  and  pursuant  to  its  directions, 
a  contract  for  doing  the  work,  there  was  an  objection  that  it  had 


V.  City  of  Grand  Rapids,  56  Mich. 
95;  s.  c.  22  N.  W.  206;  National 
Tube-Works  Co.  v.  City  of  Chamber- 
lain, 5  Dak.  54;  s.  c.  37  N.  W.  761. 
Ejectment  will  not  lie  against  a  city 
on  a  sale  by  it  of  a  street,  the  sale 
being  ultra  vires,  even  where  the 
consideration  is  retained  by  it: 
Beebe  v.  Little  Rock,  68  Ark.  39;  s. 
c.  56  S.  W.  791. 

'^Seeger  v.  Mueller,  133  111.  86; 
s.  c.  24  N.  B.  513,  where  the  rule 
was  applied  in  a  case  in  which  pur- 
chasers of  school  lands  claimed  an 
easement  of  a  right  of  way  over 
roads  laid  out  by  school  trustees, 
which  laying  out  of  roads  was  held 
to  be  ultra  vires  and  void.  In  King 
v.  Mahaska  Co.,  75  Iowa  329;  s.  c. 
39  N.  W.  636,  it  was  held  that,  where 
the  work  done  under  additional  and 
void  contracts  in  the  erection  of  a 
court-house  had  been  paid  for  in  the 
periodical  estimates  of  an  architect, 
and  afterwards  the  contractor 
brought  an  action  against  the  county 
for  a  large  sum  of  money,  involving 
all  the  transactions  between  the  par- 
ties, based  on  the  several  contracts, 
the  county  was  not  concluded,  by 
such  payments,  from  insisting  that 
the  additional  contracts  were  illegal 
and  that  all  the  money  paid  should 
be  regarded  as  paid  on  the  amount 
named  in  the  original  contract;  dis- 
tinguishing Long  V.  Boone  Co.,  36 
Iowa  60.     In  Trustees  &c.  v.  Hohn, 


82  Ky.  1,  an  action  to  recover  for 
work  done  on  streets  under  a  con- 
tract in  which  the  contractor  bound 
himself  not  to  look  to  the  city  for 
payment,  but  to  the  property-owners 
whose  lots  abutted  upon  the  street, 
it  was  held  that  the  corporation 
could  not  be  held  liable  upon  implied 
promises  by  reason  of  benefits  re- 
ceived. The  court  said: — "This  re- 
fusal to  hold  corporations  liable  is 
done  for  the  protection  of  the  inhab- 
itants of  the  corporation  and  be- 
cause the  only  power  the  corpora- 
tion has  is  from  the  law  creating  it, 
and  instead  of  recognizing  a  more 
liberal  rule  the  courts  are  inclined 
to  hold  corporations  and  their  agents 
within  the  letter  of  their  grant."  But 
in  Scofield  v.  City  of  Council  Bluffs, 
68  Iowa  695;  s.  c.  28  N.  W.  20,  it  was 
held  that  where  a  city,  pursuant  to  a 
contract,  in  payment  for  work  in 
grading  streets  issued  certificates  of 
assessment  upon  the  owners  of  abut- 
ting lots,  it  impliedly  agreed  that 
they  were  valid,  and  upon  it  being 
shown  that  they  were  not  valid,  be- 
cause the  city  had  no  power  to  as- 
sess the  cost  of  such  grading  upon 
the  abutting  lot-owners,  the  contract 
could  not  be  set  aside,  and  the  city 
was  held  liable  for  the  contract  price 
of  the  work,  and  not  only  for  the 
reasonable  value  thereof;  following 
Bucroft  V.  City  of  Council  Bluffs,  63 
Iowa  646;  s.  c.  19  N.  W.  807. 


649 


ULTRA    VIRES. 


666 


not  the  power  to  pay  for  the  work  done  under  this  contract  in  bonds 
and  that  there  should  be  no  recovery  against  the  city  for  that  reason. 
The  court,  as  the  issue  of  bonds  was  not  prohibited  by  any  statute, 
said:  "At  most  the  issue  was  unauthorized.  At  most  there  was  a 
defect  of  power.  The  promise  to  give  bonds  to  the  plaintiffs  in  pay- 
ment of  what  they  undertook  to  do  was  therefore,  at  farthest,  only 
ultra  vires;  and  in  such  a  case,  though  the  specific  performance  of  an 
engagement  to  do  a  thing  transgressive  of  its  corporate  power  may 
not  be  enforced,  the  corporation  can  be  held  liable  on  its  contract. 
Having  received  benefits  at  the  expense  of  the  other  contracting 
party,  it  can  not  object  that  it  was  not  empowered  to  perform  what 
it  promised  in  return,  in  the  matter  in  which  it  promised  to  per- 
form."" 


§  666.  Ultra  vires,  when  not  a  defense  to  actions  by  the  corpora- 
tion.— One  who  has  made  a  contract  with  a  city  which  is  ultra  vires 
on  its  part, — as,  for  instance,  for  the  working  of  the  city's  convicts  sen- 
tenced to  the  workhouse, — and  reaped  the  benefits  of  such  contract,  can 
not  defend  in  an  action  for  their  work  rendered  for  him  under  the 
contract  on  the  ground  that  the  contract  was  against  public  policy 
or  that  it  was  not  within  the  power  of  the  city  to  enter  into  if^" 


■^  Hitchcock  V.  Galveston,  96  U.  S. 
341.  The  court  referred  with  ap- 
proval to  State  Board  &c.  v.  Citizens' 
St.  R.  Co.,  47  Ind.  407,  holding  that 
"although  there  may  be  a  defect  of 
power  in  a  corporation  to  make  a 
"contract,  yet  if  a  contract  made  by 
it  is  not  in  violation  of  its  charter, 
or  of  any  statute  prohibiting  it,  and 
the  corporation  has  by  its  promise 
induced  a  party  relying  on  the  prom- 
ise and  in  execution  of  the  contract 
to  expend  money  and  perform  his 
part  thereof,  the  corporation  is  lia- 
ble on  the  contract."  See  also,  sub- 
stantially to  the  same  effect,  Alle- 
gheny City  V.  McClurkin,  14  Pa.  St. 
81;  and  more  or  less  in  point,  Maher 
V.  Chicago,  38  111.  266;  Oneida  Bank 
V.  Ontario  Bank,  21  N.  Y.  490;  Ar- 
genti  V.  City  of  San  Francisco,  16 
Cal.  255;  Silver  Lake  Bank  v.  North, 
4  Johns.  Ch.  (N.  Y.)  370.  The  court. 
In  Hitchcock  v.  Galveston,  supra, 
held  that  the  contract  remained  in 
force  so  far  as  it  was  in  other  re- 


spects lawful,  and  that  the  action  for 
damages  for  breach  of  the  same  was 
maintainable.  City  of  East  St.  Louis 
V.  East  St.  Louis  Gas  &c.  Co.,  98  111. 
415;  Daniels  v.  Tearney,  102  U.  S. 
415;  2  Parsons  Contracts  790;  Field 
Corp.,  §  273,  par.  8;  Bridge  Co.  v. 
City  of  Frankfort,  18  B.  Mon.  (Ky.) 
41;  San  Francisco  Gas  Co.  v.  City  of 
San  Francisco,  9  Cal.  453. 

'"  City  of  St.  Louis  v.  Davidson, 
102  Mo.  149;  s.  c.  14  S.  W.  825.  The 
city  could  successfully  interpose  the 
plea  of  ultra  vires  if  sued  upon  such 
a  contract,  but  the  other  party  can 
not  plead  its  disability.  The  charter 
of  this  city,  while  not  permitting 
such  a  contract,  does  not  prohibit  it; 
therefore  the  contract  though  ultra 
vires  was  not  unlawful.  This  dis- 
tinction is  sanctioned  by  the  author- 
ities: 2  Dillon  Munic.  Corp.  (4th 
ed.),  §  936;  McDonald  v.  Mayor,  68 
N.  Y.  23;  Bigelow  Estoppel  (5th  ed.) 
465,  685;  Oregonian  R.  Co.  v.  Oregon 
&c.  R.  Co.,  10  Saw.  464.     See  also, 


667 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS. 


650 


Where  a  municipal  corporation  lias  made  a  contract  with  an  individ- 
ual and  it  has  been  executed,  and  nothing  remains  to  be  done  except 
for  him  to  pay  the  last  instalment  of  the  price  agreed  upon  for  the 
privilege  accorded  him,  and  he  has  reaped  all  the  benefits  he  had  pro- 
posed to  himself  in  making  the  contract,  the  doctrine  of  ultra  vires 
does  not  apply. '^^  Although  a  city  has  no  power  to  loan  its  funds  and 
take  a  mortgage  as  security,  yet  when  its  officers  have  done  so  a  pur- 
chaser of  the  property  mortgaged  with  notice  of  the  lien  will  not  be 
permitted  to  urge  as  a  defense  to  the  foreclosure  the  ultra-vires  act 
of  the  cityJ^ 

§  667.  Taxpayers'  resistance. — The  courts  generally  now  recognize 
the  rights  of  property-holders  or  taxable  inhabitants  to  resort  to  judi- 
cial authority  to  restrain  municipal  corporations  and  their  officers 
from  transcending  their  lawful  powers  or  violating  their  legal  duties 
in  any  unauthorized  mode  which  will  increase  the  burden  of  taxation, 
or  otherwise  injuriously  affect  taxpayers  and  their  property;  such  as 
an  unwarranted  appropriation  and  squandering  of  corporate  funds  or 
unjustifiable  disposition  of  corporate  property;  an  illegal  levy  and 
collection  of  taxes  not  due  or  exigible,  etc.^'' 


Mayor  v.  Harrison,  30  N.  J.  L.  73, 
where  a  collector  of  assessments  for 
street-improvements  and  his  sureties 
sought  to  defend  an  action  on  his 
bond  upon  the  ground  that  the  act 
of  the  council  of  the  municipality  in 
creating  the  office  and  his  appoint- 
ment to  it  were  ultra  vires  and  void; 
it  was  held  that  there  was  no  power 
in  the  common  council  to  create  the 
office,  but  that  the  appointee  was 
estopped  from  denying  the  validity 
of  the  ordinance.  Middleton  v.  State, 
120  Ind.  166;  s.  c.  22  N.  E.  123,  was 
decided  on  the  same  principle;  also 
Town  of  Hendersonville  v.  Price,  96 
N.  C.  423;  s.  c.  2  S.  E.  155;  City  of 
Burlington  v.  Gilbert,  31  Iowa  356; 
Daniels  v.  Tearney,  102  U.  S.  415; 
Ferguson  v.  Landram,  5  Bush  (Ky.) 
230;  Mayor  &c.  v.  Sonneborn,  113  N. 
Y.  423;  s.  c.  21  N.  E.  121;  Common- 
wealth V.  Wolbert,  6  Binn.  (Pa.) 
292;  Postmaster-General  v.  Rice,  Gil- 
pin 554;  Ryan  v.  Martin,  91  N.  C. 
464. 

"Town  of  Monticello  v.  Cohn,  48 


Ark.  254;  s.  c.  3  S.  W.  30  (an  action 
on  a  bond  given  by  defendant  to  the 
corporation  for  a  privilege,  and  it 
was  held  he  could  not  plead  the  want 
of  corporate  power  to  make  the  con- 
tract) ;  National  Bank  v.  Matthews, 
98  U.  S.  621;  Parish  v.  Wheeler,  22 
N.  Y.  494;  Whitney  Arms  Co.  v.  Bar- 
low, 63  N.  Y.  62;  Poock  v.  Lafayette 
Bld'g  Ass'n,  71  Ind.  357;  Weber  v. 
Scott  Co.  &c.  Soc,  44  Iowa  239;  City 
of  Helena  v.  Turner,  36  Ark.  577. 

"  City  of  Fergus  Falls  v.  Fergus 
Falls  Hotel  Co.,  80  Minn.  165;  s.  c. 
83  N.  W.  54. 

■"*  Handy  v.  City  of  New  Orleans. 
39  La.  An.  107;  s.  c.  1  So.  593,  sus- 
taining an  action  based  upon  charges 
that  the  city  had  in  excess  of  its 
powers  and  in  violation  of  prohib- 
itory provisions  in  its  charter  passed 
an  ordinance  under  which  a  contract 
of  lease  of  public  wharves  was  en- 
tered into.  Followed  and  approved 
in  Conery  v.  New  Orleans  Water- 
Works  Co.,  39  La.  An.  770;  s.  c.  2 
So.   555.     As  to  the   subject-matter 


651 


ULTRA   VIRES. 


668 


§  668.  Taxpayers'  suits. — Taxpayers  may  maintain  suits  against 
towns  and  their  officers  to  prevent  or  remedy  misapplication  of  town 
funds,  their  relations  to  the  municipality  being  analogous  to  those  of 
stockholders  to  a  private  corporation.*^"  And  chancery  has  power  in 
such  cases  to  grant  affirmative  as  well  as  injunctive  relief.^^     Where 


and  amount  involved  in  giving  juris- 
diction to  the  court  the  taxpayer 
stands  in  judgment  for  the  whole 
community,  irrespective  of  the  dis- 
tributive interest  he  may  have  in 
the  matter  at  issue.  Pro  hac  vice, 
he  is  considered  as  the  payer  of  all 
taxes.  See  also,  Crampton  v.  Za- 
briskie,  101  U.  S.  601;  Gifford  v.  New 
Jersey  &c.  R.  Co.,  10  N.  J.  Eq.  171; 
Mayor  &c.  v.  Gill,  31  Md.  375;  Wade 
v.  City  of  Richmond,  18  Graft.  (Va.) 
583;  Page  v.  Allen,  58  Pa.  St.  338; 
City  of  New  London  v.  Brainard,  22 
Conn.  552;  Harney  v.  Indianapolis 
&c.  R.  Co.,  32  Ind.  244;  Barr  v.  Den- 
iston,  19  N.  H.  170;  Stevens  v.  Rut- 
land &c.  R.  Co.,  29  Vt.  546;  Webster 
V.  Town  of  Harwington,  32  Conn. 
131;  Terrett  v.  Town  of  Sharon,  34 
Conn.  105;  Merrill  v.  Plainfield,  45 
N.  H.  126;  Normand  v.  Board  &c.,  8 
Neb.  18;  Oliver  v.  Keightley,  24  Ind. 
514;  Drake  v.  Phillips,  40  111.  388; 
Grant  v.  City  of  Davenport,  36  Iowa 
396;  Douglas  v.  Mayor  &c.,  18  Cal. 
643;  Smith  v.  Magourich,  44  Ga.  163; 
Newmeyer  v.  Missouri  &c.  R.  Co.,  52 
Mo.  81;  Wright  v.  Bishop,  88  111. 
302;  Rice  v.  Smith,  9  Iowa  570; 
Place  V.  City  of  Providence,  12  R.  I. 
1;  Allison  v.  Louisville  &c.  R.  Co., 
9  Bush  (Ky.)  247;  Bound  v.  Wiscon- 
sin &c.  R.  Co.,  45  Wis.  543;  Blyton 
Land  Co.  v.  Ayres,  62  Ala.  413; 
Boyle  V.  City  of  New  Orleans,  23 
Fed.  843;  s.  c.  8  Am.  &  Eng.  Corp. 
Cas.  329;  White  v.  County  Com'rs, 
13  Or.  317;  s.  c.  10  Pac.  484;  12  Am. 
&  Eng.  Corp.  Cas.  485;  Whelen's 
Case,  108  Pa.  St.  162;  s.  c.  1  Atl.  88; 
11  Am.  &  Eng.  Corp.  Cas.  174;  City 
of  Delphi  V.  Startzman,  104  Ind.  343; 
s.  c.  3  N.  E.  937;  11  Am.  &  Eng.  Corp. 


Cas.  37;  City  of  Valparaiso  v.  Gard- 
ner, 97  Ind.  1;  s.  c.  7  Am.  &  Eng. 
Corp.  Cas.  626;  49  Am.  R.  416; 
Roper  V.  McWhorter,  77  Va.  214;  s.  c. 
4  Am.  &  Eng.  Corp.  Cas.  359;  Sack- 
ett  V.  City  of  New  Albany,  88  Ind. 
473;  s.  c.  45  Am.  R.  467;  2  Am.  & 
Eng.  Corp.  Cas.  85;  Ayer  v.  Law- 
rence, 59  N.  Y.  192;  Plagg  v.  Parish 
of  St.  Charles,  27  La.  An.  319;  Bab- 
ington  V.  Parish  of  St.  Charles,  27 
La.  An.  321;  Stevenson  v.  Weber,  29 
La.  An.  105;  New  Orleans  Tax-Pay- 
ers' Ass'n  V.  City  of  New  Orleans,  33 
La.  An.  567;  Saloy  v.  City  of  New 
Orleans,  33  La.  An.  79;  Rivet  v.  City 
of  New  Orleans,  35  La.  An.  134. 

""Russell  V.  Tate,  52  Ark.  541;  s. 
c.  13  S.  W.  130;  7  L.  R.  A.  180;  Town 
of  Jacksonport  v.  Watson,  33  Ark. 
704;  Crampton  v.  Zabriskie,  101  U. 
S.  601;  2  Dillon  Munic.  Corp.  914, 
915;  Blakie  v.  Staples,  13  Grant 
(Can.)  67,  cited  in  note  on  p.  1102, 
2  Dillon  Munic.  Corp. 

"2  Story  Eq.  Jur.  1252;  Frost  v. 
Inhabitants  &c.,  6  Allen  (Mass.) 
152;  Citizens'  Loan  Ass'n  v.  Lyon, 
29  N.  J.  Eq.  110;  Attorney-General  v. 
Wilson,  1  Craig  &  Ph.  1;  People  v. 
Fields,  58  N.  Y.  491;  Attorney-Gen- 
eral V.  City  of  Boston,  123  Mass.  460; 
Attorney-General  v.  Mayor  &c.,  1 
Bligh  312;  2  Dillon  Munic.  Corp. 
909-912.  In  Appeal  of  Tarbell,  129 
Pa.  St.  146;  s.  c.  18  Atl.  758,  the 
court  held  it  proper  to  restrain  by 
injunction  a  board  of  school  direc- 
tors from  appropriating  money  to 
the  erection  of  a  school  building 
upon  lands  conveyed  to  a  county  in 
trust  "to  be  appropriated  to  the  use 
of  the  public  buildings  of  the  county, 
an  academy  and  church  or  churches," 


§  GG9 


rUBLIC    COliPORATIONS. 


652 


nothing  has  been  done  furtlier  than  the  adoption  hy  the  common 
council  of  a  city  of  a  resolution  that  the  mayor  and  city  clerk  take 
immediate  steps  to  let  a  contract  for  the  construction  of  water-works 
for  the  city,  a  court  of  equity  will  not  interfere  at  the  suit  of  tax- 
payers to  enjoin  the  threatened  enforcement  of  such  resolution,  even 
though  its  adoption  by  the  council  was  ultra  vires  and  therefore  un- 
authorized.^^ Where  an  electric-light  company  has  made  large  ex- 
penditures in  carrying  out  a  contract  a  taxpayer  by  long  delay  is  not 
entitled  to  equitable  relief  and  it  is  not  material  that  the  contract 
may  have  been  ultra  vires. ^^ 

§  669.  The  same  subject  continued. — Where  a  city  is  attempting 
to  dispose  of  public  property  without  authority  of  law,  one  who  has 
property  liable  to  taxation  in  the  city  may  maintain  an  action  to  re- 
strain such  disposition,  though  he  be  not  a  resident  of  the  city.^* 


until  the  title  to  the  ground  on  which 
the  buildings  might  lawfully  be 
erected  should  have  been  acquired. 

"  Pedrick  v.  City  of  Ripon,  73  Wis. 
622;  s.  c.  41  N.  W.  705.  See  also, 
Judd  V.  Town  of  Fox  Lake,  28  Wis. 
583;  West  v.  Ballard,  32  Wis.  168; 
Nevil  V.  Clifford,  55  Wis.  161;  s.  c. 
12  N.  W.  419;  Roe  v.  Lincoln  Co.,  56 
Wis.  66;  s.  c.  13  N.  W.  887;  Gilkey 
V.  City  of  Merrill,  67  Wis.  459;  s.  c. 
30  N.  W.  733;  Sage  v.  Town  of  Fi- 
field,  68  Wis.  546;  s.  c.  32  N.  W.  629; 
Snyder  v.  Foster,  77  Iowa  638;  s.  c. 
42  N.  W.  506  (where  it  was  held 
that  a  taxpayer  could  maintain  an 
action  to  prevent  the  county  officers 
paying  out  money  on  a  contract  for 
the  erection  of  a  bridge  v/^hich  the 
county  had  no  legal  authority  to 
erect);  2  High  Injunctions,  §  1560; 
Hospers  v.  Wyatt,  63  Iowa  264;  s.  c. 
19  N.  W.  204;  Cornell  College  v. 
Iowa  Co.,  32  Iowa  520;  Carthan  v. 
Lang,  69  Iowa  384;  s.  c.  28  N.  W. 
650.  In  Briggs  v.  Borden,  71  Mich. 
87;  s.  c.  38  N.  W.  712,  the  right  of 
a  resident  taxpayer  of  a  school  dis- 
trict which  the  township  board  of 
school  inspectors,  acting  without 
jurisdiction,  had  attempted  to  divide 
and  parcel  out,  to  other  districts,  to 
file  a  bill  to  restrain  the  sale  of  the 


schoolhouse  and  other  property  of 
the  original  district,  was  sustained. 
The  court  said: — "If  the  school  in- 
spectors are  permitted  to  take  this 
last  step  in  the  destruction  of  the 
district,  the  mischief  and  damage  to 
him  may  be  irreparable." 

"'Pugh  V.  Edison  &c.  Co.,  19  Ohio 
C.  C.  594;  Carter  v.  City  of  Portland, 
4  Or.  339;  Packard  v.  Board,  2  Colo. 
338,  350;  Whitsett  v.  Union  Depot 
&  R.  Co.,  10  Colo.  243;  s.  c.  15  Pac. 
339;  Union  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Foley,  19 
Colo.  280;  s.  c.  35  Pac.  542;  City  of 
Denver  v.  Girard,  21  Colo.  447,  450; 
s.  c.  42  Pac.  662. 

^*  Brockman  v.  City  of  Creston,  79 
Iowa  587;  s.  c.  44  N.  W.  822.  As  to 
residence  or  citizenship  of  a  person 
whose  interests  were  about  to  be 
prejudiced  by  action  of  municipal 
corporation,  not  being  essential  to 
authorize  an  action  to  restrain,  see 
also,  Brandirff  v.  Harrison  Co.,  50 
Iowa  164;  Olmstead  v.  Board,  24 
Iowa  33;  Litchfield  v.  Polk  Co.,  18 
Iowa  70.  In  Brockman  v.  City  of 
Creston,  supra,  the  court  explain 
their  ruling  thus: — "It  must  be  re- 
membered that  the  doctrine  we  rec- 
ognize is  not  based  upon  the  right 
of  the  property-owner  or  tax-payer, 
resident  or  non-resident,  to  dictate 


653  ULTRA   VIRES.  §    670 

And  the  court  can  not  inquire  into  the  motives  of  the  prosecutor  of 
such  a  suit,  nor  deny  him  relief  because  his  interest  as  a  taxpayer  is 
inconsiderable.  Nor  need  he  defer  his  action  until  a  tax  has  actually 
been  levied  upon  his  property  by  reason  of  the  wrongful  disposition 
of  the  property  of  the  city.  He  may  have  the  preventive  remedy  by 
injunction  as  soon  as  damage  is  threatened  by  the  unlawful  act.^^ 

§  670.  Suits  to  restrain  the  enforcement  of  contracts. — The  su- 
preme court  of  New  Jersey  having  decided  that  the  resolution  of  a 
board  of  freeholders  for  the  purchase  of  and  payment  for  land  on 
which  to  erect  a  court-house  by  the  issue  of  bonds  was  illegal  for 
the  lack  of  authority  in  them,  and  the  vendor  having  brought  suit  on. 
the  bonds,  the  United  States  supreme  court  sustained  an  action  of 
taxpayers  for  restraining  the  prosecution  of  the  action,  and  to  enjoin 
the  board  from  paying  the  bonds,  and  to  direct  a  reconveyance  of  the 
land  and  a  surrender  of  the  void  bonds,  holding  they  were  entitled 
to  the  relief  prayed  for.*"  A  taxpayer  of  a  city  has  sufficient  interest 
in  the  subject-matter  to  sue  to, enjoin  the  consummation  of  an  illegal 
contract  by  the  city  with  a  bank,  by  which  it  is  proposed  to  take  the 
public  moneys  out  of  the  hands  of  the  legal  custodian  of  them,  and 
deposit  them  in  a  bank  as  a  loan  at  interest.*'^  But  it  has  been  held 
that  a  person  suing  under  a  statute  which  provided  that  any  taxpayer 
might  institute  a  suit  for  an  injunction  to  restrain  the  execution  of  a 
contract  by  a  municipal  corporation  in  contravention  of  its  powers  in 
case  of  the  failure  of  the  public  prosecutor  to  institute  such  suit 
could  not  complain  that  the  owners  of  a  majority  of  the  frontage  of 
lots  on  the  proposed  line  of  a  street-railroad,  the  franchise  of  which, 
granted  by  the  city,  plaintiff  attacked  as  illegal,  had  not  given  their 

and   control   the   administration    of  having  been  acquired  through  taxa- 

the  city  government  and  to  nullify  tion,  its  disposition  would  be  in  ef- 

by  proceedings  in  the  court  the  law-  feet    a    misappropriation    of    taxes, 

ful  acts  of  the  city  officers,  legisla-  which  may  occasion  levies  to  take 

tive  or  executive,   done   in  the  ad-  the  place  of  the  misapplied  tax." 

ministration  of  the  city's  affairs,  for  ^^  Brockman  v.  City  of  Creston,  79 

the  reason  that  the  proposed  acts  of  Iowa  587;  s.  c.  44  N.  W.  822. 

the  city  do  not  promote  its  interest  **"  Crampton  v.  Zabriskie,  101  U.  S. 

or   are   against   public   policy.     The  601;  Clark  v.  Board  &c.,  9  Neb.  516; 

foundation  of  the  doctrine  is  the  in-  s.  c.  4  N.  W.  246;   Pimental  v.  City 

terference  with  the  rights  of  the  tax-  of  San  Francisco,  21  Cal.  351;   Ar- 

payer  in  the  increase  of  the  burden  genti  v.  San  Francisco,  16  Cal.  255; 

of  taxation,  or  the  liability  thereto,  Parkersburg    v.    Brown,    106    U.    S. 

by  misappropriating  the  property  of  487;  s.  c.  1  S.  Ct.  442. 

the    city,    which    may    demand    the  "  Yarnell  v.  City  of  Los  Angeles, 

levy  of  taxes  to  acquire  other  prop-  87  Cal.  603;  s.  c.  25  Pac.  767. 
erty  in  its  place;   or  the  property. 


671 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS. 


654 


written  consent  thereto,  he  not  being  an  owner  of  any  such  lots/*^  A 
contract  for  paving  a  street  awarded  to  contractors  for  a  "vulcanite 
asphalt  pavement,"  a  kind  neither  called  for  in  the  ordinance  of  the 
city  council  nor  even  hinted  at  in  the  advertisement  inviting  bids,  and 
where  the  parties  proposing  to  bid  were  instructed  to  prepare  their 
own  specifications  and  submit  them  with  their  respective  bids,  has 
been  held  illegal,  null  and  void  as  beyond  the  power  of  the  council  to 
make,  as  they  did  not  comply  with  the  statutes  for  letting  such  con- 
tracts to  the  lowest  bidder. ^^ 

§  671.  Injunction  the  proper  remedy. — A  contract  made  in  the 
name  of  a  city  not  in  the  mode  and  manner  and  upon  the  conditions 
prescribed  by  the  ordinance  is  void,  as  a  compliance  with  those  con- 
ditions by  the  governing  power  of  the  city  is  essential  to  the  exercise 
of  the  power  conferred.^"  Where  city  authorities  undertake  to  make 
a  contract  without  the  lawful  power  to  make  it,  and  the  contract,  if 
made,  will  increase  the  burden  of  taxation,  taxpayers  constitute  a 
special  class,  having  a  special  interest  in  the  subject-matter  distinct 
from  that  of  the  general  public.  In  all  such  cases  injunction  is,  upon 
obvious  principles,  the  most  convenient  and  appropriate  remedy.^^ 


•***  Simmons  v.  City  of  Toledo,  5 
Ohio  C.  C.  124. 

*"  Mazet  V.  City  of  Pittsburgh,  137 
Pa.  St.  548;  s.  c.  20  Atl.  693;  27  W. 
N.  C.  (Pa.)  73.  And  a  property- 
owner  on  the  street  which  was  to  be 
paved  had  a  right  to  maintain  a  suit 
to  enjoin  the  doing  of  the  work, 
though  it  might  be  conceded  that 
the  bill  was  filed  by  him  as  a  cover 
for  an  unsuccessful  bidder  for  such 
contract. 

'■>"  Mayor  &c.  v.  Keyser,  72  Md.  106; 
s.  c.  19  Atl.  706.  The  court  said:  — 
"They  had  no  power  to  make  a  con- 
tract without  advertising  for  pro- 
posals filed  within  the  time  desig- 
nated, nor  had  they  any  power  to 
make  a  contract  without  opening  all 
the  proposals  filed  within  the  time 
designated;  nor  had  they  any  power 
to  award  the  contract  to  any  one 
other  than  the  lowest  responsible 
bidder." 

"^  Mayor  &c.  v.  Gill,  31  Md.  375.  In 
a  later  case,  St.  Mary's  Industrial 
School   V.   Brown,   45   Md.   310,   326, 


an  injunction  was  held  to  be  the 
proper  remedy  whenever  it  appears 
that  municipal  corporations  and 
their  officers  are  "acting  ultra  vires 
or  are  assuming  or  exercising  a 
power  over  the  property  of  the  citi- 
zen, or  over  corporate  property  or 
funds,  which  the  law  does  not  confer 
upon  them,  and  where  such  unau- 
thorized act  may  affect  injuriously 
the  rights  and  property  of  the  par- 
ties complaining."  The  cases  were 
approved  and  followed  in  Mayor  &c. 
V.  Keyser,  72  Md.  106;  s.  c.  19  Atl. 
706,  where,  after  holding  that  the 
mayor  and  aldermen  had  no  power 
to  make  a  contract  for  lighting  a 
portion  of  the  city  except  in  the 
mode  and  manner  prescribed  by  law, 
and  sustaining  the  taxpayers*  right 
to  an  injunction,  the  court  said  that 
the  complainants  "have  a  right  to 
require  that  the  money  they  have 
contributed  for  the  public  benefit 
shall  be  spent  only  for  the  purposes 
and  in  the  manner  authorized  by 
law,    and    that    every    security    de- 


655 


ULTRA   VIRES. 


672 


§  672.  The  same  subject  continued, — But  a  taxpayer  can  not  have 
a  contract  of  purchase  of  property  for  the  county  set  aside  as  being 
ultra  vires,  and  the  treasurer  enjoined  from  paying  warrants  issued 
for  the  residue  of  the  purchase-money,  his  action  being  against  the 
county  treasurer,  and  the  supervisors  and  the  county  not  a  party,  for 
the  reason  that  such  a  decree  would  be  inequitable  while  the  county  is 
allowed  to  retain  the  property,  and  its  title  could  not  be  disturbed  in 
such  an  action.®'  Where  the  consideration  received  by  a  corporation 
under  an  ultra-vires  contract  can  be  restored,  a  court  of  equity  will 
not  relieve  the  corporation  as  against  the  contract,  without  providing 
for  a  restoration  of  the  consideration.*^^ 


signed  to  protect  its  proper  expendi- 
ture shall  be  faithfully  observed. 
This  right  is  a  vital  one  to  them, 
and  they  are  required  to  allege  no 
other  injury  than  that  it  is  about 
to  be  violated.  They  will  be  injured 
if  the  violation  is  permitted  by  the 
act  of  violation  alone."  See  also, 
Talcott  V.  City  of  Buffalo,  57  Hun 
(N.  Y.)  43;  s.  c.  10  N.  Y.  S.  370. 

'''Turner  v.  Cruzen,  70  Iowa  202; 
s.  c.  30  N.  W.  483. 

"=' Turner  v.  Cruzen,  70  Iowa  202; 
s.  c.  30  N.  W.  483,  in  which  case  the 
court  held  that  the  county  should 
not  be  relieved  from  its  contract  for 
the  purchase  of  a  poor-farm,  which 
purchase  was  ultra  vires,  without  a 
reconveyance  to  the  vendor.  The 
court  thus  distinguished  a  class  of 
cases: — "We  are  aware  that  there  is 
a  class  of  cases  where  courts  of  equi- 
ty declare  a  contract  ultra  vires,  and 
grant  relief  in  favor  of  a  corpora- 
tion, without  any  decree  for  the  res- 
toration of  the  consideration  re- 
ceived by  the  corporation.  This  is 
so  where  municipal  funds  have  been 
issued  in  excess  of  the  constitutional 
limit  of  indebtedness,  and  the  money 
obtained  thereon  has  been  expended. 
Courts  of  equity  decree  the  cancel- 
ation of  such  bond,  or  enjoin  pay- 
ment without  decreeing  repayment 
to  the  bondholders  of  the  money  re- 
ceived by  the  corporation  on  the 
bond.    But  this  results  from  the  ne- 


cessity of  the  case.  If  the  courts 
should  decree  repayment,  the  very 
object  of  the  constitutional  provision 
would  be  defeated."  See  also,  Pratt 
V.  Short,  53  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  506; 
Leonard  v.  City  of  Canton,  35  Miss. 
189;  Moore  v.  Mayor  &c.,  73  N.  Y. 
238;  County  Com'rs  &c.  v.  Hunt,  5 
Ohio  St.  488.  In  Nance  v.  Johnson, 
84  Tex.  401;  s.  c.  19  S.  W.  559,  it 
was  held  that  taxpayers  could  not 
maintain  a  suit  to  enjoin  the  pay- 
ment of  the  school-fund  to  a  teacher 
under  a  contract  made  with  him  by 
the  school  trustees,  on  the  ground 
that  the  trustees  had  no  authority 
to  make  such  a  contract  with  him, 
as  his  school  was  a  sectarian  one, 
unless  they  had  exhausted  the  rem- 
edies allowed  them  under  the  law  of 
appeal  from  the  school  trustees  to 
the  superintendent  of  public  instruc- 
tion, and  from  him  to  the  state  board 
of  education,  under  Sayles'  civil 
statutes  of  Texas,  art.  3715.  In 
Town  of  Winamac  v.  Huddleston, 
132  Ind.  217;  s.  c.  31  N.  E.  561,  a 
taxpayer's  action  for  injunction  to 
restrain  the  issue  of  bonds  of  a 
school  district  which  were  about  to 
be  issued  without  authority  was  sus- 
tained, as  there  was  no  other  remedy 
of  equal  power  and  efficiency,  the 
case  coming  within  the  rule  in  Wat- 
son V.  Sutherland,  5  Wall.  74;  Denny 
v.  Denny,  113  Ind.  22;  s.  c.  14  N.  E. 
593;  Bishop  v.  Moorman,  98  Ind.  1; 


§  672  PUBLIC  coRroRxi-TiONS.  656 

s.    c.    49    Am.    R.    731;    English    v.  R.    Co.,    44    Ind.    248;    Thatcher    v. 

Smock,  34  Ind.  115,  124;  s.  c.  7  Am.  Humble,  67  Ind.  444;  Spicer  v.  Hoop, 

R.   215;    Elson   v.    O'Dowd,    40    Ind.  51  Ind.  365,  370;  Bonnell  v.  Allen,  53 

300,  302;  Clark  v.  Jeffersonville  &c.  Ind.  130, 


CHAPTER    XVII. 


IMPLIED  POWERS   AND  EMINENT   DOMAIN". 


674. 
675. 


676. 


677. 


678. 


(a)   Implied  Powees. 
Section 

673.  General  statement  of  the  rule. 
Compromise  of  claims. 
The   same   subject  continued — 
Application    of    the    rule    in 
Iowa. 
The  dissenting  opinion  in  the 

Iowa  case. 
Compromise       of       ultra-vires 

claims. 
Submission  to  arbitration. 

679.  Employment  of  attorneys. 

680.  Power  to  hold  property  in  trust. 

681.  Acquisition     of     property     for 

other    than    municipal    pur- 
poses. 

682.  The  same  subject   continued — 

Discretion  in  erecting  public 

buildings. 
Power  to  indemnify  officers. 
The  same  subject  continued. 
Offers  of  rewards. 
The   same  subject  continued — 

The  power  generally  denied. 
The  same  subject  continued — 

The  foregoing  rule  qualified. 
Expenditures    in    obtaining   or 

opposing  legislation. 


683. 
684. 
685. 
686. 

687. 

688. 


(b)  Eminent  Domain. 

689.  Nature  and  definition. 

690.  The  same  subject  continued — 

Constitutional  limitations. 

691.  What  property  may  be  taken. 

692.  Quantity  of  estate. 

693.  What  constitutes  a  taking. 

694.  The  same   subject  continued — 

The  leading  case. 

695.  The   same   subject  continued — 

Constitutional  amendments. 


Section 

696.  Property  already  appropriated 

to  public  use. 

697.  The  same  subject  continued. 

698.  Change  of  grade. 

699.  Change  of  use — Additional  use. 

700.  The  same  subject  continued — 

Electric  railways. 

701.  Grant   of   power   to   municipal 

corporations. 

702.  Public  use  and  necessity  of  ap- 

propriation, by  whom  deter- 
mined. 

703.  Legislative   declaration   conclu- 

sive. 

Public  use  as  respects  munici- 
palities— Parks  and  streets. 

The   same   subject  continued — 
Water,  gas,  etc. 

The  same  subject  continued — 
Cemeteries,  sewers,  etc. 
707.  The  same   subject  continued — 
Leasing  for  public  use. 

The   same   subject  continued — 
Ornamental  purposes. 

Notice   of   proceeding — Necessi- 
ty for. 

Parties  entitled  to  notice. 

Service  of  notice. 

Treaty  with  the  owner. 

The  application  or  petition. 

The  tribunal. 

715.  Right  to  jury  trial. 

716.  Right  to  abandon  proceedings. 

717.  Damages   upon    discontinuance 

of  proceedings. 

718.  Compensation. 

719.  Elements  in  estimating  compen- 

sation. 

720.  The  same  subject  continued. 

721.  Benefits. 


704. 


705. 


706. 


708. 

709. 

710. 
711. 
712. 
713. 

714. 


1  Smith — 42 


(657) 


g    673  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  658 

Section  Section 

722.  Payment.  724.  The  same   subject  continued — 

723.  Review   of   proceedings — Certi-  Appeal. 

orari. 

(a)  Implied  Powers. 

§  673.  General  statement  of  the  rule. — The  powers  of  public  cor- 
porations arc  either  express  or  implied.  "The  former  are  those  which 
the  legislative  act  under  which  they  exist  confers  in  express  terms; 
the  latter  are  such  as  are  necessary  to  carry  into  effect  those  which  are 
expressly  granted  and  which  must  therefore  be  presumed  to  have  been 
within  the  intention  of  the  legislative  grant.  *  *  *  g^^  without 
being  expressly  empowered  so  to  do  they  may  sue  and  be  sued;^  may 
have  a  common  seal ;  may  purchase  and  hold  lands  and  other  property 
for  corporate  purposes  and  convey  the  same ;  may  make  by-laws  when- 
ever necessary  to  accomplish  the  design  of  the  incorporation  and  en- 
force the  same  by  penalties ;  may  enter  into  contracts  to  effectuate  the 
corporate  purposes.  Except  as  to  these  incidental  powers,  which  need 
not  be  though  they  usually  are  mentioned  in  the  charter,  the  charter 
itself,  or  the  general  law  under  which  they  exist,  is  the  measure  of 
the  authority  to  be  exercised.  And  the  general  disposition  of  the 
courts  of  this  country  has  been  to  confine  municipalities  within  the 
limits  that  a  strict  construction  of  the  grants  of  powers  in  their  char- 
ters will  assign  to  them ;  thus  applying  substantially  the  same  rule 
that  is  applied  to  charters  of  private  incorporations."-  Implied  power 
of  a  municipal  corporation  is  a  power  necessarily  incident  to  the  exer- 
cise of  those  powers  expressly  granted  and  directly  and  immediately 
appropriate  to  their  exercise.^ 

^  "I  tiave  no  doubt  of  the  right  of  "A  municipal  corporation  possesses 
the  school  district  as  a  body  corpo-  not  only  the  powers  specifically  con- 
rate  to  interfere  and  ask  the  aid  of  ferred  upon  it  by  its  charter,  but 
equity  to  prevent  the  consummation  also  such  as  are  necessarily  incident 
of  an  illegal  and  void  apportionment  to  or  may  fairly  be  implied  from 
and  creation  of  a  debt  against  it  by  those  powers,  including  all  that  are 
the  collection  of  the  same  out  of  the  essential  to  the  declared  object  of  its 
taxable  property  within  its  limits:"  existence:"  Village  of  Carthage  v. 
Morse,  J.,  in  School  Dist.  &c.  v.  Frederick,  122  N.  Y.  268,  271;  s.  c. 
School  Dist.  &c.,  63  Mich.  51,  58;  s.  25  N.  E.  480;  citing  Le  Couteulx  v. 
c.  29  N.  W.  489.  Courts  take  judicial  City  of  Buffalo,  33  N.  Y.  333;  Ketch- 
notice  of  the  powers  and  capacities  um  v.  City  of  Buffalo,  14  N.  Y.  356; 
of  public  corporations,  and  in  ac-  Buffalo  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  City  of  Buffalo, 
tions  by  them  it  is  not  necessary  to  5  Hill  (N.  Y.)  209;  1  Dillon  Munic. 
allege  a  legal  capacity  to  sue:  City  Corp.  (4th  ed.),  §  89;  Angell  &  Ames 
of  Janesville  v.  Milwaukee  &c.  R.  Corp.  346,  364 ;  2  Kyd  Corp.  149.  See 
Co.,  7  Wis.  484.  also,  15  Am.  &  Eng.  Encyc.  Law  1040. 

''Cooley  Const.  Lim.  (6th  ed.)  231.  ^  Gundling  v.  City  of  Chicago,  176 


€59  IMPLIED   POWERS.  §    674 

§  674.  Compromise  of  claims. — It  is  well  settled  that  municipal 
corporations  have  the  power  to  effect  the  compromise  of  claims  in 
favor  of  or  against  them.  This  is  a  corollary  to  the  right  to  sue  and 
be  sued.*  They  may  compromise  doubtful  controversies  in  which  the 
corporation  is  a  party  either  as  plaintiff  or  defendant.  A  judgment 
in  favor  of  a  city  is  not  to  be  regarded  as  final  while  the  right  of  ap- 
peal exists;  and  at  any  time  before  the  period  in  which  to  appeal  ex- 
pires, the  city  council  may  lawfully  compromise  the  case  and  settle 
the  claim  by  the  acceptance  of  a  less  sum  than  that  of  the  judgment.^ 
A  fortiori  the  proper  authorities  may  settle  a  suit  in  which  judgment 
has  been  rendered  in  favor  of  the  plaintiff  corporation,  but  from  which 
the  defendant  has  appealed.^ 

§  675.  The  same  subject  continued — Application  of  the  rule  in 
Iowa. — A  more  radical  doctrine  in  favor  of  the  power  to  compromise 
is  declared  by  the  supreme  court  of  Iowa.  By  statute  in  that  state 
county  supervisors  are  "to  represent  their  respective  counties  and  to 
have  the  care  and  management  of  the  property  and  business  of  the 
county."  Upon  an  application  for  a  writ  of  certiorari  to  test  the 
power  of  the  supervisors  to  settle  a  judgment  in  its  favor  for  less 
than  the  amount  recovered  it  was  alleged  and  admitted  by  demurrer 
that  the  judgment  debtor  was  perfectly  solvent.    The  court  sustained 

111.  340;  s.  c.  52  N.  B.  44;  People  v.  to  discharge  a  debt  without  payment 

€hicago  Gas  Trust  Co.,  130  111.  268;  which  may  be  held  against  parties 

s.  c.  22  N.  E.  798;  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.  who    are    solvent    and    responsible 

V.  City  of  Chicago,  148  111.  141;  s.  c.  where  no  controversy  exists  in  re- 

35  N.  E.  881;   Mather  v.  City  of  Ot-  gard  to  the  validity  and  binding  ef- 

tawa,  114  111.  659;  s.  c.  3  N.  E.  216.  feet  of  the  indebtedness.    This  point 

^People  V.  Board  &c.,  27  Cal.  655;  is   discussed    in   the   following  two 

People  V.  Coon,  25  Cal.  635;   Inhab-  sections. 

itants  &c.  v.  Lowell,  20  Maine  178;         ^  Town  of  Petersburg  v.  Mappin,  14 

Inhabitants    &c.    v.    Leadbetter,    16  111.  193;   s.  c.  56  Am.  D.  501,  where 

Maine  45;   State  v.  Martin,  27  Neb.  the  town  accepted  payment  of  the 

441;    s.  c.  43  N.  W.  244;   Grimes  v.  costs  in  full  settlement  of  the  judg- 

Hamilton    Co.,    37    Iowa   290;    Mills  ment.    Here  also,  the  court  said  that 

Co.  V.  Burlington  &c.  R.  Co.,  47  Iowa  public  officers  could  not,  under  the 

66;  Hall  v.  Baker,  74  Wis.  118;  s.  c.  pretense  of  satisfaction,  discharge  a 

42  N.  W.  104;  27  Am.  &  Eng.  Corp.  debt    due    the    corporation    without 

Cas.  208;  Artz  v.  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.,  payment.      "The     law     vests    them 

34  Iowa  153,  with  a  discretion   in  such   matters 

^  Agnew  V.  Brail,  124  111.  312 ;  s.  c.  which  they  are  to  exercise  for  the 

16  N.  E.  230;  20  Am.  &  Eng.  Corp.  best    interests    of    the    corporation. 

Cas.  134.     But  the  court  said  that  Settlement    of   an    existing    contro- 

the  council  had  no  power  to  sell  or  versy,  if  made  in  good  faith,  binds 

in    any   manner   to   dispose    of   the  the   corporation,   but   if   collusively 

property  of  the  corporation  without  made   it  is  not  obligatory:"    Ibid., 

consideration;  and  probably  no  right  p.  195. 


§    676  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  660 

the  action  of  the  board.  Premising  that  the  power  to  compromise  a 
claim  before  it  has  been  reduced  to  a  judgment  is  unquestionable  and 
after  judgment  when  the  debtor's  solvency  is  doubtful,  Adams,  C.  J., 
continued :  "It  is  true  that  in  the  case  at  bar  the  plaintiff  avers  that 
the  judgment  debtor  was  solvent.  But  that  averment  is  immaterial. 
We  can  not  go  into  any  such  question  of  fact  in  this  action.  The 
question  before  us  is  one  of  jurisdiction.  If  the  board  can  make  a 
compromise  with  an  insolvent  judgment  debtor  it  must  be  allowed  to 
judge  for  itself  in  any  given  case  as  to  whether  the  debtor  is  insolvent 
or  not,  and  an  error  made  in  this  respect,  however  great,  would  not 
affect  its  jurisdiction."^ 

§  676.  The  dissenting  opinion  in  the  Iowa  case. — But  in  a  dissent- 
ing opinion.  Beck,  J.,  uses  the  following  vigorous  language:  "My 
brethren  insist  that  the  defendants  satisfied  the  judgment  in  the  exer- 
cise of  their  power  to  compromise  an  action  to  which  the  county  is  a 
party.  *  *  *  But  an  insuperable  objection  to  this  position  is  that 
the  defendants  did  not  compromise  the  action  for  the  very  best  of 
reasons — no  action  in  fact  was  pending.  There  had  been  an  action, 
but  a  judgment  had  been  rendered  therein.  If  there  was  a  ^compro- 
mise' it  was  not  of  an  action,  but  of  a  valid  undisputed  claim  upon  a 
judgment.  In  the  case  which  is  cited^  there  was  an  action  against 
the  county  which  it  resisted  and  litigation  was  pending.  There  could 
well  be  a  compromise  in  that  case ;  in  this  case  there  was  no  pending 
litigation  and  no  dispute  as  to  the  validity  of  the  county's  claim  on  the 
judgment.  In  my  judgment  the  canceling  of  the  judgment  upon  the 
payment  of  a  part  only  can  not  be  called  a  compromise.  *  *  *  It 
would  be  just  as  improper  to  apply  the  word  to  such  a  transaction  as 
to  say  that  in  a  distribution  of  alms  a  compromise  is  made  with  the 
mendicant."     Further  on  in  combating  the  position  of  the  majority 

'  Collins  V.  Welch,  58  Iowa  72,  73;  such  that  the  board  is  unable  to  dis- 

s.  c.  12  N.  W.  121;   43  Am.  R.  111.  cover  any  way  of  collecting  any  part 

The  opinion  proceeds  as  follows: —  of  the  judgment.    The  board  should 

"It  is  true  that  where  a  claim  has  have  the  power  to  accept  a  part  in 

been  reduced  to  judgment  all  ques-  satisfaction  of  the  whole  if  in   its 

tions  pertaining  to  the  rightfulness  judgment  the  best  interests  of  the 

of  the  claim  have  been  adjudicated,  county  would  thereby  be  promoted. 

But  questions  may  arise  subsequent  All    rules    of    business    conduct    by 

to  the  rendition  of  the  judgment,  and  which   the   prudent   person   is   gov- 

where  they  are  of  such  a  character  erned  are  applicable  to  a  county  in 

as  to  render  a  compromise  expedient  the  management  of  its  affairs  under 

it  is  manifest  that  the  board  ought  similar  circumstances." 
to  have  the  power  to  make  it.    Sup-        ^  Grimes  v.  Hamilton  Co.,  37  Iowa 

pose,  for  instance,  that  the  financial  290. 
condition  of  the  judgment  debtor  is 


661  IMPLIED   POWERS.  §    677 

of  the  court  that  if  the  board  had  jurisdiction  their  action  could  not 
be  reviewed  on  questions  of  fact,  he  continued:  "I  have  heard  much 
that  has  been  written  upon  the  subject  of  the  jurisdiction  of  courts, 
but  this  doctrine  is  new  to  me.  I  have  always  understood  the  rule  to 
be  that  the  jurisdiction  of  courts  (I  have  never  understood  that  the 
board  of  supervisors  is  higher  than  the  courts)  may  always  be  in- 
quired into  whenever  their  judgments  are  brought  in  question.  It  is 
true  that  their  decisions  upon  questions  of  process  whereby  they  ob- 
tained jurisdiction  can  not  be  collaterally  assailed.  But  if  upon  the 
face  of  the  record  of  a  judgment  it  appears  that  jurisdiction  is  want- 
ing the  judgment  is  void  and  will  be  so  regarded,  both  collaterally 
and  on  direct  attacks."^  In  the  author's  view  the  dissenting  opinion 
is  the  sounder  and  safer. 

§  677.  Compromise  of  ultra-vires  claims. — The  right  to  compro- 
mise disputed  claims  came  into  conflict  with  the  doctrine  of  ultra 
vires  in  a  case  in  Massachusetts  in  such  a  way  as  to  afford  ground 
for  a  vigorous  contest.  The  defendant,  a  quasi-corporation  called 
a  fire  district,  was  created  by  the  legislature  and  invested  with 
certain  express  and  ample  powers  for  the  extinguishment  of  fires 
within  its  limits.  The  district  established  an  electric  fire-alarm  sys- 
tem, one  of  the  wires  of  which  ran  into  the  house  where  the  plaintiff 
lived,  and  during  a  thunder-storm  she  was  injured  by  electricity  con- 
ducted into  the  house  by  means  of  the  wire.  It  was  not  controverted 
that  the  establishment  of  the  fire-alarm  system  was  within  the  defend- 
ant's authority.  The  plaintiff  sued  the  defendant  and  obtained  a 
verdict  with  substantial  damages  in  the  superior  court  under  instruc- 
tions from  the  presiding  justice  authorizing  it  to  be  rendered.  Ex- 
ceptions were  taken,  and  before  they  were  argued  in  the  appellate 
court  the  defendant  passed  a  vote  approjoriating  a  sum  less  than  the 
verdict  to  be  paid  in  compromise  of  the  action  and  claim,  which  the 
plaintiff  accepted  and  afterward  brought  suit  to  recover.  The  defend- 
ant contended  that  it  was  not  liable  in  the  first  instance  for  any  negli- 
gence of  the  fire-department  or  of  its  members,  and  that  it  was  wholly 
beyond  its  power  to  assume  liability  therefor  by  a  compromise  of  the 
plaintiff's  claim.  "This  latter  objection,"  said  the  court,  "is  clearly 
imtenable,  and  ive  have  therefore  no  occasion  to  consider  the  former." 
The  court  also  declared  that  whether  the  result  of  a  litigation  depends 
chiefly  upon  the  ascertainment  of  the  facts  by  the  verdict  of  a  jury, 
or  upon  the  determination  of  the  rules  of  law  found  applicable  by  the 

=>  Collins  V.  "Welch,  58  Iowa  72;  s.  c.  12  N.  W.  121;  43  Am.  R.  111. 


§  678 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS. 


663 


court,  in  either  case  the  uncertainty  is  one  upon  which  compromises 
rest  and  are  uphold  by  the  law.^" 

§  678.  Submission  to  arbitration. — The  authorities  fully  sustain 
the  proposition  that  a  municipal  corporation  may,  unless  restricted 
by  its  charter,  submit  a  disputed  claim  against  it  to  arbitration.^^ 
The  governing  body  of  the  corporation  is  the  proper  agent  to  exercise 
this  power,  and  it  may  intrust  the  city  attorney  with  the  selection  of 
the  arbitrators.^^  It  will  be  assumed  that  the  attorney  of  the  corpora- 
tion may  in  virtue  of  his  retainer  consent  to  a  reference  of  a  cause, 
though  he  had  no  authority  under  seal  to  appear  or  to  consent  to  a 
reference,  and  after  award  made  it  will  not  be  set  aside  on  the  sup- 
posed want  of  authority  in  the  attorney  to  consent  to  a  submission.^^ 
If  a  statute  should  direct  an  ascertained  sum  of  money  to  be  paid  to  an 
ascertained  person  by  the  authorities  of  a  township  or  other  political 


"Prout  V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  154 
Mass.  450;  s.  c.  28  N.  E.  679;  citing 
to  the  proposition  that  the  power  to 
sue  is  inherent,  Inhabitants  &c.  v. 
Wood,  13  Mass.  193;  Stebbens  v.  Jen- 
nings, 10  Pick.  (Mass.)  172,  188; 
Linehan  v.  City  of  Cambridge,  109 
Mass.  212;  2  Kent.  Com.  277,  278, 
283,  284  and  notes;  Angell  &  Ames 
Corp.,  §§  23,  24,  78;  1  Dillon  Munic. 
Corp.,  §§  21,  22.  And  that  the  power 
of  compromise  is  incident  to  the  lia- 
bility to  be  sued,  Cushing  v.  Inhab- 
itants &c.,  6  Cush.  (Mass.)  389; 
Drake  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  6  Cush. 
(Mass.)  393;  Matthews  v.  Inhabit- 
ants &c.,  131  Mass.  521;  s.  c.  134 
Mass.  555;  Inhabitants  &c.  v.  inhab- 
itants &c..  21  Pick.  (Mass.)  349, 
359;  Bean  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  23 
Maine  117;  President  &c.  v.  Mappin, 
14  111.  193;  Agnew  v.  Brail,  124  111. 
312;  s.  c.  16  N.  E.  230;  Board  &c.  v. 
Bowen,  4  Lans.  (N.  Y.)  24,  30,  31; 
Supervisors  &c.  v.  Birdsall,  4  Wend. 
(N.  Y.)  453;  Dillon  Munic.  Corp., 
§§  30,  477,  478. 

"Paret  v.  Bayonne,  39  N.  J.  L. 
559;  Kane  v.  City  of  Fond  du  Lac, 
40  Wis.  495;  Brady  v.  Mayor  &c.,  1 
Barb.  (N.  Y.)  584;  City  of  Shawnee- 
town  v.  Baker,  85  111.  563;  Inhabit- 
ants &c.  V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  16  Mass. 


396;  Inhabitants  &c.  v.  Brazer,  11 
Mass.  447;  Dix  v.  Town  of  Dummers- 
town,  19  Vt.  262;  Remington  v.  Har- 
rison Co.  Court,  12  Bush  (Ky.)  148; 
In  re  Arbitration  between  Eldon 
and  Ferguson  Townships,  6  Up.  Can. 
L.  J.  207;  District  Tp.  of  Walnut  v. 
Rankin,  70  Iowa  65;  s.  c.  29  N.  W. 
806  (which  was  a  case  of  a  claim  in 
favor  of  a  town  against  its  treasurer, 
and  where  the  court  said  that  an 
arbitration  of  differences  is  just  as 
legitimate  a  mode  of  settlement  as 
by  action.  "All  persons"  in  a  stat- 
ute relating  to  arbitration  includes 
municipal  corporations) ;  Spring- 
field V.  Walker,  42  Ohio  St.  543.  See 
also.  Smith  v.  City  of  Philadelphia, 
13  Phila.  (Pa.)  177. 

^-  Kane  v.  City  of  Fond  du  Lac,  40 
Wis.  495.  It  was  held  in  that  case 
that  an  alderman  who  had  been  act- 
ive in  the  council  in  endeavoring  to 
procure  payment  of  plaintiff's  claim 
against  the  city  was  not  thereby  ren- 
dered incompetent  to  act  as  an  ar- 
bitrator. At  any  rate  the  city,  hav- 
ing notice  of  his  conduct,  could  not 
object  after  award  made. 

"Paret  v.  Bayonne,  39  N.  J.  L. 
559;  Faviell  v.  Eastern  &c.  R.  Co., 
2  Exch.  344;  Alexandria  Coal  Co.  v. 
Swann,  5  How.  83. 


663 


IMPLIED    TOWERS. 


§    679 


precinct,  mandanms  might  be  used  to  coerce  sucli  payment  in  case 
of  default;  but  the  report  of  a  statutor.y  referee,  confirmed  by  the 
court,  is  in  no  better  legal  position  than  an  award  made  by  arbitrators, 
and  the  remedy  must  be  an  ordinary  action.^'' 

§  679,  Employment  of  attorneys. — A  municipal  corporation  may 
without  express  authority,  unless  especially  restricted,  employ  an  at- 
torney to  attend  to  the  corporate  interests  and  to  prosecute  and  defend 
actions  brought  by  or  against  the  municipality.^^  But  it  can  not 
make  a  valid  contract  for  the  employment  of  an  attorney  to  file  a  bill 
in  which  it  seeks  to  destroy  its  corporate  existence.^"  And  there 
is  no  implied  power  to  employ  attorneys  to  conduct  or  assist  in  con- 
ducting criminal  prosecutions.^^  And  where  the  law  has  provided 
an  officer  whose  duty  it  is  to  attend  to  all  the  legal  business  of  a 


"State  V.  Board  &c.,  41  N.  J.  L. 
135. 

'=  Lewis  V.  Mayor  &c.,  9  C.  B.  (N. 
S.)  401;  Sherman  v.  Carr,  8  R.  I. 
431;  Smith  v.  Mayor  &c.,  13  Cal.  531; 
Hornblower  v.  Duden,  35  Cal.  664; 
Thatcher  v.  Commissioners,  13  Kan. 
182;  Ellis  v.  Washoe  Co.,  7  Nev.  291; 
Clarke  v.  Lyon  Co.,  8  Nev.  181;  Wil- 
helm  V.  Cedar  Co.,  50  Iowa  254; 
Town  of  Mt.  Vernon  v.  Patton,  94 
111.  65;  Roper  v.  Town  of  Laurien- 
burg,  90  N.  C.  427;  s.  c.  7  Am.  &  Eng. 
Corp.  Cas.  130;  CuUen  v.  Town  of 
Carthage,  103  Ind.  196;  s.  c.  2  N.  E. 
571;  14  Am.  &  Eng.  Corp.  Cas.  256; 
53  Am.  R.  504;  Town  of  Bruce  v. 
Dickey,  116  111.  527;  s.  c.  6  N.  E. 
435;  State  v.  Heath,  20  La.  An.  172; 
s.  c.  96  Am.  D.  390.  County  commis- 
sioners acting  in  behalf  of  the  coun- 
ty possess  this  power:  Ellis  v. 
Washoe  Co.,  7  Nev.  291;  Jack  v. 
Moore,  66  Ala.  184;  Huffman  v. 
Board  &c.,  23  Kan.  281.  But  their 
action  must  be  taken  at  a  legal  ses- 
sion of  the  board:  McCabe  v.  Board 
&c.,  46  Ind.  380;  Board  &c.  v.  Ross, 
46  Ind.  404;  Butler  v.  City  of 
Charlestown,  7  Gray  (Mass.)  12; 
Thatcher  v.  Commissioners,  13  Kan. 
182.  See  also.  City  of  Bryan  v.  Page, 
51  Tex.  532;  s.  c.  32  Am.  R.  637;  Car- 
roll V.  City  of  St.  Louis,  12  Mo.  444. 


And  they  can  not  contract  for  serv- 
ices for  a  period  beyond  the  time 
when  by  operation  of  law  the  board 
will  be  reorganized:  Board  &c.  v. 
Taylor,  123  Ind.  148;  s.  c.  23  N.  E. 
752;  30  Am.  &  Eng.  Corp.  Cas.  294. 
Nor  for  an  unreasonably  large  con- 
tingent fee:  Chester  Co.  ,v.  Barber, 
97  Pa.  St.  455.  Counsel  may  be  em- 
ployed to  attend  to  corporate  inter- 
ests outside  of  the  territorial  limits 
of  the  corporation  or  in  another 
state:  City  of  Memphis  v.  Adams, 
9  Heisk.  (Tenn.)  518;  s.  c.  24  Am. 
R.  331.  Employment  by  a  mayor 
alone  was  sustained  in  an  extreme 
case:  City  of  Louisville  v.  Murphy, 
86  Ky.  53;  s.  c.  5  S.  W.  194;  9  Ky. 
L.  310;  18  Am.  &  Eng.  Corp.  Cas. 
421. 

^^  Daniel  v.  Mayor  &c.,  11  Humph. 
(Tenn.)  582. 

"  Hight  V.  Board  &c.,  68  Ind.  575. 
Not  even  against  an  official  indicted 
for  embezzling  corporate  funds: 
Board  &c.  v.  Ward,  69  Ind.  441; 
Montgomery  v.  Board  &c.,  22  Wis. 
69;  State  v.  Commissioners  &c.,  21 
Ohio  St.  648.  But  where  a  town  has 
an  interest  in  the  fines  it  may  em- 
ploy an  attorney  to  assist  the  state's 
attorney:  People  v.  Warren,  14  III. 
App.  296. 


§  680 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS. 


664 


county  it  has  been  held  that  the  county  can  not  employ  counsel.^^ 
Counsel  may  be  employed  not  only  in  suits  in  which  the  corporation 
is  a  party  on  the  record,  but  in  those  in  which  it  may  be  a  party  in 
interest.  ^^ 

§  680.  Power  to  hold  property  in  trust. — Municipal  corporations 
may  not  only  take  and  hold  property  in  their  own  right  by  direct  gift, 
conveyance  or  devise,-"  but  they  are  capable,  unless  specially  re- 
strained, of  taking  property,  real  and  personal,  in  trust  for  purposes 
not  foreign  to  their  institution,  and  not  incompatible  with  the  objects 
of  their  organization.^^  Its  capacity  to  take  and  execute  trusts  of 
this  kind  is  not  limited  to  objects  technically  denominated  charities  or 
pious  uses,  or  to  religious  or  educational  purposes,  and  is  circum- 
scribed by  no  other  limitations  than  such  as  should  exclude  inconsist- 


1'  Brome  v.  Cuming  Co.,  31  Neb. 
362;  s.  c.  47  N.  W.  1050;  34  Am.  & 
Eng.  Corp.  Cas.  481.  See  also,  Platte 
Co.  V.  Gerrard,  12  Neb.  244;  s.  c.  11 
N.  W.  298;  Board  &c.  v.  Tate,  10 
Neb.  193;  s.  c.  4  N.  W.  1044;  Ramson 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  24  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  226; 
Clough  V.  Hart,  8  Kan.  487;  State 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  40  N.  J.  L.  186.  Cf. 
Hugg  V.  City  Council  &c.,  29  N.  J. 
Eq.  6. 

^' Ellis  V.  Washoe  Co.,  7  Nev.  291; 
Thatcher  v.  Commissioners,  13  Kan. 
182;  Smith  v.  Mayor  &c.,  13  Cal.  531; 
Hornblower  v.  Duden,  35  Cal.  664; 
Jack  V.  Moore,  66  Ala.  184;  Curtis 
V.  Gowan,  34  111.  App.  516;  Doster  v. 
Howe,  28  Kan.  353;  Gushing  v.  In- 
habitants &c.,  6  Gush.  (Mass.)  389. 
As  to  what  does  not  constitute  a 
sufficient  interest,  see  Halstead  v. 
Mayor  &c.,  3  N.  Y.  430;  Smith  v. 
Mayor  &c.,  4  Lea  (Tenn.)  69.  A 
town  has  power  to  employ  counsel 
to  defend  an  action  for  false  impris- 
onment brought  against  the  town 
marshal  by  a  person  arrested  by  him 
for  violating  a  town  ordinance:  Cul- 
len  V.  Town  of  Carthage,  103  Ind. 
196;  s.  c.  2  N.  E.  571;  53  Am.  R.  504; 
14  Am.  &  Eng.  Corp.  Gas.  256.  See 
also,  Roper  v.  Town  of  Laurienburg, 
90  N.  C.  427;  s.  c,  7  Am.  &  Eng.  Corp. 
Cas.  130. 


=°  Sargent  v.  Cornish,  54  N.  H.  18; 
McDonogh  v.  Murdoch,  15  How.  367; 
2  Dillon  Munic.  Corp.,  §  566,  and 
cases  there  cited;  15  Am.  &  Eng. 
Encyc.  Law  1060,  and  cases  cited. 

-^Vidal  V.  Mayor  &c.,  2  How.  127; 
Perin  v.  Carey,  24  How.  465;  Trus- 
tees V.  Peaslee,  15  N.  H.  317;  Chapin 
V.  School  Dist,  35  N.  H.  445;  The 
Dublin  Case,  38  N.  H.  459.  Educa- 
tion is  not  an  Incongruous  element 
in  municipal  affairs,  and  bequests 
for  that  purpose  are  valid  so  far  as 
the  capacity  to  hold  is  concerned: 
Maynard  v.  Woodward,  36  Mich.  423; 
Hathaway  v.  Sackett,  32  Mich.  97; 
Yates  V.  Yates,  9  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  324; 
Bell  Co.  V.  Alexander,  22  Tex.  350; 
Common  Council  &c.  v.  State,  5  Ind. 
334;  Inhabitants  &c.  v.  Cole,  3  Pick. 
(Mass.)  232;  Christy  v.  Commis- 
sioners &c.,  41  Ohio  St.  711;  Barnum 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  62  Md.  275.  Bequest 
for  the  relief  of  the  poor:  Board 
&c.  V.  Rogers,  55  Ind.  297;  Craig  v. 
Secrist,  54  Ind.  419.  For  a  hospital: 
Mayor  &c.  v.  Elliott,  3  Rawle  (Pa.) 
170.  For  highways  and  bridges: 
Town  of  Hamden  v.  Rice,  24  Conn. 
350.  For  a  town  building:  Cogge- 
shall  V.  Pelton,  7  Johns.  Ch.  (N.  Y.) 
292.  For  purchase  of  fire-engines: 
Wright  V.  Linn,  9  Pa.  St.  433. 


C65  IMPLIED   POWERS.  §    G81 

ent,  incompatible  and  improper  objects.  Thus,  it  has  been  held  that 
a  town  is  capable  of  holding  in  trust  a  sum  of  money,  the  income  to 
be  invested  yearly  in  the  purchase  and  use  for  display  of  United 
States  flags.^^ 

§  681.    Acquisition  of  property  for  other  than  municipal  purposes. 

— In  an  action  of  ejectment  by  a  town  it  adduced  evidence  of  posses- 
sion for  more  than  twenty  years  in  proof  of  title.  It  appeared,  how- 
ever, that  the  premises  were  not  used  for  municipal  purposes,  but 
were  part  of  a  larger  tract  which  was  for  most  of  the  time  in  the  occu- 
pation of  tenants  of  the  town.  The  defendants  contended  that  the 
town  could  not  acquire  title  by  possession  for  any  other  than  munici- 
pal purposes  and  requested  the  court  so  to  charge,  and  the  court  re- 
fusing to  do  so  they  excepted.  "The  cases  cited  in  support  of  these 
exceptions,"  said  Durfee,  C.  J.,  "do  not  go  to  the  point  that  a  town 
can  not  acquire  land  by  possession  for  other  than  municipal  purposes, 
but  only  to  the  point  that  it  is  ultra  vires  for  a  town  to  purchase  land 
for  other  than  such  purposes.  We  think  this  quite  a  different  thing; 
for  a  town  can  not  purchase  land  without  expending  its  moneys,  and 
it  has  no  right  to  expend  its  moneys,  raised  by  taxation  or  otherwise 
for  municipal  purposes,  for  other  purposes.  The  acquirement  of  land 
by  possession  does  not  involve  an  expenditure  any  more  than  does 
the  acquirement  of  land  by  deed  of  gift  or  by  devise ;  and  it  has  been 
decided  that  a  gift  or  devise  of  land  to  a  town  is  good  even  though 
the  land  be  given  or  devised  in  general  terms,  and  be  accepted  without 
any  intent  to  use  it  strictly  for  municipal  purposes."^^ 

§  682.  The  same  subject  continued — Discretion  in  erecting  puhlic 
huildings. — The  validity  of  appropriations  for  the  purpose  of  erect- 
ing or  repairing  public  buildings  is  sometimes  contested  in  the  courts 
on  the  ground  that  the  contemplated  accommodations  exceed  the  ac- 
tual needs  of  the  corporation  and  are  to  be  rented  in  part  to  private 
individuals.    The  distinction  drawn  in  the  authorities  is  this :    If  the 

--  Sargent  v.  Cornish,  54  N.  H.  18.  tion   of   misuser  by   declaring  void 

The  court  tliere  said  ttiat  it  seems  to  conveyances    made    in    good    faith: 

be  impossible  to  prescribe  in  definite  Chambers   v.   City   of   St.   Louis,   29 

terms   the    almost    innumerable    ob-  Mo.  543.    See  also,  Inhabitants  &c.  v. 

jects  of  a  liberal  bounty  with  which  Eaton,  13  Mass.  371;  Holten  v.  Board 

a  town  might  be  advantageously  and  &c.,  55  Ind.  194. 

happily     endowed,     directly     or     in        -^  Town  of  New  Shoreham  v.  Ball, 

trust.     In  this  case  it  was  held  that  14  R.  I.  566;   citing  Inhabitants  &c. 

if  a  city  violates  or  abuses  its  power  v.  Baton,  13  Mass.  371;   Sargent  v. 

to  purchase  property  it  is  a  matter  Cornish,  54  N.  H.  18;  Dillon  Munic. 

solely    between    it    and    the    state.  Corp.,  §  437. 
Courts  will  not  determine  the  ques- 


683 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS. 


666 


primary  object  of  a  public  expenrlitnre  is  to  subserve  a  public  munici- 
pal purpose,  the  expenditure  is  legal  notwithstanding  it  also  involves 
as  an  incident  an  expense  which,  standing  alone,  would  not  be  lawful. 
But  if  the  primary  object  is  to  promote  some  private  end,  the  ex- 
penditure is  illegal  even  though  it  may  incidentally  serve  some  public 
purpose.^*  It  is  proper  in  constructing  buildings  to  make  suitable 
provision  for  prospective  wants.^^  Proceedings  in  raising  and  ex- 
pending money  within  the  limits  of  the  corporate  powers  in  these 
particulars  will  not  be  collaterally  impeached  and  held  void  because 
in  the  opinion  of  a  court  and  jury  a  less  sum  would  have  answered 
the  immediate  necessities  of  the  corporation  or  the  money  might  have 
been  more  judiciously  and  economically  expended.^*' 

§  683,  Power  to  indemnify  officers. — A  municipal  corporation  may 
legally  indemnify  an  officer  acting  in  good  faith  for  a  loss  incurred 
in  the  discharge  of  his  official  duties.  Thus,  the  court  refused  to 
enjoin  a  town  from  indemnifying  one  of  its  officers  for  his  expenses 
in  successfully  resisting  a  suit  for  damages  for  malicious  prosecution 
in  procuring,  by  the  direction  of  the  town  council,  the  arrest  of  the 
plaintiff  on  a  charge  of  obtaining  public  moneys  by  false  pretenses. 


'*  Bates  v.  Bassett,  60  Vt.  530;  s.  c. 
15  Atl.  200.  "This  is  the  test,"  said 
the  court  in  that  case,  "where  good 
faith  is  exercised  in  making  the  ex- 
penditure. If  a  public  purpose  is 
set  up  as  a  mere  pretense  to  conceal 
a  private  purpose,  of  course  the  ex- 
penditure is  illegal  and  fraudulent." 
A  town  hall  was  fitted  up  with  the- 
atrical apparatus  and  part  of  the 
building  was  rented  as  a  post-office. 
The  court  sustained  a  tax  to  defray 
the  expense.  See  also,  Worden  v. 
Inhabitants  &c.,  131  Mass.  23;  Inhab- 
itants &c.  V.  Camden  Village  Corp., 
77  Maine  530;  s.  c.  1  Atl.  689;  City 
of  Jacksonville  v.  Ledwith,  26  Fla. 
163;  s.  c.  7  So.  885;  Bell  v.  City  of 
Platteville,  71  Wis.  139;  s.  c.  "36  N. 
W.  831;  Konrad  v.  Rogers,  70  Wis. 
492;  s.  c.  36  N.  W.  261;  Ely  v.  City 
of  Rochester,  26  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  133; 
Reynolds  v.  Mayor  &c.,  8  Barb.  (N. 
Y.)  597;  Poillon  v.  City  of  Brooklyn, 
101  N.  Y.  132;  s.  c.  4  N.  B.  191;  At- 
torney-General V.  City  of  Eau  Claire, 


37  Wis.  400  (where  it  was  held  that 
the  legislature  could  not  authorize 
the  erection  of  a  dam  across  the 
river  at  the  expense  of  the  city  "for 
the  purpose  of  leasing  water-power 
for  private  purposes"  merely;  yet, 
upon  subsequent  amendment  of  the 
act,  it  was  in  effect  held  that  as  the 
city  had  lawful  authority  to  erect 
the  dam  "for  the  purpose  of  water- 
works for  the  city,"  it  might  as  inci- 
dent thereto  lease  for  private  pur- 
poses any  excess  of  water-power  not 
required);  State  v.  City  of  Eau 
Claire,  40  Wis.  533;  Green  Bay  &c. 
Co.  v.  Kaukauna  &c.  Co.,  70  Wis. 
635;  s.  c.  35  N.  W.  529;  36  N.  W.  828. 

"^  Greenbanks  v.  Boutwell,  43  Vt. 
207;  French  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  3 
Allen  (Mass.)  9. 

-"Eddy  V.  Wilson,  43  Vt.  362; 
Greenley  v.  People,  60  111.  19; 
Spaulding  v.  City  of  Lowell,  23  Pick. 
(Mass.)  71;  Torrent  v.  Common 
Council  &c.,  47  Mich.  115;  s.  c.  10 
N.  W.  132. 


66: 


IMPLIED    POWERS. 


684 


the  plaintiff  having  been  acquitted  upon  the  trial.-''  So,  also,  where 
the  mayor  of  a  city,  in  the  execution  of  a  law  conferring  certain  pow- 
ers upon  him,  and  in  good  faith  but  in  excess  of  his  authority,  tres- 
passed upon  the  rights  of  a  citizen,  who  sued  for  false  imprisonment 
and  recovered  a  verdict,  it  was  pronounced  to  be  a  "legitimate  duty" 
and  a  "usual  and  ordinary  expense"  for  the  city  to  reimburse  him.^® 

§  684.  The  same  subject  continued. — But  in  order  to  justify  an 
expenditure  of  money  in  indemnifying  an  ofiticer  three  things  must 
appear :  first,  the  officer  must  have  been  acting  in  a  matter  in  which 
the  corporation  had  an  interest;  second,  he  must  have  been  acting  in 
the  discharge  of  a  duty  imposed  or  authorized  by  law;  and  third,  he 
must  have  acted  in  good  faith.  ^^  In  two  Connecticut  cases  the  en- 
forcement of  this  rule  resulted  in  a  denial  of  the  right  to  indemnify. 
The  common  council  of  the  city  of  Bridgeport,  under  authority  of 
the  city  charter,  enacted  a  by-law  with  regard  to  wharves,  and  the 
anchoring,  moving  and  mooring  of  vessels  in  the  harbor,  and  ap- 


"  This  was  within  the  power  con- 
ferred by  the  statute  to  raise  money 
for  "town  purposes":  State  v.  Coun- 
cil &c.,  38  N.  J.  L.  430;  s.  c.  20  Am. 
R.  404;  citing  King  v.  Inhabitants 
&c.,  4  T.  R.  591;  Attorney-General  v. 
Mayor,  2  Mylne  &  Cr.  406;  Reg.  v. 
Town  Council  &c.,  4  Q.  B.  893;  Reg. 
V.  Town  Council  &c.,  4  Q.  B.  900, 
n.  a;  Lewis  v.  Mayor  &c.,  9  C.  B.  (N. 
S.)  401;  Reg.  v.  Mayor  &c.,  10  Ad. 
&  El.  281;  Reg.  v.  Paramore,  10  Ad. 

6  El.  286;  Nelson  v.  Inhabitants  &c., 

7  Pick.  (Mass.)  18;  Bancroft  v.  In- 
habitants &c.,  18  Pick.  (Mass.)  566; 
Fuller  V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  11  Gray 
(Mass.)  340  (where  the  members  of 
a  school  committee  were  sued  for 
libel  because  of  some  statements 
made  in  their  official  report  to  the 
town.  For  their  expenses  in  suc- 
cessfully defending  themselves  the 
town  voted  an  indemnity  and  the 
court  held  that  it  had  a  right  to  do 
so);  Hadsel  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  3 
Gray  (Mass.)  526;  State  v.  Board 
&c.,  37  N.  J.  L.  254.  Cf.  Hotchkiss 
V.  Plunkett,  60  Conn.  230;  s.  c.  22 
Atl.  535,  cited  in  the  following  sec- 
tion. 


="  Sherman  v.  Carr,  8  R.  I.  431. 
The  court  said  that  the  opposite  rule 
would  tend  to  make  an  officer  too 
cautious  if  not  too  timid  in  the  exer- 
cise of  his  powers — "powers  which 
must  be  frequently  exercised  for  the 
protection  of  society  before  and  not 
after  a  thorough  investigation  of  the 
case  in  which  he  is  called  upon  to 
act;"  and  that,  although  it  may  be 
urged  that  if  the  officer  has  the  right 
to  fall  back  on  the  city  treasury 
there  is  danger  that  he  will  become 
reckless  and  overbearing,  still  it 
would  seem  to  be  the  wisest  course 
to  leave  the  matter  of  indemnifica- 
tion to  the  discretion  of  those  who 
represent  the  interests  of  the  city. 
"We  know  of  no  case,"  continued 
the  court,  "in  which,  while  the  offi- 
cer continues  to  act  in  behalf  of  the 
community  and  not  in  his  own  be- 
half, it  is  held  that  the  community 
can  not  indemnify  him:"  Ibid.,  p. 
434.  See  also,  Nelson  v.  Inhabitants 
&c.,  7  Pick.  (Mass.)  18;  quoted  at 
length  in  Cooley  Const.  Lim.  (6th 
ed.)  258. 

^'^  Hotchkiss  V.  Plunkett,  60  Conn. 
230;  s.  c.  22  Atl.  535. 


§    684  PUBLIC    CORI'ORATIONS.  668 

pointed  an  officer  called  a  superintendent  of  wharves  to  discharge  the 
duty  provided  for  in  the  by-law.  The  performance  of  his  duties  was 
not  enforced  by  a  penalty,  and  he  acted  only  upon  application  of  par- 
ties interested  and  at  their  expense.  While  acting  in  good  faith  he 
ordered  a  vessel  lying  at  a  wharf  to  be  hauled  astern  to  make  more 
room  for  another  at  an  adjoining  wharf,  and  was  sued  for  damages 
by  the  owner  of  the  wharf.  It  was  decided  that  the  city  had  no  suffi- 
cient interest  in  the  matter  to  sustain  a  vote  of  indemnity  for  his 
expenses  in  defending  the  suit.  "He  is  not  the  agent  or  servant  of  the 
city,"  said  the  court,  "nor  subject  to  its  control,  and  it  is  not  responsi- 
ble for  his  official  negligence,  misconduct  or  delinquency,  nor  bene- 
fited by  his  official  fidelity.  With  respect  to  his  official  character  and 
obligation  the  city  has  no  duty  to  perform,  no  rights  to  defend,  no 
interest  to  protect,  and  no  pecuniary  or  corporate  concern  in  the  sub- 
ject-matter connected  with  his  official  duty.  Want  of  interest  involves 
the  want  of  power  and  is  necessarily  fatal  to  the  claims  of  the  city."^"' 
And  where  the  members  of  a  board  of  education  of  a  school  district 
were  sued  for  an  injury  to  the  business  reputation  of  the  plaintiffs 
by  their  refusal  to  entertain  a  bid  offered  by  the  plaintiffs  for  fur- 
nishing stationery  for  the  district  on  the  ground  that  they  had  some- 
time before  dealt  dishonestly  with  the  district,  the  money  of  the  dis- 
trict could  not  be  used  for  the  defense  of  the  suit.^^ 

=°  Gregory  v.   City  of   Bridgeport,  Hazard,  7  R.   I.   438;    City  of  New 

41  Conn.  76;  s.  c.  19  Am.  R.  485;  cit-  London  v.  Brainard,  22  Conn.  552; 

ing  Merrill  v.   Plainfield,  45   N.   H.  Webster  v.  Town  of  Harwinton,  32 

126;   Gove  v.  Epping,  41  N.  H.  539;  Conn.  131. 

Halstead  v.  Mayor  &c.,  3  Comst.  (N.  ^' Hotchkiss  v.  Plunkett,  60  Conn. 
Y.)  430;  Martin  v.  Mayor  &c.,  1  Hill  230;  s.  c.  22  Atl.  535.  Andrews,  C. 
(N.  Y.)  545;  Hodges  v.  City  of  Buf-  J.,  pointedly  remarked  that  there 
falo,  2  Denio  (N.  Y.)  110;  Vincent  v.  was  no  duty  authorized  or  imposed 
Inhabitants  &c.,  12  Cush.  (Mass.)  to  make  charges  of  dishonesty  and 
103;  Stetson  v.  Kempton,  13  Mass.  cheating.  See  also,  Fuller  v.  In- 
272;  Nelson  v.  Inhabitants  &c..  7  habitants  &c.,  11  Gray  (Mass.)  340. 
Pick.  (Mass.)  18;  Fuller  v.  Inhabit-  A  corporation  can  not  appropriate 
ants  &c.,  11  Gray  (Mass.)  340;  Bab-  money  to  pay  the  costs  of  an  official 
bitt  V.  Selectmen  &c.,  3  Cush.  who  has  been  prosecuted  for  official 
(Mass.)  530;  Bancroft  v.  Inhabit-  misconduct,  although  he  be  ac- 
ants  &c.,  18  Pick.  (Mass.)  566;  quitted:  People  v.  Lawrence,  6  Hill 
Tash  V.  Adams,  10  Cush.  (Mass.)  (N.  Y.)  244;  Merrill  v.  Plainfield, 
252;  Claflin  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  4  45  N.  H.  126;  Butler  v.  City  of  Mil- 
Gray  (Mass.)  502;  Hood  v.  Mayor  waukee,  15  Wis.  493;  Smith  v.  May- 
fee,  1  Allen  (Mass.)  103;  Briggs  v.  or  &c.,  4  Lea  (Tenn.)  69,  72.  See 
Whipple,  6  Vt.  95;  Baker  v.  Inhabit-  also,  Halstead  v.  Mayor  &c.,  3  N,  Y. 
ants    &c.,    13    Maine    74;     Fisk    v.  430. 


669  IMPLIED   POWEHS.  §    685 

§  685.  Offers  of  rewards. — The  question  wliether  towns,  cities  or 
counties  have  the  implied  power  to  bind  themselves  by  offers  of  reward 
for  the  arrest  and  conviction  of  criminals  has  been  considered  in 
several  cases,  and  the  conclusion  supported  by  the  weight  of  author- 
ity is  adverse  to  the  existence  of  such  a  power.  One  of  the  earliest 
cases  involving  this  point  arose  in  Massachusetts,  and  Chief  Justice 
Shaw  there  held  that  a  statute  limiting  the  power  of  the  mayor  and 
aldermen  in  offering  rewards  to  a  certain  amount  did  not  operate  to 
restrain  the  citi/  cowicil,  as  the  representatives  of  the  whole  body  of 
the  people,  from  offering  a  greater  amount  for  the  apprehension  and 
conviction  of  any  person  who  should  set  fire  to  a  building  with  felo- 
nious intent.^^  The  courts  wherein  this  power  has  been  denied  to 
municipalities  do  not  attempt  to  cope  with  this  case  as  a  direct  oppos- 
ing authority,  nor  does  it  seem  to  the  author  that  they  parry  the  force 
of  it  satisfactorily.  Some  of  them  take  no  notice  of  it  whatever,  while 
it  has  been  said  not  to  be  applicable  because  the  Massachusetts  statute 
conferred  the  power  to  offer  rewards.^^  And  again,  that  as  the  re- 
ward was  for  the  detection  of  persons  who  should  thereafter  be  guilty 
of  the  crime  of  arson  within  the  limits  of  the  city,  it  was  "a  simple 
police  measure,  as  legitimate  as  the  employment  of  police  to  guard 
the  inhabitants  and  their  property  against  violators  of  the  law."^* 
But  the  learned  chief  justice  did  not  rest  his  decision  upon  either  of 
these  grounds  or  refer  to  them  in  any  manner.  In  Pennsylvania  it 
was  held  to  be  within  the  legitimate  province  of  the  burgesses  of  a 
town  to  offer  rewards  for  the  detection  of  offenders  against  the  gen- 
eral safety  of  its  inhabitants  (incendiaries  in  that  case).  The  court 
said :  "The  burgesses  *  *  *  are  a  part  of  the  public  police.  It  is 
therefore  the  state  by  one  of  its  departments  that  offers  a  reward  for 
the  detection  and  conviction  of  an  unknown  offender  against  its 
laws."^^ 

§  686.    The  same  subject  continued — The  power  generally  denied. 

— But,  with  the  exceptions  noted  in  the  preceding  section,  the  deci- 
sions are  unanimous,  and  the  purely  implied  power  to  tax  the  inhabit- 
ants for  the  apprehension  of  criminals  is  not  only  denied,^®  but  charter 

^"  Crawshaw  v.  City  of  Roxbury,  7  equally  within  the  province  of  the 

Gray  (Mass.)  374.  state  in  administering  its  criminal 

^^  Hawk   v.   Marion   Co.,   48    Iowa  laws. 

472,  474.  ^Borough  of  York  v.  Forscht,  23 

^*  Patton    V.    Stephens,    14    Bush  Pa.  St.  391,  393. 

(Ky.)   324.     But  it  is  evident  that,  ^"Gale     v.     Inhabitants     &c.,     51 

whether  the  offer  is  antecedent  or  Maine  174.     "We  have  been  unable 

subsequent  to  the  commission  of  the  to    find    any    case    overturning    the 

offense,  the  service  to  be  paid  for  is  case    of    Gale    v.    [Inhabitants    of] 


§    687  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  670 

provisions  are  strictly  construed  so  as  to  exclude  it.  Thus,  an  article 
in  the  charter  of  the  city  of  Covington  providing  that  "the  council 
shall  have  power  to  pass  any  needful  by-laws  and  ordinances  for  the 
due  and  effectual  administration  of  right  and  justice.  *  *  *  They 
may  legislate  upon  all  subjects  wdiich  the  good  government  of  said 
city  shall  require,  unless  restrained  by  the  terms  of  the  charter  or 
constitution  of  the  state,  notwithstanding  the  legislature  may  have 
enacted  laws  relating  to  the  same,"  confers  no  authority  to  offer  a 
reward  for  the  arrest  of  the  city  treasurer,  who  had  been  indicted  for 
forgery  and  for  the  embezzlement  of  the  funds  of  the  city.^'^  "It  is 
not  a  matter  in  which  the  local  public  have  an  exclusive  or  peculiar 
interest,"  said  the  court,  "as  distinguished  from  the  general  public. 
The  offender  when  arrested  must  be  tried  under  the  laws  of  the  state 
by  the  judiciary  of  the  state.  *  *  *  No  power  can  be  implied  in 
favor  of  a  corporation  which  does  not  pertain  to  matters  of  a  local 
character,  matters  which  peculiarly  concern  the  local  public,  and  with- 
out which  those  local  affairs  committed  by  the  state  to  the  corporation 
can  not  be  properly  attended  to."^^ 

§  687.    The  same  subject  continued — The  foregoing  rule  qualified. 

— Where  it  was  provided  by  statute  that  counties  "may  acquire  and 
hold  property  and  make  all  contracts  necessary  or  expedient  for  the 
management,  control  and  improvement  of  the  same,"  it  was  con- 
ceded that  the  county  had  no  power  to  offer  a  reward  for  the  arrest  of 
persons  charged  with  the  commission  of  crime,  but  held  that  the  board 
of  supervisors  might  offer  a  reward  for  the  recovery  of  money  which 
had  been  stolen  from  the  county.  "Of  necessity  it  seems  to  us  that 
this  power  must  exist,"  said  the  court;  "otherwise,  when  a  county 
treasury  is  robbed,  the  county  authorities  must  fold  their  hands  and 
remain  passive  until  the  thief  repents  and  voluntarily  returns  the 

South   Berwick:"   Baker  v.   City  of  1105;    35   Am.   R.   266    (the   charter 

Washington,  7  D.  C.  134,  140;  Hawk  gave  the  common  council  power  by 

V.  Marion  Co.,  48  Iowa  472;    Board  a  two-thirds  vote  to  offer  rewards. 

&c.  V.  Bradford,   72   Ind.   455;    s.   c.  It  was  held  that  even  assuming  that 

37  Am.  R.  174;   Hight  v.  Board  &c.,  there  was  an  implied  power,  it  could 

68  Ind.  575;   Board  &c.  v.  Ward,  69  not  be  exercised  except  in  the  man- 

Ind.  441.     See  also,  Lee  v.  Trustees  ner  pointed  out) ;   Loveland  v.  City 

&c.,  7  Dana  (Ky.)  28.  of  Detroit,  41  Mich.  367;   s.  c.  1  N. 

='  Patton    V.    Stephens,    14    Bush  W.    952.     See    also.    Stamp   v.    Cass 

(Ky.)  324.  Co.,  47  Mich.  330;  s.  c.  11  N.  W.  183. 

"^  Patton    V.    Stephens,    14    Bush  Whether    a    reward    might    not   be 

(Ky.)    324,    328.     If    the    power    be  binding  if  it  related  merely  to  of- 

doubtful    the    court    should    decide  fenses      against      municipal      ordi- 

against  it:    Hanger  v.  City  of  Des  nances,   qu«re:    Murphy  v.  City  of 

Moines,  52  Iowa  193;  s.  c.  2  N.  W.  Jacksonville,  18  Pla.  318. 


671 


IMPLIED    POWERS. 


§  688 


money,  or  rely  on  the  exertions  of  the  individual  citizen  to  work  and 
labor  for  the  recovery  of  the  money  without  hope  of  pay  or  pecuniary 
reward.  If  the  latter  discovered  the  money  under  such  circumstances, 
the  temptation  to  divide  with  the  thief  instead  of  the  county  would  be 
great."^^ 

§  688.  Expenditures  in  obtaining  or  opposing  legislation. — The  su- 
preme court  of  Connecticut  decided  that  a  town  has  the  power  to 
employ  and  pay  counsel  to  oppose  before  the  general  assembly  a 
petition  to  divide  its  territory,  made  by  certain  individuals  seek- 
ing to  promote  their  own  interests,  and  not  by  the  state  from  mo- 
tives of  policy.  The  chief  justice  dissented,  and  the  majority 
opinion  concedes  that  the  conclusion  of  the  court  is  in  conflict  with 
the  views  expressed  in  Maine  and  Massachusetts.*"  In  the  latter 
state  it  was  held  that  a  town  has  no  implied  authority  to  incur  ex- 
pense in  opposing  before  the  legislature  a  proposition  to  annex  it  to 
another  town.*^     The  same  court  had  previously  denied  the  validity 


^°  Hawk  v.  Marion  Co.,  48  Iowa 
472,  475,  holding  also  that  if  only  a 
part  of  the  stolen  money  is  recov- 
ered the  party  through  whose  agen- 
cy the  recovery  has  been  effected  is 
entitled  to  a  pro-rata  share  of  the 
reward.  Under  the  revised  stat- 
utes of  Illinois,  ch.  60,  §  15,  provid- 
ing that  county  boards  may  offer  re- 
wards for  the  arrest  and  conviction 
of  any  person  guilty  of  stealing 
"any  horse,  mare."  etc.,  "or  any 
other  property  exceeding  $50  in 
value,"  the  limitation  as  to  value  ap- 
plies only  to  property  other  than 
that  specified:  Butler  v.  McLean 
Co.,  32  111.  App.  397.  When  the  of- 
fer of  a  reward  is  authorized,  an  of- 
ficer can  not  recover  it  if  his  services 
are  only  in  the  line  of  his  duty: 
Pool  V.  City  of  Boston,  5  Cush. 
(Mass.)  219;  Stamper  v.  Temple,  6 
Humph.  (Tenn.)  113;  Kick  v.  Mer- 
ry, 23  Mo.  72;  Day  v.  Putnam  Ins. 
Co.,  16  Minn.  408;  Warner  v.  Grace, 

14  Minn.  487;  Gillmore  v.  Lewis,  12 
Ohio  281;  Means  v.  Hendershott,  24 
Iowa  78;  Thornton  v.  Missouri  Pac. 
R.  Co.,  42  Mo.  App.  58.  See  also, 
Morris  v.  Kasling,  79  Tex.  141;  s.  c. 

15  S.  W.  226. 


'"  Parrel  v.  Town  of  Derby,  58 
Conn.  234;  s.  c.  20  Atl.  460;  34  Am. 
&  Eng.  Corp.  Cas.  391.  "Had  the 
state  of  its  own  motion,  by  reasons 
of  public  policy,  taken  steps  to 
change  the  boundaries  of  the  town 
or  abolish  it  altogether,  the  case 
presented  would  have  been  a  very 
different  one;  but  the  attack  was 
not  made  by  the  state  from  motives 
of  policy,  and  in  the  interest  of  good 
government,  but  was  made  by  cer- 
tain parties  who  sought  thereby  to 
promote  their  own  interests.  The 
attack  was  not  directed  alone 
against  other  individuals  who  dif- 
fered from  them  but  against  the 
town  as  well.  The  end  sought  in- 
volved not  only  a  dismemberment  of 
the  town  in  respect  to  territory  and 
population,  but  also  a  division  of  its 
corporate  property,  a  reduction  of 
its  grand  list,  an  apportionment  of 
its  debts,  liabilities  and  burdens  as 
to  highways,  bridges,  paupers  and 
the  like." 

"  Coolidge  V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  114 
Mass.  592;  Minot  v.  Inhabitants  &c., 
112  Mass.  1;  s.  c.  17  Am.  R.  52 
(where  it  was  held  that  a  town 
could  not  legally  appropriate  money 


§  689  PUBLIC  conroRATiONS.  672 

of  a  contract  to  pay  for  services  of  "lob])y  members"  in  procuring' 
the  passage  of  a  charter  of  incorporation.'*"  In  Maine,  also,  a  town 
can  not  legally  raise  and  expend  money  either  for  services  of  members 
of  the  "third  house"  in  opposing  a  division  of  the  town,*^  or  of  at- 
torneys who  appear  before  a  committee  for  the  same  purpose.**  A 
city  has  no  authority  to  appropriate  money  to  obtain  legislative  per- 
mission to  build  a  bridge  across  a  navigable  river,*  ^  or  to  procure  the 
passage  of  an  unconstitutional  act.*^  The  power  granted  in  a  charter 
"to  provide  for  supplying  the  city  with  water,"  by  implication  gives 
the  city  power  to  agree  upon  water  rates.*'''  Power  to  light  streets 
includes  power  to  buy  or  build  a  plant  for  that  purpose.*^  There  is 
no  implied  power  to  provide  for  a  pyrotechnic  display  on  the  Fourth 
of  July.*9 

(b)  Eminent  Domain. 

§  689.  Nature  and  definition. — The  right  of  eminent  domain  has 
been  defined  to  be  "that  superior  right  of  property  pertaining  to  the 
sovereignty  by  which  the  private  property  acquired  by  its  citizens 
under  its  protection  may  be  taken  or  its  use  controlled  for  the  public 
benefit  without  regard  to  the  wishes  of  its  owners.  More  accurately 
it  is  the  rightful  authority  which  exists  in  every  sovereignty  to  control 
and  regulate  those  rights  of  a  public  nature  which  pertain  to  its  citi- 
zens in  common,  and  to  appropriate  and  control  individual  property 
for  the  public  benefit,  as  the  public  safety,  necessity,  convenience  or 

to  pay  for  the  expenses  of  a  commit-  **  Henderson  &c.  v.  City  of  Coving- 
tee  directed  by  vote  to  petition  the  ton,  14  Bush  (Ky.)  312. 
legislature  for  annexation  to  anoth-  "  Mead  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  139 
er  town).  But  under  a  statute  au-  Mass.  341;  s.  c.  1  N.  E.  413;  8  Am.  & 
thorizing  the  employment  of  coun-  Eng.  Corp.  Cas.  545.  In  Bachelder 
sel  by  "any  town  interested  in  a  pe-  v.  Epping,  28  N.  H.  354,  the  plaintiff 
tition  to  the  legislature"  to  repre-  recovered  for  services  as  a  member 
sent  it  at  hearings  thereon,  a  town  of  a  committee  appointed  to  apply 
may  employ  and  pay  counsel  to  op-  to  the  legislature  to  have  a  term  of 
pose  its  division  before  a  committee  court  holden  annually  in  the  de- 
of  the  legislature:    Connolly  v.   In-  fendant  town. 

habitants  &c.,  151  Mass.  437;  s.  c.  24  ^' Los  Angeles  &c.  Co.  v.  City  of 

N.  E.  404.  Los    Angeles,    88    Fed.    720;     Santa 

"Frost  V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  6  Allen  Ana    Water    Co.    v.    Town    of    San 

(Mass.)  152,  on  the  ground  that  se-  Buenaventura,  56  Fed.  339;   Illinois 

cret  attempts  to  secure  votes,  etc.,  Trust  &c.  Bank  v.  City  of  Arkansas 

are  not  a  legal  consideration.  City,  76  Fed.  271;   s.  c.  22  C.  C.  A. 

^=  Frankfort  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  54  171. 

Maine  250.  «Hay  v.   City  of  Springfield,  64 

^  Inhabitants    &c.    v.    Inhabitants  111.  App.  671. 

&c.,  63  Maine  231.  '"  Love  v.  City  of  Raleigh,  116  N. 

C.  296;  s.  c.  21  S.  E.  503. 


673 


EMIXEXT    DOMAIN". 


§    090 


welfare  may  demand.""''  It  is  a  necessary  and  inherent  attribute 
of  sovereignty  in  the  state,  which  does  not  depend  njjon  constitutional 
provisions  for  its  existence."^  All  grants  of  property  by  the  state  are 
subject  to  the  imjdied  condition  that  it  may  be  resumed  by  an  exer- 
cise of  the  right  of  eminent  domain,  and  a  contract  renouncing  this 
power  is  not  covered  by  the  constitution  of  the  United  States  prohibit- 
ing legislation  that  impairs  the  obligation  of  contracts.^- 

§  690.    The  same  subject  continued — Constitutional  limitations. — 

The  provision  in  the  constitution  of  the  United  States  that  private 
property  shall  not  be  taken  for  public  u,se  without  just  compensation 
is  a  restriction  only  upon  the  power  of  the  federal  government  and 
not  a  limitation  of  the  power  of  the  states.^^     But  this  provision  is 


'"  Cooley  Const.  Lim.  640;  citing 
Vattel,  ell.  20,  §  34;  Bynliershoek, 
lib.  2,  ch.  15;  Angell  Watercourses, 
§  457;  2  Kent  Com.  338-340;  Red- 
field  Railways,  ch.  11,  §  1;  Waples 
Proceedings  in  Rem,  §  242;  Pol- 
lard's Lessee  v.  Hagan,  3  How.  212; 
Beelvman  v.  Saratoga  &c.  R.  Co.,  3 
Paige  (N.  Y.)   45. 

"  Harvey  v.  Thomas,  10  Watts 
(Pa.)  63;  Noll  v.  Dubuque  &c.  R. 
Co.,  32  Iowa  66;  Raleigh  &c.  R.  Co. 
v.  Davis,  2  Dev.  &  B.  L.  (N.  C.)  451; 
Brown  v.  Beatty,  34  Miss.  227; 
United  States  v.  Jones,  109  U.  S. 
513;  s.  c.  3  S.  Ct.  346;  Peo- 
ple V.  Mayor  &c.,  32  Barb.  (N. 
Y.)  102;  Lewis  Eminent  Do- 
main, ch.  1.  The  right  which  is 
denominated  the  eminent  domain  is 
distinguished  from  the  police  power, 
in  that  the  former  is  a  taking  of 
property  and  the  latter  a  regulation 
of  the  use  of  it:  Philadelphia  v. 
Scott,  81  Pa.  St.  80;  King  v.  Daven- 
port, 98  111.  305;  Bass  v.  State,  34 
La.  An.  494;  Hine  v.  City  of  New 
Haven,  40  Conn.  478;  Inhabitants 
&c.  v.  Mayo,  109  Mass.  315;  People 
V.  Hawley,  3  Mich.  330;  Vanderbilt 
v.  Adams.  7  Cowen  (N.  Y.)  349.  It 
is  also  distinct  from  the  common- 
law  right  to  destroy  property  to  pre- 
vent a  public  calamity,  such  as  the 
1  Smith — 43 


spread  of  fire  or  ravages  of  pesti- 
lence: Russell  V.  Mayor  &c.,  2  Denio 
(N.  Y.)  461;  American  Print  Works 
V.  Lawrence,  21  N.  J.  L.  248;  Field 
V.  City  of  Des  Moines,  39  Iowa  575. 
And  from  taxation:  People  v.  Mayor 
&c.,  4  N.  Y.  419,  where  the  two  rights 
are  contrasted.  And  from  assess- 
ments for  local  improvements:  Nich- 
ols V.  City  of  Bridgeport,  23  Conn. 
189;  State  v.  Blake.  36  N.  J.  L.  442; 
Chambers  v.  Saterlee,  40  Cal.  497; 
Matter  of  Dorrance  Street,  4  R.  I. 
230.  And  from  the  war  power: 
Lewis  Eminent  Domain,  §  8  and 
cases  there  cited. 

'-  Cooley  Const.  Lim.  339,  where 
the  author  says  that  if  such  an 
agreement  were  held  to  be  valid  the 
only  effect  would  be  to  require  that 
compensation  be  made  for  its  viola- 
tion. 

^^  Barron  v.  Mayor  &c.,  7  Peters 
243;  Pumpelly  v.  Green  Bay  Co.,  13 
Wall.  166;  Cairo  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Turner, 
31  Ark.  494;  Johnson  v.  Rankin,  70 
N.  C.  550;  Withers  v.  Buckley,  20 
How.  84;  Martin  v.  Dix,  52  Miss.  53; 
Young  V.  McKenzie.  3  Ga.  31.  But 
to  constitute  "due  process  of  law" 
within  the  meaning  of  the  four- 
teenth amendment  it  is  believed  that 
the  decided  cases  "require  compen- 
sation,   notice   and    procedure   con- 


§  691 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS. 


674 


now  a  part  of  the  organic  law  of  every  state  except  North  Caro- 
lina.^* 

§  691.  What  property  may  be  taken. — "Every  species  of  property 
which  the  public  need  may  require  and  which  government  can  not 
lawfully  appropriate  under  any  other  right  is  subject  to  be  seized 
and  appropriated  under  the  right  of  eminent  domain."^^  Land, 
timber,  stone  and  gravel  with  which  to  make  or  improve  the  public 
highways,^"  streams  of  water,^^  a  prescriptive  right  to  pollute  a 
watercourse/®  a  right  to  use  the  water  of  a  stream  for  irrigation/* 
and  all  corporate  property  and  corporate  franchises.''" 


formable  to  law:"  Elliott  Roads  & 
Streets  (2d  ed.),  §  183;  Scott  v.  City 
of  Toledo,  36  Fed.  385.  As  to  the 
constitutional  guaranty  of  trial  by 
jury,  see  §  715,  post. 

"  The  constitutional  provisions  in 
the  different  states  are  given  in  ex- 
tenso  in  Lewis  Eminent  Domain,  27, 
n.  Previous  to  the  adoption  of  these 
limitations  it  was  held  in  many  ju- 
risdictions that  the  property  of  the 
citizen  was  secured  from  seizure 
without  compensation  by  funda- 
mental principles  of  natural  justice 
which  were  supposed  to  inhere  in 
the  constitution:  Harness  v.  Chesa- 
peake &c.  Canal  Co.,  1  Md.  Ch.  248; 
Bradshaw  v.  Rogers,  20  Johns.  (N. 
Y.)  103.  But  this  opinion  was  not 
universal  and  is  opposed  to  the  later 
cases  and  the  views  of  standard  au- 
thors: Winona  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Wald- 
ron,  11  Minn.  515;  Harvey  v.  Thom- 
as, 10  Watts  (Pa.)  63;  Lewis  Emi- 
nent Domain,  §  10;  Cooley  Const. 
Lim.  81. 

^^  Cooley  Const.  Lim.  (6th  ed.) 
646;  Elliott  Roads  &  Streets  (2d 
ed.),  §§  213  et  seq.,  223;  Lewis  Emi- 
nent Domain,  §  262. 

^•^  Wheelock  v.  Young,  4  Wend.  (N. 
Y.)  647;  Bliss  v.  Hosmer,  15  Ohio 
44;  Watkins  v.  Walker  Co.,  18  Tex. 
585;  Arnold  v.  Hudson  River  R.  Co., 
55  N.  Y.  661;  Lyon  v.  Jerome,  15 
Wend.  (N.  Y.)  569;  Jerome  v.  Ross, 


7  Johns.  Ch.  (N.  Y.)  315.  Buildings 
may  be  removed  or  destroyed  to 
make  way  for  public  improvements, 
and  a  dwelling-house  is  no  more  ex- 
empt than  any  other  species  of  prop- 
erty: Wells  V.  Somerset  &c.  R.  Co., 
47  Maine  345.  Nor  a  pier:  Matter 
of  Union  Ferry,  98  N.  Y.  139.  Toll- 
bridges,  turnpikes  and  ferries  may 
be  taken :  Northampton  Bridge  Case, 
116  Mass.  442;  In  re  Towanda 
Bridge  Co.,  91  Pa.  St.  216;  Arming- 
ton  V.  Town  of  Barnett,  15  Vt.  745; 
Sullivan  v.  Board  &c.,  58  Miss.  790. 

"  Gardner  v.  Trustees  &c.,  2  Johns. 
Ch.  (N.  Y.)  162;  Reusch  v.  Chicago 
&c.  R.  Co.,  57  Iowa  687;  s.  c.  11  N. 
W.  647. 

^^  And  this  without  taking  the 
land  along  it:  Martin  v.  Gleason,  139 
Mass.  183;  s.  c.  29  N.  E.  664. 

^^  And  this  may  be  separated  from 
the  land  in  connection  with  which  it 
ripened:  Strickler  v.  City  of  Colo- 
rado Springs,  16  Colo.  61;  s.  c.  26 
Pac.  313. 

°°West  River  Bridge  Co.  v.  Dix,  6 
How.  507;  Central  Bridge  Corp.  v. 
City  of  Lowell,  4  Gray  (Mass.)  474; 
In  re  Twenty-second  street,  15  Phila. 
(Pa.)  409;  Proprietors  &c.  v.  New 
Hampshire  Bridge,  7  N.  H.  35;  Com- 
monwealth V.  Pennsylvania  Canal 
Co.,  66  Pa.  St.  41;  s.  c.  5  Am.  R.  329. 
Cf.  Central  City  Horse  R.  Co.  v.  Fort 
Clark  Horse  R.  Co.,  81  111.  523. 


675 


EMINENT    ])()>[AIN. 


692 


§  692.  Quantity  of  estate. — It  is  competent  for  the  legislature  to 
determine  the  extent  of  the  estate  which  shall  be  taken  for  public 
use.^^  It  may  authorize  the  condemnation  of  the  absolute  fee- 
simple^-  and  if  the  public  necessity  for  which  authority  to  appropriate 
land  is  given  be  of  a  permanent  nature,  the  legislative  intent  to  seize 
the  fee  may  be  implied."^  But  ordinarily  express  authority  is  re- 
quired to  deprive  the  owner  of  the  fee/*  and  statutes  will  be  strictly 
construed  so  as  to  limit  the  estate  taken  to  an  easement  if  possible.^^ 


"  It  is  the  exclusive  judge:  Brook- 
lyn Park  Com'rs  v.  Armstrong,  45  N. 
Y.  234;  Wyoming  Coal  Co.  v.  Price, 
81  Pa.  St.  156;  United  States  v.  Har- 
ris, 1  Sumner  21.  Cf.  Jackson  v. 
Rutland  &c.  R.  Co.,  25  Vt.  150;  Bar- 
clay V.  Howell's  Lessees,  6  Peters 
498.  But  the  power  to  decide  may 
be  delegated:  Powers'  Appeal,  29 
Mich.  504;  Rensselaer  &c.  R.  Co.  v. 
Davis,  43  N.  Y.  137;  Embury  v.  Con- 
ner, 3  N.  Y.  511;  In  re  Commission- 
ers of  Public  Works,  10  N.  Y.  S.  705. 

°^  Haldeman  v.  Pennsylvania  R. 
Co.,  50  Pa.  St.  425;  Ferree  v.  School 
Dist,  76  Pa.  St.  376;  Bachler's  Ap- 
peal, 90  Pa.  St.  207;  Hey  wood  v. 
Mayor  &c.,  7  N.  Y.  314;  Washington 
Cemetery  v.  Prospect  Park  &c.  R. 
Co.,  68  N.  Y.  591;  In  re  City  of  Buf- 
falo, 64  N.  Y.  547;  Water-Works  Co. 
V.  Burkhart,  41  Ind.  364;  Canal  &c. 
Co.  V.  Commissioners  &c.,  26  La.  An. 
740;  Elliott  Roads  &  Streets  (2d 
ed.),  §  224.  In  such  a  case  the 
weight  of  authority  is  that  there  is 
no  reverter  upon  a  cessation  of  pub- 
lic use:  Malone  v.  City  of  Toledo,  28 
Ohio  St.  643;  Heard  v.  City  of 
Brooklyn,  60  N.  Y.  242;  Heath  v. 
Barmore,  50  N.  Y.  302;  2  Dillon 
Munic.  Corp.,  §  589.  An  act  author- 
izing the  taking,  on  the  express 
ground  of  expediency,  of  more  land 
than  was  necessary  for  the  purpose 
specified,  was  held  unconstitutional 
in  Embury  v.  Conner,  3  N.  Y.  511. 

"^Holt  V.  City  Council  &c.,  127 
Mass.  408  (case  of  a  public  park) ; 
De  Varaigne  v.  Fox,  2  Blatchf.  95 
(an   almshouse).     See   also,   Brook- 


lyn Park  Com'rs  v.  Armstrong,  45  N, 
Y.  234;  Tifft  v.  City  of  Buffalo,  82 
N.  Y.  204.  A  statute  entitled  "to 
enable"  a  city  "to  abate  a  nuisance 
and  for  the  preservation  of  the  pub- 
lic health"  authorized  the  city  "to 
purchase  or  otherwise  take  the 
lands"  within  a  large  district,  pro- 
vide for  payment  to  the  owners  for 
damages,  and  directed  the  city  "to 
raise  the  grade  of  the  territory  so 
taken  or  purchased  with  reference 
to  a  complete  drainage  thereof  so  as 
to  abate  the  present  nuisance  and  to 
preserve  the  health  of  the  city."  It 
was  held  that  the  fee  of  lands  taken 
under  this  act  vested  in  the  city  as 
absolute  owner,  and  that  the  statute 
was  not  unconstitutional  either  as 
an  attempt  to  exercise  judicial  pow- 
er or  as  authorizing  the  taking  of  a 
greater  interest  than  was  necessary; 
Dingley  v.  City  of  Boston,  100  Mass. 
544. 

^  Clark  V.  Worcester,  125  Mass. 
226;  Board  v.  Beckwith,  10  Kan. 
603. 

"=  Kellogg  V.  Malin,  50  Mo.  496; 
United  States  v.  Harris,  1  Sumner 
21;  In  re  Commissioners  of  Public 
Works,  10  N.  Y.  S.  705;  Quimby  v. 
Vermont  &c.  R.  Co.,  23  Vt.  387; 
Washington  Cemetery  v.  Prospect 
Park  &c.  R.  Co.,  68  N.  Y.  591.  Cf. 
Page  v.  O'Toole,  144  Mass.  303;  s.  c. 
10  N.  E.  851;  Edgerton  v.  Huff,  2& 
Ind.  35;  City  of  Logansport  v.  Shirk, 
88  Ind.  563.  Where  an  easement 
only  is  taken  the  owner  retains  the 
right  to  enjoy  the  property  so  far 
as  it  is  susceptible  of  use  without 


G93 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS. 


676 


§  693.  What  constitutes  a  taking. — It  was  formerly  held  in  sub- 
stance that  to  constitute  a  taking  within  the  meaning  of  the  constitu- 
tion there  must  be  an  actual  physical  appropriation  of  the  property, 
or  a  divesting  of  title.^*'  But  the  later  authorities,  by  adopting  a  more 
liberal  construction  of  the  term  "property,'"^^  include  all  tlie  rights 
which  pertain  to  the  ownership  of  things  real  and  personal."^ 

'  §  694.  The  same  subject  continued — The  leading  case. — The  lead- 
ing case  wherein  the  later  doctrine  is  expounded  is  Eaton  v.  Boston 
&c.  E.  Co.,''^  decided  by  the  supreme  court  of  New  Hampshire  in  1873. 
A  railroad  corporation  constructed  its  road  across  Eaton's  farm. 
Damages  were  assessed  under  the  statute  and  paid  to  Eaton,  who  re- 
leased the  corporation  from  damages  on  account  of  the  laying  out  of 
the  road  over  his  land.  Northerly  of  the  farm  there  was  a  ridge  of 
land  completely  protecting  the  farm  from  the  effect  of  floods  and 
freshets  in  a  neighboring  river.  Through  this  ridge  the  corporation, 
in  constructing  its  road,  made  a  deep  cut,  and  the  waters  of  the  river 
in  times  of  flood  carried  sand,  gravel  and  stones  upon  Eaton's  land. 


interfering  with  the  paramount 
right  of  the  public:  Village  of 
Brooklyn  v.  Smith,  104  111.  429; 
Goodtitle  v.  Alker,  1  Burr.  133;  El- 
liott Roads  &  Streets  (2d  ed.), 
§  230,  and  cases  cited. 

™  Sedgwick  Const.  Law  (2d  ed.) 
456-458;  Lewis  Eminent  Domain, 
§  57. 

07  "The  earlier  cases  as  to  what 
constitutes  a  taking  were  based 
upon  a  radically  defective  interpre- 
tation of  the  constitution,  which  not 
only  denied  the  right  to  compensa- 
tion in  many  cases  where  it  ought 
to  be  given,  but  greatly  embarrassed 
the  property-owner  in  obtaining  it 
in  those  cases  in  which  it  was  con- 
ceded to  be  due.  These  early  cases 
attacked  the  question  wrong  end, 
first,  so  to  speak,  through  the  word 
'taken'  instead  of  through  the  word 
'property.'  It  is  only  by  having  a 
clear  and  correct  conception  of  the 
idea  of  property  that  a  uniform, 
consistent  and  just  application  of 
the  constitution  can  be  made  to  the 
many  complicated  and  varied  cases 
which  come  up  for  adjudication:" 
Preface  to  Lewis  Eminent  Do- 
main, p.  1. 


•"^  Arnold  v.  Hudson  River  R.  Co., 
55  N.  Y.  661;  Eaton  v.  Boston  &c.  R. 
Co.,  51  N.  H.  504;  Thompson  v.  An- 
droscoggin River  Imp.  Co.,  54  N.  H. 
545;  Smith  v.  City  of  Rochester,  92 
N.  Y.  463;  Matter  of  Hamilton  Ave- 
nue, 14  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  405.  But  the 
damage  must  be  of  such  a  nature  as 
to  give  a  cause  of  action  on  com- 
mon-law principles.  A  jail  may  be 
obnoxious  to  those  who  live  or  do 
business  near  it,  but  the  special 
damage  in  such  case  is  incidental  to 
what  the  general  interest  of  the 
community  requires  and  becomes 
damnum  absque  injuria:  Burwell  v. 
Board  &c.,  93  N.  C.  73;  Wehn  v. 
Commissioners  &c.,  5  Neb.  494.  Dis- 
turbing the  right  to  lateral  support 
of  land  is  a  taking:  O'Brien  v.  City 
of  St.  Paul,  25  Minn.  331;  Buskirk 
V.  Strickland,  47  Mich.  389;  s.  c.  11 
N.  W.  210;  Richardson  v.  Vermont 
&c.  R.  Co.,  25  Vt.  465.  So,  too,  de- 
priving the  owner  of  the  use  of  a 
non-navigable  stream:  Smith  v.  City 
of  Rochester,  92  N.  Y.  463;  Yates  v. 
Milwaukee.  10  Wall.  497. 

«"  51  N.  H.  504;  s.  c.  12  Am.  R.  147. 


677  EMINENT    DOMAIN,  §    694 

It  was  held  that,  even  if  the  corporation  had  constructed  the  road 
with  due  care  and  prudence,  Eaton  could  recover  the  damage  caused 
him  by  cutting  away  the  ridge.  The  court  said:  "The  constitutional 
prohibition  (which  exists  in  most,  or  all,  of  the  states)  has  received 
in  some  quarters  a  construction  which  renders  it  of  comparatively 
little  worth,  being  interpreted  much  as  if  it  read:  ^No  person  shall 
be  divested  of  the  formal  title  to  property  without  compensation,  but 
he  may,  without  compensation,  be  deprived  of  all  that  makes  the  title 
valuable.'  *  *  *  In  a  strict  sense,  land  is  not  'property,'  but  the 
subject  of  property.  The  term  'property,'  although  in  common  par- 
lance frequently  applied  to  a  tract  of  land  or  a  chattel,  in  its  legal 
signification  'means  only  the  right  *  *  *  over  a  determinate 
thing.'  'Property  is  the  right  of  any  person  to  possess,  use,  enjoy  and 
dispose  of  a  thing.'^°  If  property  m  land  consists  in  certain  essential 
rights,  and  a  physical  interference  with  the  land  substantially  sub- 
verts one  of  those  rights,  such  interference  'takes'  pro  tanto  the 
owner's  'property.'  The  right  of  indefinite  user  (of  using  indefi- 
nitely) is  an  essential  quality  or  attribute  of  absolute  property,  with- 
out which  absolute  property  can  have  no  legal  existence.  This  right 
of  user  necessarily  includes  the  right  and  power  of  excluding  others 
from  using  the  land.  From  the  very  nature  of  these  rights  of  user 
and  of  exclusion,  it  is  evident  that  they  can  not  be  materially  abridged 
without  ipso  facto  taking  the  owner's  'property.'  If  the  right  of  in- 
definite user  is  an  essential  element  of  absolute  property  or  complete 
ownership,  whatever  physical  'interference  annuls  this  right  takes 
'property' — although  the  owner  may  still  have  left  to  him  valuable 
rights  (in  the  article)  of  a  more  limited  and  circumscribed  nature. 
He  has  not  the  same  property  that  he  formerly  had.  His  absolute 
ownership  has  been  reduced  to  a  qualified  ownership.  *  *  *  j^ 
the  claim  set  up  by  the  defendants  in  this  case  is  well  founded,  an 
easement  is  already  vested  in  them.  An  easement  is  property,  and  is 
Avithin  the  protection  of  the  constitutional  prohibition  now  under 
consideration.  If  the  defendants  have  acquired  this  easement,  it 
can  not  be  taken  from  them,  even  for  public  use,  without  compensa- 
tion. But  the  right  acquired  by  the  defendants  is  subtracted 
from  the  plaintiff's  ownership  of  the  land.  Whatever  interest  the 
defendants  have  acquired  in  this  respect  the  plaintiff  has  lost.  If  what 
they  have  gained  is  property,  then  what  he  has  lost  is  property."^  ^ 

'"Citing  Selden,  J.,  in  Wynehamer  H.  504,  511,  515;  s.  c.  12  Am.  R.  147. 

v.  People,  13  N.  Y.  378,  433;    1  Bl.  This  case  was  approved  in  Thomp- 

Com.    138;    2   Austin   Jurisprudence  son  v.  Androscoggin  River  Imp.  Co., 

(3d  ed.)  817,  818.  54  N.  H.  545.     See  also.  Grand  Rap- 

"  Eaton  V.  Boston  &c.  R.  Co.,  51  N.  ids  Booming  Co.  v.  Jarvis,  30  Mich. 


§  695 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS. 


crs 


§  695.  The  same  subject  continued — Constitutional  amendments. — 
The  narrow  constructiou  placed  by  some  of  the  courts  upon  the  words 
"property"  and  "taken"  caused  the  amendment  of  the  constitutions  of 
many  of  the  states  so  that  damage  to  private  property  taken  for  public 
use  should  be  compensated.'^-  Judge  Dillon  sums  up  the  effect  of  these 
amendments  as  follows:  "It  may  perhaps  be  premature  to  affirm 
that  the  meaning  of  the  word  'damaged,'  as  used  in  the  recent  con- 
stitutional amendments,  is  absolutely  confined  to  cases  where  the 
common  law  would  have  given  a  remedy  for  injuries  to  property  or 
property-rights,  if  the  legislative  authority  to  do  the  act  which  caused 
the  damage  had  not,  aside  from  such  constitutional  amendment,  de- 
prived, or  been  previously  construed  to  deprive,  the  owner  of  his  right 
to  compensation  therefor ;  and  yet  such  is,  in  our  judgment,  its  main, 
if  not  exclusive,  purpose  and  effect."" 

§  696.  Property  already  appropriated  to  public  use. — It  is  a  well- 
established  rule  that  property  already  appropriated  in  the  proper  ex- 
ercise of  the  power  of  eminent  domain  can  not  be  taken  for  another 
public  use  which  will  wholly  defeat  or  supersede  the  former  use,  unless 
the  power  to  make  such  second  appropriation  be  given  expressly  or 
by  necessary  implication.''*     A  further  exposition  of  the  rule  was 


308;  Lewis  Eminent  Domain,  ch.  3; 
Elliott  Roads  &  Streets  (2d  ed.),  ch. 
8;  Cooley  Const.  Lim.  (6th  ed.)  666 
et  seq.;  Dillon  Munic.  Corp.,  §  587b. 
"-  Such  amendments  have  been 
adopted  in  the  following  states  and 
construed  in  the  cases  cited: — Ala- 
bama: City  Council  &c.  v.  Town- 
send,  84  Ala.  478;  s.  c.  40  So.  780. 
Arkansas:  Hot  Springs  R.  Co.  v. 
Williamson,  45  Ark.  429.  Califor- 
nia: Reardon  v.  City  of  San  Fran- 
cisco, 66  Cal.  492;  s.  c.  6  Pac.  317. 
Colorado:  Mollandin  v.  Union  Pac. 
R.  Co.,  14  Fed.  394.  Georgia:  City 
of  Atlanta  v.  Green,  67  Ga.  386.  Illi- 
nois: Rigney  v.  City  of  Chicago,  102 
111.  64;  Chicago  v.  Taylor,  125  U.  S. 
161;  s.  c.  8  S.  Ct.  820;  City  of  Chi- 
cago V.  Union  Bldg.  Ass'n,  102  111. 
379;  s.  c.  40  Am.  R.  598;  City  of  01- 
ney  v.  Wharf,  115  111.  519;  s.  c.  5  N. 
E.  366.  Missouri:  McElroy  v.  Kan- 
sas City,  21  Fed.  257;  Sheehy  v. 
Kansas  City  &c.  R.  Co.,  94  Mo.  574; 
s.  c.  7  S.  W.  579.    Nebraska:  Schal- 


ler  v.  City  of  Omaha,  23  Neb.  325;  s. 
c.  36  N.  W.  533.  Pennsylvania: 
Hendrick's  Appeal,  103  Pa.  St.  358; 
Chester  Co.  v.  Brower,  117  Pa.  St. 
647;  s.  c.  12  Atl.  577;  O'Brien  v. 
Pennsylvania  &c.  R.  Co.,  119  Pa.  St. 
184;  s.  c.  13  Atl.  74;  Pennsylvania 
R.  Co.  V.  Marchant,  119  Pa.  St.  541; 
s.  c.  13  Atl.  690.  Texas:  Bounds  v. 
Kirven,  63  Tex.  159.  West  Vir- 
ginia: Hutchinson  v.  City  of  Park- 
ersburg,  25  W.  Va.  226. 

'=*  Dillon  Munic.  Corp.  (4th.  ed.), 
§  587. 

"*  Little  Miami  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  City 
of  Dayton,  23  Ohio  St.  510;  Railroad 
Co.  V.  Village  of  Belle  Centre,  48 
Ohio  St.  273;  s.  c.  27  N.  E.  464.  "It 
is  settled  beyond  controversy  that 
land  already  appropriated  to  a  pub- 
lic use  can  not  be  appropriated  to 
another  public  use  unless  the  stat- 
ute clearly  confers  authority  to 
make  a  second  seizure:"  City  of  Sey- 
mour V.  Jeffersonville  &c.  R.  Co., 
126  Ind.  466;  s.  c.  26  N.  E.  188;  cit- 


679  EMINENT    DOMAIN.  §    007 

given  by  Folgor,  J.,  of  the  court  of  appeals  of  Xcw  York,  as  follows: 
"An  implication  is  an  inference  of  something  not  directly  declared, 
but  arising  from  what  is  admitted  or  expressed.  *  *  *  in  deter- 
mining whether  a  power  generally  given  is  meant  to  have  operation 
upon  lands  already  devoted  by  legislative  authority  to  a  public  purpose, 
it  is  proper  to  consider  the  nature  of  the  prior  public  work,  the  public 
use  to  which  it  is  applied,  the  extent  to  which  that  use  would  be  im- 
paired or  diminished  by  the  taking  of  such  part  of  the  land  as  may 
be  demanded  for  the  subsequent  public  use.  If  both  uses  may  not 
stand  together,  with  some  tolerable  interference  which  may  be  com- 
pensated for  by  damages  paid ;  if  the  latter  use,  when  exercised,  must 
supersede  the  former, — it  is  not  to  be  implied  from  a  general  power 
given,  without  having  in  view  a  then  existing  and  particular  need 
therefor,  that  the  legislature  meant  to  subject  lands  devoted  to  a  public 
use  already  in  exercise  to  one  which  might  thereafter  arise.  A  legis- 
lative intent  that  there  should  be  such  an  effect  will  not  be  inferred 
from  a  gift  of  power  made  in  general  terms.  To  defeat  the  attain- 
ment of  an  important  public  purpose  to  which  lands  have  already  been 
subjected  the  legislative  intent  must  unequivocally  appear.  If  an 
implication  is  to  be  relied  upon,  it  must  appear  from  the  face  of  the 
enactment,  or  from  the  application  of  it  to  the  particular  subject- 
matter  of  it,  so  that  by  reasonable  intendment  some  especial  object 
sought  to  be  attained  by  the  exercise  of  the  power  granted  could  not 
be  reached  in  any  other  place  or  manner."''^ 

§  697.  The  same  subject  continued. — Ordinarily  a  highway  or  rail- 
road can  not  be  laid  out  longitudinally  over  a  previously  established 
railroad  or  highway  by  virtue  of  general  statutory  powers  or  without 
special  authority  from  the  legislature.^^  On  the  other  hand,  in  the 
absence  of  special  regulations  and  by  virtue  of  a  general  authority 
to  lay  out  such  roads,  necessary  crossings  can  be  made.'^^    It  was  held 

ing  Lake  Shore  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Cincin-  turn-outs    and    switches.     See    also, 

nati  &c.  R.  Co.,  116  Ind.  578;  s.  c.  19  In  re  Boston  &c.  R.  Co.,  53  N.  Y.  574. 

N.  E.  440;    Baltimore  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  "''West  Boston  Bridge  Co.  v.  Coun- 

North,   103   Ind.   486;    s.   c.   3   N.  E.  ty  Com'rs.  10  Pick.  (Mass.)  270,272; 

144;    McDonald   v.    Payne,   114    Ind.  Inhabitants  &c.  v.  Connecticut  River 

359;  s.  c.  16  N.  E.  795;  Elliott  Roads  R.  Co.,  4  Cush.  (Mass.)  63,  71;  Bos- 

&  Streets  (1st  ed.)  167,  notes  2  and  ton  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Lowell  &c.  R.  Co., 

4  (see  2d  ed.,  §§  218,  219).  124  Mass.  368,  371. 

"In  re  City  of  Buffalo,  68  N.  Y.  "St.   Paul  &c.  R.   Co.  v.   City  of 

167.     It  was  held  in  that  case  that  Minneapolis,  35  Minn.  141;   s.  c.  27 

under  a  general  power  a  city  could  N.  W.  500;  State  v.  Easton  R.  Co..  36 

not  excavate  a  canal  across  several  N.    J.    L.    181;    Tuckahoe    Canal    v. 

railroad-tracks  and  a  railroad-yai'd  Tuckahoe  &c.  R.  Co..  11  Leigh  (Va.) 

where  there  were  numerous  tracks,  42.     Express  authority  to  cross  rail- 


G98 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS. 


680 


that  under  a  general  authority  county  commissioners  might  take  a 
strip  of  land  from  a  schoolhouse  lot  for  a  needed  town  way,  where 
the  use  of  the  lot  for  school  purposes,  though  considerably  impaired, 
would  not  be  wholly  prevented."  There  are  cases  in  which  it  would 
seem  that  lands  used  for  a  burying-ground  have  been  taken  by  the 
municipal  authorities  for  highway  purposes,  but  whether  they  were 
taken  under  a  general  or  special  authority  does  not  appear,''^  In 
Connecticut  it  was  held  that  land  already  in  use  as  a  cemetery  could 
not  be  taken  for  a  highway  without  clear  legislative  authority.*** 

§  698.  Change  of  grade. — At  common  law  a  municipal  corporation 
is  not  liable  for  injuries  resulting  from  changing  the  grade  of  a  high- 
way.^^  But  a  recovery  may  be  had  for  injuries  which  result  from  the 
negligent  manner  in  which  the  work  is  performed.*^  And  in  many 
states  there  are  statutory  or  constitutional  provisions  giving  a  right  of 
action  for  a  substantial  injury  without  regard  to  negligence.*^ 


road-tracks  does  not  extend  to  land 
used  for  depot  purposes:  Prospect 
Park  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Williamson,  91  N. 
Y.  552;  Albany  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Brown- 
ell,  24  N.  Y.  345. 

'"  Inhabitants  &c.  v.  County 
Com'rs,  154  Mass.  424;  s.  c.  28  N.  E. 
298.  Authority  to  take  land  for  an- 
other public  use  may  rest  on  neces- 
sary implication:  In  re  Application 
of  Mayor  &c.,  135  N.  Y.  253;  s.  c.  31 
N.  E.  1043;  N.  Y.  Law  Jour.,  Oct.  27, 
1892. 

"  In  the  matter  of  Albany  Street, 
11  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  149;  In  the  mat- 
ter of  Beekman  Street,  20  Johns.  (N. 
Y.)  269. 

**"  Evergreen  Cemetery  Ass'n  v. 
City  of  New  Haven,  43  Conn.  234. 

"'  Simmons  v.  City  of  Camden,  26 
Ark.  276;  s.  c.  7  Am.  R.  620;  Burr  v. 
Inhabitants  &c.,  121  Mass.  241; 
Snow  V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  109  Mass. 
123 ;  Brown  v.  City  of  Lowell,  8  Met. 
(Mass.)  172;  Callender  v.  Marsh,  1 
Pick.  (Mass.)  418;  Alden  v.  City  of 
Minneapolis,  24  Minn.  254,  257;  Lee 
V.  City  of  Minneapolis,  22  Minn.  13; 
Shaw  V.  Crocker,  42  Cal.  435;  Fel- 
lowes  V.  City  of  New  Haven,  44 
Conn.  240;  s.  c.  26  Am.  R.  447;  Dor- 
man  v.  City  of  Jacksonville,  13  Fla. 


538;  Fuller  v.  City  of  Atlanta,  66 
Ga.  80;  Thomson  v.  Mayor  &c.,  61 
Mo.  282;  Nebraska  City  v.  Lampkin, 
6  Neb.  27;  Hendershott  v.  City  of 
Ottumwa,  46  Iowa  658;  Nevins  v. 
City  of  Peoria,  41  111.  502;  City  of 
Terre  Haute  v.  Turner,  36  Ind.  522; 
Keasy  v.  City  of  Louisville,  4  Dana 
(Ky.)  154;  Hovey  v.  Mayo,  43 
Maine  322;  Tyson  v.  City  of  Mil- 
waukee, 50  Wis.  78;  s.  c.  5  N.  W. 
914;  Transportation  Co.  v.  Chicago, 
99  U.  S.  635;  People  v.  Green,  64  N. 
Y.  606;  Pusey  v.  City  of  Allegheny, 
98  Pa.  St.  522;  Humes  v.  Mayor  &c., 
1  Humph.  (Tenn.)  403.  In  Ohio  the 
rule  is  different:  Keating  v.  Cincin- 
nati, 38  Ohio  St.  141;  Rhodes  v. 
City  of  Cleveland,  10  Ohio  159;  Dod- 
son  V.  City  of  Cincinnati,  34  Ohio 
St.  276. 

"  Dorman  v.  City  of  Jacksonville, 
13  Fla.  538;  City  of  Aurora  v.  Reed, 
57  111.  29;  Cotes  v.  City  of  Daven- 
port, 9  Iowa  227;  Elliott  Roads  & 
Streets  (2d  ed.),  §§  463,  483. 

'^^  Dalzell  V.  City  of  Davenport,  12 
Iowa  437;  City  of  Columbus  v.  Hy- 
draulic Woollen  Mills  Co.,  33  Ind. 
435;  Burr  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  121 
Mass.  241;  Hurford  v.  City  of  Oma- 
ha, 4  Neb.  336;  Crossett  v.  City  of 


681 


EMINENT  DOMAIN. 


§    699 


§  699.  Change  of  use — Additional  use. — It  is  clear  that  where  the 
owner  of  the  property  condemned  retains  the  fee,  he  is  entitled  to 
additional  compensation  in  a  new  proceeding,  if  an  additional  burden 
is  cast  upon  the  land.'*'*  "It  is  difficult  to  determine  what  shall  be 
considered  an  additional  burden,  entitling  the  owner  of  the  fee  to  the 
protection  of  the  constitutional  provision  limiting  the  right  of  emi- 
nent domain.  If  the  new  use  is  radically  distinct  and  different  from 
the  former,  tliere  must  be  a  new  assessment  of  compensation ;  and  the 
decided  weight  of  authority  is  that  constructing  an  ordinary  com- 
mercial railroad  on  a  street  or  road  is  a  change  of  use  entitling  the 
owner  of  the  soil  to  compensation."®^     But  where  the  use  is  not 


Janesville,  28  Wis.  420.  "A  case  of 
this  character  does  not  stand  upon 
the  common  law,  and,  therefore,  is 
not  within  the  rule  that  an  action 
will  lie  where  there  is  an  invasion 
of  a  right,  although  no  substantial 
injury  is  shown;  for  it  is  of  the  es- 
sence of  the  statutory  right  that  it 
should  affirmatively  appear  that  the 
complaining  property-owner  has 
sustained  substantial  damages:" 
Elliott  Roads  &  Streets  (2d  ed.), 
§  487,  and  cases  cited. 

"  "The  soil  can  not  be  devoted  to  a 
different  use,  whether  more  or  less 
onerous,  without  a  new  condemna- 
tion and  compensation  paid:"  Lewis 
Eminent  Domain,  §  140. 

'''^Elliott  Roads  &  Streets  (2d  ed.), 
§  207,  where  the  authorities  on  both 
sides  are  collected,  and  the  prevail- 
ing rule  vindicated  by  the  authors. 
Part  of  a  highway  can  not  be  used 
for  a  market-house  without  compen- 
sation to  the  owner  of  the  fee. 
"Land  taken  and  applied  for  the  or- 
dinary purposes  of  a  street  would 
often  be  an  improvement  of  the  ad- 
jacent property;  an  appropriation  of 
it  to  the  uses  of  a  market  would, 
perhaps,  as  often  be  destructive  of 
one-half  of  the  value  of  such  prop- 
erty:" State  v.  Laverack,  34  N.  J. 
L.  201,  205.  See  also,  Lutterloh  v. 
Mayor  &c.,  15  Fla.  306;  State  v.  • 
Mayor &c.,  5  Port.  (Ala.)  279;  Mayor 
&c.  V.  Wilson,  49  Ga.  476.    So  with  a 


ferry-landing  upon  a  highway:  Pros- 
ser  V.  Davis,  18  Iowa  367;  Chambers 
V.  Furry,  1  Yeates  (Pa.)  167;  Haight 
V.  Keokuk,  4  Iowa  199;  Chess  v.  Ma- 
nown,  3  Watts  (Pa.)  219.  Cf.  Hud- 
son v.  Cuero  Land  &c.  Co.,  47  Tex. 
56.  And  generally  where  telegraph- 
or  telephone-lines  are  put  up  on  the 
highway.  But  the  question  of  dam- 
age is  one  of  fact:  Lewis  Eminent 
Domain,  §  131.  In  Julia  Bldg.  Ass'n 
V.  Bell  Tel.  Co.,  88  Mo.  258,  and 
Pierce  v.  Drew,  136  Mass.  75  (two 
judges  dissenting),  it  is  held  that 
the  erection  of  telegraph-  and  tele- 
phone-poles is  not  an  additional 
servitude.  And  in  Consumers'  Gas 
&c.  Co.  V.  Congress  Spring  Co.,  15  N. 
Y.  S.  624,  it  is  held  that  poles  and 
wires  for  electric  lights  are  merely 
ancillary  to  the  original  use,  but  that 
special  and  peculiar  circumstances 
might  give  a  right  to  compensation. 
For  cases  holding  that  the  use  of  a 
highway  for  a  telegraph-line  will  en- 
title the  abutting  owner  to  ad- 
ditional compensation,  see  Dusen- 
bury  V.  Mutual  Tel.  Co.,  11  Abb.  N. 
C.  (N.  Y.)  440;  Atlantic  &c.  Tel.  Co. 
V.  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.,  6  Biss.  158; 
Board  &c.  v.  Barnett,  107  111.  507; 
Elliott  Roads  &  Streets  (2d  ed.), 
§§  705,  706.  As  to  elevated  rail- 
roads, it  was  held  by  a  majority 
of  the  justices  of  the  New  York 
court  of  appeals  that  an  abutting 
owner,  even  if  he  does  not  own  the 


?^  i 


00 


PUBLIC    CORPOIUTIONS. 


682 


essentially   changed   there   is   no  new   taking   in   the   constitutional 
sense.®® 

§  700.  The  same  subject  continued — Electric  railways. — The  ques- 
tion whether  electric  railways  shall  be  placed  in  the  same  category 
as  horse-railroads  or  in  that  of  steam-railroads  has  been  earnestly 
debated  in  several  cases.  So  far  as  the  bare  weight  of  authority 
can  silence  contention,  it  must  be  declared  that  a  change  in  the  motive 
power  from  horses  to  electricity,  applied  by  means  of  the  overhead- 
wire  system,  is  not  a  radical  and  substantial  departure  in  the  occupancy 
of  the  highway  and  does  not  constitute  a  new  and  additional  burden. 
This  is  the  law  in  Pennsylvania,®'^  New  Jersey,® ®  Michigan,**''  and 


fee  of  any  part  of  the  street,  has 
such  a  property  as  to  be  entitled  to 
additional  compensation:  Story  v. 
New  York  &c.  R.  Co.,  90  N.  Y.  122. 
That  the  city  can  not  authorize  the 
use  of  a  street  for  a  hack-stand  as 
against  an  abutting  owner,  see  Mc- 
Caffrey v.  Smith,  41  Hun  (N.  Y.) 
117.  In  Attorney-General  v.  Metro- 
politan R.  Co.,  125  Mass.  515,  and 
Lockhart  v.  Craig  &c.  R.  Co.,  139  Pa. 
St.  419,  422;  s.  c.  21  Atl.  26,  a  horse- 
railroad  was  held  not  to  be  a  new 
servitude  if  the  use  of  the  highway 
be  reasonable.  To  the  same  point,  2 
Dillon  Munic.  Corp.,  §  722;  Cincin- 
nati &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Incorporated  Vil- 
lage of  Cumminsville,  14  Ohio  St. 
523;  Detroit  City  R.  Co.  v.  Mills,  85 
Mich.  634,  654;  s.  c.  48  N.  W.  1007, 
and  cases  there  cited;  Taggart  v. 
Newport  St.  R.  Co.,  16  R.  I.  668;  s.  c. 
19  Atl.  326.  While  it  is  recognized 
that  the  proper  and  contemplated 
use  of  a  highway  is  not  to  be  deemed 
limited  to  such  vehicles  as  are  in 
use  at  the  time,  it  is  considered  to 
be  too  great  an  extension  to  hold 
that  it  embraces  its  use  for  a  steam- 
railway.  At  this  point  the  line  has 
been  drawn  by  a  great  weight  of 
judicial  decision:  "Williams  v.  New 
York  &c.  R.  Co.,  16  N.  Y.  97;  Wager 
V.  Troy  Union  R.  Co.,  25  N.  Y.  526; 
Imlay  v.  Union  Branch  R.  Co.,  26 
Conn.  249,  255;  Sherman  v.  Milwau- 
kee &c.  R.  Co.,  40  Wis.  645;  Kuche- 


man  v.  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.,  46  Iowa 
366;  Kaiser  v.  St.  Paul  &c.  R.  Co., 
22  Minn.  149;  Southern  Pac.  R.  Co. 
V.  Reed,  41  Cal.  256. 

*"  Changing  a  highway  into  a  turn- 
pike: Benedict  v.  Goit,  3  Barb.  (N. 
Y.)  459;  Carter  v.  Clark,  89  Ind.  238; 
Wright  v.  Carter,  27  N.  J.  L.  76, 
Contra,  Cape  Girardeau  Road  v.  Ren- 
froe,  58  Mo.  265.  Use  of  city  or  vil- 
lage streets  for  sewers  and  drains, 
water-pipes,  gas-pipes,  steam  and 
electricity:  Lewis  Eminent  Domain, 
§  127  et  seq.  The  same  writer  points 
out  (§  140)  a  distinction  between 
cases  where  the  public  holds  a  qual- 
ified fee  in  lands  and  those  were 
the  fee  is  absolute.  In  the  latter 
case  a  change  of  use  gives  no  claim 
to  compensation.  "Thus  lands  taken 
for  an  asylum,  jail  or  schoolhouse 
are  usually  held  by  a  fee-simple  ab- 
solute, while  lands  acquired  for 
streets  and  public  grounds,  though 
held  in  fee,  are  nevertheless  held  in 
trust  for  the' use  specified." 

"  Lockhart  v.  Craig  St.  R.  Co.,  139 
Pa.  St.  419;  s.  c.  21  Atl.  26. 

^'^  Halsey  v.  Rapid  Transit  St.  R. 
Co.,  47  N.  J.  Eq.  380;  s.  c.  20  Atl.  859. 

8"  Detroit  City  R.  Co.  v.  Mills,  85 
Mich.  634;  s.  c.  48  N.  W.  1007.  The 
same  doctrine  was  announced  by  the 
Cuyahoga  county,  Ohio,  court  of 
common  pleas  in  Pelton  v.  Railroad 
Co.,  22  Week.  Law  Bui.  67. 


683  ElMINENT   DO:\rAIN,  §    700 

Eliodc  Island.""  In  llie  Pennsylvania  case  the  eonrt  said:  "The  pro- 
posed construction  here  is  no  more  illegal  by  reason  of  its  effects  upon 
the  owners  of  property,  so  far  as  actual  interference  with  their  rights 
to  use  the  streets  is  concerned,  than  so  many  lamp-posts,  and  if  com- 
pensation could  not  be  compelled  for  the  ground  taken  by  them, 
neither  should  it  be  for  the  posts  supporting  the  wires  in  this  case."®^ 
And  Grant,  J.,  delivering  the  opinion  in  the  Michigan  case,  said: 
^'These  poles  used  by  the  complainant  [the  railway  company]  are 
a  necessary  part  of  its  system.  When  they  do  not  interfere  with  the 
owner's  access  to  and  the  use  of  his  land,  we  see  no  reason  why  they 
should  be  held  to  constitute  an  additional  servitude.  Certainly  they 
constitute  no  injury  to  his  reversionary  interest.  To  constitute  an 
additional  servitude,  therefore,  they  must  be  an  injury  to  the  present 
use  and  enjoyment  of  his  land.  But  they  do  not  obstruct  his  light  or 
his  vision  as  do  the  structures  of  an  elevated  railroad.  Neither  they 
nor  the  cars  they  assist  in  moving  cause  the  noise,  steam,  smoke 
and  dirt  which  are  produced  by  steam-cars.  They  do  not  interfere 
with  his  going  and  coming  at  his  pleasure  when  placed  as  they  can 
and  must  be  so  as  to  give  him  free  access.  Wherein  then  is  he  injured  ? 
If  it  be  said  that  they  are  unsightly  and  therefore  offend  his  taste, 
it  can  well  be  replied  that  they  are  no  more  so  than  the  lamp-post 
or  the  electric  tower.  It  is  as  necessary  that  rapid  transit  be  furnished 
to  a  crowded  city  as  it  is  that  light  should  be  furnished  to  its  streets. 
Public  convenience  and  necessity  must  control  in  all  such  cases."®^ 

^  Taggart  v.  Newport  Street  R.  Co.,  elusion  of  others  from  the  use  of  the 

16  R.  I.  668;  s.  c.  19  Atl.  326.  street.    A  railway  so  constructed  and 

"^  Lockhart  v.  Craig  St.  R.  Co.,  139  operated  would  be  a  public  nuisance 

Pa.  St.  419,  425;  s.  c.  21  Atl.  26.  and  the^  courts  should  abate  it.     3. 

^=  Detroit  City  R.  Co.  v.  Mills,  85  The  complainant's  road-bed  and 
Mich.  634,  657;  s.  c.  48  N.  W.  1007.  track  must  be  built  substantially 
But  the  scope  of  the  decision  was  with  the  level  of  the  street  so  as  to 
limited  by  the  enunciation  of  the  permit  vehicles  to  cross  without  dif- 
following  general  principles: — "1.  ficulty.  4.  The  poles  must  be  so 
The  complainant  can  not  lawfully  placed  as  not  to  interfere  with  the 
construct  and  operate  its  road  in  a  rights  of  ingress  and  egress  to  abut- 
street  too  narrow  to  admit  the  pas-  ting  property."  And  the  doctrine 
sage  of  its  cars  and  other  vehicles  at  seems  also,  to  be  confined  to  the  use 
the  same  time,  nor  so  construct  it  of  city  streets  as  distinguished  from 
as  to  interfere  with  the  rights  of  country  roads.  See  s.  c,  pp.  653,  654, 
the  general  public  in  the  street:  and  Lockhart  v.  Craig  St.  R.  Co.,  139 
Grand  Rapids  St.  R.  Co.  v.  West  Side  Pa.  St.  419,  424;  s.  c.  21  Atl.  26.  In 
St.  R.  Co.,  48  Mich.  433;  s.  c.  12  N.  the  opinion  delivered  in  the  Michi- 
W.  643.  2.  Nor  in  a  street,  though  of  gan  case,  Long,  J.,  concurred,  and 
sufficient  width,  if  its  condition  be  Champlin,  C.  J.,  gave  a  qualified  as- 
such  that  the  operation  of  the  rail-  sent,  but  McGrath  and  Morse,  JJ.. 
way  will  result  in  the  practical  ex-  entered  an  emphatic  protest. 


§  701 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS. 


684 


§  701.  Grant  of  power  to  municipal  corporations. — The  right  of 
eminent  domain  is  one  which  lies  dormant  in  tlie  state  until  legislative 
action  is  had  pointing  out  the  occasion,  mode,  conditions  and  agencies 
for  its  exercise.®^  The  legislature  may  delegate  authority  to  private 
or  to  municipal  corporations  to  take  property  by  eminent  domain,"* 
but  the  power  must  be  given  in  express  terms  or  by  necessary  implica- 
tion."" Statutes  conferring  the  right  are  to  be  strictly  construed."^ 
A  provision  that  the  common  council  may  enforce  ordinances  "to 
construct  and  regulate  sewers,"  etc.,  "and  provide  for  the  payment  of 
the  cost  of  constructing  the  same,"  does  not  confer  the  power  to  con- 
demn property  by  eminent  domain."^  And  power  to  open,  extend  or 
straighten  streets  and  alleys  does  not  authorize  the  condemnation  of 
land  for  the  purpose  of  widening  a  street."^  It  has  been  held,  how- 
ever, that  power  "to  build  and  keep  in  repair  county  buildings, 
*  *  *  and  in  case  there  are  no  public  buildings,  to  provide 
suitable  rooms  for  county  purposes,"  gives  the  right  to  acquire  land 
by  eminent  domain.""  When  the  power  is  clear  and  the  contem- 
plated use  in  a  particular  case  is  public,  the  courts  will  not  inquire 
into  the  necessity  or  propriety  of  the  exercise  of  the  right,  or  investi- 
gate the  motives  of  the  municipal  authorities.^"** 


"^Dyckman  v.  Mayor  &c.,  5  N.  Y. 
434;  Cooley  Const.  Lim.  (6th  ed.) 
648;  Allen  v.  Jones,  47  Ind.  438;  Chi- 
cago &c.  R.  Co.  V.  Town  of  Lake,  71 
111.  333.  A  strict  compliance  must 
be  had  with  all  the  provisions  of  the 
law  or  the  proceeding  will  be  inef- 
fectual: Cooley  Const.  Lim.  (6th 
ed.)  649  and  cases  cited;  Weckler  v. 
City  of  Chicago,  61  111.  142;  2  Dillon 
Munic.  Corp.  (4th  ed.),  §  605. 

■■'^People  V.  Smith,  21  N.  Y.  595; 
Commonwealth  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  1 
Pick.  (Mass.)  180;  2  Dillon  Munic. 
Corp.  (4th  ed.),  §  602. 

"^  Harwinton  v.  Catlin,  19  Conn. 
520;  Baldwin  v.  City  of  Bangor,  36 
Maine  518;  State  v.  Bishop,  39  N.  J. 
L.  226;  Gallup  v.  Woodstock,  29  Vt. 
347.  When  the  statute  makes  no 
provision  for  compensation  the  pro- 
cedure can  not  be  sustained:  'Chaf- 
fee's Appeal,  56  Mich.  244;  s.  c.  22 
N.  W.  871;  In  re  Widening  of  Bur- 
nish St.,  140  Pa.  St.  531;  s.  c.  21  Atl. 
500. 


""Alexandria  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Alexan- 
dria &c.  R.  Co.,  75  Va.  780;  Washing- 
ton Cemetery  v.  Prospect  Park  &c. 
R.  Co.,  68  N.  Y.  591;  Chamberlain  v. 
Elizabethport  Steam  Cordage  Co.,  41 
N.  J.  Eq.  43;  s.  c.  2  Atl.  775;  Leeds  v. 
City  of  Richmond,  102  Ind.  372;  s.  c. 
1  N.  E.  711. 

"Allen  v.  Jones,  47  Ind.  438,  442. 

''"Chaffee's  Appeal,  56  Mich.  244; 
s.  c.  22  N.  W.  871.  See  also.  People 
v.  Common  Council  fee,  50  N.  Y.  525; 
City  of  East  St.  Louis  v.  St.  John, 
47  111.  463. 

'-'^  Board  &c.  v.  Gorrell,  20  Gratt. 
(Va.)  484. 

""  Dunham  v.  Village  of  Hyde 
Park,  75  111.  371  (unless,  as  the  court 
intimated,  tiie  case  shows  manifest 
injustice,  oppression  and  gross  abuse 
of  powers) ;  Townsend  v.  Hoyle,  20 
Conn.  1,  9;  Kelsey  v.  King,  32  Barb. 
(N.  Y.)  410;  Stout  v.  Chosen  Free- 
holders, 25  N.  J.  L.  202. 


GS5 


EMlMOXr    DOMAI  \. 


702 


§  702.  Public  use  and  necessity  of  appropriation,  by  whom  deter- 
mined.— "The  question,  Wliat  is  a  public  use?  is  always  one  of  law. 
Dt'l'creiice  will  be  paid  to  the  legislative  jiulgment  as  expressed  in 
euactnieiils  for  an  appropriation  of  property,  but  it  will  not 
be  conclusive. "^"^  But  the  necessity  and  expediency  of  the  exercise 
of  the  right  of  eminent  domain  is  a  political  question,  which  is  to  be 
determined  exclusively  by  the  legislature.^"^ 


'"Cooley  Const.  Lim.  (6th  ed.) 
660;  Olmstead  v.  Camp,  33  Conn. 
532;  Loughbridge  v.  Harris,  42  Ga. 
500;  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Lake,  71 
111.  333;  Water-Works  Co.  v.  Burk- 
hart,  41  Ind.  364;  Bankhead  v. 
Brown,  25  Iowa  540;  Scudder  v. 
Trenton  &c.  Co.,  1  N.  J.  Eq.  694;  s.  c. 
23  Am.  U.  756;  Beekman  v.  Saratoga 
&c.  R.  Co.,  3  Paige  (N.  Y.)  45;  s.  c. 
22  Am.  D.  679  and  note;  In  re  Deans- 
ville  Cemetery  Ass'n,  66  N.  Y.  569; 
s.  c.  23  Am.  R.  86;  In  re  Union  Ferry 
Co.,  98  N.  Y.  139;  In  re  Niagara  Falls 
&c.  R.  Co.,  108  N.  Y.  375;  s.  c.  15  N. 
B.  429;  Ryerson  v.  Brown,  35  Mich. 
333;  s.  c.  24  Am.  R.  564;  In  re  St. 
Paul  &c.  R.  Co.,  34  Minn.  227;  s.  c. 
25  N.  W.  345;  City  of  Savannah  v. 
Hancock,  91  Mo.  54;  s.  c.  3  S.  W.  215; 
McQuillen  v.  Hatton,  42  Ohio  St.  202; 
Harding  v.  Goodlet,  3  Yerg.  (Tenn.) 
40;  s.  c.  24  Am.  D.  546;  Tyler  v. 
Beacher,  44  Vt.  648. 

'"-  United  States  v.  Harris,  1  Sumn. 
21,  42;  De  Varaigne  v.  Pox,  2  Blatch. 
95;  Dingley  v.  City  ol;  Boston,  100 
Mass.  544,  558;  Haverhill  Bridge 
Proprietors  v.  County  Com'rs,  103 
Mass.  120;  s.  c.  4  Am.  R.  518;  Hing- 
ham  &c.  Co.  v.  Norfolk  Co.,  6  Allen 
(Mass.)  353;  Talbot  v.  Hudson,  16 
Gray  (Mass.)  417;  In  re  Wellington, 
16  Pick.  (Mass.)  87;  s.  c.  26  Am.  D. 
631;  Iji  re  Deansville  Cemetery 
Ass'n.  66  N.  Y.  569,  572;  s.  c.  23  Am. 
R.  86;  Harris  v.  Thompson,  9  Barb. 
(N.  Y.)  350;  People  v.  Smith,  21  N. 
Y.  595;  Brooklyn  Park  Com'rs  v. 
Armstrong,  45  N.  Y.  234;  Hey  ward 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  7  N.  Y.  314,  325;  Varick 
V.  Smith,  5  Paige  (N.  Y.)  137;  s.  c. 


28  Am.  D.  417;  Coster  v.  Tidewater 
Co.,  18  N.  J.  Eq.  54,  67;  Scudder  v. 
Trenton  &c.  Co.,  1  N.  J.  Eq.  694; 
s.  c.  23  Am.  D.  756;  Concord  R.  Co. 
V.  Greeley,  17  N.  H.  47;  Smedley  v. 
Irwin,  51  Pa.  St.  445;  Mayor  &c.  v. 
Scott,  1  Pa.  St.  309;  Sadler  v.  Lang- 
ham,  34  Ala.  311,  327;  Aldridge  v. 
Tuscumbia  R.  Co.,  2  St.  &  P.  (Ala.) 
199;  s.  c.  23  Am.  D.  307;  New  Cen- 
tral Coal  Co.  V.  George's  Creek  Coal 
&c.  Co..  37  Md.  537;  Anderson  v. 
Tuberville,  6  Coldw.  (Tenn.)  150; 
Memphis  Freight  Co.  v.  Mayor  &c., 
4  Coldw.  (Tenn.)  419;  Challis  v. 
Atchison  &c.  R.  Co.,  16  Kan.  117; 
Parham  v.  Justices,  9  Ga.  341;  Ford 
V.  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.,  14  Wis.  609; 
Tait's  Ex'r  v.  Central  Lunatic 
Asylum,  84  Va.  271;  s.  c.  4  S.  E.  697; 
Sholl  V.  German  Coal  Co.,  118  111. 
427;  s.  c.  10  N.  E.  199;  In  re 
Union  Ferry  Co.,  98  N.  Y.  139; 
Stockton  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Common 
Council  &c.,  41  Cal.  147;  Napa  &c.  R. 
Co.  V.  Board  &c.,  30  Cal.  435,  437; 
County  Court  &c.  v.  Griswold,  58 
Mo.  175;  Lewis  Eminent  Domain 
162,  238.  But  it  is  competent  for  the 
state  to  delegate  the  authority  to 
adjudicate  upon  the  question  to  the 
tribunal  which  has  cognizance  of  the 
proceeding  for  appropriation:  Coo- 
ley  Const.  Lim.  (6th  ed.)  663;  citing 
(among  other  cases)  In  re-  New 
York  &c.  R.  Co.,  66  N.  Y.  407;  In  re 
St.  Paul  &c.  R.  Co..  34  Minn.  227; 
s.  c.  25  N.  W.  345;  State  v.  Proprie- 
tors &c.,  46  N.  J.  L.  495;  Tracy  v. 
Elizabethtown  &c.  R.  Co..  80  Ky.  259; 
Spring  Valley  Water  Works  v.  San 
Mateo  Water  Works,  64  Cal.  123;  s. 


§    703  PUBLIC    COUrOKATlOiNS.  686 

§  703.  Legislative  declaration  conclusive. — Conceding  that  the  de- 
termination by  the  legislative  authority  that  a  certain  appropriation 
of  property  is  for  a  public  use  may  be  supervised,  and  in  cases  of  gross 
error  or  extreme  wrong  controlled  by  the  judgment  of  the  courts,  the 
rule-  is  qualified,  in  a  very  important  particular  by  a  decision  of 
the  court  of  appeals  ofNew  York.  The  legislature  made  an  appropria- 
tion for  the  purpose  of  extending  a  public  canal  by  dredging  a  private 
mill-race  which  drew  its  supply  of  water  from  one  side  of  the  canal.^"^ 
The  plaintiff,  who  was  tlie  owner  of  a  race  on  the  other  side,  com- 
plained, that  the  volume  of  water  to  which  he  was  entitled  would,  be 
diminished,  and  he  successfully  assailed  the  validity  of  the  act  in 
the  trial  court  by  showing  upon  the  testimony  of  witnesses  that  the 
improvement  could  not  benefit  the  canal,  but  would  benefit  the  prop- 
erty of  the  owner  of  the  race  which  was  to  be  enlarged.  But  the  court 
of  appeals  sustained  the  act,  reversing  the  judgment  of  the  court 
below.  O'Brien,  J.,  premising  that  the  purpose  of  the  work,  so  far 
as  it  appeared  on  the  face  of  the  statute,  was  public  and  not  private, 
continued  as  follows:  "The  expenditure  may  in  fact  be  improvi- 
dent and  the  work  may  prove  to  be  useless  to  the  public,  but  the  legis- 
lature, as  the  depositary  of  the  sovereign  powers  of  the  people,  must 
necessarily  be  the  judge  of  the  propriety  and  utility  of  making  it. 
If  it  were  otherwise,  every  appropriation  of  money  by  the  legislature 
could  be  assailed  in  the  courts,  at  the  suit  of  private  individuals, 
on  the  ground  that  they  are  useless  and  intended  for  a  purpose  other 
than  is  plainly  expressed,  in  order  to  evade  some  provision  of  the  or- 
ganic law.  The  judicial  department  can  not  institute  an  inquiry 
concerning  the  motives  and  purposes  of  the  legislature,  in  order  to 
attribute  to  it  a  design  contrary  to  that  clearly  expressed  or  fairly 
implied  in  the  bill,  without  disturbing  or  impairing  in  some  measure 
the  powers  and  functions  assigned  by  the  constitution  to  each  de- 
partment of  the  govermneiit.  The  courts  can  not  determine,  upon 
the  testimony  of  witnesses,  that  the  purpose  of  the  legislature  was  to 
appropriate  public  money  for  the  benefit  of  an  individual,  when  it  has 
expressed  its  purpose  in  the  bill  itself  to  be  the  enlargement  or  im- 
provement of  the  canal.  They  must  assume  that  the  legislature  acted 
in  good  faith  and  meant  just  what  it  said,  though  it  may  be  possible 
to  show,  outside  of  the  language  and  terms  of  the  bill,  that  in  fact 

c.  28  Pac.  447;  Cape  Girardeau  &c.  Lecoul  v.  Police  Jury,  20  La.  An. 
Road   V.    Dennis,    67    Mo.    438.      See     308. 

also,  Rensselaer  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Davis,  '"'  The  ostensible  purpose  of  the 
43  N.  Y.  137;  Milwaukee  &c.  R.  Co.  improvement  was  to  permit  naviga- 
V.  City  of  Faribault,  23  Minn.  167;     tion  by  boats  from  the  canal  to  a 

public  street. 


687 


EMINENT   DOMAIN. 


704 


all,  or  the  larger  part,  of  the  benefits  following  the  expenditure  may 
or  will  be  reaped  by  a  few  individuals.  ■•=  *  *  Eeason  and  au- 
thority as  well  as  the  fitness  of  things  demand  that  when  an  act  of  the 
legislature  appropriating  money  is  assailed  upon  the  ground  that  the 
purpose  of  such  appropriation  is  local  or  private  and  not  public,  the 
question  shall  be  determined  by  the  language  and  general  scope  of  the 
act."i°* 


§  704.  Public  uses  as  respects  municipalities — Parks  and  streets. — 
Municipalities  may  be  authorized  to  condemn  private  property 
for     public     roads     and     streets,^''^     public     parks,"^     and     public 


'"Waterloo  Woolen  Mfg.  Co.  v. 
Shanahan,  128  N.  Y.  345,  358;  s.  c, 
28  N.  E.  358.  The  language  of  the 
court,  as  quoted  in  the  text,  had  di- 
rect reference  to  the  contention  that 
the  purpose  of  the  bill  was  local  and 
private,  requiring  the  assent  of  two- 
thirds  of  the  members  of  each  house, 
which  it  did  not  receive,  and  in  an- 
other part  of  the  opinion  it  was 
shown  that  the  plaintiff,  under  the 
facts  proved  in  the  case„  had  no  right 
to  the  water  which  would  be  divert- 
ed from  him.  But  the  doctrine  would 
seem  to  be  necessarily  applicable  to 
a  bill  for  the  appropriation  of  pri- 
vate property,  and  the  court  evident- 
ly so  regarded  the  matter. 

^"^  Sadler  v.  Langham,  34  Ala.  311; 
Sherman  v.  Buick,  32  Cal.  241;  Rey- 
nolds v.  Reynolds,  15  Conn.  83; 
O'Reiley  v.  Kankakee  Val.  &c.  Co., 
32  Ind.  169;  Dorgan  v.  City  of  Bos- 
ton, 94  Mass.  223;  Watson  v.  Town 
Council  &c.,  5  R.  I.  562;  Seaman  v. 
Hicks,  8  Paige  (N.  Y.)  655;  Elliott 
Roads  &  Streets  (2d  ed.),  §§  190, 
195;  Coster  v.  Tide  Water  Co.,  18  N. 
J.  Eq.  54;  City  of  Savannah  v.  Han- 
cock, 91  Mo.  54;  s.  c.  3  S.  W.  215; 
United  States  v.  Railroad  Bridge  Co., 
6  McLean  317.  Land  can  not  be  ap- 
propriated for  private  ways:  Sadler 
V.  Langham,  34  Ala.  311;  Roberts  v. 
Williams,  15  Ark.  43;  Nesbit  v. 
Trumbo,  39  111.  110;  Bankhead  v. 
Brown,  25  Iowa  540;  Dickey  v.  Ten- 


nison,  27  Mo.  373;  Taylor  v.  Porter, 
4  Hill  (N.  Y.)  140;  s.  c.  40  Am.  D. 
274.  Cf.  Brewer  v.  Bowman,  9  Ga. 
37;  Robinson  V.  Swope,  12  Bush 
(Ky.)  21.  "It  is  not  the  amount  of 
travel,  the  extent  of  the  use  of  a 
highway  by  the  public  that  distin- 
guishes it  from  a  private  way  or 
road.  It  is  the  right  to  so  use  or 
travel  upon  it,  not  its  exercise:" 
Wild  V.  Deig,  43  Ind.  455,  461;  s.  c. 
13  Am.  R.  399.  But  it  may  be  a  pub- 
lic road  though  maintained  at  pri- 
vate expense:  Denham  v.  County 
Com'rs,  108  Mass.  202;  Davis  v. 
Smith,  130  Mass.  113;  Shaver  v. 
Starrett,  4  Ohio  St.  494;  Perrine  v. 
Farr,  22  N.  J.  L.  356;  Procter  v.  An- 
dover,  42  N.  H.  348.  See  also,  Cope- 
land  V.  Packard,  16  Pick.  (Mass.) 
217;  Crockett  v.  City  of  Boston,  5 
Cush.  (Mass.)  182;  Parks  v.  Mayor 
&c.,  8  Pick.  (Mass.)  218.  Power  to 
narrow  a  street  may  be  given,  but 
the  easement  of  the  abutting  owners 
in  the  street  as  it  exists  must  be 
paid  for:  Town  of  Rensselaer  v. 
Leopold,  106  Ind.  29;  s.  c.  5  N.  E. 
761.  Highways  may  be  laid  out  for 
pleasure  driving:  Higginson  v.  In- 
habitants &c.,  11  Allen  (Mass.)  530; 
Petition  of  Mount  Washington  Road 
Co..  35  N.  H.  134;  Lewis  Eminent 
Domain,  §  175. 

""People  V.  Williams,  51  111.  57; 
In  re  Central  Park  Extension.  16 
Abb.  Pr.   (N.  Y.)   56;  City  of  Phila- 


705 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS. 


688 


squares.^*'''  But  land  can  not  be  taken  for  private  roads.  Dillon,  C. J., de- 
livering the  opinion  of  the  supreme  court  of  Iowa,  said:  "Wherever, by 
any  well-considered  decision,  private  roads  have  been  sustained,  it  was 
because  they  were  regarded  as  public  in  their  character;  and  if  prop- 
erly so  regarded,  laws  authorizing  their  establishment  would  doubt- 
less_  be  valid."^°^  In  Vermont  it  was  held  that  pent  roads  are  not 
necessarily  and  essentially  private.^""  And  where  land  is  condemned 
for  a  public  square  it  is  immaterial  whether  it  is  intended  to  be  trav- 
eled upon  or  not,  and  it  is  no  objection  that  damages  are  to  be  as- 
sessed upon  the  owners  of  adjoining  property,  be  they  few  or  many.^^** 

§  705.  The  same  subject  continued — Water,  gas,  etc. — So,  also,  in 
the  exercise  of  the  power  of  eminent  domain  private  property  may 
be  taken  for  the  purpose  of  supplying  the  inhabitants  with  water^^^ 


delphia  v.  Germantown  Pass.  R.  Co., 
10  Pliila.  (Pa.)  165.  Land  for  a  park 
may  be  condemned  outside  the  city 
limits  and  conveniently  near  there- 
to: Matter  of  Mayor  of  New  York, 
99  N.  Y.  569;  s.  c.  2  N.  E.  642; 
Thompson  v.  Moran,  44  Mich.  602; 
s.  c.  7  N.  W.  180.  In  St.  Louis  Co. 
Court  V.  Griswold,  58  Mo.  175,  it  was 
held  that  a  county  might  be  empow- 
ered to  take  land  for  a  park  near  to 
but  outside  of  the  limits  of  the  city 
of  St.  Louis,  and  create  a  county 
debt  therefor.  Nor  was  the  act  void 
for  uncertainty  because  the  title  to 
the  land  was  to  vest  in  "the  people 
of  the  county."  As  to  the  rights  of 
a  landowner  whose  premises  front 
on  a  public  park  to  enjoin  its  use 
for  other  than  public  purposes,  see 
Morris  v.  Sea  Girt  Land  Imp.  Co., 
38  N.  J.  Bq.  304  and  note. 

"'Owners  &c.  v.  Mayor  &c.,  15 
Wend.  (N.  Y.)  374. 

1°*  Bankhead  v.  Brown,  25  Iowa 
540,  549. 

109  Warren  v.  Bunnell,  11  Vt.  600. 

""  Owners  &c.  v.  Mayor  &c.,  15 
Wend.  (N.  Y.)  374. 

"1  Burden  v.  Stein,  27  Ala.  104, 
116;  Cummings  v.  Peters,  56  Cal.593; 
Lake  Pleasanton  W.   Co.  v.   Contra 


Costa  W.  Co.,  67  Cal.  659;  s.  c.  8  Pac. 
501;  St.  Helena  W.  Co.  v.  Forbes, 
62  Cal.  182;  Lumbard  v.  Stearns,  4 
Cush.  (Mass.)  60;  Ham  v.  City  of 
Salem,  100  Mass.  350;  Inhabitants 
&c.  V.  County  Com'rs,  4  Gray  (Mass.) 
500;  Bailey  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  126 
Mass.  416;  Tyler  v.  Inhabitants  &c., 
147  Mass.  609;  s.  c.  18  N.  E.  582; 
Martin  v.  Gleason,  139  Mass.  183;  s. 
c.  29  N.  E.  664;  Matter  of  New  Ro- 
chelle  Water  Co.,  46  Hun  (N.  Y.) 
525;  Gardner  v.  Trustees  &c.,  2 
Johns.  Ch.  (N.  Y.)  162;  Stamford 
Water  Co.  v.  Stanley,  39  Hun  (N. 
Y.)  424;  In  re  Middletown  Village, 
82  N.  Y.  196;  In  re  Rochester  Water 
Com'rs,  66  N.  Y.  413;  Reddell  v. 
Bryan,  14  Md.  444;  Kane  v.  Mayor 
&c.,  15  Md.  240;  Riche  v.  Bar  Harbor 
Water  Co.,  75  Maine  91;  Thorn  v. 
Sweeney,  12  Nev.  251;  State  v.  City 
of  Eau  Claire,  40  Wis.  533.  For  this 
purpose  also,  authority  may  be  given 
to  condemn  property  situated  at  a 
distance  from  the  city:  Mayor  &c. 
V.  Bailey.  2  Denio  (N.  Y.)  433,  446. 
Compensation  must  be  made  to  those 
who  own  the  right  to  use  the  water: 
City  of  Emporia  v.  Soden,  25  Kan. 
588;  s.  c.  37  Am.  R.  265. 


689 


EMINENT   DOMAIN. 


700 


and  gas^^-  for  public  school  buildings/ *■'*  markets,"*  and  alms- 
houses."^ 

§  706.    The   same   subject   continued — Cemeteries,   sewers,    etc. — 

Lands  may  also  be  condemned  for  the  purpose  of  a  public  cemetery. ^^'^ 
In  this  instance  the  land  is  deemed  to  be  taken  for  public  use,  if  all 
the  public  have  a  right  of  burial  there,  even  though  the  privilege 
must  be  paid  for  and  thus  operate  practically  to  exclude  some  per- 
sons.^^'  But  it  is  otherwise  if  the  public  have  not  and  can  not  acquire 
the  right  of  sepulture."**  The  construction  of  drains  and  sewers  and 
levees  is  a  public  purpose."**  But  drainage  laws  which  permit  the 
taking  of  property  for  the  chief  object  of  promoting  private  interests 
are  unconstitutional.^-'' 


"^  Bloomfield  &c.  Co.  v.  Richard- 
son, 63  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  437.  See  also, 
In  re  Deering,  93  N.  Y.  361;  Provi- 
dence Gas  Co.  V.  Thurber,  2  R.  I.  15; 
Johnston  v.  People's  Natural  Gas 
Co.  (Pa.),  5  Cent.  R.  564. 

"^  Chamberlin  v.  Morgan,  68  Pa. 
St.  168;  Long  v.  Fuller,  68  Pa.  St. 
170;  Township  Board  &c.  v.  Hack- 
man,  48  Mo.  243;  Williams  v.  School 
Dist,  33  Vt.  271. 

"*  Matter  of  Application  of  Cooper, 
28  Hun  (N.  Y.)  515. 

"^  Hayward  v.  Mayor  &c.,  8  Barb. 
(N.  Y.)  486.  And  public  buildings 
of  all  kinds:  Lewis  Eminent  Do- 
main, §  174. 

110  Evergreen  Cemetery  Ass'n  v. 
Beecher,  53  Conn.  551;  s.  c.  5  Atl. 
353;  Balch  v.  County  Com'rs,  103 
Mass.  106;  Edgecumbe  v.  City  of 
Burlington,  46  Vt.  218. 

^"  Evergreen  Cemetery  Ass'n  v. 
Beecher,  53  Conn.  551;  s.  c.  5  Atl. 
353. 

lis  Evergreen  Cemetery  Ass'n  v. 
Beecher,  53  Conn.  551;  s.  c.  5  Atl. 
353;  Matter  of  Deansville  Cemetery 
Ass'n,  66  N.  Y.  569. 

""  Patterson  v.  Baumer,  43  Iowa 
477;  Sessions  v.  Crunkilton,  20  Ohio 
St.  349;  Zimmerman  v.  Canfield,  42 
Ohio  St.  463;  s.  c.  9  Am.  &  Eng.  Corp. 
Cas.  382;  Hildreth  v.  City  of  Lowell, 
1  Smith — 44 


11  Gray  (Mass.)  345;  People  v.  Near- 
ing,  27  N.  Y.  306;  Norfleet  v.  Crom- 
well, 70  N.  C.  634;  s.  c.  16  Am.  R. 
787;  Hartwell  v.  Armstrong,  19 
Barb.  (N.  Y.)  166;  Burk  v.  Ayers, 
19  Hua  (N.  Y.)  17;  Matter  of  Ryers, 
72  N.  Y.  1;  Dingley  v.  City  of  Boston, 
100  Mass.  544;  Bancroft  v.  City  of 
Cambridge,  126  Mass.  438. 

^-°  Jenal  v.  Green  Island  Draining 
Co.,  12  Neb.  163;  s.  c.  10  N.  W.  547; 
Cypress  Pond  Draining  Co.  v.  Hoo- 
per, 2  Met.  (Ky.)  350;  Reeves  v. 
Treasurer  &c.,  8  Ohio  St.  333;  Pat- 
terson V.  Baumer,  43  Iowa  477.  Cf. 
Seely  v.  Sebastian,  4  Or.  25;  Ander- 
son V.  Kerns  Draining  Co.,  14  Ind. 
199;  s.  c.  77  Am.  D.  273;  Pool  v. 
Trexler,  76  N.  C.  297.  In  discussing 
a  drainage  act  the  court  of  appeals 
of  New  York  (Folger,  J.)  said:  — 
"Drainage  acts  of  the  legislature  not 
having  in  view  the  public  health 
solely  have  been  recognized  and  ac- 
quiesced in  by  the  courts.  But  we 
wish  to  be  distinctly  understood  that 
we  sustain  this-  act  as  constitutional 
solely  for  that  it  plainly  has  for  its 
purpose  the  preservation  and  promo- 
tion of  the  public  health.  .  .  . 
That  the  public  purpose  may  be 
sought  and  attained,  and  private 
benefit  also  found,  is  not  improbable. 
So   it   is  when  private   property  is 


§    707  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  690 

§  707.    The  same  subject  continued — Leasing  for  public  use. — In 

a  case  decided  by  the  New  York  court  of  appeals/-^  it  was  urged 
that  the  provisions  of  the  New  York  statute^--  authorizing  the 
mayor,  aldermen  and  commonalty  of  the  city  of  New  York  to  ac- 
quire water-front  property,  including  piers  and  bulkheads,  were  un- 
constitutional, upon  the  ground  that  they  contemplated  an  appropria- 
tion to  the  sole  use  of  special  kinds  of  commerce  or  of  steamboats,  and 
also  a  lease  of  certain  piers  and  rights  of  wharfage  to  a  particular 
steamship-line  to  the  exclusion  of  all  others,  thus  constituting  what 
was  contended  to  be  a  private  and  not  a  public  use.  Peckham,  J.,  de- 
livering the  oj)inion  of  the  court,  conceding  that  an  interest  may  be  of 
a  public  nature  when  the  use  may  tend  incidentally  to  benefit  the  pub- 
lic in  some  collateral  way,  in  which  case  the  right  to  take  property 
in  invitum  does  not  exist,  proceeded  to  show  that  property  may  right- 
fully, under  certain  circumstances,  be  devoted  to  a  special  and  particu- 
lar public  use,  and  yet  the  entire  public  be  permitted  to  use  it  or 
have  access  to  it  only  in  a  very  restricted  manner.  Applying  these 
well-recognized  principles  to  the  case  in  hand,  he  continued:  "We 
must  consider  the  nature  of  the  property  which  is  to  be  so  used  or 
leased,  and  the  object  and  purpose  of  such  use  must  be  viewed  in 
connection  with  the  whole  of  the  property  of  like  nature  under  the 
control  and  ownership  of  the  city.  *  *  *  The  circumstances  sur- 
rounding the  ease  must  be  viewed  in  all  aspects.  The  act  plainly  con- 
templates, through  all  its  provisions,  the  fact  that  there  will  always 
remain  under  the  direct  control  and  possession  of  the  city  sufficient 
piers  and  docks  for  the  accommodation  of  all  the  commerce  which 
may  seek  our  port,  and  which  has  no  special  pier  or  dock  leased  to 
the  owner  of  the  vessel  desiring  dock  facilities.'*  The  act  was  unani- 
mously pronounced  constitutional.^-^ 

taken  for  the  public  use  of  a  rail-  99  N.  Y.  569;  s.  c.  2  N.  E.  642;  Law 
road,  and  in  quite  as  great  degree;  Jour.,  October  27,  1892. 
but  in  such  case  the  private  interest  ^--  Ch.  574,  laws  of  1871. 
promoted  is  said  to  be  incidental.  ^-^  The  opinion  continues: — "Con- 
And  though  the  works  authorized  to  sidering  the  large  extent  of  the  prop- 
effect  this  public  purpose  are  in  any  erty  of  this  description  owned  and  to 
case  not  extended  beyond  a  particu-  be  owned  by  the  city,  together  with 
lar,  and  it  may  be  a  small,  district,  the  fact  that  there  is  no  absolute  di- 
the  purpose  is  the  same  and  is  pub-  rection  to  the  city  to  lease  the  small- 
lie:"  Matter  of  Ryers,  72  N.  Y.  1,  8.  est  portion  thereof  to  any  one,  we 
The  constitutionality  of  these  acts  is  became  at  once  convinced  that  the 
treated  at  length,  and  the  authorities  leasing  which  will  be  actually  car- 
collated  by  states,  in  Lewis  Eminent  ried  on  under  this  mere  permission 
Domain,  §  188  et  seq.  will  amount  to  no  more  than  a  spe- 
"^  In  re  Application  of  Mayor  &c.,  cial    regulation    of    the    manner    in 


691  EMINENT  do:maix.  §  708 

§  708.    The  same  subject  continued — Ornamental  purposes. — Byn- 

kcrslioek  iv^  quoted  by  Chancellor  Kent^-'*  as  insisting  "that  private 
property  can  not  he  taken  on  any  terms  without  consent  of  the  owner 
for  purposes  of  public  ornament  or  pleasure."  And  Judge  Dillon 
says  that  "if  it  be  admitted  or  shown  in  any  given  ease  that  the  orna- 
mental purpose  is  not  associated  with  any  useful  purpose,  it  would 
seem  to  be  true  that  it  is  inconsistent  with  the  respect  in  which  all 
enlightened  governments  hold  private  property  to  say  that  it  can  be 
compulsorily  taken  from  the  owner."^^^  No  case  seems  to  have  been 
adjudicated  in  which  the  contemplated  purpose  was  wholly  disso- 
ciated from  any  recognized  "useful"  purpose.  But  the  doctrine  to 
be  applied  has  been  distinctly  declared  by  the  supreme  court  in  Ver- 
mont. The  commissioners  in  a  proceeding  to  lay  out  a  highway 
adjacent  to  a  court-house  and  town  hall  reported  that  they  established 
the  road  upon  the  ground  of  a  general  public  necessity  and  convenience 
which  they  considered  almost  indispensable  for  the  use  of  the  court- 
house and  town  hall,  etc.,  taking  into  account  in  part  "the  looks" 
as  well  as  the  convenience  and  necessity;  but  that  "for  the  purpose 
of  embellishment  alone  or  mainly"  they  should  uot  have  established 
the  road.  The  decision  of  the  county  court  rejecting  this  report  was 
reversed  upon  appeal.  Eedfield,  C.  J.,  said:  "If  it  appeared  upon 
the  face  of  the  report  that  the  prevailing  ground  with  the  commis- 
sioners in  establishing  the  highway  was  that  of  ornament  and  improve- 
ment of  the  court-house  .grounds,  we  should  regard  it  as  an  insuffi- 
cient basis  upon  which  to  lay  the  highway,  and  as  equivalent  to  a  re- 
port against  its  being  laid.  But  in  the  present  case  we  understand  the 
prevailing  motive  in  laying  out  the  road  was  the  public  convenience 
and  private  necessity,  and  the  matter  of  ornament  merely  incidental 
and  accessory.  In  that  view  *  *  *  jt  does  not  seem  to  us  objec- 
tionable."^2« 

which  a  comparatively  small  portion  be  properly  or  effectually  performed, 

of  the  whole  property  of  this  nature  And  in  filling  the  necessity  for  such 

owned  by  the  city  shall  be  used  for  accommodations  the  city  or  state  is 

the    legitimate    ends    of    commerce,  only  performing  its  public  duty." 

.     .     .     When  used  by  lessees  under  ^-*  Gardner  v.  Trustees  &c.,  2  Johns, 

the  facts  already  stated,  the  use  is  Ch.  (N.  Y.)  161,  165. 

a  public  one.  The  use  is  public  while  '^  2    Dillon    Munic.    Corp.,    §    599, 

the  property  is  thus  leased,  because  where  the  author  also  remarks  that 

it  fills  an  undisputed  necessity  ex-  "it  would  be  an  extreme  case  where 

isting  in   regard   to  these   common  a   purpose   was   wholly   ornamental 

carriers   by   water,   who   are   them-  and  not  at  all  useful." 

selves  engaged  in  fulfilling  their  ob-  '="  Town   of  Woodstock  v.   Gallup, 

ligations  to  the  general  public;  obli-  28  Vt.  587,  590.    See  also.  West  River 

gations  which   could  not  otherwise  Bridge  Co.  v.  Dix,  6  How.  507.     In 


709 


PUBLIC    COriPOltATlONS. 


692 


§  709.  Notice  of  proceeding — Necessity  for. — The  phrase  "due 
process  of  law,"  in  the  fourteenth  auieudnieut  of  the  federal  constitu- 
tion,* is  held  to  require  notice  to  the  owners  of  land  which  it  is  sought 
to  appropriate  hy  condemnation  proceedings.  "Due  process  of  law," 
said  the  court  of  appeals  of  New  York,  "requires  an  orderly  proceed- 
ing adapted  to  the  nature  of  the  case,  in  which  the  citizen  has  an  op- 
portunity to.be  heard,  and  to  defend,  enforce  and  protect  his  rights. 
A  hearing  or  an  opportunity  to  be  heard  is  absolutely  essential.  We 
can  not  conceive  of  due  process  of  law  without  this."^-^  But  it  is  not 
needful  that  the  statute  should  provide  for  personal  and  individual 
notice,  as  distinguished  from  public  and  general  notice  given  by  ad- 
vertisements in  newspapers.^ ^^  And  the  propriety  of  taking  private 
property  for  a  public  use  is  not  strictly  a  judicial  question,  and  the 
parties  interested  have  no  constitutional  right  to  notice  of  proceedings 
to  determine  whether  it  shall  be  taken  or  not.^-^ 


Higginson  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  11  Al- 
len (Mass.)  530,  it  was  held  that 
where  there  is  a  sufficient  amount  of 
travel  to  warrant  the  laying  out  of 
a  highway,  the  reasons  which  may 
induce  people  to  travel  on  it  are  im- 
material, and  that  pleasure  travel 
may  be  accommodated  as  well  as 
business  travel.  "Streets  may  be 
widened  and  court-yards  left  which 
are  for  ornament  and  not  open  to 
public  travel:"  Mills  Eminent  Do- 
main, §  18;  citing  In  re  Bushwick 
Ave.,  48  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  9. 

1"  Stuart  V.  Palmer,  74  N.  Y.  183 ; 
Campbell  v.  Dwiggins,  83  Ind.  473; 
Harbeck  v.  City  of  Toledo,  11  Ohio 
St.  219;  Lake  Shore  &c.  R.  Co.  v. 
Cincinnati  &c.  R.  Co.,  116  Ind.  578; 
s.  c.  19  N.  E.  440;  Molett  v.  Keenan, 
22  Ala.  484;  Nichols  v.  City  of 
Bridgeport,  23  Conn.  189;  Matter  of 
Village  of  Middletown,  82  N.  Y. 
196;  Langford  v.  Commissioners,  16 
Minn.  375;  Darlington  v.  Common- 
wealth, 41  Pa.  St.  68;  Mayor  &c. 
V.  Bouldin,  23  Md.  328;  Kidder  v. 
City  of  Peoria,  29  111.  77.  The  case 
of  Swan  V.  Williams,  2  Mich.  427, 
holding  that  no  notice  is  required, 
is  pronounced  by  Messrs.  Elliott 
to    be    absolutely   unsound:    Elliott 


Roads  &  Streets  (2d  ed.),  §  197,  n. 
In  §  197  the  learned  and  discrimi- 
nating authors  maintain  that  some 
provision  for  notice  is  absolutely 
essential  to  the  constitutionality  of 
a  law  conferring  the  power  to  con- 
demn, and  must  be  so  declared 
•though  the  property-owner  actually 
appears  before  the  appraisers;  and 
they  hold  to  the  dissenting  opinion 
in  Kramer  v.  Cleveland  &c.  R.  Co.,  5 
Ohio  St.  140. 

1^  Matter  of  Petition  of  De  Peyster, 
80  N.  Y.  565;  United  States  Trust 
Co.  V.  United  States  Ins.  Co.,  18  N. 
Y.  199;  Starbuck  v.  Murray,  5  Wend. 
(N.  Y.)  148;  s.  c.  21  Am.  D.  172; 
Davies  v.  City  of  Los  Angeles,  86 
Cal.  37;  s.  c.  24  Pac.  771;  Polly  v. 
Saratoga  &c.  R.  Co.,  9  Barb.  (N.  Y.) 
449;  Owners  &c.  v.  Mayor  &c.,  15 
Wend.  (N.  Y.)  374;  Wilson  v.  Hath- 
away, 42  Iowa  173  (followed  in  State 
V.  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.,  80  Iowa  586; 
s.  c.  46  N.  W.  741);  Mason  v.  Mes- 
senger, 17  Iowa  261;  Cupp  v.  Board 
&c.,  19  Ohio  St.  173;  Wilkin  v.  St. 
Paul  &c.  R.  Co.,  16  Minn.  271;  In- 
habitants &c.  V.  Morton.  25  Mo.  593; 
Nations  v.  Johnson,  24  How.  195. 

^^^  People  V.  Smith,  21  N.  Y.  595. 
distinguishing  such  cases  from  the 


693 


EMINENT   DOMAIN. 


710 


§  710.  Parties  entitled  to  notice. — In  proceedings  to  condemn  land 
the  statute  generally  provides  that  notice  shall  he  given  to  the 
"owners,"  which  is  construed  to  include  those  who  have  vested  estates 
appearing  of  record/^"  but  not  those  whose  interest  consists  of  a  mere 
lien,  or  contingent  or  inchoate  estate.  Under  this  rule  a  judgment 
creditor^^^  and  the  holder  of  a  contingent  dower  interest  have  no  such 
substantial  right  as  to  be  entitled  to  notice.^^^ 

§  711.  Service  of  notice. — The  notice,  if  so  directed,  must  be  to  the 
owner  by  name."^  But  it  need  not  be  personally  served  on  him,^^* 
although  if  sent  by  mail,  and  by  reason  of  improper  addressing  it 
never  reaches  the  person  for  whom  it  is  intended,  the  proceeding  as 
to  him  is  of  no  effect. ^^^     Where  several  commissioners  published  a 


process  for  arriving  at  the  amount 
of  compensation;  George's  Creek 
Coal  Co.  v.  New  Central  &c.  Co.,  40 
Md.  425;  Elliott  Roads  &  Streets  (2d 
ed.),  §  200. 

""  Gerrard  v.  Omaha  &c.  R.  Co.,  14 
Neb.  270;  s.  c.  15  N.  W.  231;  Parks 
v.  City  of  Boston,  15  Pick.  (Mass.) 
198;  Shelton  v.  Town  of  Derby,,  27 
Conn.  414;  Borough  of  Harrisburg  v. 
Crangle,  3  W.  &  S.  (Pa.)  460;  New 
Orleans  R.  Co.  v.  Frederic,  46  Miss. 
1;  Philadelphia  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Will- 
iams, 54  Pa.  St.  103;  Elliott  Roads 
&  Streets  (2d  ed.),  §  323,  and  cases 
there  cited.  Mortgagees  are  neces- 
sary parties:  Wilson  v.  European 
&c.  R.  Co.,  67  Maine  358;  Sherwood 
v.  City  of  Lafayette,  109  Ind.  411; 
s.  c.  10  N.  E.  89;  Severin  v.  Cole,  38 
Iowa  463;  Hagar  v.  Brainard,  44  Vt. 
294;  Cool  v.  Crommet,  13  Mayie  250; 
Parker's  Case,  36  N.  H.  84;  Astor  v. 
Hoyt,  5  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  603;  Mutual 
L.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Eastern  &c.  R.  Co.,  38 
N.  J.  Eq.  132.  And  tenants  in  com- 
mon: Grand  Rapids  &c.  R.  Co.  v. 
Alley,  34  Mich.  16.  Cf.  Bowman  v. 
Venice  &c.  R.  Co.,  102  111.  459.  And 
both  landlord  and  tenant:  Voegtly 
V.  Pittsburgh  &c.  R.  Co.,  2  Grant  Cas. 
(Pa.)  243;  6  Am.  &  Eng.  Encyc.  of 
Law  609.  The  trustee  represents  his 
cestui  que  trust:  Hawkins  v.  County 
Com'rs,  2  Allen  (Mass.)  254;  State 
V.  Mayor  fee,  32  N.  J.  L.  49.    As  to 


waiver  of  insufficiency  in  the  notice 
by  appearance  without  objections, 
see  Harrington  v.  Wofford,  46  Miss. 
31;  Morrow  v.  Weed,  4  Iowa  77; 
People  V,  Hagar,  52  Cal,  171;  Delany 
V.  Gault,  30  Pa.  St.  63;  Muncey  v. 
Joest,  74  Ind.  409;  Headrick  v. 
Whittemore,  105  Mass.  23.  In  Will- 
iams v.  Hartford  &c.  R.  Co.,  13  Conn. 
397,  a  notice  was  sent  on  the  day 
previous  to  the  appraisal  to  the 
owner,  who  lived  in  close  proximity 
to  the  place.  He  sent  a  written  pro- 
test but  not  asking  for  delay.  The 
notice  was  held  sufficient.  "If  the 
facts  are  such  as  to  impart  notice 
that  the  person  in  possession  has  a 
proprietary  claim  to  the  land  or 
color  of  title,  then  he  should  be  made 
a  party:"  Elliott  on  Roads  &  Streets 
(2d  ed.),  §  324  and  cases  cited. 

"'Gimbel  v.  Stolte,  59  Ind.  446; 
Watson  V.  New  York  &c.  R.  Co.,  47 
N.  Y.  157. 

1S2  Moore  v.  Mayor.  4  Sandf.  (N. 
Y.)  456;  Jackson  v.  Edwards,  7  Paige 
Ch.  (N.Y.)  386;  City  of  Indianapolis 
V.  Kingsbury,  101  Ind.  200;  s.  c.  51 
Am.  R.  749 ;  Duncan  v.  City  of  Terre 
Haute,  85  Ind.  104.  See  also,  Simar 
V.  Canaday,  53  N.  Y.  298. 

"'Birge  v.  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.,  65 
Iowa  440;  s.  c.  21  N.  W.  767. 

"*  Harper  v.  Lexington  &c.  R.  Co., 
2  Dana  (Ky.)  227. 

135  Morgan  v.  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.,  36 


§    712  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  694 

notice  that  lands  were  al)out  to  be  taken  for  a  railroad  and  that  they 
would  meet  on  a  day  named  to  lay  out  the  route  and  assess  damages, 
and  the  notice  was  directed,  "To  all  persons  owning  land  on  the  line 
of  the  railroad,  as  the  same  is  now  or  may  be  located  through  section 
23,  township  11,  range  25,  in  the  county  of  Wyandotte  and  state  of 
Kansas,"  the  United  States  supreme  court  held  it  to  be  sufficient  no- 
tice to  any  one  owning  a  quarter-section  in  section  23  that  some  of  his 
land  might  be  taken. ^^^  It  was  further  held  that  a  non-resident  owner 
was  concluded  by  such  publication  as  well  as  a  resident  owner.^^^ 
Where  the  form  of  the  notice  is  matter  of  detail  in  the  enabling  act, 
the  provisions  must  be  carefully  carried  out.  Thus  if  the  law  says  the 
notice  must  state  the  time  when  the  commissioners  will  begin  con- 
demnation proceedings  and  it  fails  to  show  the  time,  the  proceedings 
will  be  held  void;^^'  or  if  the  law  directs  the  notice  to  be  served,  in 
case  of  a  corporation,  on  its  president,  or  some  other  named  officer, 
service  on  any  other  official  is  not  legal  service.^^'' 

§  712.  Treaty  with  the  owner. — The  owner  of  property  has  no  con- 
stitutional right  to  an  opportunity  to  sell  and  a  failure  to  agree  as 
a  preliminary  to  proceedings  to  condemn.^*"  But  it  has  been  held 
that  if  the  statute  authorizes  a  seizure  only  in  case  no  agreement  can 
be  made  with  him,  the  proceedings  are  fatally  defective  if  the}^  fail 
to  show  that  this  condition  has  been  fulfilled.^*^     According  to  some 

Mich.  428.    The  substance  of  the  no-  man,  41  Kan.  300,  304;  s.  c.  21  Pac. 

tice  must  be  such  as  the  statute  re-  284. 

quires  and  must  be  given  in  the  "''  In  re  St.  Paul  &c.  R.  Co.,  36 
mode  prescribed,  and  if  proceedings  Minn.  85;  s.  c.  30  N.  W.  432;  Acker- 
are  not  begun  at  the  time  designated  man  v.  Huff,  71  Tex.  317;  s.  c.  9  S. 
a  new  notice  must  be  issued.  These  W.  236.  See  also,  Cory  v.  Chicago 
and  all  other  matters  relating  to  the  &c.  R.  Co.,  100  Mo.  282;  s.  c.  13  S.  W. 
condemnation  of  land  for  roads  and  346.  Any  local  rule,  statutory  or  ju- 
streets  are  carefully  and  thoroughly  dicial,  that  notice  is  ineffectual  un- 
treated in  Elliott  Roads  &  Streets  less  personally  served  on  all  resident 
(2d  ed.),  chs.  13-15.  owners,   must  be  strictly  followed: 

i^^Huling  V.  Kaw  Val.  R.  &c.  Co.,  Mulligan  v.  Smith,  59  Cal.  206;  State 

130  U.  S.  559;  s.  c.  9  S.  Ct.  603.  v.  Common  Council  &c.,  42  Wis.  287; 

"^  See    also,    Harvey    v.    Tyler,    2  Kundinger  v.   City  of   Saginaw,   59 

Wall.  328;   Secombe  v.  Railroad  Co.,  Mich.  355;  s.  c.  26  N.  W.  634. 

23  Wall.   108;    Pennoyer  v.  Neff,  95  ""Grand  Rapids  v.  Grand  Rapids 

U.  S.  714;  McMillan  v.  Anderson,  95  &c.  R.  Co.,  58  Mich.  641;  s.  c.  26  N. 

U.  S.  37;   Davidson  v.  New  Orleans,  W.  159. 

96  U.  S.  97,  105 ;  Hagar  v.  Reclama-  "^  Graf  v.  City  of  St.  Louis,  8  Mo. 

tion  Dist.,  Ill  U.  S.  701;   s.  c.  4  S.  App.  562;  citing  Kansas  City  &c.  R. 

Ct.  663;   Boom  Co.  v.  Patterson,  98  Co.  v.  Campbell.  62  Mo.  585;  Moses 

U.  S.  403,  406.  V.  St.  Louis  Sectional  Dock  Co.,  84 

^'^  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  House-  Mo.  242;  reversing  s.  c.  9  Mo.  App. 


695 


EMINENT   DOMAIN. 


i: 


authorities  proof  of  tlie  fact  is  deemed  to  l)c  waived  by  proceeding  to 
trial  without  objection,^ ■"^  while  others  declare  that  the  objection  may 
be  taken  at  any  stage  of  the  case,  even  after  award. ^*^  There  must  be 
a  genuine  effort  to  effect  an  agreement/*^  but  "the  attempt  need 
not  be  prosecuted  further  than  to  develop  the  fact  that  an  agreement 
is  impossible/"''*'*  and  if  the  owner  is  under  a  legal  disability  to  con- 
tract, the  statute  has  no  application.^'*^  If  the  petition  states  the  in- 
ability to  agree,  it  need  not  recite  the  circumstances,^  *°  unless  the 
statute  so  requires. ^*^ 

§  713.  The  application  or  petition. — The  statute  sometimes  grants 
power  to  the  municipal  authorities  to  initiate  proceedings  to  condemn 
land  of  their  own  motion,  but  more  generally  it  is  provided  that 
this  shall  be  done  upon  application  or  petition.  In  the  latter  case  a 
sufficient  application  is  absolutely  essential  to  confer  jurisdiction.^*^ 
The  petition  should  be  in  substantial  conformity  with  the  statute,  but 
technical  accuracy  is  not  requisite. ^"*^    If,  however,  it  is  provided  that 


571.  See  also,  to  the  same  point, 
State  V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  36  N.  J.  L. 
499;  Matter  of  Opening  House  Ave., 
67  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  350;  Matter  of 
Marsh,  71  N.  Y.  315;  Powers  v.  Ha- 
zelton  &c.  R.  Co.,  33  Ohio  St.  429; 
Arnold  v.  Village  of  Decatur,  29 
Mich.  77;  Gilmer  v.  Lime  Point,  19 
Cal.  47;  Morseman  v.  City  of  Ionia, 
32  Mich.  283.  Cf.  ^tna  Mills  v.  In- 
habitants &c.,  126  Mass.  422;  Ney  v. 
Swinney,  36  Ind.  454.  In  Hall  v. 
People,  57  111.  307,  such  a  provision 
was  held  directory  in  a  collateral 
proceeding. 

i"a  Taylor  v.  Clemson,  11  CI.  &  F. 
610;  President  &c.  v.  Diffebach,  1 
Yeates  (Pa.)  367. 

"-  Lewis  Eminent  Domain,  §  301 
and  cases  there  cited. 

'"  Laue  v.  City  of  Saginaw,  53 
Mich.  442;  s.  c.  19  N.  W.  137. 

^"  Lewis  Eminent  Domain,  §  302; 
citing  Matter  of  the  Village  of  Mid- 
dleton,  82  N.  Y.  196. 

"^Laue  v.  City  of  Saginaw,  53 
Mich.  442;  s.  c.  19  N.  W.  137.  See 
also.  President  &c.  v.  Diffebach,  1 
Yeates  (Pa.)  367. 

""  Bowman  v.   Venice  &c.   R.   Co., 


102  111.  459;  Matter  of  Lockport  &c. 
R.  Co.,  77  N.  Y.  557. 

"'See  Matter  of  Marsh,  71  N.  Y. 
315. 

"^  State  V.  Morse,  50  N.  H.  9  (hold- 
ing, however,  that  although  the  rec- 
ord of  the  laying  out  of  a  highway 
disclosed  no  application,  yet  the  rec- 
ord being  ancient,  such  an  applica- 
tion might  be  presumed  by  the  jury, 
in  connection  with  user  even  for  less 
than  twenty  years) ;  Oliphant  v. 
Commissioners  &c.,  18  Kan.  3S6; 
Commonwealth  v.  Peters,  3  Mass. 
229;  State  v.  County  Com'rs,  6  Neb. 
129;  People  v.  Judge  &c.,  40  Mich. 
64;  State  v.  Berry,  12  Iowa  58.  The 
municipal  authorities  can  not  dele- 
gate the  power  confided  to  them: 
Oliphant  v.  Commissioners  &c.,  su- 
pra. But  they  may  appoint  a  com- 
mittee to  report  on  expediency:  Dor- 
man  V.  City  Council  &c.,  81  Maine 
411;  s.  c.  17  Atl.  316. 

""The  use  of  the  word  "road"  in- 
stead of  "highway"  is  not  fatal:  In- 
habitants &c.  V.  Commissioners,  26 
Maine  406.  See  also.  Board  &c.  v. 
Hogan,  39  Kan.  606:  s.  c.  18  Pac.  611; 
Dorman    v.    City    Council    &c.,    81 


713 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS. 


696 


the  petition  must  be  signed  by  a  certain  number  of  persons  with 
j)rescribed  qualifications,  this  is  a  jurisdictional  requirement,  and 
if  the  record  fails  to  show  affirmatively  the  existence  of  the  fact,  the 
proceedings  will,  when  attacked  directly,  as  by  petition  in  error,  be 
held  void.^^°  If  attacked  collaterally,  it  may  be  proved  by  evidence 
aliunde  that  the  petitioners  are  duly  qualified.^^^  There  is  no  juris- 
diction to  act  unless  the  petition  contains  substantially  all  that  the 
statute  declares  shall  be  inserted  in  it.  Thus  a  statement  that  in  the 
opinion  of  the  petitioners  the  improvement  asked  for  should  be  made 
is  not  an  averment  that  in  their  opinion  public  interests  require  it.^^^ 
But  the  law  looks  to  the  substance  rather  than  to  the  form,  and  if 
there  is  a  substantial  compliance  with  every  essential  condition  it  is 
sufficient.^^^  In  the  case  of  a  proposed  highway  it  is  the  practice  to 
state  at  least  the  termini  with  reasonable  and  approximate  definite- 
ness,^^*  and  it  should  appear  affirmatively  that  it  is  within  the  terri- 
torial jurisdiction  of  the  tribunal  ;^^^  and  an  averment  of  necessity 
for  the  taking  is  generally  deemed  jurisdictional.^^® 


Maine  411;  s.  c.  17  Atl.  316.  Nor  is 
it  necessary  that  those  authorized 
to  judge  of  the  necessity  and  conve- 
nience of  ways  shall  use  technical 
terms  in  their  adjudication  and  loca- 
tion, provided  their  intention  is 
manifest,  and  they  have  jurisdiction 
of  the  subject:  Inhabitants  &c.  v. 
Commissioners,  26  Maine  406.  "Pub- 
lic convenience  and  necessities  of 
the  city"  is  equivalent  to  the  statu- 
tory phrase,  "common  convenience 
and  necessity:"  Dorman  v.  City 
Council  &c.,  81  Maine  411;  s.  c.  17 
Atl.  316. 

^^''  Oliphant  v.  Commissioners  &c., 
18  Kan.  386;  Early  v.  Hamilton,  75 
Ind.  376;  Board  &c.  v.  Muhlenbacker, 
18  Kan.  129;  Conoway  v.  Ascherman, 
94  Ind.  187. 

^^^  Oliphant  v.  Commissioners  &c., 
18  Kan.  386;  Willis  v.  Sproule,  13 
Kan.  257;  Robinson  v.  Rippey,  111 
Ind.  112;  s.  c.  12  N.  E.  141;  Austin 
V.  Allen,  6  Wis.  134. 

''-  In  re  Grove  Street,  61  Cal.  438. 

"'  Matter  of  Commissioners  of 
Washington  Park,  52  N.  Y.  131, 
where  an  annexed  schedule,  referred 
to  in  the  petition,  was  deemed  a  part 
of  it. 


"*  Hayford  v.  County  Com'rs  &c., 
78  Maine  153;  s.  c.  3  Atl.  51;  Inhab- 
itants &c.  V.  County  Com'rs,  12  Cush. 
(Mass.)  351,  in  both  of  which  cases 
the  petition  was  fatally  defective  on 
this  point.  See  also,  generally,  on 
sufficiency  of  description.  Inhabit- 
ants &c.  V.  Norfolk,  117  Mass.  416; 
Smith  V.  Weldon,  73  Ind.  454;  Jack- 
son V.  Rankin,  67  Wis.  285;  s.  c.  30 
N.  W.  301;  Clement  v.  Burns,  43  N. 
H.  609;  Inhabitants  &c.  v.  Field,  1 
Conn.  279;  Henline  v.  People,  81  111. 
269;  Inhabitants  &c.  v.  County 
Com'rs,  37  Maine  112;  Mossman  v. 
Forest,  27  Ind.  233;  Toledo  &c.  R. 
Co.  V.  Munson,  57  Mich.  42;  s.  c.  23 
N.  W.  455;  West  v.  West  &c.  R.  Co., 
61  Miss.  536;  Watson  v.  Crowsore, 
93  Ind.  220. 

""'>  Elliott  Roads  &  Streets  (2d  ed.), 
§  296. 

'^"Colville  V.  Judy,  73  Mo.  651;  In 
re  Road  in  Sterrett  Tp.,  114  Pa.  St. 
627:  s.  c.  7  Atl.  765;  Brown  v.  Rome 
&c.  R.  Co.,  86  Ala.  206;  s.  c.  5  So. 
195;  City  of  Helena  v.  Harvey,  6 
Mont.  114;  s.  c.  9  Pac.  903;  Leath  v. 
Summers,  3  Ired.  L.  (N.  C.)  108. 
Formal  objections  should  be  specific 
and    promptly    made:     Meranda    v. 


697 


EMINENT   DOMAIN. 


14 


§  714.  The  tribunal. — No  appropriation  of  land  can  l)c  made  un- 
less the  statute  provides  a  tribunal  for  the  assessment  of  damages.^''^ 
But  while  the  legislature  must  provide  an  impartial  tribunal  to  as- 
certain the  amount  of  compensation/^**  and  give  the  parties  interested 
an  opportunity  to  be  heard  before  such  tribunal,  it  may  determine 
what  the  tribunal  shall  be — whether  a  jury,  a  court  without  a  jury, 
or  commissioners  selected  by  the  court.  ^^^  The  tribunal  must,  how- 
ever, be  one  of  a  judicial  nature,  though  not  necessarily  a  court  or  a 
body  exercising  judicial  functions  only;^*'"  and  the  weight  of  au- 


Spurlin,  100  Ind.  380;  City  of 
Worcester  v.  Keith,  5  Allen  (Mass.) 
17;  Carr  v.  State,  103  Ind.  548;  s.  c. 
3  N.  E.  375;  Bachelor  v.  New  Hamp- 
ton. 60  N.  H.  207;  Wells  v.  Rhodes, 
114  Ind.  467;  s.  c.  16  N.  E.  830.  As 
to  allowance  of  amendment,  see 
Young  V.  Laconia,  59  N.  H.  534;  Rus- 
sell V.  Turner,  62  Maine  496;  Cool- 
man  V.  Fleming,  82  Ind.  117;  Elliott 
Roads  &  Streets  (2d  ed.),  §  341  and 
cases  cited. 

"^  Ames  V.  Lake  Superior  &c.  Co., 
21  Minn.  241;  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.  v. 
Heister,  8  Barr  (Pa.)  445. 

I's  What  shall  be  a  "just  compensa- 
tion" can  be  determined  only  by 
some  impartial  agency.  The  parties 
who  take  the  land  can  not  be  allowed 
to  determine  it:  Hessler  v.  Drainage 
Com'rs,  53  111.  105;  Powers  v.  Bears, 
12  Wis.  214;  Lumsden  v.  City  of  Mil- 
waukee, 8  Wis.  485.  Cf.  Flournoy  v. 
City  of  Jeffersonville,  17  Ind.  169; 
McMicken  v.  City  of  Cincinnati.  4 
Ohio  St.  394,  where  the  rule  is  re- 
laxed in  cases  where  an  appeal  is 
allowed.  The  legislature  can  not 
prescribe  a  schedule  of  prices:  Cun- 
ningham V.  Campbell,  33  Ga.  625.  A 
person  ought  not  to  be  appointed  to 
review  damages  in  laying  out  a  road 
who  has  formed  or  expressed  an 
opinion  upon  the  subject  with  a 
knowledge  of  the  facts,  and  the  as- 
sessment made  under  such  appoint- 
ment will  be  set  aside  on  certiorari; 
no  person,  however,  who  knew  of 
such  objection  at  the  time  of  the  ap- 


pointment and  did  not  make  it  then 
will  be  allowed  to  take  advantage  of 
it  upon  certiorari:  Inhabitants  &c. 
V.  Dilley,  24  N.  J.  L.  209. 

^^"Ames  V.  Lake  Superior  &c.  R. 
Co.,  21  Minn.  241.  The  legislature 
may  confer  upon  the  board  of  super- 
visors of  one  county  the  power  to 
lay  out  a  road  in  another  county: 
People  v.  Board  &c.,  33  Cal.  487; 
United  States  v.  Jones,  109  U.  S.  513; 
s.  c.  3  S.  Ct.  346.  The  tribunal 
should  be  composed  of  disinterested 
persons.  As  to  disqualification  by 
relationship  to  parties,  see  Clifford 
v.  Commissioners,  59  Maine  262. 
The  interest  of  a  general  taxpayer 
may  be  disregarded :  State  v.  Crane, 
36  N.  J.  L.  394;  Bradley  v.  City  of 
Frankfort,  99  Ind.  417;  Chase  v. 
Town  of  Rutland,  47  Vt.  393.  But 
the  disqualification  by  direct  inter- 
est has  its  origin  in  the  fundamental 
nature  of  law:  State  v.  Crane,  36 
N.  J.  L.  394;  Elliott  Roads  &  Streets 
(2d  ed.),  §§  273,  281,  282.  Cf.  Mayor 
&c.  V.  Long,  31  Mo.  369;  Foot  v. 
Stiles,  57  N.  Y.  399.  Selection  by  lot 
is  not  an  appointment  by  the  court: 
Menges  v.  City  of  Albany,  56  N.  Y. 
374. 

^"^  State  V.  Macdonald,  26  Minn. 
445;  s.  c.  sub  nom.  State  v.  District 
Court.  4  N.  W.  1107;  Doctor  v.  Hart- 
man,  74  Ind.  221;  White  v.  Conover, 
5  Blackf.  (Ind.)  462:  State  v.  Rich- 
mond. 6  Fost.  (N.  H.)  232;  Shue  v. 
Highway  Com'rs,  41  Mich.  638;  s.  c. 
2  N.  W.  808. 


§  715 


PUBLIC    COHPOKATIONS. 


698 


thority  is  that  jurisdiction  must  appear  upon  the  face  of  the  rec- 
ord.^ «^ 

§  715.  Right  to  jury  trial. — The  constitutional  provision  which 
declares  that  the  right  of  trial  by  Jury  shall  remain  inviolate  has  no 
relation  to  proceedings  for  the  condemnation  of  private  property  by 
eminent  domain.  ^''-  But  some  of  the  constitutions  secure  the  right 
in  this  class  of  cases  ia  express  terms. ^^^  And  vi^here  the  word  "jury'* 
is  used  it  is  construed  to  denote  ex  vi  termini  a  body  of  twelve  men 
acting  substantially  through  the  accustomed  forms  by  which  the  pow- 
ers of  a  jury  are  exercised.^"*  It  is  generally  held  in  interpreting 
these  provisions  that  if  a  jury  trial  may  be  had  in  an  appellate  court. 


'^'  Elliott  Roads  &  Streets  (2d  ed.), 
§§  295,  296,  where  the  authorities 
are  examined. 

ic2rpj^g  reason  is  that  the  right  in 
such  cases  did  not  exist  at  common 
law:  Beekman  v.  Saratoga  &c.  R. 
Co.,  3  Paige  Ch.  (N.  Y.)  45;  s.  c.  22 
Am.  D.  679;  Willyard  v.  Hamilton, 
7  Ohio  (pt.  2)  111;  s.  c.  30  Am.  D. 
195;  Montgomery  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Sayre, 
72  Ala.  443;  People  v.  Blake,  19  Cal. 
579;  Scudder  v.  Trenton  Del.  Falls 
Co.,  1  Saxt.  Ch.  (N.  J.)  694;  s.  c.  23 
Am.  D.  756;  Backus  v.  Lebanon,  11 
N.  H.  19;  s.  c.  35  Am.  D.  466;  Brug- 
german  v.  True,  25  Minn.  123;  Copp 
V.  Henniker,  55  N.  H.  179;  Hymes  v. 
Aydelott,  26  Ind.  431;  Dronberger  v. 
Reed,  11  Ind.  420;  Lipes  v.  Hand,  104 
Ind.  503;  s.  c.  1  N.  E.  871;  4  N.  E. 
160;  City  of  Kansas  v.  Hill,  80  Mo. 
523;  Kendall  v.  Post.  8  Or.  141; 
Wurts  v.  Hoagland,  114  U.  S.  606; 
s.  c.  5  S.  Ct.  1086;  Missouri  Pac.  R. 
Co.  V.  Humes,  115  U.  S.  512;  s.  c.  6 
S.  Ct.  110;  People  v.  Smith,  21  N.  Y. 
595;  Hood  v.  Pinch,  8  Wis.  381; 
Liigat  V.  Commonwealth,  19  Pa.  St. 
456;  Virginia  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Elliott, 
5  Nev.  358;  Anderson  v.  Caldwell,  91 
Ind.  451;  s.  c.  46  Am.  R.  613;  Kim- 
ball v.  Board  &c..  46  Cal.  19.  Contra, 
Kramer  v.  Cleveland  &c.  R.  Co.,  5 
Ohio  St.  140;  Rhine  v.  City  of  Mc- 
Kinney,  53  Tex.  354;  Henderson  &c. 
R.  Co.  V.  Dickerson,  17  B.  Mon. 
(Ky.)  173.    See  also,  Lewis  Eminent 


Domain,  §  311.  "The  proceeding  for 
the  ascertainment  of  the  value  of  the 
property  and  consequent  compensa- 
tion to  be  made  is  merely  an  inquisi- 
tion to  establish  a  particular  fact  as 
a  preliminary  to  the  actual  taking; 
and  it  may  be  prosecuted  before 
commissioners  or  special  boards,  or 
the  courts,  with  or  without  the  in- 
tervention of  a  jury,  as  the  legisla- 
tive power  may  designate.  All  that 
is  required  is  that  it  shall  be  con- 
ducted in  some  fair  and  just  manner, 
with  opportunity  to  the  owners  of 
the  property  to  present  evidence  as 
to  its  value,  and  to  be  heard  there- 
on:" Justice  Field  in  United  States 
V.  Jones,  109  U.  S.  513,  519;  s.  c.  3 
S.  Ct.  346. 

"^Williams  v.  City  of  Pittsburg, 
83  Pa.  St.  71;  Mitchell  v.  Illinois  &c. 
R.  Co..  68  111.  286;  Weber  v.  Board 
&c.,  59  Cal.  265;  Louisville  &c.  R.  Co. 
V.  Dryden,  39  Ind.  393;  Paul  v.  City 
of  Detroit,  32  Mich.  108;  Ipsom  v. 
Mississippi  &c.  R.  Co.,  36  Miss.  300. 

^«*  Clark  V.  City  of  Utica,  18  Barb. 
(N.  Y.)  451.  Unanimity  is  necessary 
to  a  legal  verdict:  Lamb  v.  Lane, 
4  Ohio  St.  167;  Whitehead  v.  Arkan- 
sas &c.  R.  Co.,  28  Ark.  460;  City  of 
Des  Moines  v.  Layman,  21  Iowa  153; 
Mitchell  V.  Illinois  &c.  R.  Co.,  68  111. 
286;  Cooley  Const.  Lim.  (4th  ed.) 
394.  Cf.  Cruger  v.  Hudson  River  R. 
Co.,  12  N.  Y.  190;  McManus  v.  Mc- 
Donough,  107  111.  95. 


699 


!•: M 1 N i: N  r  domaix. 


§  "10 


it  is  no  objection  (linl  the  pivliniiiiai y  licariii<r  is  hofore  a  tril)unal 
without  a  jiiry.'"^'  And  a  jniy  may  be  waived  by  agreement  of  the 
l^arties  interested."'" 

§  716.  Right  to  abandon  proceedings. — Tn  the  absence  of  statutory 
provisions  re(iiiiring-  proceedings  once  begun  to  l)e  prosecuted  to  com- 
pletion, it  is  almost  universally  held  that  the  party  instituting  them 
has  a  right  to  withdraw  at  any  time  before  the  compensation  is  deter- 
mined ;  that  is,  before  the  confirmation  of  the  commissioner's  report.^"' 
And  although  it  is  held  in  New  York  that  "the  order  of  confirma- 
tion operates  as  a  judgment  binding  both  parties,"^ *''^  the  prevailing 
rule  is  that  the  public  authorities  have  a  reasonable  time  to  decide 
whether  to  accept  the  land  or  other  property  at  the  price  fixed  or  to 
discontinue  the  proceedings.^®^ 


>"  Steuart  v.  Mayor  &c.,  7  Md.  500; 
Hapgood  v.  Doherty,  8  Gray  (Mass.) 
373;  Tharp  v.  Witham,  6.5  Iowa  566; 
s.  c.  22  N.  W.  677;  Maxwell  v.  Board 
&c.,  119  Ind.  20,  23;  s.  e.  19  N.  E. 
617;  21  N.  E.  453;  Lamb  v.  Lane,  4 
Ohio  St.  167;  Reckner  v.  Warner,  22 
Ohio  St.  275;  Mayor  &c.  v.  Central 
R.  Co.,  53  Ga.  120.  A  bond  may  be 
required  by  statute  on  appeal:  Lewis 
Eminent  Domain,  §  312  and  cases 
cited. 

^««  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Hock,  118 
111.  587;  s.  c.  9  N.  E.  205. 

'«'  City  of  Elkhart  v.  Simonton,  71 
Ind.  7:  Brokaw  v.  City  of  Terra 
Haute,  97  Ind.  451;  Pittsburgh  &c. 
R.  Co.  V.  Swinney,  97  Ind.  586; 
Hunting  v.  Curtis,  10  Iowa  152;  Cor- 
bin  v.  Cedar  Rapids  &c.  R.  Co.,  66 
Iowa  73 ;  s.  c.  23  N.  W.  270 ;  Graff  v. 
Mayor  &c.,  10  Md.  544;  Black  v. 
Mayor  &c.,  50  Md.  235;  Clarke  v. 
Manchester,  56  N.  H.  502;  Whyte  v. 
City  of  Kansas,  22  Mo.  App.  409; 
City  of  St.  .Joseph  v.  Hamilton,  43 
Mo.  282;  Stiles  v.  Town  of  Middle- 
sex, 8  Vt.  436;  Hullin  v.  Second  Mu- 
nicipality, 11  Rob.  (La.)  97;  Appli- 
cation &c.  for  Widening  of  Roffig- 
nac  St.,  4  Rob.  (La.)  357:  Stevens 
v.  Borough  of  Danbury.  53  Conn. 
9:  O'Neil  v.  Board  &c..  41  N.  J.  L. 
161;  Chesapeake  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Brad- 


ford, 6  W.  Va.  220.  In  New  York  it 
was  held  that  the  court  may  impose 
conditions:  Matter  of  Waverly  Wa- 
ter-Works, 85  N.  Y.  478.  See  also, 
Beekman  Street,  20  Johns.  (N.  Y.) 
269;  Lewis  Eminent  Domain,  §  655. 
It  would  seem  to  be  reasonable  to 
require  a  party  to  make  his  election 
within  the  time  allowed  for  filing 
objections  to  the  report:  Crume  v. 
Wilson,  104  Ind.  583;  s.  c.  4  N.  E. 
169;  People  v.  Common  Council  &c., 
78  N.  Y.  56.  In  England,  after  no- 
tice of  intention  to  take,  even  be- 
fore the  price  is  ascertained,  the 
proprietor  acquires  the  right  to  in- 
sist upon  fulfilment  of  the  award 
when  made:  Birmingham  &c.  R.  Co. 
V.  Reg.,  6  Ry.  Cas.  628;  s.  c.  4  Eng. 
L.  &  Eq.  276;  King  v.  Market  St. 
Com'rs,  4  B.  &  Ad.  333;  Stone  v. 
Commercial  R.  Co.,  4  M.  &  C.  122; 
Walker  v.  Eastern  Counties  R.  Co..  6 
Hare  594;  Tawney  v.  Lynn  &c.  R. 
Co.,  16  L.  J.   (N.  S.)  Eq.  282. 

"'  Matter  of  Rhinebeck  &c.  R.  Co., 
67  N.  Y.  242.  See  also,  Drath  v. 
Burlington  &c.  R.  Co.,  15  Neb.  367; 
s.  c.  18  N.  W.  717. 

'<■■'•  O'Neil  V.  Board  &c.,  41  N.  .J.  L. 
161;  State  v.  Halsted.  39  N.  J.  L. 
640;  Merrick  v.  Mayor  &c.,  43  Md. 
219;  Mayor  &c.  v.  Musgrave,  48  Md. 
272;  City  of  St.  Joseph  v.  Hamilton, 


17 


PUBLIC    CORrOHATIONS. 


700 


§  717.  Damages  upon  discontinuance  of  proceedings. — Upon  a  dis- 
continuance the  landowner  is  entitled  to  recover  his  legal  costs,  at 
any  rate,  and  probably  other  legitimate  expenses/'^'*  which  in  one 
case  were  held  not  to  include  counsel  fees.^^^  "If,  pending  proceed- 
ings, possession  has  been  taken  of  the  property  sought  to  be  con- 
demned, the  abandonment  of  such  proceedings  renders  such  possession 
wrongful  from  the  beginning,  and  a  suit  will  lie  for  any  damages 
occasioned  by  the  entry  and  possession. "^^^  In  many  cases  the  owner 
is  kept  in  suspense  for  a  considerable  period  before  the  election  to  dis- 
continue is  made,  during  which  time  he  is  unable  to  dispose  of  his 
property,  deems  it  injudicious  to  improve  it,  or  is  otherwise  deprived 
of  the  beneficial  use  of  it.  The  supreme  court  of  Louisiana  declared 
that  the  fact  of  great  delay  and  abandonment  of  the  suit  was  prima 
facie  evidence  that  it  was  unnecessary  and  gave  judgment  for  dam- 
ages.^'^^  The  same  doctrine  was  laid  down  by  the  court  of  appeals  of 
Maryland,^ ^*  and  subsequently  affirmed  with  the  qualification  that  the 


43  Mo.  282;  People  v.  Village  of 
Hyde  Park,  117  111.  462;  s.  c.  6  N.  E. 
33;  Wilkinson  v.  Bixler,  88  Ind.  574; 
Carson  v.  City  of  Hartford,  48  Conn. 
68;  State  v.  Mills,  29  Wis.  322. 
There  should  be  no  unreasonable  de- 
lay: Baltimore  &c.  Co.  v.  Nesbit,  10 
How.  395.  See  also,  Williams  v. 
New  Orleans  R.  Co.,  60  Miss.  689. 
But,  in  favor  of  the  property  owner, 
an  unreasonable  delay  may  consti- 
tute an  abandonment  by  implica- 
tion: Bensley  v.  Mountain  Lake 
Water  Co.,  13  Cal.  306.  For  other 
cases  of  constructive  abandonment, 
see  State  v.  Halsted,  39  N.  J.  L.  640; 
Breese  v.  Poole,  16  111.  App.  551. 
Costs  of  discontinuance:  North 
Missouri  R.  Co.  v.  Lackland,  25  Mo. 
515.  The  right  to  abandon  pro- 
ceedings is  frequently  regulated  by 
statute,  and  many  cases  construing 
these  provisions  are  cited  in  Lewis 
Eminent  Domain,  §  356. 

^■"Carson  v.  City  of  Hartford,  48 
Conn.  68;  Graff  v.  Mayor  &c.,  10 
Md.  544;  State  v.  Graves,  19  Md. 
351;  Gear  v.  Dubuque  &c.  R.  Co.,  20 
Iowa  523;  McLaughlin  v.  Municipal- 
ity, 5  La.  An.  504.  See  also,  Martin 
v.  Mayor,  1  Hill  (N.  Y.)  545;  Feiten 


v.  City  of  Milwaukee,  47  Wis.  494; 
s.  c.  2  N.  W.  1148;  Leisse  v.  St.  Louis 
&c.  R.  Co.,  72  Mo.  561;  North  Mis- 
souri &c.  R.  Co.  V.  Lackland,  25  Mo. 
515;  State  v.  Waldron,  17  N.  J.  L. 
369. 

>'i  Bergman  v.  St.  Paul  &c.  R.  Co., 
21  Minn.  533. 

'"-Lewis  Eminent  Domain,  §  658; 
citing  Pittsburgh  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Swin- 
ney,  97  Ind.  586;  Hullin  v.  Second 
Municipality,  11  Rob.  (La.)  97;  Van 
Valkenburg  v.  City  of  Milwaukee, 
43  Wis.  574. 

"^  McLaughlin  v.  Municipality,  5 
La.  An.  504.  Where  the  proceed- 
ings are  rightfully  discontinued, 
after  award  made,  the  landowner's 
remedy,  if  he  has  any,  is  by  special 
action  for  damages  and  not  by  man- 
damus or  other  action  to  collect  the 
amount:  State  v.  Graves,  19  Md. 
351;  Milliard  v.  City  of  Lafayette, 
5  La.  An.  112;  In  re  Canal  St.,  11 
Wend.   (N.  Y.)   155. 

"^  Norris  v.  Mayor  &c.,  44  Md. 
598,  holding  that  the  measure  of 
damages  is  interest  upon  the  mar- 
ket value  of  the  property  for  the 
time  the  delay  was  without  justifi- 
able excuse. 


701 


EMINENT    DO]N[ATN'. 


718 


delay  must  be  culpable  or  unreasonable,  which  is  a  question  of  fact 
for  the  jury/'^^'     Further  than  tliis  the  courts  are  not  disposed  to 

§  718.  Compensation. — Pecuniary  compensation  must  be  paid  to 
the  person  wlioso  property  is  taken,  the  amount  of  which  is  fixed  by 
inquest  before  a  jury  or  before  commissioners.  The  compensation 
must  be  the  full  reasonable  value  of  the  interest  appropriated,  and  tJie 
measure  of  damages  is  the  market  value. ^"^  In  estimating  the  market 
value  speculative  considerations  do  not  have  weight  unless,  in  excep- 
tional cases,  the  probable  increase  in  value  from  whatever  cause 
can  be  very  clearly  proven.  But  improvements  on  the  property  taken 
may  not  be  disregarded."®     The  market  value  is  usually  calculated 


"=  Black  v.  Mayor  &c.,  50  Md.  235. 
To  the  same  effect  see  Leisse  v.  St. 
Louis  &c.  R.  Co.,  2  Mo.  App.  Repr. 
105;  s.  c.  5  Mo.  App.  585;  s.  c.  af- 
firmed in  72  Mo,  561.  See  also, 
Whyte  v.  City  of  Kansas,  22  Mo. 
App.  409. 

""  Carson  v.  City  of  Hartford,  48 
Conn.  68;  Bergman  v.  St.  Paul  &c. 
R.  Co.,  21  Minn.  533;  Van  Vallien- 
burg  v.  City  of  Milwaulvee,  43  Wis. 
574;  Feiten  v.  City  of  Milwaulvee, 
47  Wis.  494;  s.  c.  2  N.  W.  1148.  Mar- 
tin v.  Mayor  &c.,  1  Hill  (N.  Y.)  545, 
decides  that  there  is  no  action  even 
for  unreasonable  delay.  Where  the 
proceedings  are  abandoned  after 
award  made  and  subsequently  recom- 
menced, it  has  been  held  that  the 
first  award  is  binding  and  a  bar  to 
the  new  proceedings:  Rogers  v.  City 
of  St.  Charles,  3  Mo.  App.  41.  See 
also,  Hupert  v.  Anderson,  35  Iowa 
578.  Many  statutes  now  give  a 
right  to  recover  damages  upon 
abandonment.  The  expression 
"trouble  and  expense"  is  construed 
in  Whitney  v.  City  of  Lynn,  122 
Mass.  338.  See  also,  Stafford  v. 
Mayor  &c.,  7  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  541. 

'"Hill  v.  Mohawk  &c.  R.  Co.,  5 
Denio  (N.  Y.)  206;  In  re  Purman 
St.,  17  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  649;  Lawrence 
V.  City  of  Boston,  119  Mass.  126; 
Burt  V.  Brigham,  117  Mass.  307; 
Cobb  V.  City  of  Boston,  112  Mass. 
181;    Fall   River   Works   v.    City   of 


Fall  River,  110  Mass.  428;  Edmunds 
V.  City  of  Boston,  108  Mass.  535; 
King  V.  Minneapolis  Union  R.  Co., 
32  Minn.  224;  s.  c.  20  N.  W.  135; 
Jones  V.  New  Orleans  &c.  R.  Co.,  70 
Ala.  227;  Cohen  v.  St.  Louis  &c.  R. 
Co.,  34  Kan.  158;  s.  c.  8  Pac.  138;  St. 
Louis  &c.  R.  Co.  V.  Anderson,  39 
Ark.  167;  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Ja- 
cobs, 110  111.  414;  Jacksonville'  &c. 
R.  Co.  V.  Walsh,  106  111.  253;  Sidener 
V.  Essex,  22  Ind.  201;  Cummins  v. 
Des  Moines  &c.  R.  Co.,  63  Iowa  397; 
s.  c.  19  N.  W.  268;  Bangor  &c.  R.  Co. 
V.  McComb,  60  Maine  290;  Fremont 
&c.  R.  Co.  V.  Whalen,  11  Neb.  585;  s. 
c.  10  N.  W.  491;  Virginia  &c.  R.  Co. 
V.  Elliott,  5  Nev.  358;  Pittsburg  &c. 
R.  Co.  v.  Rose,  74  Pa.  St.  362;  How- 
ard V.  City  of  Providence,  6  R.  I. 
514;  Chapman  v.  Oshkosh  &c.  R. 
Co.,  33  Wis.  629;  City  of  Memphis  v. 
Bolton,  9  Heisk.  (Tenn.)  508;  On- 
tario &c.  R.  Co.  V.  Taylor,  6  Ont. 
Rep.  Q.  B.  D.  338;  Penny  v.  Penny, 
37  L.  J.  Ch.  340.  Witnesses  ac- 
quainted witlj  the  market  value  may 
testify  to  their  opinion,  though  it  is 
said  to  be  the  prevailing  rule  that  a 
witness  can  not  be  asked  how  much 
damages  a  party  has  suffei'ed:  Elli- 
ott Roads  &  Streets  (2d  ed.),  §  258, 
and  cases  cited. 

"*  Jacksonville  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Walsh, 
106  111.  253;  Lafayette  &c.  R.  Co.  v. 
Winslow,  66  111.  219. 


§    719  PUBLIC    COKI'OKATIOXS.  703 

at  what  the  property  woiikl  "bring  in  the  hnnds  of  a  prudent  seller  at 
liberty  to  fix  the  time  and  the  conditions  of  the  sale."^^^  And  con- 
siderations of  association  or  affection  are  not  admitted.  In  Massa- 
chusetts the  court  held  that  it  was  not  competent  to  take  into  account 
what  the  owner  would  give  rather  than  be  turned  out  of  his  prop- 
erty.^^°  Nor  can  the  fact  that  the  particular  lot  is  absolutely  indis- 
pensable to  the  project  of  the  corporation  be  made  an  element  in  its 
value.^^^  But  of  course  the  purpose  to  which  property  has  been  put 
and  in  view  of  which  improvements  have  been  made  is  very  justly  a 
factor  in  the  case.^^^ 

§  719.  Elements  in  estimating  compensation. — The  statement  that 
the  indispensability  of  the  property  to  the  taker's  purposes  is  not  to 
affect  the  amount  of  compensation  must  be  taken  with  the  qualifica- 
tion that  where  property  is  found  in  every  way  suitable  and  he  seeks 
to  condemn  it,  although  other  property  could  be  obtained  not  quite 
so  conveniently  situated,  the  owner  is  entitled  to  the  benefit  of  the 
suitability  in  estimating  its  value.  In  the  case  of  Boom  Co.  v. 
Patterson,^®^  the  plaintiff,  a  boom  construction  company,  entitled 
by  law  to  enter  upon  and  occupy  lands  necessary  properly  to 
conduct  its  business,  sought  to  acquire  a  chain  of  islands  in  the 
Mississippi  river,  very  well  fitted  to  form,  by  connecting  their  shore 
line,  a  boom  of  great  dimensions.  The  result  of  the  original  proceed- 
ings was  an  award  of  $3,000,  from  which  both  parties  appealed. 
Upon  a  second  appraisement  the  jury  assessed  the  value  of  the  prop- 
erty at  $300,  but  in  view  of  its  adaptability  for  boom  purposes  they 
found  a  further  and  additional  value  of  $9,058.33.  The  company 
contended  that  the  $300  appraisal  was  all  it  could  be  made  to  pay. 
Mr.  Justice  Field,  for  the  court,  said:  "In  determining  the  value  of 
land  appropriated  for  public  purposes  the  same  considerations  are  to 
be  regarded  as  in  a  sale  of  property  between  private  parties.  The 
inquiry  in  such  cases  must  be,  Wliat  is  the  property  worth  in  the 
market,  viewed  not  merely  with  reference  to  the  uses  to  which  it  is 

""6   Am.   &  Eng.   Encyc.   of   Law  Nev.  358;   Penny  v.  Penny,  37  L.  J. 

568;  citing  among  other  cases,  Law-  Ch.  340. 

rence  v.  City  of  Boston,   119   Mass.  ^^^  Michigan  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Barnes, 

126;    City  of  Memphis  v.  Bolton,   9  44  Mich.  222;  s.  c.  6  N.  W.  651;  Price 

Heisk.  (Tenn.)  508;  Tufts  v.  City  of  v.  Milwaukee  &c.  R.  Co.,  27  Wis.  98; 

Charlestown,   4   Gray    (Mass.)    537;  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Jacobs,  110  111. 

Cobb  V.  City  of  Boston,   112   Mass.  414;  Robb  v.  Maysville  &c.  Tpk.  Co., 

181.  3   Met.    (Ky.)    117;    King  v.   Minne- 

''"  Tufts  V.  City  of  Charlestown,  4  apolis  Union  R.  Co.,  32  Minn.  224;  s. 

Gray   (Mass.)   537.  c.  20  N.  W.  135. 

'''  Virginia  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Elliott,  5  ^''  98  U.  S.  403. 


703  EMINENT   DOMAIN,  §    720 

at  the  time  applied,  but  witli  reference  to  the  uses  to  which  it  is 
plainly  adapted;  that  is  to  say,  what  is  its  worth  from  its  availability 
for  valuable  uses  ?  Property  is  not  to  be  deemed  worthless  because  the 
owner  allows  it  to  go  to  waste,  or  to  be  regarded  as  valueless  because 
he  is  unable  to  put  it  to  any  use.  Others  may  be  able  to  use  it,  and 
make  it  subserve  the  necessities  or  conveniences  of  life.  Its  capability 
of  being  made  thus  available  gives  it  a  market  value  which  can  be 
readily  estimated.  *  *  *"  The  learned  justice  goes  on  to  show 
the  adaptability  of  the  islands  to  the  company's  purposes,  and  adds: 
"Their  adaptability  for  boom  purposes  was  a  circumstance,  there- 
fore, which  the  owner  had  a  right  to  insist  upon  as  an  element  in 
estimating  the  value  of  his  lands."^** 

§  720.  The  same  subject  continued. — Some  cases  go  even  further 
and  hold  that  the  owner  is  entitled  to  the  highest  price  the  property 
will  bring  for  the  use  to  which  it  may  most  advantageously  be  ap- 
plied.^^^  Judge  Cooley  expresses  himself  on  the  subject  of  compensa- 
tion as  follows:  "The  principle  upon  which  the  damages  are  to  be 
assessed  is  always  an  important  consideration  in  these  cases,  and  the 
circumstances  of  different  appropriations  are  sometimes  so  peculiar 
that  it  has  been  found  somewhat  difficult  to  establish  a  rule  that  shall 
always  be  just  and  equitable.  If  the  whole  of  a  man's  estate  is  taken 
there  can  generally  be  little  difficulty  in  fixing  upon  the  measure  of 
compensation ;  for  it  is  apparent  that  in  such  a  case  he  ought  to  have 
the  whole  market  value  of  his  premises,  and  he  can  not  reasonably 
demand  more.  The  question  is  reduced  to  one  of  market  value,  to  be 
determined  upon  the  testimony  of  those  who  have  knowledge  upon  that 
subject  or  whose  business  or  experience  entitles  their  opinion 
to  weight.  It  may  be  that,  in  such  a  case,  the  market  value  may  not 
seem  to  the  owner  an  adequate  compensation,  for  he  may  have  reasons 
peculiar  to  himself,  springing  from  asociation  or  other  cause,  w^iich 
make  him  unwilling  to  part  with  the  property  on  the  estimate  of  his 
neighbors ;  hut  such  reasons  are  incapable  of  being  iahen-  into  account 
in  legal  proceedings  where  the  question  is  one  of  compensation  in 
money,  inasmuch  as  it  is  manifestly  impossible  to  measure  them  by 
any  standard  for  estimating  values  which  is  applied  in  other  cases  and 

^^  See  also.  In  re  Furman  St.,  17  "^  In  re  Furman  Street,  17  Wend. 

Wend.  (N.  Y.)  649;  Goodwin  v.  Gin-  (N.  Y.)  649,  650;   King  v.  Minneap- 

cinnati   &c.   Canal   Co.,   18   Ohio   St.  olis  Union  R.  Co.,  32  Minn.  224;  s.  c. 

169;   Young  v.  Harrison,  17  Ga.  30.  20  N.  W.  135.     See  also,  as  to  recov- 

That  no  allowance  is  to  be  made  for  ery    for    incidental    injuries    to   re- 

the  good  will  of  a  business,  see  Ed-  maining     land,     Elliott     Roads     & 

munds  v.  Boston,  108  Mass.  535.  Streets  (2d  ed.),  §  253. 


§  721  PUBLIC  conroRATioxs,  704 

wliieli  necessarily  measures  the  worth  of  property  by  its  value  as  an 
article  of  sale,  or  as  a  means  of  producing  pecuniary  returns."^^" 

§  721.  Benefits. — There  is  a  wide  difference  of  opinion  among  the 
courts  upon  tlie  question  whether  the  damages  for  tlie  land  taken  may 
be  offset  either  wholly  or  partly  by  the  benefits  that  accrue  to  the 
residue.  It  is  said  in  a  standard  treatise  that  the  authorities  range 
themselves  under  these  heads:  "1st.  Those  holding  that  benefits 
can  not  in  any  case  be  set  off  against  the  injury  sustained  by  the  land- 
owner.^*^ 2d.  Those  holding  that  special  benefits  may  not  be  set  off 
against  the  value  of  the  land  actually  seized,  but  may  be  set  off  against 
incidental  injuries  sustained  by  the  landowner.^**  3d.  Those  hold- 
ing that  special  benefits  may  be  set  off  against  the  value  of  the  land 
as  well  as  against  incidental  injuries."^**"  In  all  cases  the  benefits 
claimed  must  be  special  to  the  particular  parcel  affected^ ^°  and  of  a 
kind  not  common  to  the  public  at  large. ^^^  In  several  states  there 
are  statutory  or  constitutional  provisions  forbidding  a  deduction  on 
account  of  benefits.  In  declaring  the  construction  of  such  an  inhibi- 
tion the  court  of  appeals  of  New  York  said :  "Whatever  land  is  taken 
must  be  paid  for  by  the  railroad  company  at  its  full  market  value, 
and  from  such  value  no  deduction  can  be  made,  although  the  re- 
mainder of  the  landowner's  property  may  be  largely  enhanced  in 
value  as  a  result  of  the  operation  of  the  railroad.  But  in  considering 
tlie  question  of  damages  to  the  remainder  of  the  land  not  taken,  the 
commissioners  must  consider  the  effect  of  the  road  upon  the  whole 
of  that  remainder,  its  advantages  and  disadvantages,  benefits  and  in- 
juries, and  if  the  result  is  beneficial  there  is  no  damage  and  nothing 
can  be  awarded."^^" 

^""Cooley    Const.    Lim.    (6th    ed.)  Putnam  v.  Douglas  Co.,  6  Or.  328;  s. 

646,  647.  c.  25   Am.   R.   527;    Root's  Case,   77 

1"  Elliott    Roads    &    Streets     (2d  Pa.    St.    276;     Nichols    v.    City    of 

ed.),    §    245;     citing    among    other  Bridgeport,  23  Conn.  189.     See  also, 

cases,    New    Orleans    &c.    R.    Co.    v.  6  Am.  &  Bng.  Encyc.  of  Law  581. 

Moye,  39  Miss.  374;  City  of  Memphis  '""Mayor  &c.  v.  Long,  31  Mo.  369; 

V.    Bolton,    9    Heisk.    (Tenn.)     508;  Paducah  &c.  Co.  v.  Stovall,  12  Heisk. 

Israel  V.  Jewett,  29  Iowa  475;  Mayor  (Tenn.)     1;     Selma    &c.    R.    Co.    v. 

&c,  V.  Hartridge,  37  Ga.  115.  Camp,  45  Ga.  180;   Koestenbader  v. 

^^  Citing  among  other  cases,  Rob-  Price,  41  Iowa  204. 

bins  V.  Milwaukee  &c.  R.  Co.,  6  Wis.  '"'  Commissioners  &c.  v.  Johnston, 

636;  Shipley  V.  Baltimore  &c.  R.  Co.,  71    N.    C.    398;    Meacham    v.    Fitch- 

34    Md.    336;     City    Council    &c.    v.  burg  R.  Co.,   4  Cush.    (Mass.)    291; 

Marks,  50  Ga.  612;  City  of  Shawnee-  City  of  Springfield  v.   Schmook,  68 

town  V.  Mason,  82  111.  337;  Sutton  V.  Mo.    394;    Lipes   v.    Hand,    104    Ind. 

City  of  Louisville,  5  Dana  (Ky.)  28.  503;   s.  c.  1  N.  E.  871;  4  N.  E.  160; 

""  Citing  with   other  cases,   Mcln-  Penrice  v.  Wallis,  37  Miss.  172. 

tire  V.  State,  5  Blackf.   (Ind.)   384;  "=  Newman  v.  Metropolitan  &c.  R. 


705  EMINENT    DOMAIN,  '  §    723 

§  722,  Payment. — Where  the  constitution  does  not  provide  that 
payment  must  be  made  before  the  property  is  taken,  it  need  not  be 
given  in  all  cases  concurrently  in  point  of  time  with  the  actual  exer- 
cise of  the  right  of  eminent  domain.  It  is  enough  if  an  adequate  and 
certain  remedy  is  provided  whereby  the  owner  of  such  property  may 
compel  payment  of  his  damages.^"^  A  remedy  contingent  upon  the 
realization  of  a  fund  from  taxation  for  benefits  within  a  limited-as- 
sessment district  does  not  meet  the  requirements  of  the  law.^^*  And 
it  is  a  gross  violation  of  constitutional  right  to  compel  the  owner  of 
property  to  resort  to  a  lawsuit  in  order  to  recover.  ^^^  Judge  Cooley 
says :  "The  land  should  either  be  his  or  he  should  be  paid  for  it. 
Whenever,  therefore,  the  necessary  steps  have  been  taken  on  the  part 
of  the  public  to  select  the  property  to  be  taken,  locate  the  public  work, 
and  declare  the  appropriation,  the  owner  becomes  absolutely  entitled 
to  the  compensation,  whether  the  public  proceed  at  once  to  occupy  the 
property  or  not.  If  a  street  is  legally  established  over  the  land  of 
an  individual,  he  is  entitled  to  demand  payment  of  his  damages 
without  waiting  for  the  street  to  be  opened."^ ''^  But  where  a  town 
was  authorized  to  borrow  money  by  the  issue  of  its  bonds,  to  meet  any 
deficiency  in  local  assessments,  and  enable  payment  to  be  more  readily 
made,  the  court  of  appeals  of  New  York  held  that  the  provision  fur- 
Co.,  118  N.  Y.  618;  s.  c.  23  N.  E.  901.  Wallace  v.  Karlenoweski,  19  Barb. 
See  also,   Shipley  v.   Baltimore  &c.     (N.  Y.)   118. 

R.  Co.,  34  Md.  336;  Wilson  v.  Rock-         ^^^  Cooley    Const.    Lim.     (6th    ed.) 
ford  &c.  R.  Co.,  59  111.  273.  696;    citing  City  of  Philadelphia  v. 

1"^  Matter  of  Petition  of  United  Dickson,  38  Pa.  St.  247;  City  of 
States,  96  N.  Y.  227;  Bloodgood  v.  Philadelphia  v.  Dyer,  41  Pa.  St.  463; 
Mohawk  &c.  R.  Co.,  18  Wend.  (N.  Hallock  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  2  Met. 
Y.)  9;  Lyon  V.Jerome,  26  Wend.  (N.  (Mass.)  558;  Blake  v.  City  of  Du- 
Y.)  485;  People  v.  Hayden,  6  Hill  buque,  13  Iowa  66;  Higgins  v.  City 
(N.  Y.)  359;  Rexford  v.  Knight,  11  of  Chicago,  18  111.  276;  Town  of 
N.  Y.  308.     Cf.  2  Kent  Com.  339,  n.     Hampton  v.  Coffin,  4  N.  H.  517;  Har- 

^'■^  Sage  V.  City  of  Brooklyn,  89  N.  rington  v.  County  Com'rs,  22  Pick. 
Y.  189;  Chapman  v.  Gates,  54  N.  Y.  (Mass.)  263.  See  also.  City  of  Chi- 
132;  City  of  Lafayette  v.  Shultz,  44  cago  v.  Barbian,  80  111.  482;  Elliott 
Ind.  97;  Commissioners  &c.  v.  Dur-  Roads  &  Streets  (2d  ed.),  §  269. 
ham,  43  111.  86.  Title  does  not  vest  until  payment: 

195  Even  though  it  be  mandamus  to  New  Orleans  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Lagarde, 
compel  the  appointment  of  commis-  10  La.  An.  150;  Gillan  v.  Hutchin- 
sioners  of  appraisal:  Shepardson  v.  son,  16  Cal.  153.  Preliminary  sur- 
Milwaukee  &c.  R.  Co.,  6  Wis.  605;  veys  are  not  a  taking:  Cushman  v. 
Norton  v.  Peck,  3  Wis.  714.  See  Smith,  34  Maine  247;  Orr  v.  Quim- 
also,  Walther  V.  Warner,  25  Mo.  277;  by,  54  N.  H.  590;  Steuart  v.  Mayor 
Henry  v.  Dubuque,  10  Iowa  540;  &c.,  7  Md.  500. 
1  Smith — 45 


723 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS. 


706 


nished  adequate  seeurity.^"^  Where  the  statute  provides  a  remedy 
not  obnoxious  to  the  objections,  suggested,  it  is  only  by  that  means  that 
payment  may  be  enforced.^'''*  If  there  be  no  statutory  provision  the 
owner  may  of  course  have  an  action  for  his  moncy.^^" 

§  723.  Review  of  proceedings — Certiorari. — Where  the  proceedings 
are  merely  erroneous  the  remedy  is  usually  by  certiorari  or  appeal.^*''* 
A  writ  of  certiorari  (when  not  auxiliary  to  any  other  process)  is  in 
the  nature  of  a  writ  of  error,  addressed  to  an  inferior  court  or  tribunal 
whose  procedure  is  not  according  to  the  course  of  the  common  law, 
After  the  writ  has  been  issued  and  the  record  certified  in  obedience 
to  it,  the  court  is  bound  to  determine  upon  an  inspection  of  the  whole 
record  whether  the  proceedings  are  legal  or  erroneous ;  but  the  grant- 
ing of  the  writ  in  the  first  instance  is  not  a  matter  of  right  and  rests 
in  the  discretion  of  the  court,  and  the  writ  will  not  be  granted  unless 
the  petitioner  satisfies  the  court  that  substantial  justice  requires  it.^°^ 


"^  In  the  Matter  of  Church,  92  N. 
Y.  1.  The  Messrs.  Elliott,  whose 
opinion  is  always  entitled  to  weight, 
do  not  think  this  doctrine  ought  to 
prevail:  Elliott  Roads  &  Streets  (2d 
ed.),  §  237. 

^"^  Calking  v.  Baldwin,  4  Wend. 
(N.  Y.)  667;  Brown  v.  Beatty,  34 
Miss.  227;  Dodge  v.  Essex  Co. 
Com'rs,  3  Met.  (Mass.)  380;  Lafay- 
ette &c.  R.  Co.  V.  Smith,  6  Ind.  249; 
New  Albany  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Connelly,  7 
Ind.  32;  Indiana  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Oakes, 
20  Ind.  9;  Mills  Eminent  Domain, 
§§  87,  88;  Lewis  Eminent  Domain, 
§  608. 

"°  Jamison  v.  City  of  Springfield, 
53  Mo.  224.  If  the  property  be  tak- 
en without  payment  he  may  main- 
tain ejectment  in  Iowa  and  Missis- 
sippi: Daniels  v.  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co., 
35  Iowa  129;  Memphis  &c.  R.  Co.  v. 
Payne,  37  Miss.  700.  Contra  in 
Arkansas:  Cairo  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Tur- 
ner, 31  Ark.  494. 

'""'  Farmington  River  &c.  Co.  v. 
County  Com'rs,  112  Mass.  206.  In- 
junction is  not  the  appropriate  rem- 
edy: State  V.  Hanna,  97  Ind.  469; 
Buckley  v.  Drake,  41  Hun  (N.  Y.) 
384;  Tharp  v.  Witham,  65  Iowa  566; 
s.  c.  22  N.  W.  677.     Nor  mandamus 


to  compel  appointment  of  new  com- 
missioners: State  V.  Longstreet,  38 
N.  J.  L.  312. 

-'■'-  Farmington  River  &c.  Co.  v. 
County  Com'rs,  112  Mass.  206;  Com- 
monwealth V.  Sheldon,  3  Mass.  188; 
Ex  parte  Weston,  11  Mass.  417;  Lees 
V.  Child,  17  Mass.  351;  Freetown  v. 
County  Com'rs,  9  Pick.  (Mass.)  46; 
Inhabitants  &c.  v.  County  Com'rs, 
20  Pick.  (Mass.)  71;  Gleason  v. 
Sloper,  24  Pick.  (Mass.)  181;  In- 
habitants &c.  V.  County  Com'rs,  5 
Gray  (Mass.)  451,  453;  Ex  parte 
Hitz,  111  U.  S.  766;  s.  c  4  S.  Ct.  698; 
Pickford  v.  Mayor  &c.,  98  Mass.  491; 
City  of  Charlestown  v.  Commission- 
ers, 109  Mass.  270;  Petition  of 
Landaff,  34  N.  H.  163;  Tiedt  v.  Car- 
stensen,  61  Iowa  334;  s.  c.  16  N.  W. 
214;  Keys  v.  Marin  Co.,  42  Cal.  252; 
Boston  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Folsom,  46  N. 
H.  64.  Requisites  of  petition  for 
certiorari:  Chambers  v.  Lewis,  9 
Iowa  583;  Vanderstolph  v.  Highway 
Com'rs,  50  Mich.  330;  s.  c.  15  N.  W. 
495;  Richardson  v.  Smith,  59  N.  H. 
517;  Stokes  v.  Early,  45  N.  J.  L.  478. 
Petitioner  must  show  a  special  inter- 
est: Parnell  v.  Commissioners,  34 
Ala.  278. 


707  EMINENT   DOMAIN.  §    724 

The  writ  lies  only  to  correct  errors  in  law  and  not  to  revise  a  decision 
of  a  question  of  fact  upon  the  evidence  introduced  at  the  hearing  in 
the  inferior  court,  or  to  examine  the  sufficiency  of  the  evidence  to 
support  the  finding,  unless  objection  was  taken  to  the  evidence  for 
incompetency  so  as  to  raise  a  legal  question. ^°^  Whenever  the  case 
was  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  inferior  tribunal,  the  petitioner  for 
a  writ  of  certiorari  can  not  be  permitted  to  introduce  evidence  or  to* 
contradict  or  vary  its  statement,  in  its  record  or  return,  of  its  proceed- 
ings or  decision.^"^  It  is  only  where  extrinsic  evidence  has  been  in- 
troduced, at  the  hearing  upon  the  petition,  in  support  of  the  decision 
below,  and  by  way  of  showing  that  substantial  justice  does  not  require 
the  proceedings  to  be  quashed,  that  like  evidence  may  be  introduced 
by  the  party  petitioning  for  the  writ,  and  then  upon  the  same  point 
only.^"*  The  writ  must  be  addressed  to  the  court  having  the  custody 
and  control  of  the  record  of  the  proceedings  sought  to  be  quashed.^*' ^ 
It  can  only  be  granted  after  notice  and  opportunity  to  show  cause 
against  it,  and  if  granted  without  such  notice  will  be  quashed  as  im- 
providently  issued.-*'®  When  the  proceedings  are  before  county  com- 
missioners, notice  of  the  petition  should  be  given  to  them,,  the  answer 
or  return  to  the  petition  must  be  the  joint  act  of  the  whole  present 
board  and  the  separate  answer  of  one  commissioner  can  not  be  re- 
ceived.^"'^ 

§  724.  The  same  subject  continued — Appeal. — The  right  of  appeal 
is  purely  statutory.  ^^^  The  legislature  has  authority  to  deny  an  appeal 
and  to  make  the  decision  of  the  inferior  tribunal  final  and  conclusive, 
or,  if  appeal  is  allowed,  to  declare  what  questions  shall  be  and  what 
questions  shall  not  be  tried  on  appeal.^""     Ordinarily  only  parties  to 

^^  Hayward's      Case,       10      Pick.  ^"^  Commonwealth  v.  Winthrop,  10 

(Mass.)   358;  Nightingale's  Case,  11  Mass.  177. 

Pick.  (Mass.)  168;  Stratton  v.  Com-  -"''Commonwealth   v.    Downing,    6 

mon wealth,    10    Met.    (Mass.)    217;  Mass.  72. 

Cobb  V.  Lucas,  1.5  Pick.  (Mass.)  1.  ""'Inhabitants      &c.      v.      County 

^"^Pond  V. Medway,  Quincy  (Mass.)  Com'rs,  16  Gray  (Mass.)  341. 

193;  City  of  Charlestown  v.  County  ^"  Sims  v.  Hines,  121  Ind.  534;  s. 

Com'rs,  109  Mass.  270;    Inhabitants  c.  23  N.  E.  515. 

&c.     v.     County     Com'rs,     5     Allen  =»=>  Matter  of  State  Reservation,  102 

(Mass.)  13.  N.  Y.  734;  s.  c.  7  N.  E.  916;  Appeal 

'"*  Inhabitants    &c.,    Petitioner,    6  of   Houghton,   42   Cal.   35;    Sims   v. 

Pick.   (Mass.)   470;   Stone  v.  City  of  Hines,  121  Ind.  534;    s.  c.  23  N.  E. 

Boston,  2  Met.  (Mass.)  220,  228.   See  515;   State  v.  Mayor  &c.,  29  N.  J.  L. 

further,  as  to  practice  upon  hearing  441;    Ricketts    v.    Village    of    Hyde 

of  petition  for  certiorari.  Farming-  Park,    85    111.    110;    Norfolk   &c.   R. 

ton  River  &c.  Co.  v.  County  Com'rs,  Co.  v.  Ely,  95  N.  C.  77;   Murray  v. 

112  Mass.  206,  215.  Tucker,  10  Bush  (Ky.)  240;  Dough- 


724 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS. 


708 


the  proceedings  have  the  right  of  appeal.'^ "^  Notice  must  be  given 
and  served  as  the  statute  provides.^^^  The  practice  in  the  appellate 
court  is  generally  regulated  by  statute,  but  in  respect  of  matters  not 
included  in  the  statutory  provisions,  the  general  rules  of  practice  in 
similar  cases  are  adopted.^ ^^  The  appeal  operates  to  vacate  the  deci- 
sion appealed  from,^^^  and  the  case  is  usually  tried  de  novo  in  the 
appellate  court.^^* 


erty  v.  Miller,  36  Cal.  83;  Emery  v. 
Bradford,  29  Cal.  75;  Fass  v.  See- 
hawer,  60  Wis.  525;  s.  c.  19  N.  W. 
533.  Statutes  giving  appeals  are 
liberally  construed  so  as  to  embrace 
condemnation  proceedings  if  possi- 
ble: Howard  v.  Drainage  Com'rs, 
126  111.  53;  s.  c.  sub  nom.  Howard  v. 
Shaw,  18  N.  E.  313;  Yelton  v.  Addi- 
son, 101  Ind.  58. 

""  Canyonville  &c.  Road  Co.  v. 
Douglass  Co.,  5  Or.  280;  Barr  v. 
Stevens,  1  Bibb  (Ky.)  292;  Spauld- 
ing  V.  Milwaukee  &c.  R.  Co.,  57  Wis. 
304;  s.  c.  14  N.  W.  368;  15  N.  W. 
482.  "Persons"  includes  corpora- 
tions: People  V.  May,  27  Barb.  (N. 
Y.)  238. 

-"  People  V.  Lawrence,  54  Barb. 
(N.  Y.)  589;  Commissioners  &c.  v. 
Claw,  15  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  537;  Klein 
V.  St.  Paul  &c.  R.  Co.,  30  Minn.  451; 


s.  c.  16  N.  W.  265;  Waltmeyer  v. 
Wisconsin  &c.  R.  Co.,  64  Iowa  688; 
s.  c.  21  N.  W,  139.  Appearance  for 
the  purpose  of  moving  to  dismiss  is 
not  a  waiver  of  notice:  Spurrier  v. 
Wirtner,  48  Iowa  486.  See  also, 
People  V.  Osborn,  20  Wend.  (N.  Y.) 
186. 

"'- Elliott  Roads  &  Streets  (2d 
ed.),  §  362,  and  cases  there  cited; 
Lewis  Eminent  Domain,  §  540. 

"^  Minneapolis  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Wood- 
worth,  32  Minn.  452;  s.  c.  21  N.  W. 
476. 

'"  Hardy  v.  McKinney,  107  Ind. 
364;  s.  c.  8  N.  E.  232;  Blize  v.  Cast- 
lio,  8  Mo.  App.  290.  See  also.  Raw- 
lings  V.  Biggs,  85  Ky.  251;  s.  c.  8 
Ky.  L.  919;  3  S.  W.  147;  Kirkpat- 
rick  V.  Taylor,  118  Ind.  329;  s.  c.  21 
N.  E.  20;  Davis  v.  Mayor,  1  Duer  (N. 
Y.)  451. 


CHAPTEE  XVIII. 

MUNICIPAL    CONTRACTS. 

Section  Section 

725.  Municipal  contracts — General.       737.  Validity  of  contracts — General. 

726.  Contracts — By  whom  made.  738.  Contracts  which  have  been  held 

727.  What  is  municipal  contract.  valid. 

728.  Implied  contracts.  739.  Invalidity  of  contracts. 

729.  Ratification  of  contracts.  740.  Construction  of  contracts. 

730.  Rescission  of  contracts.  741.  Extras. 

731.  Modification    or    alteration  of     742.  Exclusive  franchises  and  priv- 

contracts.  ileges. 

732.  Acceptance  of  work  under  con-     743.  Contracts  ultra  vires. 

tract.  744.  Liability    of    municipality    on 

733.  Performance  of  contract.  contracts. 

734.  Waiver  of  performance.  745.  Estoppel. 

735.  Breach  of  contract — Remedy.  746.  Letting  of  municipal  contracts. 

736.  Payments  on  contract. 

§  725.  Municipal  contracts — General. — While  it  is  not  intended, 
in  this  connection,  to  enter  into  the  general  subject  of  the  law  of  con- 
tracts, yet  it  is  believed  that  the  subject-matter  of  municipal  contracts 
is  of  vital  interest,  and  deserves  more  than  a  mere  casual  treatment 
such  as  was  given  to  the  subject  in  the  first  edition  of  this  work.  We 
have,  therefore,  rewritten  the  chapter  and  endeavored  to  cover  the  field 
of  municipal  contracts,  though  in  a  very  condensed  form,  as  de- 
veloped principally  by  the  decisions  rendered  since  the  first  edition 
of  this  work  was  published.  The  general  features  of  the  municipal 
contract  are  not  unlike  those  of  the  ordinary  contract,  and  hence  will 
not  be  considered  herein.  There  are,  however,  certain  matters  per- 
taining to  contracts  of  municipalities,  which  are  unique,  and  are  of 
special  significance  and  importance  to  all  who  have  a  general,  or 
special,  interest  in  the  contractual  relationship  of  this  class  of  corpo- 
rations. 

§  726.  Contracts — By  whom  made. — As  a  general  rule  all  munici- 
pal contracts  are  made  by  the  common  council,  board  of  trustees,  or 
other  body,  by  whatever  name  designated,  in  whom  is  vested,  by  char- 
ter or  statute,  the  law-making  power  of  the  corporation.  By  custom, 
and  by  reason  of  the  greater  facility  in  the  matter  of  execution,  the 
ministerial  and  formal  execution  of  contracts  is  vested  in  some  bureau 

(709) 


§    72G  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  710 

or  departmont  of  tlic  nuinicipality,  or  in  the  mayor,  or  other  officer, 
but  their  power  to  act  is  special  and  must  be  found  in  some  formal  au- 
thority conferred  by  the  council,  unless,  indeed,  the  statute  or  charter 
confers  such  authority,  which  is  sometimes  done.  The  legislature  has 
seen  proper  in  some  cases  to  confer  upon  special  boards  or  bureaus 
the  power  of  corporate  agents  to  make  contracts  in  relation  to  cer- 
tain subjects  wholly  independent  of  the  council,  or  authority  from 
it,  but  such  legislation,  and  contracts  thereunder,  are  contrary  to  the 
general  rule.^  Concerning  the  power  of  corporate  agents  to  make  con- 
tracts in  behalf  of  the  municipality,  it  may  be  stated  that  their  power 
is  special  and  limited  and  usually  prescribed  by  the  statute  or  charter. 
Outside  of  this  scope  of  authority  they  have  no  power  to  act,  and  being 
special  agents  the  general  law  of  agency  applies  and  all  persons  dealing 
with  them,  in  the  matter  of  contracts,  must  do  so  charged  with  knowl- 
edge of  their  authority  to  act,  and  the  scope  of  their  power  to  bind  the 
corporation.^^  In  addition  to  this  there  is  also  the  limitation  upon  the 
corporation  itself  that  all  its  corporate  contracts  must  relate  to  strictly 
corporate  matters.  Where  the  limitation  on  the  power  of  the  city 
council  to  contract  appears  in  the  statute  or  charter  knowledge  of  such 
limitation  will  be  presumed  by  the  court.-     Where  an  agent  is  em- 

1  Paul  V.  City  of  New  York,  61  N.  tion  the  cost  between  the  city  and 

Y.  S.  570;  s.  c.  46  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  company  providing  that  such  agree- 

69;  Gushee  v.  City  of  New  York,  56  ment  when  approved  by  the  board 

N.  Y.  S.  1002;  s.  c.  26  Misc.  (N.  Y.)  of  railroad   commissioners  shall  be 

287.     Neither   the   commissioner   of  -final  and  conclusive  on  the  parties, 

water  supply  nor  the  board  of  public  a   contract   so   made   is   binding   on 

improvements   has  power   under  N.  the   parties,   though   not   authorized 

Y.  laws  of  1897,  ch.  378,  to  contract  by  the  city  or  ratified  by  the  coun- 

for  a  supply  of  water  and  for  fur-  cil:  New  York  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Wheeler, 

nishing  it  to  the  inhabitants  with-  72  Conn.  481;   s.  c.  45  Atl.  14.     The 

out  authority  conferred  by  previous  ^a  Condran  v.  City  of  New  Orleans, 

legislation     by     the     municipality:  43  La.  An.  1202   (mem.);  s.  c.  9  So. 

Press  Pub.  Co.  v.  Holahan,  62  N.  Y.  31;    Burchfield  v.  City  of  New  Or- 

S.  872;    s.  c.  29  Misc.    (N.  Y.)    684.  leans,  42  La.  An.  235;  s.  c.  7  So.  448; 

Cf.  Woodruff  V.  Catlin,  54  Conn.  277;  Fox  v.  Sloo,  10  La.  An.  11;  Ross  v. 

s.  c.  6  Atl.  849;  New  York  &c.  R.  Co.  City  of  Philadelphia,  115  Pa.  St.  222; 

V.  Bristol,  151  U.  S.  556;  s.  c.  14  S.  s.  c.  8  Atl.  398. 

Ct.  437;  Mooney  v.  Clark,  69  Conn.  -Black  v.  Common  Council  &c., 
241;  s.  c.  37  Atl.  506,  1080.  119  Mich.  571;  s.  c.  78  N.  W.  660.  In 
Where  a  special  act  empowers  a  all  cases  where  authority  is  con- 
special  commission  to  act  for  a  city  ferred  by  statute  upon  an  agent  a 
in  making  an  agreement  with  a  rail-  person  dealing  with  such  agent  is 
road  company  in  reference  to  abol-  bound  to  ascertain  the  nature  and 
ishing    grade    crossings   and    appor- 


711 


MUNICIPAL    CONTRACTS. 


'26 


ployed  by  a  municipality  to  make  a  contract,  as  is  frequently  necessary 
to  do,  it  is  necessary  that  his  authority  to  contract  shall  appear  of  rec- 
ord, and  thereby  appear  as  part  of  the  council  proceedings.^  Some- 
times in  the  administration  of  municipal  affairs  the  council  finds  it 
necessary  to  delegate  to  a  committee  power  to  make  a  contract,  but  such 
power  must  be  embodied  in  an  ordinance  and  the  details  as  to  scope, 
etc.,  fixed  as  far  as  possible.*  Where  the  contract  is  made  by  a  com- 
mittee, and  reported  to  the  council,  the  action  of  the  committee  should 
be  ratified  by  the  council,  and  thus  become  the  act  of  the  council  itself. 
In  such  case  the  power  of  the  committee  being  delegated  power  it 
follows  that  the  committee  can  not  delegate  its  power  to  a  subcom- 
mittee.^ A  contract  may  also  be  made  by  a  board  and  be  ratified  by 
the  council  in  a  case  where  the  council  originally  had  power  to  make 
such  contract.*^  But  where  a  board  is  authorized  by  statute,  as  in 
cases  of  public  improvements,  to  advertise  for  bids,  open  and  approve 


extent  of  his  authority:  Town  of 
Madison  v.  Newsome,  39  Fla.  149;  s. 
c.  22  So.  270.  And  in  dealing  with 
a  city  treasurer  parties  are  charged 
with  notice  that  he  has  no  power  to 
issue  city  warrants:  Bardsley  v. 
Sternberg,  17  Wash.  243;  s.  c.  49 
Pac.  499.  A  contractor  entering 
into  a  contract  with  a  municipality 
does  so  with  knowledge  of  the  limi- 
tations upon  the  power  of  the  mu- 
nicipality: Santa  Cruz  Rock  Pave- 
ment Co.  V.  Broderick,  113  Cal.  628; 
s.  c.  45  Pac.  863;  McAleer  v.  Angell, 
19  R.  I.  688;  s.  c.  36  Atl.  588;  Osgood 
V.  City  of  Boston,  165  Mass.  281;  s. 
c.  43  N.  E.  108.  The  rule  is  univer- 
sal and  general  that  persons  con- 
tracting with  a  municipal  corpora- 
tion must  inquire  into  the  power  of 
the  corporation  or  its  officers  to 
make  the  contract:  State  v.  Minne- 
sota &c.  R.  Co.,  80  Minn.  108;  s.  c. 
83  N.  W.  32.  Cf.  City  of  Chicago  v. 
Williams,  182  111.  135;  s.  c.  55  N.  E. 
123;  Kerr  v.  City  of  Bellefontaine, 
59  Ohio  St.  446;  s.  c.  52  N.  E.  1024. 

^  Where  an  agent  is  employed  to 
make  a  contract  on  behalf  of  a  mu- 


nicipality for  a  street  improvement 
his  authority  must  appear  of  record: 
Barker  v.  Southern  Const.  Co.,  20 
Ky.  L.  796;   s.  c.  47  S.  W.  608. 

^  A  committee  of  the  council  may, 
by  ordinance,  be  authorized  to  make 
a  contract  for  street  improvement: 
Reuting  v.  City  of  Titusville,  175  Pa. 
St.  512;  s.  c.  34  Atl.  916. 

^  A  part  of  the  members  of  a  com- 
mittee by  their  separate  action,  not 
at  a  meeting  of  the  committee,  can 
not  set  aside  the  formal  action  of 
the  committee  as  a  whole:  Mur- 
dough  V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  165  Mass. 
109;  s.  c.  42  N.  E.  502;  Shea  v.  Mil- 
ford,  145  Mass.  528;  s.  c.  14  N.  E. 
764. 

'^  The  test  as  to  the  power  of  a  mu- 
nicipal corporation  to  make  a  con- 
tract is  to  be  determined  by  the  fact 
as  to  whether  it  is  for  the  general 
good  of  all  the  inhabitants:  Sun 
Printing  &c.  Ass'n  v.  Mayor  &c.,  40 
N.  Y.  S.  607;  s.  c.  8  App.  Div.  (N. 
Y.)  230;  Hill  v.  City  of  Indianapo- 
lis. 92  Fed.  467.  Where  an  act  cre- 
ating a  city  board  is  held  to  be  un- 
constitutional the  contracts  of  such. 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS. 


712 


the  same,  and  let  contracts,  the  council  has  no  power  to  interfere  in 
any  manner  with  the  making  of  the  contract,  the  discretion  of  the 
board,  or  any  of  the  details,  although  the  improvement  is  beneficial 
to  the  city  and  the  duty  of  paying  therefor  devolves  upon  it.'^  The 
power  to  make  contracts  in  behalf  of  and  binding  on  the  municipality 
by  other  than  the  city  council  is  exceptional  and  special,  the  general 
rule  being  that  a  contract  must  be  made  either  by  the  council,  or 
under  its  authority  and  direction,  and  in  the  latter  case  the  act  is  min- 
isterial.® A  contract  may  be  based  upon  a  petition  of  taxpayers,  or 
even  upon  a  vote  of  tire  electors ;  nevertheless,  it  is  the  contract  of  the 
municipality.^  The  contract,  and  particularly  so  if  in  regard  to 
public  improvements,  involving  large  deferred  payments,  should  be 
by  ordinance  duly  enacted,  in  which  all  formalities  are  complied 
with.^*^  And  the  minutes  of  the  council  are  the  best  proof  of  the  con- 
tract, but  not  the  only  proof." 

§  727.  What  is  a  municipal  contract. — A  franchise  to  a  railroad 
company  by  a  municipality  based  on  valuable  privileges  given  the 
latter  which  are  lived  up  to  by  the  former  constitutes  a  contract 
which  can  not  be  violated  by  the  city.^-    Where  a  specification  for  a 


board  are  not  binding  on  the  city: 
City  of  Findlay  v.  Pendleton,  62 
Ohio  St.  80;  s.  c.  56  N.  E.  649. 

'  Moran  v.  Thompson,  20  Wash. 
525;  s.  c.  56  Pac.  29.  Where  the 
charter  gives  the  mayor  and  council 
ample  power  and  control  over  the 
streets  and  general  power  to  con- 
struct, pave  and  keep  them  in  re- 
pair, they  may  exercise  discretion 
in  matters  of  detail:  Seaboard  Nat'l 
Bank  v.  Woesten,  147  Mo.  467;  s.  c. 
48  S.  W.  939.  A  statute  providing 
for  the  incorporation  of  water  com- 
panies and  prohibiting  municipali- 
ties from  making  contracts  depriv- 
ing themselves  of  the  right  to  regu- 
late the  rates  does  not  apply  to  con- 
tracts with  individuals:  Los  Ange- 
les City  Water-Works  Co.  v.  City  of 
Los  Angeles,  88  Fed.  720. 

^  Neither  the  commissioner  of  pub- 
lic works  nor  the  mayor,  or  both,  can 
make  a  contract  without  authority 
from  the  council:  City  of  Chicago  v. 
Frazer,  60  III.  App.  404;  People  v. 
Town,  37  N.  Y.  S.  864;   s.  c.  1  App. 


Div.  (N.  Y.)  127.  Additional  water 
supply  can  only  be  procured  in  the 
city  of  New  York  from  action  of  the 
municipal  assembly:  Keator  v.  Dal- 
ton,  62  N.  Y.  S.  878;  s.  c.  29  Misc. 
(N.  Y.)  692.  A  contract  signed  by 
the  mayor,  under  seal  of  the  city, 
which  recites  that  the  name  of  the 
city  is  thereto  subscribed,  binds  the 
city:  Fehler  v.  Gosnell,  99  Ky.  380; 
s.  c.  35  S.  W.  1125;  18  Ky.  L.  238. 

"  Board  &c.  v.  National  Life  Ins. 
Co.,  90  Fed.  228. 

^"Noel  V.  City  of  San  Antonio,  11 
Tex.  Civ.  App.  580;  s.  c.  33  S.  W.  2G3. 

'^  In  the  absence  of  minutes,  parol 
proof  is  admissible:  City  of  Belton 
V.  Sterling  (Tex.),  50  S.  W.  1027. 
Utah  Rev.  St.  1898,  ch.  13,  §§  283, 
286,  repeals  Rev.  St.  1898,  §  206, 
subsecs.  36,  76,  in  reference  to  the 
power  to  make  contracts:  Nelden 
v.  Clark,  20  Utah  382;  s.  c.  59  Pac. 
524. 

'=  Western  Union  Tel.  Co.  v.  City 
of  Syracuse,  53  N.  Y.  S.  690;  s.  c.  24 
Misc.  (N.  Y.)  338. 


713  MUNICIPAL    CONTRACTS.  §    728 

public  improvement  fully  describes  the  work  to  be  done,  and  a  bid 
is  made  thereon  for  such  work  in  writing  and  it  is  accepted  and  entered 
of  record  it  constitutes  between  the  city  and  the  contractor  a  valid  con- 
tract. ^^  But  it  is  not  absolutely  essential,  however  desirable,  that  the 
contract  shall  be  in  writing,  although  the  charter  so  requires.  Thus 
where  the  contract  was  verbal  and  was  fully  performed  on  the  part  of 
the  contractor  he  was  permitted  to  recover.^*  Neither  the  municipal 
charter,  nor  a  statute  purporting  to  regulate  the  use  of  property  held 
by  a  public  corporation  for  governmental  or  public  purposes,  is  a  con- 
tract. ^^  A  resolution  by  the  city  council  passed  pending  an  injunc- 
tion proceeding  in  which  it  is  provided  that  a  proposed  draft  of  the 
contract  be  approved,  and  its  execution  agreed  upon,  to  be  performed 
as  soon  as  the  council  shall  be  free  to  act,  is  not  a  contract.^®  A  reso- 
lution of  the  council  that  the  mayor  be  instructed  to  purchase  certain 
property  for  a  certain  sum  and  on  certain  conditions  is  not  on  its  face 
a  contract  of  purchase.  ^'^ 

§  728.  Implied  contracts. — A  municipality  may  be  bound  by  an 
implied  contract,  concerning  a  matter  about  which  it  would  be  author- 
ized to  contract,  to  the  same  extent  as  an  individual.^^  In  other 
words,  where  a  municipality  is  authorized  to  contract  it  may  be  made 
liable  under  an  implied  contract. ^^  But  a  contract  will  not  be  im- 
plied where  goods  have  been  ordered  by  one  employe,  and  accepted  by 
another,  without  authority,  and  used  by  him.^"  Where  a  person  is 
compelled  by  municipal  officers  to  perform  labor  for  the  municipality 
under  a  judgment  which  is  void  he  may  recover  the  value  of  his 
services.^^  A  city  is  not  liable  to  a  person  who  volunteers  services.^^ 
Nor  is  it  liable  on  an  implied  contract  for  the  temporary  use  of  a 
hose  which  belongs  to  an  individual  but  was  used  under  the  suppo- 
sition that  it  belonged  to  the  city.^^ 

"City  of  Fort  Madison  v.  Moore,  Council  &c.,  114  Ala.  433;    s.  c.  21 

109  Iowa  476;  s.  c.  80  N.  W.  527.  So.  960. 

"  North  River  Electric  &c.  Co.  v.  ^'  Buck  v.  City  of  Eureka,  124  Cal. 

City  of  New  York,  62  N.  Y.  S.  726;  61;  s.  c.  56  Pac.  612. 

s.  c.  48  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  14.  -"New  Jersey  Car  Spring  &c.  Co.  v. 

« Covington  v.   Kentucky,   173  U.  City  of  Jersey  City   (N.  J.),  46  Atl. 

S.  231;  s.  c.  19  S.  Ct.  383.  649. 

'"  State  V.  Noyes,  25  Nev.  31;  s,  c.  ^^  Fox  v.  City  of  Richmond,  19  Ky. 

56  Pac.  946.  L.  326;  s.  c.  40  S.  W.  251. 

"  Carskaddon    v.    City    of    South  "  Lydecker  v.  Village  of  Nyack,  39 

Bend,  141   Ind.  596;    s.  c.  39  N.  E.  N.  Y.  S.  509;   s.  c.  6  App.  Div.   (N. 

667;  41  N.  E.  1.  Y.)  90. 

1^  Brush   Electric   &c.   Co.   v.   City  "  Dolloff   v.    Inhabitants    &c.,    162 

Mass.  569;  s.  c.  39  N.  E.  191. 


§    729  PUBLIC    CORPOHATIONS.  714 

§  729.  Ratification  of  contracts. — A  contract  that  is  within  the 
scope  of  the  city's  power,  but  irregular  in  that  it  was  made  by  resolu- 
tion instead  of  ordinance,  may  be  ratified  by  a  subsequent  ordinance 
without  a  new  consideration.-*  An  so  where  officers  of  a  corporation 
execute  a  contract  in  behalf  of  the  city  which  they  were  not  author- 
ized to  execute  but  which  should  have  been  executed  by  another  officer 
the  city  council  by  an  ordinance  duly  passed  may  ratify  the  contract.^^ 
Likewise  a  contract  which  has  been  improperly  executed  may  be  rati- 
fied by  the  departments  which  have  general  powers  over  such  matters, 
where  the  city  has  had  the  benefit  of  the  contract  performed  in  good 
faith. ^^  Where  a  contract  is  invalid  by  reason  of  some  irregularity, 
that  does  not  go  to  the  subject-matter,  it  may  be  the  subject  of  ratifi- 
cation in  so  far  as  it  has  been  executed,-'^  but  if  it  is  void  for  non- 
compliance with  statutory  requirements  it  can  not  be  ratified,  the 
requirements  being  mandatory,^'*  nor  can  a  contract  which  is  ultra 
vires  be  ratified.-''  Neither  does  the  attempted  ratification  of  a  void 
contract  work  an  estoppel  against  the  city.  Thus  where  the  board  of 
supervisors  of  a  city  and  county  authorize  the  payment  of  a  demand 
under  a  void  contract,  in  such  case  the  board  having  no  power  to 
make  the  contract  it  can  have  no  power  to  order  payment.^**  Where 
a  contract  made  by  a  water  board  is  outside  of  the  scope  of  its  powers 
it  may  be  rendered  valid  by  a  ratification  of  the  council,^^  for  a  city 
like  an  individual  may  ratify  the  acts  of  its  agent  provided  the  con- 
tract is  not  itself  unlawful,^ ^  and  where  original  power  existed  a 
city  council  may  ratify  the  unauthorized  act  of  another.^^     So  where 

^  State  V.  Cowgill  &c.  Mill  Co.,  156  works  must  receive  the  ratification 

Mo.  620;  s.  c.  57  S.  W.  1008.  of  the  council  the  board  has  no  pow- 

■'^  City   of  Chicago  v.   Galpin,   183  er  to  provide  in   the  contract  that 

111.  399;  s.  c.  55  N.  E.  731.  alterations    in    the    work    shall    be 

^  North  River  Electric  &c.  Co.  v.  added  to  or  deducted  from  the  origi- 

City  of  New  York,  62  N.  Y.  S.  726 ;  s.  nal    contract   price:    Chittendsn    v. 

c.  48  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  14.     Cf.  Port  City  of  Lansing,  120  Mich.  539;  s.  c. 

Jervis  Water-Works  Co.  v.  Village  of  79  N.  W.  797. 

Port  Jervis,  151  N.  Y.  Ill;   s.  c.  45  ^'Roberts   v.    City   of   Cambridge, 

N.  E.  388.  164  Mass.  176;  s.  c.  41  N.  E.  230. 

''  Frederick  v.  People,  83  111.  App.  ==  City  of  Findlay  v.  Pertz,  66  Fed. 

89.  427;  s.  c.  13  C.  C.  A.  559. 

-*City    of    Indianapolis   v.    Mann,  ^^Kcch  v.  City  of  Milwaukee,   89 

144  Ind.  175;  s.  c.  42  N.  E.  901.  Wis.  220;  s.  c.  62  N.  W.  918;  Davis  v. 

-» Ellis  V.  City  of  Cleburne   (Tex.  Mayor  &c.,  61  Mich.  530;  s.  c.  28  N. 

Civ.  App.),  35  S.  W.  495.  W.     526;     1     Dillon     Munic.     Corp., 

="  Santa  Cruz  Rock  Pavement  Co.  §  463;   People  v.  Swift,  31  Cal.  26; 

v.  Broderick,  113  Cal.  628;    s.  c.  45  Blen  v.  Bear  River  Co.,  20  Cal.  602; 

Pac.    863.     Where    the    charter    pro-  San    Francisco    Gas   Co.   v.    City   of 

vides     that     all     contracts     recom-  San  Francisco,  9  Cal.  45S;    Hoyt  v. 

mended    by    the    board    of    public  Thompson,  19  N.  Y.  207,  218;  Clarke 


715 


MUNICIPAL    CONTRACTS, 


§  729 


tlie  cit}^  has  undertaken  to  delegate  power  to  an  agent  but  the  delega- 
tion was  unauthorized,  the  acts  themselves  may  be  ratified.^*  A  con- 
tract may  be  ratified  by  a  statute  conferring  on  a  municipality  power 
to  enter  into  a  contract  previously  made  without  such  authority,  and 
the  ratification  is  of  the  date  of  the  approval,^  ^  but  a  ratification  by 
the  legislature  does  not  ratify  a  fraud  inherent  in  the  contract  and 
not  disclosed  to  the  legislature,^*'  nor  does  it  ratify  a  contract  made 
in  violation  of  an  existing  statute.^^  Where  a  corporation  is  empow- 
ered to  contract  for  the  purchase  of  goods,  it  may  bind  itself  by  an 
original  contract,  or  the  purchase  may  be  ratified  by  an  acceptance 
and  use,  or  directing  payment.^*  It  is  not  necessary  that  there  shall 
be  a  formal  ratification ;  as,  where  services  were  rendered  at  the 
request  of  the  president  of  the  board  of  trustees,  which  the  corpora- 
tion subsequently  accepted  and  agreed  to  pay  for.^**  An  action  of  a 
city  to  enforce  an  assessment  is  a  ratification  of  the  contract  on  which 
it  is  based.***    A  ratification,  by  a  vote  of  the  electors,  does  not  validate 


V.  Lyon  Co.,  8  Nev.  181;  Howe  v. 
Keeler,  27  Conn.  538;  Emerson  v.  In- 
habitants &c.,  13  Pick.  (Mass.)  377; 
Hodges  v.  Buffalo,  2  Denio  (N.  Y.) 
110;  People  v.  Plagg,  17  N.  Y.  584; 
s.  c.  16  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  36;  Brady 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  20  N.  Y.  312;  Delafield 
v.  Illinois,  2  Hill  (N.  Y.)  159,  176; 
s.  c.  8  Paige  (N.  Y.)  527;  26  Wend. 
(N.  Y.)  192;  Mills  v.  Gleason,  11 
Wis.  470;  s.  c.  8  Am.  Law.  Reg.  693; 
Dubuque  Female  College  v.  District 
Tp.  &c.,  13  Iowa  555;  Merrick  v. 
Burlington  &c.  Road  Co.,  11  Iowa 
74;  Mayor  &c.  v.  Jackson,  1  Doug. 
(Mich.)  106;  Crawshaw  v.  City  of 
Roxbury,  7  Gray  (Mass.)  374;  Bur- 
rill  v.  City  of  Boston,  2  Cliff.  590; 
Albany  Nat'l  Bank  v.  City  of  Albany, 
92  N.  Y.  363;  City  of  Galveston  v. 
Morton,  58  Tex.  409;  Strong  v.  Dis- 
trict of  Columbia,  1  Mackey  265; 
Town  of  Durango  v.  Pennington,  8 
Colo.  257;  s.  c.  7  Pac.  14;  Town  of 
Bruce  v.  Dickey,  116  111.  527;  s.  c.  6 
N.  E.  435;  Board  &c.  v.  Hinchman, 
31  Kan.  729;  s.  c.  3  Pac.  504;  Lin- 
coln v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  75  Maine 
141;  Schmidt  v.  Stearns  Co.,  34 
Minn.  112;  s.  c.  24  N.  W.  358;  Kings- 
ley  V.  Norris,  60  N.  H.  131. 


^*  Naegely  v.  City  of  Saginaw,  101 
Mich.  532;  s.  c.  60  N.  W.  46. 

^^  Chesapeake  &c.  Tel.  Co.  v.  Mayor 
&c.,  89  Md.  689;  s.  c.  43  Atl.  784;  44 
Atl.  1033. 

^^  Santa  Ana  Water  Co.  v.  Town 
of  Buenaventura,  65  Fed.  323. 

"  Board  &c.  v.  Mayor  &c.,  57  N.  J. 
L.  452;  s.  c.  31  Atl.  625.  A  law  may 
legalize  a  contract  between  a  city 
and  a  railroad  company  since  the 
legislature  may  confer  such  power 
by  retrospective  action:  Weed  v. 
Common  Council  &c.,  56  N.  Y.  S. 
105;  s.  c.  26  Misc.  (N.  Y.)  208.  The 
defects  in  the  preliminary  proceed- 
ings incident  to  the  making  of  the 
contract  may  be  remedied  by  a  cur- 
ative act,  but  this  does  not  neces- 
sarily render  the  contract  itself 
valid:  Windsor  v.  City  of  Des 
Moines,  110  Iowa  175;  s.  c.  81  N.  W. 
476. 

^^  New  Jersey  Car  Spring  &c.  Co. 
V.  City  of  Jersey  City  (N.  J.),  46 
Atl.  649. 

^^  Kents  V.  Village  of  North  Tarry- 
town,  64  N.  Y.  S.  178;  s.  c.  50  App. 
Div.  (N.  Y.)  502. 

"  City  of  Harrisburg  v.  Shepler, 
190   Pa.   St.   374;    s.   c.   42   Atl.    893. 


§    730  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  716- 

a  contract  as  of  the  time  it  was  made,  but  only  from  the  time  o£ 
ratification.*^ 

§  730.  Rescission  of  contracts. — Contracis  by  a  municipality  are  in 
the  exercise  of  proprietary  or  business  powers  and  are  governed  by 
the  rules  applicable  to  other  contracts,  and  when  without  fraud  and 
fairly  made  on  the  part  of  the  contractor  and  without  bad  faith  or 
misconduct  on  the  part  of  the  city  officials,  and  not  unreasonable,  can 
not  be  repudiated  by  the  city  after  performance  or  part  performance 
by  the  contractor.*^  A  court  will  not  cancel  a  municipal  contract 
upon  the  ground  that  the  city  made  a  bad  bargain,  paid  more  than  the 
property  was  worth,  and  that  the  council's  action  was  dictated  by  im- 
proper motives.*^  A  contract  entered  into  by  a  city  can  not  be  re- 
scinded by  verbal  instructions  given  by  members  of  the  council.  The 
corporation  alone  can  discontinue  a  contract,  and  such  discontinu- 
ance is  proved  by  the  M^ritten  minutes  and  records  of  the  council;** 
and  in  such  case  the  entry  in  the  minutes  of  the  council  that  a  claim 
was  disallowed  and  the  mayor  instructed  to  inform  the  claimant  that 
the  claim  would  not  be  paid  for  the  reason  that  the  company  had  not 
performed  its  contract  is  not  a  discontinuance  of  the  contract,  as  to 
future  accruing  claims  under  the  contract.*^  After  a  contract  has 
become  binding  it  can  not  be  rescinded  by  one  without  the  consent  of 
the  other  party.*''  A  municipal  corporation  can  not  avoid  a  contract 
that  has  been  ratified  by  the  electors  after  it  has  been  accepted  and 
performed  by  the  company  and  has  been  complied  with  by  the  city 
for  a  number  of  years,  on  the  ground  of  irregularity  in  the  election.*^ 
A  right  of  revocation  in  the  city  if  the  other  party  fails  to  fulfill 
the  contract  may  be  exercised  by  the  city  when  sufficient  grounds  exist 
therefor,  and  a  prima  facie  presumption  may  be  indulged  that 
the  revocation  is  on  good  grounds.*^  The  use  of  water  by  the 
city  under  a  rescinded  contract  will  render  the  city  liable  for  the 

Where  a  committee  was  authorized  "  City  of  Greenville  v.  Greenville 

to    make    a    particular    contract    it  Water  Works  Co.,  125  Ala.  625;  s.  c. 

may,  by  a  subsequent  vote,  ratify  a  27  So.  764. 

contract  made  by  its  chairman  and  ^'^  City  of  Greenville  v.  Greenville 

the     engineer:      May     v.     City     of  Water  Works  Co.,  125  Ala.  625;  s.  c. 

Gloucester,   174  Mass.   583;    s.  c.  55  27  So.  764. 

N.  E.  465.  ""  Hudson    Electric    L.    Co.    v.    In- 

*' Squire   v.   Preston,   31   N.   Y.   S.  habitants  &c.,  163  Mass.  346;  s.  c.  40 

174;  s.  c.  82  Hun  (N.  Y.)  83.  N.  E.  109. 

"  Little   Falls   Electric  &c.   Co.   v.  "  Cribs  v.  City  of  Lebanon,  98  Fed. 

City  of  Little  Falls.  102  Fed.  663.  549. 

*^  New  Orleans  v.  Warner,  175  U.  *'*  City  of  Newport  v.  Phillips,  19 

S.  120;  s.  c.  20  S.  Ct.  44.  Ky.  L.  352;  s.  c.  40  S.  W.  378. 


717  MUNICIPAL    CONTRACTS.  §    731 

water  so  furnished.*^  The  trustees  of  a  corporation  are  not  re- 
quired to  exercise  diligence  to  obtain  information  concerning  the 
nature  or  cost  of  work  for  the  benefit  of  bidders,  and  where  no  fraud 
is  imputed  to  the  trustees  a  contractor  is  not  entitled  to  a  rescission 
because  the  work  is^  more  difficult  than  he  was  expecting  from  the 
profile  and  data  in  the  engineer's  office,  or  because  some  of  the  trus- 
tees knew,  or  should  have  known,  of  the  existence  of  information  they 
did  not  communicate  to  the  contractor.^''  The  abandonment  of  a  con- 
tract induced  by  the  fraud  of  the  deputy  comptroller  does  not  render 
the  city  liable  to  an  assignee  of  the  contractor.^  ^  An  action  against 
the  city  can  not  be  maintained  to  recover  money  on  the  contract  after 
its  revocation.  The  action  is  for  a  breach  of  the  contract. ^^  A  bridge 
erected  as  part  of  a  street-improvement  under  an  authorized  contract 
can  not  be  removed  by  the  contractor  unless  it  can  be  done  without 
injuring  the  foundation  and  unless  he  refunds  what  has  been  paid 
to  him.°^ 

§  731.  Modification  or  alteration  of  contracts. — Where  two  munici- 
palities are  authorized  to  contract  with  each  other,  and  there  is  no 
limitation  placed  on  that  power,  they  may  make  any  reasonable  modifi- 
cation of  such  contract,  or  substitute  a  new  contract  in  place  of  the 
old  one.^*  Generally  speaking,  it  is  within  the  power  of  the  city  to 
provide  in  the  contract  for  changes  or  modifications  thereof  if  they 
are  made  in  good  faith,  honestly,  and  for  the  benefit  of  the  city.^^ 
The  general  rule  is  that  the  motives  of  the  council  are  not  the  subject 
of  review  by  the  courts,  but  a  resolution  of  a  council  waiving  a  re- 
quirement in  a  contract  for  a  public  improvement  is  administrative 
in  its  character  and  hence  the  motives  which  induced  its  passage  are 
proper  subjects  of  judicial  investigation.^®  A  contract  can  only  be 
modified  by  the  body  which  was  authorized  to  make  it.     Thus  a  con- 

*»  United  States  Water  Works  Co.  '"City  of  Newport  v.  Phillips,  19 

V.  Borough  of  Du  Bois,  176  Pa.  St.  Ky.  L.  352;  s.  c.  40  S.  W.  378. 

439;  s.  c.  35  Atl.  251.  ""  Berlin  Iron-Bridge  Co.  v.  City  of 

'°  Sanitary  Dist.  &c.  v.  Ricker,  91  San  Antonio,  92  Tex.  388;   s.  c.  50 

Fed.  833.  S.  W.  408. 

"  Jones  v.  Savage,  53  N.  Y.  S.  308;  =*  Arnold  v.  Mayor  &c.,  21  R.  I.  15; 

s.  c.  24  Misc.    (N.  Y.)    158.     A  con-  s.  c.  41  Atl.  576. 

tract  will  not  be  canceled  for  fraud  ^^  Filbert  v.  City  of  Philadelphia, 

on  the  part  of  municipal  officers  at  181   Pa.   St.   530;    s.   c.   37  Atl.   545; 

the  suit  of  a  taxpayer  where  the  con-  Weston  v.  City  of  Syracuse,  31  N.  Y. 

tractor    did    not    participate    in    the  S.  186;  s.  c.  82  Hun  (N.  Y.)  67. 

fraud  and   where  the  contract  was  ^°  Weston  v.  City  of  Syracuse,  158 

let  in  accordance  with  the  charter:  N.  Y.  274;  s.  c.  53  N.  E.  12. 
Seaboard  Nat'l  Bank  v.  Woesten,  147 
Mo.  467;  s.  c.  48  S.  W.  939. 


§    733  PUBLIC    COUi'OltATlONS.  718 

tract  subject  to  the  approval  of  the  council  can  not  be  altered  witliQut 
its  consent  and  approval."  Where  it  is  necessary  that  an  ordinance 
shall  be  ratified  by  a  popular  vote  in  order  to  the  creation  of  an  in- 
debtedness, the  proposition,  as  ratified,  will  control  a  schedule  made 
by  the  company  and  city  officials.^*^  A  contract  having  been  made 
granting  rights  and  franchises  can  not  be  modified  by  subsequent 
ordinances  limiting  the  rights  theretofore  granted,  where  it  is  not  a 
valid  exercise  of  police  power.'^'' 

§  732.  Acceptance  of  work  under  contract. — The  acceptance  of 
work  under  a  contract  within  a  specified  time  is  immaterial,  where 
the  city  permits  expenditures  under  the  contract  and  performance 
under  it  for  several  years.^"  In  other  words  the  acceptance  may  be 
implied.  Thus  where  the  contract  requires  the  work  when  completed 
to  be  accepted  by  the  city,  actual  use  of  the  improvement  after  com- 
pletion will  operate  as  an  estoppel  on  the  city  from  urging  as  a 
defense  the  non-acceptance.*'^  Fraud  on  the  part  of  the  contractor  in 
the  performance  of  the  work,  and  failure  on  the  part  of  the  proper  city 
officials  to  discover,  and  have  rectified,  the  fraudulent  work,  vitiates 
the  acceptance  of  such  part  of  the  work  and  renders  an  assessment 
void  on  abutting  property.®^  But  in  the  absence  of  fraud,  the  accept- 
ance of  work  when  property-owners  have  had  an  opportunity  to  be 
heard,  is  conclusive.''^  The  employment  by  a  contractor  of  members 
of  the  city  council  to  superintend  the  improvement,  and  by  such  em-' 
ployment  procuring  the  acceptance  of  work  not  in  compliance  with  the 
contract,  is  a  fraud  upon  the  property-owners  and  ground  for  resisting 
an  assessment.**'*  Where  material  used  has  passed  inspection  and  is 
equal  to  samples  furnished,  but  the  work,  as  a  whole,  has  not  been 
accepted,  the  contractor  is  liable  for  the  loss  occasioned  by  the  use  of 

"  Campau  v.  City  of  Detroit,  106  "=  Mason  v.  City  of  Des  Moines,  108 

Mich.  414;  s.  c.  64  N.  W.  336.  Iowa  658;  s.  c.  79  N.  W.  389. 

=*  Tacoma  Light  &c.  Co.  v.  City  of  "'  Green  v.  Shanklin,  24  Ind.  App. 

Tacoma,  13  Wash.  115;  s.  c.  42  Pac.  608;   s.  c.  57  N.  B.  269.     Nor  is  the 

533.  assessment  in  such  case  void  for  del- 

^^  City  of  Indianapolis  v.  Consum-  egating  to  the  contractor  power  to 

ers'  Gas  &c.  Co.,  140  Ind.  107;   s.  c.  determine   where   good   walks   exist 

39  N.  E.  433.  and   where  the  sidewalk  should  be 

"»  State  V.  Mayor  &c.,  19  Mont.  518;  built. 

s.  c.  49  Pac.  15.  ^  Green  v.  Shanklin,  24  Ind.  App. 

"1  Neosho  City  Water  Co.  v.  City  608;  s.  c.  57  N.  E.  269. 
of  Neosho,  136  Mo.  498;,  s.  c.  38  S. 
W.  89. 


719 


MUNICIPAL    CONTRACTS. 


733 


material  not  in  compliance  with  the  contract.*'^    The  city  has  no  right 
to  accept  part  performance  of  a  contract  for  an  entire  improvement."* 

§  733.  Performance  of  contract. — Where  the  statute  requires  a 
street-improvement  contract  shall  fix  a  time  when  the  work  shall  be 
commenced  and  when  completed,  and  the  contract  specifies  that  work 
shall  be  commenced  within  ten  days  and  completed  within  two  hun- 
dred and  forty  days  thereafter  it  is  a  sufficient  compliance.*^'^  The 
city  and  not  the  individual  property-owner  is  the  judge  whether  the 
contract  is  complied  with,  and  unless  there  is  a  fraudulent  abuse  of 
the  power  the  property-owner  is  concluded.  In  case  of  fraud  equity  is 
the  proper  remedy."^  Where  the  certificate  of  the  city  engineer  is  made 
final  and  tonclusive  by  the  contract  as  to  the  amount  of  work  done 
and  materials  furnished,  such  certificate,  in  the  absence  of  bad  faith, 
or  misconstruction  by  the  engineer,  will  be  binding. "''     A  guaranty 


«=  Goswell  V.  City  of  Louisville 
(Ky.),  57  S.  W.  476. 

™Berwind  v.  Galveston  &c.  Ins. 
Co.,  20  Tex.  Civ.  App.  426;  s.  c.  50 
S.  W.  413. 

"^  Rannsh  v.  Hartwell,  126  Cal.  443. 
Where  an  ordinance  designated  a 
sidewalk  20  feet  wide,  and  that  con- 
structed was  19  feet  and  7  inches,  the 
stone  curbing  being  5  inches  wide,  it 
is  a  sufficient  compliance  where  the 
pavement  is  paid  for  by  the  square 
foot:  Middlesborough  Town  &c.  Co. 
V.  Knoll,  21  Ky.  L.  1399;  s.  c.  55  S. 
W.  205.  A  slight  variance  in  the 
performance  of  a  contract  from  its 
requirements  resulting  in  no  injury 
to  the  improvement  and  no  in- 
creased cost  is  not  ground  for  re- 
straining the  payment  of  the  con- 
tract price  at  the  suit  of  an  abutting 
property  owner:  McCartan  v.  Inhab- 
itants &c.,  57  N.  J.  Bq.  571;  s.  c.  41 
Atl.  830. 

°« People  V.  McWhethy,  177  111. 
334;  s.  c.  52  N.  E.  479;  Ricketts  v. 
Village  of  Hyde  Park,  85  111.  110; 
Haley  v.  City  of  Alton,  152  111.  113; 
s.  c.  38  N.  E.  750.  Where  the  means 
of  payment  under  a  contract,  guar- 
anteed by  the  city,  have  failed,  as  in 
case  of  a  paving  contract,  where 
part  was  payable  by  property  owners, 
and  the  failure  can  not  be  attributed 


to  the  city  contractor,  the  city  is  lia- 
ble: Cole  V.  City  of  Shreveport,  41 
La.  An.  839;  s.  c.  6  So.  688,  affirming 
a  judgment  in  favor  of  the  contract- 
ors for  a  balance  due  on  a  paving 
contract  which  was  made  with  the 
understanding  that  the  owners  of 
land  fronting  on  the  street  were 
bound  for  a  portion  of  the  cost,  and 
the  city  guaranteeing  the  payment 
of  the  same  by  appropriation  of 
wharfage  dues  which  by  legislation 
afterwards  it  could  not  use  in  that 
way.  The  court  approved  and  fol- 
lowed Hitchcock  V.  Galveston,  96  U. 
S.  341.  A  contract  to  furnish  electric 
lighting  but  not  specifying  any  par- 
ticular source  may  be  enforced  al- 
though the  contractor  has  sold  and 
removed  his  own  plant  and  fur- 
nishes light  from  the  plant  of  an- 
other: Town  of  Colorado  City  v. 
Townsend,  9  Colo.  App.  249;  s.  c.  47 
Pac.  665.  Where  an  ordinance  and 
specifications  called  for  a  specified 
material,  and  the  contract  referred 
to  the  ordinance  and  specifications, 
both  of  them  were  held  to  be  bind- 
ing on  the  contractor:  Dunn  v.  Mc- 
Neely,  75  Mo.  App.  217. 

"^  Smith  V.  Mayor  &c.,  42  N.  Y.  S. 
522;  s.  c.  12  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  391. 
But  see  Quinn  v.  Mayor  &c.,  45  N.  Y. 
S.  7;  s.  c.  16  App.  Div.   (N.  Y.)  408. 


§    734  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  720 

of  performance  may  be  special  and  not  general,  as  where  a  contractor 
guarantees  to  make  all  repairs  which  may  become  necessary  from  any 
imperfection  in  the  work  or  material  within  a  specified  period.  Such 
guaranty  is  not  to  be  construed  as  a  guaranty  to  repair  irrespective 
of  the  causes.  ^"^  And  so  where  a  guaranty  was  for  a  period  of  five 
years  against  all  defects  due  to  proper  use  it  was  not  held  a  guaranty 
for  all  future  repairs  but  a  guaranty  of  substantial  compliance  with 
the  terms  of  the  contract.^^  The  performance  of  a  contract  by  a  con- 
tractor does  not  entitle  him  to  his  money  where  as  a  condition  pre- 
cedent to  the  making  of  the  contract  a  certificate  of  the  auditor  that 
the  money  required  is  in  the  treasury  to  the  credit  of  the  fund  has 
not  been  filed  and  recorded,  and  the  city  is  not  liable.^ ^  Where  the 
city  receives  the  benefit  of  a  part  performance  of  a  contract  with 
knowledge  of  the  non-performance  of  the  remainder  it  is  liable  for  the 
part  performed.'^^ 

§  734.  Waiver  of  performance. — Where  the  details  of  the  con- 
struction of  a  public  work  are  left  to  the  council  by  the  charter  it  is 
within  the  power  of  the  council  to  waive  performance  of  the  contract, 
in  so  far  as  work  done  has  not  been  in  compliance  with  the  contract, 
where  the  consent  of  property-owners  is  not  based  on  the  contract  as 
made.'^'*  A  waiver  of  compliance  with  a  contract  may  be  implied,  as 
where  a  contract  called  for  water  of  good  quality  to  be  furnished 
and  the  city  continued  to  audit  the  bills  and  use  the  water.'^^     But 

"°  City  of  Kansas  City  v.  Hanson,  tract  providing  for  delays  includes 

60  Kan.  833;  s.  c.  58  Pac.  474.  delays     occasioned     by     injunction: 

"  Allen  V.  City  of  Portland,  35  Or.  Whittemore  v.  Sills,  76  Mo.  App.  248. 

420;  s.  c.  58  Pac.  509.  There  is  no  right  to  abrogate  a  con- 

•=  Comstock  V.  Incorporated  Village  tract  on  the  ground  of  unnecessary 

of  Nelsonville,  61  Ohio  St.  288;  s.  c.  delay   in   completion   of  work  by  a 

56  N.  E.  15.  contractor  where  the  city  has  been 

"  Sykes  v.  City  of  St.  Cloud,  60  remiss  in  complying  with  the  re- 
Minn.  442;  s.  c.  62  N.  W.  613.  Under  quirements  of  the  contract  where  the 
an  agreement  by  which  the  city  cov-  contract  is  highly  penal:  Mayor  &c. 
enanted  that  it  had  not  done,  and  v.  Reilly,  59  Hun  (N.  Y.)  501;  s.  c. 
would  not  do,  anything  to  delay  the  13  N.  Y.  S.  521. 

contractor,    and    there    was    discov-        '*  Weston  v.  City  of  Syracuse,  158 

ered,  as  the  work  progressed,  an  ob-  N.  Y.  274;  s.  c.  53  N.  E.  12;  Meech  v. 

struction  which  existed  by  permis-  City  of  Buffalo,  29  N.  Y.  198;  Moore 

sion  of  the  city  and  not  removable  v.    City   of   Albany,    98    N.    Y.    396; 

by  the  contractor,  it  was  the  duty  of  Voght  v.  City  of  Buffalo,  133  N.  Y. 

the   city  to   remove   it  after  notice  463;  s.  c.  31  N.  E.  340. 
from  the  contractor  or  provide  for        '^  Creston  Waterworks  Co.  v.  City 

the    protection    of    the    contractor:  of  Creston,  101  Iowa  687;  s.  c.  70  N. 

Mairs  v.  Mayor  &c.,  62  N.  Y.  S.  351;  W.  739. 
s.  c.  30  Misc.    (N.  Y.)    384.     A  con- 


721  MUNICIPxVL    CONTRACTS.  §    735 

payments  on  account  on  certiticates  of  the  engineer  do  not  waive  the 
terms  of  a  written  contract  in  the  al)sence  of  evidence  that  such  was 
the  intention  on  the  part  of  the  council.'^*' 

§  735.  Breach  of  contract — Remedy. — Although  the  contract  pro- 
vides that  no  payment  shall  he  made  upon  it  until  the  cash  has 
been  collected  by  assessment,  yet  where  the  municipality  formally 
declares  that  the  contract  has  been  abandoned  and  refuses  to  levy 
an  assessment  to  pay  the  contract  price  the  contractor  may  sue  for  a 
breach  of  such  contract.'''^  A  contract  will  not  be  enjoined  in  its  ex- 
ecution because  of  irregularities  in  advertising  for  proposals ;  as  where 
the  advertisement  is  by  the  board  of  public  safety  instead  of  the  de- 
partment of  public  works.'^^  A  refusal  on  the  part  of  a  city  comptrol- 
ler and  deputy  to  pay  instalments,  and  a  denial  by  them  of  the  city's 
liability,  is  a  breach  of  the  contract.'^^  Proof  of  the  ordinance,  the 
contract,  performance,  acceptance  of  work,  issuance  of  warrant  and 
failure  for  four  years  to  provide  a  fund  from  which  to  pay  constitutes 
a  prima  facie  case  against  the  city,  and  the  burden  is  then  upon  the 
city  to  show  as  a  defense  that  a  failure  to  provide  the  necessary  funds 
was  not  owing  to  its  neglect  in  complying  with  the  charter  or  in  exer- 
cising reasonable  diligence.^ °  The  waiver  of  liquidated  damages 
based  on  delay  in  the  work,  is  not  to  be  construed  as  an  admission  by 
the  city  of  its  responsibility  for  the  delay.^^ 

§  736.  Payments  on  contract. — Where  the  method  of  payment  is 
prescribed  by  contract  or  by  statute  that  method  must  be  strictly  pur- 
sued.    And  so  where,  by  the  contract,  no  payment  is  to  be  made  until 

™  Dougherty   v.   Borough   of   Nor-  ^^  Mairs  v.  City  of  New  York,  65 

wood,  196  Pa.  St.  92;  s.  c.  46  Atl.  384.  N.  Y.  S.  160;  s.  c.  52  App.  Div.   (N. 

Cf.  St.  Paul  Gaslight  Co.  v.  City  of  Y.)   343.     The  non-enforcement  of  a 

St.  Paul,  78  Minn.  39;  s.  c.  80  N.  W.  penalty   in   a   contract  by  the   city 

774,  877.     A  vote  by  a  town  to  pay  council  is  not  a  defense  to  an  assess- 

a  judgment  rendered  on  a  contract,  ment,  such  penalty  having  no  rela- 

when    not   a   waiver   of   the   town's  tion  to  the  assessment  and  not  being 

rights, — see  Town  of  Grand  Isle  v.  provided  by  law:    Cass  Farm  Co.  v. 

Kinney,  70  Vt.  381;  s.  c.  41  Atl.  130.  City  of  Detroit,  124  Mich.  433;  s.  c. 

"  Weston  v.  City  of  Syracuse,  158  83  N.  W.  108.  La.  act  No.  133  of  1888 

N.  Y.  274;  s.  c.  53  N.  E.  12.  for  the  specific  enforcement  of  con- 

'*  Potts  V.  Philadelphia,  195  Pa.  St.  tracts  furnishes  cities  a  more  sum- 

619;  s.  c.  46  Atl.  195.  mary  remedy  against  private  corpo- 

'^  Jones  V.  City  of  New  York,  62  rations  for  the  enforcement  of  con- 

N.  Y.  S.  284;  s.  c.  47  App.  Div.  (N.  tracts     than     previously     existing: 

Y.)  39.  State  v.  New  Orleans  &c.  R.  Co.,  52 

^o  Jones  V.  City  of  Portland,  35  Or.  La.  An.  1570;  s.  c.  28  So.  111. 
512;  s.  c.  58  Pac.  657. 
1  Smith— 46 


^    736  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  722 

the  cost  of  the  work  has  been  ascertained,  and  assessed  upon,  and  col- 
lected from  the  taxpayers  this  is  a  condition  precedent  to  an  action  to 
recover  payment.  The  remedy  is  mandamns.*"  A  contract  by  a  city 
with  a  water  company  that  is  fair  and  reasonable,  in  the  matter  of  j)ay- 
ment  or  compensation  may  be  made  to  depend  upon  the  amount  of  tax 
assessed  against  the  water  company  for  municipal  purposes.^ ^  A  con- 
tractor may  enforce  payment  from  a  fund  derived  from  the  sale  of 
bonds  issued  for  the  construction  of  the  work  although  the  ordinance 
provides  for  the  payment  out  of  funds  derived  from  general  taxa- 
tion.®* Under  a  statute  giving  cities  and  villages  power  to  make  local 
improvements  by  special  assessment  or  by  special  taxation,  or  both, 
of  contiguous  property,  or  by  general  taxation  or  otherwise  as  they 
shall  prescribe  by  ordinance,  and  the  improvement  is  one  properly 
chargeable  against  abutting  property,  the  decision  of  the  city  council 
is  iinal,  and  a  contractor  is  not  entitled  to  be  paid  from  the  general 
taxation.®^  Where  a  contract  provides  that  payment  under  the  eon- 
tract  shall  not  be  made  until  the  work  is  completed  according  to 
agreement  and  the  completion  certified  by  specified  officers  the  certifi- 
cate does  not  estop  the  city  from  showing  the  correct  amount  and 
character  of  the  work  and  the  incorrectness  of  the  certificate.^"  An 
improvement  made  and  guaranteed  for  five  years  on  which  certifi- 
cates are  issued  whenever  two  blocks  are  completed  and  certified  to 
is  to  be  paid  for  in  cash  when  the  city  makes  appropriations,  and  not 
at  the  end  of  five  years. ^'^  A  contract  by  which  the  city  agrees  to  pay 
ninety  per  cent,  of  the  estimated  amount  of  work  done  for  the  preced- 
ing month  means  for  all  materials  furnished  in  the  preceding  month 
though  not  put  in  place.®®  Where  there  are  constitutional  limita- 
tions as  to  the  amount  of  municipal  indebtedness  a  contract  may  be 
made  payable  in  annual  instalments  if  such  instalments  are  within 
the  constitutional  limits.®^ 

^=  Weston  V.  City  of  Syracuse,  158  '*  First  Nat'l  Bank  v.  Keith,  183 

N.  Y.  274;  s.  c.  53  N.  E.  12;  People  v.  111.  475;  s.  c.  56  N.  E.  179. 

Mayor  &c.,  144  N.  Y.  63;  s.  c.  38  N.  «^  City  of   Pontiac  v.   Talbot  Pav. 

E.  1006;   Howell  v.  City  of  Buffalo,  Co.,  94  Fed.  65;  s.  c.  36  C.  C.  A.  88. 

15  N.  Y.  512;  Baldwin  v.  City  of  Os-  ""^  Dean  v.   City  of  New  York,   61 

wego,  1  Abb.  Ch.  App.  Dec.   (N.  Y.)  N.  Y.  S.  374;  s.  c.  45  App.  Div.   (N. 

62;    Beard  v.   City  of  Brooklyn,   31  Y.)  605. 

Barb.  (N.  Y.)  142;  Dannot  v.  Mayor,  "State  v.  City  of  New  Orleans,  51 

66  N.  Y.  585;  Hunt  v.  City  of  Utica,  La.  An.  699;  s.  c.  25  So.  421. 

18  N.  Y.  442.  ,  "'  Delafield  v.  Village  of  Westfeld, 

*' Maine    Water    Co.    v.    City    of  58  N.  Y.  S.  277;   s.  c.  41  App.  Div. 

Waterville,   93  Maine  586;    s.   c.   45  (N.  Y.)  24. 

Atl.  830.  '"  McBean  v.   City  of  Fresno,   112 

Cal.  159;  s.  c.  44  Pac.  358. 


723  MUNICIPAL    CONTRACTS.  §    737 

§  737.  Validty  of  contracts — General. — The  validity  of  ordi- 
nances, when  contracts,  has  been  treated  in  Chapter  XIV, '^'^^  and  will 
not  be  repeated  in  this  connection.  It  may  be  stated  generally  that  the 
contract  must  relate  to  a  subject-matter  within  the  scope  of  the  con- 
tractual powers  of  the  municipality.  It  must  not  be  in  contravention 
of  the  constitution,  the  general  statutes  or  the  municipal  charter,  and 
not  contrary  to  public  policy.  Where  the  charter,  or  other  law  gov- 
erning the  subject,  has  prescribed  certain  preliminary  steps,  in  rela- 
tion to  the  making  of  contracts,  which  are  mandatory,  these  condi- 
tions precedent  are  to  be  carefully  observed.  Where  the  charter  makes 
an  ordinance  effective  unless  vetoed  in  a  given  number  of  days,  and 
prior  to  the  expiration  of  this  period  a  contract  is  entered  into  under 
the  ordinance,  it  is  not  void,  and  on  the  expiration  of  the  time  allowed 
for  veto,  and  no  disapproval,  it  becomes  valid  and  binding  from  its 
date,  and  a  subsequent  attempt  to  repeal  the  ordinance  is  ineffective.^* 
Where  a  contract  provides  that  it  shall  be  voidable  by  the  city  upon 
the  judgment  of  a  court  of  competent  jurisdiction  whenever  there 
shall  be  a  substantial  failure  in  performance,  until  so  avoided  it  is 
valid  and  binding  on  the  city.**^  In  determining  by  a  court  whether  a 
contract  is  void,  as  where  it  relates  to  furnishing  the  city  with  water, 
the  court  can  only  take  cognizance  of  a  violation  of  legal  principles  in 
the  making  or  scope  of  the  contract,  and  whether  there  has  been  a 
neglect  of  prescribed  formalities  or  fraud.''^  It  should  be  noticed  fur- 
ther in  this  connection  that  most  contracts  by  a  municipality  are  in  the 
exercise  of  the  proprietary  powers  belonging  to  it,  rather  than  legisla- 
tive, and  in  such  cases  the  jurisdiction  of  courts  is  not  hampered  by  the 
strict  rules  applicable  to  the  exercise  of  legislative  functions.''^  If  the 
contract  is  incomplete,  as  where  it  relates  to  a  public  improvement, 
and  provides  that  the  work  shall  be  in  accordance  with  specifications 
annexed  to  and  made  a  part  of  it,  and  there  are  no  specifications,  no 
valid  contract  exists.^*  There  must  be  likewise,  as  with  contracts  in 
general,  the  element  of  mutuality. '^^    Where  the  charter  provides  that 

*'a  §  532,  ante.  »^  Where  a  contract  provides  that 

^"Harris  v.  City  of  St.  Joseph,  99  a    lighting    company    shall    furnish 

Fed.  246.  such  lights  as  the  city  may  desig- 

"^  Walla  Walla  City  v.  Walla  Walla  nate,  which  the  city  does  not  do  but 

Water  Co.,  172  U.  S.  1;   s.  c.  19  S.  repudiates  the  contract  and  notifies 

Ct.  77.  the  company,  there  is  a  want  of  mu- 

"- State  v.  Mayor  &e.,  58  N.  J.  L.  tuality  and   no  contract  exists:    El 

262;  s.  c.  33  Atl.  740.  Paso  Gas  &c.  Co.  v.  City  of  El  Paso, 

"==  State  v.  Mayor  &c.,  19  Mont.  518;  22  Tex.  Civ.  App.  309;  s,  c.  54  S.  W. 

s.  c.  49  Pac.  15.  798. 

"'  Gray  v.  Richardson,  124  Cal.  460; 
s.  c.  57  Pac.  385. 


§    737  PUBLIC    CORPOKATIONS.  734 

in  contracts  by  the  board  of  public  works  certain  powers  shall  be  re- 
served to  the  board  the  contract  must  enumerate  the  powers  reserved, 
and  a  general  reference  to  the  charter  for  an  enumeration  is  not  suffi- 
cient.''*^ A  contract  may  be  valid  in  part  and  void  in  part,  but  in  order 
that  the  unobjectionable  part  may  be  held  valid  it  must  be  a  complete 
contract  of  itself  and  enforceable.  A  contract  otherwise  valid  and 
legal  is  not  rendered  invalid  by  the  city  attempting  to  confer  an  ex- 
clusive right,  and  therefore  exceeding  its  powers,  if  the  provisions  of 
the  contract  otherwise  are  not  dependent  upon  the  illegal  provision. 
A  contract  need  not  be  rendered  void  in  toto  because  of  an  illegal 
provision  therein. "'^  Where  a  city  has  power  to  make  a  contract  for 
supplying  the  city  with  water,  a  portion  of  the  contract  relating  to 
the  exclusive  and  continuing  features  of  the  franchise  granted  may 
be  void  and  not  enforceable  and  the  remaining  features  of  the  contract 
relating  to  the  rentals  for  hydrants  valid  and  enforceable.^**  A  contract 
that  is  otherwise  complete  will  be  rendered  invalid  by  a  provision  re- 
quiring all  materials  furnished  thereunder  to  be  shipped  over  a  cer- 
tain railroad.^''  As  seen  in  the  chapter  relating  to  ordinances  a  con- 
tract must  be  reasonable  and  not  oppressive. °"^  But  there  are  no  rules 
of  general  application  by  which  the  reasonableness  or  unreasonable- 
ness may  be  determined.  Each  case  must  be  determined  by  the  facts 
and  circumstances  surrounding  it.  A  contract  leasing  water-works 
to  a  company  for  thirty  years  at  an  annual  rental  of  fifteen  hundred 
dollars  and  the  cancelation  of  large  claims  of  the  lessees  against  the 
city  has  been  held  to  be  reasonable. ^**°  And  so  a  contract  for  lighting 
the  city  for  five  years  with  the  privilege  of  terminating  the  contract 
on  three  months'  notice  by  the  city  if  not  satisfied  is  reasonable. ^°^ 
One  claiming  compensation  under  a  contract  must  show  that  his 
claim  was  to  be  paid  out  of  the  current  revenues,  or  from  some  fund 
within  the  immediate  control  of  the  city,  or  that  the  constitutional 
provision  has  been  complied  with.^°- 

^"Ricketson  v.  City  of  Milwaukee,  '''City  of  Greenville  v.  Greenville 

105   Wis.   591;    s.  c.  81   N.  W.   864.  Water  Works  Co.,  125  Ala.  625;  s.  c. 

Where  the  mayor  was  authorized  by  27  So.  764. 

the   council  to   contract  for  offices,  '*"  Cason  v.   City  of  Lebanon,   153 

the   rental   not   to   exceed   a    fixed  Ind.  567 ;  s.  c.  55  N.  E.  768. 

amount,    a   lease   for   ten   years   to  '"a  §  525,  ante. 

cease  if  the  city  should  sooner  erect  ""Los  Angeles  Water  Co.  v.  City 

a  building  of  its  own  was  held  to  be  of  Los  Angeles,  88  Fed.  720. 

legal:      City    of    Michigan    City    v.  "^  City    of    Hartford    v.    Hartford 

Leeds,  24  Ind.  App.  271;  s.  c.  55  N.  Electric  L.  Co.,  65  Conn.  324;   s.  c. 

E.  799.  32  Atl.  925. 

»'  Kimball  v.  City  of  Cedar  Rapids,  "=  McNeal  v.  City  of  Waco,  89  Tex. 

100  Fed.  802.  83;  s.  c.  33  S.  W.  322. 


725  MUNICIPAL    CONTRACTS.  §    738 

§  738.  Contracts  which  have  been  held  valid. — Without  being  able 
to  classify  or  generalize  the  following  contracts  have  been  held  valid 
on  various  grounds:  (a)  A'ot  in  restraint  of  succeeding  council:  A 
contract  of  a  municipality  for  a  lease  of  a  water-works  system  for  a 
period  of  twenty  years  is  not  necessarily  void  as  being  in  restraint  of 
succeeding  councils. ^°^  (b)  When  not  contravening  cotistitutional 
limitations:  A  contract  payable  annually  for  water  and  light  fur- 
nished, does  not  create  a  present  indebtedness  for  the  aggregate 
amount,  and  is  therefore  valid  under  constitutional  limitations  as  to 
amount  of  indebtedness.^"*  (c)  Maintaining  and  Tceeping  roads  in 
repair:  An  agreement  to  build  and  maintain  certain  roads,  and  re- 
pair the  same,  so  far  as  damaged  from  flooding  from  a  dam  owned  by 
the  promisor,  is  not  void  for  non-compliance  with  the  statute  in  rela- 
tion to  keeping  in  repair  roads  generally.^"^  (d)  Paving  and  keeping 
a  street  in  repair:  A  contract  to  pave  a  street  and  make  repairs  ren- 
dered necessary  by  indifferent  work  or  the  use  of  defective  material 
is  not  invalid  in  the  absence  of  proof  that  the  agreement  to  repair 
increased  the  amount  of  the  bid  and  imposed  upon  the  abutting  prop- 
erty-owners a  burden  properly  resting  on  the  general  public. ^°® 
(e)  Guaranty  to  keep  street  in  repair:  A  guaranty  to  keep  a  street 
in  repair  for  five  years  does  not  render  the  contract  void,  but  the  con- 
tractor can  not  recover  for  the  excess  of  the  assessment  caused  by  the 
guaranty  which  is  presumed  to  be  ten  per  cent,  retained  by  the  city 
to  secure  the  repairs. ^"^  (f )  Repairs  for  a  term  of  years:  A  charter 
prohibiting  contracts  for  public  improvements  unless  recommended 

"^  Higgins  V.  San  Diego  Water  Co.,  plant  for  supplying  a  city  or  village 

118  Cal.  524;    s.  c.  45   Pac.  824;    50  with  water  thirty  years  is  not  an  un- 

Pac.  670.  reasonable  time  for  the  duration  of 

^"^Foland   v.    Town   of   Frankton,  the  contract:    Little  Falls  E.  &  W. 

142  Ind.  546;  s.  c.  41  N.  E.  1031.    A  Co.  v.  City  of  Little  Falls,  102  Fed. 

contract  for  a  term  of  10  years  pay-  663. 

able  in  equal  annual  payments  for  "^  Town  of  Levis  v.  Black  River 

paving  and  resurfacing  a  street  is  Imp.  Co.,  105  Wis.  391;  s.  c.  81  N.  W. 

not,  by  reason  of  the  term,  objec-  669. 

tionable  if  the  current  revenues  are  "''  City  of  Kansas  City  v.  Hanson, 
sufficient  to  meet  the  payments:  60  Kan.  833;  s.  c.  58  Pac.  474;  Rob- 
Morris  V.  Barber  Asphalt  P.  Co.,  5  ertson  v.  City  of  Omaha,  55  Neb. 
Lack.  Leg.  N.  (Pa.)  129.  Wh.eve  a  718;  s.  c.  76  N.  W.  442;  Barber  &c. 
contract  is  made  in  good  faith  and  Pav.  Co.  v.  Ullman,  137  Mo.  543 ;  s.  c, 
is  not  unreasonable  or  unfair  it  may  38  S.  W.  458;  Allen  v.  City  of  Daven- 
extend  over  a  considerable  term  of  port,  107  Iowa  90;  s.  c.  77  N.  W.  532; 
years  and  not  be  void  on  the  ground  State  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  60  N.  J.  L. 
of  public  policy:  Maine  Water  Co.  v.  394;  s.  c.  38  Atl.  635;  Cole  v.  People, 
City  of  Waterville,  93  Maine  586;  s.  161  111.  16;  s.  c.  43  N.  E.  607. 
c.  45  Atl.  830.  Where  a  contract  in-  ^''"  City  of  Louisville  v.  Selvage,  21 
volves  the  erection  of  an  expensive  Ky.  L.  349;  s.  c.  51  S.  W.  447. 


§  738  ruBLic  coiiPORATiONS.  726 

by  the  board  of  pnl)lic  works  does  not  prevent  the  council  from  con- 
tracting for  repairs  for  a  term  of  years  in  a  paving  contract  which 
contract  is  made  in  accordance  with  the  charter/°*^  (g)  Removal  of 
garbage:  Where  an  ordinance  required  all  garbage  to  be  removed  by 
a  licensed  person  it  is  not  objectionable  in  that  it  was  for  a  longer 
term  than  was  permissible.^"''  (h)  Agreement  based  on  invalid  as- 
sessment: After  a  voluntary  agreement  to  pay  a  sum  to  a  municipal 
corporation  as  a  proportionate  share  of  an  assessment  for  an  improve- 
ment one  is  not  permitted  afterwards  to  say  that  the  assessment  was 
illegal  and  invalid  in  the  absence  of  an  allegation  of  fraud,  accident 
or  mistake  in  the  execution  of  the  contract.  It  is  competent  for  a 
person  to  make  a  valid  agreement  to  pay  an  invalid  assessment  where 
his  property  is  benefited.^"  (i)  When  not  founded  on  an  appropria- 
tion: It  is  not  material  in  a  municipal  contract  that  it  does  not  ap- 
pear that  it  is  founded  on  an  appropriation  of  money." ^  (j)  Subse- 
quent restriction  of  debt  limits:  A  contract  is  valid  notwithstanding 
the  legislature  may  subsequently  restrict  the  debt  limits  under  which 
it  would  be  invalid.^^^  (k)  Sale  of  gas  plant:  A  contract  of  sale  of 
a  gas  plant  by  a  city  in  consideration  that  the  purchaser  would  light 
the  streets  and  the  city  pay  the  taxes  against  such  purchaser  is  en- 
forceable.^^^  (1)  Not  oppressive  and  against  public  policy:  A  con- 
tract which  has  been  executed  and  in  force  for  ten  years  will  not  be 
held  unreasonably  oppressive  and  against  public  policy.^ ^*  (m)  Not 
indefinite:    A  contract  for  water  supply  is  not  void  for  not  stating 

1"^  Barber  &c.  Pav.  Co.  v.  Hezel,  76  pany  to  keep  it  so:  State  v.  New  Or- 

Mo.  App.  135.    Where  the  contractor  leans  &c.  R.  Co.,  52  La.  An.  1570;  s. 

lias  agreed  to  make  repairs  on  notice  c.  28  So.  111. 

such  notice  must  be  given,  although  '""  City    of    Grand    Rapids    v.    De 

lie  has  become  insolvent  and  has  as-  Vries,  123  Mich.  570;  s.  c.  82  N.  W. 

signed  his  interest  in  the  balance  of  269.     A  contract  for  the  disposition 

the  contract  price:     Southern   Pav.  of  sewage   for  five  years  has  been 

Co.  v.  City  of  Chattanooga  (Tenn.),  held  valid:  McBean  v.  City  of  Fres- 

48    S.    W.    92.      A    city    council    is  no,  112  Cal.  159;  s.  c.  44  Pac.  358. 

not   authorized    to    make   provision  ""Floyd  v.  Atlanta  Banking  Co., 

for    repairs    before    the    necessity  109  Ga.  778;  s.  c.  35  S.  E.  172.    But 

exists    therefor:      City    of    Kansas  see  Union  Pav.  &c.  Co.  v.  McGovern, 

City  v.   Hanson,   8   Kan.  App.    290;  127  Cal.  638;  s.  c.  60  Pac.  169. 

s.  c.  55  Pac.  513.     Where  a  railroad  "^  City  of  Harrisburg  v.   Shepler, 

company  has  obligated  itself  to  keep  190  Pa.  St.  374;  s.  c.  42  Atl.  893. 

a  street  in  good  order,  and  by  inac-  "=  Ludington  Water  Supply  Co.  v. 

tion  on  the  part  of  the  city  the  street  City  of  Ludington,   119   Mich,   480; 

becomes  in  ^  such  state  of  repair  as  s.  c.  78  N.  W.  558. 

to  require  an  unusual  expenditure,  "•■  Board  &c.  v.  Capital  Gas  &c.  Co., 

the  proper  construction  requires  the  16  Ky.  L.  780;  s.  c.  29  S.  W.  855. 

city  to  restore  the  street  to  good  or-  "*  Fergus  Falls  Water  Co.  v.  City 

der  and   require  the   railroad   com-  of  Fergus  Falls,  65  Fed.  586. 


737  MUNICIPAL    CONTRACTS.  §    738 

the  source  of  supply.^^^  (n)  Discretion  permissihh :  A  contract  for 
lighting  may  be  within  the  discretion  of  the  municipality.^^*'  (o)  To 
keep  turnpike  in  repair:  A  contract  with  a  turnpike  company  to  re- 
move its  gate  and  keep  its  road  in  repair  within  the  city  limits  is 
valid.^^^  (p)  Constructing  bridge  over  a  railroad:  A  city  has  power 
to  bind  itself  to  pay  part  of  the  expense  of  constructing  a  bridge  over  a 
railroad.^ ^**  (q)  Construction  of  seiver:  Under  a  statute  authorizing 
a  town  to  construct  a  town  hall,  necessary  outbuildings  and  convenient 
accommodations  for  the  same  it  is  authorized  to  construct  a  sewer  for 
the  service  of  the  town  hall.^^''  (r)  Water-supply  as  fire  protection: 
Where  the  statute  authorizes  the  city  to  provide  for  the  health  and 
welfare  of  the  city  it  has  power  to  contract  for  a  water-supply  as  a  pro- 
tection against  fires.^^°  (s)  Construction  of  crematories:  Where  a 
city  is  authorized  to  contract  or  otherwise  for  the  disposal  of  its 
garbage  and  to  purchase  or  lease  land  within  its  territory  for  the 
purpose  of  erecting  crematories,  it  does  not  prevent  it  from  contract- 
ing with  a  rendering  establishment  outside  its  limits  to  dispose  of 
dead  animals  in  a  sanitary  and  inoffensive  manner.^- ^  (t)  To  fix 
water  rates:  A  charter  granting  power  to  provide  for  supplying  a 
city  with  water  gives  power  to  fix  the  rates  to  be  charged  to  consum- 
ers.^^^  (u)  Heating  and  lighting  court-house:  A  joint  committee 
created  by  law  and  which  has  control  of  the  court-house  has  authority 
to  contract  for  heating  and  lighting  the  same.^^^  (v)  No  appropria- 
tion to  pay  made:  Irregularity  in  the  payment  for  land  by  a  munici- 
pality, as  where  no  formal  appropriation  had  been  made  as  required 
by  the  charter,  will  not  affect  the  title  to  the  land  of  the  municipality, 
in  a  suit  by  a  citizen  to  rescind.^-'*  (w)  License  not  a  contract:  A  li- 
cense for  a  whole  year  is  not  a  contract  for  that  time  within  the  pro- 
vision of  the  constitution. ^^^  (x)  Franchise  for  term  of  years: 
Where  a  charter  authorizes  the  city  to  provide  for  lighting  the  streets 

^'^  Brady  v.  City  of  Bayonne,  57  N.  422.     Cf.  Chesapeake  &c.  Tel.  Co.  v. 

J.  L.  379;  s.  c.  30  Atl.  968.  Mayor  &c.,  89  Md.  689;   s.  c.  43  Atl. 

"8  Wade  v.  Borough  of  Oakmont,  784;  44  Atl.  1033. 

165  Pa.  St.  479;  s.  c.  30  Atl.  959.  "^  Tiede  v.  Schneidt,  105  Wis.  470; 

"^Providence  &c.  Plank  R.  Co.  v.  s.  c.  81  N.  W.  826. 

City  of  Scranton,   1  Lack.  Leg.  N,  ^--Los  Angeles  Water  Co.  v.  City 

(Pa.)   183.  of  Los  Angeles,  88  Fed.  720. 

"^City  of  Argentine   v.   Atchison  "^  State  v.  McCardy,  62  Minn.  509; 

&c.  R.  Co.,  55  Kan.  730;  s.  c.  41  Pac.  s.  c.  64  N.  W.  1133. 

946.  i=*Ecroyd  v.   Coggeshall,   21  R.   L 

"=*  Watson  v.  Town  of  New  Milford,  1;  s.  c.  41  Atl.  260. 

72  Conn.  561;  s.  c.  45  Atl.  167.  ^''^  St.  Charles  v.  Hackman,  133  Mo. 

'=°Webb  City  &c.  Waterworks  Co.  634;  s.  c.  34  S.  W.  878. 
v.  City  of  Webb  City,  78  Mo.  App. 


§    739  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  728 

and  for  a  water-supply,  by  contract  or  otherwise,  and  to  grant  fran- 
chises for  a  term  of  years  for  such  purposes,  a  franchise  may  be  grant- 
ed or  contract  entered  into  binding  the  city  for  the  term  of  the  fran- 
chise or  contract.^^"  (y)  Contract  for  term  of  years  in  Ohio:  The 
Ohio  act  of  May  4,  1885,  as  amended  by  act  of  May  13,  1886,  super- 
sedes, in  certain  cities,  the  act  of  January  29,  1885,  and  a  twenty-year 
contract  is  legal,  without  submission  to  a  vote  of  the  electors. ^^'^  (z) 
Time  for  commencement  and  completion  of  contract:  A  statute 
which  requires  the  superintendent  of  streets  to  fix  the  time  for  the 
commencement  and  completion  of  the  work  is  not  complied  with  by 
an  agreement  to  commence  work  in  fifteen  days  and  complete  same  in 
one  hundred  and  eighty  days  thereafter. ^^® 

§  739,  Invalidity  of  contracts. —  (a)  In  violation  of  statute: 
Where  the  statute  provides  that  no  contract,  or  other  obligation  in- 
volving an  expenditure  of  money,  shall  be  made,  or  ordinance  or  res- 
olution for  an  appropriation  or  expenditure  of  money  shall  be  passed, 
unless  the  auditor  shall  first  certify  that  the  money  required  is  in  the 
treasury  to  the  credit  of  the  fund  to  be  drawn  upon,  it  applies  only 
to  street-improvements  to  be  paid  from  the  general  taxes  and  not  to 
those  to  be  paid  by  taxes  on  abutting  property-owners.^^^  And  where 
the  charter  provides  that,  except  as  therein  otherwise  provided,  any 
public  work  or  improvement  that  may  be  the  subject  of  a  contract 
must  first  be  authorized  by  the  board  of  public  improvements,  and 
by  the  municipal  assembly,  it  has  no  reference  to  the  public  lighting 
of  the  city.^^°  Where  by  statute  personal  property  can  not  be  con- 
tracted for  at  one  time  to  exceed  five  hundred  dollars  unless  author- 
ized by  a  majority  of  the  electors,  a  purchase  of  fire-apparatus  exceed- 
ing five  hundred  dollars  is  invalid  ;^^^  and  in  such  case  the  contract  is 
not  rendered  valid  by  splitting  the  price  into  parts  of  less  than  five 
Hundred  dollars.^^^     (b)   In  violation  of  constitutional  limitations: 

""Cunningham   v.   City   of  Cleve-  lage  of  Nelsonville,  61  Ohio  St.  288; 

land,  98  Fed.  657;   s.  c.  39  C.  C.  A.  s.  c.  56  N.  B.  15. 

211.  '      ""  Blank  v.  Kearny,  61  N.  Y.  S.  79; 

^"^  Defiance  Water   Co.   v.   City  of  s.  c.  44  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  592. 

Defiance,  90  Fed.  753.  "'  Fire   Extinguisher   Mfg.    Co.   v. 

1=^  Palmer  v.  Burnham    (Cal.),  47  City  of  Perry,  8  Okla.  429;  s.  c.  58 

Pac.  599.    The  mere  fact  that  one  of  Pac.  635. 

the  parties  to  a  contract  executes  it  "-  Fire   Extinguisher   Mfg.   Co.   v. 

for    the    benefit    of    an    undisclosed  City  of  Perry,  8  Okla.  429;   s.  c.  58 

third  person  does  not  render  it  in-  Pac.    635.     Cf.    Raton    Waterworks 

valid:     Herman  v.  City  of  Oconto,  Co.  v.  Town  of  Raton,  9  N.  M.  70; 

100  Wis.  391;  s.  c.  76  N.  W.  364.  s.  c.  49  Pac.  898.     Contract  held  in- 

^"  Comstock    V.    Incorporated    Vil-  valid    without   being    countersigned 


729 


MUNICIPAL    CONTRACTS. 


739 


Where  the  constitution  limits  the  expenditures  to  the  revenue  pro- 
vided for  such  year,  and  the  revenue  has  been  expended  for  the  year, 
the  city,  no  matter  how  pressing  its  needs  may  be,  can  not  incur  lia- 
bilities to  be  paid  from  the  revenues  of  the  succeeding  year.^^^  Where 
the  constitution  provides  that  no  indebtedness  shall  be  incurred  un- 
less at  the  time  provision  is  made  for  the  payment  of  interest  and 
to  create  a  sinking-fund  therefor,  a  contract  without  such  provision 
is  void.^^*  Where  a  city  grants  the  right  to  erect  telegraph-poles  in 
a  street  on  condition  that  the  city  be  permitted  to  use  them  free  of 
charge,  and  the  grant  is  accepted  and  the  poles  used  by  the  city,  it 
can  not  subsequently  impose  a  tax  on  such  poles.^^^  (c)  In  violation 
of  precedent  preliminaries :  Frequently  the  statute  requires  certain 
preliminaries  to  be  taken,  which  are  made  conditions  precedent  to 
the  making  of  valid  contracts  involving  the  expenditure  of  money, 
and  in  such  case  these  provisions  are  generally  construed  as  manda- 
tory. Where  the  statute  requires  as  a  precedent  to  entering  into  a 
contract  that  the  auditor,  or  clerk,  shall  certify  that  the  money  re- 
quired is  in  the  treasury  to  the  credit  of  the  particular  fund,  this  is 
an  essential  to  making  a  valid  contract. ^^^    Where  the  statute  provides 


by  the  comptroller  under  provisions 
of  charter:  City  of  Superior  v.  Nor- 
ton, 63  Fed.  357;  s.  c.  12  C.  C.  A.  469. 

1'^  Bradford  v.  City  &c.  of  Sau 
Francisco,  112  Cal.  537;  s.  c.  44  Pac. 
912.  A  contract  in  excess  of  the 
constitutional  limit  without  a  vote 
of  the  people  is  void:  City  of  Cov- 
ington V.  McKenna,  99  Ky.  508;  s.  c. 
36  S.  W.  518;  18  Ky.  L.  288.  A  con- 
stitutional limit  of  twenty  years  in 
the  grant  of  a  franchise  or  privilege 
will  prohibit  the  making  of  a  con- 
tract granting  a  franchise  of  twenty 
years  from  a  future  date:  City  of 
Somerset  v.  Smith,  20  Ky.  L.  1488; 
s.  c.  49  S.  W.  456. 

^=*  Noel  V.  City  of  San  Antonio,  11 
Tex.  Civ.  App.  580;  s.  c.  33  S.  W.  263. 

"^  City  of  St.  Louis  v.  Western  U. 
Tel.  Co.,  63  Fed.  68. 

^=«  City  of  Findlay  v.  Pendleton,  62 
Ohio  St.  80;  s.  c.  56  N.  E.  649;  Sulli- 
van V.  City  of  Leadville,  11  Colo. 
483;  s.  c.  18  Pac.  736;  Town  of  Du- 
rango  v.  Pennington,  8  Colo.  257, 
260;  s.  c.  7  Pac.  14  (where  the  set- 
tled   law    was    announced    that    "a 


party  dealing  with  a  municipal  body 
is  bound  to  see  to  it  that  all  manda- 
tory provisions  of  the  law  are  com- 
plied with,  and  if  he  neglects  such 
precaution  he  becomes  a  mere  volun- 
teer and  must  suffer  the  conse- 
quences") ;  Tracey  v.  People,  6  Colo. 
151.  Where  there  is  fraud  between 
the  contractor  and  the  city  officers 
by  which  the  letting  of  a  contract  is 
secured  but  not  to  the  lowest  bidder, 
as  required  by  the  mandatory  provis- 
ion of  the  charter,  the  city  may  prop- 
erly defend  on  this  ground:  Nelson 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  5  N.  Y.  S.  688;  s.  c.  23 
N.  Y.  St.  518.  Daniels,  J.,  said:  — 
"Where  parties  in  this  manner  join 
together  to  evade  and  disregard  the 
obligations  and  duties  of  public  offi- 
cers and  the  plain  mandates  of  stat- 
utory provisions,  the  contract  result- 
ing from  their  acts  and  combination 
is  not  only  fraudulent,  but  it  is  un- 
lawful, and  upon  such  an  unlawful 
agreement  no  action  can  be  main- 
tained for  indemnity  by  either  of  the 
parties."  See  also,  People  v.  Ste- 
phens, 71  N.  Y.  527,  558. 


§    739  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  730 

that  no  contract  involving  the  appropriation  of  money  shall  take  ef- 
fect until  the  controller  sliall  certify  thereon  that  the  estimated  cost 
of  the  work  has  been  charged  against  the  appropriation  on  which  it 
is  founded,  it  can  not  be  dispensed  with.^-"*^  This  requirement  applies 
to  a  contract  made  by  a  city  with  a  contractor  for  paving  in  front  of 
the  city's  property.^^®  A  contract  made  without  complying  with  the 
statutory  requirements  as  to  interest  and  sinking-fund  is  void."** 
Where  by  constitutional  provision  a  municipal  corporation  is  prohib- 
ited from  creating  an  indebtedness  unless  a  provision  is  made  at  the 
time  for  levying  and  collecting  a  sufficient  tax  to  pay  interest  thereon, 
and  for  the  creation  of  a  sinking-fund  for  the  final  payment,  a  con- 
tract in  violation  of  such  provision  is  void.^***  In  such  case  it  makes 
no  difference  that  the  city  had  twelve  months  in  which  to  pay  the 
debt,  or  had  a  sufficient  amount  to  pay  the  debt  in  another  fund, 
(d)  Interest  of  officers  in  contract:  It  is  a  universal  rule,  unyielding 
in  its  application  and  founded  on  public  policy,  that  no  municipal 
officer  shall  be  interested,  directly  or  indirectly,  in  municipal  con- 
tracts. An  alderman  has  no  right  to  enter  into  a  contract  with  the 
council.  Public  policy  forbids  such  transactions.^'*^  The  city  has  no 
right  to  contract  with  a  corporation  in  which  a  member  of  the  council 
is  interested  (see  statute). ^"'^  A  stockholder  and  officer  of  a  corpora- 
tion who  is  also  a  member  of  the  council,  may  be  disqualified  from 

"'Continental  C.  Co.  v.  City  of  Al-  Water  Works  Co.,  56  Neb.  403;  s.  c. 

toona,  92  Fed.  822.  76  N.   W.   906.     Where  the  law  re- 

"'  City  of  Harrisburg  v.   Shepler,  quires  the  publication  of  a  notice  of 

190  Pa.  St.  374;  s.  c.  42  Atl.  893.  a  public  improvement,  as  to  what  is 

"^  Berlin  I.  B.  Co.  v.  City  of  San  sufficient  notice  see  Arnold  v.  City 

Antonio,  62  Fed.  882.    And  see  Kuhls  of  Ft.  Dodge,  111  Iowa  152;  s.  c.  82 

v.  City  of  Laredo  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  N.  W.  495.    Where  the  making  of  a 

27  S.  W.  791.  contract    is    within    the    corporate 

""  Mineralized  Rubber  Co.  v.  City  powers,  and  it  is  regular  on  its  face 

of  Cleburne,  22  Tex.  Civ.  App.  621;  and  has  been  performed  by  the  con- 

s.  c.  56  S.  W.  220.     A  contract  for  tractor,   mere   irregularities   in  pre- 

lighting  the  streets  for  five  years  is  liminary   steps  are  not  a   defense: 

void  in  Minneapolis  unless  the  funds  State    v.    Long    Branch    Police    &c. 

are  on  hand  and  taxes  actually  lev-  Com.,  59  N.  J.  L.  371;   s.  c.  35  Atl. 

ied  at  the  time  the  contract  is  made  1070. 

are  sufficient  to  cover  the  liability:  "^Snipes  v.  City  of  Winston,  126 

Kiichli  V.   Minnesota  &c.   Elec.   Co.,  N.  C.  374;  s.  c.  35  S.  E.  610;   Santa 

58  Minn.   418;    s.  c.  59  N.  W.  1088.  Ana  Water  Co.  v.  Town  of  Buena- 

An  ordinance  making  a  contract  for  ventura,  65  Fed.  323. 

water-works  under  Neb.  Comp.   St.,  ^"  Goodrich  v.  City  of  Waterville, 

eh.  14,  art.  1,  §  69,  is  valid  though  88  Maine  39;  s.  c  33  Atl.  659;  Nune- 

not  preceded  by  an  appropriation  to  macher  v.  City  of  Louisville,  98  Ky. 

meet   payments   for   water   rentals:  334;   s.  c.  32  S.  W.  1091;   17  Ky.  L. 

City  of  North  Platte  v.  North  Platte  933. 


731  MUNICIPAL    CONTRACTS.  §    739 

voting  on  an  ordinance  providing  for  a  supply  of  water  to  the  munici- 
pality by  the  corporation,  yet  the  ordinance  itself  is  not  rendered 
invalid  by  such  vote  if  it  appears  that  the  contract  is  legitimate  and 
a  majority  of  the  memljers  of  the  council  voted  for  tlie  ordinance 
without  counting  the  invalid  vote.  This  is  not  the  rule,  however, 
where  the  contract  is  prohibited.^*^  In  a  suit  on  a  contract  with  a 
board  of  education  a  conspiracy  between  the  plaintiff  and  a  member 
of  the  board  whereby  the  latter  was  to  have  the  benefit  of  the  contract 
and  the  bid  of  the  former  was  in  fact  for  the  latter  will  prevent  a 
recovery  thereon  where  the  charter  prohibits  its  members  from  being 
interested  directly  or  indirectly  in  its  contracts.^**  Where  the 
charter  prohibits  an  officer  being  interested  directly  or  indirectly  in 
any  contract  in  which  the  corporation  is  concerned  he  can  not  charge 
for  services  rendered  as  attorney  in  court  for  it  whether  the  contract 
is  express  or  implied  ;^*^  but  the  rule  does  not  apply  where  the  mayor 
after  the  making  of  a  contract  and  its  acceptance  takes  stock  in  a  cor- 
poration which  succeeds  to  the  rights  of  the  original  contracting  par- 
ties.^'*'' And  so  a  poundmaster  can  not  recover  for  premises  furnished 
by  him  under  an  implied  contract.^* '^  It  has  been  held  that  where  an 
alderman  liolds  as  collateral  security  a  share  of  stock  in  an  electric- 
light  company,  he  is  not  permitted  to  vote  authorizing  a  contract 
with  such  company  though  the  stock  has  small  value.^*^  And  so  a 
secretary  and  stockholder  of  a  corporation  which  has  a  contract  with 
a  city  for  lighting  can  not  be  councilman  although  the  contract  was 
made  prior  to  his  election. ^*^  The  mere  fact  that  the  mayor  and  a 
member  of  the  council  may  at  some  time  become  liable  as  stock- 
holders in  a  corporation  should  it  become  insolvent  and  other  con- 
tingencies happen  will  not  render  invalid  a  contract  between  the 
municipality  and  the  corporation,  it  appearing  that  they  were  no 
longer  stockholders.^ ^°  Eelationship  between  the  city  engineer  and 
the  contractor  who  has  a  contract  with  the  city  does  not  render  the 
contract  void,  and  particularly  so  where  it  appears  that  the  engineer 
has  no  interest  in  the  contract  directly  or  indirectly.^ ^^    A  contract  is 

"^  Marshall  v.  Borough  of  Ellwood  "'  Macy  v.  City  of  Duluth,  68  Minn. 

City,  189  Pa.   St.  348;    s.  c.  41  Atl.  452;  s.  c.  71  N.  W.  687. 

994.  ""Foster  v.  City  of  Cape  May,  60 

"*Heughes  v.  Board  of  Education  N.  J.  L.  78;  s.  c.  36  Atl.  1089. 

&c.,  55  N.  Y.  S.  799;  s.  c.  37  App.  Div.  '''■'  Commonwealth  v.  De  Camp,  177 

(N.  Y.)  180.  Pa.  St.  112;  s.  c.  35  Atl.  601. 

"'  West  V.  Berry,  98  Ga.  402 ;  s.  c.  ^"^  City  of  Broken  Bow  v.  Broken 

25  S.  E.  508.  Bow  Waterworks  Co.,  57  Neb.  548; 

""  State    V.    Mayor    &c..    19    Mont.  s.  c.  77  N.  W.  1078. 

518;  s.  c.  49  Pac.  15.  '^^  Cason  v.   City  of  Lebanon,   153 

Ind.  567;  s.  c.  55  N.  E.  768. 


§    739  PUBLIC    COIirOKATIONS.  732 

not  rendered  invalid  by  reason  of  the  contractor  being  a  partner,  of 
a  member  of  the  board  letting  the  contract,^"'-  nor  will  the  mere  fact 
that  a  member  of  the  council  is  interested  in  a  contract  for  public 
improvement  invalidate  the  tax  for  such  improvements.^^^  Where 
a  city  has  been  furnished  with  gas  by  a  gas  company  it  is  lia- 
ble for  the  reasonable  value  thereof  although  the  mayor  is  a  stock- 
holder and  is  the  president  of  the  company.^^*  Where  the  council 
proceedings  were  irregular  and  a  purchase  was  made  from  a  council- 
man and  the  council  has  ratified  the  payment  and  used  the  material 
and  can  not  return  it,  the  town  can  not  recover  the  money  paid.^^^ 
(e)  Interest  of  municipality  in  subject-matter:  It  is  at  all  times  a 
question  of  prime  importance  that  the  city  shall  be  interested  in  the 
subject-matter  of  the  contract.  It  is  not  sufficient  that  some  of  its 
citizens  may  be  benefited  thereby,  or  even  a  considerable  number  of 
them,  nor  its  ofiicers  or  employes  be  parties.  A  contract  by  a  corpo- 
ration council  for  services  of  a  stenographer  in  a  suit  to  which  the  city 
is  not  a  party  and  in  no  way  interested  is  invalid. ^^'^  (f )  Must  he  in 
good  faith:  A  contract  entered  into  prior  to  consolidation  and  not 
to  take  effect  until  after  and  to  run  for  ten  years  is  not  in  good 
faith,  is  against  public  policy  and  void.^^'^  (g)  In  restraint  of  future 
legislation :  The  authorities  of  a  city  can  not  by  present  agreement 
bind  themselves  to  exercise  their  legislative  powers  in  a  particular 
manner  at  some  future  time.^^®  (h)  Delegation  of  powers:  The 
reservation  in  a  contract  of  power  in  the  city  engineer  to  annul  the 
contract  is  but  an  attempt  to  delegate  legislative  power,  and,  there- 
fore, void.^^**  (i)  Contracts  at  special  meetings:  A  contract  entered 
into  at  a  special  meeting  of  the  council  of  which  several  mem.bers 
had  no  notice  and  in  which  they  did  not  participate  is  invalid.^®" 

^=*=  State  V.  City  of  Passaic,  63  N.  680;    56  N.  Y.  S.  580;    38  App.  Div. 

J.  L.  208;  s.  c.  42  Atl.  1058.  (N.  Y.)  480. 

'^^  Roberts  v.  First  Nat'l  Bank,  8  ^'^^  New  York  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Village 

N.  D.  504;  s.  c.  79  N.  W.  1049.  of  New  Rochelle,  60  N.  Y.  S.  904;  s. 

^=*  Capital   Gas  Co.   v.   Young,   109  c.  29  Misc.  (N.  Y.)  195. 

Cal.  140;  s.  c.  41  Pac.  869.    The  lia-  ^'^'^  Neill  v.  Gates,  152  Mo.  585;  s.  c. 

bility  in  this  case  grew  out  of  the  54  S.  W.  460. 

obligation  of  the  company  to  furnish  ^™  London  &c.  Land  Co.  v.  City  of 

gas  under  the  code  and  not  by  con-  Jellico,  103  Tenn.  320;  s.  c.  52  S.  W. 

tract.  995;  Lord  v.  City  of  Anoka,  36  Minn. 

'^^Frick  v.  Brinkley,  61  Ark.  397;  176;    s.  c.  30  N.  W.  550;    Township 

s.  c.  33  S.  W.  527.  Board  &c.  v.  Hastings,  52  Mich.  528; 

''"City  of  Chicago  v.  Williams,  80  s.  c.  18  N.  W.  250;  Supervisors  &c.  v. 

111.  App.  33.  Horton,  75  Iowa  271;  s.  c.  39  N.  W. 

"' Hendrickson    v.    City    of    New  394;    Paola   &c.    R.    Co.    v.    Commis- 

York,  160  N.  Y.  144;   s.  c.  54  N.  E.  sioners  &c.,  16  Kan.  302;   People  v. 

Batchelor,  22  N.  Y.  128;  Harding  v. 


733  MUNICIPAL    CONTRACTS.  §    730 

(j)  Conlract  increasing  interest:  A  contract  by  sinkin<]^-fuii(l  trustees 
for  tlie  sale  of  bonds  resulting  in  adding  interest  to  tbe  funded  public 
debt  is  invalid.^"^  (k)  Failure  to  attack  specifications:  Tbe  failure  to 
annex  specifications  to  a  contract  referred  to  a  ])art  tbereof  renders 
the  contract  invalid  and  tbe  assessment  based  tbercon  void.^"-  (1) 
Purchase  of  smallpox  Jiospital:  Power  to  make  police,  sanitary,  and 
other  regulations,  not  in  conflict  with  general  law,  does  not  authorize 
the  purchase  of  a  site  for  a  smallpox  hospital.^"*  (m)  Fixing  price  of 
water  for  thirty  years:  Where  by  statute  cities  arc  authorized  to  con- 
tract for  a  water-supply  for  a  period  not  exceeding  thirty  years,  they 
may  not  fix  a  price  for  that  period.^*''*  (n)  Ik  violation  of  popular 
vote:  Where  the  electors,  at  an  election  called  for  the  purpose,  have 
expressed  themselves,  in  relation  to  street  lighting,  in  favor  of  con- 
struction or  purchase  of  an  electric-light  plant,  a  subsequent  contract 
with  a  corporation  for  street  lighting  for  ten  years  is  void.^"°  (o)  Di- 
version of  puhlic  funds :  A  contract  unlawfully  diverting  public  funds 
is  void.^*'°  (p)  Contracts  procured  by  bribery:  The  rule  is  universal 
that  fraud  in  procuring  the  maldng  of  a  contract  vitiates  the  contract. 
Hence  bribery  in  obtaining  a  contract  will  render  it  void,  although  it 
is  with  the  lowest  bidder.^"^  (q)  Must  be  a  corporation:  A  contract 
by  what  is  neither  a  de  facto  nor  de  jure  corporation  is  a  nullity.^"^ 
(r)  Change  in  improvement :  An  act  changing  the  line  of  an  improve- 
ment after  a  contract  had  been  made  so  as  to  lessen  the  amount  and 
cost  of  work  renders  the  contract  inoperative  and  the  assessment 

Vandewater,    40    Cal.    77;     Stow    v.  ing  to  allow  no  grade  crossings  at 

Wyse,  7  Conn.  214.  such  point:    State  v.  Minnesota  &c. 

"^  City  of  Cincinnati  V.  Guckenber-  R.    Co.,    80    Minn.    108;    s.   c.    83    N. 

ger,  60  Ohio  St.  353;   s.  c.  54  N.  E.  W.  32. 

376.  ^"^  George  v.  Wyandotte  &c.  Light 

"-Gray    v.    Richardson,    124    Cal.  Co.,  105  Mich.  1;  s.  c.  62  N.  W.  985. 

460;  s.  c.  57  Pac.  385.  '"^  Village  of  Kent  v.  Dethridge  &c. 

'°^  Von  Schmidt  v.  Widber,  105  Cal.  Glass  Co.,  10  Ohio  C.  C.  629. 

151;  38  Pac.  682.  "^Herman  v.  City  of  Oconto,  100 

"^City  of  Carlysle  v.  Carlysle  Wis.  391;  s.  c.  76  N.  W.  364.  An  alle- 
Water  &c.  Co.,  52  111.  App.  577;  s.  c.  gation  in  an  answer  that  the  con- 
affirmed  on  other  grounds,  140  111.  tract  sued  on  was  obtained  by  bri- 
445;  29  N.  E.  556.  It  is  beyond  the  bery  of  the  officers  charged  with  its 
power  of  a  city  to  enter  into  a  con-  execution,  the  ones  bribed  and  the 
tract  with  a  railroad  company  bind-  amount  paid  being  unknown,  is  suffi- 
ing  itself  to  maintain  and  keep  in  cient  where  no  application  for  a 
repair  for  all  future  time  a  bridge  more  specific  statement  is  made: 
which  is  the  joint  work  of  the  city  Herman  v.  City  of  Oconto,  100  Wis. 
and  railroad  company,  on  a  public  391;  s.  c.  76  N.  W.  364. 
highway  and  over  tracks  belonging  '"^City  of  Guthrie  v.  Wylie,  6  Okla. 
to  the  railroad  company,  and  agree-  61;  s.  c.  55  Pac.  103. 


§    739  PUBLIC    COIM'OUATIONS.  734 

void.^""  (s)  Compromise  of  an  illegal  claim:  A  compromise  of  an 
illegal  claim  against  the  city  is  not  legal,  and  creates  no  liability,^'"* 
and  so  as  to  a  contract  in  connection  with  an  invalid  franchisc/^^  and 
a  contract  based  on  a  void  ordinance.^'-  (t)  Must  he  reasonable:  A 
contract  with  a  water  company  to  furnish  the  city  with  water  for 
thirty  years  is  unreasonable  and  beyond  the  power  of  the  city  to 
make.^^^  And  so  is  an  exclusive  privilege  for  lighting  for  ninety-nine 
years.^'^*  (u)  Exclusive  employment  of  union  labor:  A  stipulation  in 
a  contract  by  a  board  of  education  that  none  but  union  labor  shall  be 
employed  by  the  contractor  is  void.  It  is  a  discrimination  against  dif- 
ferent classes  of  citizens  and  of  such  a  nature  as  to  restrict  competi- 
tion and  to  increase  the  cost  of  work,  and  is  an  infringement  of  the 
constitutional  rights  of  citizens.^ '°  (v)  To  aid  construction  of  rail- 
road: An  agreement  to-  pay  a  stipulated  monthly  rental  for  a  water- 
works plant  on  condition  that  the  lessor  would  construct  a  railroad  be- 
tween certain  points,  where  the  city  has  no  right  to  expend  funds  to  aid 
railroads,  is  void.^'^*^  While  a  contract  with  specified  persons  may  be 
void  as  granting  an  unauthorized  exclusive  franchise,  yet  so  long  as 
the  city  accepts  services  under  the  contract  it  must  pay  the  stipulated 
price,^^'^  (w)  Invalid  contract — How  abrogated:  Where  a  contract 
is  objectionable  in  itself  on  the  ground  of  infringing  on  the  police 
power  of  the  state,  or  if  it  becomes  so  in  its  execution,  the  municipality 
may,  in  the  exercise  of  its  police  power,  regulate  the  manner  in  which 

109  Warren    v.    Chandos,    115    Cal.  Live  Stock  Excli.,  170  111.  556;  s.  c. 

382;  s.  c.  47  Pac.  132.  48  N.  E.  1062;   Pishburn  v.  City  of 

""Village  of  Port  Edward  v.  Fish,  Chicago,  171  111.  338;   s.  c.  49  N.  E. 

33  N.  Y.  S.  784;  s.  c.  86  Hun  (N.  Y.)  532. 

548.  ^'°  Higgins    v.    San    Diego    Water 

"1  Nicholasville   W.   Co.   v.   Board  Co.,  118  Cal.  524;   s.  c.  50  Pac.  670. 

&c.  (Ky.),  64  S.  W.  1133.  A  city  without  special  authority  can 

"-Ellis  V.  City  of  Cleburne   (Tex.  not  extend  its  aid  to  an  association: 

Civ.  App.),  35  S.  W.  495.  Park  v.  Modern  Woodmen,  181  111. 

"•'Plynn  v.  Little  Palls  &c.  Co.,  74  214;  s.  c.  54  N.  E.  932.    The  subscrip- 

Minn.  180;  s.  c.  77  N.  W.  38;  78  N.  tion  for  corporate  stock  by  a  city 

W.  106.  being  unauthorized   the   acceptance 

"*City  of  Wellston  v.  Morgan,  59  of  bonds  by  it  does  not  make  it  a 

Ohio  St.  147;  s.  c.  52  N.  B.  127.  stockholder:  City  of  Genesee  v.  Gen- 

"^ Adams  v.  Brenan,  177  111.  194;  eseo  &c.  Co.,  55  Kan.  358;    s.  c.  40 

s.  c.  52  N.  E.  314;  Millett  v.  People,  Pac.  655.    But  if  there  was  a  general 

117  111.  294;  s.  c.  7  N.  E.  631;  Prorer  power  to  contract  for  a  water  supply 

V.  People,  141  111.  171;  s.  c.  31  N.  E.  the  city  will  be  liable  on  a  quantum 

395;   Bruceville  Coal  Co.  v.  People,  valebat  for  the  reasonable  value  of 

147  111.  66;  s.  c.  35  N.  E.  62;  Ramsey  the  use  of  the  plant. 

V.  People,  142  111.  380;  s.  c.  32  N.  E.  "Mllinois  Trust  &c.  Bank  v.  Ar- 

364;   Ritchie  v.  People,  155  111.  98;  kansas  City  W.  Co.,  67  Ped.  196. 
s.  c.  40  N.  E.  454 ;  People  v.  Chicago 


735  MUNicir.VL  contracts.  §  T30 

it  may  ])e  carried  out,  or  may  al)ro_tiat(>  it  ciitiroly  upon  tlic  principle 
that  it  can  not  bind  itself  to  any  course  of  action  which  shall  prove 
deleterious  to  the  health  or  morals  of  its  inhabitants."''  An  illegal 
contract  might  be  canceled  at  the  suit  of  a  lot-owner  in  a  suit  brought 
before  much  work  had  been  done,  and  before  the  bonds  had  been  sold, 
and  an  assessment  made,  and  the  fact  that  at  the  time  of  the  trial 
the  work  had  been  completed  and  the  bonds  issued  and  sold  would  not 
cure  the  illegality.""  (x)  Recovery  under  void  contract:  A  con- 
tractor can  not  recover  from  the  city  the  value  of  a  bridge  built  under 
a  void  contract. ^^"  The  city  may  recover  the  proceeds  of  bonds  issued 
by  it  to  a  corporation  under  a  void  subscription  to  the  capital  stock. ^^^ 
(y)  Mahing  of  long  lease:  Where  the  city  holds  land  for  the  benefit 
of  the  public  it  has  no  right  to  make  a  long  lease  of  such  land  for 
private  purposes.^**-  (z)  Release  of  railway  from  duty:  Where  a  duty 
rests  upon  a  railway  company  to  restore  a  public  highway  to  its  former 
condition  the  city  can  not  make  a  valid  contract  relieving  the  com- 
pany from  such  performance  and  waiving  its  power  to  enforce  per- 
formance.^^^  (aa)  Remedy  in  equity:  A  contract  with  a  city  to 
furnish  it  for  municipal  use  a  fire-alarm  telegraph  system  which  is 
void  for  contravening  constitutional  limitations  can  not  be  changed 
by  a  court  of  equity  so  as  to  give  an  implied  franchise  to  the  contract- 

"'  Walla  Walla  City  v.  Walla  Walla  of  Corpus  Christ!  v.  Central  W.  & 

Water  Co.,  172  U.  S.  1;    s.  c.  19  S.  W.  Co.,  8  Tex.  Civ.  App.  94;  s.  c.  27 

Ct.  77.  S.  W.  803.     A  lease  of  franchises  by 

^■*  Allen  V.  City  of  Davenport,  107  a   city   after   the   repeal   of   an   act 

Iowa  90;  s.  c.  77  N.  W.  532.  granting  them  to  the  city  is  void: 

^^«  Berlin  I.  B.  Co.  v.  City  of  San  Central  W.  &  W.  Co.  v.  City  of  Cor- 

Antonio,  62  Fed.  882.    A  town  is  re-  pus  Christi,  23  Tex.  Civ.  App.  390; 

lieved  from  liability  on  a  contract  s.  c.  57  S.  W.  982.     A  city,  as  les- 

assigned  without  its  consent,  though  sor,  is  governed  by  the  same  obliga 

not   annulled   until   after   receiving  tions  of  law  as  are  imposed  upon 

the  benefits,  where  the  law  prohibits  other    lessors,    and    if    part    of    the 

the    assignment    of    such    contracts  leased  premises  are  taken  for  public 

without  the  written  consent  of  the  improvement  there  must  be  a  dimi- 

town,  and  authorizes  its  revocation  nution  of  rent:    Hinrichs  v.  City  of 

on    the    ground    of   an    assignment  New  Orleans,  50  La.  An.  1214;  s.  c. 

without    consent:      Suburban    Blec.  24  So.  224. 

Light  Co.  V.  Town  of  Hempstead,  38        ^'^  State    v.    Minnesota    Trans.    R. 

App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  355;  s.  c.  56  N.  Y.  Co.,  80  Minn.  108;  s.  c.  83  N.  W.  32. 

S.  443.  Cf.  Plynn  v.  Little  Falls  &c.  Co.,  74 

"'City  of  Geneseo  v.  Geneseo  &c.  Minn.  180,  186;  s.  c.  77  N.  W.  38;  78 

Co.,  55  Kan.  358;  s.  c.  40  Pac.  655.  N.  W.  106;  State  v.  St.  Paul  City  R. 

'"Weeks  v.  City  of  Galveston,  21  Co..  78  Minn.  331;  s.  c.  81  N.  W.  200; 

Tex.  Civ.  App.  102;  s.  c.  51  S.  W.  544.  Nash  v.  Lowry,  37  Minn.  261;   s.  c. 

A  city  can  not  lease  to  one  person  all  33  N.  W.  787. 
its  wharf  and  water  privileges:  City 


§  740  ri'HLic  coiu'OHATioNS.  736 

ing  company  to  operate  the  system  for  its  own  benefit  and  use,  nor 
can  the  court  authorize  tJie  delivery  of  possession  of  the  plant  as  an 
entirety  where  part  of  the  apparatus  and  poles  belong  to  the  city.^®* 
Where  the  charter  requires  all  contracts  to  be  signed  by  the  mayor, 
or  some  other  person  authorized  thereto,  a  contract  for  a  sewer  signed 
only  by  the  parties  who  agree  to  do  the  work  is  invalid  and  no  action 
can  be  maintained  thereon  for  damages  for  preventing  its  perform- 
ance by  the  city,  nor  will  equity  grant  relief,  where  no  work  has  been 
done  and  there  is  no  detriment  except  prospective  profits."^ 

§  740.  Construction  of  contracts. — ]\Iunicipal  contracts  are  gov- 
erned by  the  same  general  rules  of  construction  as  are  applied  to  other 
contracts  with  but  few  minor  exceptions.  The  construction  of  a  mu- 
nicipal contract  is  to  be  governed  by  the  surroundings  existing  at  the 
time,  and  not  in  the  light  of  subsequent  developments  and  newly 
arising  conditions.^^'^  A  few  judicial  constructions  under  municipal 
contracts  are  given  though  no  general  rules  are  to  be  derived  there- 
from, (a)  As  to  losses — By  ivliom  home:  Where  a  contract  provided 
that  all  losses  arising  from  the  nature  of  the  work  and  from  unseen 
obstructions  should  be  borne  by  the  contractor  the  city  is  not  li- 
able.^®^  (b)  To  improve  a  street:  A  contract  binding  a  railroad 
company  to  regrade  and  gravel  a  street  used  by  it,  place  it  in  a  good 
condition  and  keep  it  in  good  repair  is  not  to  be  construed  as  a  contract 
to  improve  the  street  by  a  brick  pavement,  but  it  does  not  prevent 
the  city  from  improving  the  street  by  special  assessment.^ ^^  (c)  What 
estimates  include:  Estimates  for  grading  a  street  properly  include  the 
filling  in  and  the  adjustment  of  sewers,  catch-basins  and  manholes.^^® 
(d)  When  plans  and  specifications  govern:  Where  a  contract  pro- 
vides that  the  work  is  to  be  done  according  to  certain  plans  and  speci- 
fications which  form  part  of  it,  and  nothing  is  said  as  to  the  proposal 
and  acceptance  which  are  attached  to  the  contract,  the  plans  and 
specifications  will  govern  without  reference  to  the  proposal  and  ac- 
ceptance.^^**    (e)  Bent  of  hydrants:     A  contract  by  which  the  city 

^**  Gamewell  &c.  Tel.  Co.  v.  City  of  ^*°  Los  Angeles  Water  Co.  v.  City 

Laporte,  102  Fed.  417;  s.  c.  42  C.  C.  of  Los  Angeles,  88  Fed.  720. 

A.  405;  96  Fed.  664.  ^"  Mairs  v.  Mayor  &c.,  65  N.  Y.  S. 

"■^Frick  V.   City   of  Los  Angeles,  351;  s.  c.  52  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  343. 

115  Cal.  512;   s.  c.  47  Pac.  250.     A  ^"^  Cason  v.  City  of  Lebanon,  153 

judgment      rendered      by      consent  Ind.  567;  s.  c.  55  N.  E.  768. 

against  town  commissioners  will  not  ^*"'  Sawyer  v.  City  of  Chicago,  183 

estop  the  town  from  setting  up  want  111.  57;  s.  c.  55  N.  E.  645. 

of   power   to   make    such    contract:  ""Murphy  v.  City  of  Yonkers,  60 

Union   Bank   &c.    v.    Commissioners  N.  Y.  S.  940;  s.  c.  45  App.  Div.   (N. 

&c.,  119  N.  C.  214;  s.  c.  25  S.  E.  966;  Y.)  621. 
34  L.  R.  A.  487. 


737  MUNICITAL    CONTRACTS.  §    740 

rents  a  specified  rmmber  of  hydrants  for  a  specific  sum  per  annum 
for  the  period  of  ten  years  with  the  privilege  of  taking  any  additional 
hydrants  at  a  specified  annual  rental  means  that  if  additional  hydrants 
are  rented  it  shall  be  for  the  remaining  portion  of  the  ten  years  and 
not  until  the  order  may  be  rescinded,^"^  (f)  Not  retrospective:  The 
limitation  of  a  tax  to  seven  mills  on  the  dollar  for  water  supply  does 
not  apply  to  existing  contracts.^®-  (g)  Ohligation  to  purchase  water- 
works: A  grant  of  the  right  to  erect  water- works  providing  that  at 
the  expiration  of  twenty  years,  if  the  grant  should  not  be  renewed,  the 
city  should  purchase  the  works,  makes  it  obligatory  on  the  city  to  pur- 
chase if  the  grant  is  not  renewed.^"^  (h)  When  ohligation  of  contract 
impaired:  A  statute  so  construed  as  to  require  a  vote  of  the  taxpayers 
on  the  reincorporation  of  a  city  or  town,  in  favor  of  assuming  the 
debts  of  the  old  corporation,  before  the  new  corporation  is  held  there- 
for, impairs  the  obligation  of  a  contract  and  is  void.^^*  (i)  "Street" 
— Meaning  of:  In  the  absence  of  limiting  words  "street"  means  the 
whole  area  from  the  line  of  lots  on  one  side  to  the  line  of  lots  on  the 
other,  and  includes  the  sidewalk  areas.^"^  (j)  Guaranty  for  repairs, 
when:  A  contract  including  maintenance  will  be  regarded  as  a 
guaranty  in  a  contract  for  repaving,  where  it  does  not  appear  that  the 
bid  was  higher  than  if  the  maintenance  had  been  'omitted.^*"^ 

"'State  v.  City  of  Phillipsburg,  23  rates:    Arnold  v.  Mayor  &c.,  21  R.  I. 

Mont.  16;  s.  c.  57  Pac.  405.  15;   s.  c.  41  Atl.  576.     Construction 

'■'-  State  V.  City  of  Kearney,  49  Neb.  of  Ohio  Rev.  St.,  §  2486,  as  to  power 

337;  s.  c.  70  N.  W.  255.  of  trustees  in  relation  to  contracts: 

"=*  National   Water   Works    Co.   v.  Kerr    v.    City   of    Bellefontaine,    59 

Kansas  City,  62  Fed.  853;  s.  c.  10  C.  Ohio  St.  446;  s.  c.  52  N.  E.  1024.  Con- 

C.  A.  653.  struction  of  Seattle  charter  with  ref- 

'"  Shapleigh  v.  San  Angelo,  167  U.  erence  to  the  validity  of  contracts 

S.  646;  s.  c.  17  S.  Ct.  957.  thereunder:    Moran  v.  Thompson,  20 

"^  Board  of  Public  Works  &c.   v.  Wash.  525;   s.  c.  56  Pac.  29.     Con- 

Hayden,  13  Colo.  App.  36;    s.  c.  56  struction  of  St.  Louis  charter  with 

Pac.  201.  reference  to  the  validity  of  contracts 

""Seaboard   Nat'l   Bank  v.   Woes-  thereunder:    Seaboard  Nat'l  Bank  v. 

ten,  147  Mo.  467;  s.  c.  48  S.  W.  939.  Woesten,  147  Mo.  467;  s.  c.  48  S.  W. 

A  contract  for  construction  of  tunnel  939.    Construction  of  charter  of  Bay 

partly    through     rock     and     partly  City,   Mich.,   and   contract  thereun- 

through    earth    construed:    City    of  der:    Fox  v.  City  of  Bay  City,  122 

Chicago  V.  Duffy,  179  111.  447;   s.  c.  Mich.  499;  s.  c.  81  N.  W.  352.     Con- 

53  N.  E.  982.    As  to  when  rentals  are  struction  of  contract  under  St.  Paul 

due  in  advance  for  water  supplies,  city  charter:    St.  Paul  Gaslight  Co. 

see  City  of  Greenville  v.  Greenville  v.  City  of  St.  Paul,  78  Minn.  39;-  s.  c. 

Water  Works  Co.,  125  Ala.  625;   s.  c.  80  N.  W.  774,  877.     Construction  of 

27  So.  764.    Construction  of  contract  contracts    generally, — see    Barry    v. 

under  R.  I.  act  of  June  13,  1878,  §§  9,  City  of  New  York,  56  N.  Y.  S.  1049; 

10,  in  relation  to  regulation  of  water  s.  c.  38  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  632. 
1  Smith — 47 


§    741  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  738 

§  741.  Extras. — There  are  many  unforeseen  contingencies  that 
arise  in  the  performance  of  municipal  contracts  that  by  no  reasonable 
probability  could  have  been  anticipated,  in  the  inception  of  the  con- 
tract, and  afford  grounds  for  well-founded  claims  for  extra  com- 
pensation. While  this  is  true  no  reason  exists  why  the  contract  itself 
should  not  contain  provisions,  equitable  and  just  to  all  concerned, 
for  adjusting  all  claims  for  extra  compensation.  There  is  probably 
no  matter,  in  the  management  of  municipal  affairs,  requiring  greater 
acumen,  judgment,  and  legal  ability  than  the  preparation  of  munici- 
pal contracts,  involving,  as  they  frequently  do,  complicated  interests, 
vast  expenditures  of  money  and  extending  over  considerable  periods 
of  time.  Claims  for  extras,  or  extra  compensation  over  and  beyond 
the  contract  price,  may  be,  and  often  are,  equitable  and  just,  but  the 
casual  observer  of  the  trend  of  municipal  litigation  must  observe  that 
they  are  often  made,  either  as  an  evasion  of  the  law  requiring  con- 
tracts to  be  let  to  the  lowest  responsible  bidder,  or  as  a  means  of  extor- 
tion. There  are  two  adequate  remedies  for  this  evil  which  are  easily 
attainable;  that  is,  judicious  legislation,  such  as  has  been  adopted  in 
a  few  states,  and  ample  provisions  touching  all  claims  for  extras 
under  municipal  contracts,  embodied  in  the  contract  itself.  There  are 
many  safeguards  thrown  around  the  execution  of  municipal  contracts, 
for  the  protection  of  the  public,  all  of  which  are  rendered  nugatory 
by  laxness  in  legislation,  or  want  of  care  in  the  drafting  of  the 
contract  in  the  matter  of  extras.  The  provision  of  a  contract  that  no 
extras  were  to  be  allowed  except  in  case  of  a  change  of  the  route,  or 
appliances,  and  then  only  when  agreed  upon  and  endorsed  on  the  con- 
tract, or,  in  case  of  a  disagreement,  the  engineer  should  fix  a  valua- 
tion, and  endorse  the  same  on  the  contract,  will  prevent  a  recovery 
for  extras  furnished  at  the  request  of  the  engineer,  but  of  which  the 
council  had  no  knowledge,  and  no  endorsement  on  the  contract  was 
made.  The  engineer  had  no  power  to  contract  for  the  city.^"^  A 
municipality  is  not  liable  for  work  done  outside  of  the  contract  al- 
though done  by  order  of  the  engineer  of  the  municipality  and  with  the 
knowledge  of  some  of  the  municipal  officers.  ^''^  The  contract  may 
provide  that  no  extra  work  shall  be  performed  or  material  furnished 
except  on  the  written  order  of  the  contractor,  signed  or  countersigned 
by  the  city  engineer,  and  approved  by  the  city  council,  and  unless  this 
is  done  the  city  is  not  liable.^^"  It,  no  doubt,  would  be  equally  effi- 
cacious, in  many  cases,  to  provide  also  that  the  municipal  contract 

'^'  J.  M.  Griffith  Co.  v.  City  of  Los        '="'  City  of  Huntington  v.  Force,  152 
Angeles  (Cal.),  54  Pac.  383.  Ind.  368;  s.  c.  53  N.  E.  443. 

"'West   Chicago   Park   Com'rs   v. 
Kincade,  64  111.  App.  113. 


739  MUNICIPAL    CONTRACTS.  §    742 

shall  in  no  case  be  modified,  clinngcd  or  in  any  manner  extended  to 
include  extra  work  or  material  except  by  order  of  tbc  city  council 
by  ordinance  duly  enacted.  The  contract  may  also  provide  that  no 
claim  for  extras  shall  be  binding  on  the  municipality  unless  presented 
in  writing  to  the  city  council  for  allowance  within  a  specified  period, 
and  no  suit  or  proceeding  shall  be  based  thereon  without  such  presen- 
tation, the  presentation  to  include  a  minute  statement  of  the  nature, 
items,  etc.  No  recovery  can  be  had  for  work  done  outside  of  specifi- 
cations designated  by  the  engineer.^'^''  The  acceptance  and  use  of  a 
building  does  not  bind  the  city  to  pay  for  extra  work  done  thereon 
which  was  unauthorized.-'*^  The  furnishing  of  extra  lights  in  excess 
of  the  number  required  by  the  contract  for  four  years  without  demand- 
ing payment,  receiving  payment  monthly  for  those  furnished  under 
the  contract,  is  not  conclusive  that  the  extra  lights  were  furnished 
gratuitously.^"^  Extra  work  rendered  necessary  by  a  mistake  of  the 
city  engineer  makes  the  city  liable  therefor.^''^  Whether  additional 
work  was  extra  work  was  left  for  the  future,  and  a  provision  vesting 
in  the  engineer  the  final  decision  as  to  construction  and  meaning  of 
the  specifications  has  no  application  and  his  decision  is  not  bind- 
ing.^"* A  contractor  doing  work  made  necessary  by  unforeseen  ex- 
igencies is  entitled  to  extra  compensation  therefor.^''^ 

§  742.  Exclusive  franchises  and  privileges. — The  law  does  not  look 
with  favor  upon  municipal  contracts  granting  exclusive  privileges 
and  has  at  all  times  condemned  monopolies.  There  may  be,  and 
sometimes  are,  extenuating  circumstances  involved,  particularly  in  the 
matter  of  time  or  the  duration  of  the  contract,  but  there  are  no  general 
rules  pertaining  to  the  subject  and  each  case  is  governed  by  its  own 
facts  and  circumstances.  A  grant  of  especial  and  exclusive  privileges 
is  void.-"®  And  so  is  a  contract  granting  an  exclusive  right  and  fran- 
chise for  twenty-one  years.-°^  A  contract  with  a  water-supply  com- 
pany which  contains  no  privileges,  and  no  contract  is  made  for  fur- 

^'"'McEwen    v.    City    of   Nashville  ^"^  Abells  v.  City  of   Syracuse,   40 

(Tenn.  Ch.  App.),  36  S.  W.  968.  N.  Y.  S.  233;  s.  c.  7  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.) 

^"  Boston  Elec.  Co.  v.  City  of  Cam-  501.  General  construction  of  con- 
bridge,  163  Mass.  64;  s.  c.  39  N.  E.  tract  as  to  extras, — see  Braney  v.  In- 
787.  habitants  &c.,  167  Mass.  16;  s.  c.  44 

^o^*  Brush  Elec.  &c.  Co.  v.  City  Coun-  N.  E.  1060;  City  of  Chicago  v.  Weir, 

cil  &c.,  114  Ala.  433;  s.  c.  21  So.  960.  165  111.  582;  s.  c.  46  N.  E.  725. 

^o^McCann   v.   City  of  Albany,   42  =««  Parfitt  v.  Ferguson,  38  N.  Y.  S. 

N.  Y.  S.  94;    s.  c.  11  App.  Div.    (N.  466;  s.  c.  3  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  176. 

Y.)  378.  ""  Illinois  Trust  &c.  Bank  v.  Ar- 

""^  Murphy  v.  City  of  Yonkers,  60  kansas  City  W.  Co.,  67  Fed.  196. 
N.  Y.  S.  940;   s.  c.  45  App.  Div.   (N. 
Y.)  621. 


§    743  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  740 

iiishing  the  inhabitants  with  water,  does  not  preclude  the  city  from 
erecting  or  purchasing  water-works  to  supply  its  inhabitants  and  for 
its  own  use  and  is  not  ground  for  injunction. ^°®  A  contract  between 
a  city  and  an  electrical  subway  company  of  the  right  to  construct 
subways,  to  lease  space  therein  without  prejudice  to  the  city  to  enter 
into  further  and  different  contracts,  and  that  nothing  shall  be  con- 
strued as  granting  exclusive  privileges,  reserves  to  the  city  the  right 
to  grant  other  privileges  as  to  subways. ^"'^  A  contract  to  be  a  mo- 
nopoly must  be  with  reference  to  franchises  and  agreements  in  re- 
striction of  trade,  and  not  mere  police  regulations  in  the  interest  of 
public  health.^^"  Where  no  exclusive  rights  are  given  it  is  not  a 
monopoly.^"  Where  a  board  of  health  is  authorized  to  provide  for 
the  collection  and  disposal  of  its  garbage  it  can  contract  with  a  single 
person  for  such  work  and  not  create  an  illegal  monopoly.^^^  The 
grant  of  a  franchise  for  water  and  light  plants  for  a  term  of  years  is 
not  the  grant  of  an  exclusive  privilege.^^^ 

§  743.  Contracts  ultra  vires. — The  general  subject  of  ultra-vires 
acts  of  municipal  corporations  is  treated  in  a  special  chapter,  and  the 
subject  will  only  be  incidentally  considered  in  this  connection.  There 
are  many  municipal  contracts  that  are  illegal  and  therefore  void  that 
are  not  to  be  classified  with  ultra-vires  contracts.  An  ultra-vires  con- 
tract is  one  made  concerning  a  subject-matter  that  is  beyond  the  gen- 
eral scope  of  power  of  the  corporation  to  contract.  A  municipality 
would  have  no  power  to  contract  concerning  a  mining  interest,  a  dry- 
goods  business,  or  a  grain  speculation,  and  if  it  did  so  the  contract 
would  be  ultra  vires  and  void.  A  contract  in  violation  of  the  statute 
or  contrary  to  public  policy  may  be  equally  void  but  not  ultra  vires,^^* 

=»"  Bienville  Water  &c.  Co.  v.  City  '"  State  v.  Orr,  68  Conn.  101 ;  s.  c. 

of  Mobile,  95  Fed.  539.  35  Atl.  770;  34  L.  R.  A.  279. 

*"  Empire    City     Subway    Co.    v.  ""'  Cunningham   v.   City   of   Cleve- 

Broadway  &c.  R.  Co.,  159  N.  Y.  555,  land,     98     Fed.     657.     What    not    a 

s.  c.  54  N.  E.  1092.  monopoly, — see  Waco  Water  &c.  Co. 

""Coombs  v.  MacDonald,  43  Neb.  v.  City  of  Waco  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  27 

632;  s.  c.  62  N.  W.  41.     Cf.  Walker  v.  S.  W.  675.     Ordinance  of  the  city  of 

Jameson,  140  Ind.  591;  s.  c.  37  N.  E.  Walla  Walla  held  not  to   grant  an 

402;   39  N.  E.  869;   28  L.  R.  A.  679;  exclusive    franchise    to    water    com- 

Smiley  v.  MacDonald,  42  Neb.  5;   s.  pany:  City  of  Walla  Walla  v.  Walla 

c.  60  N.  W.  355;   27  L.  R.  A.  540.  n.  Walla  Water  Co.,  172  U.  S.  1;   s.  c. 

But  see  In  re  Lowe,  54  Kan.  757;  s.  19  S.  Ct.  77. 

c.  39  Pac.  710;  27  L.  R.  A.  545.  "*  Field    v.    City    of    Shawnee,    7 

="Ludington  Water-Supply  Co.  v.  Okla.  73;  s.  c.  54  Pac.  318;  and  see 

City  of  Ludington,  119  Mich.  480;  s.  ch.  16,  ante, 
c.  78  N.  W.  558. 


741  MUNICIPAL   CONTRACTS.  §    744 

and  being  void  is  not  susceptible  of  ratification.^^^  The  following 
contracts  were  held  to  be  ultra  vires :  The  offering  of  a  reward  ;^^" 
borrowing  money  to  pay  expenses  of  a  contested  election  in  regard  to 
the  removal  of  the  county  seat;^^'^  to  make  loans  and  donations  to 
colleges  ;^^^  the  giving  away,  or  exchange  of  the  city  streets  for  other 
property.'^^®  Where  a  municipality  has  power  to  provide  for  a  water 
supply  it  may  employ  an  engineer  to  supply  plans  and  specifications, 
and  the  contract  is  not  ultra  vires,  although  the  building  of  the  water- 
works is  subsequently  enjoined  on  other  grounds  than  the  municipal 
functions  of  the  municipality.^^**  The  defense  of  ultra  vires  must  be 
raised  by  pleading.-^^  A  city  is  not  authorized  to  bind  itself  by  a  con- 
tract to  furnish  Avater  for  a  number  of  years,  at  a  fixed  rate.  But 
this  is  not  on  the  ground  of  ultra  vires.- ^- 

§  744.  Liability  of  municipality  on  contracts. —  (a)  For  failure  to 
collect  assessment :  A  contract  for  a  sewer,  part  of  which  is  to  be  paid 
for  out  of  the  general  sewer  fund  and  the  remainder  to  be  assessed 
against  the  property  benefited,  makes  the  city  liable  for  the  whole  sum 
though  it  is  able  to  collect  but  part  of  the  assessment. ^^^  Where  a 
contract  is  based  on  a  special  assessment  with  a  provision  waiving  all 
claims  or  lien  against  the  city  except  from  the  collection  of  the  special 
assessment,  the  contractor  can  not  recover  a  general  judgment  against 
the  city  on  the  ground  that  its  officers  failed,'  or  refused,  to  levy  a 
second  assessment  after  the  first  had  been  held  invalid.--*  Delay  in 
the  collection  of  an  assessment  growing  out  of  a  mistake  in  the  law 
rendering  it  necessary  to  make  a  reassessment  renders  the  city  liable 
for  the  damages  caused  by  such  delay.^^^     Where  improvements  are 

=^' State  v.  Murphy,  134  Mo.  548;         ==^  Addyston  Pipe  &c.  Co.  v.  City  of 

s.  c.  31  S.  W.  784;   34  S.  W.  51;   35  Corry,  197  Pa.  St.  41;   s.  c.  46  Atl. 

S.  W.  1132.  1035. 

""  City  of  "Winchester  v.  Redmond,        "^  City  of  Pontiac  v.  Talbot  Pav. 

93  Va.  711;  s.  c.  25  S.  E.  1001.  Co.,  94  Fed.  65;  s.  c.  36  C.  C.  A.  88. 

^^"  Myers  v.  City  of  Jeffersonville,        -^  Denny  v.   City   of   Spokane,   79 

145  Ind.  431;  s.  c.  44  N.  E.  452.  Fed.  719.     Cf.  Reilly  v.  City  of  Al- 

"I'City  of  Fulton  v.  Northern  111.  bany,  112  N.  Y.  30;    s.  c.   19  N.  E. 

Coll.,  158  111.  333;  s.  c.  42  N.  E.  138.  508;    City  of  Leavenworth  v.  Mills, 

^^'Beebe   v.    Little   Rock,    68   Ark.  6  Kan.  288;   City  of  Leavenworth  v. 

39;  s.  c.  56  S.  W.  791.  Stille,     13     Kan.     539;     Commercial 

""Harlow   v.    Borough    of   Beaver  Nat'l  Bank  v.  City  of  Portland,  24 

Palls,  188  Pa.  St.  263;   s.  c.  41  Atl.  Or.    188;    s.    c.    33    Pac.    532;    Cum- 

533.  ming    v.   Mayor   &c.,    11    Paige    (N. 

"'Brown   v.    Board    &c.,    103    Cal.  Y.)  596;  City  of  Memphis  v.  Brown, 

531;  s.  c.  37  Pac.  503.  20  Wall.  289,  311;  McEwan  v.  City  of 

"-Trustees  &c.  v.  City  of  Jackson-  Spokane,  16  Wash.  212;  s.  c.  47  Pac. 

ville,  61  111.  App.  199.  433. 


§    744  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  742 

made  under  the  assessment  plan  against  property  specially  benefited, 
and  not  at  the  expense  of  the  city  generally,  the  city  is  not  liable  gen- 
erally for  failure  duly  and  without  neglect  to  collect  the  special  as- 
sessments.--*^ Warrants  payable  out  of  a  street-grade  fund  can  not 
be  collected  from  the  city  generally.  And  this  though  the  remedy 
against  the  special  fund  be  lost.--''  (b)  When  officers  may  hind  mu- 
nicipality :  Where  street  lighting  was  furnished  at  the  request  of  cer- 
tain officials,  who  had  administrative  authority  under  the  charter,  and 
the  street  lighting  was  absolutely  necessary  for  the  city,  the  court 
will  grant  relief.^^®  A  municipal  corporation  is  liable  for  the  acts 
of  an  authorized  officer  although  such  officer  expended  more  money 
than  he  was  authorized  to  expend. ^^^  Where  the  charter  intrusts  the 
care  of  schools  to  a  board  of  education  and  its  trustees  the  city  is  liable 
for  a  violation  of  a  contract  by  them.-^°  (c)  Officers  not  liable  when: 
Where  a  person  making  a  contract  with  village  officers  knows  their 
official  position  and  of  the  invalidity  of  the  contract  without  ratifica- 
tion of  the  board,  and  there  is  absence  of  proof  of  an  intention  to 
make  themselves  personally  liable,  they  can  not  be  held  personally. -^^ 
(d)  Liability  on  void  contracts:  Where  a  contract  for  water  supply 
for  more  than  a  year  is  illegal  by  reason  of  not  having  been  submitted 
to  a  vote  of  the  people,  but  the  contractor  has  expended  a  large  amount 
for  a  plant,  the  city  is  liable  for  the  water  actually  supplied  under 
such  contract  in  each  year.-^^  While  an  executory  contract  between 
a  city  and  an  alderman  will  not  be  enforced,  yet,  if  it  has  been  per- 
formed by  the  alderman,  in  good  faith,  and  the  benefits  received  by 
the  city,  a  recovery  may  be  had  on  the  quantum  meruit.-^^  Although 
a  contract  may  be  invalid  the  city  is  bound  to  pay  for  the  benefits 
received,-^*  as  where  water  is  furnished  to  and  used  by  it,^^^  or  where 

226  Northwestern  L.  Co.  v.  City  of  sub  nom.  Sanitary  Dist.  &c.  v.  Geo. 

Aberdeen,   20   Wash.    102;    s.    c.    54  F.  Blake  Mfg.  Co.,  affirmed  in  179 

Pac.  935.  111.  167;  53  N.  E.  627. 

"^  Rhode  Island  Mortgage  &c.  Co.  ■^''  Purcell  v.  Long  Island  City,  36 

V.  City  of  Spokane,  19  Wash.  616;  N.  Y.  S.  290;   s.  c.  91  Hun   (N.  Y.; 

s.  c.  53  Pac.  1104.     Under  Tex.  Rev.  271. 

St.,  art.  544-547,  the  city  is  primarily  ="  Miller  v.  Board  &c.,  37  N.  Y.  S. 

liable  for  the  entire  improvement  or-  766;  s.  c.  15  Misc.  (N.  Y.)  322. 

dered,  although  by  the  statute  the  -^=City    Council    &c.     v.     Dawson 

city  is  made  liable  for  one-third  and  Waterworks  Co.,  106  Ga.  696;   s.  c. 

abutting  owners  two-thirds:   City  of  32  S.  B.  907. 

Belton  V.  Sterling   (Tex.),  50  S.  W.  ^^^  City  of  Concordia  v.  Hagaman, 

1027.  1  Kan.  App.  35;  s.  c.  41  Pac.  133. 

^'^^  North  River  Elec.  &c.  Co.  v.  City  "^*  Nicholasville  Water  Co.  v.  Board 

of  New  York,  62  N.  Y.  726;   s.  c.  48  &c.,  18  Ky.  L.  592;  s.  c.  36  S.  W.  549. 

App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  14.  ='' Nicholasville   W.   Co.   v.    Board 

"''Geo.  F.  Blake  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Sani-  &c.  (Ky.),  38  S.  W.  430. 
tary  Dist.  &c.,  77  Til.  App.  287;  s.  c. 


743 


MUNICIPAL    CONTRACTS. 


§   '^44 


services  have  been  rendered  l)y  an  attorney.-^"  But  a  city  is  not  liable 
on  a  contract  made  in  violation  of  the  constitution.^^''  (e)  Where 
work  and  material  not  in  accordance  with  contract:  Where  fraud  is 
not  shown  in  the  certificate  of  performance,  or  that  the  work  called  for 
was  not  performed,  or  that  it  was  not  of  the  general  character  re- 
quired, it  is  not  ground  for  resisting  payment  that  the  material  and 
work  were  not  in  accordance  with  the  contract.-^'*  (f)  Work  per- 
formed under  contract:  Where  a  contractor  is  in  performance  of  work 
in  grading  a  street,  and  the  city  takes  possession  for  the  purpo.se  of 
laying  a  sewer  and  subsequently  turns  the  street  over  to  another  to  be 
macadamized,  the  city  is  liable  for  the  grading  done.^^®  (g)  On  quan- 
tum meruit  and  valebat:  Where  a  corporation  has  power  to  make  a 
contract  but  it  is  executed  irregularly  and  therefore  void,  recovery 
may  Le  had  on  a  quantum  meruit  without  showing  a  ratification  if  the 
corporation  receives  and  retains  the  benefits.^'***  Under  a  continuous 
contract  the  acceptance  of  a  portion  does  not  render  the  city  liable  on 
a  quantum  valebat.^''^  (h)  On  negotiable  bonds:  The  city  can  not 
escape  the  payment  of  an  obligation  on  the  ground  that  negotiable 
securities  were  issued  therefor  instead  of  non-negotiable.^'*-  (i)  Lia- 
bility of  city  for  damages:  Under  a  contract  with  the  city  for  grad- 
ing a  street,  where  no  provision  is  made  for  the  payment  of  daMiages 


^"  Brand  v.  City  of  San  Antonio 
(Tex.i,  37  S.  W.  340.  Where  irregu- 
larity in  the  making  of  a  contract 
malves  it  impossible  to  sue  upon  to 
enforce  the  contract  there  may  exist 
a  right  of  action  upon  a  quantum 
meruit:  Condran  v.  City  of  New 
Orleans,  43  La.  An.  1202;  s.  c.  9  So. 
31;  Hill  v.  New  Orleans  &c.  R.  Co., 
11  La.  An.  292;  City  of  Ellsworth  v. 
Rossiter,  46  Kan.  237;  s.  c.  26  Pac, 
674.  See  also,  Butler  v.  Board  &c., 
15  Kan.  178;  Brown  v.  City  of 
Atchison,  39  Kan.  37;  s.  c.  17  Pac. 
465;  Salomon  v.  United  States,  19 
Wall.  17;  Commissioners  &c.  v. 
Brewer,  9  Kan.  307;  Huffman  v. 
Board  &c.,  23  Kan.  281. 

"'  Noel  V.  City  of  San  Antonio,  11 
Tex.  Civ.  App.  580;  s.  c.  33  S.  W. 
263. 

=5' People  V.  Coler,  57  N.  Y.  S.  461; 
s.  c.  26  Misc.  (N.  Y.)  509. 

='"City  of  Dunkirk  v.  Wallace,  19 
Ind.  App.  298;  s.  c.  45  N.  E.  614. 


-'°  Lincoln  Land  Co.  v.  Village  of 
Grant,  57  Neb.  70;  s.  c.  77  N.  W.  349. 

-"  Berwind  v.  Galveston  &c.  Inv. 
Co.,  20  Tex.  Civ.  App.  426;  s.  c.  50 
S.  W.  413.  Where  a  corporation  has 
received  the  benefits  of  a  contract  it 
is  not  a  defense  to  show  the  passage 
of  resolutions  limiting  expenses, 
the  contractor  having  no  knowledge 
of  such  action:  Sanitary  Dist.  &c.  v. 
Geo.  F.  Blake  Mfg.  Co.,  179  111.  167; 
s.  c.  53  N.  E.  627. 

"*-  Pacific  Imp.  Co.  v.  City  of 
Clarksdale,  74  Fed.  528.  The  taking 
of  a  bond  of  indemnity  from  a  rail- 
road company  to  protect  the  city 
from  a  failure  of  the  railroad  com- 
pany to  construct  a  tunnel  under  the 
street  in  accordance  with  the  ordi- 
nance and  to  indemnify  persons 
against  the  company's  negligence 
and  wrongful  acts  does  not  make  the 
city  liable  to  such  persons:  Terry  v. 
City  of  Richmond,  94  Va.  537;  s.  c. 
27  S.  E.  429. 


§    744  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  744 

and  the  assessment  of  benefits,  and  for  that  reason  the  performance 
of  the  contract  is  enjoined,  the  city  will  be  liable  to  the  contractor  for 
damages  in  the  absence  of  an  express  provision  in  the  contract  or 
charter  exempting  the  city  from  liability.^**  Where  the  city  is  lim- 
ited to  a  maximum  expenditure  for  a  specified  purpose,  not  being 
within  the  general  municipal  powers,  it  is  not  liable  in  excess  of  this 
sum  even  to  a  bona-fide  contractor  who  has  performed  the  contract.^** 
(j)  Defenses  of  municipality:  "Where  the  city  granted  electric-light 
and  water  franchises  to  certain  persons,  who  proceeded  to  form  a 
corporation  to  construct  and  operate  plants,  to  which  was  assigned  the 
franchises,  and  the  company  thereupon  mortgaged  its  plants,  property, 
and  contracts,  it  was  held,  in  an  action  to  foreclose,  which  was  subse- 
quently made  a  creditor's  bill,  and  in  which  case  an  ancillary  bill  was 
filed  by  the  receiver  against  the  city  to  reach  rentals  due  from  it,  that 
it  was  no  defense  that  the  company  was  not  a  corporation  de  jure  or 
de  facto.^*^  The  defense  that  the  city  had  paid  out  all  the  contract 
price  on  other  claims  and  had  none  to  pay  plaintiff,  requires  the  city 
to  establish  that  the  claims  for  which  the  money  was  paid  were  legally 
filed.^'*®  (k)  Equitable  remedies:  Where  a  city  entered  into  a  con- 
tract for  a  fire  and  police  telegraph  system,  at  a  time  when  the  city 
was  already  indebted  beyond  the  constitutional  limit,  which  was 
known  to  both  parties,  and  recovery  was  refused  by  the  court  for  the 
contract  price,  the  contractor  is  not  entitled  to  file  a  bill  in  equity 
to  charge  the  city  with  rentals,  or  to  compel  it  to  transfer  the  sjstem 
to  the  contractor  as  a  whole.^'*''  Facts  alleged  may  not  bo  sufficient 
to  authorize  a  recovery  at  law  but  may  be  sufficient  for  equitable  re- 
lief."*® (1)  Remedies  of  contractor:  Where  plaintiff  had  two  con- 
tracts, one  to  excavate  one  street  and  one  to  fill  another  street,  the 
dirt  from  the  former  to  be  used  in  filling  the  latter,  and  he  was 
permitted  to  perform  but  a  portion  of  the  first  contract,  his  measure  of 
damages  is  the  contract  price  for  the  work  done  and  the  difference 
between  the  cost  of  excavation  and  the  contract  price  on  the  work 
not  done,  and  in  addition  the  value  of  the  earth  that  would  have  been 
excavated  had  the  contract  been  completed.^*^     Where  a  street-paving 

^*Ash  v.  City  of  Independence,  79  N.  Y.  S.  794;  s.  c.  31  Misc.   (N.  Y.) 

Mo.  App.  70.  102. 

""  Black  V.   Common  Council  &c.,  ^"  Gamewell  &c.   Tel.   Co.  v.   City 

119  Mich.  571;  s.  c.  78  N.  W.  660.  of  Laporte,  96  Fed.  664;  s.  c.  102  Fed. 

=«  Cunningham    v.    City   of   Cleve-  417;  42  C,  C.  A.  405. 

land,  98  Fed.  657.  ^'  Kerr  v.  City  of  Bellefontaine,  59 

=^«Iowa  Brick  Co.  v.  City  of  Des  Ohio  St.  446;  s.  e.  52  N.  E.  1024. 

Moines,  111  Iowa  272;  s.  c.  82  N.  W.  =^»McManus   v.    City    of    Philadel- 

922;  Dixon  v.  City  of  New  York,  63  phia,  195  Pa.  St.  304;   s.  c.  45  Atl. 


745  MUNICIPAL    CONTRACTS.  §    745 

contractor  suffers  damages  by  reason  of  the  settling  of  a  trench  im- 
properly filled  by  a  water  board,  the  board  is  not  liable  to  the  con- 
tractor therefor,  where  the  trench  was  in  existence  before  the  paving 
was  done,  and  the  contract  was  entered  into  with  knowledge  of  the 
trench.-'"^"  (m)  Liability  for  expenses — Medical  services:  Where  a 
city  charter  contains  a  mandatory  provision  that  certain  medical  ser- 
vices rendered  at  the  request  of  the  police  department  shall  be  paid 
for  at  a  certain  rate,  and  requires  a  specified  sum  to  be  appropriated 
therefor,  the  city  is  liable,  notwithstanding  the  charter  also  provides 
that  no  expenses  shall  be  incurred  by  any  department  or  officers  with- 
out an  appropriation  previously  made,^^^  but  the  city  is  not  liable 
where  its  appropriation  has  been  exhausted  before  the  services  were 
rendered,  (n)  Liability  in  case  of  an  independent  contractor: 
Where  plaintiff  was  injured  by  dynamite  used  in  excavating  a  sewer 
and  the  evidence  showed  that  the  sewer  was  being  constructed  by  con- 
tractors under  the  supervision  of  a  foreman ;  that  all  employes,  includ- 
ing plaintiff,  were  hired  and  paid  by  the  contractors ;  and  it  further 
appeared  that  the  city  exercised  no  control  over  the  work  or  the  serv- 
ants, and  reserved  the  right  only  to  see  that  the  work  was  in  accord- 
ance with  the  contract,  the  city  is  not  liable.^^^* 

§  745.  Estoppel. — Estoppel  of  municipal  corporations  generally  is 
elsewhere  treated  fully  and  need  not  be  considered  here  extensively. 
Where  a  contract  is  void  because  in  conflict  with  the  constitution,  laws, 
and  public  policy,  the  city  may  plead  the  illegality  of  the  contract 
although  fully  performed  by  the  contractor;-^-  and  there  is  no  es- 
toppel when  the  contract  is  ultra  vires.^^^     The  fact  that  a  city  has 

1053;   Gamewell  &c.  Tel.  Co.  v.  City  St.  399;   Creed  v.  Hartmann,  29  N. 

of   Laporte,   42   C.   C.   A.   405;    s.  c.  Y.  591;  Storrs  v.  City  of  Utica,  17  N. 

102  Fed.  417;   Comstock  v.  Incorpo-  Y.  104;  Congreve  v.  Morgan,  5  Duer 

rated  Village  of  Nelsonville,  61  Ohio  (N.  Y.)   495;  Water  Co.  v.  Ware,  16 

St.  288;  56  N.  E.  15.  Wall.    566;    Mayor   &c.    v.    Furze,    3 

='"  Grant  v.  Board  of  Water  Com'rs  Hill  (N.  Y.)  616;  Dygert  v.  Schenck, 

&c.,  122  Mich.  694;    s.  c.  81  N.  W.  23  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  446;  Vanderpool  v. 

969.  Husson,     28     Barb.     (N.     Y.)     196; 

==^1  Dixon  v.  City  of  New  York,  63  Matheny    v.    Wolffs,    2    Duv.    (Ky.) 

N.  Y.  S.  794;   s.  c.  31  Misc.   (N.  Y.)  137;    Inhabitants  &c.  v.  Holbrook,  9 

102.  Allen  (Mass.)  17;  Bower  v.  Peate,  L. 

^'aStaldter  v.  City  of  Huntington,  R.  1  Q.  B.  D.  321;  Ellis  v.  Sheffield 

153  Ind.  354;   s.  c.  55  N.  E.  88.     Cf.  Gas  &c.  Co.,  23  L.  J.  Q.  B.  42. 

Vincennes      Water-Supply      Co.      v.  -^-  City    Council    &c.    v.     Dawson 

White,  124  Ind.  376;    s.  c.  24  N.  E.  Water  Works  Co.,  106  Ga.  696;  s.  c. 

747;    Wabash  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Farver,  32  S.  E.  907. 

Ill    Ind.    195;    s.    c.    12    N.    B.    296;  =^'McAleer  v.  Angell,  19  R.  I.  688; 

Clark  V.  Fry.  8  Ohio  St.  358;    Car-  s.  c.  36  Atl.  588. 
man  v.  Steubenville  R.  Co.,  4  Ohio 


§  745 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS. 


746 


received  benefits  under  a  contract  will  not  estop  it  from  avoiding  the 
contract  if  it  was  made  without  authority.  ^^^  Where  a  contract  was  the 
result  of  a  compromise  between  the  city  and  a  railroad  company,  and 
a  bridge,  provided  for  therein,  was  built  by  both  parties  and  kept  in 
repair  by  the  city,  it  does  not  estop  the  city  from  alleging  the  invalidity 
of  the  contract  as  being  ultra  vires. "^^  And  so  where  an  ordinance  is 
necessary  to  the  validity  of  an  improvement,  the  city  is  not  estopped 
to  assert  its  invalidity  by  reason  of  the  work  having  been  done  and 
the  benefits  having  been  received.^'^"  A  contract,  invalid  because  made 
at  a  special  meeting  of  which  certain  members  had  no  notice,  but 
which  is  legitimate  and  proper  and  within  the  scope  of  the  council's 
power,  will  be  enforced  against  the  city  where  it  has  received  the 
benefit  of  the  contract,  and  the  contractor  has  expended  money  on  the 
improvements.-^''  Where  a  lessee  from  the  city  made  permanent  im- 
provements on  the  leased  premises  under  an  agreement  that  the 
city  would  refund  the  value  at  the  termination  of  the  lease,  the  city 
will  be  estopped  to  claim  the  contract  was  ultra  vires.^^^  Failure 
on  the  part  of  the  city  to  enforce  a  disputed  provision  of  a  contract 
for  a  period  of  five  years  will  work  an  estoppel  on  the  part  of  the  city 
to  enforce  such  provision.^ °^ 


^  McTwiggan  v.  Hunter,  19  R.  I. 
265;  s.  c.  33  Atl.  5. 

^^^  State  V.  Minnesota  Trans.  R. 
Co.,  80  Minn.  108;  s.  c.  83  N.  W.  32. 

^^  Wheeler  v.  City  of  Poplar  Bluff, 
149  Mo.  36;  s.  c.  49  S.  W.  1088. 

23' London  &c.  Co.  v.  Jellico,  103 
Tenn.  320;  s.  c.  52  S.  W.  995;  Hitch- 
cock V.  Galveston,  96  U.  S.  341;  San 
Francisco  Gas  Co.  v.  City  of  San 
Francisco,  9  Cal.  453;  Columbus 
Waterworks  Co.  v.  City  of  Colum- 
bus, 48  Kan.  99;  s.  c.  28  Pac.  1097; 
Moore  v.  Mayor  &c.,  73  N.  Y.  238; 
Schipper  v.  City  of  Aurora,  121  Ind. 
154;  s.  c.  22  N.  E.  878;  Gas  L.  Co.  v. 
Memphis,  93  Tenn.  612;  s.  c.  30  S. 
W.  25;  Dowell  v.  City  of  Portland, 
13  Or.  248;  s.  c.  10  Pac.  308. 

-3^  Wilkins  v.  Mayor  &c.,  30  N.  Y.  S. 
424;  s.  c.  9  Misc.  (N.  Y.)  610. 

^"'City  of  St.  Louis  v.  Laclede 
Gas  Light  Co.,  155  Mo.  1;  s.  c.  55  S. 
W.  1003.  One  who  has  had  the  full 
benefit  of  property  of  a  corporation 
under  a  contract  is  estopped  to  ques- 


tion the  validity  of  such  contract: 
Mayor  &c.  v.  Sonneborn,  113  N.  Y. 
423;  s.  c.  21  N.  E.  121,  an  action  by 
the  city  to  recover  rent  for  lease  of 
a  pier,  in  which  the  lessee  at- 
tempted to  defend  on  the  ground 
that  the  lease  was  not  made  in  terms 
of  the  statute  relating  to  such  mat- 
ters, which  provides  that  all  "leases 
other  than  for  districts  appropriated 
by  said  board  to  special  commercial 
interests  shall  be  made  at  public 
auction  to  the  highest  bidder."  See 
also,  Whitney  Arms  Co.  v.  Barlow, 
63  N.  Y.  62;  Rider  Life  Raft  Co.  v. 
Roach,  97  N.  Y.  378.  A  city  is  not 
estopped  by  a  resolution  of  the  coun- 
cil reciting  a  compliance  with  the 
contract  when  in  fact  there  had 
not  been  in  an  action  to  rescind  the 
contract:  City  of  Galesburg  v.  Gales- 
burg  Water  Co.,  34  Fed.  675;  af- 
firmed in  Farmers'  Loan  &c.  Co.  v. 
Galesburg,  133  U.  S.  156;  s.  c.  10  S. 
Ct.  316. 


747  MUNICirAL   rOXTRACTS.  §    74G 

§  746.  Letting  of  municipal  contracts. — There  is  no  subject  con- 
nected with  nmnieipiil  contracts  that  has  been  more  fruitful  of  liti- 
gation than  tlie  matter  of  letting  such  contracts  under  the  statutory 
provisions  usually  found  regulating  the  subject.  There  is  great  dis- 
similarity in  the  statutes,  and  much  confusion  in  the  decisions  and 
but  few  general  principles  to  be  derived  therefrom.  It  seems  to  be 
generally  admitted,  however,  that  the  provisions  of  the  statute  pre- 
scribing the  mode  and  time  of  advertising  for  bids  are  mandatory, 
and  a  condition  precedent  to  the  making  of  a  valid  contract.-"**  (a) 
Sufficiency  of  notice  on  advertisement:  Where  the  law  requires  the 
advertisement  for  bids  for  at  least  ten  days,  one  insertion  ten  days 
before  letting  is  sufficient.'"^  Where  the  statute,  or  charter,  fixes 
the  length  of  time  and  method  of  advertising  there  can  be  no  radical 
departure  from  such  requirements.  It  has  been  held,  however,  that 
although  the  charter  requires  advertisement  for  bids  before  letting 
contracts,  the  design  of  which  being  to  insure  economy  and  prevent 
favoritism  and  corruption,  yet  in  case  of  emergency,  where  a  delay 
would  result  in  irreparable  injury,  a  valid  contract  may  be  made 
without  such  preliminary  advertisement  if  the  price  is  reasonable.^" - 
"WHiere  the  assignees  of  a  contractor  sue  on  a  contract  that  has  been 
completed  by  the  board  of  pulilic  works,  after  abandonment  by  the 
contractor,  it  is  of  no  avail  to  the  plaintiffs  that  no  advertisement  for 
bids  was  made  for  the  completion  of  the  work  as  required  by  law.-""^ 
The  New  Jersey  act  of  ]\Iay  22,  1894,  authorizing  the  lighting  of 
public  streets  and  places  in  cities,  towns,  townships,  boroughs  and 
villages,  and  to  erect  and  maintain  proper  appliances,  does  not  re- 
quire advertisements  for  proposals  nor  that  the  contract  be  awarded 
to  the  lowest  bidder.  The  contract  may  be  awarded  with  or  without 
proposals,  and  so  long  as  the  contract  is  bona  fide  and  is  made  with 
reasonable  discretion  and  judgment  it  will  not  be  interfered  with.-"* 
(b)  Letting  of  contract  on  bids,  not  required  when:  The  statutes, 
as  a  rule,  do  not  require  all  contracts  to  be  let  on  bids  submitted ;  in 
fact,  where  the  amount  involved  is  small  or  the  number  necessarily 

="*'  McLoud   v.   City    of    Columbus,  Schefbauer  v.  Board  &c.,  .57  N.  J.  L. 

54  Ohio  St.  439;  s.  c.  44  N.  E.  95.  588;  s.  c.  31  All.  454;  Howell  v.  City 

="' Woodward  v.  Collett,  20  Ky.  L.  of  Millville,  60  N.  J.  L.  95,  98;  s.  c. 

1066;  s.  c.  48  S.  W.  164.  36  Atl.  691;   Foster  v.  City  of  Cape 

="=  North    River    Elec.    &c.    Co.    v.  May,   60   N.  J.   L.   78;    s.   c.   36   Atl. 

City  of  New  York,  62  N.  Y.  S.  726;  s.  1089;  State  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  52  N. 

c.  48  App.  Div.   (N.  Y.)  14.  J.  L.  483;   s.  c.  19  Atl.  966.     Notice 

='■•' Jones  V.  Savage,  53  N.  Y.  S.  308;  of  the  improvement  for  which  bids 

s.  c.  24  Misc.  (N.  Y.)  158.  are  invited  held  insufficient  in  Wind- 

-"*  Oaltley  v.  City  of  Atlantic  City,  sor  v.  City  qf  Des  Moines,  101  Iowa 

63  N.  J.  L.  127;  s.  c.  44  Atl.  651.    Cf.  343;  s.  c.  70  N.  W.  214. 


§    746  PUBLIC    CORrORATIONS.  748 

large,  it  would  be  necessarily  inconvenient  so  to  do.  It  has  been  held 
that  a  statute  which  provides  that  all  contracts  exceeding  $500 
shall  be  let  to  the  lowest  bidder  does  not  apply  to  a  contract  for 
hiring  pumps  at  $42.50  per  day  which  may  be  terminated  at  any 
time.^''^  Evidently  this  would  not  be  the  case  if  there  was  a  manifest 
evasion  of  the  law.  It  has  been  held  under  a  city  charter  that  a  city 
council  may  let  contracts  for  street-improvements  without  advertising 
for  bids,  where  the  law  requiring  bids  is  applicable  only  to  the  mayor 
and  a  committee,  and  not  applicable  to  the  letting  of  bids  by  the  coun- 
cil.^®® (c)  Opening  of  bids:  Where  bids  were  to  be  received  by  a  cer- 
tain day  and  the  bids  were  opened  two  days  later,  but  the  record  was 
silent  as  to  when  the  bids  were  handed  in,  it  will  be  presumed  the 
bid  was  in  apt  time.^*^'^  Where  the  law  requires  all  bids  to  be  publicly 
opened  by  the  officer  in  charge  of  the  advertising,  and  such  officer  is 
absent  at  the  time,  the  bids  can  not  be  opened  by  his  secretary,^"*  and 
bids  opened  in  the  absence  of  the  officer  authorized  to  open,  may  be 
disregarded  by  him.-^^  Where  an  ordinance  provides  that  advertise- 
ments for  bids  for  public  improvements  shall  specify  a  time  and  place 
when  and  where  bids  shall  be  opened  by  the  board  of  public  works  in 
the  presence  of  such  persons  as  shall  choose  to  attend,  and  the  adver- 
tisement merely  recited  that  sealed  proposals  would  be  received  at  the 
office  of  the  board  of  public  works  till  a  certain  hour,  at  which  time 
they  were  in  fact  opened  in  public  in  the  presence  of  bidders,  the 
assessment  was  legal.-""  Where  the  statute  requires  each  bid  to  con- 
tain the  full  name  of  every  one  interested  in  it,  it  is  mandatory,  and 
this  for  the  reason  that  it  is  material  to  know  who  are  to  be  held  re- 
sponsible for  the  faithful  performance  of  the  contraet.-^^  (d)  Accept- 
ance of  bid:  After  the  acceptance  of  a  bid  such  acceptance  can  not  be 
reconsidered  and  revoked,  for  the  reason  that  it  has  then  become  a  con- 

="=  Sanitary  Dist.  &c.  v.  Geo.  F.  ^"^People  v.  Coler,  54  N.  Y.  S.  785; 
Blake  Mfg.  Co.,  179  111.  167;  s.  c.  53  s.  c.  35  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  401. 
N.  E.  627.  Where  the  charter  pro-  =""  People  v.  Coler,  54  N.  Y.  S.  785; 
hibits  the  making  of  a  contract  s.  c.  35  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  401. 
where  the  expense  will  exceed  $500  ""Cass  Farm  Co.  v.  City  of  De- 
without  letting  it  to  the  lowest  troit,  124  Mich.  433;  s.  c.  83  N.  W. 
bidder  it  has  no  application  to  the  108.  The  minutes  of  a  board  must 
hiring  of  pumps  to  be  used  by  the  show  that  bids  were  opened  and  de- 
engineer  of  the  corporation  in  doing  clared  publicly  as  required  by  law 
work  he  was  required  to  do:  Geo.  F.  or  it  is  prima  facie  proof  that  it 
Blake  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Sanitary  Dist.  &c.,  was  not  done:  Edwards  v.  Berlin, 
77  111.  App.  287.  123  Cal.  544;  s.  c.  56  Pac.  432. 

^^^  City   of  Waco   v.   Chamberlain,  "'  Strack  v.  Ratterman,  18  Ohio  C. 

92  Tex.  207;  s.  c.  47  S.  W.  527.  C.  36. 

=<"  Williams    v.    Bergin,    129    Cal. 
461;  s.  c.  62  Pac.  59. 


749  MUNICIPAL    CONTRxVCTS.  §    74G 

tract. -'^-  It  has  been  held,  however,  that  after  bids  on  plans  and 
specifications  have  been  received  it  is  competent  for  the  city  to  make 
an  agreement  with  one  of  the  bidders  modifying  the  plans  and  speci- 
fications to  the  advantage  of  the  city.^^^  It  will  be  readily  seen  that 
the  acceptance  of  a  bid  may  be  fraudulently  procured,  or  under  a 
mistake  as  to  the  real  parties  in  interest,  and  may  be  rescinded  if 
done  promptly,  (e)  Competition  the  design:  The  design  of  such 
statutes  is  to  secure  competition  and  thereby  secure  a  contract  on  as 
favorable  terms  as  possible.  The  general  rule  is,  therefore,  that  every- 
thing which  tends  to  prevent  competition  renders  the  bid  invalid. 
And  so  a  contract  for  a  public  improvement  which  reserves  to  an 
officer  the  power  to  require  a  greater  or  less  amount  of  certain  material 
in  the  work,  thereby  affecting  the  profits  on  the  work,  is  invalid  as 
calculated  to  discourage  competition.^^*  Where  the  law  requires 
contracts  to  be  let  to  the  lowest  bidder  it  must  be  done,  and  it  is  no 
excuse  that  the  council  has  determined  by  ordinance  and  agreement  to 
let  contracts  to  no  person  employing  non-union  labor. ^^^  It  has  been 
held,  however,  that  an  ordinance  in  relation  to  the  paving  of  a  street, 
which  provides  that  a  particular  kind  of  asphalt  shall  be  used  in  which 
there  is  a  monopoly,  does  not  render  the  ordinance  void.^^*'  And  so 
a  city  in  advertising  for  bids,  if  acting  in  good  faith,  may  contract  for 
the  use  of  such  materials  as  are  for  the  city's  interest,  although  such 
material  is  the  product  of  an  exclusive  manufacture.-^'^  (f)  Bids 
based  on  plans  and  specifications:  An  advertisement  for  bids  which 
refers  to  plans  and  specifications  is  sufficient,-'^  but  such  specifications 

^^  Safety  Insulated  Wire  &c.  Co.  v.  turer  is  not  void  in  the  absence  of 

City  of  Baltimore,  74  Fed.  363;  s.  c.  proof  that  they  were  patented  and 

42  U.  S.  App.  64;  20  C.  C.  A.  453.  not  generally  on  sale  in  the  market: 

^^'Reno  W.  &c.  Co.  v.  Osburn,  25  Smith  v.  City  of  Syracuse,  44  N.  Y. 

Nev.  53;  s.  c.  56  Pac.  945.     As  to  a  S.  852;  s.  c.  17  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  63. 

state  of   facts   under  which  an   ac-  But  they  are  void  if  it  is  provided 

ceptance  of  a  bid  will  not  be  bind-  that    the    materials    shall    be    pur- 

ing,  see  Wilson  v.  Gabler,  11  S.  D.  chased  of  a  certain  manufacturer: 

206;  s.  c.  76  N.  W.  924.  Larned  v.  City  of  Syracuse,  44  N.  Y. 

=^' California  Imp.  Co.  v.  Reynolds,  S.  857;  s.  c.  17  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  19. 

123  Cal.  88;  s.  c.  55  Pac.  802.  An  agreement  between  competitors 

-^^  Holden  v.  City  of  Alton,  179  111.  in  business  that  one  shall  make  a 

318;  s.  c.  53  N.  E.  556.  bid  for  both,  the  work  to  be  divided 

="*  Verdin  v.  City  of  St.  Louis,  131  between  them,  is  not  a  fraudulent 

Mo.  26;  s.  c.  33  S.  W.  480.  combination  such  as  will  render  the 

-'"  Mayor  &c.  v.  Bonnell,  57  N.  J.  L.  contract  void :  Woodward  v.  Collett, 

424;   s.  c.  31  Atl.  408.     The  petition  20  Ky.  L.  1066;  s.  c.  48  S.  W.  164. 

to    and    proceedings    of    a    council  ="-  Bozarth  v.  McGillicuddy,  19  Ind. 

called    for    an    improvement    with  App.  26;  s.  c.  47  N.  E.  397;  48  N.  E. 

bricks  made  by  a  certain  manufac-  1042. 


§    746  PUBLIC    COUPORATIONS.  750 

must  be  on  file  a  reasonable  time  before  the  bids  are  to  be  received.-^* 
A  material  conflict  to  the  disadvantage  of  the  city  between  a  detailed 
specification  furnished  with  a  proposal,  and  the  plans  and  specifica- 
tions on  which  proposals  were  invited,  renders  the  proposal  invalid.^®** 
Where  the  charter  requires  advertisement  for  proposals  for  a  public 
work  on  plans  and  specifications,  or  other  sufficient  description,  filed, 
a  mere  general  specification  is  not  a  compliance  and  does  not  authorize 
the  acceptance  of  a  bid."^^  The  fact  that  advertisement  for  bids  was 
made  before  specifications  were  prepared  and  could  be  seen  does  not 
invalidate  the  proceedings,  where  a  readvertisement  for  thirty  days 
was  made  after  the  specifications  were  prepared.-®^  Where  a  contract 
is  abandoned  and  proposals  are  advertised  for  the  completion  of  the 
work  according  to  plans  and  specifications,  it  means  the  specifications 
of  the  old  contract.^^^  (g)  Materials  as  affecting  a  hid:  Where  the 
charter  requires  contracts  to  be  let  to  the  lowest  bidder,  the  city  in  its 
advertisement  for  bids  has  no  right  to  restrict  the  use  of  material  to 
that  manufactured  by  ^  certain  specified  firm,  as  that  would  prevent 
free  competition,  and  a  fortiori  if  other  firms  manufactured  as  good 
material  as  that  specified.^^*  An  advertisement  for  proposals  which 
fails  to  state  that  the  successful  bidder  will  be  entitled  to  use  certain 
material,  already  belonging  to  the  city,  will  not  vitiate  the  contract 
made  with  the  lowest  bidder  by  which  he  is  permitted  to  use  such 
material. ^^^  The  letting  of  a  contract  will  not  be  restrained  on  the 
ground  that  there  was  no  competition  in  the  bidding  by  reason  of  a 
monopoly  in  the  sale  of  some  of  the  material  required  by  the  specifi- 
cations.-**^ Where  new  material  is  advertised  for,  second-hand  ma- 
terial can  not  be  accepted,  without  notice  to  the  other  bidders.^^'^  (h) 
Award  of  contract  to  bidder:  The  provisions  of  the  statute  relative 
to  the  letting  of  contracts  upon  bids  for  public  improvements  must  be 
strictly  followed,  and  the  letting  of  a  contract  on  terms  more  favorable 
than  the  requirement  for  bids  destroys  the  benefit  of  competition 
and  renders  the  contract  illegal  and  subject  to  being  enjoined.-*® 

2™  Smith  v.   City  of   Syracuse,   44  -'"''  Oakley  v.  City  of  Atlantic  City, 

N.  Y.  S.  852;   s.  c.  17  App.  Div.   (N.  63  N.  J.  L.  127;  s.  c.  44  Atl.  651. 

Y.)  63.                                                      -  ^'"Holmes  v.  Common  Council  &c., 

'^  State  v.  City  of  Passaic,  63  N.  J.  120  Mich.  226;  s.  c.  79  N.  W.  200.     A 

L.  208;  s.  c.  42  Atl.  1058.  contract    requiring    bids    may    limit 

=^^  Ricketson  v.  City  of  Milwaukee,  the  bids  to  two  designated  brands  if 

105  Wis.  591;  s.  c.  81  N.  W.  864.  done  in  good  faith:  Beazley  v.  Ken- 

-■^^  Johnson  v.  City  of  Rock  Hill,  57  nedy  (Tenn.),  52  S.  W.  791. 

S.  C.  371;  s.  c.  35  S.  E.  568.  ""Lake  Shore  Foundry  v.  City  of 

'^'  State  V.  City  of  Passaic,  63  N.  J.  Cleveland,  8  Ohio  C.  C.  671. 

L.  208;  s.  c.  42  Atl.  1058.  -'^^  Wickwire    v.    City    of    Elkhart, 

^-^'Smith  v.  Syracuse  Imp.  Co.,  161  144  Ind.  305;  s.  c.  43  N.  E.  216. 
N.  Y.  484;  s.  c.  55  N.  E.  1077. 


751  MUNICIPAL    CONTRACTS.  §    746 

The  awarding  of  a  contract  for  lighting  the  streets  is  a  minis- 
terial act  and  not  legislative/"*®  an  administrative  act  and  not 
judicial. -°°  Where  a  contract  shows  that  it  was  let  on  bids  had  for 
that  purpose,  in  the  absence  of  evidence  to  the  contrary  it  sufficiently 
shows  that  it  was  by  competitive  bidding,-"^  and  where  it  must  be  let  to 
the  lowest  bidder,  a  presumption  will  be  raised  that  the  trustees  did 
their  duty  where  the  record  discloses  such  facts  as  to  warrant  such  pre- 
sumption.-®- Where  the  facts  are  not  sufficient  to  establish  fraud  on 
the  part  of  the  council  in  awarding  a  contract,  the  contract  will  be  re- 
garded as  valid. ^®^  Where  the  city  has  a  right  to  pay  for  street 
lighting  out  of  the  current  funds  or  revenues  as  the  services  are  ren- 
dered, and  monthly  statements  were  rendered,  and  payments  made, 
pursuant  to  a  proposition  of  the  light  company,  but  no  contract  was 
ever  signed  by  the  mayor,  or  prepared  and  approved  by  the  city  at- 
torney, the  contract  can  not  be  avoided  at  the  suit  of  a  taxpayer.^"* 
An  assessment  for  an  improvement  will  not  be  set  aside  on  the  grounds 
of  fraud  of  the  council  where  the  bid  is  not  so  high  as  to  warrant  a 
finding  of  improvidence  of  the  council,  the  council  being  aware  of  no 
collusion  between  bidders,  although  it  appears  that  the  bid  is  forty 
to  fifty  per  cent,  above  the  fair  cash  price  for  the  work,  but  the  war- 
rants for  the  work  were  at  twenty-five  to  thirty  per  cent,  discount.^®^ 
The  award  of  a  contract  to  one  who  is  slightly  in  excess  of  the  lowest 
bid  will  not  in  the  absence  of  fraud  or  bad  faith  invalidate  the  con- 
tract.-^*' Where  discretion  is  vested  in  an  officer  he  has  a  right  to 
restrict  bidders  for  supplies  to  animals  killed  and  dressed  in  the 
state. -^'^  A  contract  awarded  on  condition  that  a  bond  be  furnished 
by  a  certain  time,  or  it  would  be  reawardcd,  followed  by  default,  does 
not  require  notice  of  a  reaward  to  the  defaulting  bidder.^®^  A  grant 
of  a  franchise  to  a  water-works  company  without  receiving  bids  as 
required  by  the  constitution  is  void.-'"'  A  contract  in  excess  of  $500, 
without  advertising  for  bids  as  required,  is  not  void  where  there  is 

^^  Seitzinger  v.  Borough  of  Tama-  Y.  S.  1000;  s.  c.  14  Misc.  (N.  Y.)  258. 

qua,   187  Pa.  St.   539;    s.  c.   41  Atl.  =»*  Dallas  Elec.  Co.  v.  City  of  Dal- 

454.  las,  23  Tex.  Civ.  App.  323;    s.  c.  58 

^Adleman  v.  Pierce   (Idaho),  55  S.  W.  153. 

Pac.  658.  -'"  Shannon  v.  Portland,  38  Or.  382, 

=''  City  of  Marshall  v.  Rainey,  78  s.  c.  62  Pac.  50. 

Mo.  App.  416.  -""  Kingsley  v.   Bowman,  53  N.  Y. 

^'-Neff  v.  Covington  Stone  &c.  Co.,  S.  426;  s.  c.  33  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  1. 

21  Ky.  L.  1454;  s.  c.  55  S.  W.  697.  =»^  In  re  Rooney,  56  N.  Y.  S.  483; 

-^^  Potts   v.    Philadelphia,    195    Pa.  s.  c.  26  Misc.  (N.  Y.)  73. 

St.  619;  s.  c.  46  Atl.  195.    The  letting  =°"  Barrett  v.  Ocean  City,  62  N.  J. 

of  a  contract  to  one  not  the  lowest  L.  588;  s.  c.  41  Atl.  946. 

bidder  does  not  establish  fraud,  or  -'"'  Nicholasville  Water  Co.  v.  Board 

illegality:    Terrell  v.  Strong,  35  N.  &c.,  18  Ky.  L.  592;  s.  c.  36  S.  W.  549. 


§    746  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  753 

but  one  bidder  that  can  perform  the  contract.^"''  The  power  to  award 
bidders  the  contract  for  a  public  work  is  lost  by  a  delay  of  several 
months,^"^  (i)  Lettmg  to  lowest  bidder:  Where  the  contract  is  re- 
quired to  be  let  to  the  lowest  bidder,  whom  the  council,  in  its  discre- 
tion, may  deem  best,  this  does  not  make  it  mandatory  to  let  to  the  low- 
est bidder.^*'-  Where  the  contract  must  be  let  to  the  lowest  bidder 
there  is  no  objection  in  saying  that  bids  in  excess  of  a  certain  amount 
for  a  particular  street  will  not  be  considered.^*'^  Where  the  lowest  bid 
is  rejected  the  bidder  has  no  right  of  action  against  the  city  to  recover 
what  would  have  been  his  profits  had  his  bid  been  accepted,^°*  Where 
the  law  requires  a  contract  to  be  let  to  the  lowest  bidder,  and  it  is  let 
without  such  bidding,  the  contractor  can  not  recover.  Where  it  must 
be  let  to  the  lowest  bidder,  the  city  may  divide  the  improvement  in 
several  parts  and  let  the  different  parts  to  different  bidders,  where  the 
whole  improvement  will  thereby  be  made  at  less  cost  than  by  a  single 
letting.^°^  In  the  absence  of  fravid  or  an  abuse  of  discretion  a  city 
need  not  let  a  contract  to  the  lowest  bidder  where  the  charter  does  not 
so  prescribe.^*'*^  (j)  Letting  to  lowest  responsible  bidder:  Where  by 
charter  a  contract  is  to  be  let  to  the  lowest  responsible  bidder  the  word 
"responsible"  does  not  apply  to  ability  to  pay  money  only,  but  means 
ability  to  respond  to  the  requirements  of  the  contract,  regard  being 
had  to  the  subject-matter  thereof.^ °^     "Eesponsible"  may  also  have 

^""'City    of    Hartford    v.    Hartford  518;  s.  c.  37  Pac.  695;  Kerr  v.  Cen- 

Elec.  L.  Co.,  65  Conn.  324;   s.  c.  32  tral  Board  &c.,  25  Pitts.  Leg.  J.   (N. 

Atl.  925.  S.)    54.     If  the  requirements  as  to 

'■""■  Pennell  v.  City  of  New  York,  45  the  proposals  for  bids  are  reasona- 

N.  Y.  S.  229;   s.  c.  17  App.  Div.   (N.  ble  an  injunction  will  not  issue  at 

Y.)    455.     Under   Cal.    St.    1891   the  the  suit  of  a  taxpayer  to  restrain 

awarding  of  a  contract  may  be  ap-  the  letting  of  a  contract  to  a  higher 

proved    by    the    mayor,    or    three-  bidder  where  the  lowest  bidder  had 

fourths  of  the  city  council:    Green-  not  complied  with  such  reasonable 

wood  V.  Morrison,  128  Cal.  350;  s.  c.  requirements:    Berghoffen  v.  City  of 

60  Pac.  971.  New  York,  64  N.  Y.  S.  1082;  s.  c.  31 

'»=  Brown  v.  City  of  Houston  (Tex.  Misc.  (N.  Y.)  205. 

Civ.  App.),  48  S.  W.  760.  ="'^  Jones    v.    City    of    Seattle,    19 

^°^  Seaboard   Nat'l   Bank  v.   Woes-  AVash.  669;  s.  c.  53  Pac.  1105. 

ten,  147  Mo.  467;  s.  c.  48  S.  W.  939.  '""Elliot  v.  City  of  Minneapolis,  59 

^"  Talbot  Pav.  Co.  v.  City  of  De-  Minn.  Ill ;  s.  c.  60  N.  W.  1081.  There 

troit,  109  Mich.  657;   s.  c.  67  N.  W.  are  some  contracts  of  a  municipality 

979;  City  Imp.  Co.  v.  Broderick,  125  required  to  be  let  to  the  highest  bid- 

Cal.  139;  s.  c.  57  Pac.  776.   The  letting  der,  and  where  this  is  so  the  same 

to  one  who  is  not  the  lowest  bidder  rules  apply:  State  v.  Payssan,  47  La. 

may  be  enjoined  at  the  instance  of  An.  1029;  s.  c.  17  So.  481. 

a  taxpayer,  but  not  at  the  instance  ,    ^"People  v.  Kent,  160  111.  655;  s.  c. 

of  an   unsuccessful   bidder:     Times  43  N.  E.  760. 
Pub.  Co.  v.  City  of  Everett,  9  Wash. 


753  MUNICIPAL    COXTHACTS.  §    74G 

reference  to  the  jiulo-mont  and  skill  of  llic  bidder/''"^  Where  a  bidder 
is  required  to  give  satisfactory  proof  of  his  ability  properly  to  perforin 
the  work  the  board  of  public  works  can  not  exercise  an  arbitrary  dis- 
cretion in  tlie  matter.^**'*  Fixing  the  niininunn  price  to  be  paid  for 
labor  and  awarding  a  contract  on  that  basis  renders  the  contract  void 
where  the  contract  must  be  to  the  lowest  responsible  bidder.^^"  Where 
by  law  a  contract  is  to  be  let  to  the  lowest  responsible  bidder  the  city 
can  not  impose  a  condition  that  each  bidder  shall  agree  to  employ,  or 
allow  the  employment  of,  only  such  labor  as  a  certain  trades  council 
shall  designate,  or  forfeit  the  contract.^^^  (k)  Rejection  of  bids  is 
judicial:  Where  a  board  in  passing  ujDon  bids  is  authorized  to  require 
bidders  to  furnish  evidence  of  ability  and  financial  resources  to  com- 
plete a  proposed  contract,  and  to  pass  upon  the  sufficiency  of  such  evi- 
dence and  award  the  contract,  it  acts  judicially,  and  its  discretion  will 
not  be  interfered  with  by  the  courts,  in  the  absence  of  fraud,  by  either 
mandamus  or  mandatory  injunction. ^^-  (1)  Where  officer  is  vested 
ivith  discretion:  Where  an  officer  in  the  letting  of  a  contract  to  a  bid- 
der is  vested  with  the  exercise  of  official  judgment  and  discretion,  as 
where  the  contract  is  to  be  let  to  the  lowest  responsible  bidder,  courts 
have  no  right,  in  the  absence  of  fraud,  to  interfere  with  the  exercise  of 
that  judgment  and  discretion.  The  officers'  duty  is  not  merely  minis- 
terial and  can  not  be  controlled  by  mandamus.^ ^^  (m)  Giving  of 
bonds,  or  security:  Where  a  bond  is  required  but  there  is  no  provision 
as  to  the  amount,  or  its  form,  or  the  time  to  be  given,  the  officers  have 
power  to  regulate.^^^     It  has  been  held  that  such  provision  required 

=«^  Renting   v.    City   of   Titusville,  1101;  State  v.  McGrath,  91  Mo.  386; 

175  Pa.  St.  512;  s.  c.  34  Atl.  916.  The  s.  c.  3  S.  W.  846;   State  v.  Commis- 

word  "responsible"  in  the  matter  of  sioners  &c.,  36  Ohio  St.  526;  Douglas 

letting  bids  has   reference  to  pecu-  v.  Commonwealth,  108  Pa.  St.  559; 

niary   ability,   judgment   and    skill:  Hoole  v.  Kinkaid,  16  Nev.  217. 
Interstate  Vitrified  Brick  &c.  Co.  v.         ^^^  In  re  McCain,  9  S.  D.  57;   s.  c. 

Philadelphia,  164  Pa.  St.  477;    s.  c.  68  N.  W.  163;  People  v.  Kent,  160  111. 

30  Atl.  383.  655;  s.  c.  43  N.  E.  760;  Kelly  v.  City 

'•»  McGovern  V.  Board  &c.,  57  N.  J.  of   Chicago,    62    111.    279;    People   v. 

L.  580;  s.  c.  31  Atl.  613.  Mayor  &c.,   25  Wend.    (N.  Y.)    680; 

''"Frame  v.  Felix,  167  Pa.  St.  47;  People  v.   Common  Council  &c.,   78 

s.  c.  31  Atl.  375.  N.  Y.  33. 

'"Elliott  V.   City   of  Pittsburg,   6        '» Selpho  v.  City  of  Brooklyn,  39 

Pa.  Dist.  R.  455.  N.  Y.  S.  520;   s.  c.  5  App.  Div.    (N. 

''^Johnson  v.   Sanitary  Dist.,   163  Y.)  529.    A  statute  requiring  a  bond 

111.  285;  s.  c.  45  N.  E.  213;  East  River  from  a  bidder  whose  bid  is  accepted 

Gaslight  Co.  v.   Donnelly,   93  N.  Y.  is  mandatory:     Barker  v.  Southern 

557;    People  v.   Gleason,   121   N.   Y.  Const.  Co.,  20  Ky.  L.  796;  s.  c.  47  S. 

631;    s.    c.    25    N.    E.    4;    Erving   v.  W.  608. 
Mayor,  131  N.  Y.  133;  s.  c.  29  N.  E. 
1  Smith — 48 


§  746 


PUBLIC    CORPOnATIONS. 


754 


security  with  every  bid  and  that  the  security  is  to  be  a  guaranty  on  the 
bid  as  well  as  the  performance  of  the  contract.^  ^^  It  has  been  held 
not  to  be  unreasonable  to  require  a  deposit  of  $100,000  on  an  ex- 
penditure of  $7,999,000.^^^  Where  a  bidder  was  unable  to  furnish 
the  required  deposit  when  bids  were  asked  for,  but  is  subsequently 
able  to  do  so,  it  is  no  ground  for  rescinding  the  contract  and  re- 
opening bids.^^^  A  certified  check  required  to  be  deposited  with  a 
bid  may  be  forfeited  only  where  the  contract  is  based  on  legal  pro- 
ceedings by  the  authorities.^^^  And  a  contractor  refusing  to  sign  a 
contract  because  more  burdensome  than  the  specifications,  is  entitled 
to  his  deposit.^^^  (n)  Municipality  not  liable  for  facts  not  com- 
mwiicated :  The  sanitary  district  of  Chicago  being  represented  by 
trustees  is  not  responsible  for  the  individual  knowledge  of  individual 
trustees  as  to  materials  to  be  encountered  in  the  process  of  excavation, 
and  which  was  not  embodied  in  the  profile  given  for  the  benefit  of 
bidders  and  not  communicated  to  the  bidder.^-"  (o)  Not  liable  for 
representations  wlien:  A  chief  engineer  of  a  sanitary  district,  whose 
duty  it  is  to  let  contracts,  is  not  authorized  to  make  representations 
and  bind  the  district  in  regard  to  the  subject-matter  for  which  bids 
are  asked.^^^ 


'^'Selpho  v.  City  of  Brooklyn,  39 
N.  Y.  S.  520;  s.  c.  5  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.) 
529.  A  chai'ter  providing  that  all 
contractors  shall  give  bond  condi- 
tioned for  the  payment  of  all  claims 
for  materials  is  a  legitimate  exercise 
of  legislative  power:  Wilson  v.  Web- 
ber, 157  N.  Y.  693;  s.  c.  51  N.  B. 
1094.  A  person  furnishing  terra 
cotta  manufactured  by  him  accord- 
ing to  plans  and  specifications  which 
is  placed  in  the  building  by  a  con- 
tractor is  a  sub-contractor  and  re- 
quired to  give  bond:  People  v.  Cot- 
teral,  119  Mich.  27;  s.  c.  77  N.  W.  312. 
A  bond  given  by  a  contractor  to  se- 
cure the  performance  of  a  contract 
is  in  effect  a  bond  to  secure  the  per- 
formance of  the  work:  City  of  Fort 
Madison  v.  Moore,  109  Iowa  476;  s. 
0.  80  N.  W.  527.  When  suit  may  be 
brought  on  contractor's  bond  by  ma- 
terial men, — see  Wilson  v.  Webber, 
157  N.  Y.  693;  s.  c.  51  N.  E.  1094. 
When  not, — see  Buffalo  Cement  Co. 
V.  McNaughton,  156  N.  Y.  702;  s.  c.  51 
N.  E.  1089.    And  see  Baum  v.  What- 


com Co.  &c.,  19  Wash.  626;  s.  c.  54 
Pac.  29.  Under  Kansas  City  charter 
the  sureties  of  a  contractor  are  not 
liable  to  a  sub-contractor  for  the 
building  of  a  sewer:  Kansas  City 
V.  McDonald,  80  Mo.  App.  444. 

'^«  State  v.  City  of  Jersey  City  (N. 
J.),  42  Atl.  845. 

'"State  V.  City  of  Jersey  City  (N. 
J.),  42  Atl.  845. 

3^'N.  P.  Perine  Contr.  &c.  Co.  v. 
City  of  Pasadena,  116  Cal.  6;  s.  c.  47 
Pac.  777. 

■™  Colter  V.  Casteel  (Tex.  Civ. 
App.),  37  S.  W.  791.  Where  a  suc- 
cessful bidder  makes  a  deposit  as  a 
guaranty  of  good  faith  on  his  part 
and  wilfully  fails  to  perform  the 
contract  the  deposit  is  forfeited: 
Mutchler  v.  Easton  City,  9  Pa.  Co. 
Ct.  613;  Ex  parte  Barrell,  L.  R.  10 
Ch.  512;  Village  of  Morgan  Park  v. 
Gahan,  35  111.  App.  646. 

''"Sanitary  Dist.  &c.  v.  Ricker,  91 
Fed.  833. 

'"  Sanitary  Dist.  &c.  v.  Ricker,  91 
Fed.  833. 


CHAPTER  XIX. 

LEGISLATIVE    CONTROL. 

Section  Section 

747.  Legislative    control    subject   to     756.  The   same   subject  continued — 

limitations.  Public  interest  paramount  to 

748.  Powers  that  the  state  can  not  private  right. 

relinquish.  757.  Application  of  revenues. 

749.  Impairment        of        legislative     758.  The  same  subject  continued. 

grants.  759.  Impairment    of    obligations    to 

750.  The  same  subject  continued.  individuals. 

751.  Remission  of  forfeitures.  760.  The  same  subject  continued. 

752.  Property  held  for  public  uses.  761.  Impairment         of         remedies 

753.  Tenure   of    office    of    municipal  against  the  corporation. 

officers.  762.  The   same   subject  continued — 

754.  Agencies  of  municipal  adminis-  Control  of  taxing  power  lim- 

tration.  ited. 

755.  Diversion  of  funds.  763.  Vacating   assessments   of   dam- 

ages. 
764.  The  rule  summarized. 

§  747.  Legislative  control  subject  to  limitations. — The  subject  of 
legislative  control,  so  far  as  the  latter  operates  upon  and  through  the 
charter,  has  been  discussed  in  another  chapter,^  and  the  general  rule 
affirming  the  supremacy  of  the  legislature  over  its  instrumentalities 
of  government  finds  application  in  numerous  instances  throughout 
this  work.  As  regards  matters  of  general  concern  and  duties  which 
the  people  of  cities  or  other  municipal  corporations  owe  to  the  state  at 
large,  the  control  of  the  state  is  complete,  and  no  discretionary  author- 
ity is  vested  in  such  corporations.  But  these  corporations,  though 
made  use  of  in  state  government  and  in  that  character  subject  to 
state  control,  have  other  objects  and  purposes  peculiarly  local,  in  which 
the  state  at  large,  except  in  conferring  the  power  and  regulating  its 
exercise,  is  legally  no  more  concerned  than  it  is  in  the  individual  and 
private  concerns  of  its  several  citizens.  And  as  regards  property- 
rights  and  matters  of  exclusively  local  concern,  the  state  has  no  right 
to  interfere  and  control  by  compulsory  legislation  the  action  of 
municipal  corporations." 

*  Amendment,  Repeal  and  Forfeit-        ^  People  v.   Common   Council   &c., 
ure  of  Charter,  ch.  4,  ante.  28  Mich.  228;  s.  c.  15  Am.  R.  202,  a 

(755) 


S  748 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS. 


75G 


§  748,  Powers  that  the  state  can  not  relinquish. — Justice  Swayne, 
speaking  upon  this  subject  for  the  United  States  supreme  court,  said : 
"The  legislative  power  of  a  state,  except  so  far  as  restrained  by  its  own 
constitution,  is  at  all  times  absolute  with  respect  to  all  offices  within 
its  reach.  It  may  at  pleasure  create  or  abolish  them  or  modify  their 
duties.  It  may  also  shorten  or  lengthen  the  term  of  service.  And  it 
may  increase  or  diminish  the  salary  or  change  the  mode  of  compensa- 
tion.^ The  police  power  of  the  states,  and  that  with  respect  to  munic- 
ipal corporations,  and  the  many  other  things  that  might  be  named, 
are  of  the  same  absolute  character.*  In  all  these  cases  there  can  be 
no  contract  and  no  irrepealable  law,  because  they  are  'governmental 
subjects,'  and  hence  within  the  category  before  stated.  They  involve 
public  interests,  and  legislative  acts  concerning  them  are  necessarily 
public  laws.  Every  succeeding  legislature  possesses  the  same  juris- 
diction and  power  with  respect  to  them  as  its  predecessors.  The  latter 
have  the  same  power  of  repeal  and  modification  which  the  former 
had  of  enactment — neither  more  nor  less.  All  occupy  in  this  respect 
a  footing  of  public  equality.  This  must  necessarily  be  so  in  the  nature 
of  things.  It  is  vital  to  the  public  welfare  that  each  one  should 
be  ahle  at  all  times  to  do  whatever  the  varying  circumstances  and 


well-considered  case  refusing  a  man- 
damus to  compel  the  common  coun- 
cil of  the  city  to  order  the  issuing  of 
bonds  to  purchase  lands  for  a  park 
contracted  for  by  a  board  of  park 
commissioners  under  an  act  of  the 
legislature  supposed  to  have  en- 
larged the  powers  of  this  board  so 
far  as  to  authorize  them  to  make  a 
purchase  of  lands  for  the  city;  in 
other  words,  to  give  them  a  power 
of  taxation;  the  court  holding  that 
while  it  was  within  the  legislative 
power  to  take  away  as  it  did  from 
a  citizens'  meeting,  where  it  was  for- 
merly located  under  a  prior  act,  the 
right  to  decide  for  the  city  upon  the 
purchase  of  a  public  park,  and  to 
lodge  it  with  some  other  proper 
agent  or  representative  of  the  local 
community,  the  state  had  no  author- 
ity to  confer  such  functions  upon 
its  own  agents,  nor  by  legislative 
amendment  to  enlarge  their  powers 
upon  these  park  commissioners,  who 
were  originally  state  appointees  and 


had  become  representatives  of  the 
city  only  to  the  extent  that  their 
authority  was  recognized  under  the 
original  statute  by  the  representa- 
tives of  the  city,  which  conferred 
upon  them  no  such  power.  See 
"Legislative  Control  of  Municipal 
Corporations,"  by  W.  P.  Wade,  Esq., 
8  Cent.  L.  J.  3;  and  as  to  compul- 
sory legislation,  People  v.  Mahaney, 
13  Mich.  481;  People  v.  State  Treas- 
urer, 23  Mich.  499.  As  to  the  pri- 
vate rights  of  corporations  as  distin- 
guished from  public,  see  Small  v. 
Inhabitants  &c.,  51  Maine  359;  Phil- 
adelphia v.  Fox,  64  Pa.  St.  169; 
Western  College  v.  City  of  Cleve- 
land, 12  Ohio  St.  375;  San  Fran- 
cisco Gas  Co.  v.  City  of  San  Fran- 
cisco, 9  Cal.  453;  Oliver  v.  Worces- 
ter, 102  Mass.  489. 

'■"  See  Butler  v.  Pennsylvania,  10 
How.  402. 

'See  Cooley  Const.  Lim.  232,  342; 
Regents  v.  Williams,  9  Gill  &  J. 
(Md.)  365. 


757 


LEGISLATIVE    CONTROL. 


§  749 


present  exigencies  touching  the  subject  involved  may  require.  A 
different  result  would  be  fraught  with  evil.  All  those  considerations 
apply  with  full  force  to  the  times  and  places  of  holding  courts.  They 
are  both  purely  public  things,  and  the  laws  concerning  them  must 
necessarily  b€  of  the  same  character.  If  one  may  be  bargained  about 
so  may  the  other.  In  this  respect  there  is  no  difference  in  principle 
between  them."^ 

§  749.  Impairment  of  legislative  grants. — A  legislative  grant  is  an 
executed  contract,  and  as  such  is  within  the  clause  of  the  constitution 
of  the  United  States  which  prohibits  the  states  from  passing  any  law 
impairing  the  obligation  of  contracts.  It  can  not,  therefore,  be  de- 
stroyed and  the  estate  be  divested  by  any  subsequent  legislative  enact- 
ment.® "And  though  a  municipal  corporation  is  the  creature  of  the 
legislature,  yet  when  the  state  enters  into  a  contract  with  it,  the 
subordinate  relation  ceases,  and  that  equality  arises  which  exists 
between  all  contracting  parties.  And  however  great  the  control  of 
the  legislature  over  the  corporation,  it  can  be  exercised  only  in  subor- 
dination to  the  principle  which  secures  the  inviolability  of  contracts."'^ 


^  Newton  v.  Commissioners,  100  U. 
S.  548,  an  action  to  restrain  the  re- 
moval of  a  county  seat,  in  which 
case  the  court  applied  the  principles 
of  the  text  and  held  that  a  law  es- 
tablishing a  county  seat  of  a  county 
in  a  town  upon  condition  that  the 
citizens  of  the  town  should  give  a 
bond  in  a  fixed  sum  for  building  a 
court-house,  the  condition  precedent 
having  been  complied  with,  was  not 
a  contract  which  would  disable  the 
legislature  subsequently  to  legislate 
for  its  removal  to  another  town. 
See  also,  Armstrong  v.  Board  &c.,  4 
Blackf.  (Ind.)  208;  Elwell  v.  Tuck- 
er, 1  Blackf.  (Ind.)  285  (in  which 
the  Indiana  court  said: — "The  es- 
tablishment of  the  time  and  place  of 
holding  courts  is  a  matter  of  gen- 
eral legislation,  respecting  which 
the  act  of  one  session  of  the  general 
assembly  can  not  be  binding  on  an- 
other") ;  Adams  v.  Logan  Co.,  11  111. 
336;  Bass  v.  Fontleroy,  11  Tex.  698. 

•^  Grogan  v.  City  of  San  Francisco, 
18  Cal.   590,   holding  it  not  in   the 


power  of  the  legislature  to  divest 
property  which  is  not  held  in  trust 
for  public  municipal  purposes.  See 
also,  Benson  v.  Mayor  &c.,  10  Barb. 
(N.  Y.)  223. 

^  Field,  C.  J.,  in  Grogan  v.  City  of 
San  Francisco,  18  Cal.  590,  613.  In 
Spaulding  v.  Andover,  54  N.  H.  38, 
an  act  which  declared  a  portion  of  a 
fund  which  had  been  assigned  to  a 
town  "to  belong  to  and  be  the  prop- 
erty of"  certain  individuals  was  held 
to  be  invalid  as  violating  a  contract 
between  the  state  and  the  town 
which  was  the  effect  of  a  statute 
under  which  the  state  issued  bonds 
and  assigned  to  the  town  its  portion 
"to  be  devoted  exclusively  toward 
the  reimbursement  of  the  expendi- 
tures incurred  by  the  town  for  war 
purposes  during  the  rebellion."  The 
court  said: — "[The  assignment  of 
these  bonds]  was  an  unqualified  and 
unincumbered  grant  [of  the  same  to 
the  town],  possessing  all  the  inci- 
dents of  an  executed  and  irrevoc- 
able contract." 


§  "^'"^O 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS. 


758 


§  750.  The  same  subject  continued. — The  supreme  court  of  the 
United  States  sustained  a  statute  of  Connecticut  which  discontinued  a 
ferry  in  which  a  town  had  a  half -interest  on  the  ground  that  there 
was  no  contract  between  the  state  and  the  town  by  which  the  latter 
could  claim  a  permanent  right  to  the  ferry,  the  nature  of  the  subject- 
matter  of  the  grant  and  the  character  of  the  parties  to  it  both  show- 
ing that  it  was  not  such  a  contract  as  was  beyond  the  interference 
of  the  legislature.** 

§  751.  Remission  of  forfeitures. — A  county  does  not,  nor  do  any  of 
its  citizens  or  its  governing  authorities,  acquire  a  right  of  property  or 
any  separate  or  private  interest  in  a  forfeiture  named  in  an  act  of 
the  legislature  authorizing  a  subscription  by  the  state  to  the  stock 
of  a  private  corporation,  if  the  corporation  fails  to  do  a  certain  thing, 


*Town  of  East  Hartford  v.  Hart- 
ford Bridge  Co.,  10  How.  511. 
Woodbury,  Justice,  said: — "The  do- 
ings of  the  legislature  must  be  con- 
sidered rather  as  public  laws  than 
as  contracts.  They  related  to  public 
interests.  They  changed  as  those 
interests  demanded.  The  grantees 
likewise,  the  towns  being  mere  or- 
ganizations for  public  purposes, 
were  liable  to  have  their  public  pow- 
ers, rights  and  duties  modified  or 
abolished  at  any  moment  by  the  leg- 
islature. They  are  incorporated  for 
public  and  not  private  objects.  They 
are  allowed  to  hold  privileges  or 
property  only  for  public  purposes. 
The  members  are  not  shareholders 
nor  joint  partners  in  any  corporate 
estate  which  they  can  sell  or  devise 
to  others,  or  which  can  be  attached 
and  levied  on  for  their  debts. 
Hence,  generally,  the  doings  between 
them  and  the  legislature  are  in  the 
nature  of  legislation  rather  than 
compact,  and  subject  to  all  the  leg- 
islative conditions  just  named,  and 
therefore  to  be  considered  as  not 
violated  by  subsequent  legislative 
changes.  It  is  hardly  possible  to 
conceive  the  grounds  on  which  a  dif- 
ferent result  could  be  vindicated 
without  destroying  all  legislative 
sovereignty  and  checking  most  leg- 


islative improvements  and  amend- 
ments, as  well  as  supervision  over 
its  subordinate  public  bodies.  Thus 
to  go  a  little  into  details,  one  of  the 
highest  attributes  of  a  legislature  is 
to  regulate  public  matters  with  all 
public  bodies,  no  less  than  the  com- 
munity, from  time  to  time,  in  the 
manner  which  the  public  welfare 
may  appear  to  demand.  It  can 
neither  devolve  these  duties  perma- 
nently on  other  public  bodies,  nor 
permanently  suspend  or  abandon 
them  itself,  without  being  usually 
regarded  as  unfaithful,  and,  indeed, 
attempting  what  is  wholly  beyond 
its  constitutional  competency.  It  is 
bound,  also,  to  continue  to  regulate 
such  public  matters  and  bodies,  as 
much  as  to  organize  them  at  first. 
Where  not  restrained  by  mere  con- 
stitutional provision,  this  power  is 
inherent  in  its  nature,  design  and 
attitude,  and  the  community  possess 
as  deep  and  permanent  interest  in 
such  power  remaining  in  and  being 
exercised  by  the  legislature  when 
the  public  progress  and  welfare  de- 
mand it,  as  individuals  or  corpora- 
tions can  in  any  instance  possess  in 
restraining  it."  See  also,  remarks 
of  Taney,  C.  J.,  in  Charles  River 
Bridge  v.  Warren  Bridge,  11  Peter . 
420,  547,  548. 


759 


LEGISLATIVE    CONTROL. 


752 


though  the  act  declares  it  for  the  use  of  the  county.  A  proviso  of 
that  kind  in  an  act  of  the  legislature  is  a  measure  of  state  policy 
which  the  state  has  a  right  to  change  if  the  policy  is,  afterwards  dis- 
covered to  be  erroneous.** 

§  752.  Property  held  for  public  uses. — It  is  within  the  power  of  the 
legislature  to  relieve  a  city  or  other  municipal  corporation  from  the 
trust  to  hold  real  property  condemned  or  purchased  for  a  public  use 
only,  and  to  authorize  it  to  sell  and  convey  the  same.^°  So,  also,  the 
legislature  may  sanction  a  sale  of  such  property,  a  change  in  its  char- 
acter from  realty  to  personalty,  and  the  devotion  of  the  avails  of  such 
a  sale  to  general  or  special  purposes.^^  The  legislature  having  declared 
in  a  prior  act  authorizing  the  purchase  of  lands  for  a  public  use  by  a 
municipality  that  the  holders  of  the  bonds  issued  and  sold  by  it  to  pay 
for  such  lands  should  have  a  lien  upon  the  lands  to  secure  the  pay- 
ment of  the  bonds,  it  can  not  by  a  subsequent  act  empower  the  munic- 
ipality to  sell  such  lands  and  make  a  title  freed  from  the  lien  of  such 


^  Maryland  v.  Baltimore  &c.  R.  Co., 
3  How.  534,  in  which  it  was  urged 
that  the  county  had  acquired  a  bene- 
ficial right  to  the  $1,000,000  named 
in  the  act  by  reason  of  the  failure 
of  the  railroad  company  to  construct 
their  road  through  the  county;  that 
its  right  was  a  vested  right;  in 
short,  that  it  was  a  contract,  and 
that  the  legislature  had  no  power  by 
a  subsequent  act  to  release  the  cor- 
poration from  its  payment  and  or- 
der a  discontinuance  of  the  suit 
which  the  county  had  instituted  for 
the  amount.  The  supreme  court  of 
the  United  States  held  that  it  was  a 
penalty  inflicted  upon  the  corpora- 
tion as  a  punishment  for  disobeying 
the  law,  and  the  assent  of  the  com- 
pany to  it,  as  a  supplemental  char- 
ter, was  not  sufficient  to  deprive  it 
of  the  character  of  a  penalty.  A 
clause  of  forfeiture  in  a  law  is  to  be 
construed  differently  from  a  similar 
clause  in  an  engagement  between 
individuals.  A  legislature  can  im- 
pose it  as  a  punishment,  but  indi- 
viduals can  only  make  it  a  matter  of 
contract.  The  legislature  has  a 
right  to  remit  a  penalty  imposed  by 
law.     In  Holliday  v.  People,  10  111. 


214,  it  was  held  that  the  legislature 
might,  after  verdict,  release  a  pen- 
alty in  a  popular  action  brought  for 
the  benefit  of  a  county,  a  county  be- 
ing a  public  corporation  subject 
completely  to  the  control  of  the  leg- 
islature, and  the  acts  of  the  execu- 
tive pursuant  to  the  provisions  of 
the  constitution.  See  also.  Coles  v. 
Madison  Co.,  Breese  (111.)  154;  Con- 
ner V.  Bent,  1  Mo.  235.  In  the  lat- 
ter case  it  was  held  that  the  legisla- 
ture was  competent  to  relieve  from 
a  forfeiture,  even  where  the  money 
was  going  to  a  county,  and  that 
after  judgment;  also,  that  where 
money  accrues  to  a  county  (this 
was  an  action  for  money  collected 
as  district  taxes  claimed  not  to 
have  been  paid  over),  it  can  not  be 
said  to  be  so  vested  as  to  prevent  the 
control  of  the  legislature,  as  the  leg- 
islature has  power  over  the  counties 
and  all  things  that  belong  to  them 
in  that  capacity  simply  as  such. 

^"  Brooklyn  Park  Com'rs  v.  Arm- 
strong, 45  N.  Y.  234;  s.  c.  6  Am.  R. 
70.  See  also,  Nicoll  v.  New  York 
&c.  R.  Co.,  12  N.  Y.  121. 

"  De  Varaigne  v.  Fox,  2  Blatchf . 
95. 


753 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS. 


700 


bondholders.  The  security  can  not  be  taken  away  without  impairing 
the  ol)ligation  of  the  contract,  which  is  not  one  between  the  corpora- 
tion and  the  state,  but  between  the  creditor  of  the  one  part,  and  the 
corporation  and  the  state  of  the  other  part.^^ 

§  753.  Tenure  of  office  of  municipal  officials. — It  has  been  held  in 
Kentucky  that  the  provisions  of  the  state  constitution  as  to  courts  of 
cities  and  the  election  of  judges  were  never  intended  to  take  from  the 
legislature  the  power  to  enlarge  the  boundaries  of  towns  in  existence 
at  the  time  of  the  adoption  of  the  constitution,  or  to  alter  or  abolish 
the  courts  therein,  when  the  lawmaking  power  should  deem  it  for  the 
benefit  of  the  inhabitants.^^ 

§  754.    Agencies    of    municipal     administration. — Although    the 

power,  under  its  charter  and  subsequent  legislation,  has  been  placed 
in  the  governing  authorities  of  a  municipal  corporation  to  appoint 


^-  Brooklyn  Park  Com'rs  v.  Arm- 
strong, 45  N.  Y.  234;  s.  c.  6  Am.  R. 
70.  See  also,  Curran  v.  Arkansas, 
15  How.  304-314;  McGee  v.  Mathis, 
4  Wall.  143;  Wabash  &c.  Co.  v. 
Beers,  2  Black  448. 

"  Boyd  v.  Chambers,  78  Ky.  140,  in 
which  the  right  to  the  oiRce  of  a  city 
judge  elected  in  accordance  with  the 
terms  of  a  new  charter  of  a  city  re- 
incorporated was  sustained  over  the 
claims  of  one  elected  when  the  pro- 
visions of  the  constitution  governed 
in  the  matter.  The  court  of  appeals 
said: — "Cities  and  towns  are  mere 
creatures  of  the  legislature,  and  the 
power  exists  in  that  department  of 
the  state  government  not  only  to 
abolish  the  courts,  but  to  destroy 
the  existence  of  the  corporation  by 
a  repeal  of  its  charter.  These  in- 
ferior courts  not  being  the  creatures 
of  the  constitution,  it  was  never  in- 
tended to  deprive  the  legislature  of 
the  power  to  regulate  and  control  by 
proper  legislation  all  the  machinery 
necessary  to  the  existence  of  such 
municipalities."  Again  they  said:  — 
"And  when  its  [the  city's]  charter 
has  been  repealed  and  a  new  and 
distinct  act  of  incorporation  ob- 
tained [which  was  done  here],  it  is 


the  creation  of  a  new  city  govern- 
ment, with  its  civil  and  police  juris- 
diction as  well  as  the  manner  of 
electing  all  its  officers  controlled  by 
its  charter,  when  not  in  violation  of 
the  constitution."  In  Rutgers  v. 
Mayor  &c.,  42  N.  J.  L.  51,  it  was  held 
to  be  in  the  power  of  the  legislature 
of  New  Jersey  to  enact  a  law  which 
was  supplemental  to  an  act  which 
had  established  a  district  court  in 
cities  having  fifteen  thousand  in- 
habitants. The  supplemental  act 
changed  the  former  by  substituting 
twenty  thousand  inhabitants.  The 
ground  of  the  ruling  was  that  dis- 
trict courts  are  inferior  courts, 
which  the  legislature  could  estab- 
lish, alter  or  abolish  at  its  discre- 
tion, as  the  public  good  might  re- 
quire; and  if  in  its  discretion  the 
court  was  abolished,  the  term  of 
service  of  its  officers  was  thereby 
terminated.  The  effect  of  the  sup- 
plemental act,  as  the  city  did  not 
have  twenty  thousand  inhabitants, 
was  to  abolish  the  court  and  termi- 
nate the  term  of  office  of  the  re- 
lator, who  applied  for  mandamus  to 
compel  the  payment  of  his  salary  as 
district  judge  after  the  passage  of 
the  supplemental  act. 


761  LEGISLATIVE    CONTROL.  §    755 

the  officers  of  any  department  of  its  government,  there  remains  in  the 
legislature  the  power,  to  be  exercised  whenever  it  deems  that  the 
public  welfare  requires  it,  to  create  by  legislative  enactment  a  board 
for  the  government  of  that  particular  department,  to  appoint  the  mem- 
bers of  the  board,  and  to  define  its  duties  and  delegate  to  it  the 
powers  necessary  to  the  administration  of  that  department,^*  That 
the  constitution  of  a  state  mentions  and  recognizes  any  particular 
municipal  corporation  does  not  make  the  charter  oi  that  corporation 
a  constitutional  charter  so  as  to  place  it  beyond  the  reach  of  legislative 
power.^^  The  doctrine  that  there  is  a  fundamental  principle  of  right 
and  justice,  inherent  in  the  nature  and  spirit  of  the  social  compact, 
that  rises  above  and  restrains  the  power  of  legislation,  can  not  be  ap- 
plied to  the  legislature  when  exercising  its  sovereignty  over  public 
charters,  granted  for  the  purpose  of  government.^^ 

§  755.  Diversion  of  funds. — It  was  urged  in  an  Illinois  case  that 
money  appropriated  by  an  act  to  establish  and  maintain  a  general  sys- 
tem of  internal  improvements  to  the  different  counties  through  which 
no  railroad  or  canal  was  provided  to  be  made,  when  received  by  the 
county,  became  its  property  for  the  use  of  the  inhabitants  thereof  and 
was  beyond  legislative  control.  The  supreme  court  held  that  this 
money  was  subject  to  legislative  control,  and  until  definitely  appro- 
priated it  might  be  resumed  or  diverted  at  the  will  of  the  legislature.^''^ 

"  Mayor  &c.  v.  State,  15  Md.  376.  rected.  That  the  state  may  make  a 
"  Mayor  &c.  v.  State,  15  Md.  376.  contract  with  or  a  grant  to  a  public 
This  ruling  was  based  upon  the  doc-  municipal  corporation,  which  it 
trine  that  the  power  to  govern  be-  could  net  subsequently  impair  or  re- 
longs  to  the  people,  and  it  is  their  sume,  is  not  denied;  but  in  such 
duty  to  exercise  it  for  the  common  case  the  corporation  is  to  be  re- 
good,  and  being  under  that  obliga-  garded  as  a  private  company.  A 
tion,  it  is  not  to  be  assumed  that  grant  may  be  made  to  a  public  cor- 
they  have  impaired  the  means  ef  poration  for  purposes  of  private  ad- 
performing  the  duty  by  parting  vantage,  and  although  the  public 
with  the  power  to  any  division  of  may  also  derive  a  common  benefit 
the  body  politic.  therefrom,  yet  the  corporation 
^■^  Mayor  &c.  v.  State,  15  Md.  376.  stands  on  the  same  footing  as  re- 
"  Richland  Co,  v.  Lawrence  Co.,  spects  such  grants  as  would  any 
12  111.  1.  The  court  said: — "There  body  of  persons  upon  whom  like 
was  no  contract  here  between  the  privileges  were  conferred.  Public 
state  and  Lawrence  county,  either  or  municipal  corporations,  however, 
at  the  time  the  appropriation  was  which  exist  only  for  public  purposes 
made  or  when  the  county  received  and  possess  no  power  except  such  as 
the  money.  The  county  was  the  are  bestowed  upon  them  for  pub- 
mere  agent  of  the  state  for  the  dis-  lie  political  purposes,  are  subject  at 
bursement  of  a  certain  amount  of  all  times  to  the  control  of  the  legis- 
the  money  of  the   state  as  she  di-  lature,  which  may  alter,  modify  or 


§    756  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  762 

§  756.  The  same  subject  continued— Public  interest  paramount  to 
private  right. — A  municipal  ollicer  has  no  vested  right  of  property  in 
any  portion  of  a  fund  of  the  corporation  which  is  set  apart  as  a  fund 
for  the  relief  of  disabled  or  retiring  officers  of  the  class  to  which  he 
belongs,  which  results  from  an  authority  given  to  the  treasurer  of  the 
corporation  by  a  statute  fixing  the  compensation  of  such  officers,  to  re- 
tain a  certain  amount  from  their  compensation  for  this  purpose.  The 
effect  of  the  provisions  of  such  a  statute  is  an  appropriation  by  the 
state  each  month  to  the  creation  of  the  fund  for  the  purposes  desig- 
nated in  the  statute,  and  until  used  for  these  purposes  it  can  be 
transferred  to  other  parties  and  applied  to  different  purposes  by  the 
legislature.^^ 

§  757.  Application  of  revenues. — The  revenues  of  a  county  are  not 
the  property  of  the  county  in  the  sense  in  which  the  revenue  of  a  pri- 
vate corporation  is  regarded ;  and  the  power  of  the  legislature  to  direct 
their  application  is  plenary.  A  county  being  a  public  corporation, 
which  exists  only  for  public  purposes,  connected  with  the  administra- 
tion of  the  state  government,  it  follows  that  such  a  corporation,  and 
of  course  its  revenue,  are  subject  to  the  control  of  the  legislature,  and 
when  the  legislature  directs  the  application  of  its  revenue  to  a  par- 
ticular purpose,  or  its  payment  to  any  party,  a  duty  is  imposed  and  an 
obligation  created  upon  the  county." 

abolish  tliem  at  pleasure:  2  Kent  '^  Board  &c.  v.  City  of  Springfield, 
Com.  305;  Bailey  v.  M!iyor  &c.,  3  63  111.  66.  In  People  v.  Power,  25 
Hill  CN.  Y.)  531."  111.  187,  the  supreme  court  of  Illi- 
^*  Pennie  v.  Reis,  132  U.  S.  464;  s.  nois  sustained  the  validity  of  an  act 
c.  10  S.  Ct.  149.  Field,  Justice,  said:  of  the  legislature  which  provided 
— "The  direction  of  the  state,  that  that  the  county  in  which  a  city  was 
the  fund  should  be  one  for  the  bene-  situated,  out  of  taxes  collected  as 
fit  of  the  police  officer  or  his  repre-  ordered  by  the  act,  should  pay  over 
sentative  under  certain  conditions,  to  the  city  certain  portions  of  the 
was  subject  to  change  or  revocation  revenue  realized  from  the  taxes.  It 
at  any  time  at  the  will  of  the  legis-  was  especially  urged  before  the 
lature.  There  was  no  contract  on  court  that  the  legislature  could  not 
the  part  of  the  state  that  its  disposi-  control  the  revenue  of  a  county,  such 
tion  should  always  continue  as  origi-  revenue  being  the  property  of  the 
nally  provided.  Until  the  particu-  counties,  not  to  be  taken  from  them 
lar  event  should  happen  upon  which  without  their  consent,  and  to  be 
the  money  or  a  part  of  it  was  to  be  used  and  appropriated  in  such  man- 
paid,  there  was  no  vested  right  in  ner  only  as  the  county  courts  of  the 
the  officer  to  such  payment.  His  in-  respective  counties  might  direct; 
terest  in  the  fund  was,  until  then,  a  that  to  do  so  would  violate  the  con- 
mere  expectancy  created  by  the  law  stitutional  provisions  as  to  laws  im- 
and  liable  to  be  revoked  or  de-  pairing  the  obligation  of  contracts, 
stroyed  by  the  same  authority."  Upon   this  point  the   court  said:  — 


7G3 


LEGISLATIVE    CONTROL. 


§  758.  The  same  subject  continued. — The  power  of  appropriation 
which  a  legislature  can  exercise  over  the  revenues  of  the  state  for  any 
purpose,  which  it  may  regard  as  calculated  to  promote  the  public  good, 
it  can  exercise  over  the  revenues  of  a  county,  city  or  town,  for  any 
purpose  connected  with  the  present  or  past  condition,  except  as  such 
revenues  may  by  the  law  creating  them  be  devoted  to  special  pur- 
poses.-*' 

§  759.  Impairment  of  obligations  to  individuals. — The  implied 
contract  which  is  deemed  to  arise  out  of  the  acceptance  of  a  charter 
by  a  municipal  corporation  is  a  contract  between  the  city  and  the  state, 
and  not  between  the  city  and  individuals,  and  is  not  "impaired"  by  a 
statute  exempting  the  corporation  from  liability  for  torts.^^     An  act 


"The  whole  state  has  an  interest  in 
the  revenue  of  a  county,  and  for  the 
public  good  the  legislature  must 
have  the  power  to  direct  its  applica- 
tion. The  power  conferred  upon  a 
county  to  raise  a  revenue  by  taxa- 
tion is  a  political  power,  and  its  ap- 
plication, when  collected,  must  nec- 
essarily be  within  the  control  of  the 
legislature  for  political  purposes." 

^  This  rule  was  declared  by  Field. 
J.,  in  People  v.  Burr,  13  Cal.  343, 
351.  See  also,  Town  of  Guilford  v. 
Board  &c.,  13  N.  Y.  143;  People  v. 
Mayor  &c.,  4  Comst.  (N.  Y.)  419; 
Thomas  v.  Leland,  24  Wend.  (N.  Y.) 
65;  Shaw  v.  Dennis,  5  Gilm.  (111.) 
405;  City  of  Bridgeport  v.  Housa- 
tonic  R.  Co.,  15  Conn.  475,  492;  In- 
habitants &c.  V.  County  Com'rs  &c., 
13  Pick.  (Mass.)  60;  truchelut  v. 
City  Council  &c.,  1  N.  &  Mc.  (S.  C.) 
227;  Wilkinson  v.  Leland,  2  Peters 
627,  661,  662;  Morris  v.  People,  3 
Denio  (N.  Y.)  381;  Grant  v.  Courter, 
24  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  232;  Benson  v. 
Mayor  &c.,  24  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  248; 
Clark  v.  City  of  Rochester,  24  Barb. 
(N.  Y.)  446;  Sharpless  v.  Mayor  &c., 
21  Pa.  St.  147;  Moers  v.  City  of 
Reading,  21  Pa.  St.  188;  Cass  v. 
Dillon,  2  Ohio  St.  607;  Cincinnati 
&c.  R.  Co.  V.  Commissioners  &c.,  1 
Ohio  St.  77;  People  v.  Morris,  13 
Wend.  (N.  Y.)  325;  People  v.  Mayor 
&c.,  25  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  680;  People  v. 


Draper,  25  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  344;  State 
v.  Baltimore  &c.  R.  Co.,  12  Gill  &  J. 
(Md.)  399;  Creighton  v.  Board  &c., 
42  Cal.  446  (in  which  it  was  held 
that  the  power  of  the  legislature  to 
appropriate  the  moneys  of  the  mu- 
nicipal corporations  in  payment  of 
claims,  ascertained  by  it  to  be  equi- 
tably due  to  individuals,  though 
such  claims  be  not  enforceable  in 
the  courts,  depends  largely  upon  the 
legislative  conscience  and  will  not 
be  interfered  with  by  the  judicial 
department,  Ui,■^-  '-n  exceptional 
cases);  People  v.  Board  &c.,  11  Cal. 
206;  People  v.  Haws,  37  Barb.  (N. 
Y.)  440;  Stillwell  v.  Mayor  &c.,  19 
Abb.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  376;  Hobart  v.  Su- 
pervisors, 17  Cal.  24;  People  v. 
Pacheco,  27  Cal.  175,  209;  People  v. 
Stewart,  28  Cal.  395;  Beals  v.  Board 
&c.,  35  Cal.  624;  Davidson  v.  Mayor 
&c.,  27  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  342. 

-^  Gray  v.  City  of  Brooklyn,  10 
Abb.  Pr.  (N.  S.)  (N.  Y.)  186.  The 
section  of  the  act,  amendatory  of 
the  charter  of  the  city,  under  consid- 
eration, which  exempted  the  city 
from  liability  for  non-feasance,  etc., 
of  city  ofBcers,  was  held  constitu- 
tional; and  the  court  further  said 
the  section  was  intended,  not  to  di- 
vest persons  affected  thereby  of 
their  rights,  but  to  change  and  limit 
their  remedies. 


§   760 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS. 


764 


of  the  legislature  establishing  a  board  of  public  works  for  a  city 
can  not  be  held  invalid  on  the  ground  that  it  divests  old  boards,  or 
the  city  corporation,  or  the  common  council,  of  the  title  to  property, 
and  transfers  it  to  and  vests  it  in  such  a  board  of  public  works.^^ 

§  760.  The  same  subject  continued. — If  a  contract  when  made  is 
valid  under  the  constitution  and  laws  of  a  state,  as  they  have  been 
previously  expounded  by  its  judicial  tribunals,  and  as  they  were  un- 
derstood at  the  time,  no  subsequent  action  by  the  legislature  or  the 
judiciary  will  be  regarded  by  the  United  States  supreme  court  as  es- 
tablishing its  invalidity.-^ 


"People  V.  Hurlbut,  24  Mich.  44, 
73,  Christiancy,  J.,  saying: — "All 
those  previous  boards  and  the  city 
corporation  itself  held  whatever 
property  they  did  hold  in  the  right, 
and  for  the  public  benefit,  of  the 
city,  as  a  public  trust  for  municipal 
purposes;  and  it  was  clearly  compe- 
tent for  the  legislature  to  transfer  it 
to  another  public  board,  to  be  held 
in  the  same  manner,  for  the  same 
public  use  and  benefits."  In  West- 
ern Sav.  &c.  Society  v.  City  of  Phila- 
delphia, 31  Pa.  St.  185,  the  supreme 
court  of  the  state  of  Pennsylvania 
aflirmed  the  granting  of  an  injunc- 
tion on  complaint  of  the  society  to 
restrain  the  city  from  an  election  of 
a  number  of  trustees  of  a  loan  fund 
in  accordance  with  an  act  passed  by 
the  legislature,  which  the  court  held 
not  to  be  in  the  power  of  the  legisla- 
ture, as  it  impaired  a  contract  made 
by  the  city  with  reference  to  the 
organization  of  a  gas-works  com- 
pany, on  the  principle  that  when- 
ever a  municipal  corporation  en- 
gages in  things  not  public  in  their 
nature  it  acts  as  a  private  individu- 
al,— no  longer  legislates,  but  con- 
tracts,— and  is  as  much  bound  by 
its  engagements  as  a  private  person. 

-''Olcott  V.  Supervisors,  16  Wall. 
678,  in  which  the  court  applied  the 
principles  stated  in  the  text,  and 
held  an  act  of  the  legislature  of  Illi- 
nois, authorizing  a  vote  of  the  peo- 
ple of  a  particular  county  upon  the 


question  whether  they  would  aid  the 
building  of  a  certain  railroad,  and, 
if  they  voted  in  favor  of  aiding,  au- 
thorizing the  issue  of  county  orders 
for  money  to  aid  in  the  building,  to 
have  been  a  proper  exercise  of  legis- 
lative authority,  and  the  county 
charged  on  such  orders  issued  by  it 
and  given  to  the  road  by  way  of  do- 
nation. See  also,  Chicago  v.  Shel- 
aon,  9  Wall.  50;  Louisiana  v.  Pils- 
bury,  105  U.  S.  278;  Livingston  Co. 
V.  Darlington,  101  U.  S.  407;  Have- 
meyer  v.  Iowa  Co.,  3  Wall.  294; 
Thomson  v.  Lee,  3  Wall.  327; 
Gelpcke  v.  City  of  Dubuque,  1  Wall. 
175;  Butz  V.  City  of  Muscatine,  8 
Wall.  575;  Mitchell  v.  Burlington,  4 
Wall.  270.  In  Burton  v.  Town  of 
Koshkonong,  4  Fed.  373,  it  was  held 
that  if  a  statute  which  provided 
against  interest  upon  interest  was 
intended  and  did  operate,  so  as  to 
affect  the  rate  of  interest  upon  cou- 
pons of  the  bonds  of  this  town, — a 
contract  made  before  its  passage,  it 
would  be  such  a  change  in  the  rem- 
edy as  practically  to  cut  off  a  por- 
tion of  the  cause  of  action  or  render 
the  contract  of  less  available  worth, 
and  was  as  much  within  the  consti- 
tutional provision  inhibiting  laws 
impairing  the  obligation  of  con- 
tracts as  if  it  affected  the  contract 
directly,  and  judgment  was  given 
for  the  plaintiff.  In  United  States 
V.  Lincoln  Co.,  5  Dill.  184,  it  was 
held  that  an  act  of  the  legislature. 


765  LEGISLATIVE    CONTROL.  §    761 

§  761.    Impairment   of  remedies   against   the   corporation. — If   a 

municipality  enters  into  a  contract  under  a  supposed  power  to  pay  for 
improvements  by  an  assessment  upon  property-owners  presumably 
benefited  by  such  improvements,  and  upon  its  afterwards  appearing 
that  there  was  no  such  power  in  the  corporation,  the  legislature  passes 
a  statute  empowering  the  municipality  to  levy  a  tax  to  pay  for 
such  improvements,  a  contractor  who  has  reduced  his  claim  for  such 
work  to  judgment  against  the  corporation  has  a  vested  right  under 
that  statute  to  a  remedy  to  compel  the  corporation  to  levy  such  a 
tax  that  the  legislature  can  not  take  away  by  subsequent  legislation, 
under  the  constitutional  provision  prohibiting  legislation  which 
will  impair  contracts.-* 

§  762.  The  same  subject  continued — Control  of  taxing  power  lim- 
ited.— The  supreme  court  of  the  United  States  upon  this  subject  has 
said:  "The  argument  in  support  of  the  act  [a  statute  of  Louisiana 
authorizing  the  "premium  bond"  plan  for  settling  the  bonded  and 
floating  debts  of  the  city  of  New  Orleans]  is  substantially  this :  That 
the  taxing  power  belongs  exclusively  to  the  legislative  department  of 
the  government,  and  when  delegated  to  a  municipal  corporation  may, 
equally  with  other  powers  of  the  corporation,  be  revoked  or  restricted 
at  the  pleasure  of  the  legislature.     It  is  true  that  the  power  of  taxa- 

if  it  applies  to  county  bonds  issued  of  Watertown,  6  Biss.  79,  a  Wiscon- 
before  its  passage,  and  takes  away  sin  statute  of  limitations  so  far  as 
the  power  from  the  county  court  to  it  affected  municipal  bonds  issued 
levy  taxes  to  pay  these  bonds,  and  before  its  passage  was  held  to  be 
as  a  result  the  right  of  the  holder  unconstitutional  and  void.  Hop- 
of  a  judgment  based  upon  such  kins,  J.,  held  that  in  passing  a  stat- 
bonds  to  compel  a  levy  of  a  tax  by  ute  of  limitations  the  legislature 
mandamus  to  the  county  court,  was  must  allow  a  reasonable  time  with- 
in conflict  with  the  constitution  in  which  to  prosecute  existing 
as  to  impairing  the  obligation  of  causes  of  action;  and  as  to  what 
contracts.  constitutes  such  reasonable  time  the 
-*  Memphis  v.  United  States,  97  U.  legislature  was  not  the  exclusive  au- 
S.  293.  See  also.  Von  Hoffman  v.  thority.  The  period  fixed  by  the 
City  of  Quincy,  4  Wall.  535.  In  legislature  is  subject  to  review  by 
Lansing  v.  County  Treasurer,  1  Dill,  the  court,  and  if  they  deem  it  un- 
522,  a  statute  of  Iowa  which  dis-  reasonable  they  will  disregard  it  as 
criminated  specially  against  taxes  impairing  the  obligation  of  con- 
levied  to  pay  judgments  on  bonds  is-  tracts.  A  limitation  to  one  year  in 
sued  by  municipal  corporations  in  municipal  bonds  issued  for  negotia- 
aid  of  railroads  was,  in  view  of  the  tion  in  a  foreign  market  the  judge 
laws  in  force  when  the  bonds  were  regarded  as  clearly  unreasonable 
issued,  held  to  be  unconstitutional  and  unconstitutional.  It  amounted 
and  void  as  impairing  the  obliga-  to  a  destruction  of  the  contract, 
tion  of  contracts.     In  Pereles  v.  City 


§    763  PUBLIC    COIJPORATIONS.  76fi 

tion  belongs  exclusively  to  the  legislative  department,  and  that  the 
legislature  may  at  any  time  restrict  or  revoke  at  its  pleasure  any  of 
the  powers  of  a  municipal  corporation,  including  among  others  that 
of  taxation,  subject,  however,  to  this  qualification,  which  attends  all 
state  legislation,  that  its  action  in  that  respect  shall  not  conflict  with 
the  prohibitions  of  the  constitution  of  the  United  States,  and,  among 
other  things,  shall  not  operate  directly  upon  contracts  of  the  corpora- 
tion, so  as  to  impair  their  obligation  by  abrogating  or  lessening  the 
means  of  their  enforcement.  Legislation  producing  this  latter  result, 
not  indirectly  as  a  consequence  of  legitimate  measures  taken,  as  will 
sometimes  happen,  but  directly  by  operating  upon  those  means,  is 
prohibited  by  the  constitution,  and  must  bo  disregarded — treated  as 
if  never  enacted — ])y  all  courts  recognizing  the  constitution  as  the  par- 
amount law  of  the  land.  This  doctrine  has  been  repeatedly  asserted 
by  this  court  when  attempts  have  been  made  to  limit  the  power  of 
taxation  of  a  municipal  body,  upon  the  faith  of  which  contracts  have 
been  made,  and  by  means  of  which  alone  they  could  be  performed. 
So  long  as  the  corporation  continues  in  existence  the  court  has  said 
that  the  control  of  the  legislature  over  the  power  of  taxation  dele- 
gated to  it  is  restrained  to  cases  where  such  control  does  not  impair 
the  obligation  of  contracts  made  upon  a  pledge,  expressly  or  im- 
pliedly given,  that  the  power  should  be  exercised  for  their  fulfil- 
ment. However  great  the  control  of  the  legislature  over  the  corpora-' 
tion  while  it  is  in  existence,  it  must  be  exercised  in  subordination  to 
the  principles  which  secure  the  inviolability  of  contracts."-^ 

§  763.    Vacating  assessments  of  damages. — The  effect   of   a   law 
which  empowers  a  municipality  to  condemn  property  in  the  broaden- 

^  Wolff  v.  New  Orleans,  103  U.  S.  Kearzey,   96  U.   S.   595,  as  to  what 

358.     See  also.  Von  Hoffman  v.  City  constitutes  the  obligation  of  a  con- 

of  Quincy,  4  Wall.  535.     In  National  tract,   as   follows: — "The   obligation 

Bank  v.   Sebastian  Co.,  5   Dill.   414,  of    a    contract    includes    everything 

an  action  by  the  bank  upon  county  within  its  obligatory  scope.     Among 

warrants  issued  by  the  county  in  a  these  elements  nothing  is  more  im- 

regular  manner,  it  was  held  that  a  portant  than  the  means  of  enforce- 

statute     of     Arkansas     which     was  ment.     This  is  the  breath  of  its  vital 

passed  by  the  legislature  after  the  existence.     Without  it  the  contract, 

institution  of  this  suit  in  the  federal  as   such,   in   the   view   of   the   law, 

court,  declaring  counties  no  longer  ceases  to  be,  and  falls  into  the  class 

bodies    corporate    and    suable    upon  of   'those   imperfect   obligations,'  as 

their  contracts,  being  evidently  in-  they  are  termed,  which  depend  for 

tended    to    deprive    parties    of    the  their  fulfilment  upon  the  will  and 

right  to  sue  counties  in  the  federal  conscience  of  those  upon  whom  they 

court,  impaired  the  obligation  of  a  rest.    The  ideas  of  right  and  remedy 

contract;    and    Parker,    Judge,    ex-  are  inseparable." 
tracted  from  the  case  of  Edwards  v. 


767 


LEGISLATIVE    CONTROL. 


764 


ing  of  its  streets,  upon  that  being  done,  and  a  commission  appointed 
under  the  hiw  assessing  and  fixing  the  compensation  to  the  landowner, 
is  not  to  divest  the  owner  at  once  of  his  property  and  to  vest  in  him 
a  right  to  the  amount  fixed  as  his  compensation,  such  that  the  legis- 
lature may  not  provide  for  a  vacating  of  an  order  of  confirmation  of 
the  report  of  the  commission  in  the  matter,  and  submit  to  the  court 
whether  or  not  there  had  been  error,  mistake,  irregularity  and  illegal 
acts  in  the  proceedings."® 

§  764.  The  rule  summarized. — A  municipal  corporation,  being  a 
mere  agent  of  the  state,  stands  in  its  governmental  or  public  charac- 
ter in  no  contract  relation  with  its  sovereign,  at  whose  pleasure  its 
charter  may  be  amended,  changed  or  revoked  without  the  impairment 
of  any  constitutional  obligation ;  but  such  a  corporation  in  respect 
of  its  private  or  proprietary  rights  and  interests  may  be  entitled  to 
constitutional  protection. -''     It  was  held  by  the  supreme  court  of  the 


"•^  Garrison  v.  City  of  New  York,  21 
Wall.  196,  in  which  it  was  held  that 
in  the  proceeding  to  condemn  prop- 
erty for  public  use  there  is  nothing 
in  the  nature  of  a  contract  between 
the  owner  and  the  state  or  corpora- 
tion which  the  state  in  virtue  of  her 
right  of  eminent  domain  authorizes 
to  take  the  property;  all  that  the 
constitution  of  the  state  or  of  the 
United  States  or  justice  requires  in 
such  cases  being  that  a  just  compen- 
sation shall  be  made  to  the  owner; 
his  property  can  then  be  taken  with- 
out his  assent.  The  court  said:  — 
"The  proceeding  to  ascertain  the 
benefits  or  losses  which  will  accrue 
to  the  owner  of  the  property  when 
taken  for  public  use,  and  thus  the 
compensation  to  be  made  to  him,  is 
in  the  nature  of  an  inquest  on  the 
part  of  the  state,  and  is  necessarily 
under  her  control.  It  is  her  duty  to 
see  that  the  estimates  made  are  just, 
not  merely  to  the  individual  whose 
property  is  taken  but  to  the  public 
who  is  to  pay  for  it.  And  she  can 
to  that  end  vacate  or  authorize  the 
vacation  of  any  inquest  taken  by  her 
direction  to  ascertain  the  particular 
facts  for  her  guidance,  where  the 
proceeding  has  been  irregularly  or 


fraudulently  conducted  or  in  which 
error  has  intervened  and  order  a 
new  inquest,  provided  such  methods 
of  procedure  be  observed  as  will  se- 
cure a  fair  hearing  from  the  parties 
interested  in  the  property."  See 
also,  Matter  of  Broadway,  61  Barb. 
(N.  Y.)  483;  s.  c.  49  N.  Y.  150. 

^  This  doctrine,  first  declared  in 
Dartmouth  College  v.  Woodward,  4 
Wheat.  518,  660,  661,  restated  in 
East  Hartford  v.  Hartford  Bridge 
Company,  10  How.  511,  533,  534,  has 
been  reiterated  in  New  Orleans  v. 
New  Orleans  Water-Works  Co.  and 
Conery  v.  New  Orleans  Water- 
Works  Co.,  142  U.  S.  79;  s. 
c.  12  S.  Ct.  142;  in  which 
case  the  city  had  under  an  act  of 
the  legislature  made  a  contract  for  a 
supply  of  water  with  the  water- 
works company,  and  it  was  urged  by 
the  city  that  a  subsequent  act  of  the 
legislature  which  required  the  city 
to  make  a  proper  compensation  to 
the  company  for  water  furnished, 
or  the  company  should  not  be  com- 
pelled to  deliver  the  water  to  the 
city,  impaired  the  first  contract.  In 
Commissioners  &c.  v.  Commission- 
ers &c.,  92  U.  S.  307,  311,  it  was  held 
that  the  legislature  had  power  to  di- 


§  764 


PUBLIC    CORrORATIONS. 


768 


United  States  that  a  municipal  corporation  could  not  claim  that  a 
contract  between  it  and  a  private  corporation  had  been  impaired  by  a 
subsequent  act  of  the  legislature,  where  this  contract,  which  was  in 
reality  one  between  the  state  and  the  private  corporation,  had  been 
adjudged  in  the  state  courts  to  be  ultra  vires;  also,  that  as  the  city 
had  repudiated  its  contract  by  bringing  suit  against  the  private  cor- 
poration for  its  taxes,  it  was  estopped  from  the  claim  of  impairment 
of  the  contract  by  subsequent  legislation  when  such  legislation  was 
rendered  necessary  by  or  at  least  was  the  natural  outgrowth  of  its 
own  repudiation  of  the  contract.^^ 


minish  or  enlarge  the  area  of  a 
county  whenever  the  public  conveni- 
ence or  necessity  required  it.  In 
Williamson  v.  New  Jersey,  130  U.  S. 
189,  199;  s.  c.  9  S.  Ct.  453,  it  was 
held  that  the  power  of  taxation  on 
the  part  of  a  municipal  corporation 
is  not  private  property  or  a  vested 
right  of  property  in  its  hands,  but 
the  conferring  of  such  power  is  an 
exercise  by  the  legislature  of  a  pub- 
lic and  governmental  power  which 
can  not  be  imparted  in  perpetuity, 
and  is  always  subject  to  revocation, 
modification  and  control,  and  is  not 
the  subject  of  contract.  In  Essex 
Public  Road  Board  v.  Skinkle,  140 
U.  S.  334;  s.  c.  11  S.  Ct.  790,  it  was 


held  that  an  executive  agency  cre- 
ated by  a  state  for  the  purpose  of 
improving  public  highways,  and  em- 
powered to  assess  the  cost  of  their 
improvement  upon  adjoining  lands 
and  to  purchase  such  lands  as  were 
delinquent  in  the  payment  of  the  as- 
sessment, did  not  by  such  purchase 
acquire  a  contract  right  in  the  land 
so  bought  which  the  state  could  not 
modify  without  violating  the  pro- 
visions of  the  constitution  of  the 
United  States. 

'*  New  Orleans  v.  New  Orleans 
Water-Works  Co.  and  Conery  v.  New 
Orleans  Water-Works  Co.,  142  U.  S. 
79;  s.  c.  12  S.  Ct.  142. 


CHAPTER  XX. 


TORTS    AND    CRIMES. 


Section 

765.  Torts  by  the  sovereign  power. 

766.  The  state  not  liable  for  officers' 

torts — No     respondeat     supe- 
rior. 

767.  Suits   against   United    States — 

Court  of  claims. 

768.  Suits  against  New  York — Board 

of  claims. 

769.  Counties,   etc.,   as   divisions   of 

the  state. 

770.  The  same  subject  continued. 

771.  Non-liability   of   New   England 

towns. 

772.  Liability  of  New  York  towns. 

773.  Liability   of  towns,   etc.,  as  to 

special  duties. 

774.  Non-liability  of  school  districts 

and  drainage  districts. 

775.  Non  -  liability      for      separate 

boards  and  bodies. 

776.  Non-liability  for  torts  of  inde- 

pendent officers. 

777.  The   same   subject   continued — 

Who  are  independent  officers. 

778.  The   same   subject   continued — 

Applied  in  New  York  city,  etc. 

779.  Liability  of  municipal  corpora- 

tions in  tort — General  princi- 
ples. 

780.  Liability  in  performance  of  pub- 

lic or  governmental  functions. 

781.  Duties    which    are    mandatory 

and  discretionary. 

782.  Duties  legislative  or  judicial. 

783.  Liability  for  torts  of  public  oflB- 

cers. 

784.  Liability  for  torts  of  officers  not 

public. 

785.  Liability    in    making    improve- 

ments, etc. 


Section 

786.  Torts  in  diverting  watercourses, 

surface  water,  etc. 

787.  Respondeat  superior  not  appli- 

cable to  public  oflScers. 

788.  Negligence    as    an    element    of 

tort. 

789.  Liability    for   collision    of    ves- 

sels. 

790.  Torts  of  independent  contract- 

or. 

791.  Miscellaneous  matters  in   rela- 

tion to  torts. 

792.  Non-liability  for  firemen. 

793.  Non-liability  for  police. 

794.  Liability  for  acts  of  mobs. 

795.  Private  interests  must  yield  to 

public. 

796.  The   same   subject  continued — 

Destroying  buildings  to  check 
fire. 

797.  Non-liability  for  negligence  in 

public  service. 

798.  Liability  in  matters  of  arrest. 

799.  Non-liability  as  to  jails. 

800.  Non-liability  as  to  hospitals. 

801.  Non-liability  as  to  fire-works. 

802.  Liability  as  to  city  wells  and 

water. 

803.  Non-liability  to  trespassers. 

804.  Liability  for  nuisances. 

805.  Municipal   liability   in   general. 

806.  Chartered     cities,    etc.,     distin- 

guished from  counties,  etc. — 
The  conflict. 

807.  Municipal   liability  in  exercise 

of  private  powers. 

808.  Liability     commensurate     with 

duty. 

809.  Municipal  liability  as  to  water 

front. 


1  Smith — 49 


(769) 


S  765 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS. 


770 


Section 

810.  Liability  for  fright  of  horses. 

811.  Municipal   liability   for  acts  of 

officers  and  agents. 

812.  Not  liable  for  ultra  vires  acts 

of  officers. 

813.  Non-liability  in  the  exercise  of 

discretionary  powers. 

814.  The   same   subject  continued — 

New  York  and  Georgia  rule. 

815.  The   same   subject   continued — 

Drainage. 

816.  Non-liability  for  errors  of  judg- 

ment. 


Section 

817.  Liability  for  trespass. 

818.  Liability  for  waste. 

819.  Liability  after  notice — Implied 

notice. 

820.  The  same   subject  continued — 

Statutory  notice. 

821.  The   same  subject   continued — 

New  York  decisions. 

822.  Impeaching    municipal    legisla- 

tive acts  for  fraud. 

823.  Indictment  for  torts. 

824.  Not  indictable  for  felony. 


§  765.  Torts  by  the  sovereign  power. — While  the  maxim  that  the 
king  can  do  no  wrong  is  deemed  not  to  apply  to  the  United  States  or 
the  several  states^  in  their  character  of  public  corporations,^  it  is  ob- 
vious enough  on  general  principles  that  they  should  not  be  subject  to 
prosecution  in  the  courts  of  their  own  creation  for  such  wrongs  as  they 
may  commit,^  without  their  consent  to  such  prosecution  duly  expressed 
by  statute.^  The  liabilities  of  the  state,  being  created  only  by  its  legis- 
lature, may  be  revoked  by  the  same  body  whenever  the  public  interest 
requires.^  The  legislature  of  a  state  may  keep  within  the  letter  of 
the  constitution  and  bill  of  rights  to  which  it  is  subject,  and  yet  with 
impunity  pass  laws  which  are  unjust  and  oppressive  to  individuals.^ 


1  Langford  v.  United  States,  101  U. 
S.  341. 

-  United  States  v.  Hillegas,  3  Wash. 
C.  C.  70.  While  generally  the  word 
"corporation"  as  used  in  statutes 
does  not  include  a  state,  yet  in  its 
more  extensive  meaning,  both  the 
United  States  and  the  several  states 
may  be  termed  corporations:  Geor- 
gia V.  Atkins,  35  Ga.  315. 

^  "We  consider  it  to  be  a  funda- 
mental principle  that  the  govern- 
ment can  not  be  sued  except  by  its 
own  consent,  and  certainly  no  state 
can  pass  a  law  which  would  have 
any  validity  for  making  the  govern- 
ment suable  in  its  courts:"  Carr  v. 
United  States,  98  U.  S.  433;  United 
States  V.  Lee,  106  U.  S.  196.  204; 
s.  c.  1  S.  Ct.  240;  The  Siren,  7  Wall. 
152;  The  Davis.  10  Wall.  15.  "The 
state  is  not  liable  for  the  negligence 


or  misfeasance  of  its  agents  unless 
such  liability  has  been  voluntarily 
assumed  by  it  by  legislative  enact- 
ment:" Lewis  V.  State,  96  N.  Y.  71; 
People  V.  Dennison,  84  N.  Y.  272. 

^Carr  v.  United  States,  98  U.  S. 
433,  437. 

^Ex  parte  State,  52  Ala.  231;  Van- 
dyke V.  State,  24  Ala.  81;  Beers  v. 
Arkansas,  20  How.  (U.  S.)  527.  See 
also.  Chisholm  v.  Georgia.  2  Dallas 
419;  Hollingsworth  v.  Virginia,  3 
Dallas  378;  Platenius  v.  State,  17 
Ark.  518. 

"  In  Bertholf  v.  O'Reilly,  74  N.  Y. 
509.  the  civil  damages  act  of  1873 
was  upheld  as  constitutional  in  spite 
of  its  "sweeping  character;"  and  An- 
drews. J.,  said: — "We  come  back  to 
the  proposition  that  no  law  can  be 
pronounced  invalid  for  the  reason 
simply  that  it  violates  our  notions  of 


771 


TORTS   AND    CRIMES. 


§  7GG 


In  some  European  countries  an  innocent  man  who  is  punished  for 
crime  through  judicial  errors  may  have  reparation  therefor  from  the 
state,  but  not  in  this  country.  This  seems  to  be  a  penalty  which  one 
has  to  pay  for  belonging  to  civilized  society.'^ 

§  766.  The  state  not  liable  for  officers'  torts — No  respondeat  su- 
perior.— In  respect  to  its  contracts  the  state  is  equally  liable  with 
individuals;^  and  is  restrained  by  the  constitution  from  making  laws 
to  impair  the  obligation  of  its  contracts.^  But  governments,  federal 
or  state,  do  not  hold  themselves  liable  to  individuals  for  their  officers' 
misfeasance,  laches,  or  imauthorized  exercise  of  power,^**  for  such  lia- 
bility would  involve  them  in  endless  embarrassments.^^  The  state  is 
not  liable  for  the  tortious  acts  of  its  agents  except  by  force  of  statute. ^^ 
A  state  acts  in  a  sovereign  capacity  and  does  not  submit  its  action  to 
the  judgment  of  courts  and  is  not  liable  for  torts  or  negligence  of 
its  agents,  and  a  corporation  created  by  the  state  as  a  mere  agency  of 
the  state  for  the  more  efficient  exercise  of  governmental  functions  is 
likewise  exempted  from  the  obligation  to  respond  in  damages,  as 
master,  for  negligent  acts  of  its  servants  to  the  same  extent  as  the 
state  itself,  unless  such  liability  is  expressly  provided  by  the  statute 
creating  such  agency:^^ 


justice,  is  oppressive  and  unfair  in 
its  operation,  or  because  in  ttie  opin- 
ion of  some  or  all  of  the  citizens  of 
the  state,  it  is  not  justified  by  public 
necessity."  See  also,  Mobile  Co.  v. 
Kimball,  102  U.  S.  691,  704. 

^  This  apparent  injustice  is  consid- 
ered in  26  Am.  L.  Rev.  555,  and  the 
N.  Y.  Law  Jour,  of  Sept.  21,  1892. 

^Danolds  v.  State,  89  N.  Y.  36,  44; 
People  v.  Stephens,  71  N.  Y.  527, 
549. 

"  Dartmouth  College  v.  Woodward, 
4  Wheat.  518;  Fletcher  v.  Peck,  6 
Cranch  87,  137;  New  Jersey  v.  Wil- 
son, 7  Cranch  164. 

"  Gibbons  v.  United  States,  8  Wall. 
269. 

"  Story  Agency,  §  319.  In  United 
States  V.  Kirkpatrick,  9  Wheat.  720, 
735,  Story,  J.,  said: — "The  general 
principle  is  that  laches  is  not  im- 
putable to  the  government;  and  this 
maxim  is  founded  not  in  the  notion 
of  extraordinary  prerogative,  but 
upon  a  great  public  policy.    The  gov- 


ernment can  transact  its  business 
only  through  its  agents;  and  its  fis- 
cal operations  are  so  various,  and  its 
agencies  so  numerous  and  scattered, 
that  the  utmost  vigilance  would  not 
save  the  public  from  the  most  se- 
rious losses,  if  the  doctrine  of  laches 
can  be  applied  to  its  transactions." 
See  also.  United  States  v.  Vanzandt, 
11  Wheat.  186;  United  States  v. 
Nicholl,  12  Wheat.  505;  People  v. 
Russell,  4  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  570;  Sey- 
mour V.  Van  Slyck,  8  Wend.  (N.  Y. ) 
403;  overruling  People  v.  Jansen,  7 
Johns.  (N.  Y.)  332. 

^- Lewis  V.  State,  96  N.  Y.  71;  Clod- 
felter  v.  State,  86  N.  C.  51,  where 
the  court  said: — "That  the  doctrine 
of  respondeat  superior  applicable  to 
the  relation  of  principal  and  agent 
does  not  prevail  against  the  sover- 
eign in  the  necessary  employment 
of  public  agents  is  too  well  settled 
upon  authority  and  practice  to  ad- 
mit of  controversy." 

^^Kinnare  v.  City  of  Chicago,  171 


§    7G7  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  77^ 

§  767.  Suits  against  United  States — Court  of  claims. — The  United 
States  has  not  generally  consented  to  be  sued  in  the  federal  court  of 
claims  in  cases  sounding  in  tort  or  for  war  claims/*  and  is  not  liable 
for  the  tort  of  its  officers  in  forcibly  taking  private  land  for  public 
use.^'^  That  court  is  prohibited  from  exercising  jurisdiction  in  con- 
gressional cases^*'  if  tlie  claim  be  for  destruction  of  or  damage  to 
property  by  the  army,  or  if  it  be  barred  by  the  acts  of  1873  or  1879.^'^ 
When  congress  by  special  legislation  refers  a  claim  of  which  the  court 
has  not  jurisdiction  it  must  be  held  that  the  first  purpose  of  congress 
is  to  confer  jurisdiction,  and,  also,  that  the  court  is  to  render  sub- 
stantial justice  if  upon  ordinary  principles  of  law  the  claimant  is 
entitled  to  it;^*  but  where  a  private  act  of  congress  submits  the  ques- 
tion whether  the  government  is  liable  for  certain  alleged  acts  of  its 
officers,  the  liability  must  be  deemed  to  be  the  legal  liability  which 
an  ordinary  body  corporate,  such  as  a  municipal  corporation,  would 
be  subject  to  for  similar  acts  of  its  agents.^ ^  That  congress  has  by 
several  special  acts  provided  for  payment  of  several  claims  on  which 
claimants  could  not  have  recovered  in  the  court  of  claims  in  the  exer- 
cise of  its  general  jurisdiction  is  no  reason  why  the  United  States 
should  be  held  liable  in  that  court  on  a  like  claim  which  congress 
has  not  provided  for.^"  A  statute  authorizing  the  court  of  claims  to 
render  judgment  on  claims  for  property  taken  in  1857  for  the  United 
States  by  Colonel  Johnson,  while  in  command  of  the  Utah  expedition, 
was  held  not  to  authorize  that  court  to  give  judgment  for  losses 
caused  by  the  refusal  of  the  colonel  to  permit  claimants'  trains  to 
proceed  without  delay.^^  Though  the  United  States  be  not  responsi- 
ble for  the  trespass  of  officers  who  illegally  seize  the  property  of  a 

111.  332;  s.  c.  49  N.  E.  536;  Town  of  ^'Langford   v.   United   States,   101 

Waltham  t.  Kemper,  55  111.  346;  El-  U.  S.  341.   See  United  States  v.  Great 

more   v.    Drainage   Com'rs,    135    111.  Falls  Mfg.  Co.,  112  U.  S.  645;   s.  c. 

269;  s.  c.  25  N.  E.  1010;  Symonds  v.  5  S.  Ct.  306. 

Clay  Co.,  71  111.  355;  Town  of  Odell  ^«Act  of  March  3,  1883. 

v.  Schroeder,  58  111.  353;   Wilcox  v.  "Burke  v.  United  States,  21  Ct.  CI. 

City  of  Chicago,  107  111.  334;   Nagle  317;   Myers  v.  United  States,  22  Ct. 

V.  Wakey,  161  111.  387;  s.  c.  43  N.  E.  CI.  80;   Nelson  v.  United  States,  22 

1079.  Ct.  CI.  159.     See  Beasley  v.  United 

"Act  of   1887,    24   U.    S.    Stat,   at  States,  21  Ct.  CI.  225. 

Large,  ch.  359.     In  United  States  v.  '"  Gumming   v.   United    States,    22 

Lee,  106  U.  S.  196,  205;  s.  c.  1  S.  Ct.  Ct.  CI.  344. 

240,  Miller,  J.,  says: — "Congress  has  '"  Cumming  v.   United    States,    22 

created  a  court  in  which  it  has  au-  Ct.  CI.  344. 

thorized  suits  to  be  brought  against  -"  United  States  v.  McDougall,  121 

the  United   States,   but  has  limited  U.  S.  89;  s.  c.  7  S.  Ct.  850. 

such  suits  to  those  arising  on  con-  "  United  States  v.  Irwin,  127  U.  S. 

tracts,  with  a  few  unimportant  ex-  125;  s.  c.  8  S.  Ct.  1033. 
ceptions." 


'73 


TORTS   AND    CRIMES. 


768 


citizen,  yet  if  the  proceeds  pass  into  the  treasury  the  government  will 
be  liable  on  implied  contract  to  account  to  the  owner  therefor,  and 
the  court  of  claims  will  have  jurisdiction.^^  In  congressional  cases  the 
claimant  in  the  cgurt  of  claims  must  prove  his  loyalty,  and  it  is  not 
always  clear  whether  it  is  the  personal  representative,  or  the  heir,  or 
the  creditor  of  a  deceased  whose  loyalty  must  be  proved.^^  A  claim 
must  be  dismissed  if  the  claimant  "sustained  the  late  rebellion/'-* 

§  768.    Suits  against  New  York — ^Board  of  claims. — In  New  York 

a  board  of  claims  has  been  established  to  hear  and  determine  "all  pri- 
vate claims  against  the  state  of  New  York";-^  and  the  state  may  be- 
come liable  for  an  authorized  trespass  by  its  agents  and  officers  on  pri- 
vate lands  ;^^  but  under  the  statute  establishing  the  board  of  claims  and 
the  statute  of  187G  creating  the  board  of  audit,^'^  the  state  is  not  gen- 
erally liable  for  the  negligence  or  misfeasance  of  its  agents,  because  the 
state  has  not  by  its  legislature  assumed  such  a  liability.-^  In  North 
Carolina,  too,  it  is  held  that  the  state  is  not  rendered  liable  for  the 
torts  of  its  officers  while  administering  the  functions  of  government 
by  the  constitutional  provision  which  confers  jurisdiction  on  the 
state  supreme  court  "to  hear  claims  against  the  state."""  A  similar 
rule  prevails  in  Alabama.^'^ 


"Thayer  v.  United  States,  20  Ct. 
CI.  137. 

-^  Compare  Newman  v.  United 
States,  21  Ct.  CI.  205,  with  Randolph 
V.  United  States,  21  Ct.  CI.  282. 

'*  Hart  V.  United  States,  118  U.  S. 
62;  s.  c.  6  S.  Ct.  961. 

2^  Laws  1884,  ch.  85,  §  1;  Laws 
1883,  ch.  205;  Laws  1888,  ch.  435. 

^"Coleman  v.  State,  47  N.  Y.  St. 
609,  where  on  appeal  from  the  board 
of  claims  it  was  decided  by  the  court 
of  appeals  that  "for  the  injury 
caused  by  entering  upon  this  strip 
of  land  by  the  state  it  was  liable  and 
the  board  erred  in  refusing  the 
claimant  any  relief.  The  entry  of 
the  state  upon  the  land  and  its  di- 
rection to  the  contractor  to  excavate 
and  remove  the  stone  therefrom  be- 
ing wrongful,  a  trespass,  it  became 
liable  for  all  trespasses  committed 
by  the  contractor  with  the  knowl- 
edge and  acquiescence  of  the  agents 
of  the  state  in  executing  the  con- 
tract." 


"Laws  1876,  ch.  444. 

=**  Lewis  V.  State,  96  N.  Y.  71, 
where,  a  prisoner  in  the  state  re- 
formatory having  been  injured  by  a 
defective  ladle  which  the  overseer 
compelled  him  to  use,  Danforth,  J., 
said: — "The  claimant  must  fail  un- 
less the  doctrine  of  respondeat  su- 
perior can  be  applied  to  the  state 
and  the  state  made  liable  for  the 
negligence  or  misfeasance  of  its 
agents  in  like  manner  as  a  natural 
person  is  responsible  for  the  acts  of 
his  servants.  We  are  aware  of  no 
principle  of  law  or  of  any  adjudged 
case  which  makes  that  application 
except  where  the  state  by  its  legis- 
lature has  voluntarily  assumed  it." 

=^  Clodfelter  v.  State,  86  N.  C.  51. 

^"  State  V.  Hill,  54  Ala.  67,  where 
it  was  held  that  §  2534  of  the  re- 
vised code  was  only  intended  to  af- 
ford to  persons  who  had  claims 
against  the  state  a  mode  of  ascer- 
taining whether  or  not  they  were 
well  founded,  and  if  they  were  what 


S  769 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS. 


774 


§  769.  Counties,  etc.,  as  divisions  of  the  state. — Counties,  towns, 
and,  in  some  states,  eities,  in  the  uxercisL'  of  the  governmental  func- 
tions delegated  to  them  by  the  state,  are  not  liable  for  the  misfeasance 
or  negligence  of  their  officers ;  thus  a  county  is  not  liable  for  the  neg- 
ligence of  commissioners  in  selecting  an  incompetent  physician  for 
the  care  of  the  poor.^^  In  Alabama  a  county,  being  deemed  an  agency 
of  the  state,  and  as  exercising  a  quasi-legislative  authority  over  high- 
ways, is  not  liable  at  common  law  in  damages  for  any  negligence  in 
respect  to  them,^^  but  such  liability  must  be  specially  defined  by 
statute.^^  In  Virginia  a  county  as  a  political  subdivision  of  the  state 
is  not  subject  to  suit,  except  as  permitted  by  statute,  and  such  per- 
mission may  be  withdrawn  at  the  pleasure  of  the  legislature;^*  and 
the  same  rule  exists  in  Georgia,  though  the  code  makes  every  county 
a  corporation  with  the  right  to  sue  and  be  sued.  In  a  particular  case, 
however,  the  code  provides  that  a  county  may  be  sued  for  neglect  to 


sum  was  due  to  them;  but  not  to 
create  a  liability  on  the  part  of  the 
state  where  it  did  not  exist  already 
under  the  laws. 

'•'^  In  Summers  v.  Board  &c.,  103 
Ind.  262;  s.  c.  2  N.  E.  725;  53  Am. 
R.  512,  the  court  said: — "There  is  no 
more  reason  for  holding  counties 
liable  for  the  negligence  of  the  com- 
missioners in  the  exercise  of  the 
governmental  functions  delegated  to 
them  than  there  is  for  holding  cities 
liable  for  the  acts  of  their  firemen 
or  police  officers,  or  for  holding 
counties  and  townships  liable  for 
the  torts  of  sheriffs  and  constables. 
In  providing  for  the  care  of  the 
poor,  a  police  power  which  resides 
primarily  in  the  sovereignty  is  exer- 
cised, and  neither  the  sovereign  nor 
the  local  governing  body  to  whom 
such  a  power  is  delegated  is  respon- 
sible for  the  misfeasance  of  its  offi- 
cers." See  also.  City  of  Lafayette  v. 
Timberlake,  88  Ind.  330;  Faulkner 
V.  City  of  Aurora,  85  Ind.  130;  Rob- 
inson V.  City  of  Evansville,  87  Ind. 
334;  Brinkmeyer  v.  City  of  Evans- 
ville, 29  Ind.  187.  And  in  Bryant  v. 
City  of  St.  Paul,  33  Minn.  289;  s.  c. 
23  N.  E.  220;  53  Am.  R.  31;  21  Cent. 
L.  J.  33,  it  was  held  that  the  city 
was  not  liable  for  the  misfeasance 


of  the  board  of  health  selected  by 
the  city. 

^=  Askew  V.  Hale  Co.,  54  Ala.  639; 
Mitchell  V.  Tallapoosa  Co.,  30  Ala. 
130;  Van  Eppes  v.  Board  &c.,  25  Ala. 
460. 

''^  Barbour  Co.  v.  Horn,  48  Ala.  649. 
Under  the  Alabama  Code  (§  1203) 
an  action  lies  against  a  county  to 
recover  damages  sustained  from  the 
fall  of  a  bridge,  after  the  expiration 
of  the  period  covered  by  the  build- 
er's guaranty,  though  no  toll  was 
charged:  Barbour  Co.  v.  Brunson, 
36  Ala.  362. 

^'  Fry  V.  Albemarle  Co.,  86  Va.  195; 
s.  c.  9  S.  E.  1004;  Hunsaker  v.  Bor- 
den, 5  Cal.  288;  Sharp  v.  Contra 
Costa  Co.,  34  Cal.  284.  Plaintiff,  the 
employe  of  an  independent  contract- 
or, engaged  in  building  a  bridge  on 
a  county  road,  was  injured  by  the 
negligent  explosion  of  a  charge  of 
dynamite  by  the  agents  of  defendant 
county  while  blasting  and  building 
an  approach  to  the  bridge.  It  was 
held,  in  an  action  for  damages,  that 
counties  are  not  liable  for  the  torts 
of  their  officers  acting  within  the  line 
of  their  authority,  unless  made  so 
by  statute:  Smith  v.  Board  &c.,  46 
Fed.  340. 


775 


TORTS   AND    CRIMES. 


§  770 


keep  bridges  in  repair,  where  the  required  bond  is  not  taken  from  the 
bridge  contractor.^^  In  Connecticut  counties  have  no  organization 
and  can  not  be  sued.^*^  The  doctrine  of  respondeat  superior  is  not 
applicable  to  counties,  because  there  is  no  relation  of  master  and  serv- 
ant between  them  and  their  officers,  whose  office  and  duties  are  created 
by  the  legislature.^^ 

§  770.  The  same  subject  continued. — In  Illinois  a  county  is  not 
liable,  in  damages,  for  loss  of  life  caused  by  not  keeping  a  bridge  in 
repair,^ ^  or  for  personal  injury  caused  by  the  negligent  construction 
of  a  court-house.^"  In  Iowa  it  is  held  that  no  claim  is  a  "just  claim" 
against  a  county,  within  the  meaning  of  the  code  provision,  unless  the 
law  somewhere  either  requires  or  authorizes  its  payment  by  the 
county.'"'    In  Iowa  a  county  is  under  the  same  obligation  of  reasonable 


Scales   v.   Ordinary   &c.,   41   Ga. 


225. 


36  Ward  V.  Hartford  Co.,  12  Conn. 
404. 

"  Fry  V.  Albemarle  Co.,  86  Va.  195; 
s.  c.  9  S.  E.  1004,  where  the  court 
said: — "No  suit  can  be  maintained 
against  the  county  upon  the  princi- 
ples of  respondeat  superior  because 
the  relation  of  master  and  servant 
did  not  exist;  such  officers  are  quasi- 
public  officers  of  the  state.  For  al- 
though the  officer  in  charge  was  ap- 
pointed by  the  county,  yet  the  office 
and  duties  incident  to  it  were  cre- 
ated by  an  act  of  the  legislature  for 
the  general  public  welfare,  the  pub- 
lic roads  of  Albemarle  county  being 
highways  of  the  commonwealth  for 
the  common  benefit  of  all  the  people 
of  the  state."  See  the  application  of 
respondeat  superior  to  municipal 
corporations  in  Maxmilian  v.  Mayor 
&c.,  62  N.  Y.  160. 

^  White  V.  Bond  Co.,  58  111.  297. 
See  also,  Town  of  Waltham  v.  Kem- 
per, 55  111.  346;  Russell  v.  Town  of 
Steuben,  57  111.  35;  Hedges  v.  Madi- 
son Co.,  1  Gilm.  (111.)  567;  overrul- 
ing Town  of  South  Ottawa  v.  Foster, 
20  111.  296. 

^^Hollenbeck  v.  Winnebago  Co.,  95 
111.  148,  151,  where  the  court  said:  — 
"No  reason  is  perceived  why  a  coun- 


ty should  be  held  to  respond  in  dam- 
ages for  the  negligence  of  its  officers 
while  acting  in  the  discharge  of  pub- 
lic corporate  duties  enjoined  upon 
them  by  the  laws  of  the  state.  Coun- 
ties are  but  local  subdivisions  of  the 
state  clothed  with  but  few  corpo- 
rate powers  and  these  not  of  a  pri- 
vate character.  ...  In  fact  the 
powers  and  duties  of  counties  bear 
such  a  due  analogy  to  the  govern- 
mental functions  of  the  state,  that  as 
well  might  the  state  be  held  respon- 
sible for  the  negligent  acts  of  its 
officers  as  counties.  But  it  is  said 
that  the  alleged  negligence  was  af- 
firmative in  character,  imputed  to 
the  county  itself.  The  authorities, 
however,  do  not  seem  to  make  a  dis- 
tinction between  the  negligence  of  a 
town  or  county  in  failing  to  observe 
a  duty  and  the  performance  of  that 
duty  in  a  negligent  manner." 

*"  Turner  v.  Woodbury  Co.,  57  Iowa 
440;  s.  c.  10  N.  W.  827;  Foster  v. 
Clinton  Co.,  51  Iowa  541;  s.  c.  2  N. 
W.  207.  A  county  is  not  liable  in 
damages  for  personal  injury  caused 
by  the  defective  construction  of  its 
court-house,  or  the  failure  properly 
to  light  it  at  night:  Kincaid  v.  Har- 
din Co.,  53  Iowa  430;  s.  c.  5  N.  W. 
589.  But  a  county  is  liable  for  a 
defective  county  bridge,  because  in 


771 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS. 


776 


care  and  diligence  to  keep  its  bridges  safe  as  a  municipal  corporation 
is  to  keep  its  streets  safe.'*^  In  Missouri  a  county  created  by  the  legis- 
lature for  purposes  of  public  policy  is  not  responsible  for  the  neglect 
of  prescribed  duties,  unless  made  so  by  statute.*^ 

§  771.  Non-liability  of  New  England  towns. — New  England 
towns,  as  involuntary  political  divisions  of  the  state  established  for 
purposes  of  government,  have  the  same  exemption  as  counties,  and 
are  not  liable  to  individuals  for  neglect  of  the  public  duties  enjoined 
upon  them,  unless  made  subject  to  action  by  statute.*^     It  is  to  be  ob- 


respect  to  it  a  special  authority  is 
conferred  at  the  county's  request: 
Kincaid  v.  Hardin  Co.,  53  Iowa  430; 
s.  c.  5  N.  W.  589;  Wilson  v.  Jefferson 
Co.,  13  Iowa  181;  Huston  v.  Iowa  Co., 
43  Iowa  456. 

"Weirs  v.  Jones  Co.,  80  Iowa  351; 
s.  c.  45  N.  W.  883,  where  the  rule 
was  applied  to  barricading  danger- 
ous places.  Compare  Soper  v.  Henry 
Co.,  26  Iowa  264,  269,  with  Cook  v. 
City  of  Anamosa,  66  Iowa  427;  s.  c. 
23  N.  W.  907;  Koester  v.  City  of  Ot- 
tumwa,  34  Iowa  41;  Klatt  v.  City  of 
Milwaukee,  53  Wis.  196,  200;  s.  c. 
10  N.  W.  162. 

*"  Reardon  v.  St.  Louis  Co.,  36  Mo. 
555;  Ray  Co.  v.  Bentley,  49  Mo.  236. 

'^  Hill  V.  City  of  Boston,  122  Mass. 
344;  s.  c.  23  Am.  R.  332.  In  the  lead- 
ing case  of  Eastman  v.  Meredith,  36 
N.  H.  284;  s.  c.  72  Am.  D.  302, 
the  town-house  was  so  imperfectly 
constructed  that  the  flooring  gave 
way  at  the  annual  town  meet- 
ing, but  it  was  held  that  a  voter 
injured  thereby  could  not  recover 
damages  against  the  town  because, 
as  Perley,  C.  J.,  said,  "Towns  are  in- 
voluntary territorial  and  political  di- 
visions of  the  state,  like  counties, 
established  for  purposes  of  govern- 
ment and  municipal  regulation.  It 
is  chiefly  through  this  organization 
of  towns  that  the  people  exercise  the 
sovereign  power  of  government;  and 
the  plaintiff's  claim  is  for  damages 
which  he  has  suffered  from  neglect 
of  the  town  to  provide  him  a  safe 


place  for  the  exercise  of  his  public 
lights  as  a  citizen  of  the  town  and 
state.  .  .  .  There  is  a  great  weight 
of  authority  to  show  that  towns  in 
New  England  are  not  liable  to  a  civil 
action  in  a  case  like  this.  In  Riddle  v. 
Proprietors  &c.,  7  Mass.  169,  187, 
the  case  of  Russell  v.  Men  of  Devon, 
2  T.  R.  667,  is  cited  as  an  authority 
applicable  to  towns  and  counties  in 
Massachusetts;  and  in  Mower  v.  In- 
habitants &c.,  9  Mass.  250,  it  was 
held  that  towns  are  not  liable  to  a 
civil  action  for  neglect  to  perform 
public  duties  imposed  on  them,  un- 
less the  action  were  given  by  some 
statute,  and  Russell  v.  Men  of  Devon 
was  again  recognized  as  applicable 
to  the  case  of  towns.  President  &c. 
V.  Cook,  4  Pick.  (Mass.)  405;  Tisdale 
V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  8  Met.  (Mass.) 
388;  Holman  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  13 
Met.  (Mass.)  297;  and  Brady  v.  City 
of  Lowell,  3  Cush.  (Mass.)  124,  are 
to  the  same  point.  In  Adams  v. 
President  &c.,  1  Greenl.  (Maine) 
361,  Mellen,  C.  J.,  cites  from  Riddle 
V.  Proprietors  &c.,  supra,  the  re- 
marks of  Parsons,  C.  J.,  on  this  sub- 
ject, and  adds:  'No  private  action, 
unless  given  by  statute,  lies  against 
quasi-corporations  for  breach  of  a 
corporate  duty.'  And  other  cases  in 
Maine  would  seem  to  show  that  the 
rule  as  above  stated  is  well  estab- 
lished in  that  state:  Hooper  v.  Em- 
ery, 14  Maine  375,  377;  Reed  v.  In- 
habitants &c.,  20  Maine  246,  248; 
Sanford  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  32  Maine 


777 


TOETS    AND    CRIMES. 


772 


served,  however,  that  from  a  very  early  period  Massachusetts  towns 
have  been  made  liable  by  statute  for  defects  in  their  highways  and 
hridges.** 

§  772.  Liability  of  New  York  towns. — In  New  York,  prior  to 
1881,  in  distinction  from  chartered  cities  and  villages,  no  corporate 
duty  rested  upon  towns,  either  at  common  law  or  by  statute,  in  re- 
spect to  the  care  or  regulation  of  highways,  and  there  was  therefore 
no  liability  upon  towns  to  respond  in  damages  for  neglect  to  keep 
highways  in  repair.*^     By  the  act  of  1881  the  liability  of  towns  was 


536.  We  understand  the  same  rule 
to  prevail  in  Vermont.  In  Baxter  v. 
Winoonski  Tpk.  Co.,  22  Vt.  114,  Ben- 
net,  J.,  in  delivering  the  opinion  of 
the  court,  says,  'I  take  it  to  be  well 
settled  that  if  the  statute  had  not 
given  the  action,  no  individual  who 
had  sustained  a  special  damage 
through  neglect  of  the  town  to  re- 
pair their  roads  could  maintain  a 
suit.  It  may  be  said  that  where  an 
individual  sustains  an  injury  by  the 
neglect  or  default  of  another,  the  law 
gives  a  remedy;  but  that  principle 
does  not  apply  where  the  public  are 
concerned.'  And  the  same  general 
doctrine  is  affirmed  in  Hyde  v.  Town 
of  Jamaica,  27  "Vt.  443.  In  Connect- 
icut it  is  held  that  no  action  will  lie 
for  injuries  caused  by  defects  in  a 
highway,  unless  given  by  statute: 
Chidsey  v.  Town  of  Canton,  17  Conn. 
475.  In  Farnum  v.  Town  of  Con- 
cord, 2  N.  H.  392,  Richardson,  C.  J., 
says:  'No  action  lies  at  common 
law  against  towns  for  damages  sus- 
tained through  defects  in  highways.' 
He  cites,  as  authorities  for  his  posi- 
tion. Mower  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  9 
Mass.  250,  and  Russell  v.  Men  of 
Devon,  2  T.  R.  667;  and  after  quot- 
ing the  provision  of  our  statute 
which  gives  an  action  for  special 
damages  caused  by  insufficiency  of 
highways,  he  adds:  'And  the  ques- 
tion is,  whether  any  damage  has 
happened  to  the  plaintiff  in  this  case 
by  means  of  the  insufficiency  or 
•want  of  repairs  of  the  highway  in 


question,  within  the  intent  and 
meaning  of  this  statute.'  The  right 
to  recover  against  the  town  is  thus 
placed  entirely  on  the  statute.  There 
is  certainly  no  such  exact  resem- 
blance between  counties  in  England 
and  our  towns  as  will  make  all  the 
reasons  upon  which  the  court  in 
Russell  V.  Men  of  Devon  placed  their 
decision  applicable  to  towns  in  this 
state.  Counties  in  England  are,  how- 
ever, territorial  and  political  divis- 
ions of  the  country,  as  counties  and 
towns  are  here;  and  they  are  quasi- 
corporations  so  far  as  to  be  liable 
to  public  prosecution  for  neglect  to 
perform  their  public  duties.  .  .  . 
And  the  doctrine  of  that  case  has 
been  adopted  and  applied  to  towns 
in  numerous  instances  by  judges 
who  must  certainly  be  reckoned 
among  the  most  eminent  jurists  that 
New  England  has  produced:  by 
Parsons  and  Shaw  in  Massachusetts, 
by  Mellen  and  Shepley  in  Maine,  and 
by  our  own  learned  Chief  Justice 
Richardson  in  this  state;  and  no 
men  in  the  country  have  been  more 
familiarly  acquainted  with  the  whole 
legal  history  of  towns  in  New  Eng- 
land, and  all  the  traditions  of  the 
law  in  relation  to  them." 

"Mass.  Colonial  Stats.  (1648); 
Gen.  Stats.,  ch.  44,  §§  1,  22.  See  Hill 
V.  City  of  Boston,  122  Mass.  344;  s. 
c.  23  Am.  R.  332. 

^'^Monk  V.  Town  of  New  Utrecht, 
104  N.  Y.  552;  s.  c.  11  N.  E.  268; 
People  V.  Board  &c.,  74  N.  Y.  310. 


773 


PUBLIC    CORrORATIONS. 


778 


made  coextensive  with  that  of  highway  commissioners  of  towns,  and 
the  liability  of  these  officers  is  only  a  limited  responsibility — arising 
out  of  their  negligence  and  to  the  extent  that  they  are  possessed  of  or 
have  the  power  to  obtain  means  to  make  necessary  repairs.**'  While 
under  the  act  of  1881  the  duty  of  repair  still  rests  on  the  highway 
commissioners,  the  civil  liability  for  injury  resulting  from  the  neg- 
lect of  that  duty  is  transferred  to  the  town.*^  And  that  statute  is  not 
unconstitutional  because  it  makes  a  town  liable  for  the  neglect  of  its 
highway  commissioners.*^ 

§  773.  Liability  of  towns,  etc.,  as  to  special  duties. — This  rule  of 
exemption  from  liability  applies  to  counties  and  towns  only  when  act- 
ing in  their  public  character  and  in  respect  to  their  public  and  invol- 
untary duties  in  distinction  from  their  special  and  voluntary  duties.** 


^'^  Clapper  v.  Town  of  Waterford, 
131  N.  Y.  382;  s.  c.  30  N.  E.  240.  In 
Monk  V.  Town  of  New  Utrecht,  104 
N.  Y.  552;  s.  c.  11  N.  E.  268,  Ruger, 
C.  J.,  said: — "Neither  at  common 
law  nor  by  the  statute  were  towns 
under  any  legal  liability  to  respond 
in  damages  even  to  persons  injured 
by  defects  in  the  highways,  until 
after  the  enactment  of  ch.  700  of  the 
laws  of  1881.  ...  By  this  act  of 
1881  it  was  provided  that  towns 
should  thereafter  be  liable  for  such 
injuries  in  cases  where  the  commis- 
sioners of  highways  of  said  towns 
are  now  by  law  liable  therefor.  It 
is  seen  that  the  liability  of  the  towns 
is  thus  made  co-extensive  with  that 
of  commissioners  of  highways  in 
towns.  No  absolute  liability  for  such 
injuries  was  ever  imposed  by  law 
upon  such  officers,  but  only  a  limited 
responsibility  arising  out  of  their 
negligence  to  the  extent  only  that 
they  were  possessed  of  or  had  power 
to  obtain  means  to  make  necessary 
repairs:  Hines  v.  City  of  Lockport, 
50  N.  Y.  236;  Hover  v.  Barkhoof,  44 
N.  Y.  113." 

"  Bryant  v.  Town  of  Randolph,  133 
N.  Y.  70;  s.  c.  30  N.  E.  657. 

*'  Taylor  v.  Town  of  Constable,  15 
N.  Y.  S.  795;  s.  c.  131  N.  Y.  597;  30 
N.  B.  63. 


^^  Thus  in  Hannon  v.  St.  Louis  Co., 
62  Mo.  313,  where  the  county  made 
a  contract  for  laying  water  pipe  to 
the  county  asylum,  the  work  being 
done  under  the  supervision  of  the 
county  engineer,  and  while  a  trench, 
was  being  dug  it  caved  in  and  killed 
one  of  the  workmen,  it  was  held  that 
the  duty  in  which  the  county  was 
engaged  was  not  one  imposed  by 
general  law  on  all  counties,  but  a 
self-imposed  one;  that  quoad  hoc  the 
county  was  a  private  corporation 
engaged  in  a  private  enterprise,  and 
governed  by  the  same  rules  as  to 
its  liability.  And  Metcalf,  J.,  in  Big- 
elow  V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  14  Gray 
(Mass.)  541,  speaking  of  the  rule 
established  in  Mower  v.  Inhabitants 
&c.,  9  Mass.  247,  that  a  private  ac- 
tion can  not  be  maintained  against 
a  quasi-corporation  for  neglect  of 
corporate  duty  unless  the  action  be 
given  by  the  statute,  adds: — "This 
rule  of  law,  however,  is  of  limited 
application.  It  is  implied  in  the 
case  of  towns  only  to  the  neglect  or 
omission  of  a  town  to  perform  those 
duties  which  are  imposed  on  all 
towns  without  their  corporate  assent, 
and  not  to  the  neglect  of  those  ob- 
ligations which  a  town  incurs  when 
a  special  duty  is  imposed  on  it  with 
its  consent  express  or  implied,  or  a 


779 


TORTS    AND    CRIMES. 


774: 


i.'he  distinction  has  been  often  observed  between  the  liability  of  towns 
and  cities  for  neglect  to  perform  public  duties  growing  out  of  the 
powers  which  they  exercise  under  the  general  law,  and  this  liability 
ahen  the  duty  arises  from  some  special  power  conferred  on  a  particu- 
lar town  or  city;''"  in  the  exercise  of  these  special  powers  a  city  is  a 
corporate  legal  individual  and  liable  for  injuries  to  third  persons 
resulting  from  the  neglect  of  corporate  officers  and  agents.^^  In  Ken- 
tucky a  county,  being  held  to  be  a  corporation  as  well  as  a  political 
division  of  the  state,  may  be  sued  for  the  infringement  of  a  patent  ;^^ 
but  a  county  is  not  liable  where  the  county  authorities  are  not  privy 
to  the  infringement.^^ 

§  774.    Non-liability  of  school  districts  and  drainage  districts. — 

The  management  of  the  public  schools  is  a  branch  of  the  state  govern- 
ment, and  school  districts,  as  part  of  the  state  educational  system,  are 


special  authority  is  conferred  on  it 
at  its  request.  In  the  latter  case  a 
town  is  subject  to  the  same  liabili- 
ties for  the  neglect  of  those  special 
duties  to  which  private  corporations 
would  be  if  the  same  duties  were  im- 
posed or  the  same  authority  con- 
ferred on  them,  including  their  lia- 
bility for  the  wrongful  neglect  as 
well  as  the  wrongful  acts  of  their 
officers  and  agents."  A  township  is 
not  liable  for  torts  committed  by  its 
officers  for  filling  up  a  ditch  without 
proper  authority:  Chase  v.  Middle- 
ton,  123  Mich.  647;  s.  c.  82  N.  W. 
612. 

=>"  Mayor  &c.  v.  Furze,  3  Hill  (N. 
Y.)  612;  Bailey  v.  Mayor  &c.,  3  Hill 
(N.  Y.)  531. 

=1  Lloyd  v.  Mayor  &c.,  5  N.  Y.  369. 

"May  V.  Logan  Co.,  30  Fed.  250; 
May  V.  Mercer  Co.,  30  Fed.  246.  In 
the  latter  case  Barr,  J.,  said:  — 
"There  are  many  cases  which  hold 
that  counties  can  not  be  sued  at 
all, — this  will  of  course  depend  upon 
the  nature  and  character  of  the  sub- 
divisions called  counties,  in  the  re- 
spective states, — and  some  that  they 
can  not  be  sued  for  torts;  but  as- 
suming that  a  county  is  a  corpora- 
tion and  may  sue  and  be  sued  for 
its  contracts  made  within  the  scope 


of  the  authority  given  them,  there  is 
only  one  case  known  to  me  which 
holds  that  a  county  is  not  liable  for 
the  infringement  of  a  patent  right 
by  its  use,  and  that  is  Jacobs  v. 
Hamilton  Co.,  1  Bond  500.  .  .  . 
This  case  has,  however,  not  been  fol- 
lowed." A  city  is  liable  in  its  cor- 
porate capacity  for  the  infringement 
of  a  patent  (Munson  v.  Mayor  &c., 
3  Fed.  338),  though  it  was  by  the 
separately  incorporated  fire  depart- 
ment (Brickill  v.  Mayor  &c.,  7  Fed. 
479),  on  the  ground  that  any  gains 
from  such  infringement  must  be  in 
the  general  treasury  of  the  city. 

^^  A  contract  for  building  a  county 
jail  provided  for  a  patent  lock  de- 
vice, which  was  put  in  by  the  con- 
tractor without  authority  from  the 
owner  of  the  patent.  In  less  than 
two  years  after  the  county  took  pos- 
session of  the  jail  the  patent  ex- 
pired, and  in  the  meantime  the  lock 
device  was  not  used.  The  county 
authorities  knew  nothing  of  the  con- 
tractor having  put  in  the  lock  with- 
ovit  authority  from  the  patentee.  It 
was  held  that  the  county  was  not 
liable  in  tort  for  infringement  of 
the  patent:  May  v.  Juneau  Co.,  30 
Fed.  241. 


775 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS. 


780 


on  the  same  footing  as  counties  and  towns  in  respect  to  liability  to 
individuals  for  the  breach  of  official  duty  by  their  officers.^*  In  Ohio 
it  has  been  held  that  a  corporate  board  of  education  is  not  liable  to  a 
pupil  at  a  common  school  injured  through  the  board's  negligence. ^^ 
In  Illinois  a  drainage  district  formed  under  the  statute  of  1879  is 
not  a  private  but  a  public  corporation,  and  is  not  liable  for  the  negli- 
gent or  tortious  acts  of  its  commissioners.^" 

§  775.  Non-liability  for  separate  boards  and  bodies. — A  city  is  not 
liable  for  the  torts  or  negligence  of  a  board  of  health  in  the  discharge 
of  its  duties,  where  such  board  is  constituted  a  separate  body  by  the 
city  charter,  and  it  is  not  material  whether  its  members  are  appointed 
directly  by  the  state  or  by  the  city  government  in  pursuance  of  the 
charter.^^     The  board  of  revision  and  correction  of  assessments  in 


^*  Bank  v.  Brainerd  School  Dist., 
49  Minn.  106;  s.  c.  51  N.  W.  814, 
where  the  court  said: — "The  board 
of  education  is  a  corporation  which 
holds  and  manages  the  property  in 
its  control  as  trustee  for  the  district 
for  a  public  purpose.  It  is  made  its 
duty  to  keep  and  take  care  of  the 
property  of  the  district,  but  this  is 
a  duty  it  owes  to  the  district  and 
not  to  individuals,  and  is  a  duty  im- 
posed for  the  public  benefit,  with  no 
consideration  or  emolument  to  the 
corporation;  and  it  is  given  a  corpo- 
rate existence  solely  for  the  exercise 
of  this  public  function.  It  is  organ- 
ized for  educational  purposes,  not 
for  the  benefit  or  protection  of  prop- 
erty or  business  interests."  See  also. 
Board  v.  Moore,  17  Minn.  412.  Nor 
is  a  right  of  action  against  a  school 
district  for  such  negligence  given 
by  §  117,  ch.  36,  general  statutes  of 
1878,  which  authorizes  actions  to  be 
brought  against  trustees  in  their  of- 
ficial capacity  for  an  injury  to  the 
rights  of  plaintiff  arising  from  some 
act  or  omission  of  the  officers  or  of 
the  district:  Bank  v.  Brainerd  School 
Dist.,  supra. 

^^  Finch  V.  Board  of  Education,  30 
Ohio  St.  37,  where  it  was  said: — ■ 
"Whether  we  consider  the  language 
of  the  statutes  affecting  this  ques- 


tion of  defendant's  liability,  apply- 
ing to  them  the  rules  of  construc- 
tion indicated  by  the  very  narrow 
range  of  objects  and  purposes  in  the 
organization  of  defendant  as  a  cor- 
poration, or  looking  to  the  general 
policy  of  our  state  common-school 
system,  we  are  of  opinion  no  action 
sounding  in  tort  was  ever  contem- 
plated." And  in  Bigelow  v.  Inhab- 
itants &c.,  14  Gray  (Mass.)  541,  it 
was  held  that  a  "town  which  has  as- 
sumed the  duties  of  school  districts 
is  not  liable  for  an  injury  sustained 
by  a  scholar  attending  the  public 
school  from  a  dangerous  excavation 
in  the  school  yard  owing  to  the  neg- 
ligence of  the  town  officers." 

'^"^  Elmore  v.  Drainage  Com'rs,  135 
111.  269;  s.  c.  25  N.  E.  1010,  where 
the  court  said: — "The  non-liability 
of  the  public  quasi-corporation,  un 
less  liability  is  expressly  declared, 
is  usually  placed  on  these  grounds: 
that  the  corporators  are  made  such 
nolens  volens;  that  their  powers  are 
limited  and  specific,  and  that  no 
corporate  funds  are  provided  which 
can  without  express  provision  of  law 
be  appropriated  to  private  indemni- 
fication." 

"Bryant  v.  City  of  St.  Paul,  33 
Minn.  289;  s.  c.  23  N.  W.  220,  where 
the   court  said: — "The  duty  is  im- 


781 


TOKTS    AND    CRIMES. 


776 


New  York  city  being  independent  public  officers  acting  not  for  the 
peculiar  benefit  of  the  city,  but  for  the  public  good,  the  city  is  not 
liable  for  their  negligent  discharge  of  duty;^^  and  the  city  is  simi- 
larly exempt  as  to  the  negligence  of  its  commissioners  of  public  in- 
struction,^^ and  as  to  the  negligence  of  its  commissioners  of  charities* 
and  correction.*'" 

§  776.  Non-liability  for  torts  of  independent  officers. — A  municipal 
corporation  is  not  liable  for  the  torts  or  negligence  of  an  officer  whom 
it  is  required  by  law  to  appoint  for  the  performance  of  a  public  duty 
laid  upon  the  officer,  and  from  which  it  derives  no  special  benefit.*'^ 
A  village  is  not  liable  for  the  negligence  of  its  trustees  and  commis- 
sioners if  under  the  village  charter  they  are  independent  public  offi- 


cers."" 

posed  by  the  legislature  upon  the 
board  of  health,  under  the  police 
power,  to  be  exercised  for  the  bene- 
fit of  the  public  generally.  It  is  one 
in  which  the  city  corporation  has  no 
particular  interest,  and  from  which 
it  derives  no  special  benefit  in  its 
corporate  capacity.  And  we  think 
it  clear  that,  as  respects  an  agency 
thus  created  for  the  public  service, 
the  city  should  not  be  held  liable 
for  the  manner  in  which  such  serv- 
ice is  performed  by  the  board. 
.  .  .  The  duties  of  such  officers 
are  not  of  that  class  of  municipal 
or  corporate  duties  with  which  the 
corporation  is  charged  in  considera- 
tion of  charter  privileges,  but  are 
police  or  governmental  functions, 
which  could  be  discharged  equally 
well  through  agents  appointed  by 
the  state,  though  usually  associated 
with  and  appointed  by  the  munici- 
pal body."  See  also.  New  York  &c. 
Co.  V.  Brooklyn,  71  N.  Y.  580;  Jones 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  9  N.  Y.  St.  247. 

'^"Tone  V.  Mayor  &c.,  70  N.  Y.  157; 
followed  in  Heiser  v.  Mayor  &c.,  104 
N.  Y.  68;  s.  c.  9  N.  E.  866. 

="  Ham  V.  Mayor  &c.,  70  N.  Y.  459. 

'^^  "Where,  as  in  New  York,  the  state 
courts  hold  that  a  city  is  not  liable 
for  injuries  arising  from  the  negli- 
gence of  the  employes  of  a  munici- 
pal board,  a  libel  against  a  steam- 
boat owned  by  the  city  and  negli- 


gently responsible  for  a  collision 
must  be  dismissed  without  costs: 
Haight  V.  New  York,  24  Fed.  93. 

®^  New  York  &c.  Co.  v.  Brooklyn, 
71  N.  Y.  580,  where  both  the  dock 
commissioners  and  common  covmcil 
were  to  be  regarded  as  agents  of  the 
state,  not  of  the  city,  and  therefore 
the  city  not  liable  for  their  torts 
or  omissions.  -  -  -  The  duties 
imposed  on  the  commissioners  of 
public  charities  and  corrections  for 
the  city  of  New  York  by  the  stat- 
utes of  1860  and  1870  are  public  in 
their  character  and  from  them  no 
special  benefit  to  the  city  is  derived; 
and  such  officers,  though  appointed 
by  the  city,  are  not  its  agents  or 
servants;  and  therefore  the  city  was 
held  not  liable  where  the  commis- 
sioners' employe  caused  death  by 
the  negligent  driving  of  an  ambu- 
lance belonging  to  the  city:  Max- 
milian  v.  Mayor  &c.,  62  N.  Y.  160. 
Where  the  driver  of  a  city  wagon 
employed  by  the  board  of  public 
works  to  cart  refuse  and  ashes  to 
a  public  dumping  place  by  his  negli- 
gence killed  a  man  while  making  a 
dump,  it  was  held  that  the  city  was 
not  liable:  Condict  v.  Mayor  &c.,  46 
N.  J.  L.  157.  See  also,  Wallace  v. 
City  of  Menasha,  48  Wis.  79,  85;  s.  c. 
4  N.  W.  101;  Hayes  v.  City  of  Osh- 
kosh,  33  Wis.  314. 
®^  Where  the  charter  of  a  village 


PUBLIC    COllPORATIOXS. 


782 


§  777.    The  same  subject  continued — Who  are  independent  officers. 

— It  has  been  held  upon  high  authority  that  whether  an  ollieer  or  board 
existing  under  a  municipal  charter  is  to  be  deemed  independent  or 
not  does  not  much  depend  upon  the  means  by  which  such  officers  are 
placed  in  their  position, — whether  they  are  elected  by  the  people  of 
the  municipality  or  appointed  by  the  governor  of  the  state  or  the  presi- 
dent of  the  United  States,  as  the  people  are  the  recognized  sonrce 
of  all  authority,  state  and  municipal;  it  rather  depends  upon  the 
nature  of  the  powers  conferred  upon  these  officers  and  boards."^     A 


makes  it  a  highway  district  of  a 
neighboring  town,  and  provides  that 
the  highway  taxes  shall  be  paid  to 
the  treasurer  to  be  expended  in 
maintaining  the  streets,  which  shall 
be  under  the  charge  of  a  commis- 
sioner appointed  by  the  trustees, 
such  trustees  and  commissioner  are 
not  the  agents  of  the  village  in  the 
premises,  but  are  public  officers,  and 
the  village  is  not  liable  for  their 
negligence:  Bates  v.  Village  of  Rut- 
land, 62  Vt.  178;  s.  c.  20  Atl.  278, 
where  the  court  said: — "The  defend- 
ant was  engaged  in  the  public  work 
of  repairing  its  streets.  The  officers 
by  whom  the  work  was  being  per- 
formed were  for  this  purpose  public 
officers,  and  for  their  negligent  acts 
an  action  does  not  lie  against  the 
defendant."  See  also,  Wilkins  v. 
Village  of  Rutland,  61  Vt.  336;  s.  c. 
17  Atl.  735;  Walsh  v.  Village  of  Rut- 
land, 56  Vt.  228;  Weller  v.  City  of 
Burlington,  60  Vt.  28;  s.  c.  12  Atl. 
215.  Where  the  trustees  of  a  New 
York  village  are  made  by  its  charter 
highway  commissioners  they  are  to 
be  regarded,  in  respect  to  that  func- 
tion, not  as  independent  officers  but 
as  corporate  agents,  so  as  to  make 
the  village  civilly  responsible  for 
their  acts  or  omissions  according  to 
the  law  of  master  and  servant:  Con- 
rad V.  Trustees  &c.,  16  N.  Y.  158. 

^The  act  of  congress  of  1871  (16 
U.  S.  Stat,  at  Large  419)  created 
a  municipal  corporation  called  the 
District  of  Columbia;  it  provided 
for  the  appointment  of  a  governor 


and  for  a  legislative  assembly  for 
the  district;  it  created  a  board 
of  public  works  to  consist  of  the 
governor  and  four  others  to  be 
appointed  by  the  president  by  and 
with  the  consent  of  the  senate; 
such  board  to  have  entire  con- 
trol of  the  streets,  and  to  disburse  all 
moneys  therefor,  and  to  make  re- 
ports to  the  legislative  assembly  of 
the  district  and  to  the  governor, 
who  was  directed  to  lay  the  same 
before  the  president  to  be  by  him 
ti'ansmitted  to  congress.  It  was  held 
in  Barnes  v.  District  of  Columbia,  91 
U.  S.  540,  that  the  board  of  public 
works  was  not  an  independent  body 
acting  for  itself  but  a  part  of  the 
corporation,  and  that  the  district 
was  responsible  to  an  individual  in- 
jured through  the  defective  condi- 
tion of  the  streets  of  Washington. 
Hunt,  J.,  speaking  for  the  majority 
of  the  court,  said: — "We  have  al- 
ready endeavored  to  show  that  it  is 
quite  immaterial,  on  the  question 
whether  this  board  is  a  municipal 
agency,  from  what  source  the  power 
comes  to  those  officers,  whether  by 
appointment  of  the  president  or  by 
the  legislative  assembly,  or  by  elec- 
tion. This  board  is  invested  with 
the  entire  control  and  regulation  of 
the  repair  of  the  streets  and  all 
other  works  which  may  be  intrusted 
to  their  charge  by  the  legislative  as- 
sembly or  congress.  It  is  to  be  no- 
ticed here  that  the  municipal  cor- 
poration as  represented  by  the  leg- 
islative assembly  may  impose  upon 


783 


TORTS    AND    CRIMES. 


778 


state  officer  must  derive  his  powers  from  and  execute  them  in  obedi- 
ence to  a  state  hiw.*^* 

§  778.  The  same  subject  continued — Applied  in  New  York  city, 
etc. — The  park  commissioners  of  New  York  city  are  not  independent 
public  officers,  but  act  for  the  city,  and  the  city  is  liable  for  their 
negligence  within  the  rule  as  to  municipal  liability  for  an.  officer's 
neglect;®"  and  this  is  also  true  of  the  street-cleaning  commissioners 


this  board  such  other  duties  as  they 
think  proper.     .     .     .     The  board  is 
required  to  make  a  report  of  their 
transactions    during   the    preceding 
year  to  each  branch  of  the  legisla- 
tive assembly  and  also  to  the  pres- 
ident to  be  placed  before  congress  by 
him.    This  duty  is  also  an  indication 
of    their    subordination    equally    to 
congress  and  to  the  legislative  as- 
sembly.    The  powers  given  to  this 
board  are  not  of  a  character  belong- 
ing   to     independent     officers,     but 
rather  those  which  indicate  that  it 
is  the  representative  of  the  munici- 
pal corporation.     ...     In  the  case 
before  us  we  think  that  congress  in- 
tended to  make  the  board  a  portion 
of  t,he  municipal  corporation.     .     .     . 
Names    are    not    things.     Perhaps 
there  is  no  restriction  on  the  power 
of  congress  to  create  a  state  within 
the  limits  of  the  District  of  Colum- 
bia; but  it  does  not  make  an  organi- 
zation a  state  to   call   its  mayor  a 
governor,  or  its  common  council  a 
legislative  assembly,  or  its  superin- 
tendent of  streets  a  board  of  public 
works,  especially  when  the  statute 
by   which    they    are    created    opens 
with  a  declaration  of  its  intention 
to   create   a   municipal   corporation. 
We  take  the  body  thus  organized  to 
be  a  municipal  corporation  and  that 
its  parts  are  composed  of  the  mem- 
bers referred  to;  and  we  hold,  there- 
fore,  that  the   proceedings  by  that 
body,  in  the  repair  and  improvement 
of  the  street  out  of  which  the  acci- 
dent arose,  are  the  proceedings  of 
the  municipal  corporation."     In  the 
foregoing  decision,  Bailey  v.  Mayor 


&c.,  3  Hill  (N.  Y.)  531;  s.  c.  affirmed 
2  Denio   (N.  Y.)   433,  was  relied  on 
as  a  leading  authority.    But  see  Hill 
V.  City  of  Boston,  122  Mass.  344;  s. 
c.  23  Am.  R.  332. 
"*  State  V.  Vallei,  41  Mo.  29. 
«^Ehrgott  V.  Mayor  &c.,  96  N.  Y. 
264,  where  Earl,  J.,  said: — "To  de- 
termine whether  there  is  municipal 
responsibility  the  inquiry  must  be 
whether  the  department  whose  mis- 
feasance   or    nonfeasance    is    com- 
plained of  is  a  part  of  the  machinery 
for  carrying  on  the  municipal  gov- 
ernment, and  whether  it  was  at  the 
time  engaged  in  the  discharge  of  a 
duty,  or  charged  with  a  duty  prima- 
rily resting  upon  the  municipality. 
For  these  views  the  cases  of  Bailey 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  3  Hill  (N.  Y.)  531,  538; 
s.  c.  affirmed  2  Denio   (N.  Y.)    433, 
and  Barnes  v.  District  of  Columbia, 
91  U.   S.  540,  are  ample  authority; 
and  the  case  of  Richards  v.  Mayor 
&c.,   16  J.  &  Sp.    (N.  Y.)    315,  is  a 
precise     authority."      Detroit    park 
commissioners  selected  by  the  legis- 
lature are  not  city  officers:    People 
V.    Common    Council    &c.,    28    Mich. 
228.     When  park  commissioners  are 
agents  of  the  city  the  city  is  liable 
for  their  acts:    Mahon  v.  Mayor  &c., 
31  N.  Y.  S.  676;  s.  c.  10  Misc.  (N.  Y.) 
664.     Where  the  statutes  of  Massa- 
chusetts gave  a  remedy  for  damages 
for  the  acts  of  park  commissioners 
in  diverting  surface  water,  and  there 
was  no  evidence  that  they  had  ex- 
ceeded their  authority,  it  was  held 
that  an  action  of  tort  would  not  be 
sustained,   but   the   remedy   if   any 
was  under  the  statute:    Holleran  v. 


§    779  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  784: 

under  the  city-consolidation  act  of  1882  in  the  performance  of  the 
duty  of  removing  refuse  from  the  streets/*'  and  probably  also  as  to 
the  aqueduct  commissioners  appointed  under  the  act  of  1883  for  sup- 
plying the  city  of  '^cw  York  with  additional  water.®^ 

g  779.  Liability  of  municipal  corporations  in  tort — General  prin- 
ciples.— It  may  be  well  in  this  connection  to  state  as  briefly  and  as 
concisely  as  possible,  a  few  of  the  fundamental  principles  relating  to 
the  functions  and  duties  of  municipal  corporations,  in  order  more 
clearly  to  understand  and  more  readily  apply  the  principles  of  laws  re- 
lating to  the  subject-matter  of  torts,  (a)  As  already  seen  the  mu- 
nicipal corporation  performs  a  two-fold  function  in  the  affairs  of 
the  state.  In  its  nature  it  is  dual.  It  is  charged  by  the  state  with 
the  performance  of  certain  duties  that  are  governmental  and  relate  to 
the  public  health,  general  welfare,  public  peace,  etc.  These  duties 
are  sometimes  designated  in  state  legislation,  and  sometimes  in  muni- 
cipal legislation  enacted  under  powers  delegated  by  the  state.  On 
the  other  hand  the  municipality,  although  chartered  as  an  entity  by 
the  state,  is  invested  with  certain  powers  of  local  self-government, 
and  concerning  matters  of  purely  local  concern,  in  which  the  corpo- 
ration alone  is  interested,  and  in  this  respect  it  partakes  largely  of  the 
nature  of  a  private  corporation.  In  the  performance  of  these  func- 
tions it  exercises  legislative  powers  similar  to  the  state,  optional  in 
their  nature,  and  coextensive  w^ith  municipal  interests.  It  also,  of 
necessity,  is  invested  with  the  power  of  administration,  not  unlike 
the  executive  power  of  the  state,  and  has  certain  limited  judicial 
powers,  chiefly,  as  a  rule,  relating  to  the  violation  of  its  ordinances. 
The  scope  of  municipal  powers,  duties  and  corporate  functions  is 
regulated  and  defined  in  its  charter.  Being  essentially  a  private  cor- 
poration it  is  subject  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the  courts  of  the  state, 
and  its  rights,  powers  and  duties  are  therein  interpreted  the  same  as 
those  of  individuals  or  private  corporations,  (b)  Whether  a  munic- 
ipality will  legislate  or  adopt  an  ordinance  is  wholly  discretionary. 

City  of  Boston,  176  Mass.  75;   s.  c.  bureau   are  city  employes  and  the 

57   N.   E.   220.     City  not  liable  for  city  is  liable  for  injury  caused  by 

acts  of  road  commissioners  in  the  the  negligence  of  such  employes  in 

construction  of  a  drain:    Bryant  v.  driving    through    the    city    streets: 

Inhabitants  &c.,  86  Maine  450;   s.  c.  Bodge  v.   Philadelphia,   167   Pa.   St. 

29  Atl.  1109.     Where  an  electric  bu-  492;  s.  c.  31  Atl.  728. 

reau    derives    large    revenues    from  ""Engle  v.  New  York,  40  Fed.  51; 

grants    to    private    persons,    which  Barney  Dumping  Boat  Co.  v.  Mayor 

grants  are  regulated  by  ordinance,  &c.,  40  Fed.  50. 

and  the  revenues  are  paid  into  the  "  People  v.  Civil   Service  Boards, 

city  treasury,  the  employes  of  such  17  Abb.  N.  C.  (N.  Y.)  64. 


785  TORTS    AND    CRIMES.  §    780 

(c)  Where  a  municipal  officer  is  charged  with  the  performance  of  pub- 
lic duties  he  is,  so  far  as  those  duties  are  concerned,  a  state  officer,  (d) 
The  statute  or  charter  may  give  to  a  municipal  officer  discretion  in  the 
performance  of  the  duties  of  his  office,  (e)  The  statute  or  charter 
may  make  the  performance  of  certain  duties  of  a  municipality  manda- 
tory and  imperative,  (f)  The  option  to  perform,  the  manner  of 
performing,  and  the  result  of  the  performance  of  public  duties  create 
no  liabilities,  (g)  The  performance  of  purely  municipal  functions 
is  administrative  and  the  usual  liability  applying  to  such  duties  ap- 
plies, (h)  Some  acts  of  a  municipality  are  judicial  in  their  nature 
and  no  liability  ensues,  as  in  the  plan,  size  and  material  of  a  sewer, 
(i)  Other  aists  are  ministerial,  to  which  liability  attaches,  as  in  the 
construction  of  a  sewer. 

§  780.  Liability  in  performance  of  public  or  governmental  func- 
tions.— When  power  conferred  has  relation  to  public  purposes  and 
for  the  public  good  it  is  to  be  classified  as  governmental  in  its  nature 
and  appertains  to  the  corporation  in  its  political  capacity.  But  when 
it  relates  to  the  accomplishment  of  private  purposes  in  which  the 
public  is  only  indirectly  concerned,  it  is  private  in  its  nature  and  the 
municipality  in  respect  to  its  exercise  is  regarded  as  a  legal  indi- 
vidual. In  the  former  case  the  corporation  is  exempt  from  all  lia- 
bility, whether  for  non-user  or  misuser ;  while  in  the  latter  case  it  may 
be  held  to  that  degree  of  responsibility  which  would  attach  to  an 
ordinary  corporation.*'^ 

"^  Springfield  &c.  Ins.  Co.  V.  Village  function:    Miller  v.  City  of  Minne- 

of  Keeseville,  148  N.  Y.  46;  s.  c.  42  apolis,  75  Minn.  131;  s.  c.  77  N.  W. 

N.  E.  405.     Where  by  statute  it  is  788.     A  city  is  not  liable  for  a  fire 

made  the  duty  of  the  commissioner  through  negligence  or  inefficiency  of 

of  street  cleaning  to  remove  or  dis-  its  fire  department:     Irvine  v.  City  of 

pose  of  ashes,  garbage,  etc.,  as  often  Chattanooga,  101  Tenn.  291;  s.  c.  47 

as   the   public   health    may   require,  S.  W.  419.     Nor  in  the  performance 

the  performance  of  such  duty  is  a  of  public  duties  generally:    Bartlett 

governmental  function  and  the  city  v.   Town  of  Clarksburg,   45   W.  Va. 

it  not  liable  for  an  injury  caused  by  393;  s.  c.  31  S.  E.  918;  Snyder  v.  City 

the  driver  in  the  street  cleaning  de-  of  Lexington,  20  Ky.  L.  1562;   s.  c. 

partment:     Davidson  v.  Mayor  &c.,  49  S.  W.  765.    Where  the  charter  im- 

54  N.  Y.  S.  51;  s.  c.  24  Misc.  (N.  Y.)  poses  a  duty  on  the  board  of  health 

560.    But  not  so  if  it  is  a  quasi-pri-  of  keeping  its  streets  free  from  filth 

vate  duty:    Quill  v.  Mayor  &c.,  55  N.  the  duty  is  governmental  in  its  na- 

Y.  S.  889;  s.  c.  36  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  ture     and     not     administrative,     in 

476.    A  city  is  not  liable  for  permit-  which  case  the  city  is  not  liable  for 

ting  its  hydrants  to  become  clogged  an  act  of  negligence  by  one  engaged 

since  the  neglect  is  in  the  perform-  in    the    performance    of    this    duty: 

ance   of   a   public   or   governmental  Love  v.  City  of  Atlanta,  95  Ga.  129; 

1  Smith — 50 


781 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS. 


786 


§  781.  Duties  which  are  mandatory  and  discretionary. — The  legis- 
lature may  confer  powers  and  enjoin  their  performance  as  a  duty; 
or  it  may  create  new  powers  to  be  exercised  as  governmental  adjuncts 
and  make  their  assumption  optional  with  the  corporation.  Where 
a  duty  specifically  enjoined  upon  the  corporation  as  such  has  been 
wholly  neglected  by  its  agents  and  an  injury  to  an  individual  arises 
in  consequence  of  the  neglect,  the  corporation  will  be  responsible.^* 
So  when  a  ministerial  duty  is  imposed  by  law  a  negligent  omission  to 
perform  that  duty  creates  a  liability  for  damages.^"  But  such  lia- 
bility will  not  attach  to  a  coi^oration  where  it  voluntarily  assumes 
powers  authorized  by  the  legislature  under  a  general  provision  respect- 
ing municipalities  throughout  the  state  and  permissive  in  their  na- 
ture." As  a  part  of  the  governmental  machinery  of  the  state,  munic- 
ipal corporations  legislate  and  provide  for  the  customary  local  con- 
venience of  the  people,  and  in  exercising  these  discretionary  functions 
the  corporations  are  not  called  upon  to  respond  in  damages  to  indi- 


s.  c.  22  S.  E.  29.  Where  a  person  is 
convicted  by  a  municipal  court  and 
sentenced  to  work  on  the  streets, 
and  while  so  engaged  is  killed 
through  negligence  of  the  foreman, 
an  employe  of  the  city,  who,  after 
the  injury,  fails  to  secure  proper 
medical  attention  and  treatment,  the 
city  is  not  liable:  Nisbet  v.  City  of 
Atlanta,  97  Ga.  650;  s.  c.  25  S.  E.  173. 
The  city  is  not  liable  for  the  failure 
of  a  private  water  company,  with 
which  it  has  a  contract  to  supply 
water,  to  meet  its  obligations:  Plant- 
ers' Oil  Mill  V.  Monroe  Waterworks 
&c.  Co.,  52  La.  An.  1243;  s.  c.  27  So. 
684.  Cf.  City  of  New  Orleans  v. 
Kerr,  50  La.  An.  413;  s.  c.  23  So.  384. 
But  is  liable  for  property  destroyed 
on  account  of  an  insufficient  water 
supply:  Springfield  &c.  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Village  of  Keeseville,  29  N.  Y.  S. 
1130;  s.  c.  80  Hun  (N.  Y.)  162.  The 
power  of  a  city  to  supply  water  is 
legislative  in  its  nature  and  the  city 
is  not  liable  for  loss  occasioned  by 
fires  growing  out  of  insufficient  fire 
protection:  Planters'  Oil  Mill  v. 
Monroe  Water-works  &c.  Co.,  52  La. 
An.  1243;  s.  c.  27  So.  684.  Cf.  Yule 
v.  City  of  New  Orleans,  25  La.  An. 
394;     Springfield     &c.     Ins.     Co.     v. 


Village  of  Keeseville,  148  N.  Y. 
46;  s.  c.  42  N.  E.  405;  Akin  v. 
Akin,  78  Ga.  24;  s.  c.  1  S.  E. -267; 
Heller  v.  Mayor  &c.,  53  Mo.  159; 
Wheeler  v.  City  of  Cincinnati,  19 
Ohio  St.  19;  s.  c.  2  Am.  R.  368;  Van- 
horn  V.  City  of  Des  Moines,  63  Iowa 
447;  s.  c.  19  N.  W.  293;  Brinkmeyer 
V.  City  of  Evansville,  29  Ind.  187; 
Grant  v.  City  of  Erie,  69  Pa.  St.  420; 
s.  c.  8  Am.  R.  272;  Mendel  v.  City  of 
Wheeling,  28  W.  Va.  233;  Foster  v. 
Lookout  Water  Co.  &c.,  3  Lea 
(Tenn.)  42;  Tainter  v.  City  of 
Worcester,  123  Mass.  311;  Witheril 
V.  Mosher,  9  Hun  (N.  Y.)  412.  City 
not  liable  for  failure  to  enforce  ordi- 
nance: Moran  v.  Pullman  &c.  Co., 
134  Mo.  641;  s.  c.  36  S.  W.  659. 

"^  Springfield  &c.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Village 
of  Keeseville,  148  N.  Y.  46;  s.  c.  42 
N.  E.  405. 

'"Springfield  &c.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Vil- 
lage of  Keeseville,  supra. 

"Springfield  &c.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Vil- 
lage of  Keeseville,  supra.  Cf.  Edg- 
erly  v.  Concord,  62  N.  H.  8;  Tainter 
V.  City  of  Worcester,  123  Mass.  311; 
Maxmilian  v.  Mayor  &c.,  62  N.  Y. 
160;  Eastman  v.  Meredith,  36  N.  H. 
284;  Hughes  v.  Monroe  Co.,  147  N. 
Y.  49;  s.  c.  41  N.  E.  407. 


787  TORTS   AND    CRIMES.  §    783 

viduals  either  for  omissions  to  act  or  in  the  mode  of  exercising  the 
powers  conferred  on  them  for  public  purposes  and  to  be  exercised  at 
discretion  for  the  public  good.  For  injuries  arising  from  the  corpo- 
ration's failure  to  exercise  its  public,  legislative  and  police  powers, 
and  for  the  manner  of  exercising  those  powers,  there  is  no  remedy 
against  the  municipality,  nor  can  an  action  be  maintained  for  damages 
resulting  from  the  failure  of  its  officers  properly  and  efficiently  to 
discharge  their  official  duties.''^ 

§  782.  Duties  legislative  or  judicial. — In  general  a  municipality 
is  not  liable  for  negligence  in  the  performance  of  any  duty  which  is 
legislative  or  judicial,  or  for  a  failure  to  perform  such  duty,  but  is 
liable  for  neglect  to  perform  a  ministerial  duty,  or  for  negligence  in 
the  exercise  of  privileges  granted.''^  Municipal  corporations  are  not 
liable  for  the  manner  in  which  they  exercise  in  good  faith  their  dis- 
cretionary powers  of  a  public,  or  legislative,  or  quasi-judicial  char- 
acter. Official  action  is  judicial  when  it  is  the  result  of  judgment  or 
discretion,  and  ministerial  when  it  is  absolute,  certain  and  imperative, 
involving  merely  the  execution  of  a  set  work,  and  when  the  laws 
which  impose  it  prescribe  the  time,  mode,  and  occasion  of  its  per- 
formance with  such  certainty  that  nothing  remains  for  judgment  or 
discretion.'^*  And  so  a  corporation  acts  judicially,  or  exercises  dis- 
cretion, when  it  selects  and  adopts  a  plan  in  the  making  of  public 
improvements  such  as  the  construction  of  sewers  and  drains,  but  as 
soon  as  it  begins  carrying  out  that  plan,  it  acts  ministerially,  and  is 
bound  to  see  that  the  work  is  done  in  a  reasonably  safe  and  skilful 
manner. '^^ 

§  783.  Liability  for  torts  of  public  officers. — In  regard  to  the  lia- 
bility of  the  municipality  for  torts  the  general  rule  is  that  where  the 
officers  or  department  are  in  the  performance  of  duties  pertaining  to 
the  state  or  which  are  governmental  the  corporation  is  not  liable ;  thus 

"  Edgerly  v.  Concord,  62  N.  H.  8.  Seifert  v.  City  of  Brooklyn,  101  N. 

"Vaughtman   v.   Town   of  Water-  Y.  136;   s.  c.  4  N.  E.  321.     The  city 

loo,  14  Ind.  App.  649;  s.  c.  43  N.  E.  is  not  liable  for  a  failure  to  pass  an 

476.  ordinance  prohibiting  the  riding  of 

^*  City  of  Chicago  v.  Seben,  165  111.  bicycles  on  the  sidewalk  to  a  pedes- 

371,  378;  s.  c.  46  N.  E.  244;  People  v.  trian  injured  by  a  bicycle:   Tarbut- 

Bartels,  138  111.  322;   s.  c.  27  N.  E.  ton  v.  Town  of  Tennille,  110  Ga.  90; 

1091.  s.  c.  35  S.  E.  282.     The  improper  and 

''^  City   of   Chicago   v.    Seben,    165  negligent  exercise   of   police   power 
111.  371;   s.  c.  46  N.  E.  244;   City  of  does  not  render  a  city  liable:   Beth- 
Springfield  V.  Le  Claire,  49  111.  476,  am  v.  City  of  Philadelphia,  196  Pa. 
478;  Johnston  v.  District  of  Colum-  St.  302;  s.  c.  46  Atl.  448. 
"bia,  118  U.  S.  19;  s.  c.  6  S.  Ct.  923; 


§  784 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS. 


788 


as  to  the  departments  of  charity  in  charge  of  the  poor,  the  criminal 
and  insane,  or  the  department  of  police,  or  the  board  of  education. ^*' 
On  the  other  hand  where  the  duties  are  essentially  local,  in  which  the 
municipality  has  a  special  interest  as  distinguished  from  the  public  at 
large,  or  where  the  corporation  derives  an  emolument,  profit  or  advan- 
tage, the  corporation  is  liable ;  thus  as  to  the  street  department,  sewer 
department  and  fire-department.'^'^ 

§  784.  Liability  for  torts  of  officers  not  public. — Where  a  contract  is 
let  to  grade  a  street  to  the  official  grade  and  by  an  error  of  a  city 
officer  the  grade  of  a  street  was  made  eight  feet  above  the  official 
grade,  by  means  of  which  extra  grade  damages  ensue,  the  city  is  not 
liable.  The  rule  is  that  when  an  officer  has  no  other  authority  en- 
trusted to  him  than  that  of  the  law  and  he  acts  beyond  that  authority 
and  a  tort  ensues,  and  a  citizen  is  injured  in  person  or  property,  it  is 
the  act  of  the  officer  only  and  the  city  is  not  liable.'^*  An  act  by  munic- 
ipal officers  done  outside  of  their  actual  and  apparent  scope  of  au- 
thority, does  not  render  the  city  liable. '^^  A  board  of  education  is  not 
liable  for  an  act  of  an  officer  done  outside  of  the  scope  of  his  au- 
thority.^**   But  where  he  acts  under  the  direction  of  the  city,  or  with 


'"  Maxmilian  v.  Mayor  &c.,  62  N. 
Y.  160;  Swift  v.  Mayor  &c.,  83  N.  Y. 
528,  535;  Ham  v.  Mayor  &c.,  70  N. 
Y.  459. 

"Ehrgott  V.  Mayor  &c.,  96  N.  Y. 
264,  271;  Barney  Dumping  Boat  Co. 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  40  Fed.  50;  Philadel- 
phia &c.  R.  Co.  V.  Mayor  &c.,  38  Fed. 
159;  Barnes  v.  District  of  Columbia, 
91  U.  S.  540;  New  York  &c.  Co.  v. 
City  of  Brooklyn,  71  N.  Y.  580; 
Bieling  v.  City  of  Brooklyn,  120  N. 
Y.  98,  105;  s.  c.  24  N.  E.  389.  A 
board  of  education  is  not  liable  for 
misuser  by  an  officer  who  is  in  per- 
formance of  his  duties  under  the 
compulsory  education  act:  Reynolds 
V.  Board  of  Education  &c.,  53  N.  Y. 
S.  75;  s.  c.  33  App.  Div.   (N.  Y.)   88. 

'^  Sievers  v.  City  &c.  of  San  Fran- 
cisco, 115  Cal.  648;  s.  c.  47  Pac.  687; 
Chambers  v.  Satterlee,  40  Cal.  497, 
529;  Goddard  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  84 
Maine  499;  s.  c.  24  Atl.  958;  30  Am. 
St.  373.  (See  this  case  for  valuable 
collection  of  cases  and  analysis.) 
Cf.  Huffman  v.  San  Joaquin  Co.,  21 


Cal.  426;  Barnett  v.  Contra  Costa 
Co.,  67  Cal.  77;  s.  c.  7  Pac.  177 
Lloyd  V.  Mayor  &c.,  5  N.  Y.  364 
Crowell  V.  Sonoma  Co.,  25  Cal.  313 
Winbigler  v.  Mayor  &c.,  45  Cal.  36 
Chope  V.  City  of  Eureka,  78  Cal. 
588;  s.  c.  21  Pac.  364. 

'"Wabaska  Elec.  Co.  v.  City  of 
Wymore,  60  Neb.  199;  s.  c.  82  N, 
W.  626.  City  is  not  liable  for  the 
malicious  acts  of  an  officer:  Moss  v. 
City  Council  &c.,  93  Ga.  797;  s.  c.  20 
S.  E.  653.  But  it  has  been  held 
that  the  city  is  liable  for  such  acts 
if  done  within  the  scope  of  author- 
ity, whether  the  acts  are  ratified  or 
not:  City  of  Ysleta  v.  Babbitt,  8 
Tex.  Civ.  App.  432;  s.  c.  28  S.  W. 
702.  The  law  is  well  settled  that  a 
municipality  is  not  liable  for  the 
tortious  acts  of  its  officers  or  agents, 
when  they  are  ultra  vires  or  beyond 
the  scope  of  corporate  authority  in 
reference  to  the  subject-matter: 
Boye  V.  City  of  Albert  Lea,  74  Minn. 
230;  s.  c.  76  N.  W.  1131. 

''"Reynolds  v.  Board  ef  Education 


789  TORTS    AND    CRIMES.  §    785 

its  sanction,  the  law  is  otherwise  and  the  city  liahle,*^  and  so  where  the 
act  of  the  mayor  in  committing  a  trespass  is  ratified  by  the  city,  liabil- 
ity attaches,^^  or  where  it  is  done  under  the  direction  of  the  city  coun- 
cil.**^ The  statute  may  also  change  the  rule  and  make  the  city  liable.^* 
A  city  is  not  liable  for  negligence  of  an  assistant  street  superintend- 
■ent  not  under  the  control  of  a  city  council,  though  elected  by  it.*^ 
The  reason  for  this  rule  is  in  the  fact  where  a  city  is  in  the  exercise 
of  its  police  power  it  is  not  liable  for  the  acts  of  its  officers  in  viola- 
tion of  the  laws  of  the  state  and  in  excess  of  the  legal  powers  of 
the  city.*^  Where  a  city  has  power  to  change  the  grade  of  its  streets 
only  by  ordinance,  it  is  not  liable  for  the  acts  of  its  agents  in  making 
a  change  in  the  grade  without  such  ordinance.®'^  Where  a  city  made  a 
contract  for  improving  a  street  and  deducted  a  certain  price  per  yard 
for  the  use  of  its  steam-roller,  and  the  roller  was  used  by  the  city 
€mployes  without  suggestions  from  the  contractor  and  a  fire  was 
communicated  by  the  roller,  the  city  is  liable  f^  and  so  in  the  opera- 
tion of  an  acequia  for  irrigation  purposes.  ^'^ 

§  785.  Liability  in  making  improvements,  etc. — If  the  city  in 
making  an  improvement  uses  ordinary  care  and  skill,  so  that  when 
the  work  is  completed  it  will  be  reasonably  safe,  the  city  will  not  be 
liable.^"  Where  personal  injuries  are  received  as  a  result  of  negli- 
gence of  the  city  in  building  a  sewer  for  the  use  of  which  property- 
owners  pay  a  rental  to  the  city,  it  is  liable  therefor.''^  But  the  city  is 
not  liable  for  acts  in  maintenance  of  water-works  which  by  statute  is 
vested  in  an  independent  commission,®^  nor  is  it  liable  for  a  loss  oc- 

&c.,  53  N.  Y.  S.  75;  s.  c.  33  App.  Div.  111.  353;   City  of  Chicago  v.  Turner, 

(N.  Y.)  88.  80   111.   419,   422;    Wilcox  v.  City  of 

"Johnson     City     v.     Wolfe,     103  Chicago,  107  111.  334;   Blake  v.  City 

Tenn.  277;  s.  c.  52  S.  W.  991.  of  Pontiac,  49  111.  App.  543. 

"=  Commercial  Elec.  &c.  Co.  v.  City  "'  Beatty  v.  City  of  St.  Joseph,  57 

of  Tacoma,  20  Wash.   288;    s.  c.  55  Mo.  App.  251. 

Pac.  219.  ""^  McMahon   v.    City   of   Dubuque, 

•^^Hallman   v.   City   of   Platteville,  107  Iowa  62;  s.  c.  77  N.  W.  517. 

101  Wis.  94;  s.  c.  76  N.  W.  1119.  ''^  City  of  Ysleta  v.  Babbitt,  8  Tex. 

^  Parks  V.  Greenville,  44  S.  C.  168;  Civ.  App.  432;  s.  c.  28  S.  W.  702.     As 

s.  c.  21  S.  E.  540.  to  when  an  officer  is  not  an  agent  of 

^^  McCann  v.  City  of  Waltham,  163  the   city,   see   Gilpatrick   v.   City   of 

Mass.  344;  s.  c.  40  N.  E.  20.     It  was  Biddeford,    86    Maine   534;    s.    c.    30 

urged  in  a  unique  case  that  a  police-  Atl.  99. 

man   was  a   nuisance   and   the   city  ""McQueen  v.  City  of  Elkhart,  14 

therefore  liable  for  his  acts,  but  the  Ind.  App.  671;  s.  c.  43  N.  E.  460. 

contention  was  not  sustained:  Craig  ''  Coan  v.  City  of  Marlborough,  164 

V.   City   of  Charleston.   78   111.   App.  Mass.  206;  s.  c.  41  N.  E.  238. 

312;    s.   c.  affirmed   180   111.   154;    54  "=  Gross  v.  City  of  Portsmouth,  68 

N.  E.  184.  N.  H.  266;  s.  c.  33  Atl.  256. 

^'Town  of  Odell  v.  Schroeder,  58 


§    786  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  790 

casioned  by  fire  growing  out  of  the  defective  condition  of  its  water- 
worlvs.''^  But  where  water-gates  are  maintained  by  a  city  for  pecu- 
niary gain  it  is  immaterial  by  whom,  or  for  what  purpose,  they  were 
originally  erected,  in  an  action  for  damages.^*  In  such  case  the  main- 
tenance or  removal  of  the  gates  is  not  a  governmental  function.®^ 
A  city  hiring  a  train  and  crew  and  operating  the  same  on  a  temporary 
track  laid  on  its  own  property  is  liable  to  its  employes  as  other  cor- 
porations operating  a  railroad.^''  The  liability  of  a  city  for  injury 
growing  out  of  ownership  and  operation  of  a  gravel-bank  which  is 
dangerous,  where  no  notice  is  given  to  laborers,  is  the  same  as  that  of  a 
natural  person.''^  The  city  is  liable  for  injury  to  an  employe  by  reason 
of  mismanagement  of  a  steam-roller  engaged  in  repairing  the 
streets.^^  Where  a  city  is  the  owner  of  a  toll-bridge  over  a  river 
it  is  liable  for  injury  resulting  from  defects  in  the  approach  to  the 
bridge  though  in  another  state.®''  And  it  is  liable  for  an  injury  grow- 
ing out  of  negligence  in  not  providing  barriers  or  lights  on  a  draw- 
bridge.^**" Where  a  statute  provides  that  it  shall  not  be  lawful  to  lo- 
cate a  pest-house  within  one  mile  of  the  boundary-line  of  the  city  and 
a  person  is  injured  by  the  acts  of  the  municipal  officers,  the  city  is 
liable  for  their  acts  though  the  statute  provides  a  remedy  against  the 
olScers  only.^"^ 

§  786.    Torts    in    diverting    watercourses,    surface-water,    etc. — 

Where  the  city  in  grading  its  streets  diverted  the  natural  drainage'  of 
the  surface-water  and  threw  larger  quantities  of  water,  dirt  and  filth 
than  formerly  on  plaintiff's  ground  and  caused  large  quantities  of 
water,  dirt  and  filth  to  acumulate  on  the  street  in  front  of  plaintiff's 
lot,  to  such  an  extent  as  to  become  a  nuisance,  it  is  unnecessary  to 
allege  that  the  work  was  negligently  and  unskilfully  done.^°^     Nor 

«^  Springfield   &c.    Ins.   Co.  v.   Vil-  58  S.  C.  413;  s.  c.  36  S.  E.  661.     See 

lage  of  Keeseville,  148  N.  Y.  46;  s.  c.  Rev.  Stats.  S.  C,  §  1582. 

42  N.  E.  405.  ""City   Council  &c.  v.   Hudson,  94 

"'City  Council  &c.  v.  Lombard,  99  Ga.  135;  s.  c.  21  S.  E.  289. 

Ga.  282;  s.  c.  25  S.  E.  772.  "°  Stephani  v.  City  of  Manitowoc, 

"^City    Council    &c.    v.    Lombard,  89  Wis.  467;  s.  c.  62  N.  W.  176. 

supra.  "'  City    of    Henderson    v.    Clayton 

""Coughlan  v.  City  of  Cambridge,  (Ky.),  57  S.  W.  1. 

166  Mass.  268;  s.  c.  44  N.  E.  218.   For  "-Guest  v.  Commissioners  &c.,  90 

negligent   construction    of   doors   of  Md.  689;   s.  c.  45  Atl.  882.     Cf.  Sei- 

an  engine  house,  see  Kies  v.  City  of  fert  v.  City  of  Brooklyn,  101  N.  Y. 

Erie,  169  Pa.  St.  598;    s.  c.  32  Atl.  136;    s.   c.    4   N.   E.   321;    Byrnes  v. 

621.  City  of  Cohoes,  67  N.  Y.  204;  Noon- 

^'City    of    Winfield    v.    Peeden,    8  an  v.  City  of  Albany,  79  N.  Y.  470, 

Kan.  App.  671;  s.  c.  57  Pac.  131.  475;   Field  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  36  N. 

"'Barksdale   v.    City    of   Laurens,  J.  Eq.  118;    O'Brien  v.   City  of   St. 


791  TORTS   AND    CRIMES.  §    787 

in  such  case  is  it  necessary  to  allege  knowledge  or  notice  on  the  part 
of  the  cit}^,  since,  it  being  an  original  wrong-doer,  it  is  not  entitled  to 
notice  before  suit.^°^  A  municipality  is  liable  for  damages  caused 
by  tearing  away  a  gutter  wall  by  which  the  water  from  the  street  was 
turned  upon  plaintiff's  premises  and  building.^"*  It  has  been  held  that 
damages  are  not  recoverable  for  water  caused  to  flow  in  a  dooryard 
by  reason  of  necessary  changes  in  the  surface  and  grade  of  a  street, 
under  the  general  statutes,  section  2683,  laws  of  Connecticut,  although 
it  might  have  been  graded  so  as  to  prevent  such  flow.^°^  The  city 
may  be  liable  for  diverting  a  watercourse  for  supplying  a  reservoir.^"'' 
In  the  grading  of  streets  it  is  the  duty  of  the  city  to  take  care  of  the 
surface-water  accumulated  by  reason  of  the  grading  and  prevent  in- 
jury to  property  where  it  can  be  done  practically  and  at  a  reasonable 
expense.^'*'  AVhere  the  city  collects  the  water  in  a  body  and  by  artificial 
means  throws  it  upon  adjacent  land  it  is  liable.^**^  And  where  by  a 
permanent  public  improvement  it  narrows  the  channel  of  a  natural 
waterway  and  throws  the  current  on  the  opposite  side  so  as  to  injure 
property  then  it  is  liable.^"''  A  citizen  is  liable  in^ damages  for  negli- 
gence in  diverting  a  stream  by  means  of  an  artificial  canal  by  means 
of  which  the  canal  overflowed  and  damaged  plaintiff's  land.  Where 
the  city  is  beneficially  interested  it  is  not  a  governmental  function."** 
In  a  suit  for  polluting  a  stream  with  sewage,  evidence  of  a  town  vote 
authorizing  the  construction  of  the  sewers  and  making  appropriation 
therefor  is  admissible,  whether  the  town  was  or  was  not  authorized 
to  build  sewers.^^^ 

§  787.  Respondeat  superior  not  applicable  to  public  officers. — 
Where  the  city  assumes  a  duty  public  in  its  nature,  such  as  the  erec- 
tion of  a  schoolhouse,  and  an  injury  results,  it  is  not  liable.  It  is  per- 
formed in  obedience  to  a  statute  which  was  enacted  because  it  was 

Paul,  25  Minn.  331;   Ashley  v.  City  N.  Y.  S.  579;  s.  c.  31  Misc.   (N.  Y.) 

of  Port  Huron,  35  Mich.  296;  Patoka  375. 

Tp.  V.  Hopkins,  131  Ind.  142;    s.  c.  ""  Schuett  v.  City  of  Stillwater,  80 

30  N.  E.  896;  Pumpelly  v.  Green  Bay  Minn.  287;  s.  c.  83  N.  W.  180. 

&c.   Co.,   13   Wall.   136;    Hitchins  v.  ^"^  Jordan  v.  City  of  Benwood,  42 

Mayor  &c.,  68  Md.  100,  113;  s.  c.  11  W.  Va.  312;  s.  c.  26  S.  B.  266;  36  L. 

Atl.  826;  Mayor  &c.  v.  Merryman,  86  R.  A.  519;   Bedell  v.  Village  of  Sea 

Md.  584,  592;  s.  c.  39  Atl.  98.  Cliff,  46  N.  Y.  S.  226;   s.  c.  18  App. 

^''^  Guest  V.  Commissioners  &c.,  90  Div.  (N.  Y.)  261;  Cannon  v.  City  of 

Md.  689;  s.  c.  45  Atl.  882.  St.  Joseph,  67  Mo.  App.  367. 

^"*  Morley  v.  Village  of  Buchanan,  ""  Parker  v.  City  of  Atchison,  58 

124  Mich.  128;  s.  c.  82  N.  W.  802.  Kan.  29;  s.  c.  48  Pac.  631. 

"^  Downs   v.    City   of   Ansonia,   73  ""Willson  v.  Boise  City    (Idaho), 

Conn.  33;   s.  c.  46  Atl.  243.  55  Pac.  887. 

'"'Rider  v.  City  of  Amsterdam,  65  "'Watson   v.    Town   of   New   Mil- 
ford,  72  Conn.  561;  s.  c.  45  Atl.  167. 


§    787  PUBLIC    COIU'ORATIONS.  793 

deemed  expedient  by  the  legislature,  in  the  distribution  of  the  powers 
of  government,  to  require  the  city,  nolens  volens,  to  perform  a  public 
service  in  which  it,  as  a  corporation,  had  no  interest.  In  such  case  the 
employes  are  the  servants  and  agents  of  the  state,  and  not  the  city, 
and  it  is  for  this  reason  the  doctrine  of  respondeat  superior  does  not 
apply.^^^  Negligence  of  a  public  officer  engaged  in  the  performance 
of  a  public  duty  which  results  in  a  personal  injury  to  an  emplo^^e,  does 
not  render  the  municipality  liable,^ ^^  and  so  the  city  is  not  liable  for 
the  acts  of  a  liquor-licensing  board,  such  board  not  being  agents  but 
public  officers  of  the  city.^^'*  Where  a  person  is  arrested  without  cause, 
is  confined  in  the  city  jail  and  injured  by  reason  of  its  improper  con- 
struction and  unwholesome  condition,  the  city  is  not  liable  for  such  in- 
juries, for  the  reason  that  the  city  is  not  responsible  for  an  illegal  ar- 
rest by  a  police  officer,  and  respondeat  superior  does  not  apply.^^^ 
Where  a  tort  was  committed  by  a  chain-gang  superintendent  by  im- 
prisoning a  person  and  compelling  him  to  work,  although  it  was  done 
under  instructions  from  county  authorities,  there  is  no  liability.  ^^^ 
The  city  is  not  liable  for  the  acts  of  an  officer  in  requiring  a  prisoner  to 
break  stone  when  he  was  not  sentenced  to  hard  labor,^^^  nor  generally 
for  the  negligence  of  any  officer  who  is  in  the  performance  of  duties 
imposed  by  law,^^^  nor  in  the  exercise  of  police  powers,  even  under  a 
void  ordinance,^  ^^  nor  for  endeavoring  to  enforce  a  void  judgment  for 
a  fine  where  the  offense  was  against  the  general  law.^^**  Although 
police  officers  are  appointed  by  the  municipality  under  authority  of 
a  statute,  the  city  is  not  liable  for  their  acts  under  the  rule  respon- 
deat superior.^ ^^  A  city  is  not  liable  for  negligent  and  wilful  acts 
of  city  physicians,^^"  nor  for  the  acts  of  an  officer  which  are  unofficial, 
but  the  duties  are  imposed  by  resolution  of  the  council. ^-^     Respond- 

"2  Kinnare  v.  City  of  Chicago,  171  ""  Royce    v.    Salt    Lake    City,    15 

111.  332;  s.  c.  49  N.  E.  536.  Utah  401;   s.  c.  49  Pac.  290. 

"^  Murphy  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  176  ""*  Sievers  v.  City  &c.  of  San  Fran- 
Mass.  422;  s.  c.  57  N.  B.  689.  And  cisco,  115  Cal.  648;  s.  c.  47  Pac.  687. 
so  as  to  the  torts  of  a  general  officer  ^^^  Easterly  v.  Town  of  Irwin,  99 
over  whom  the  council  exercises  no  Iowa  694;  s.  c.  68  N.  W.  919;  City  of 
control  except  of  general  orders  or  Caldwell  v.  Prunelle,  57  Kan.  511;  s. 
ordinances:     Jensen  v.  City  of  Wal-  c.  46  Pac.  949. 

tham,  166  Mass.  344;   s.  c.  44  N.  E.  ""  Fox   v.    City    of   Richmond,    19 

339.  Ky.  L.  326;  s.  c.  40  S.  W.  251. 

"*  McGinnis    v.     Inhabitants    &c.,  "^  Woodhull  v.  City  of  New  York, 

176  Mass.  67;  s.  c.  57  N.  E.  210.  150  N.  Y.  450;  s.  c.  44  N.  E.  1038. 

"^  Gray  V.  Mayor  &c.,  Ill  Ga.  361;  ^-- Bates   v.    City   of    Houston,    14 

s.  c.  36  S.  E.  792;   Bean  v.  City  of  Tex.  Civ.  App.  287;    s.  c.   37   S.  W. 

Middlesboro  (Ky.),  57  S.  W.  478.  383. 

""Bailey   v.    Fulton    Co.,   Ill   Ga.  ^^^Gray    v.    City    of    Detroit,    113 

313;  s.  c.  36  S.  E.  596.  Mich,  657;  s.  c.  71  N.  W.  1107. 


793  TORTS   AND    CRIMES,  §    788 

cat  superior  does  apply  where  an  act  is  within  the  general  scope  of 
the  corporate  powers,  and  is  in  the  execution  of  such  powers,  but  is 
done  in  such  negligent  and  unlawful  manner  as  to  injure  others.^-'* 
The  fact  that  a  department  is  created  by  law  for  the  performance  of 
a  public  duty  does  not  relieve  the  city  from  liability  growing  out  of 
negligence  in  the  performance  of  duties  voluntarily  assumed.^^^ 

§  788.  Negligence  as  an  element  in  tort. — The  propriety  of  con- 
sidering negligence  as  an  element  in  the  subject  of  torts  may  be 
■doubted.  Negligence  in  municipal  affairs  usually  arises  in  connection 
with  streets,  alleys  and  sidewalks,  and  is  fully  treated  in  that  connec- 
tion and  will  be  only  briefly  considered  here.  Negligence  as  applied 
to  the  management  of  municipal  affairs  is  not  susceptible  of  defini- 
iion,  and  is  only  made  plain  by  illustration.  The  application  of  the 
doctrine  of  negligence  can  only  be  considered  with  reference  to  the 
facts  and  circumstances  of  each  case  and  there  are  no  well-defined 
rules  governing  the  subject.  The  existence  of  negligence  in  any  case 
is  a  question  of  fact  to  be  determined  by  the  jury.^-^^  In  order  that  the 
city  may  be  held  liable  for  negligence  it  is  essential  that  it  shall  have 
knowledge  of  the  negligent  act,  or  notice  thereof.  Notice,  however,  is 
not  required  where  the  negligent  act  is  the  act  of  the  servants  of  the 
•city.^^''  Again,  what  is  sufficient  notice  of  the  negligent  act  is  a  ques- 
tion of  fact  for  the  jury.^-'^  Knowledge  of  the  defect  is  not  conclusive 
evidence  of  negligence. ^^^  Officers  of  a  city  are  chargeable  with  knowl- 
edge which  it  is  their  duty  to  possess,  as  such  officers.^-^  Notice 
should  be  given  to  such  officers  as  are  chargeable  with  the  duty  of 
care,  as  in  case  of  streets,  sidewalks,  etc.,  although  it  has  been  held 
that  notice  to  the  mayor  is  notice  to  the  city  of  a  trespass  by  its  offi- 
cers.^^°     As  to  negligence  in  the  case  of  children  receiving  injury 

«*Boye  V.  City  of  Albert  Lea,  74  ^=°  City  of  Dallas  v.  Cooper   (Tex. 

Minn.  230;  s.  c.  76  N.  W.  1131.  Civ.  App.),  34  S.  W.  321. 

125  Twist  V.  City  of  Rochester,  55  "'  Sproul    v.    City    of    Seattle,    17 

N.  Y.  S.  850;  s.  c.  37  App.  Div.   (N.  Wash.  256;   s.  c.  49  Pac.  489;   Smith 

Y.)   307.  v.  Mayor  &c.,  45  N.  Y.  S.  239;   s.  c. 

^==aCity   of   Ft.    Scott  v.    Peck,   5  17  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  438. 

Kan.   App.    593;    s.   c.   49   Pac.    Ill;  '-"Nichols    v.    Incorporated    Town 

Sheridan  v.  Mayor  &c.,  33  N.  Y.  S.  of  Laurens,  96  Iowa  388;  s.  c.  65  N. 

71;  s.  c.  12  Misc.   (N.  Y.)  47;  Roach  W.  335;  Mayor  &c.  v.  Starr,  112  Ala. 

V.  City  of  Ogdensburg,  36  N.  Y.  S.  98;  s.  c.  20  So.  424. 

112;  s.  c.  91  Hun  (N.  Y.)  9;  Rumsey  '=«  Carstesen  v.  Town  of  Stratford, 

V.  City  of  Philadelphia,  171  Pa.  St.  67  Conn.  428;  s.  c.  35  Atl.  276. 

63;  s.  c.  32  Atl.  1133;  Fuchs  v.  City  '''"City  of  San  Antonio  v.  Mackey's 

of  St.  Louis,  133  Mo.  168;    s.  c.  31  Estate,  22  Tex.  Civ.  App.  145;   s.  c. 

S.  W.  115;  34  S.  W.  508.  54  S.  W.  33.     Where  the  question  of 


§    788  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  794: 

through  fault  of  the  city  the  Law  is  somewhat  different,  in  some 
respects,  from  that  applicable  to  persons  of  mature  age.  It  has  been 
held  that  the  city  is  liable  for  death  of  a  child  falling  from  a  section 
of  the  sidewalk  it  was  using  as  a  raft  on  a  pond  of  water  accumulated 
by  the  city's  negligence  in  grading  for  a  sewer,^^^  and  for  leaving  a 
sand-pit  in  close  proximity  to  a  street  open  and  unprotected,  whereby 
a  child  enters  the  pit  and  is  injured.  ^^^  And  so  where  there  is  a  half- 
block  of  ground  in  a  populous  city  bounded  on  two  sides  by  public 
streets  and  on  a  third  by  a  public  alley,  on  which  is  a  dangerous  pond 
or  pit,  in  which  the  water  is  from  five  to  fourteen  feet  deep,  with  logs 
floating  upon  it  on  which  children  were  in  the  habit  of  playing,  and 
the  city  had  been  notified  of  the  attractiveness  to  children  and  the  dan- 
gerous character  thereof,  and  an  injury  ensues  to  a  child  seven  years 
old,  the  city  is  liable.  ^^^  Undoubtedly  the  general  rule  of  law  is  that 
an  owner  of  premises  is  not  required  to  keep  his  premises  in  a  safe 
condition  for  the  benefit  of  trespassers  who  come  upon  them  without 
invitation,  express  or  implied,  for  their  own  pleasure  or  to  gratify 
their  own  curiosity.^^*  But  an  exception  to  this  general  rule  exists 
in  its  application  to  children.  Thus  where  the  owner  of  premises 
leaves  them  open  and  unguarded  and  they  are  of  such  nature  and  char- 
acter as  to  be  an  attraction  to  children,  appealing  to  their  childish 
curiosity,  the  owner  becomes  liable  for  an  injury.  In  such  case  the 
owner  should  reasonably  anticipate  the  injury. ^^^     If  the  property  is 

negligence  is  one  for  the  jury  and  pra.  The  cases  which  sustain  this 
the  evidence  is  conflicting  and  the  doctrine,  usually  known  as  the 
verdict  of  the  jury  in  the  trial  court  Turn-table  Cases,  are:  Keffe  v.  Mil- 
is  approved  by  that  court  it  will  not  waukee  &c.  R.  Co.,  21  Minn.  207; 
be  disturbed  by  the  appellate  court:  Kansas  City  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Fitzsim- 
City  of  Ft.  Scott  V.  Peck.  5  Kan.  App.  mons,  22  Kan.  686;  Koons  v.  St. 
593;  s.  c.  49  Pac.  111.  A  finding  Louis  &c.  R.  Co.,  65  Mo.  592;  Union 
that  the  village  had  notice  is  suf-  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Dunden,  37  Kan.  1;  s. 
ficient  where  a  village  trustee  nailed  c.  14  Pac.  501;  Evanisch  v.  G.  C.  & 
down  the  loose  board  which  caused  S.  F.  R.  Co.,  57  Tex.  123;  Ferguson 
the  injury,  but  the  stringers  being  v.  Columbus  &c.  R.  Co.,  75  Ga.  637; 
decayed  were  insufficient  to  hold:  s.  c.  77  Ga.  102;  St.  Louis  &c.  R.  Co. 
Village  of  Sorento  v.  Johnson,  52  111.  v.  Bell,  81  111.  76.  Other  cases  of  a 
App.  659.  similar  nature  are:   Mackey  v.  City 

"^City  of  Omaha  v.  Richards,  49  of  Vicksburg.  64  Miss.  777;    s.  c.  2 

Neb.  244;  s.  c.  68  N.  W.  528.  So.  178;  Birge  v.  Gardner,  19  Conn. 

^"^Hawley  v.  City  of  Atlantic,  92  507;    Daley  v.  Norwich  &c.   R.   Co., 

Iowa  172;  s,  c.  60  N.  W.  519.  26  Conn.  591;  Powers  v.  Harlow,  53 

"^'City  of  Pekin  v.  McMahon,  154  Mich.  507;    s.  c.  19  N.  W.  257;    Hy- 

111.  141;  s.  c.  39  N.  E.  484.  draulic  Works  Co.  v.  Orr,  83  Pa.  St. 

"^City  of  Pekin  v.  McMahon,  su-  332;   Whirley  v.  Whiteman,  1  Head 

pra.  (Tenn.)     610.     For    an     exhaustive 

^^^  City  of  Pekin  v.  McMahon,  su-  note  on  the  liability  for  dangerous 


795  TORTS    AND    CRIMES.  §    789 

not  immediately  on  the  highway  it  has  been  held  there  was  no  lia- 
bility."" And  so  where  the  agency  of  the  injury  was  not  attractive 
to  children  there  would  be  no  negligence. '•"''^ 

§  789.  Liability  for  collision  of  vessels. — Where  a  city  under  power 
in  its  charter  enters  into  the  business  of  towing  vessels  for  profit  and 
by  negligence  causes  injury  to  another  vessel  by  collision,  it  is  liable. ^^* 
The  reason  for  the  liability  in  this  class  of  cases  is  based  upon  the  fact 
that  when  a  city  voluntarily  assumes  the  exercise  of  powers  which 
are  private  in  their  nature,  and  for  profit,  it  is  liable  to  suit  and  the 
measure  of  actual  damage  that  an  individual  or  private  corporation 
would  vsubject  itself  to  under  similar  circumstances. ^^'^  The  city  is 
liable  for  the  collision  of  its  fire-boat  with  another  vessel  through  the 
negligence  of  the  former.  In  such  case  the  fire-department  does  not 
act  as  an  instrumentality  of  the  state,  but  rather  of  the  munici- 
pality.^*" A  city  is  liable  for  a  collision  of  its  ice-boat  with  another 
vessel  moored  at  a  dock  while  the  ice-boat  is  engaged  in  private  service 
for  the  owners  of  the  dock,  gratuitously  or  for  compensation.^*^ 

§  790.  Torts  of  independent  contractor. — The  city  is  liable  for  an 
injury  although  it  may  have  employed  an  independent  contractor  to 
do  the  work,  where  the  work  is  done  under  specifications  by  the  city, 
and  is  in  conformity  therewith,  and  the  injury  is  the  proximate  and 
necessary  result  of  the  work  contracted  for.^*^    The  city  is  liable  for 

condition  of  private  grounds  lying  W.  417;  Klix  v.  Nieman,  68  Wis.  271; 

open     beside     a     highway     or     fre-  s.  c.  32  N.  W.  223. 

quented  paths,  see  note  to  Lepnick  v.  "*  City  of  Philadelphia  v.  Gavag- 

Gaddis,  72  Miss.  200;  s.  c.  16  So.  213,  nin,  62  Fed.  617;    s.  c.   10  C.  C.  A. 

in  26  L.  R.  A.   686.    But  upon  this  552. 

subject  the  authorities  are  not  en-  ^^^  City  of  Philadelphia  v.  Gavag- 

tirely  harmonious:    Gillespie  v.  Mc-  nin,  supra;  The  Giovanni  v.  City  of 

Gowan,  100  Pa.  St.  144;   Hargreaves  Philadelphia,  59  Fed.  303. 

V.  Deacon,  25  Mich.  1;   Klix  v.  Nie-  ""Workman  v.  City  of  New  York, 

man,  68  Wis.  271;  s.  c.  32  N.  W.  223;  63  Fed.  298.    A  city  is  liable  for  a 

Schmidt  v.  Kansas  City  Dist.  Co.,  90  collision  of  a  fire-tug  with  another 

Mo.  284;   s.  c.  1  S.  W.  865;    2  S.  W.  vessel.    This  is  contrary  to  the  com- 

417;  City  of  Indianapolis  v.  Emmel-  mon  law  and  grows  out  of  the  prin- 

man,  108  Ind.  530;  s.  c.  9  N.  E.  155;  ciples    of    maritime    law.    Inasmuch 

Clark  V.  City  of  Richmond,   83  Va.  as  public  policy  forbids  a  seizure  of 

355;  s.  c.  5  S.  E.  369;  Clark  v.  Man-  the  vessel  as  in  other  maritime  cases 

Chester,  62  N.  H.  577;  Trost  v.  East-  the     judgment     is     in     personam: 

ern  R.  Co.,  64  N.  H.  220;  s.  c.  9  Atl.  Thompson  N.  W.  Co.  v.  City  of  Chi- 

790.  cago,  79  Fed.  984. 

i^«  Gillespie  v.   McGowan,   100   Pa.  '»  Guthrie  v.  City  of  Philadelphia, 

St.  144.  73  Fed.  688. 

"'^  Hargreaves  v.  Deacon,  25  Mich.  "=  City    of    Louisville    v.    Shanna- 

1;  Schmidt  v.  Kansas  City  Dist.  Co.,  ban,  22  Ky.  L.  163;    s.  c.  56  S.  W. 

90  Mo.  284;    s.  c.  1  S.  W.  865;    2   S.  808. 


§    791  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  796 

improper  materials  and  work  by  a  contractor  where  all  materials  were 
subject  to  the  approval  of  a  commissioner  of  public  improvements, 
and  the  location  of  a  wall  was  designated  by  a  city  engineer  and  was 
built  under  the  supervision  of  the  engineer  or  his  assistants.^''^  The 
city  is  liable  for  failure  to  require  the  contractor  to  use  care  to  pre- 
vent injury.^**  It  is  probable  that  where  city  authorities  employ  a 
contractor  to  do  what  they  arc  empowered  by  statute  to  do,  which  is 
dangerous  in  its  nature,  the  city  is  liable  for  injuries. ^*^ 

§  791.  Miscellaneous  matters  in  relation  te  torts. — \\Tiere  the  city 
gave  authority  to  al)utting  owners  to  make  excavations  dangerous  to 
the  public  and  has  notice  thereof,  it  is  liable,^*®  but  not  so  if  it  has 
given  no  permission.  ^^'^  Where  there  is  a  valid  ordinance  and  grading 
is  done  without  provision  for  and  the  payment  of  damages  to  an 
abutting  owner,  the  city  is  liable.^*^  A  city  in  the  exercise  of  a  gov- 
ernmental power  in  granting  a  railroad  company  the  right  to  construct 
a  tunnel  under  a  street  is  not  liable  for  damages  occasioned  by  the 
company. ^*^  It  is  not  a  defense  in  an  action  for  negligence  that  a 
lawful  act  was  performed  in  an  unlawful  manner,  as  where  an 
improvement  was  required  to  be  made  under  contract  and  was  in  fact 
done  by  or  under  the  direction  of  the  superintendent  of  streets.^^" 
Where  the  city  is  prosecuting  work  through  its  officials  and  at  its 
expense,  it  will  not  be  heard  to  say  that  through  irregularity  in  the 
proceedings  the  work  was  without  authority  of  law.^^^  A  municipal 
corporation  is  not  liable  in  tort  when  the  alleged  tort  consists  in  a 
breach  of  a  contract  which  is  void  by  being  prohibited  by  the  consti- 
tution.^^^  A  county,  occupying  a  leased  building,  is  liable  for  its 
loss  by  fire  if  occasioned  by  the  negligence  of  officers  charged  with  its 
care.^^^  Though  an  ordinance  shows  an  abuse  of  discretionary  power 
vested  in  the  municipality,  it  is  not  liable  for  damages  caused  by  the 

"^  Goldschmid  v.  Mayor  &c.,  43  N.  ^^''  Donahew    v.     City     of    Kansas 

Y.  S.  447;  s.  c.  14  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  City,  136  Mo.  657;  s.  c.  38  S.  W.  571. 

135.  To  the  same  effect  is  Collenswortli 

"*  White  V.  Mayor  &c.,  44  N.  Y.  S.  v.  City  of  New  Whatcom,  16  Wash. 

454;  s.  c.  15  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  440.  224;  s.  c.  47  Pac.  439. 

"'  Hardaker  v.  Idle  Dist.  Council,  "^  Norton  v.  City  of  New  Bedford, 

1  Q.  B.  D.  335.  166  Mass.  48;  s.  c.  43  N.  E.  1034. 

""Sproul    V.    City    of    Seattle,    17  ''=  Schiilenberg  &c.  Co.  v.   City  of 

Wash.  256;  s.  c.  49  Pac.  489.  East  St.  Louis,  63  111.  App.  214;  s.  c. 

'"Jones   V.    City    of    Clinton,    100  166  111.  232;  46  N.  E.  728;  Prince  v. 

Iowa  333;  s.  c.  69  N.  W.  418.  City  of  Quincy,  28  111.  App.  490. 

'"Rives   V.   City   of  Columbia,   80  ''' Williams  v.  Board  &c.,  61  Kan. 

Mo.  App.  173.  708;  s.  c.  60  Pac.  1046. 

Ill)  Terry  v.  City  of  Richmond,  94 
Va.  537;  s.  c.  27  S.  E.  429. 


797 


TORTS   AND    CRIMES. 


enactment  and  enforcement  of  such  ordinance.^^*  The  city  is  nor 
ble  for  an  injury  growing  out  of  the  use  of  impure  vaccine  under  a^ 
ordinance  requiring  all  citizens  and  residents  to  be  vaccinated. !^^  A 
city  is  not  liable  for  an  injury  to  property  on  a  wharf-boat  which 
grows  out  of  the  negligence  of  one  to  whom  the  city  had  leased  the 
wharf  and  privileges. ^^^  Where  a  public  work  by  reason  of  its  nature 
and  location  injures  a  person,  and  which  could  have  been  avoided  by 
the  exercise  of  reasonable  prudence  as  to  plan  and  location,  the  city 
and  contractor  are  liable. ^^^ 

§  792.  Non-liability  for  firemen. — Members  of  a  fire-department, 
as  ofhcers  charged  with  a  public  service,  are  not  the  agents  or  servants 
of  the  city  which  appoints  them,  and  the  city  is  therefore  not  liable 
for  their  negligent  discharge  of  official  duty,^^^  nor  is  it  liable  for  neg- 


^^*  Rosenbaum  v.  City  of  Newbern, 
118  N.  C.  83;  s.  c.  24  S.  E.  1. 

^^  Wyatt  v.  City  of  Rome,  105  Ga. 
312;  s.  c.  31  S.  E.  188;  42  L.  R.  A. 
180;  Sberbourne  v.  Yuba  Co.,  21  Cal. 
113;  Summers  v.  Board  &c.,  103  Ind. 
262;  s.  c.  2  N.  E.  725;  Ogg  v.  City  of 
Lansing,  35  Iowa  495;  Love  v.  City 
of  Atlanta,  95  Ga.  129;  s.  c.  22  S.  E. 
29. 

^^^  Carrollton  &c.  Mfg.  Co.  v.  City 
of  Carrollton,  20  Ky.  L.  818;  s.  c.  47 
S.  W.  439,  885. 

"'De  Baker  v.  Southern  &c.  R. 
Co.,  106  Cal.  257;  s.  c.  39  Pac.  610; 
Carstesen  v.  Town  of  Stratford,  67 
Conn.  428;  s.  c.  35  Atl.  276. 

""  Smith  v.  City  of  Rochester,  76 
N.  Y.  506.  A  city  is  not  responsible 
for  the  torts  of  its  firemen:  Kies  v. 
City  of  Erie,  135  Pa.  St.  144;  s.  c. 
19  Atl.  942;  Knight  v.  City  of  Phila- 
delphia, 15  W.  N.  C.  (Pa.)  307;  Fire 
Ins.  Patrol  v.  Boyd,  120  Pa.  St.  624; 
s.  c.  15  Atl.  553.  A  city  is  not  liable 
for  the  negligent  driving  of  a  mem- 
ber of  its  fire-department  in  going  to 
a  fire,  though  the  department  be  un- 
der its  direct  control,  management 
and  operation,  and  the  members  of 
it  be  employed  and  paid  by  the  city: 
Alexander  v.  City  of  Vicksburg,  68 
Miss.  564;  s.  c.  10  So.  62.  In  Hayes 
V.   City   of   Oshkosh,   33   Wis.    314, 


Dixon,  C.  J.,  said: — "The  grounds 
of  exemption  from  liability  are  that 
the  corporation  is  engaged  in  a  pub- 
lic service  in  which  it  has  no  partic- 
ular interest,  .  .  .  but  which  it 
is  bound  to  see  performed  in  pursu- 
ance of  a  duty  imposed  by  law  for 
the  general  welfare;  that  the  mem- 
bers of  the  fire-department,  though 
appointed  by  the  city  corporation, 
are  not,  when  acting  in  the  dis- 
charge of  their  duties,  servants  or 
agents  of  the  city,  but  they  act 
rather  as  public  officers  charged  with 
a  public  service  for  whose  negli- 
gence or  misconduct  in  the  discharge 
of  official  duty  no  action  will  lie 
against  the  city  unless  expressly 
given."  In  Fisher  v.  Boston,  104 
Mass.  87,  Gray,  J.,  said: — "Nor  is  it 
material  that  in  Boston  a  fire-de- 
partment has  been  established  and 
is  regulated  under  a  special  statute 
accepted  by  the  city  council:  Stat. 
1850,  ch.  262.  The  engineers  and 
members  of  that  department  are  no 
less  public  officers  and  no  more 
agents  of  the  city  than  fire-wards 
and  similar  officers  under  the  gen- 
eral statutes.  In  the  leading  case  of 
Hafford  v.  City  of  New  Bedford,  16 
Gray  (Mass.)  297,  the  fire-depart- 
ment, for  the  negligence  of  whose 
members  the  city  was  held  not  to  be 


793 


PUBLIC    CORPOIUTIONS. 


798 


ligence  in  the  performance  of  a  public  duty  imposed  by  law,  to  a  mem- 
ber of  its  fire-department  injured  by  reason  of  a  defective  brake  on  an 
engine.^'"'''  The  fire  commissioners  of  the  city  of  New  York  being 
public  officers  and  not  its  agents,  it  is  not  liable  for  their  wrongful 
dismissal  of  a  fireman. ^®° 

§  793.  Non-liability  for  police. — Municipal  corporations  are  not 
liable  for  the  torts  or  negligence  of  policemen  because  the  duties  of 
those  officers  are  of  a  public  nature  and  their  appointment  is  devolved 
by  the  legislature  on  cities,  towns  and  boroughs  as  a  convenient 
mode  of  exercising  a  public  function  ;^^^  thus  a  borough  was  held 
not  liable  where  a  policeman  stood  by  and  made  no  effort  to  stop 
the  firing  of  cannon  on  a  public  street.^**^  And  a  city  is  not  liable 
for  an  illegal  arrest  and  imprisonment  by  the  police, ^®^  or  for 
their  unnecessary  violence,^*^*  or  for  their  accidental  shooting  of  a 


liable  to  an  action,  was  established 
and  regulated  and  its  officers  and 
members  appointed  under  a  similar 
special  statute.  .  .  .  However  ap- 
pointed or  elected  such  persons  are 
public  officers  who  perform  duties 
imposed  by  law  for  the  benefit  of 
all  the  citizens,  the  performance  of 
which  the  city  or  town  has  no  con- 
trol over  and  derives  no  benefit  from 
in  its  corporate  capacity.  The  acts 
of  such  officers  are  their  own  official 
acts  and  not  the  acts  of  the  munici- 
pal corporation  or  its  agents."  And 
see  Mayor  &c.  v.  Workman,  67  Fed. 
347;  s.  c.  14  C.  C.  A.  530;  Shanewerk 
V.  City  of  Port  Worth,  11  Tex.  Civ. 
App.  271;  s.  c.  32  S.  W.  918. 

159  Wild  V.  Mayor  &c.,  47  N.  J.  L. 
406;  s.  c.  1  Atl.  490.  And  it  makes 
no  difference  that  the  injury  oc- 
curred while  a  fire-tower  was  being 
tested  preparatory  to  its  purchase 
by  the  city:  Thompson  v.  Mayor 
&c.,  52  N.  Y.  Super.  427. 

i°»Terhune  v.  Mayor  &c.,  88  N.  Y. 
247,  251. 

"^  Perkins  v.  City  of  New  Haven, 
53  Conn.  214;  s.  c.  1  Atl.  825.  In 
Iowa  it  has  been  repeatedly  decided 
that  as  the  police  regulations  of  a 
city  are  not  made  and  enforced  in 
the  interest  of  the  city  in  its  cor- 


porate capacity,  but  in  the  interest 
of  the  public,  it  is  not  liable  for  the 
acts  of  its  officers  in  enforcing  such 
regulations:  Ogg  v.  City  of  Lansing, 
35  Iowa  495;  Calwell  v.  City  of 
Boone,  51  Iowa  687;  s.  c.  2  N.  W.  614. 

''"'-  Borough  of  Norristown  v.  Fitz- 
patrick,  94  Pa.  St.  121.  See  also, 
Elliott  V.  City  of  Philadelphia,  75 
Pa.  St.  347,  where  a  horse  in  the 
custody  of  a  policeman  was  killed 
through  his  negligence.  Policemen 
do  not  derive  their  powers  and 
duties  from  the  city  or  town  which 
appoints  them,  but  from  the  law: 
Buttrick  v.  City  of  Lowell,  1  Allen 
(Mass.)  172;  and  are  not  the  city's 
servants:  Kimball  v.  City  of  Boston, 
1  Allen  (Mass.)  417;  People  v.  Shep- 
ard.  36  N.  Y.  285;  Burch  v.  Hard- 
wicke,  30  Graft.  (Va.)  24. 

"■'  Harris  v.  City  of  Atlanta,  62  Ga. 
290;  Cook  v.  Mayor  &c.,  54  Ga.  468. 

'"*  Calwell  V.  City  of  Boone,  51 
Iowa  687;  s.  c.  2  N.  W.  614.  See  also, 
McElroy  v.  City  Council  &c.,  65  Ga. 
387.  A  complaint  in  a  suit  against 
a  city  which  alleges  that  a  policeman 
of  the  city  arrested  plaintiff  for  a 
supposed  violation  of  a  city  ordi- 
nance, without  a  warrant,  and  with- 
out affidavit  made  as  required  by 
law;  that  plaintiff  had  not  violated 


799 


TORTS    AND    CRIMES. 


794 


citizen.^'''     A  city  is  not  liable  to  one  who  is  injured  while  aiding,  at 
their  request,  its  police  to  make  an  arrest.^^" 

§  794.  Liability  for  acts  of  mobs. — Municipal  liability  for  injury 
to  person  or  property  caused  by  a  mob  does  not  exist  at  common 
lj^^^i66a  gjj(j  (JQgg  j-^Q^  j.gg^  upon  contract  between  the  city  and  the  suf- 
ferer, but  is  wholly  statutory. ^"'^  It  is  well  settled  that  a  statute  cre- 
ating such  a  liability  is  not  unconstitutional.^"®  Under  the  Pennsyl- 
vania mob  laws  of  1841  and  1849  it  is  held  that  the  fact  that  the  au- 
thorities are  unable  to  quell  a  riot,  and  that  the  property  injured  is  in 
transitu  and  belongs  to  non-residents,  does  not  limit  the  county's 
liability  for  damages.^"^  Under  the  New  York  mob  laws  a  city  is 
liable  for  goods  carried  away  by  a  mob  as  well  as  for  those  destroyed 
on  the  premises;  and  it  is  not  a  good  defense  for  the  city  that  the 


the  ordinance;  and  that  the  police- 
man was  incompetent,  to  the  knowl- 
edge of  the  city, — states  no  cause  of 
action:  Rusher  v.  City  of  Dallas,  83 
Tex.  151;  s.  c.  18  S.  W.  333. 

^•^^  Culver  V.  City  of  Streator,  130 
111.  238;  s.  c.  22  N.  E.  810. 

I'^'^Cobb  V.  City  of  Portland,  55 
Maine  381,  where  the  court  said:  — 
"But  the  plaintiff  was  not  the  serv- 
ant of  the  city  nor  was  the  police- 
man whom  he  assisted.  Both  were 
acting  under  the  authority  of  the 
state  as  the  conservators  of  the  pub- 
lic peace — the  peace  of  the  state,  not 
the  peace  of  the  city  of  Portland 
alone.  It  is  true  they  derived  their 
authority  from  the  city,  but  that 
was  done  by  act  of  the  legislature 
as  a  matter  of  convenience.  .  .  . 
The  obligation  devolved  by  statute 
upon  the  city  to  appoint  police  offi- 
cers .  .  .  confers  no  particular 
interest,  benefit  or  advantage  upon 
it  in  its  corporate  capacity  and  cre- 
ates no  liability  on  its  part  for  the 
acts  of  those  officers."  See  also. 
Western  College  v.  City  of  Cleveland, 
12  Ohio  St.  375;  Borough  of  Norris- 
town  V.  Fitzpatrick,  94  Pa.  St.  121; 
Campbell  v.  City  Council  &c.,  53  Ala. 
527. 

i««a  Robinson  v.  Greenville,  42  Ohio 


St.  625,  where  Okey,  J.,  said:  — 
"Thus,  with  respect  to  the  power  to 
suppress  riots  and  assemblages  of 
disorderly  persons,  it  has  been  uni- 
formly held  that  the  corporation  is 
a  mere  agency  of  the  state,  and  not 
liable  for  negligence  in  the  perform- 
ance of  such  duties.  Upon  this  prin- 
ciple it  has  been  held  that  there  is 
no  corporate  liability  for  the  acts  of 
a  mob  although  the  charter  contains 
this  provision  as  to  the  duties  of 
council, — that  it  shall  be  their  duty 
to  regulate  the  police  of  the  city, 
preserve  the  peace,  prevent  riots, 
disturbances  and  disorderly  assem- 
blages." 

'"Louisiana  v.  Mayor  &c.,  109  U. 
S.  285;  s.  c.  3  S.  Ct.  211.  So,  a  city 
which  has  failed  to  prohibit  the 
firing  of  cannon  in  its  public  parks, 
or  given  its  legislative  sanction  to 
such  firing  on  certain  conditions,  is 
not  liable  for  injuries  to  individuals 
caused  by  such  firing  if  there  is  no 
statute  giving  an  action  therefor: 
Lincoln  v.  City  of  Boston,  148  Mass. 
578;  s.  c.  20  N.  E.  329. 

^•^  Louisiana  v.  Mayor  &c.,  109  U. 
S.  285;  s.  c.  3  S.  Ct.  211;  Darlington 
V.  Mayor  &c.,  31  N.  Y.  164. 

'"'Allegheny  Co.  v.  Gibson,  90  Pa. 
St.  397. 


§    795      •  rUBLIC    CORI'OUATIONS.  80O 

crowd  at  first  collected  to  see  a  fire,  if  it  afterwards  united  in  unlawful 
conduct.""  And  the  fact  that  plaintiff  keeps  a  disorderly  house  is  not 
a  good  defense."^  If  a  building  is  not  a  nuisance  per  se,  the  town 
may  be  liable  for  its  destruction  by  a  mob,  though  under  conditions  its 
erection  be  prohibited."^  The  city  is  liable  for  property  destroyed  by 
a  mob  or  riot  in  the  absence  of  the  owner's  consent  or  contributory 
negligence  on  his  part  where  the  general  municipal  law  declares  that 
the  city  shall  be  lial^le  in  damages  for  the  destruction  of  property  by 
mobs  or  riots.  "^  The  Illinois  statute  (1887)  makes  a  city  liable  for 
property  other  than  property  in  transit  destroyed  by  a  mob  or  riot 
composed  of  twelve  or  more  persons.^'^*  The  Illinois  statute  (1895) 
providing  that  when  any  property,  except  property  in  transit,  shall  be 
destroyed  or  injured  by  a  mob  or  riot  of  twelve  or  more  persons,  the 
city  or  county  shall  be  liable  for  the  injury  to  the  extent  of  three- 
fourths  the  damages,  is  constitutional.^''^  That  the  mob  was  composed 
mainly  of  employes  of  plaintiff  is  not  a  defense.^'**  It  is  not  the  duty 
of  the  owner  of  property  destroyed  by  a  mob  to  employ  an  armed  force 
of  men  to  defend  his  property. "''  Under  the  Kansas  statute  making 
cities  and  towns  liable  for  injury  by  mobs,  evidence  was  admitted  that 
a  person  killed  by  a  mob  was  guilty  of  misconduct  or  crime  within  a 
reasonable  time  prior  to  the  killing  which  may  have  influenced  the 
mob,  or  which  might  affect  his  value  to  next  of  kin.^'^^  A  city  is  not 
liable  for  the  loss  of  life  by  a  mob.^'^® 

§  795.  Private  interests  must  yield  to  public. — As  public  accommo- 
dation must  prevail  over  private  interests,  a  city  is  not  liable  for  a 
private  injury  which  is  incidental  to  an  authorized  public  improve- 
ment; for  example,  for  raising  or  lowering  the  grade  of  a  street  under 
authority  of  law,  though  an  abutting  ownei*'s  house  may  thereby  be  left 
standing  high  above  the  grade  or  in  a  hollow  below  it.  The  indi- 
vidual can  have  no  compensation  for  the  inconveniences  which  fairly 

""Solomon  v.  City  of  Kingston,  24  lington  v.  Mayor  &c.,  31  N.  Y.  164; 

Hun    (N.  Y.)    562;    Sarles  v.  Mayor  Allegheny  Co.  v.  Gibson,  90  Pa.  St. 

&c.,  47  Barb.   (N.  Y.)  447.  337.     And   see   Louisiana  v.    Mayor 

"^Bly  V.  Board  &c.,  36  N.  Y.  297.  &c.,  109  U.  S.  285;  s.  c.  3  S.  Ct.  211. 

17=  Brightman  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  65  ^"^  Spring  Valley  Coal  Co.  v.  City 

Maine  426.  of  Spring  Valley,  65  111.  App.  571. 

"^  Marshall  v.  City  of  Buffalo,  64  ""  Spring  Valley  Coal  Co.  v.  City 

N.  Y.  S.  411;  s.  c.  50  App.  Div.   (N.  of  Spring  Valley,  65  111.  App.  571. 

Y.)  149.  ""Adams  v.  City  of  Salina,  58  Kan. 

"*  Spring  Valley  Coal  Co.  v.  City  246;  s.  c.  48  Pac.  918. 

of  Spring  Valley,  65  111.  App.  571.  ™  City  of  New  Orleans  v.  Abbag- 

"^  Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  City  of  Chi-  nato,  62  Fed.  240;   s.  c.  10  C.  C.  A. 

cago,  81  Fed.  317;  Underbill  v.  City  361. 
of  Manchester,  45  N.  H.   214;    Dar- 


801 


TORTS    AXD    CRIMES. 


795 


result  from  the  making  of  needed  public  improvements,  as  he  is 
supposed  to  be  recompensed  by  the  enhancement  of  the  general  wel- 
fare.^'"' The  rule  Just  laid  down  is  well  illustrated  in  the  case  of  the 
Brooklyn  bridge.  The  Brooklyn  bridge  over  the  East  river,  being 
erected  by  the  two  cities  under  authority  derived  from  congress  and 
the  New  York  legislature,  can  not  be  abated  as  a  public  nuisance,  and 
the  public  benefit  from  it  far  outweighs  any  inconvenience  to  indi- 
viduals by  interfering  with  navigation.^^^  Acts  done  in  the  proper 
exercise  of  governmental  powers  and  not  directly  encroaching  upon 
private  property,  though  impairing  its  use,  are  held  not  to  be  a  talcing 
within  the  constitutional  provision.^*"-  And  a  lot-owner  who  has  peti- 
tioned for  a  public  improvement  and  has  had  his  day  in  court  on  a 
review  of  the  assessment  therefor,  and  has  failed  to  exercise  his  right 


I'^Vidalat  v.  City  of  New  Orleans, 
43  La.  An.  1121;  s.  c.  10  So.  175; 
Hembling  v.  City  of  Big  Rapids,  89 
Mich.  1;  s.  c.  50  N.  W.  741;  City  of 
Pontiac  v.  Carter,  32  Micli.  164.  In 
Governor  &c.  v.  Meredith,  4  T.  R. 
794,  Lord  Kenyon  thus  states  the 
reasons  which  preclude  a  private 
remedy  in  such  cases: — "If  this  ac- 
tion could  be  maintained  every  turn- 
pike, paving  and  navigation  act 
would  give  rise  to  an  infinity  of  ac- 
tions. If  the  legislature  think  it 
necessary,  as  they  do  in  many  cases, 
they  enable  the  commissioners  to 
award  satisfaction  to  the  indivduals 
who  happen  to  suffer.  But  if  there 
be  no  such  power  the  parties  are 
without  remedy,  provided  the  com- 
missioners do  not  exceed  their  ju- 
risdiction. Some  individuals  suffer 
an  inconvenience  under  all  these 
acts  of  parliament,  but  the  interests 
of  individuals  must  give  way  to  the 
accommodation  of  the  public."  See 
also,  Boulton  v.  Crowther,  2  B.  &  C. 
703;  King  v.  Commissioners.  8  B.  & 
C.  355;  Callender  v.  Marsh,  1  Pick. 
(Mass.)  418;  Smith  v.  Corporation 
&c.  of  Washington,  20  How.  135.  In 
Glasgow  V.  St.  Louis,  107  Mo.  198; 
s.  c.  17  S.  W.  743,  it  was  held  that 
an  owner  had  no  redress  by  injunc- 
tion or  damages  for  the  vacating  of 

1  Smith — 51 


a  street  upon  which  he  did  not  abut; 
as  there  was  no  physical  interfer- 
ence with  his  property  or  any  ease- 
ment thereof,  the  inconvenience  he 
suffered  with  others  did  not  entitle 
him  to  relief  under  the  clause  of  the 
constitution  "that  private  property 
shall  not  be  taken  or  damaged  for 
public  use  without  just  compensa- 
tion."   See  §  662,  ante. 

^"Miller  v.  Mayor  &c.,  109  U.  S. 
385;  s.  c.  3  S.  Ct.  228.  See  also,  Es- 
canaba  &c.  Co.  v.  City  of  Chicago, 
107  U.  S.  678;  s.  c.  2  S.  Ct.  185;  Gil- 
man  v.  City  of  Philadelphia,  3  Wall. 
713. 

''-Atwater  v.  Trustees  &c.,  124  N. 
Y.  602;  s.  c.  27  N.  E.  385;  Transpor- 
tation Co.  V.  Chicago,  99  U.  S.  635, 
641.  A  city  is  not  liable  unless  made 
so  by  statute  or  charter  for  conse- 
quential injuries  to  property  adja- 
cent to  a  public  street  caused  by  a 
change  lawfully  made  of  the  grade 
of  a  street:  Henderson  v.  City  of 
Minneapolis,  32  Minn.  319;  s.  c.  20 
N.  W.  322;  Lee  v.  City  of  Minneapo- 
lis, 22  Minn.  13.  But  is  liable  if  in 
so  changing  a  grade  it  removes  the 
lateral  support  of  an  abutting  lot: 
Dyer  v.  City  of  St.  Paul,  27  Minn. 
457;  s.  c.  8  N.  W.  272;  Nichols  v. 
City  of  Duluth,  40  Minn.  389;  s.  c. 
42  N.  W.  84. 


§    796  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  ,  802 

to  appear  before  the  city  council  to  claim  damages  therefor,  is  thereby 
estopped  to  recover  damages  in  an  independent  action.  ^''^  Mere  non- 
resistance  to  a  projected  improvement  or  the  joining  in  a  petition  for 
it  does  not  estop  a  lot-owner  from  claiming  compensation  for  an 
injury  caused  by  it;^^*  but  the  active  promotion  and  superintendence 
of  the  improvement  may  amount  to  such  estoppel.^* ^  The  remedy 
of  a  person  claiming  to  be  unfairly  assessed  for  a  local  improvement 
is  to  apply  to  the  statutory  tribunal  vested  with  the  power  of  review; 
and  where  no  constitutional  objection  is  raised  or  fraud  charged,  the 
inquiry  in  such  a  case  will  be  limited  to  the  question  whether  the  mu- 
nicipal authorities  have  acted  within  their  powers.^"*^ 

^  796.  The  same  subject  continued — Destroying  buildings  to  check 
fire. — Unless  made  so  by  statute  a  city  is  not  liable  to  individuals  for 
the  necessary  destruction  of  buildings  in  order  to  prevent  a  conflagra- 
tion.^'*^ Such  a  destruction  of  private  property  is  not  a  taking  for 
public  use  entitling  the  owner  to  compensation.^"*^  In  Pennsylvania 
the  mayor  of  a  city  is  by  virtue  of  his  official  position  justified  in 
demolishing  a  wooden  building  which  is  dangerous  to  the  public 
safety.^*"* 

§  797.  Non-liability  for  negligence  in  public  service. — Where  a 
city,  under  the  authority  of  a  general  law,  undertakes  a  work  for  the 
sole  use  and  benefit  of  the  public,  it  is  not  liable  for  an  injury  caused 
by  the  negligent  or  defective  performance  of  such  work  by  its  agents 
or  servants,  unless  some  statute  either  directly  or  by  implication  gives 

^''Hembling  V.  City  of  Big  Rapids,  '"In  Bowditch  v.  Boston,  101  U. 
89  Mich.  1;  s.  c.  50  N.  W.  741;  Brown  S.  IG,  Swayne,  J.,  said: — "In  order 
v.  City  of  Grand  Rapids,  83  Mich,  to  charge  the  city,  the  remedy  being 
101;  s.  c.  47  N.  W.  117;  Peninsula  given  by  statute  only,  the  case  must 
Iron  &c.  Co.  v.  Crystal  Falls  Tp.,  60  be  clearly  within  the  statute.  The 
Mich.  510;  s.  c.  27  N.  W.  666;  city  is  responsible  by  force  of  the 
Comstock  V.  City  of  Grand  Rapids,  statute  only,  and  such  responsibility 
54  Mich.  641;  s.  c.  20  N.  W.  623;  is  limited  to  the  cases  specially  con- 
Williams  V.  City  of  Saginaw,  51  templated."  See  also,  Taylor  v.  In- 
Mich.  120;  s.  c.  16  N.  W.  260.  habitants   &c.,    8   Met.    (Mass.)    462, 

'**  Jones  v.  Borough  of  Bangor,  144  465;  Field  v.  City  of  Des  Moines,  39 

Pa.  St.  638;  s.  c.  23  Atl.  252.  Iowa  575.    As  to  the  statutory  liabil- 

'^^Bidwell   V.   City  of   Pittsburgh,  ity  of  the  city  of  New  York  in  such 

85  Pa.  St.  412.    And  see  Dewhurst  v.  a  case,  see  Mayor  &c.   v.  Lord,   18 

City  of  Allegheny,   95  Pa.   St.   437;  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  126;  Russell  v.  Mayor 

McKnight  v.  City  of  Pittsburgh,  91  &c.,  2  Denio  (N.  Y.)  461. 

Pa.  St.  273.  ''^  Stone  v.   Mayor  &c.,    25   Wend. 

i^"  Kansas    City    Grading    Co.    v.  (N.  Y.)   157,  174;   Russell  v.  Mayor 

Holden,  107  Mo.  305;   s.  c.  17  S.  W.  &c.,  2  Denio  (N.  Y.)  461. 

798,  "» Fields  v.  Stokley,  99  Pa.  St.  306. 


803 


TORTS    AND   CRIMES. 


797 


a  private  remedy  for  such  injury.""  This  rule  has  been  applied 
against  a  traveler  injured  by  negligent  blasting  while  excavating  the 
foundation  of  a  public  schoolhouse;"^  and  against  a  child  injured 
by  reason  of  an  unsafe  staircase  of  a  schoolhouse  and  a  dangerous  ex- 
cavation in  a  schoolhouse  yard."-  The  same  rule  has  been  applied  in 
favor  of  cities  in  respect  to  town-houses  and  court-houses  ;^^^  and  in 
respect  to  public  grounds  like  Boston  Common."*  And  it  makes  no 
material  difference  in  the  application  of  the  rule  whether  the  injury 
is  caused  by  a  negligent  act  done  in  the  direct  performance  of  the  pub- 
lic work  or  is  received  after  the  completion  of  the  work.^^^  As  an  ap- 
parent exception  to  the  foregoing  general  rule,  cities  and  towns  have 
been  held  liable  for  injuries  caused  by  the  negligent  construction  of 
roads  and  bridges."**  In  Texas  where  a  city  established  a  place  for 
the  burial  of  carcasses  and  garbage  in  order  to  improve  its  sanitary 
condition,  it  was  held  not  to  be  liable  to  an  individual  for  sickness 
produced  thereby,  as  the  intended  improvement  was  in  the  interest  of 


""Howard  v.  City  of  Worcester, 
153  Mass.  426;  s.  c.  27  N.  E.  11.  "In 
the  absence  of  a  statute  creating  the 
liability,  no  action  can  be  maintained 
against  a  municipal  corporation  for 
an  injury  arising  from  the  neglect 
of  a  public  corporate  duty  from  the 
performance  of  which  the  corpora- 
tion receives  no  special  benefit,  pe- 
cuniary or  otherwise:"  Allen,  J.,  in 
Clark  V.  Manchester,  62  N.  H.  577. 
See  also,  Edgerly  v.  Concord,  62  N. 
H.  8. 

"^  Howard  v.  City  of  Worcester, 
153  Mass.  426;  s.  c.  27  N.  E.  11. 

"^  Hill  V.  City  of  Boston,  122  Mass. 
344;  s.  c.  23  Am.  R.  332;  Bigelow  v. 
Inhabitants  &c.,  14  Gray  (Mass.) 
541;  Sullivan  v.  City  of  Boston,  126 
Mass.  540.  See  also,  Wixon  v.  City 
of  Newport,  13  R.  I.  454. 

"^Eastman  v.  Meredith,  36  N.  H. 
284;  Board  &c.  v.  Mighels,  7  Ohio 
St.  109.  A  county  is  not  liable  for 
injuries  caused  by  its  neglect  to  pro- 
vide a  railing  around  a  veranda  on 
the  second  floor  of  the  court-house, 
where  no  liability  is  imposed  by  stat- 
ute: Sheppard  v.  Pulaski  Co.,  13  Ky. 
L,.  672;  s.  c.  18  S.  W.  15. 

^»*  Steele   v.    City   of   Boston,    128 


Mass.  583;  Oliver  v.  City  of  Worces- 
ter, 102  Mass.  489;  Clark  v.  Inhab- 
itants &c.,  128  Mass.  567;  Veale  v. 
City  of  Boston,  135  Mass.  187. 

^'^  Howard  v.  City  of  Worcester, 
153  Mass.  426;  s.  c.  27  N.  E.  11; 
Tindley  v.  City  of  Salem,  137  Mass. 
171;  Lincoln  v.  City  of  Boston,  148 
Mass.  578;  s.  c.  20  N.  E.  329;  Fisher 
V.  City  of  Boston,  104  Mass.  87 ;  Haf- 
ford  V.  City  of  New  Bedford,  16  Gray 
(Mass.)  297. 

'"''  See  Lawrence  v.  Inhabitants  &c., 
5  Gray  (Mass.)  110;  Deane  v.  Inhab- 
itants &c.,  132  Mass.  475;  Waldron 
V.  City  of  Haverhill,  143  Mass.  582; 
s.  c.  10  N.  E.  481.  "These  cases,  how- 
ever, rest  on  grounds  which  take 
them  out  of  the  general  rule,  and  in 
the  last  resort  it  must  be  properly 
considered  that,  taking  all  the  stat- 
utes together  which  relate  to  the 
construction  of  roads  and  bridges,  it 
is  to  be  inferred  that  the  legislature 
intended  to  recognize  the  existence 
of  a  liability  for  the  consequences 
of  negligence  in  the  performance  of 
the  work:"  Allen,  J.,  in  Howard  v. 
City  of  Worcester,  153  Mass.  426;  s. 
c.  27  N.  E.  11. 


§    798  rUBLIC    COKPOEATIOXS.  804 

the  public  and  the  execution  of  it  was  not  attended  with  negligence; 
but  the  court  added  that  if  the  acts  done  had  teen  for  the  city's  private 
advantage  it  would  have  been  liable  for  the  injury  irrespective  of 
the  question  of  negligence.  ^"'^  Though  a,  municipal  work  be  made 
and  maintained  for  a  time  for  a  public  purpose,  yet  if  such  purpose  be 
abandoned  and  it  be  used  for  a  private  purpose,  the  city  becomes 
liable  for  negligence  in  such  case  as  any  other  private  corporation 
would  be.^^® 

§  798.  Liability  in  matters  of  arrest. — The  municipality  is  not  li- 
able for  the  acts  of  a  police  otficer  in  making  an  arrest  for  a  violation 
or  an  ordinance/"^  but  is  liable  for  imprisonment  for  default  in  pay- 
ment of  a  fine  under  an  ordinance  which  is  unconstitutional. -°°  A 
city  is  not  liable  for  the  mayor  causing  a  person  charged  with  a  viola- 
tion of  an  ordinance  to  give  a  larger  bond  for  appearance  than  tlie 
law  authorized,  thus  causing  confinement  through  inability  to  give 
bond.^°^  Although  the  ordinance  be  void,  the  city  is  not  liable  in 
damages  for  an  arrest  thereunder  in  the  absence  of  malice,  and  where 
the  city  acts  in  good  faith,  ^*^^  nor  for  making  an  arrest  for  a  breach 
of  the  peace  under  a  void  ordinance.  ^"^  Where  the  mayor,  police  force 
and  city  physician  commit  a  trespass  in  detaining  yellow-fever  sus- 
pects and  confining  them  in  plaintiff's  hotel  for  six  days  without 
authority  or  ratification  of  the  council,  the  city  is  not  liable.^"*  A 
municipality  is  not  liable  for  an  injury  resulting  from  exposure  of 
a  violator  of  an  ordinance  from  which  he  contracted  a  disease  and  died. 
The  placing  the  prisoner  in  a  dilapidated  prison  is  in  the  exercise  of 
a  governmental  function  from  which  no  liability  results.^°^ 

§  799.  Non-liability  as  to  jails. — A  county  is  not  liable  to  a  pris- 
oner for  injur}^  to  his  health  caused  by  failure  of  the  supervisors  to 

^"  Fort  Worth  v.  Crawford,  64  Tex.  Ky.  271;  s.  c.  32  S.  W.  948.    The  city 

202;  s.  c.  53  Am.  R.  753.  is  not  liable  for  an  unlawful  arrest 

"*  Clark  V.   Manchester,   62  N.   H.  and  imprisonment  of  police  officers: 

577.  Kelley  v.  Cook,  21  R.  I.  29;  s.  c.  41 

"»Vaughlman  v.  Town  of  Water-  Atl.  571. 

loo,  14  Ind.  App.  649;  s.  c.  43  N.  E.  ="*  City  of   San  Antonio  v.   White 

476.     See  Gullikson  v.  McDonald,  62  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  57  S.  W.  858. 

Minn.  278;  s.  c.  64  N.  W.  812.  =«^  Eddy  v.  Village  of  Ellicottville, 

^'"'McGraw  v.  Town  of  Marion,  98  54  N.  Y.  S.  800;    s.  c.  35  App.  Div. 

Ky.  673;  s.  c.  34  S.  W.  18.  (N.  Y.)    256.     For  acts  of  officer  in 

^"1  Gray  v.  Mayor  &c..  Ill  Ga.  361;  confining  a  person  in  his  own  house, 

s.  c.  36  S.  E.  792.  as  a  quarantine  measure,  see  Tilford 

'"=  Masters  v.   Village   of   Bowling  v.  Mayor  &c.,  37  N.  Y.  S.  185;   s.  c. 

Green,  101  Fed.  101.  1  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  199. 

103  Taylor  v.  City  of  Owensboro,  98 


805 


TORTS  AND   CRIMES. 


799 


keep  the  county  jail  in  a  sanitary  condition  ;^''*  nor  for  assaults  npon 
him  by  violent  and  intoxicated  fellow  prisoners  wath  whom  the  police 
had  negligently  confined  him.^'''^  In  Kentucky  such  liability  is  im- 
posed upon  members  of  the  county  court  instead  of  upon  the  county.^''^ 
In  Georgia  a  county  is  not  responsible  for  the  tort  of  one  of  the  guards 
in  unlawfully  beating  a  convict,  nor  for  the  negligence  of  the  other 
guards  in  not  protecting  him  from  such  beating  ;^°'*  nor  is  a  city  liable 
for  a  tort  committed  by  one  of  its  convicts  on  the  person  of  another.^^'' 
In  Virginia  chartered  towns  and  cities  are  not  deemed  political  divi- 


^"^  A  person  confined  for  nearly 
four  months  in  a  county  jail  under 
an  indictment  for  forgery,  which 
was  then  dismissed,  can  not  recover 
from  the  county  for  injuries  to  his 
health,  caused  by  the  negligent  fail- 
ure of  the  board  of  supervisors  to 
keep  the  jail  in  a  healthy  condition: 
Lindley  v.  Polk  Co.,  84  Iowa  308;  s. 
c.  50  N.  W.  975.  The  care  and  con- 
trol of  prisons  being  within  the  po- 
lice power,  a  county  is  not  liable 
for  the  failure  of  its  officers  to  keep 
the  county  jail  in  a  healthy  condi- 
tion: White  V.  Board  &c.,  129  Ind. 
396;  s.  c.  28  N.  E.  846;  followed  in 
Board  &c.  v.  Boswell,  4  Ind.  App. 
133;  s.  c.  30  N.  E.  534.  A  convict  in 
the  Albany  penitentiary  alleged  that 
he  lost  his  hand  through  the  negli- 
gence of  the  county  in  compelling 
him  to  approach  a  circular-saw;  a 
demurrer  that  the  complaint  did  not 
state  sufficient  facts  was  sustained 
on  the  ground  that  the  county  while 
engaged  in  the  public  duty  of  build- 
ing and  managing  the  penitentiary 
was  not  a  corporation  but  a  mere  in- 
strumentality selected  by  the  state: 
Alamango  v.  Albany  Co.,  25  Hun  (N. 
Y.)  551.  The  city  is  not  liable  for 
negligence  in  caring  for  a  person  in 
the  police-station:  Kelley  v.  Cook,  21 
R.  I.  29;  s.  c.  41  Atl.  571.  Nor  for 
negligently  maintaining  its  lockup: 
Gullikson  v.  McDonald,  62  Minn. 
278;  s.  c.  64  N.  W.  812.  But  see 
Shields  v.  Town  of  Durham,  118  N. 
C.  450;  s.  c.  24  S.  E.  794. 

='"'  A  city  is  not  liable  for  personal 


injuries  sustained  by  one  prisoner  at 
the  hands  of  another  confined  in  the 
same  cell  of  the  city  prison,  though 
the  police  officer  who  arrested  the 
injured  prisoner,  and  put  him  in 
prison,  may  have  been  guilty  of  neg- 
ligence in  confining  him  with  an  in- 
toxicated fellow  prisoner,  who  was 
on  that  account  violent  and  danger- 
ous: Wilson  V.  Mayor  &c.,  88  Ga. 
455;  s.  c.  14  S.  B.  710.  Where  one 
is  confined  in  a  city  jail  on  a  crim- 
inal charge,  and  is  assaulted  by 
other  prisoners  confined  in  the  same 
room,  he  can  not  hold  the  city  liable 
for  such  assault,  on  the  ground  of 
the  negligence  of  its  officers  in  not 
taking  proper  measures  to  protect 
him:  Davis  v.  City  of  Knoxville,  90 
Tenn.  599;  s.  c.  18  S.  W.  254. 

-"*  General  statutes  Kentucky,  ch. 
28,  art.  17,  §  4,  which  provide  that 
the  county  court  shall  cause  a  secure 
county  jail  to  be  erected  and  kept  in 
repair,  and  that  upon  a  failure  so  to 
do  each  member  of  the  court  whose 
name  does  not  appear  recorded  in 
favor  thereof  shall  be  liable  to  a  fine, 
and  shall  be  liable  in  a  civil  action 
for  all  damage  sustained  by  any  per- 
son by  reason  thereof,  does  not  au- 
thorize an  action  against  the  county 
for  injuries  caused  by  a  defective 
jail:  Hite  v.  Whitley  Co.  Court,  91 
Ky.  168;  s.  c.  15  S.  W.  57. 

2°^  Hammonds  v.  Richmond  Co.,  72 
Ga.  188. 

"« Doster  v.  City  of  Atlanta,  72  Ga. 
233. 


§  800 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS. 


80(; 


sions  of  the  state,  as  counties  are,  and  their  liability  for  unhealthy 
jails  is  the  same  in  principle  as  for  defective  streets  and  sewers. ^^'^ 
In  Kansas  a  city  is  not  liable  for  the  bad  condition  of  its  prison  in  the 
absence  of  some  statutory  requirement  to  keep  it  in  a  proper  condi- 
tion.2^2 

§  800.  Non-liability  as  to  hospitals. — Where  a  city  is,  under  its 
charter,  a  municipal  government  as  well  as  corporation,  and  receives 
legislative  powers  in  respect  to  the  public  health,  it  is  not  liable  for  the 
negligence  or  misconduct  of  the  superintendent,  nurses  or  attendants 
of  its  hospitals. ^^^  A  corporation  established  for  the  maintenance  of 
a  public  charitable  hospital,  which  has  exercised  due  care  in  the  selec- 
tion of  its  agents,  is  not  liable  for  injury  to  a  patient  caused  by  their 
negligence,  nor  for  the  unauthorized  assumption  of  one  of  the  attend- 
ants to  act  as  a  surgeon,  even  though  the  patients  be  required  to  pay 
board.^^* 


^"Code  Virginia,  1887,  §  927,  pro- 
vides that  every  town  having  no  jail 
of  its  own  may  use  the  county  jail. 
Sections  928-930,  applicable  only  to 
counties  and  cities,  provide  that  the 
jailer  shall  keep  the  jail  always 
clean,  that  jails  shall  be  inspected 
under  direction  of  the  county  court, 
and  that  the  jailer  may  be  summari- 
ly punished  for  failure  in  his  duty. 
It  was  held  that  a  town  which  used 
a  jail  of  its  own  was  liable  for  in- 
juries to  the  health  of  a  prisoner 
caused  by  its  filthy  condition;  since, 
under  §  927  and  a  special  provision 
of  its  charter,  it  might  have  used  a 
county  jail,  subject  to  inspection 
and  control:  Edwards  v.  Town  of 
Pocahontas,  47  Fed.  268. 

'^^-  Though  the  general  statutes  of 
Kansas,  1889,  paragraph  1013,  pro- 
vide that,  in  a  city  of  the  third 
class,  the  chief  of  police  shall  have 
power  "to  keep  all  persons  arrested 
in  the  city  in  the  city  prison,  county 
jail,  or  other  proper  place,"  and  par- 
agraph 3552,  that  "all  prisoners  shall 
be  treated  with  humanity,"  the  city 
is  not  liable  for  injuries  resulting 
from  the  confinement  of  a  prisoner 
without  bedding  in  a  filthy  and  un- 
inhabitable city  prison :   City  of  New 


Kiowa  V.  Craven,  46  Kan.  114;  s.  c. 
26  Pac.  426. 

^'^  Benton  v.  Trustees  &c.,  140 
Mass.  13;  s.  c.  1  N.  E.  836.  In  City 
of  Richmond  v.  Long,  17  Graft.  (Va. ) 
375,  the  city  was  held  not  to  be  liable 
for  the  death  of  a  slave  who,  after 
being  admitted  to  the  city  hospital, 
was  negligently  allowed  to  escape 
therefrom  and  die  from  exposure. 
After  a  thorough  review  of  the  facts 
and  authorities  Rives,  J.,  said: — "If 
this  recovery  could  be  made  I  do  not 
perceive  why  by  parity  of  reason  the 
state  should  not  be  held  liable 
through  its  public  functionaries  in 
civil  actions  at  the  suit  of  individ- 
uals for  losses  or  torts  occurring  in 
the  management  of  its  departments 
and  public  institutions  under  its  im- 
mediate control  and  supervision.  It 
can  not  be  denied  that  in  the  munic- 
ipal government  of  this  city  the 
council  occupies  towards  its  hospital 
relations  quite  similar  to  those  of 
the  general  assembly  towards  its 
asylums  for  the  insane,  the  blind, 
and  deaf  mutes." 

-"  McDonald  v.  Massachusetts  Gen'l 
Hospital,  120  Mass.  432,  where  De- 
vens,  J.,  said: — "Where  actions  have 
been  brought  against  commissioners 


807 


TORTS   AND    CRIMES. 


§  801 


§  801.  Non-liability  as  to  fireworks. — The  Massachusetts  rule  that 
cities  or  towns  are  not  liable  for  negligence  in  matters  of  public  ser- 
vice, whether  the  statutes  require  such  service  or  only  permit  it,  is 
deemed  to  exempt  a  city  from  lialiility  to  persons  injured  through  the 
negligent  discharge  of  authorized  fireworks.^^^  In  states  like  New  Jer- 
sey and  Kew  York,  where  the  discharge  of  fireworks  in  the  streets  is 
deemed  a  public  nuisance,^^*'  the  licensing  of  such  a  nuisance  by  the 
city  without  the  authority  of  a  statute  renders  it  liable  for  a  conse- 
quent injury  to  individuals  f^"^  though  merely  negatively  permitting  it 
does  not  render  it  so  liable,  as  a  city  is  not  responsible  for  the  action  or 


of  public  works,  serving  gratuitous- 
ly, for  negligence  in  carrying  on  the 
work,  by  which  injury  has  occurred, 
it  has  been  held  that  they  were  not 
liable  if  proper  care  had  been  used 
by  them  in  selecting  those  who  were 
actually  to  perform  the  work:  Hol- 
liday  v.  St.  Leonards,  11  C.  B.  (N. 
S.)  192."  See  also,  Gooch  v.  Asso- 
ciation &c.,  109  Mass.  558;  Heriot's 
Hospital  V.  Ross,  12  CI.  &  F.  507. 

"^Tindley  v.  City  of  Salem,  137 
Mass.  171,  where  it  was  held  that  a 
city  which  undertakes  the  celebra- 
tion of  a  holiday  (July  4),  under 
the  authority  of  the  public  statutes, 
ch.  28,  §  13  (which  provides  that  the 
city  council  may  appropriate  money 
for  such  a  purpose),  exclusively  for 
the  gratuitous  amusement  of  the 
public,  is  not  liable  to  an  action  by 
one  who  sustains  personal  injuries 
through  the  negligence  of  city  serv- 
ants in  discharging  fireworks  for  the 
purposes  of  the  celebration.  After 
specifying  a  great  number  of  differ- 
ent cases  in  some  of  which  cities 
were  required  by  statute,  and  in 
others  of  which  they  were  only  au- 
thorized to  do  certain  things,  Allen, 
J.,  said: — "In  all  of  these  cases  the 
duty  is  imposed  or  the  authority 
conferred  for  the  general  benefit.  The 
motive  and  the  object  are  the  same, 
though  in  some  instances  the  legis- 
lature determines  finally  the  neces- 
sity or  expediency,  and  in  others  it 
leaves  the   necessity  or   expediency 


to  be  determined  by  the  towns  them- 
selves. But  when  determined,  and 
when  the  service  has  been  entei-ed 
upon,  there  is  no  good  reason  why  a 
liability  to  a  private  action  should 
be  Imposed  when  a  town  voluntarily 
enters  upon  such  a  beneficial  work, 
and  withheld  when  it  performs  the 
service  under  the  requirement  of  an 
imperative  law.  ...  It  is  well 
known  that  many  towns  in  Massa- 
chusetts, not  bound  to  do  so,  volun- 
tarily maintain  high  schools.  It  is 
not  to  be  supposed  that  the  legisla- 
ture have  intended  to  make  such 
towns  liable  to  private  actions  when 
towns  required  to  maintain  high 
schools  would  be  exempt.  On  the 
other  hand,  it  has  been  recognized 
in  numerous  cases  in  this  state  and 
elsewhere  that  the  question  of  the 
liability  of  towns  does  not  rest  upon 
this  distinction:  Clark  v.  Inhabit- 
ants &c.,  128  Mass.  567;  Fisher  v. 
City  of  Boston,  104  Mass.  87 ;  Hafford 
V.  City  of  New  Bedford,  16  Gray 
(Mass.)  297;  Bigelow  v.  Inhabitants 
&c.,  14  Gray  (Mass.)  541;  Eastman 
V.  Meredith,  36  N.  H.  284;  Wixon  v. 
City  of  Newport,  13  R.  I.  454."  See 
also.  Beach  Contr.  Neg.  (2d  ed.), 
§§  259,  413. 

=1"  Jenne  v.  Sutton,  43  N.  J.  L.  257; 
Conklin  v.  Thompson,  29  Barb.  (N. 
Y.)    218. 

="  Speir  V.  City  of  Brooklyn,  18 
N.  Y.  S.  170,  and  cases  cited. 


§  802 


PUBLIC    CORrORATIONS. 


808 


non-aetion  of  its  police,  as  shown  elsewhere.^^^  Where  a  city  has  no 
power  to  provide  for  a  display  of  fireworks  it  is  not  liable  for  in- 
juries,-^" and  is  not  liable  for  injury  from  erecting  a  scaffold  for  the 
display  of  fireworks  where  the  contractor  agreed  to  be  responsible  for 
all  personal  injuries.^^"  A  municipality  is  not  liable  for  an  injury 
caused  by  the  firing  of  fireworks  and  firearms  on  the  street  by  a  crowd 
of  citizens,  although  done  with  the  knowledge  and  consent  of  the  of- 
ficers.^-^ 

§  802.  Liability  as  to  city  wells  and  water. — A  municipal  cor- 
poration is  bound  to  use  reasonable  diligence  to  keep  its  wells  for  the 
gratuitous  use  of  the  public  in  repair,^^^  and,  on  notice  that  their 
water  is  unwholesome,  to  protect  the  public  health  by  closing  or  puri- 
fying them ;  but  it  is  not  an  insurer  of  the  quality  of  their  water,  or 
liable  to  a  person  injured  by  using  it  without  proof  of  wilful  mis- 
conduct or  culpable  neglect.  The  city  is  not  bound  from  time  to  time 
to  test  the  purity  of  such  water  by  a  chemical  examination.^-^  As  the 
powers  granted  by  the  acts  for  supplying  New  York  city  with  pure 

"^  Danaher  v.  City  of  Brooklyn, 
119  N.  Y.  241;  s.  c.  23  N.  E.  745, 
where  Earl,  J.,  said: — "The  city  has 
its  public  water-supply  by  running 
water  in  addition  to  these  wells.  The 
wells  are  furnished  and  kept  for 
public  use  by  the  city.  It  was  un- 
doubtedly the  duty  of  the  city  to 
keep  the  wells  and  pumps  in  good 
order  and  to  keep  the  wells  properly 
cleaned  out  so  that  they  would  not 
become  contaminated  by  anything 
that  might  be  thrown  into  them. 
.  .  .  The  burden  upon  the  city  is 
sufficient  if  it  be  held  to  the  respon- 
sibility of  keeping  the  wells  and 
pumps  in  order  and  clean,  and  if  it 
be  made  liable  for  any  injury  result- 
ing from  the  use  of  impure  waters 
from  the  wells  after  it  has  had  no- 
tice of  their  dangerous  qualities  and 
an  opportunity  to  remove  the  dan- 
ger. The  higher  degree  of  diligence 
(that  is.  testing  by  chemical  exami- 
nation) as  to  water  apparently  pure 
and  wholesome,  agreeable  to  the 
taste  and  in  common  use  by  the  pub- 
lic without  complaint,  would  be  un- 
reasonable." 


=^«Ante,  §  793;  Hill  v.  Board  &c., 
72  N.  C.  55;  Borough  of  Norristown 
V.  Fitzpatrick,  94  Pa.  St.  121;  Ball  v. 
Town  of  Woodbine,  61  Iowa  83;  s.  c. 
15  N.  W.  846;  47  Am.  R.  805;  Robin- 
son V.  Greenville,  42  Ohio  St.  625. 
In  Little  v.  City  of  Madison,  49  Wis. 
605;  s.  c.  6  N.  W.  249,  it  was  held 
that  a  city  license  to  exhibit  wild 
animals,  specifying  no  place  for 
such  exhibition,  is  a  license  to  ex- 
hibit in  some  suitable  place,  and  the 
fact  that  the  licensee  makes  the  ex- 
hibition in  a  public  street,  and-  is 
permitted  to  do  so  by  the  negligence 
of  city  officers,  does  not  render  the 
city  liable  for  injuries  resulting 
therefrom. 

="  Love  V.  City  of  Raleigh,  116  N. 
C.  296;  s.  c.  21  S.  E.  503. 

2^°  Heidenway  v.  City  of  Philadel- 
phia, 168  Pa.  St.  72;  s.  c.  31  Atl.  1063. 

""  Bartlett  v.  Town  of  Clarksburg, 

45  W.  Va.  393;  s.  c.  31  S.  E.  918.  It 
has  been  held,  however,  that  a  cijty 
may  conduct  the  display  of  fire- 
works: Heidenway  v.  City  of  Phil- 
adelphia, 168  Pa.  St.  72;  s.  c.  31  Atl. 
1063. 

^-^  McCarthy  v.   City  of  Syracuse, 

46  N.  Y.  194. 


809 


TORTS   AND    CRIMES. 


803 


water  were  intended  for  the  private  advantage  of  the  city,  the  city 
was  lield  liable  for  the  unskilful  construction  of  a  Croton  river  dam 
by  the  employes  of  the  water  commissioners,  who,  though  appointed 
by  the  state,  were  agents  of  the  city.^^*  Doubtless  a  city  may  be  liable 
for  causing  or  negligently  permitting  its  sewage  and  filth  to  percolate 
into  its  wells  or  other  water  supply.--^  A  city  is  not  liable  in  damages 
for  so  negligently  constructing  a  sewer  as  to  cut  off  water  from  the 
spring  of  an  abutting  land-owner,  which  otherwise  Avould  supply 
the  spring  by  percolation  through  the  soil  of  the  street,  because  the 
owner  has  no  absolute  right  to  such  percolating  water,^-*^  unless  such 
right  has  been  conferred  or  damages  for  interference  with  it  awarded 
by  statute.^-^ 

§  803.  Non-liability  to  trespassers. — A  municipal  corporation  is 
not  liable  to  a  trespasser  who  goes,  without  license  or  invitation,  upon 
its  land,  though  unmolested,  for  mere  pleasure  or  to  gratify  curiosity, 
and  there  meets  with  an  injury  through  the  corporation's  negligent 
management  of  its  property;  and  no  distinction  is  made  in  favor  of 


^^  Bailey  v.  Mayor  &c.,  3  Hill  (N. 
Y.)  531.  The  village  of  Rutland 
maintains  a  water-system  for  tlie 
double  purpose  of  furnishing  the  in- 
habitants with  a  supply  for  private 
purposes  and  providing  against  fire. 
It  was  held  that  as  to  that  portion 
of  the  system  supplying  individuals 
for  hire,  the  village  was  liable  for 
any  negligence  in  its  construction  or 
maintenance:  Wilkins  v.  Village  of 
Rutland,  61  Vt.  336;  s.  c.  17  Atl.  735. 

"5  Ballard  v.  Tomlinson,  29  Ch. 
D.  115;  Rex  v.  Medley,  6  Car.  & 
P.  292;  Charles  v.  Finchley  Local 
Board,  52  L.  J.  (N.  S.)  Ch.  554; 
Brown  v.  Illius,  27  Conn.  84.  In  Gold- 
smid  V.  Tunbridge  Wells  Com'rs,  L. 
R.  1  Eq.  161,  an  injunction  was 
granted  to  restrain  commissioners 
for  draining  a  town  from  causing 
the  sewage  to  be  discharged  into  a 
stream  passing  through  the  plain- 
tiff's land,  and  feeding  a  lake  there, 
as  the  pollution  of  the  water  per- 
ceptibly increased  as  new  houses 
contributed  their  sewage  to  the 
stream. 


--"  Elster  V.  City  of  Springfield,  49 
Ohio  St.  82;  s.  c.  30  N.  B.  274. 

"•  Trowbridge  v.  Inhabitants  &c., 
144  Mass.  139;  s.  c.  10  N.  E.  796, 
where  the  court  said: — "In  exercis- 
ing its  rights  the  town  acts,  not  un- 
der the  title  of  the  owner,  but  by 
virtue  of  the  authority  given  by  the 
statute,  and  under  the  obligation  im- 
posed by  the  statute  to  pay  all  dam- 
ages occasioned  thereby.  The  peti- 
tioner had  a  right  to  collect  and 
keep  the  water  in  her  well,  and  de- 
priving her  of  it  so  as  to  injure  her 
land  was  a  damage  to  her.  It  is  no 
answer  that  other  landowners  had 
the  same  right  in  respect  to  their 
lands,  and  that,  if  the  petitioner's 
damages  had  been  in  consequence  of 
the  exercise  of  those  rights  in  his 
land  by  a  landowner,  she  could  not 
have  recovered  damages  from  him. 
The  respondent's  rights  in  the  land, 
and  its  authority  to  do  the  act  which 
caused  the  damage,  are  given  by  the 
same  statute  which  gives  a  remedy 
to  the  petitioner  to  recover  dam- 
ages." See  also,  Watuppa  Reservoir 
v.  City  of  Fall  River,  134  Mass.  267. 


804 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS. 


810 


an  infant  child  so  receiving  an  injury.^^^  In  such  a  case  the  munici- 
pality owes  no  special  duty  to  a  child  straying  from  its  parents,  and 
the  duty  of  protecting  it  is  not  shifted  from  its  parents  to  the  mu- 
nicipality because  it  chances  to  escape  from  their  care.--''  This 
is  the  general  rule  applicable  to  those  who  trespass  on  private  lands, 
and  there  is  no  reason  why  municipal  corporations  should  not  have  the 
benefit  of  it;-^"  but  of  course  it  has  no  application  to  public  highways, 
where  all  have  a  right  to  be,  nor  can  it  be  invoked  by  a  city  which  is 
itself  either  directly  or  indirectly  a  trespasser  upon  such  highways.^^^ 

§  804.  Liability  for  nuisances. — A  municipal -corporation  must  not 
use  its  property  in  such  a  manner  as  to  injure  the  property  of  others, 
and,  unless  authorized  by  statute,  can  not  justify  a  trespass  or  nuisance 
on  the  ground  that  it  is  acting  for  the  public  benefit,^'^^  for  in  general 


"« Clark  v.  Manchester,  62  N.  H. 
577,  where  the  court  said  that  "the 
owner  of  land,  for  whatever  purpose 
it  may  be  used,  is  under  no  obliga- 
tion to  keep  his  premises  in  a  safe 
condition  for  the  prevention  of  in- 
jury to  trespassers  and  persons 
intruding  without  license  or  invita- 
tion express  or  implied."  See  also, 
Severy  v.  Nickerson  Co.,  120  Mass. 
306;  Hargreaves  v.  Deacon,  25  Mich. 
1;  Beach  Contr.  Neg.  (2d  ed.),  §  50. 

-^  Gillespie  v.  McGowan,  100  Pa. 
St.  144. 

^'''Beck  V.  Carter,  68  N.  Y.  283; 
Pierce  v.  Whitcomb,  48  Vt.  127.  See 
also,  Barrett  v.  Black,  56  Maine  498; 
Carleton  v.  Franconia  &c.  Steel  Co., 
99  Mass.  216. 

-='  Tobin  V.  Portland  &c.  R.  Co.,  59 
Maine  183,  188.  See  also.  Beach 
Contr.  Neg.  (2d  ed.),  §  256. 

233  Tiius  in  Miles  v.  City  of  Worces- 
ter, 154  Mass.  511;  s.  c.  28  N.  E.  676, 
which  was  an  action  in  tort  for  dam- 
ages occasioned  by  the  encroach- 
ment on  plaintiff's  land  of  a  wall 
built  by  the  city  in  adapting  a  lot  of 
land  to  schoolhouse  purposes.  The 
continuance  of  the  wall  on  plaintiff's 
land  was  held  to  be  a  nuisance  for 
which  the  city  was  responsible. 
Allen,  J.,  said: — "The  defendant 
suggests  that  it  is  not  liable  because 


the  wall  was  built  and  maintained 
solely  for  the  public  use  and  under 
the  requirement  of  general  laws; 
and  that  the  case  can  not  be  distin- 
guished in  principle  from  the  line 
of  cases  beginning  with  Hill  v.  City 
of  Boston,  122  Mass.  344;  s.  c.  23 
Am.  R.  332,  and  ending  with  How- 
ard V.  City  of  Worcester,  153  Mass. 
426;  s.  c.  27  N.  E.  11.  We  are  not 
aware,  however,  that  a  private  nui- 
sance to  property  can  be  justified  or 
excused  on  that  ground.  The  ver- 
dict shows  a  continuous  occupation 
of  the  plaintiff's  land  by  the  en- 
croachment of  defendant's  wall. 
The  question  of  negligence  in  the 
building  of  the  wall  is  not  material. 
The  erection  was  completed  and  was 
accepted  by  the  defendant,  and  is 
now  in  the  defendant's  sole  charge, 
and  if  it  is  a  nuisance  the  defendant 
is  responsible.  .  .  .  The  public 
use  and  the  general  benefit  will  not 
justify  such  a  nuisance  to  the  prop- 
erty of  another."  The  rule  of  lia- 
bility for  nuisances  and  for  the  in- 
vasion of  property  was  thus  laid 
down  in  Eastman  v.  Meredith,  36 
N.  H.  284,  295:— "Towns  and  other 
municipal  corporations,  including 
counties  in  this  state,  have  power, 
for  certain  purposes,  to  hold  and 
manage  property,  real  and  personal; 


811 


TORTS   AND    CRIMES. 


804 


it  has  no  more  right  than  a  natural  person  to  create  or  maintain  a 
nuisance.-^*  A  city  which  acquires  land  on  which  a  nuisance  exists 
becomes  liable  to  others  injured  by  its  continuance  if  it  suffers  the 
nuisance  to  continue  after  notice  of  its  existence  and  a  request  to  re- 
move it.-^^  Generally  the  city  is  liable  for  creating  and  maintaining 
a  nuisance.^^"  The  city  is  not  liable  for  destruction  or  loss  of  prop- 
erty occasioned  by  abating  a  nuisance,  since  the  exercise  of  such 
power  is  governmental  and  discretionary.-^'^  A  person  appointed  by 
the  mayor  as  special  policeman  to  keep  a  street  free  of  obstructions 


and  for  private  injuries  caused  by 
the  improper  management  of  their 
property,  as  such,  they  have  been 
held  to  the  general  liability  of  pri- 
vate corporations  and  natural  per- 
sons that  own  and  manage  the  same 
kind  of  property:  Bailey  v.  Mayor 
&c.,3Hill  (N.Y.)  531,  541.  ...  So 
if  a  town  or  city  maintain  an  erec- 
tion or  structure  which  is  a  private 
nuisance,  and  causes  a  special  dam- 
age, or  in  the  performance  of  an  au- 
thorized act  invade  any  right  of 
property,  the  corporation  has  been 
held  liable  to  a  civil  action:  Thayer 
V.  City  of  Boston,  19  Pick.  (Mass.) 
511;  Town  Council  v.  McComb,  18 
Ohio  229;  Rhodes  v.  City  of  Cleve- 
land, 10  Ohio  159." 

^"  Harper  v.  City  of  Milwaukee,  30 
Wis.  365;  Young  v.  Leedom,  67  Pa. 
St.  351;  Pittsburg  City  v.  Grier,  22 
Pa.  St.  54;  Delmonico  v.  New  York, 
1  Sandf.  (N.  Y.)  222.  A  city  which 
lets  for  hire  a  building  erected  for 
municipal  purposes  is  liable  for  an 
injury  caused  by  a  defect  or  want  of 
repair  in  the  building  or  for  negli- 
gence of  its  agents  in  the  manage- 
ment of  the  building  in  the  same 
manner  as  a  private  owner  would 
be:  Worden  v.  City  of  New  Bedford, 
131  Mass.  23.  In  Noonan  v.  City  of 
Albany,  79  N,  Y.  470,  Andrews,  J., 
said: — "A  municipal  corporation 
has  no  greater  right  than  an  indi- 
vidual to  collect  the  surface-water 
from  its  lands  or  streets  into  an 
artificial  channel  and  discharge  it 
upon  the  lands  of  another,  nor  has 


it  any  immunity  from  legal  respon- 
sibility for  erecting  or  maintaining 
nuisances."  See  also,  Byrnes  v. 
City  of  Cohoes,  67  N.  Y.  204.  The 
negligent  construction  of  a  gutter 
by  a  municipality,  or  its  negligent 
failure  to  keep  the  same  in  repair, 
caused  surface  water  to  flood  a  lot 
upon  which  it  would  not  otherwise 
have  flowed.  It  was  held  that  the 
municipality  was  liable  for  the  con- 
sequent damages,  although  such  lot 
was  below  the  grade  of  the  street: 
Gilluly  V.  City  of  Madison,  63  Wis. 
518;  s.  c.  24  N.  W.  137;  53  Am.  R. 
299. 

"=  Nichols  V.  City  of  Boston,  98 
Mass.  39;  McDonough  v.  Oilman,  3 
Allen  (Mass.)  264.  And  after  ac- 
ceptance of  an  unsafe  party  wall 
built  by  another,  a  city  would  prob- 
ably be  liable  to  the  adjoining  own- 
er for  an  injury  caused  by  its  fall: 
Gorham  v.  Gross,  125  Mass.  232. 
And  see  Khron  v.  Brock,  144  Mass. 
516;  s.  c.  11  N.  E.  748;  Bryant  v. 
Town  of  Randolph,  14  N.  Y.  S.  844. 
A  city  empowered,  for  sewerage  pur- 
poses, to  change,  widen  and  deepen 
the  channel  of  a  brook,  may  be  li- 
able for  so  performing  the  work  as 
to  create  an  unnecessary  nuisance: 
Morse  v.  City  of  Worcester,  139 
Mass.  389;  s.  c.  2  N.  E.  694. 

-■"^  Bolton  V.  Village  of  New 
Rochelle,  32  N.  Y.  S.  442;  s.  c.  84 
Hun  (N.  Y.)  281. 

-=^Wood  V.  City  of  Hinton,  47  W. 
Va.  645;  s.  c.  35  S.  E.  824. 


80^ 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS, 


81^ 


does  not  himself  become  a  nuisance  and  an  obstruction  to  the  street 
which  will  render  the  city  liable.-^^  A  city  is  liable  for  a  nuisance 
for  the  time  it  continued,  even  though  abated  by  the  eity.^^®  Animals 
running  at  large  in  a  city  are  a  nuisance,  which  it  is  the  duty  of  the 
city  to  suppress. ^•'^ 

§  805.  Municipal  liability  in  general. — Corporations  in  general  are 
liable  to  actions  for  torts  as  individuals  are,-*^  and  this  rule  is  ap- 
plicable to  municipal  corporations  for  torts  committed  under  their 
authority.-^^  A  municipal  corporation  is  liable  for  injuries  to  indi- 
viduals resulting  from  any  neglect  or  omission  of  duty  in  keeping  its 
streets  in  reasonably  safe  condition  for  use  in  the  usual  mode.  And 
this  is  the  rule  in  England,  even  where  the  duty  is  not  expressly  im- 
posed by  statute.-*^ 

§  806.  Chartered  cities,  etc.,  distinguished  from  counties,  etc. — 
The  conflict. — In  many  of  the  states  a  distinction  is  made  between  the 


^^'^  Craig  V.  City  of  Charleston,  78 
111.  App.  312;  s.  c.  affirmed  180  111. 
154;  s.  c.  54  N.  B.  184. 

-"■'City  of  New  Albany  v.  Slider, 
21  Ind.  App.  392;  s.  c.  52  N.  E.  626. 

=^"Coclirane  v.  City  of  Frostburg, 
81  Md.  54;  s.  c.  31  Atl.  703. 

="  In  Reed  v.  Home  Savings  Bank, 
130  Mass.  443,  the  court  said: — "It 
is  too  late  to  discuss  the  question 
whether  a  corporation  can  commit  a 
trespass  or  is  liable  to  an  action  on 
the  case  or  subject  generally  to  ac- 
tions for  torts  as  individuals  are. 
The  reports  for  a  quarter  of  a  cen- 
tury show  that  a  large  proportion 
of  actions  of  this  nature  both  for 
nonfeasance  and  misfeasance  are 
against  corporations.  By  the  great 
weight  of  modern  authority  a  cor- 
poration may  be  liable,  even  where 
a  fraudulent  or  malicious  intent  is 
necessary  to  be  proved,  the  fraud  or 
malice  of  its  authorized  agents  be- 
ing imputable  to  the  corporation,  as 
in  actions  for  fraudulent  represen- 
tations, for  libel  or  for  malicious 
prosecution." 

="  Salt  Lake  City  v.  Hollister,  118 
TJ.  S.  256;  s.  c,  6  S.  Ct.  1055. 

**^  Clemence  v.  City  of  Auburn,  66 


N.  Y.  334;  Diveny  v.  City  of  Elmira, 
51  N.  Y.  506;  Hines  v.  City  of  Lock- 
port,  50  N.  Y.  236;  Barton  v.  City  of 
Syracuse,  36  N.  Y.  54;  Conrad  v. 
Trustees  &c.,  16  N.  Y.  159;  Hutson  v. 
Mayor  &c.,  9  N.  Y.  163.  See  §  806, 
post.  In  Borough  &c.  of  Bathurst 
V.  MacPherson,  4  App.  Cas.  256,  de- 
fendants were  held  liable  for  neg- 
lect to  repair  a  barrel  drain  which 
they  had  made,  and  the  sole  control 
and  management  of  which  had  been 
vested  in  them  by  statute;  following 
Hartnall  v.  Ryde  Com'rs,  4  B.  &  S. 
361.  "In  their  lordships'  opinion  no 
substantial  distinction  can  be  taken 
between  that  case  and  the  present, 
in  which  the  duty  for  the  reasons 
above  stated  had  been  found  to  exist 
though  not  expressly  imposed  by 
statute."  In  Blackmore  v.  Vestry 
&c.,  9  Q.  B.  D.  451,  the  defend- 
ants as  the  body  authorized  by  stat- 
ute to  water  the  streets  were  held 
liable  for  the  slippery  condition  of 
an  iron  flap  which  they  had  placed 
in  the  street,  though  they  might  not 
have  been  liable  as  highway  survey- 
ors. See  also,  White  v.  Hindley 
Local  Board  &c.,  L.  R.  10  Q.  B.  219. 


8i; 


TORTS    AXD    CRIMES. 


806 


liability  of  such  purely  municipal  corporations  as  chartered  towns, 
cities  and  villages,  and  the  non-liability  of  counties  and  towns  as 
political  divisions  of  the  state,  and  the  former  are  held  quite  strictly 
to  the  performance  of  their  duties  and  responsible  in  damages  for 
neglecting  them.-'*'  If  the  charter  granted  to  a  city  or  town  at  its 
request  enables  it  to  derive  benefit  in  its  corporate  capacity  in  the  way 
of  rent  or  tolls  from  the  public  works  it  is  required  to  construct,  it 
is  deemed  reasonable  it  should  be  liable  as  other  corporations  are 
for  any  injury  caused  by  its  negligence.^^^     But  in  Arkansas  and 


-"  Thus  in  Board  &c.  v.  Mighels,  7 
Ohio  St.  109,  the  court  says: — "A 
municipal  corporation  proper  is  cre- 
ated mainly  for  the  interest,  advan- 
tage and  convenience  of  the  locality 
and  its  people;  a  county  organiza- 
tion is  created  almost  exclusively 
with  a  view  to  the  policy  of  the 
state  at  large."  In  Edwards  v. 
Town  of  Pocahontas,  47  Fed.  268, 
the  court  says: — "The  distinction 
between  the  liability  of  a  municipal 
corporation  called  into  existence 
either  at  the  direct  solicitation  or 
by  the  free  consent  of  the  persons 
composing  it  for  the  promotion  of 
their  own  local  and  private  advan- 
tage and  convenience,  and  that  of 
counties  or  other  political  divisions 
of  a  state,  established  by  general 
laws,  for  the  negligent  conduct  of 
their  officers  and  agents,  is  clearly 
defined.  The  principle  upon  which 
the  distinction  rests  is  that  counties 
are  arbitrary  political  divisions  of  a 
state,  and  the  governmental  powers 
they  exercise  are  imposed  upon  them 
by  general  laws,  while  municipal 
corporations  act  voluntarily  in  their 
assumption  of  a  part  of  the  sover- 
eignty of  the  state  in  their  exercise 
of  self-government," — citing  also, 
Cooley  Const.  Lim.  (3d  ed.)  247,  248. 
See  also,  Oliver  v.  City  of  Worcester, 
102  Mass.  489;  City  of  Galveston  v. 
Posnainsky,  62  Tex.  118,  and  cases 
cited.  In  Barnes  v.  District  of  Co- 
lumbia, 91  U.  S.  540,  the  district 
was  held  to  be  liable  to  an  individu- 
al who  fell  into  an  excavation  caused 


by  a  change  of  grade  in  the  city  of 
Washington,  which  the  district  per- 
mitted a  certain  railroad  to  make. 
The  district  as  a  chartered  munici- 
pal corporation  had  acted  by  a  board 
of  public  works  appointed  under  the 
charter  or  act  of  congress  by  the 
president  and  confirmed  by  the  sen- 
ate. Hunt,  J.,  speaking  for  the  ma- 
jority of  the  court,  said: — "The 
powers  given  to  this  board  are  not 
of  a  character  belonging  to  inde- 
pendent officers,  but  rather  those 
which  indicate  that  it  is  the  repre- 
sentative of  the  municipal  corpora- 
tion. Notwithstanding  these  feat- 
ures, and  that  we  find  this  power 
given  by  the  act  which  creates  the 
municipality,  and  that  this  is  one  of 
the  powers  ordinarily  belonging  to 
a  municipal  government,  and  though 
the  manner  of  its  bestowal  and  the 
selection  of  the  agents  who  exercise 
it  are  similar  to  that  of  the  other  ap- 
pointees and  agents  of  the  municipal 
corporation,  it  is  still  contended 
that  no  liability  exists  on  the  part  of 
the  corporation  to  compensate  the 
plaintiff  for  his  injuries.  .  .  . 
The  authorities  establishing  the 
contrary  doctrine  that  a  city  is  re- 
sponsible for  its  mere  negligence  are 
so  numei'ous  and  so  well  considered 
that  the  law  must  be  deemed  to  be 
settled  in  accordance  with  them." 

"=  Oliver  v.  City  of  Worcester,  102 
Mass.  489,  500;  Weet  v.  Trustees  &c., 
16  N.  Y.  161,  n.;  Nebraska  City  v. 
Campbell,  2  Black  590;  Weightman 
V.  Washington,  1  Black  39. 


§  80^ 


PUBLIC    COIll'ORATIONS. 


814 


California  this  distinction  is  not  observed,  and  incorporated  cities  are 
held  to  no  stricter  liability  than  counties,  unless  such  liability  is  im- 
posed by  statute.^*"  Nor  is  the  distinction  before  adverted  to  recog- 
nized in  South  Carolina,-*^  nor  in  Michigan,^*^  nor  in  New  Jersey,^*" 
nor  in  Massachusetts,  Maine  ajid  Connecticut,  in  respect  to  high- 
ways.^^° 

§  807.    Municipal  liability  in  exercise  of  private  powers. — In  the 

exercise  of  its  private  powers  a  municipality  is  liable  for  torts  to  the 
same  extent  as  a  private  corporation.^^ ^    These  private  powers  relate. 


"^  Thus  in  Arkadelphia  v.  Wind- 
ham, 49  Ark.  139;  s.  c.  4  S.  W.  450, 
the  court  said: — "We  think  the 
streets  of  a  town  or  city  like  all 
other  roads  are  public  highways; 
that  the  duty  of  keeping  them  in 
repair  is  to  the  public,  not  to  private 
individuals;  and  no  civil  action 
arises  from  an  injury  resulting 
from  a  neglect  to  keep  them  in 
repair.  In  the  absence  of  a  statute 
there  is  no  difference  between  the 
liability  of  an  incorporated  town  or 
city  and  a  county  in  such  cases. 
Such  a  distinction  would  be  con- 
trary to  every  principle  of  fairness, 
reason  and  justice."  In  California 
cities  are  deemed  like  counties  mere 
instruments  of  the  government  and 
not  liable  for  injuries  sustained  by 
individuals  through  neglect  of  city 
officers  to  keep  the  streets  in  repair: 
Winbigler  v.  Mayor  <S:c.,  45  Cal.  36, 
where  the  decisions  in  Hoffman  v. 
San  Joaquin  Co.,  21  Cal.  426,  and 
Crowell  V.  Sonoma  Co.,  25  Cal.  313, 
were  followed. 

'"  Young  V.  City  Council  &c.,  20  S. 
C.  116. 

=*'City  of  Detroit  v.  Backeby,  21 
Mich.  84;  McCutcheon  v.  Ammon 
Council  &c.,  43  Mich.  483;  s.  c.  5  N. 
W.  668;  City  of  Detroit  v.  Putnam, 
45  Mich.  263;  s.  c.  7  N.  W.  815. 

=*»Pray  v.  Mayor  &c.,  32  N.  J.  L. 
394;  Board  &c.  v.  Strader,  18  N.  J. 
L.  108;  Callahan  v.  Inhabitants  &c., 
30  N.  J.  L.  160;  Livermore  v.  Board 
&c.,  31  N.  J.  L.  508. 


==""  French  v.  City  of  Boston,   129 
Mass.  592;  s.  c.  37  Am.  R.  393;  Hill 
V.  City  of  Boston,  122  Mass.  344;  s.  c. 
23    Am.    R.    332.     In    the    last   case 
Gray,  C.  J.,  said: — "In  this  common- 
wealth   an    act    of    the    legislature 
changing    a    town    into    a    city    has 
never  been  considered  as  enlarging 
civil  remedies  for  neglect  of  corpo- 
rate duties;    and   it  has  constantly 
been  held  that  a  city  like  a  town  is 
not  liable  to  an  action  for  a  defect  in 
a  highway,  except  so  far  as  the  right 
to  maintain  such  an  action  has  been 
given     clearly    by     statute:     Brady 
V.  City  of  Lowell,  3  Cush.    (Mass.) 
121;    Harwood  v.  City  of  Lowell,  4 
Cush.  (Mass.)  310;  Hixon  v.  City  of 
Lowell,  13  Gray  (Mass.)   59;  Oliver 
V.  City  of  Worcester,  102  Mass.  489. 
The  same  view  has  been  taken  in 
other   New   England   states   and   in 
New  Jersej%  Michigan  and  Califor- 
nia: Morgan  v.  City  of  Hollowell,  57 
Maine   375;    Jones  v.   City   of   New 
Haven,  34  Conn.  1,  13;   Hewison  v. 
City  of  New  Haven,  37  Conn.  475." 
-^'  Maxmilian  v.  Mayor  &c.,  62  N. 
Y.  160,  164.     "There  are  two  kinds 
of   duties   imposed   on   a   municipal 
corporation:     one    is    of    that    kind 
which   arises   from   the   grant   of   a 
special    power    in    the    exercise    of 
which  the  municipality  is  as  a  legal 
individual;  the  other  is  of  that  kind 
which  arises  or  is  implied  from  the 
use  of  political  rights  under  the  gen- 
eral law,  in  the  exercise  of  which  it 
is   as   a   sovereign.     ...     In    the 


815 


TORTS   AND    CRIMES. 


§  807 


for  example,  to  the  corporate  property  of  a  city  held  and  managed  l)y 
it  for  its  own  immediate  profit,  though  ultimately  inuring  to  the 
public  benefit.^''-  In  New  Hampshire  where  a  city  had  ceased  to  use 
a  reservoir  for  the  public  purpose  of  extinguishing  fires,  and  was 
filling  it  up  in  order  to  use  it  for  a  private  purpose,  it  was  held  to  be 
liable  as  an  individual  would  be.-^^  Under  a  charter  requiring  a  city 
"to  preserve  peace  and  good  order,  securing  persons  and  property  from 
violence,  danger  or  destruction,"  it  is  not  enough  to  pass  an  ordinance 
against  "coasting"  on  the  streets,  but  the  city  must  also  use  reasonable 
care  and  diligence  to  enforce  it;^^*  but  in  Indiana  a  city  is  not  liable 
for  failing  to  enforce  its  ordinances  against  coasting.^'^^  Wliere  a 
town  does  work  voluntarily  as  a  private  enterprise,  and  not  under  the 
compulsion  of  a  statute,  when  it  might  have  left  it  to  a  railroad  com- 
pany as  a  duty  which  the  company  had  assumed,  it  will  be  liable  for 
an  injury  to  an  employe.^^"    A  city  is  liable  only  in  tort  for  wrong- 


exercise  of  the  former  power,  and 
tinder  the  duty  to  the  public  which 
the  acceptance  and  use  of  the  power 
Involves,  a  municipality  is  lilce  a 
private  corporation  and  is  liable  for 
a  failure  to  use  its  power  well,  or 
for  an  injury  caused  by  using  it 
badly."  In  Smith  v.  City  of  Roches- 
ter, 76  N.  Y.  506,  Miller,  J.,  says:  — 
"The  doctrine  is  well  settled  that 
municipal  corporations  are  within 
the  operation  of  the  general  rule  of 
law  that  the  superior  or  employer 
must  answer  civilly  for  the  negli- 
gence of  an  agent  or  servant  in  the 
course  of  their  employment  by 
which  another  is  injured." 

^-  In  Oliver  v.  City  of  Worcester, 
102  Mass.  489,  Gray,  J.,  thus  speaks 
of  the  private  powers  of  a  city  as 
distinguished  from  their  public  du- 
ties:— "The  distinction  is  well  es- 
tablished between  the  responsibili- 
ties of  towns  and  cities  for  acts  done 
in  their  public  capacity,  and  for 
acts  done  in  what  may  be  called 
their  private  character  in  the  man- 
agement of  property  or  rights  vol- 
untarily held  by  them  for  their  own 
immediate  profit  or  advantage  as  a 
corporation,  although  inuring  of 
course  ultimately  to  the  benefit  of 
the  public." 


="' Clark  V.  Manchester,  62  N.  H. 
577. 

^'Taylor  v.  Mayor  &c.,  64  Md.  68; 
s.  c.  20  Atl.  1027. 

^^  City  of  Lafayette  v.  Timberlake, 
88  Ind.  330,  where  Elliott,  J.,  says: 
— "A  conclusion  which  would  make 
a  city  liable  for  the  acts  of  coasters 
can  only  be  reached  by  assuming 
that  municipal  corporations  are  li- 
able for  a  failure  to  execute  the 
statutes  of  the  state  or  the  ordi- 
nances of  the  corporation,  and  this 
assumption  can  not  be  made  unless 
settled  principles  are  disregarded. 
.  .  .  Making  and  enforcing  ordi- 
nances regulating  the  use  of  streets 
brings  into  exercise  governmental, 
and  not  corporate,  powers,  and  the 
authorities  are  well  agreed  that  for 
a  failure  to  exercise  legislative,  ju- 
dicial or  executive  powers  of  gov- 
ernment, there  is  no  liability."  See 
also,  §  813,  post. 

"'"  Collins  V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  172 
Mass.  78;  s.  c.  51  N.  E.  454;  Dean  v. 
Randolph,  132  Mass.  475;  Sullivan 
v.  Holyoke,  135  Mass.  273;  Waldron 
V.  Haverhill,  143  Mass.  582;  s.  c.  10 
N.  E.  481;  Neff  v.  Inhabitants  &c., 
148  Mass.  487;  s.  c.  20  N.  E.  111. 


§    808  PUBLIC    CORrOUATIONS.  816 

fully  withholding  water  for  irrigation  where  it  has  voluntarily  agreed 
to  furnisli  it.-''''  Where  a  town  engages  in  a  private  enterprise  under 
the  charge  of  a  public  officer,  and  which  it  is  not  compelled  by  law  to 
do,  it  will  be  liable  for  negligence,  and  it  is  immaterial  whether  the 
enterprise  prove  profitable  or  not.-^**  And  so  where  a  city  holds  land 
as  a  private  owner  the  same  duties  devolve  upon  it  so  far  as  nuisances 
are  concerned  as  are  applied  to  individuals.^^ ^ 

§  808.  Liability  commensurate  with  duty. — The  liability  of  a  city, 
town  or  township  in  respect  to  public  roads  or  highways  is  commensu- 
rate with  the  duty  enjoined  by  law,  and  therefore  in  each  case  the 
inquiry  is  as  to  the  extent  of  such  duty.^®°  Where  there  is  no  duty 
there  is  no  liability.^^^  The  terms  "duty,"  "diligence,"  "vigilance" 
and  "negligence"  are  relative.  There  is  no  negligence  in  failing  to 
guard  against  a  very  unlikely  possibility.  Thus  a  highway  running 
through  a  sparsely  settled  town  does  not  require  the  same  attention  as 
a  thronged  thoroughfare  in  a  populous  city  f^^  and  in  a  city  it  is  not 
negligence  not  to  guard  against  an  accident  which  could  not  be  ex- 
pected or  foreseen. ^"^  A  power  conferred  on  city  authorities  to  super- 
intend or  repair  the  streets  imposes  the  duty  to  exercise  the  power 
when  necessary.-"*  Thus  a  town  or  township  charged  with  the  care 
of  a  bridge  is  liable  for  injury  caused  by  leaving  its  abutments  un- 
guarded."^^    The  District  of  Columbia  is  liable  for  injuries  arising 

^'  City  of  Ysleta  v.  Babbitt,  8  Tex.  expressly    provided    in    the    statute 

Civ.  App.  432;  s.  c.  28  S.  W.  702.  that  they  shall  proceed  and  make  a 

^*  Collins  V.   Inhabitants  &c.,   172  determination  of  the  matter  within 

Mass.  78;  s.  c.  51  N.  E.  454.  any    particular    time;    and,    indeed, 

^^  City  of  Pekin  v.  McMahon,  154  there   is  no  express  provision  that 

111.    141;    s.    c.    39    N.    B.    484.     Cf.  they  shall  make  any  determination 

Mackey    v.    City    of    Vicksburg,    64  whatever.     But    that    they    shall    is 

Miss.  777;   s.  c.  2  So.  178;   Clark  v.  necessarily  implied  in  the  statute; 

Manchester,  62  N.  H.  577.  and  what  is  necessarily  implied  is 

200  Plymouth  Tp.  v.  Graver,  125  Pa.  as  much  a  part  of  the  statute  as  if 

St.  24;  s.  c.  17  Atl.  249.  it  were  specially  written  therein." 

2"  Monk  V.  Town  of  New  Utrecht,         ^^  Dalton  v.  Upper  Tyrone  Tp.,  137 

104  N.  Y.  552;  s.  c.  11  N.  E.  268.  Pa.  St.  18;  s.  c.  20  Atl.  637;  Corbalis 

'"^Glasier  v.  Town  of  Hebron,  131  v.  Newberry  Tp.,  132  Pa.  St.  9;  s.  c. 

N.  Y.  447;  s.  c.  30  N.  E.  239.  19  Atl.  44;  Plymouth  Tp.  v.  Graver, 

=«'Hubbell  V.  City  of  Yonkers,  104  125  Pa.  St.  24;   s.  c.  17  Atl.  249.     A 

N.  Y.  434;  s.  c.  10  N.  E.  858.  town  is  liable  for  allowing  a  high- 

-'^  Requa  v.  City  of  Rochester,  45  way  at  a  railroad  crossing  to  remain 

N.  Y.  129;  Hutson  v.  New  York,  9  N.  for  years  in  a  dangerous  condition, 

Y.  163;   New  York  v.  Furze,  3  Hill  though  it  was 'at  first  rendered  dan- 

(N.  Y.)  612.     As  Earl,  C.  J.,  said  in  gerous    by    the    railroad    company: 

People   v.   Meakim,    133    N.   Y.    214,  Bryant  v.  Town  of  Randolph,  14  N. 

220;   s.  c.  30  N.  E.  828:— "It  is  not  Y.  S.  844.    In  Plymouth  Tp.  v.  Gra- 


817  TORTS   AND   CRIMES.  §    80!) 

from  neglect  of  its  streets  in  the  city  of  Washington.^®®  In  Michigan 
a  city  is  not  liable  for  failure  to  keep  its  sidewalks  in  repair  j^"'^  but  in 
Ohio  a  city  is  so  liable,  and  is  not  relieved  from  such  liability  by  giv- 
ing a  permit  to  individuals  to  occupy  the  streets  under  conditions.^"** 

§  809.  Municipal  liability  as  to  water-front. — The  state  may  im- 
pose a  public  duty  upon  a  particular  county  or  city  upon  the  assump- 
tion of  its  being  more  beneficially  interested  therein  than  other  por- 
tions of  the  state  f^^  for  example,  may  require  it  to  keep  the  waters 
along  its  front  in  a  navigable  condition ;  but  such  a  duty  does  not  exist 
at  common  law  in  this  country,^^"  except  where  the  city  is  in  control  of 
and  receives  a  revenue  from  wharves. ^^^  But  a  city  is  liable  in  dam- 
ages for  obstructing  navigable  waters  by  discharging  the  dirt  from  its 
sewers  into  them,  to  the  individual  thereby  peculiarly  injured. ^^^ 

§  810.  Liability  for  fright  of  horses. — Where  a  horse  attached  to  a 
cart  was  frightened  by  a  hole  negligently  left  by  a  city  in  a  pier  be- 
longing to  it,  and  backed  against  a  rotten  string-piece  which  broke, 
and  the  horse  and  cart  were  lost,  the  city  was  held  to  be  liable  in  the 
absence  of  proof  that  the  horse  was  vicious  or  unusually  excitable,^^^ 
though  the  result  might  have  been  different  if  the  place  had  not  been 
exposed  and  dangerous.-^*  The  Massachusetts  rule  is  that  if  a  horse, 
while  uncontrollable  by  reason  of  fright,  disease  or  viciousness,  comes 
upon  a  defect  in  a  highway,  the  town  is  not  liable  for  the  injury  un- 

ver,  125  Pa.  St.  24;  s.  c.  17  Atl.  249,  =•=**  City  of  Cleveland  v.  King,  132 

it  was  held  that  "whether  the  dan-  U.  S.  295;  s.  c.  10  S.  Ct.  90. 

ger  arises  trom  an  imperfection  in  '°"'  Mobile  Co.  v.  Kimball,  102  U.  S. 

the  road  itself,  or  from  an  excava-  691;    Winpenny  v.  Philadelphia,  65 

tion  in  it  outside  the  traveled  route,  Pa.  St.  135. 

or  from  the  existence  of  a  declivity  ^""Winpenny    v.    Philadelphia,    65 

or  stream  of  water  at  the  roadside.  Pa.  St.  135;   Coonley  v.  City  of  Al- 

or  from  a  railroad  upon  which  loco-  bany,  132  N.  Y.  145;   s.  c.  30  N.  B. 

motives  and  trains  of  cars  are  ac-  382. 

customed  to  pass,  if  there  is  a  con-  -'^  Pittsburg  v.  Grier,  22  Pa.  St.  54. 

currence    of     circumstances     which  ^'-  Brayton  v.  City  of  Fall  River, 

render  the  road  a  place  of  peril  to  113  Mass.  218;  Haskell  v.  New  Bed- 

the  traveler,  the  township  is  held  to  ford.  108  Mass.  208;  Boston  Rolling 

do  whatever  is  reasonable  and  prac-  Mills    v.    City    of    Cambridge,    117 

ticable  to   avert  the   danger  which  Mass.   396;    Franklin   Wharf  Co.  v. 

threatens."  City    of    Portland,     67     Maine    46; 

^■"^  District  of  Columbia  v.  "Wood-  Emory  v.  City  of  Lowell,  104  Mass. 

bury,  136  U.  S.  450;   s.  c.  10  S.  Ct.  13;  Gerrish  v.  Brown,  51  Maine  256. 

990.  ""  Macauley   v.    Mayor   &c.,    67    N. 

^"  Detroit  v.    Osborne,   135   U.   S.  Y.  602. 

492;  s.  c.  10  S.  Ct.  1012.  ^'^  Hubbell  v.  City  of  Yonkers,  104 


N.  Y.  434;  s.  c.  10  N.  E.  858. 


1  Smith — 52 


811 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS. 


818 


less  it  would  have  occurred  if  the  horse  had  not  been  uncontrollable; 
but  a  horse  which  merely  shies  is  not  considered  uncontrollable.*^''  It 
is  certainly  reasonable  that  a  city  should  be  held  not  liable  for  an 
injury  caused  by  a  frightened  horse  on  its  streets,  where  the  city  was 
not  the  cause  of  the  fright.-'"^ 

§  811.  Municipal  liability  for  acts  of  officers  and  agents. — A  mu- 
nicipal corporation  is  not  liable  for  the  acts  of  its  officers  and  agents 
unless  previously  authorized  or  subsequently  ratified  by  it,  or  unless 
done  in  good  faith  in  pursuance  of  a  general  authority  to  act  for  it 
in  the  matter  to  which  they  relate.-^'^  So  a  city  is  not  liable  to  an 
action  by  one  whose  property  has  been  wrongfully  seized  by  a  tax  col- 
lector without  authority  of  law,  where  the  city  has  neither  authorized 
nor  ratified  the  act;  and  it  is  not  a  ratification  to  receive  the  money 
in  ignorance  of  the  tort,  nor  is  authority  conferred  by  a  resolution  to 
hold  the  collector  harmless  if  he  proceeds  according  to  law.^^*    A  com- 


■''^  Titus  V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  97 
Mass.  258;  Horton  v.  City  of  Taun- 
ton, 97  Mass,  266;  Fogg  v.  Inhabit- 
ants &c.,  98  Mass.  578.  See  also, 
Beach  Contr.  Neg.  (4th  ed.),  §  245, 
and  numerous  cases  there  cited. 

"«  Cole  V.  City  of  Newburyport,  129 
Mass.  594.  Where  plaintiff  was  in- 
jured by  a  horse  running  away 
through  fright  occasioned  by  the  em- 
ployes of  the  city  fire  department 
the  city  is  not  liable  since  the  em- 
ployes were  public  officers  engaged 
in  a  public  duty:  Saunders  v.  City  of 
Ft.  Madison,  111  Iowa  102;  s.  c.  82 
N.  W.  428. 

^''Thus  in  Horton  v.  Newell,  17 
R.  I.  571;  s.  c.  23  Atl.  910,  which 
was  an  action  of  trespass  on  the 
case  against  the  city  treasurer  of 
the  city  of  Pawtucket  for  a  ma- 
licious suit  against  the  plaintiff 
brought  by  the  city  tax  collector, 
the  demurrer  was  sustained  on  the 
following  grounds  stated  by  the 
court: — "The  declaration  does  not 
allege  that  the  city  of  Pawtucket 
authorized  the  suit  by  Newell  in  his 
capacity  as  tax  collector,  complained 
of  as  malicious,  or  that  it  has  rati- 
fied such  suit.  If  it  was  maliciously 
brought     by     Newell     it    was     not 


brought  in  good  faith,  which  is  es- 
sential to  render  the  city  liable  as 
for  an  act  done  in  pursuance  of  a 
general  authority  to  act  for  it  under 
the  rule  stated  above."  See  also, 
Donnelly  v.  Tripp,  12  R.  I.  97,  where 
the  city  council  of  Providence  hav- 
ing directed  the  highway  commis- 
sioners to  cut  down  a  certain  street, 
provided  the  adjoining  owners 
agreed  not  to  make  a  claim  for  dam- 
ages, and  by  inadvertence  the  cut- 
ting down  was  done  without  such 
agreement  by  the  owners,  it  was 
held  that  the  city  was  not  liable. 
See  Mulcairns  v.  City  of  Janesville, 
67  Wis.  24;  s.  c.  29  N.  W.  565. 

2TS  Everson  v.  City  of  Syracuse,  100 
N.  Y.  577;  s.  c.  3  N.  B.  784.  So  in 
Wallace  v.  City  of  Menasha,  48  Wis. 
79;  s.  c.  4  N.  W.  101,  the  city  was 
held  not  to  be  liable  for  the  act  of 
its  treasurer  in  seizing  and  selling 
the  chattels  of  one  person  for  the 
delinquent  taxes  of  another.  In 
Buffalo  &c.  Co.  V.  City  of  Buffalo,  58 
N.  Y.  639,  the  city  was  held  liable 
because  it  authorized  the  acts  com- 
plained of  through  its  common  coun- 
cil, but  that  it  was  immaterial 
M^hether  the  acts  of  the  common 
council  were  to  be  regarded  as  those 


819 


TORTS   AND    CRIMES. 


§  812 


plaint  in  an  action  of  tort  against  a  municipality  is  demurrable  unless 
it  shows  that  the  wrongful  act  was  not  done  by  an  independent  officer 
and  was  done  by  an  officer  while  in  the  performance  of  some  duty  of  a 
corporate  nature.*"'' 

§  812.  Not  liable  for  ultra  vires  acts  of  officers,  etc. — A  municipal 
corporation  is  not  liable  for  the  negligence  of  its  agent  or  servant  in 
the  course  of  his  employment  unless  the  act  complained  of  was  within 

the  scope  of  the  corporate  powers.-'^" 

§  813.    Non-liability  in  the  exercise  of  discretionary  powers. — A 

municipal  corporation  is  not  liable  for  the  neglect  to  exercise  a  power 
•or  perform  a  duty  which  is  discretionary  or  judicial  in  its  character. 
This  rule  has  been  applied  where  a  city  failed  to  provide  sufficient 
drainage  of  an  individual's  premises.-^ ^     The  same  rule  is  applied 


of  defendants  or  as  those  of  its 
agents.  It  was  liable,  the  tortious 
acts  being  in  the  course  of  the  agen- 
cy: Lee  V.  Village  of  Sandy  Hill,  40 
JSr.  Y.  442. 

^*A  municipal  corporation  is  not 
generally  liable  for  the  wrongful  act 
of  an  officer,  and  in  order  to  hold  it 
liable  it  must  be  made  to  appear  that 
such  officer  was  not  an  independent 
public  officer,  and  that  the  wrong 
complained  of  was  done  by  such  offi- 
cer while  in  the  legitimate  exercise 
of  some  duty  of  a  corporate  nature, 
which  was  devolved  upon  him  by 
law  or  by  the  direction  of  the  cor- 
poration: Caspary  v.  City  of  Port- 
land, 19  Or.  496;  s.  c.  24  Pac.  1036. 

^»  Smith  V.  City  of  Rochester,  76 
N.  Y.  506,  where  one  of  the  defend- 
ant's hose  carts,  while  carelessly 
driven  on  the  street  in  celebrating 
the  centennial  anniversary,  ran  over 
plaintiff;  it  was  held  that  as  the 
calling  out  the  hose  cart  for  such  a 
purpose  was  not  authorize'd  the  city 
was  not  liable,  and  that  the  fact  of 
the  city  owning  the  cart  and  horses 
did  not  make  it  responsible  for  the 
negligence  of  its  servants  having 
control  of  them  and  when  using 
them  in  a  service  not  of  a  public  na- 
ture and  not  authorized  by  law.  Mil- 
ler,  J.,   said: — "If   the   corporation 


had  power  to  order  the  driver  of  the 
hose  cart,  it  could  only  do  so  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  statute  granting 
such  power,  and  if  it  had  no  such 
power,  the  order  was  clearly  void, 
and  the  corporation  was  not  liable 
for  the  consequences  arising  from 
its  being  carried  into  effect."  See 
also,  the  similar  case  of  Morrison  v. 
City  of  Lawrence,  98  Mass.  219, 
where  the  city  was  held  not  to  be 
liable  for  the  negligent  firing  of  a 
rocket  by  its  servant  under  a  de- 
fective resolution  authorizing  the 
celebration  of  the  Fourth  of  July. 
See  also,  the  general  rule  as  ex- 
pressed by  Shaw,  C.  J.,  in  Thayer  v. 
City  of  Boston,  19  Pick.  (Mass.)  511. 
^''  Mills  V.  City  of  Brooklyn,  32  N. 
Y.  489,  where  Denio,  C.  J.,  said:— "It 
is  not  the  law  that  a  municipal  cor- 
poration is  responsible  in  a  private 
action  for  not  providing  sufficient 
sewerage  for  every  or  any  part  of 
the  city  or  village.  The  duty  of 
draining  the  streets  is  one  requiring 
the  exercise  of  deliberation,  judg- 
ment and  discretion.  ...  It  ad- 
mits of  a  choice  of  means,  and  the 
determining  of  the  order  of  time  in 
which  improvements  shall  be  made. 
It  involves  also  a  variety  of  pruden- 
tial considerations  relating  to  the 
burdens  which  may  be  discreetly  im- 


813 


PUBLIC    COKi'OUATlONS. 


820 


where  the  manufacture  and  sale  of  fireworks  within  city  limits  is  left 
to  the  legislative  authority  of  the  common  council. ^^^  In  Indiana  it 
is  held  that  a  municipal  corporation  is  not  liable,  either  for  a  failure 
to  exercise  or  a  negligent  exercise  of  legislative  or  judicial  powers.^**^ 
In  other  words,  the  general  rule  is  that  a  municipal  corporation  is 
liable  only  for  omission  or  negligence  in  respect  to  its  ministerial 
duties."^* 


posed  at  a  given  time  and  the  pref- 
erence which  one  locality  may  claim 
over  another."  See  also,  Wilson  v. 
Mayor  &c.,  1  Denio  (N.  Y.)  595;  Cole 
V.  Trustees  &c.,  27  Barb.  (N.  Y.) 
218;  Kavanagh  v.  City  of  Brooklyn, 
38  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  232;  Radcliff  v. 
Mayor  &c.,  4  N.  Y.  195.  In  Edgerly 
V.  Concord,  62  N.  H.  8,  the  city  was 
held  not  liable  to  a  traveler  for  an 
injury  caused  by  his  horse  taking 
fright  at  a  stream  of  water  thrown 
from  a  hydrant  by  firemen  testing 
its  capacity  in  the  presence  of  the 
mayor  and  city  council,  who  are  en- 
gaged in  determining  the  most  suit- 
able location  for  the  erection  of  an 
engine-house  for  a  steam  fire-engine. 
Allen,  J.,  said: — "As  a  part  of  the 
governmental  machinery  of  the 
state,  municipal  corporations  legis- 
late and  provide  for  the  customary 
local  conveniences  of  the  people,  and 
in  exercising  these  discretionary 
functions  the  corporations  are  not 
called  upon  to  respond  in  damages 
to  individuals,  either  for  omissions 
to  act,  or  for  the  mode  of  exercising 
powers,  and  to  be  exercised  at  dis- 
cretion for  the  public  good.  For  in- 
juries arising  from  the  corporation's 
failure  to  exercise  its  public  legisla- 
tive and  police  powers  and  from  the 
manner  of  executing  those  powers, 
there  is  no  remedy  against  the  mu- 
nicipality, nor  can  an  action  be 
maintained  for  damages  resulting 
from  the  failure  of  its  officers  to  dis- 
charge properly  and  effectually  their 
official  duties;"  citing  Eastman  v. 
Meredith,  36  N.  H.  284;  Ray  v.  City 
of  Manchester,  46  N.  H.  59,  60;  Har- 
dy  V.    Keene,    52    N.    H.    370,    377; 


Thayer  v.  City  of  Boston,  19  Pick. 
(Mass.)  511;  Hafford  v.  City  of  New 
Bedford,  16  Gray  (Mass.)  297;  Fish- 
er V.  City  of  Boston,  104  Mass.  87; 
Hill  V.  City  of  Boston,  122  Mass.  344; 
s.  c.  23  Am.  R.  332;  Barbour  v.  City 
of  Ellsworth,  67  Maine  294;  Judge 
V.  City  of  Meriden,  38  Conn.  90; 
Jewett  V.  City  of  New  Haven,  38 
Conn.  368;  s.  c.  9  Am.  R.  382;  Hutch- 
inson V.  Town  of  Concord,  41  Vt. 
271;  Grant  v.  City  of  Erie,  69  Pa.  St. 
420;  Davis  v.  City  Council  &c.,  51 
Ala.  139. 

=«2McDade  v.  City  of  Chester,  117 
Pa.  St.  414;  s.  c.  12  Atl.  421.  See 
also,  Lehigh  Co.  v.  Hoffort,  116  Pa. 
St.  119;  s.  c.  9  Atl.  177;  Carr  v. 
Northern  Liberties,  35  Pa.  St.  324; 
Corporation  &c.  of  Easton  v.  Neff, 
102  Pa.  St.  474. 

2**^  City  of  Anderson  v.  East,  117 
Ind.  126;  s.  c.  19  N.  E.  726;  Wheeler 
V.  City  of  Plymouth,  116  Ind.  158; 
s.  c.  18  N.  E.  532;  Dooley  v.  Town  of 
Sullivan,  112  Ind.  451;  s.  c.  14  N.  E. 
566;  City  of  Terre  Haute  v.  Iluduut, 
112  Ind.  542;  s.  c.  13  N.  E.  686; 
Faulkner  v.  City  of  Aurora,  85  Ind. 
130;  City  of  Lafayette  v.  Timber- 
lake,  88  Ind.  330. 

^'  Agnew  V.  City  of  Corunna,  55 
Mich.  428;  s.  c.  21  N.  W.  873;  McAr- 
thur  V.  City  of  Saginaw,  58  Mich. 
357,  359;  s.  c.  25  N.  W.  313;  Kiley  v. 
City  of  Kansas,  87  Mo.  103 ;  Hubbell 
V.  City  of  Viroqua,  67  Wis.  343;  s.  c. 
30  N.  W.  847;  Robinson  v.  Green- 
ville, 42  Ohio  St.  625;  Hines  v.  City 
of  Charlotte,  72  Mich.  278;  s.  c.  40 
N.  W.  333;  Hitchins  v.  Mayor  &c., 
68  Md.  100;  s.  c.  11  Atl.  826. 


s-?i 


TORTS   AND    CRIMES. 


§  8U 


§  814.    The  same  subject  continued — New  York  and  Georgia  rule. — 

The  rule  laid  down  in  tiic  preceding  section  has  been  consistently 
applied  in  N"ew  York,  where  a  power  to  pass  ordinances  for  the  razing 
or  demolishing  of  public  buildings  w^hich  by  reason  of  fire  might 
become  dangerous  being  deemed  to  be  one  of  local  legislation,  it  was 
beid  that  the  failure  to  exercise  it  did  not  make  a  city  liable  for  a  death 
caused  by  the  fall  of  a  dangerous  wall.-'*^  A  city  is  not  liable  for  the 
failure  of  its  common  council,  in  the  exercise  of  its  discretionary 
power,  to  pass  and  enforce  a  necessary  resolution,  where  such  failure 
involves  an  error  of  judgment.'^"  A  city  is  not  liable  for  its  neg- 
lect to  exercise  its  quasi-judicial  and  discretionary  power  of  im- 
proving a  sidewalk  which  is  strongly  constructed  and  in  good  repair 
but  defective  in  its  plan  by  its  slope  being  too  great. -^'^ 

§  815.  The  same  subject  continued — Drainage. — The  duties  of  mu- 
nicipal authorities  in  adopting  a  general  plan  of  drainage  and  deter- 
mining when  and  where  sewers  shall  be  built,  of  what  size  and  at  what 
level,  being  of  a  quasi-judicial  character,  as  involving  the  exercise 
of  a  large  discretion  and  considerations  of  public  health  and  con- 
venience, are  not  subject  to  revision  by  court  and  jury  in  a  private 
action  for  not  sufficiently  draining  a  particular  lot  of  land.^^^  But 
the  construction  and  repair  of  sewers,  after  the  adoption  of  the  general 
plan,  are  ministerial  duties,  for  the  negligent  performance  of  which 
the  municipality  which  has  constructed  and  owns  them  may  be  liable 
to  a  person  whose  property  is  thereby  injured.- ^^    And  a  city  may 


"'^  Cain  v.  City  of  Syracuse,  95  N. 
Y.  83.  In  Georgia  it  is  lield  there  is 
no  sound  distinction  as  to  sucli  lia- 
bility between  a  failure  to  pass  an 
ordinance  in  the  first  instance  and 
its  repeal  or  suppression.  Thus 
where  a  city  council  passed  an  ordi- 
nance forbidding  the  running  of  cat- 
tle at  large  in  the  streets,  but  sub- 
sequently suspended  its  operation 
indefinitely  on  the  ground  that  the 
growth  of  weeds  and  grass  was  too 
luxuriant  for  comfort,  health  and 
good  appearance,  one  who  was  gored 
by  a  cow  running  at  large  in  the 
streets  was  held  not  to  have  a  cause 
of  action  against  the  city:  Rivers  v. 
City  Council  &c.,  65  Ga.  376.  See 
also,  Forsyth  v.  Mayor  &c.,  45  Ga. 
152;  Duke  v.  Mayor  &c.,  20  Ga.  635. 


^^  Cain  v.  City  of  Syracuse,  95  N. 
Y.  83.  See  also,  Conrad  v.  Trustees 
&c.,  16  N.  Y.  158;  McCarthy  v.  City 
of  Syracuse,  46  N.  Y.  194 ;  Saulsbury 
V.  Village  of  Ithaca,  94  N.  Y.  27; 
People  V.  Corporation  &c.  of  Albany, 
11  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  539. 

^"  Urquhart  v.  Ogdensburg,  91  N. 
Y.  67;  Mines  v.  City  of  Lockport,  50 
N.  Y.  236. 

-"**  Johnston  v.  District  of  Colum- 
bia, 118  U.  S.  19;  s.  c.  6  S.  Ct.  923; 
Mills  V.  City  of  Brooklyn,  32  N.  Y. 
489;  Wilson  v.  Mayor  &c.,  1  Denio 
(N.  Y.)  595;  Child  v.  City  of  Boston, 
4  Allen  (Mass.)  41. 

="=•  Barton  v.  City  of  Syracuse,  36 
N.  Y.  54.  While  a  municipal  corpo- 
ration may  not  be  liable  for  damage 
sustained  from  its  neglect  to  provide 


§    816  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  82^ 

be  liable  by  virtue  of  a  special  contract  to  pay  any  damages  caused  by 
the  construction  of  a  sewer.^'"'  A  city  is  liable  in  case  for  the  damage 
caused  an  individual  land-owner  by  discharging  a  public  sewer  upon 
his  land  and  into  his  mill-pond,  where  the  right  to  do  so  has  not  been 
acquired  in  some  way  known  to  the  law.^''^  A  city  is  not  liable  for 
damage  incurred  by  reason  of  the  gutters  being  insufficient  on  an  ex- 
traordinary occasion.^"^ 

§  816.  Non-liability  for  errors  of  judgment. — A  municipal  corpo- 
ration having  limited  legislative  powers  delegated  by  the  state  is  not 
liable  to  individuals  for  losses  subsequent  on  its  having  misconstrued 
the  extent  of  its  powers,- ^^  or  for  error  of  judgment  in  the  exercise 
of  such  powers  resulting  in  an  ordinance  which  is  unconstitutional.^^* 
In  the  federal  case  just  cited  the  action  of  the  city  in  adopting  the  or- 
dinance in  question  was  a  legislative  act  and  the  exercise  of  a  right  of 
sovereignty  primarily  belonging  to  the  state  but  delegated  to  the  city, 
and  the  United  States  circuit  court  held  that  for  errors  of  judgment 
in  the  exercise  of  such  powers  cities  are  not  liable  in  their  corporate 
capacity.  Where  acts  done  are  beyond  the  authority  and  power  of 
the  city  to  do,  it  is  not  responsible  for  damages  resulting  from  work 
done  negligently  or  otherwise,  under  the  supposed  authority  of  illegal 

a  sewer,  it  is  liable  if  it  provides  one  to  pay  all  damages  occasioned  by  the 
so  inadequate  that  it  overflows  and  construction:  Leeds  v.  City  of  Rich- 
discharges  sewage  on  the  land  of  mond,  102  Ind.  372;  s.  c.  1  N.  E.  711. 
an  individual.  Payment  by  such  per-  -■"■  Vale  Mills  v.  Nashua,  63  N.  H. 
son  of  an  assessment  for  the  con-  136. 

struction  is  not  an  assent  to  the  dis-  "^-  Wright  v.  City  of  Wilmington, 

charge  on  his  land:    Seifert  v.  City  92  N.  C.  156. 

of  Brooklyn,  15  Abb.  N.  C.   (N.  Y.)  =^' The  common  council  of  Alexan- 

97;    Van  Rensselaer  v.  City  of  Al-  dria  granted  a  license  to  carry  on 

bany,    15   Abb.   N.   C.    (N.   Y.)    457.  the    business    of    auctioneer    which 

Where  a  city  utilized  a  stream  as  a  was  ultra  vires.    The  town  was  held 

common  sewer  for  more  than  twenty  not  responsible  for  losses  sustained 

years,  repairing  it,  arching  it,  etc.,  by  individuals  from  the  frauds  of 

it  was  held  liable  for  injuries  sus-  the  auctioneer:     Fowle  v.  Common 

tained  from  its  neglect  to  keep  the  Council  &v..  3  Pet.  398. 

sewer    in    repair:     Kranz   v.    Mayor  ^"  One  who  has  served  out  in  pris- 

&c.,  64  Md.  491;  s.  c  2  Atl.  908.  on  a  fine  imposed  for  the  violation 

290  ^  gj|.y  -^ith  power  to  construct  of  an  unconstitutional  municipal  or- 

a  sewer   is  liable  to  the  owner  of  dinance    has    no    right    of    action 

property    injured   by   the   negligent  against  the  city  for  false  imprison- 

manner  in  which  a  contractor  con-  ment:    Trescott  v.  City  of  Waterloo, 

ducted  the  work,  where  the  city  con-  26    Fed.    592.      See    also,    Duke    v. 

tracted  with  the  owner  of  the  prop-  Mayor  &c.,  20  Ga.  635;   Ogg  v.  City 

erty  for  a  right  of  way,  and  agreed  of  Lansing,  35  Iowa  495. 


823 


TORTS   AND    CRIMES. 


§  817 


and  void  votes  of  the  city  council,-^-''  but  the  liability,  if  any,  rests 
upon  the  individuals  who  performed  those  acts.^^" 

§  817.  Liability  for  trespass. — The  state  itself  can  not  intrude  upon 
private  property  without  the  authority  of  a  statute,  and  a  municipal 
corporation,  though  acting  for  and  under  contract  with  the  state, 
can  not  justify  a  trespass  on  private  land  on  the  ground  that  such 
trespass  is  necessary  to  the  performance  of  the  contract.^'*''  Though, 
if  an  act  be  done  under  authority  of  law,  and  in  a  proper  manner, 
a  municipal  corporation  is  not  liable  for  consequential  damages  to 
he  property  not  invaded  by  it,^**^  yet  if  it  have  no  statutory  right 


'"=  Cavanagh  v.  City  of  Boston,  139 
Mass.  426;  s.  c.  1  N.  E.  834;  Spring 
v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  137  Mass.  554; 
Lemon  v.  City  of  Newton,  134  Mass. 
47G;  Gushing  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  125 
Mass.  526. 

2U6  Brigham  v.  Edmunds,  7  Gray 
(Mass.)  359.  See  also,  Baker  v.  City 
of  Boston,  12  Pick.  (Mass.)  184,  194. 

-'''  In  St.  Peter  v.  Denison,  58  N.  Y. 
416,  it  was  held  that  the  casting  of 
stone  and  earth  by  blasting  from 
the  bed  of  the  canal  upon  the  land 
of  an  adjoining  owner  by  a  contract- 
or with  the  state  engaged  in  the 
work  of  the  Erie  canal  enlargement 
was  a  trespass,  and  although  the 
work  was  done  without  negligence 
he  was  liable  for  the  resulting  dam- 
age. Folger,  J.,  said: — "The  state 
could  not  intrude  upon  the  lawful 
possession  of  a  citizen,  save  in  ac- 
cordance with  lav/.  Unless  author- 
ized by  law  so  to  do,  the  casting  of 
stone  from  the  bed  of  the  canal  upon 
the  adjoining  land  either  by  the 
state  or  an  individual  was  a  tres- 
pass: Hay  V.  Cohoes  Co.,  2  N.  Y. 
159.  The  defendant  claims  that  he 
was  authorized  by  law  in  that  he 
was,  as  the  servant  of  the  state,  in 
the  exercise  of  the  right  of  eminent 
domain  belonging  to  his  principal. 
The  state  can  not  ordinarily  exer- 
cise that  right  save  in  accordance 
with  a  special  act  of  the  legislature, 
or  through  the  constituted  authori- 
ties by  virtue  of  some  general  stat- 


ute. .  .  .  Nor  can  the  defendant 
protect  himself  from  liability  for 
that  his  act  of  blasting  out  the  rocks 
with  gunpowder  was  necessary,  and 
hence  that  the  effects  of  it  upon  the 
adjoining  premises  were  an  unavoid- 
able result  of  a  necessary  act.  The 
case  of  Hay  v.  Cohoes  Co.,  supra, 
shows  that  unless  there  is  a  right  to 
the  use  of  the  adjacent  lands  for  the 
purposes  of  the  work,  it  matters  not 
that  the  mode  adopted  of  carrying 
on  the  work  was  necessary."  Where 
a  city  takes  possession  of  private 
lands  and  constructs  a  street  and 
street  railway  thereon  in  the  ab- 
sence and  without  the  knowledge  or 
acquiescence  of  the  owner,  the  own- 
er can  maintain  an  action  for  the 
recovery  thereof  despite  the  public 
use:  Green  v.  City  of  Tacoma,  51 
Fed.  622. 

=^^Radcliff  V. 
195;  Ballinger 
Co.,    23    N.    Y. 


Mayor  &c.,  4  N. 
V.  New  York  &c. 
42.     In    Atwater 


Y. 
R. 

V. 

Trustees  &c.,  124  N.  Y.  602;  s.  c.  27 
N.  E.  385,  the  village  while  building 
a  bridge  under  statutory  authority 
erected  a  coffer-dam  in  the  outlet  of 
a  lake,  which  was  necessary  for  the 
work,  which  obstructed  the  flow  of 
water  from  the  lake,  and  caused  it 
to  remain  on  plaintiff's  land  and  de- 
prived him  of  its  beneficial  use  for 
one  season.  It  was  held  that  as  the 
work  was  properly  and  expeditious- 
ly done  there  was  not  a  taking  of 
plaintiff's  property  and  that  the  vil- 


§  817 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS. 


824 


to  enter  upon  private  property  it  is  liable  in  damages  for  such  tres- 
pass, though  unattended  with  negligence.-^"  And  if  it  have  such 
statutory  right  it  may  be  liable  for  an  injury  caused  by  negligent 
performance.^**^  Trespass  for  tearing  down  a  fence,  cutting  trees 
and  building  a  sidewalk,  under  the  belief  that  there  has  been  an 
encroachment  on  the  street,  renders  the  city  liable.^"^  An  unauthor- 
ized act  of  park  commissioners  in  taking  possession  of  property  on 
the  sides  of  a  street  for  the  purpose  of  widening  it  without  proceed- 
ings to  condemn,  after  which  the  city  took  possession  of  the  street, 
graded  and  kept  it  in  repair,  and  otherwise  exercised  acts  of  care 
over  it,  was  held  to  be  a  ratification  of  the  unauthorized  act  of  the 
commissioners,  and  will  make  the  city  liable.^''^  Where  its  officers, 
under  the  authority  of  the  municipality,  commit  a  trespass  upon  and 
seize  and  appropriate  private  property  in  opening  and  widening  a 


lage  was  not  liable  for  the  damages. 
In  Mayor  &c.  v.  Willison,  50  Md. 
138,  the  city  in  the  exercise  of  pow- 
ers conferred  by  statute,  and  with 
reasonable  care  and  skill,  having 
changed  the  natural  flow  of  surface 
water  which  usually  found  its  way 
into  a  mill  race  in  the  city,  so  that  a 
larger  flow  than  usual  was  emptied 
into  the  mill  race  along  a  given 
street,  and  in  times  of  heavy  rains  a 
larger  quantity  of  mud,  sand  and 
debris  was  thus  carried  into  the  race 
near  the  mill,  it  was  held  that  the 
city  was  not  liable  for  the  injury 
caused  by  these  obstructions.  The 
court,  speaking  of  such  consequen- 
tial damages,  said: — "Property  thus 
injured  is  not  in  the  constitutional 
sense  taken  for  public  use.  This 
doctrine  was  long  since  announced, 
after  the  most  careful  consideration 
by  courts  of  the  highest  authority: 
CoUander  v.  Marsh,  1  Pick.  (Mass.) 
418;  O'Connor  v.  Pittsburg,  18  Pa. 
St.  187.  It  was  also  approved  in 
the  leading  cases  of  Goszler  v.  Cor- 
poration of  Georgetown,  6  Wheat. 
593,  and  Smith  v.  Corporation  of 
Washington,  20  How.  135.  These 
authorities  have  since  been  followed 
by  the  decisions  of  almost  every 
state  of  the  Union  where  the  ques- 
tion has  arisen,  and  in  fact  to  such 


an  extent  that  even  the  citation  of 
the  cases  has  become  burdensome." 
Contra,  Crawford  v.  Village  of  Dela- 
ware, 7  Ohio  St.  459. 

""'•*  Tremain  v.  Cohoes  Co.,  2  N.  Y. 
163;  Pixley  v.  Clark,  35  N.  Y.  520. 

3U0  Perkins  v.  City  of  Lawrence, 
136  Mass.  305,  where  Allen,  J.,  said: 
— "The  plaintiff  in  his  opening 
stated  that  the  injury  of  which  he 
complains  was  caused  by  the  negli- 
gence of  defendant's  servants,  and 
so  brought  his  case  directly  within 
the  authority  of  Hand  v.  Inhabitants 
&c.,  126  Mass.  324,  where  the  town 
was  held  liable  for  an  injury  to  the 
plaintiff's  property  through  neglect 
in  the  construction  of  water-works 
which  the  town  had  been  authorized 
by  a  special  statute,  voluntarily  ac- 
cepted, to  construct  and  to  receive 
profits  from;  and  the  case  is  distin- 
guishable from  one  where  the  work 
was  done  in  a  reasonable,  proper 
and  skilful  manner,  as  in  Hall  v.  In- 
habitants &c.,  133  Mass.  433,  in 
which  case  the  damage  can  be  recov- 
ered only  in  the  manner  pointed  out 
by  statute." 

""'  Brink  v.  Borough  of  Dunmore, 
174  Pa.  St.  395;  s.  c.  34  Atl.  598. 

''""  City  of  Omaha  v.  Croft,  60  Neb. 
57;  s.  c.  82  N.  W.  120. 


S2o  TORTS    AND    CRIMES.  §    818 

street,  without  complying  with  the  statute  providing  for  condemna- 
tion, the  city  is  liable. -'"^  The  deposit  of  refuse  on  an  owner's  prem- 
ises is  a  trespass  and  liability  ensues,^"*  and  so  are  injuries  from  dis- 
posing of  the  garbage  of  the  city  by  the  board  of  public  works.^**® 
By  authorizing  a  contract  to  raise  the  grade  of  the  street  the  city  is 
not  liable  for  dirt  placed  on  abutting  property  by  the  contractor,  in 
the  absence  of  negligence  in  the  plan.^°''  Where  a  drain  is  extended 
into  an  abutting  lot  and  is  carelessly  left  uncovered  the  city  is  liable 
for  an  injury.^°^  The  city  is  not  liable  for  dirt  deposited  by  a  con- 
tractor upon  the  property  of  an  abutting  owner.^**^ 

§  818.  Liabitity  for  waste. — The  provision  of  the  New  York  code 
of  procedure  authorizing  an  action  by  a  taxpayer  against  the  munici- 
pal governing  body  to  prevent  "waste  or  injury  to"  municipal  prop- 
erty is  confined  to  cases  where  the  acts  complained  of  are  without 
power  or  where  corruption  or  fraud  is  charged. ^''^  But  the  courts 
may  interfere  by  injunction  to  restrain  municipal  authorities  where 
their  threatened  action  will  produce  irreparable  injury,  and  consists 
in  the  illegal  disposition  of  public  property  by  devoting  it  to  private 
nses;  and  disobedience  to  such  injunction  is  punishable  as  a  criminal 
contempt.^^*^  And  under  the  New  York  statute  of  1872  a  taxpayer 
may  maintain  an  equitable  action  against  the  town  board  of  auditors 
to  vacate  the  audit  of  an  illegal  claim  on  the  ground  that  such  audit 
is  without  authority  or  fraudulent  and  collusive,  and  also  to  restrain 
the  collection  of  a  tax  therefor.^" 

^"^  City  of  Omaha  v.  Croft,  60  Neb.  creased  without  any  corresponding 

57;  s.  c.  82  N.  W.  120.  benefit  to  the  city  or  citizens,  and 

'**  City  of  San  Antonio  v.  Mackey,  that  the  official  acts  of  the  council 

14  Tex.  Civ.  App.  210;  s.  c.  36  S.  W.  in  respect  thereto  were  illegal,  and 

760.  it  was  held  on  appeal  that  the  de- 

'"^  Kuehn  v.  City  of  Milwaukee,  92  murrer  to  the  complaint  should  have 

Wis.  263;  s.  c.  65  N.  W.  1030.  been  sustained  because  there  was  no 

^°^  City  of  Bloomington  v.  Wilson,  averment  that  the  common  council 

14  Ind.  App.  476;  s.  c.  43  N.  E.  37.  did  not  have,  under  the  city  charter, 

307  -Willis  V.  City  of  Newbern,  118  power  to  provide  for  the  lighting  of 

N.  C.  132;  s.  c.  24  S.  E.  706.  the  streets  as  in  its  discretion  might 

30S  Fuller  V.  City  of  Grand  Rapids,  seem  best,  and  no  charge  of  fraudu- 

105  Mich.  529;  s.  c.  63  N.  W.  530.  lent  or  corru-pt  action  of  the  authori- 

^"'Talcott  V.  City  of  Buffalo,  125  ties. 

N.  Y.  280;  s.  c.  26  N.  E.  263,  an  ac-  ^^^  People  v.  Dwyer,  90  N.  Y.  402. 

tion  by  a  taxpayer  against  the  city  ^"  Osterhoudt  v.  Rigney,  98  N.  Y. 

where  it  was  charged  that  by  the  222.     See  also,  Ayers  v.  Lawrence, 

substitution  of  electric  lights  for  gas  59  N.  Y.  192 ;   Metzger  v.  Attica  R. 

the  expense  of  lighting  would  be  in-  Co.,  79  N.  Y.  171. 


§  819 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS. 


82G 


§  819.  Liability  after  notice — Implied  notice. — Municipal  author- 
ities do  not  escape  liability,  by  acting  only  when  they  have  actual  no- 
tice; when  a  city  structure  or  street  has  been  out  of  repair  so  long 
that  by  reasonable  diligence  they  could  have  notice  of  its  condition, 
such  notice  may  be  imputed  to  them.^^^  In  such  cases,  and  in  particu- 
lar where  the  street  has  been  obstructed  by  the  unauthorized  act  of 
other  than  city  officers,  what  lapse  of  time  will  justify  the  imputation 
of  negligence  for  not  discovering  the  defect  or  obstruction  is  a  question 
for  the  jury.^^^  If  a  city  omits  to  act  with  reasonable  diligence  after 
notice  of  an  unlawful  obstruction  in  the  street  which  is  dangerous  in 
fact,  it  is  liable  for  the  injury  thereby  caused,  though  it  has  not  by 
actual  inspection  ascertained  its  dangerous  character,''^*  and  though 
it  has  instructed  its  subordinates  to  ascertain  the  facts  and  report.'*^^ 


^^^Pomfrey  v.  Village  of  Saratoga 
Springs,  104  N.  Y.  459;  s.  c.  11  N.  E. 
43.  Where  a  displacement  of  a 
stone  in  a  highway  has  continued 
for  such  a  time  as  to  imply  notice  to 
the  city  corporation,  and  its  subordi- 
nates have  had  actual  notice,  their 
failure  to  report  it  and  their  opinion 
that  it  was  not  dangerous  do  not 
shield  the  city  from  liability:  Good- 
fellow  v.  City  of  New  York,  100  N. 
Y.  15;  s.  c.  2  N.  B.  462.  In  Weed  v. 
Village  of  Ballston  Spa,  76  N.  Y. 
329,  it  was  held  that  actual  notice 
was  not  necessary  to  render  the 
municipality  liable  for  an  unauthor- 
ized excavation  if  it  had  continued 
so  long  as  to  be  notorious  and  to 
justify  the  presumption  that  it  was 
known  to  the  agents  charged  with 
the  duty  of  street  repair.  See  also, 
Requa  v.  City  of  Rochester,  45  N.  Y. 
129;  Diveny  v.  City  of  Blmira,  51  N. 
Y.  506;  Hume  v.  Mayor  &c.,  47  N. 
Y.  639.  Evidence  of  the  defective 
condition  of  a  sidewalk  a  few  days 
before  the  accident  whereby  plaintiff 
was  injured  is  admissible  in  his  ac- 
tion against  the  city.  Nor  is  actual 
notice  to  the  city  of  the  defect  re- 
quired to  be  shown  if  the  defect 
had  existed  for  a  considerable  time: 
City  of  Chicago  v.  Dalle,  115  111.  386; 
s.  c.  5  N.  E.  578. 

^^^  Rehberg  v.  Mayor  &c.,  91  N.  Y. 


137;  Hume  v.  Mayor  &c.,  47  N.  Y. 
640;  s.  c.  74  N.  Y.  264;  Steffan  v. 
City  of  Buffalo,  21  N.  Y.  W.  Dig. 
289;  Turner  v.  City  of  Newburgh, 
109  N.  Y.  301;  s.  c.  16  N.  E.  344; 
Kunz  V.  City  of  Troy,  16  N.  Y.  St. 
459;  s.  c.  1  N.  Y.  S.  596.  Evidence 
that  one  of  the  village  trustees  lived 
opposite  to  the  place  where  the  de- 
fect was  and  had  to  pass  it  daily  is 
sufficient  to  sustain  a  finding  that 
the  village  trustees  had  notice  of 
the  defect:  O'Reilly  v.  Village  of 
Sing  Sing,  15  N.  Y.  St.  905;  s.  c.  1  N. 
Y.  S.  582.  See  also,  Higgins  v.  Vil- 
lage of  Salamanca,  6  N.  Y.  St.  119. 
That  a  sidewalk  was  inspected  by  a 
municipal  officer  shortly  before  an 
accident  and  was  considered  by  him 
in  a  satisfactory  condition  is  not  a 
defense  for  the  corporation,  and  it 
is  a  proper  question  whetiier  the 
trustees  used  reasonable  diligence 
to  discover  whether  the  walk  was 
out  of  repair:  Stebbins  v.  Village  of 
Oneida,  23  N.  Y.  St.  702;  s.  c.  5  N.  Y. 
S.  483. 

=>"  Rehberg  v.  Mayor  &c.,  91  N.  Y. 
137. 

"^  Goodfellow  V.  City  of  New  York, 
100  N.  Y.  15;  s.  c.  2  N.  E.  462.  A 
city  is  liable  for  an  injury  caused 
by  a  hydrant  which  its  officers  have 
allowed  to  stand  within  the  limits 
of  a  sidewalk  after  notice  of  its  ex- 


827 


TORTS   AND    CRIMES. 


820 


No  notice  is  necessary  to  render  a  city  liable  for  an  injury  caused 
by  the  act  of  itself,  or  of  an  authorized  officer  or  agent.^^*'  This  sub- 
ject of  notice  is  treated  at  length  in  the  chapter  on  Streets,  etc.^^^ 

§  820.  The  same  subject  continued — Statutory  notice. — In  many 
of  the  states  it  is  provided  by  statute  that  actions  for  torts  and  negli- 
gence shall  not  be  maintainable  against  municipal  corporations  unless 
a  required  notice  of  the  injury  and  of  the  claim  for  damages  be  given 
within  a  time  specified. ^^^  Under  the  charter  of  St.  Paul,  in  Min- 
nesota, a  person  "bereft  of  reason,"  by  an  injury  received,  is  excused 
from  giving  such  notice ;^^'*  and  the  time  limited  for  commencing 
actions  against  that  city  for  injuries  caused  by  its  negligence  is  not 
applicable  to  statutory  actions  by  the  personal  representatives  of  a 
deceased  person  for  negligence  causing  his  death.^'°  The  charter 
provisions  in  respect  to  notice  to  cities  in  cases  of  torts,  and  to  other 
requisites  preliminary  to  actions  against  them,  are  quite  varied  and 
require  careful  attention.^-^     Under  the  charter  of  Appleton  city  the 


istence  and  time  to  remove  it:  King 
V.  City  of  Oshkosh,  75  Wis.  517;  s.  c. 
44  N.  W.  745. 

""  If  a  defect  in  a  street  be  caused 
by  accident  or  by  the  wrongful  and 
unauthorized  act  of  a  third  person 
the  liability  of  the  corporation  does 
not  begin  until  it  has  notice  of  the 
defect,  or  until  the  defect  has  ex- 
isted for  such  a  length  of  time  that 
ignorance  of  its  existence  is  inex- 
cusable; but  if  it  be  occasioned  by 
the  act  of  the  corporation  itself  or 
by  the  act  of  a  person  authorized 
by  the  corporation  to  make  any  use 
of  the  street  which  results  in  pro- 
ducing the  defect,  the  corporation 
will  be  liable  without  notice:  Rus- 
sell V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  74  Mo.  480. 
A  village,  though  not  liable  for  the 
defective  construction  of  a  drain  by 
its  trustees,  acting  as  public  officers, 
is  liable  for  suffering  the  drain  to 
continue  in  a  defective  condition 
after  notice:  Whipple  v.  Village  of 
Fair  Haven.  63  Vt.  221;  s.  c.  21  Atl. 
533.  See  Weller  v.  City  of  Burling- 
ton, 60  Vt.  28;  s.  c.  12  Atl.  215, 
where  the  city  was  not  liable  for 
the  negligence  of  the  trustees  act- 


ing as  public  officers.  And  to  the 
same  effect,  Bates  v.  Village  of  Rut- 
land, 62  Vt.  178;  s.  c.  20  Atl.  278. 

^"  In  vol.  2,  ch.  29. 

^'*  The  provision  of  the  special 
Minnesota  law  of  1881  incorporating 
the  city  of  Minneapolis,  that  no 
action  shall  be  maintained  against 
the  city  "on  account  of  any  injuries 
received  by  means  of  any  defect  in 
the  condition  of  any  bridge,  street, 
etc.,  unless  notice  is  given  within 
thirty  days  stating  the  place  and 
time  of  its  occurrence,  and  that  the 
person  so  injured  will  claim  dam- 
ages from  the  city  for  such  injury," 
applies  to  injuries  to  property  as 
well  as  to  person:  Nichols  v.  City  of 
Minneapolis,  30  Minn.  545;  s.  c.  16 
N.  W.  410.  See  also.  Powers  v.  City 
of  St.  Paul,  36  Minn.  87;  s.  c.  30  N. 
W.  433;  Pye  v.  City  of  Mankato,  38 
Minn.  536;  s.  c.  38  N.  W.  621. 

^^«  Ray  V.  City  of  St.  Paul,  44  Minn. 
340;  s.  c.  46  N.  W.  675. 

'="Maylone  v.  City  of  St.  Paul,  40 
Minn.  406;  s.  c.  42  N.  W.  88.  And 
see  Clark  v.  Manchester,  62  N.  H. 
577. 

*-'  In  Wisconsin  it  is  provided  by 


820 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS. 


828 


determination  of  the  council  is  a  bar  to  an  action  but  not  to  an  ap- 
peal^ and  the  objection  that  the  chiim  has  not  been  presented  to  the 
common  council  must  be  taken  by  demurrer  or  answer  or  it  is 
waived. ^-^  It  is  enough  that  such  notice  be  in  substantial  compliance, 
as  to  form  and  service,  with  the  statutory  requirement.^-^  The  Ver- 
mont statute  requires  notice  of  "the  place"  where  the  injury  was 
received;  and  where  there  was  no  controversy  or  dispute  upon  the 
trial  as  to  the  place  or  as  to  the  prominent  surrounding  objects,  or 
any  of  the  facts  bearing  upon  the  question,  it  was  held  to  be  a  question 
of  law  for  the  court  and  not  a  proper  subject  for  the  jury  whether 
the  notice  contained   a  sufficiently   accurate  description.^^*     Ample 


the  Antigo  city  charter  that  no  ac- 
tion in  tort  shall  lie  against  the  city 
unless  a  statement  of  the  wrong 
shall  be  presented  to  the  common 
council  within  sixty  days;  and  it  is 
lield  that  under  this  and-  connected 
provisions  of  the  charter  there  is  a 
right  of  action  after  presenting  the 
statement  to  the  council,  but  no 
right  of  appeal  from  the  council's 
determination:  Vogel  v.  City  of  An- 
tigo, 81  Wis.  642;  s.  c.  51  N.  W.  1008. 

^-^  Sheel  V.  City  of  Appleton,  49 
Wis.  125;  s.  c.  5  N.  W.  27.  The 
charter  provision  of  Madison  city 
that  no  action  shall  be  maintained 
against  it  "upon  any  claim  or  de- 
mand" until  it  shall  first  have  been 
presented  to  the  common  council  for 
allowance  does  not  include  actions 
for  personal  torts:  Kelley  v.  City  of 
Madison,  43  Wis.  638. 

===  Harder  v.  City  of  Minneapolis, 
40  Minn.  446;  s.  c.  42  N.  W.  350; 
Clark  v.  City  of  Austin,  38  Minn. 
487;  s.  c.  38  N.  W.  615.  In  McDon- 
ald v.  City  of  Troy,  36  N.  Y.  St.  704; 
s.  c.  13  N.  Y.  S.  385,  plaintiff's  at- 
torney prepared  the  claim,  presented 
a  copy  to  the  comptroller,  said  he 
had  the  original  with  him,  and 
asked  If  that  was  all  he  wanted,  and 
was  answered  "Yes."  It  was  held  a 
substantial  compliance  with  the  de- 
fendant's charter,  as  the  comptroller 
had  obtained  the  notice  the  law 
contemplated.       The    statement    re- 


quired by  the  New  Hampshire  Gen- 
eral Laws,  ch.  75,  §  7,  of  the  exact 
place  where  damage  to  a  traveler 
on  a  highway  is  received,  is  suffi- 
cient if  upon  the  information  con- 
tained in  it  and  by  the  exercise  of 
reasonable  diligence  the  officers  of 
the  town  can  find  the  place:  Carr  v. 
Ashland,  62  N.  H.  665. 

^"  Holcomb  V.  Town  of  Danby,  51 
Vt.  428.  It  was  said,  however,  that 
although  the  trial  court  erred  in 
submitting  the  question  to  the  jury 
the  judgment  would  not  have  been 
reversed  if  the  jury  had  decided 
correctly.  The  degree  of  certainty 
which  satisfies  the  statute  was  ex- 
pounded to  the  jury  in  the  trial 
court  to  be  a  description  "with  as 
much  particularity  and  minuteness 
as  a  person  of  common  business 
capacity,  in  the  exercise  of  such 
care  and  prudence  as  such  persons 
generally  vise  in  their  own  affairs, 
would  ordinarily  use  to  inform  an- 
other person  of  like  capacity  of  the 
place  where  the  accident  happened." 
This  was  held  to  be  erroneous  be- 
cause it  "leaves  out  of  sight  the 
fact  that  the  party  is  legally  bound 
to  give  notice  of  the  place  where  the 
accident  happened;  that  the  party 
to  whom  the  notice  is  given  has  an 
interest  and  an  object  in  knowing 
the  place;  that  he  has  a  legal  right 
to  the  information,  and  that  the  ob- 
ject of  the  notice  is  to  enable  the 


829  TORTS   AND    CRIMES.  §    831 

opportunity  to  acquire  notice  is  not  actual  notice.''-^  A  charter  pro- 
vision that  a  city  shall  not  be  liable  for  the  defective  condition  of  a 
street  unless  it  be  sho\vn  that  the  ward  alderman  knew  of  it  does 
not  apply  to  an  obstruction  placed  in  the  street  by  a  city  servant 
while  repairing  it.^"*^ 

§  821.    The  same  subject  continued — New  York  decisions. — The 

New  York  statute  of  1886  prohibiting  actions  against  municipal  cor- 
porations, for  personal  injuries,  unless  the  notice  therein  prescribed 
shall  have  been  filed  with  the  corporation  counsel  within  six  months 
after  the  cause  of  action  accrued,  and  requiring  such  actions  to  be 
brought  within  one  year,  is  constitutional  and  valid.^^^  The  provision 
of  the  Buffalo  charter,  requiring  the  claim  to  have  been  made  forty 
days  before  action  brought,  is  a  condition  precedent,  and  in  an  action 
against  the  city  for  a  tort  the  complaint  must  allege  the  presentation 
of  the  claim  to  the  common  council  and  the  expiration  of  forty  days 
thereafter  before  the  commencement  of  the  action.^^^  Under  the 
statute  of  1881  (ch.  183),  the  city  of  Cohoes  is  not  liable  for  personal 
injuries  from  unsafe  sidewalks,  etc.,  unless  actual  notice  of  the  danger 
has  been  given  to  the  common  council  or  street  superintendent  at  least 
twenty-four  hours  before  the  injury,  and  therefore  opportunity  to 
acquire  notice  of  the  danger  is  not  enough  to  create  such  liability.^-** 

§  822.  Impeaching  municipal  legislative  acts  for  fraud. — The  rule 
that  courts  will  not  inquire  into  the  motives  of  the  legislature  in 
enacting  a  law  even  where  fraud  and  corruption  are  charged  is  re- 
laxed in  respect  to  municipal  bodies,  and  the  legislative  acts  of  mu- 
nicipal councils  or  assemblies  may  be  impeached  for  fraud  at  the 
instance  of  persons  thereby  injured.^^°  Starting,  however,  with 
the  presumption  that  municipal  legislative  acts  have  been  adopted 
under  good  motives  and  on  sufficient  information,^^ ^  a  city  is  not  liable 

party  to  whom  it  is  given,  readily  Y.  St.  577;  s.  c.  11  N.  Y.  S.  778;  s.  c. 

to    find    the    place."     See    also,    on  affirmed  128  N.  Y.  617;  28  N.  E.  253. 

sufficiency  of  notice  under  this  stat-  See  also,  Reining  v.  City  of  Buffalo, 

ute.  Read  v.  Town  of  Calais,  48  Vt.  102   N.   Y.   308;    s.   c.    6    N.   E.   792; 

7;    Purrington  v.  Town  of  Warren,  Wheeler  v.  Jackson,  41  Hun  (N.  Y.) 

49  Vt.  19;   Boyd  v.  Town  of  Reads-  410;   Gray  v.  Brooklyn,  10  Abb.  Pr. 

boro,  52  Vt.  522;   Perry  v.  Town  of  N.  S.  (N.  Y.)  186. 

Putney,  52  Vt.  533;  Law  v.  Town  of  '"'Reining  v.  City  of  Buffalo,  102 

Fairfield,  46  Vt.  425;  Bean  v.  Town  N.  Y.  308;  s.  c.  6  N.  E.  792. 

of  Concord,  48  Vt.  30.  '''  McNally  v.   City  of  Cohoes,   53 

'^^McNally  v.   City  of  Cohoes,   53  Hun    (N.  Y.)    202;    s.  c.  6  N.  Y.   S. 

Hun    (N.  Y.)    202;    s.  c.  6   N.  Y.   S.  842. 

842.  ^  Glasgow   v.    St.   Louis,   107   Mo, 

^2"  Adams  v.   City  of   Oshkosh,   71  198;  s.  c.  17  S.  W.  743;  Cooley  Const, 

Wis.  49;  s.  c.  36  N.  W.  614.  Lim.   (5th  ed.)   225. 

="  Merz  v.  City  of  Brooklyn,  33  N.  =='i  New  York  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Mayor 


S  823 


PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS. 


830 


for  its  neglect  to  pass  just  and  reasonable  ordinances  in  respect  to 
matters  left  to  the  discretion  of  its  council  f^^  nor  for  its  neglect  to 
enforce  them  if  no  statutory  liability  has  been  imposed. ^^^  Where 
a  subject-matter  is  intrusted  to  a  town  or  city  for  legislative  or  judicial 
action,  the  duty  is  essentially  discretionary,  and  no  person  can  claim 
damages  for  its  non-performance.^^'* 

§  823.    Indictment  for  torts. — A  municipal  corporation  is  indicta- 
ble at  common  law  for  creating  a  public  nuisance,^^^  but  perhaps  not 


&c.,  1  Hilt.  (N.  Y.)  562;  Milhau  v. 
Sharp,  15  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  193;  Buell 
V.  Ball,  20  Iowa  282. 

'^-  In  McDade  v.  City  of  Chester, 
117  Pa.  St.  414;  s.  c.  12  Atl.  421,  the 
city  council  had  legislative  author- 
ity to  limit  or  prohibit  wholly  the 
making  and  sale  of  fireworks  with- 
in the  corporate  limits;  but  in  an 
action  for  damages  by  one  who  was 
injured  while  aiding  to  extinguish  a 
fire  in  a  fireworks  factory,  it  was 
held  that  the  power  to  prohibit  im- 
posed no  absolute  duty  to  prohibit 
fireworks,  and  that  the  city  was  not 
liable  for  the  failure  of  the  council 
to  exercise  its  power.  See  also, 
Carr  v.  Northern  Liberties,  35  Pa. 
St.  324;  Hill  v.  Board  &c.,  72  N.  C. 
55;  Rivers  v.  City  Council  &c.,  65 
Ga.  376. 

™Hines  v.  City  of  Charlotte,  72 
Mich.  278;  s.  c.  40  N.  W.  333,  where 
the  city  having  by  ordinance  estab- 
lished fire  limits  was  held  not  re- 
sponsible for  loss  by  fire  starting  in 
a  wooden  building  within  such  lim- 
its and  in  violation  of  the  ordi- 
nance, though  the  city  had  notice 
that  the  building  was  about  to  be 
erected  and  took  no  steps  to  pre- 
vent it.  The  court  said: — "The  rule 
is  well  established,  however,  not 
only  in  this  state  but  in  most  of 
the  states,  that  simply  as  municipal 
corporations,  apart  from  any  con- 
tract theory,  no  public  bodies  can 
he  made  responsible  for  oflScial  neg- 
lect involving  no  active  misfeas- 
ance. It  is  only  where  corporations 
have  been   guilty   of  some   positive 


mischief  produced  by  active  mis- 
conduct that  they  have  been  held  li- 
able, and  not  from  mere  non-feas- 
ance, or  for  errors  of  judgment. 
Municipal  corporations,  under  their 
charters  and  ordinances,  do  not  be- 
come insurers  of  the  property  with- 
in their  corporate  limits  from  de- 
struction by  reason  of  the  neglect  or 
refusal  of  their  officers  to  enforce 
their  ordinances:  Village  of  St. 
John  V.  McFarlan,  33  Mich.  72." 
See  also,  Stillwell  v.  Mayor  &c.,  17 
J.  &  Sp.  (N.  Y.)  360;  s.  c.  affirmed 
96  N.  Y.  649;  Griflan  v.  Mayor  &c.,  9 
N.  Y.  456;  Lorillard  v.  Town  of  Mon- 
roe, 11  N.  Y.  392;  Wheeler  v.  City  of 
Plymouth,  116  Ind.  158;  s.  c.  18  N. 
E.  532.  It  is  also  sometimes  pro- 
vided, as  in  the  Albany  charter  (laws 
1883,  ch.  298,  tit.  3,  §  44),  that  a  city 
shall  not  be  liable  in  damages  for  an 
omission  to  pass  or  enforce  ordi- 
nances: See  Coonley  v.  City  of  Al- 
bany, 132  N.  Y.  145,  153;  s.  c.  30  N. 
E.  382. 

'=•*  Lehigh  Co.  v.  Hoffort,  116  Pa. 
St.  119;  s.  c.  9  Atl.  177. 

^^^  Brayton  v.  City  of  Fall  River, 
113  Mass.  218,  227,  where  the  court 
said: — "If  the  sewers  are  so  built  or 
managed  as  to  create  a  public  nui- 
sance, the  defendants  are  indict- 
able." See  also,  Eastman  v.  Mere- 
dith, 36  N.  H.  284,  289;  People  v. 
Adsit,  2  Hill  (N.  Y.)  619.  In  People 
V.  Corporation  &c.  of  Albany,  11 
Wend.  (N.  Y.)  539,  the  mayor,  alder- 
men, etc.,  of  the  city  were  indicted 
for  not  cleaning  a  foul  barn  con- 
nected with  the  river  and  a  verdict 


831 


TORTS   AND    CRIMES. 


§    823 


for  not  abating  a  nuisance  created  by  another.^ ^*  In  some  states 
a  municipal  corporation  is  indictable  at  common  law  for  neglecting 
the  public  health  and  public  streets/^''  and  for  misfeasance  as  well  as 
non-feasance.^^ ^  Where  the  duty  of  keeping  in  repair  the  highways 
and  bridges  is  imposed  by  statute  upon  the  towns  in  which  they  are 
located,  an  information  will  lie  against  a  town  for  failing  to  repair 
a  bridge  either  built  or  adopted  by  it.^^^  In  England  the  rule  has 
repeatedly  been  laid  down  that  where  an  indictment  can  be  maintained 
against  a  corporation  for  a  public  injury  an  action  on  the  case  can  be 
maintained  for  a  special  damage  thereby  done  to  an  individual;^*" 
and  the  ground  both  of  the  indictment  and  of  the  private  action  is 
deemed  to  be  the  breach  of  a  covenant  entered  into  by  the  corporation 
upon  a  consideration  received  from  the  sovereign  power.^*^     In  New 


obtained  at  general  sessions.  On 
appeal  to  the  supreme  court,  Nelson, 
J.,  said: — "It  is  well  settled  that 
when  a  corporation  are  bound  to  re- 
pair a  highway  or  navigable  river 
they  are  liable  to  indictment  for 
neglect  of  their  duty.  An  indict- 
ment and  information  are  the  only 
remedies  to  which  the  public  can  re- 
sort for  a  redress  of  their  griev- 
ances in  this  respect." 

^='«  State  V.  Town  of  Burlington,  36 
Vt.  521. 

^"  Hamar  v.  Covington,  3  Met. 
(Ky.)  494;  Hill  v.  State,  4  Sneed 
(Tenn.)  443;  McCrowell  v.  Mayor 
&c.,  5  Lea  (Tenn.)  685;  State  v. 
Corporation  of  Shelbyville,  4  Sneed 
(Tenn.)  176;  State  v.  Town  of  Wit- 
tingham,  7  Vt.  390. 

^^^  In  Commonwealth  v.  Proprie- 
tors &c.,  2  Gray  (Mass.)  339,  it  was 
held  that  a  corporation  could  be  in- 
dicted for  a  misfeasance  as  well  as 
a  non-feasance,  and  Bigelow,  J., 
said: — "Corporations  can  not  be  in- 
dicted for  offenses  which  derive 
their  criminality  from  evil  intention, 
or  which  consist  in  a  violation  of 
those  social  duties  which  appertain 
to  men  and  subjects.  But  beyond 
this  there  is  no  good  reason  for 
their  exemption  from  the  conse- 
quences of  unlawful  and  wrongful 
acts  committed  by  their  agents  in 


pursuance  of  authority  derived 
from  them." 

=^'Town  of  Saukville  v.  State,  69 
Wis.  178;  s.  c.  33  N.  W.  88;  Town 
of  Byron  v.  State,  35  Wis,  313 ;  State 
v.  Town  of  Campton,  2  N.  H.  513; 
State  V.  Inhabitants  &c.,  37  Maine 
451;  Davis  v.  City  of  Bangor,  42 
Maine  522;  State  v.  City  of  Port- 
land, 74  Maine  268. 

^'"McKinnon  v.  Penson,  8  Ex.  319, 
327;  Hartnall  v.  Ryde  Com'rs,  4  B. 
&  S.  361.  Referring  to  the  last  case 
in  Borough  of  Bathurst  v.  MacPher- 
son,  L.  R.  4  App.  Cas.  256,  the  court 
said: — "It  was  there  held  that  the 
statute  creating  the  commissioners 
having  expressly  imposed  upon  them 
the  obligation  of  repairing  the 
roads,  they  are  liable  not  only  to  be 
indicted  for  a  breach  of  that  duty, 
but  to  be  sued  by  anybody  who  can 
show  that  by  reason  of  such  breach 
of  duty  he  has  sustained  particular 
and  special  damage." 

^'"In  Weet  v.  Trustees  &c.,  16  N. 
Y.  161,  163,  n.,  Selden,  J.,  said:  — 
"The  principle  which  really  lies  at 
the  basis  of  the  case  of  Henly  v. 
Lyme  Regis,  5  Bing.  91,  and  of  the 
series  of  English  cases  upon  the 
authority  of  which  that  case  was  de- 
cided, is  this: — That  whenever  an 
individual  or  corporation,  for  a  con- 
sideration received  from  the  sover- 


§    824  PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS.  832. 

Jersey  when  the  neglect  of  a  public  duty  results  in  a  public  injury 
an  individual  can  not  bring  an  action  for  his  particular  loss,  the 
only  remedy  being  indictment  for  the  public  wrong.^*^  For  an  of- 
fense which  is  statutory  only,  the  indictment  is  defective  if  it  omits 
the  words  "against  the  form  of  the  statute."^*^  Under  the  New  York 
penal  code  a  public  officer  "upon  whom  any  duty  is  enjoined  by 
law  who  wilfully  neglects  to  perform  that  duty  is  guilty  of  a  misde- 
meanor" and  indictable  therefor. ^^"^  The  Maine  rule,  and  probably 
the  general  rule,  is  that  the  same  proof  is  required  to  sustain  an  indict- 
ment against  a  city  for  neglect  of  its  streets  as  to  obtain  a  recovery 
of  damages.^** '^ 

§  824.  Not  indictable  for  felony. — The  state,  counties,  towns,  cities 
and  villages  can  not  be  indicted  for  a  felony,^'*"  but  their  officers  are 
often  declared  by  statute  to  be  guilty  of  felony  for  false  audits,  falsify- 
ing accounts,  embezzlements,  etc.^*'^  In  New  York  a  corporation  may 
be  fined  for  contempt  of  court  in  an  amount  to  cover  the  complain- 
ant's costs  and  expenses  and  also  his  damages  for  loss  or  injury, 
thereby  caused  in  cases  where  he  has  no  action  therefor. ^*^  In  the 
state  of  New  York  a  common  carrier  corporation  is  guilty  of  a  mis- 
demeanor in  employing  intemperate  persons  after  notice  that  they 
are  such,^*^  and  is  guilty  of  a  misdemeanor  for  the  unlicensed  selling 
of  intoxicants  to  its  passengers.^^" 

eign   power,  has   become   bound   by  it  is  applicable  to  a  case  like   the 

covenant   or   agreement,   either   ex-  present,  where  a  criminal  neglect  of 

press     or     implied,     to     do     certain  duty  is  charged  upon  a  corporation 

things,  such  individual  or  corpora-  who    in    the    absence    of    a    statute 

tion  is  liable  in  case  of  neglect  to  would   not  be  liable  to  be   indicted 

perform  such  covenant,  not  only  to  for  the  non-repair  of  a  highway." 

a  public  prosecution  by  indictment,  ^"  So   held   as   to   an   excise   com- 

but  to  a  private  action  at  the  suit  missioner:  People  v.  Meakim,  133  N. 

of  any  person  injured  by  such  neg-  Y.  214;  s.  c.  30  N.  E.  828. 

lect."  ^"  Davis    v.    City    of    Bangor,    42 

^"  Mayor  &c.  v.  Kiernan,  50  N.  J.  Maine  522. 

L.  246;  s.  c.  13  Atl.  170;  Livermore  '^^^^  Commonwealth    v.     Proprietors 

V.  Board  &c.,  31  N.  J.  L.  507;  Cooley  &c.,  2  Gray  (Mass.)  339,  where  Bige- 

V.  Chosen  Freeholders  &c.,  27  N.  J.  low,     J.,     said: — "Corporations     can 

L.  415;   Board  &c.  v.  Strader,  18  N.  not  be   indicted   for  offenses   which 

J.  L.  108.  derive   their   criminality   from   evil 

^*'  In  Queen  v.  Mayor  &c.,  L.  R.  19  intention.     They  can  not  be  guilty 

Q.  B.  D.  602,  an  indictment  against  of  treason  or  felony,  of  perjury  or 

a  municipal  corporation  for  non-re-  offenses  against  the  person." 

pair  of  a  highway  was  held  bad  for  ^"  N.  Y.  Pen.  Code,  §§  164-167,  470. 

this  omission.     Lord  Coleridge  said:  ''*^  Code  of  Procedure,  §  2284. 

— "This    appears    to    have   been    de-  ^*''  Laws  1892,  ch.  401,  §  39. 

cided  in  several  cases;  and  we  think  =^°  Laws  1892,  ch.  401;  §  30. 


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